larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
DHL International NV, formerly Express Line NV v Belgisch Instituut voor Postdiensten en Telecommunicatie.
Date: 2011-10-13
36. As is clear from recital 10 in the preamble to Directive 97/67, that directive constitutes a framework of general principles adopted at European Union level, the determination of the exact procedures being a matter for the Member States (Case C‑240/02 Asempre and Asociación Nacional de Empresas de Externalización y Gestión de Envíos y Pequeña Paquetería  [2004] ECR I‑2461, paragraph 30), which must be free to choose the system best adapted to their own circumstances.
58. With regard to freedom of establishment for nationals of one Member State on the territory of another Member State, according to settled case‑law, such freedom includes the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the Member State of establishment (see Case C‑247/08 Gaz de France – Berliner Investissement  [2009] ECR I‑9225, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
59. As regards companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the European Union, that freedom includes, pursuant to Article 54 TFEU, the right to exercise their activity in the Member State concerned through a subsidiary, branch or agency (see, inter alia, Case C‑307/97 Saint-Gobain ZN  [1999] ECR I‑6161, paragraph 35; Case C‑196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas [2006] ECR I‑7995, paragraph 41; and Case C‑524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation  [2007] ECR I‑2107, paragraph 36).
60. The Court has held on a number of occasions that Article 49 TFEU precludes any national measure which, even if applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality, is liable to hinder or render less attractive the exercise by Union nationals of the freedom of establishment that is guaranteed by the Treaty and that such restrictive effects may arise where, on account of national legislation, a company may be deterred from setting up subsidiary bodies, such as permanent establishments, in other Member States and from carrying on its activities through such bodies (Case C‑384/08 Attanasio Group  [2010] ECR I‑2055, paragraphs 43 and 44 and the case-law cited).
Criminal proceedings against Leo Apelt.
Date: 2011-10-13
31. However, it follows from the judgment in Case C‑1/07 Weber  [2008] ECR I‑8571 that Articles 1(2) and 8(2) and (4) of Directive 91/439 do not preclude a Member State from refusing to recognise, in its territory, a right to drive under a driving licence issued by another Member State to a person whose right to drive was withdrawn in the territory of the first Member State, even though that withdrawal was ordered after the issue of that driving licence, provided that that licence was obtained during a period in which a licence issued in the first Member State was suspended and both the suspension and the withdrawal are based on grounds existing at the date of issue of the second driving licence.
33. As the national court has observed, that confiscation may be regarded as constituting a suspension within the terms of Article 8(2) and (4) of Directive 91/439. Therefore, that directive does not preclude the German authorities from refusing to recognise, in their territory, the driving licence for vehicles in category B issued to Mr Apelt by the Czech authorities, given that both the confiscation by the German police authorities and the withdrawal by court order are justified on grounds which existed at the date of issue of that driving licence.
34. In any event, it should be remembered that it is apparent from the order for reference that the place of residence indicated on that driving licence is located in Germany. Non-compliance with the normal residence condition laid down in Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 91/439 is, however, liable in itself to justify the refusal by a Member State to recognise a driving licence issued by another Member State.
47. It would therefore be contrary to the objective of road safety mentioned in the first and fourth recitals in the preamble to Directive 91/439 not to allow a host Member State to refuse to recognise a driving licence for vehicles in category D issued on the basis of a driving licence for vehicles in category B which is vitiated by a defect justifying the non-recognition of that latter licence.
Waypoint Aviation SA v Belgian State - SPF Finances.
Date: 2011-10-13
19. It has been consistently held that, whilst direct taxation falls within their competence, the Member States must none the less exercise that competence consistently with European Union law (see, inter alia, Case C‑287/10 Tankreederei I [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 14 and case‑law cited).
20. However, the leasing and hiring of aircraft constitute services within the meaning of Article 50 EC (see, by analogy, Case C‑451/99 Cura Anlagen [2002] ECR I‑3193, paragraph 18, and Jobra , paragraph 22), so that the provisions of the EC Treaty on the freedom to provide services apply to a situation such as that in issue in the main proceedings.
21. The freedom to provide services may be relied on by an undertaking against the Member State in which it is established where the services are provided to recipients established in another Member State and, in general, whenever a provider of services offers services in a Member State other than the one in which he is established (see, inter alia, Tankreederei I , paragraph 16 and case-law cited).
22. The Court has repeatedly held that national measures which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of the freedom to provide services are restrictions on that freedom (see, inter alia, Jobra , paragraph 19, and Tankreederei I , paragraph 15).
23. In the present case, it must be held that a national provision such as that in issue in the main proceedings – which applies a less favourable tax regime to income from a loan financing the acquisition of an asset, where the right to use that asset is transferred to a company established in another Member State, than to income from a loan financing the acquisition of an asset used by a company established in the national territory – is likely to discourage undertakings that would be eligible for that tax advantage from providing services intended to finance the acquisition of assets where the right to use will be transferred to economic operators established in other Member States (see, to that effect, Jobra , paragraph 24, and Tankreederei I , paragraph 17).
27. That restriction may be accepted only if it is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest. Even if that were so, application of that restriction would still have to be such as to ensure achievement of the aim pursued and not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose ( Tankreederei I , paragraph 19 and case-law cited).
Greenstar-Kanzi Europe NV v Jean Hustin and Jo Goossens.
Date: 2011-10-20
26. First, there is a ‘primary’ right, which covers variety constituents in accordance with Article 13(2) of Regulation No 2100/94. Harvested material, for its part, is covered by a ‘secondary’ right, which, although also referred to in Article 13(2) of that regulation, is significantly restricted by paragraph 3 of the same article. Thus, although variety constituents and harvested material are both covered by the term ‘material’, within the meaning of Article 13(2) of that regulation, the right laid down for each category is none the less different.
38. It is apparent from that case‑law, which concerns the relationship between the proprietor of a mark and the licensee thereof, that where a licensee puts goods bearing the mark on the market he must, as a rule, be considered to be doing so with the consent of the proprietor of the trade mark (see Case C‑59/08 Copad [2009] ECR I‑3421, paragraph 46).
39. However, according to that same case‑law, the licence agreement does not constitute the absolute and unconditional consent of the proprietor to the licensee putting the goods bearing the trade mark on the market (see Copad , paragraph 47).
Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland v Seaport (NI) Ltd and Others.
Date: 2011-10-20
45. In that regard, Article 6(2) of that directive requires those authorities and the public affected or likely to be affected to ‘be given an early and effective opportunity’ to express their opinions on the draft plan or programme concerned and on the accompanying environmental report.
Dongguan Nanzha Leco Stationery Mfg. Co. Ltd v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2011-10-27
25. The Court notes that different rules apply for the determination of normal value and export price and therefore the SG & A expenses in issue need not necessarily be treated in the same way in both cases. However, possible differences between the two values may be taken into account under the adjustments provided for in Article 2(10) of the basic regulation (see, to that effect, Case C‑69/89 Nakajima  v Council  [1991] ECR I‑2069, paragraph 73).
31. However, Dongguan submits, first of all, citing Brother Industries  v Council , paragraphs 15 to 18, that the main question at issue concerns the determination of the stage in its distribution chain to which the analogue normal value should correspond pursuant to Article 2(7)(a) of the basic regulation, that is to say, a normal value determined under market-economy conditions.
33. Even though Article 2(1) of the basic regulation sets out the general principle that the normal value is normally to be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting countries, it does not follow from either the wording or the scheme of Article 2(7) of that regulation or from the Court’s case‑law that, when the institutions of the European Union determine the normal value ‘on any other reasonable basis’, that normal value must always correspond to the normal value at which the product is supplied to the first independent customer. Such an interpretation would undermine the discretion granted to the institutions of the European Union when determining the normal value in respect of non-market-economy countries (see, to that effect, Ikea Wholesale , paragraph 40).
Inter-Mark Group sp. z o.o. sp. komandytowa v Minister Finansów.
Date: 2011-10-27
18. In this respect, it should be noted that the Court has held that it is sufficient that a promotional activity involves the dissemination of a message intended to inform the public of the existence or the qualities of the product or service with a view to increasing the sales of that product or service for that activity to be characterised as an advertising service within the meaning of Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive, the wording of which is identical to that of Article 56(1)(b) of Directive 2006/112 (see, to that effect, Commission  v France , paragraph 18).
19. The same applies to any activity which forms an inseparable part of an advertising campaign and which thereby contributes to conveying the advertising message. This is the case with regard to the production of aids used for a particular advertisement (see Commission  v France , paragraph 19).
23. In that regard, it should be noted that, in respect of the supply of services which may be characterised as ancillary to an activity similar to the supply of services referred to in Article 52(a) of Directive 2006/112, of which the activities carried out by an organiser of fairs and exhibitions form part, the Court has held that the various categories of supplies of services set out in Article 9(2)(c) of the Sixth Directive, the wording of which corresponds to that of Article 52(a) of Directive 2006/112, have, in particular, the common feature that they are usually provided for specific events, and the place where those complex services are physically carried out is easy to identify, as a rule, since such events take place at specific locations ( Gillan Beach , paragraph 24).
30. It follows from the Court’s case-law that only supplies of services which have a sufficiently direct connection with immovable property can be covered by Article 45 of Directive 2006/112 (see, by analogy, Case C‑166/05 Heger  [2006] ECR I‑7749, paragraph 24, concerning the interpretation of Article 9(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive).
Finanzamt Essen-NordOst v GFKL Financial Services AG.
Date: 2011-10-27
17. It must be recalled at the outset that, within the framework of the VAT system, taxable transactions presuppose the existence of a transaction between the parties in which a price or consideration is stipulated. Thus, where a person’s activity consists exclusively in providing services for no direct consideration, there is no basis of assessment and the services are therefore not subject to VAT (see Case C‑246/08 Commission v Finland  [2009] ECR I‑10605, paragraph 43).
18. In that context, a supply of services is effected ‘for consideration’ within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive, and is thus liable to tax, only if there is a legal relationship between the provider of the service and the recipient pursuant to which there is reciprocal performance, the remuneration received by the provider of the service constituting the value actually given in return for the service supplied to the recipient ( MKG-Kraftfahrzeuge-Factoring , paragraph 47).
19. In that regard, according to settled case-law, the concept of the ‘supply of services effected for consideration’ within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive requires the existence of a direct link between the service provided and the consideration received (Case C‑40/09 Astra Zeneca UK  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
20. In its judgment in MKG-Kraftfahrzeuge-Factoring , the Court held that a factor’s guaranteeing to a client of payment of the debts by assuming the risk of the debtors’ default must be considered to be exploitation of the property in question for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis, within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the Sixth Directive, where that operation is carried out, in return for payment, for a given period (see MKG-Kraftfahrzeuge-Factoring , paragraph 50).
Deli Ostrich NV v Belgische Staat.
Date: 2011-10-27
16. In that regard, it is to be observed that the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice. It is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the question submitted concerns the interpretation of Community law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see Joined Cases C‑290/05 and C‑333/05 Nádasdi and Németh  [2006] ECR I‑10115, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
17. When the Court is requested to give a preliminary ruling on a matter of tariff classification, its task is to provide the national court with guidance on the criteria the implementation of which will enable the latter to classify the products correctly in the CN, rather than to effect that classification itself, particularly since the Court does not necessarily have available to it all the information which is essential in that regard (see Case C‑56/08 Pärlitigu  [2009] ECR I‑6719, paragraph 23, and Case C‑370/08 Data I/O [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 24).
22. In that regard, it should be recalled that the Court has consistently held that, in the interests of legal certainty and for ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the CN and the section or chapter notes (see Case C‑196/10 Paderborner Brauerei Haus Cramer [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
23. The explanatory notes to the CN drawn up by the Commission are an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force (see Case C‑123/09 Roeckl Sporthandschuhe  [2010] ECR I‑4065, paragraph 37, and Case C‑423/09 X [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 16).
27. In that regard, it is to be recalled that, at paragraph 3 of the judgment in Case 149/73 Witt [1973] ECR 1587, the Court observed, in relation to reindeer meat, which can come from wild or domesticated animals, that the word ‘game’, in its ordinary meaning, designates those categories of animals which live in the wild and are hunted.
Partrederiet Sea Fighter v Skatteministeriet.
Date: 2011-11-10
13. It should be noted at the outset that, it is apparent from the third and fifth recitals in the preamble to Directive 92/81 that the latter is intended to render more precise a number of common definitions for mineral oil products which are to be subject to the general excise system and to lay down certain exemptions relating to those products which are obligatory at European Union level (see Case C-389/02 Deutsche See-Bestattungs-Genossenschaft  [2004] ECR I-3537, paragraph 17, and Case C-391/05 Jan De Nul [2007] ECR I-1793, paragraph 21).
14. Therefore, the provisions concerning those exemptions should be interpreted independently on the basis of their wording and the purpose of Directive 92/81 (see Deutsche See-Bestattungs-Genossenschaft , paragraph 19, and Jan De Nul , paragraph 22).
15. As regards the first subparagraph of Article 8(1)(c) of Directive 92/81, under the terms of which mineral oils supplied for use as fuel for the purposes of navigation within European Union waters are exempted from the harmonised excise duty, it should be pointed out that that provision provides for one exception to the exemption system in providing that the exemption does not apply to mineral oils used for navigation ‘in private pleasure craft’. The second subparagraph of that provision defines the notion of ‘private pleasure craft’ as being vessels used ‘for other than commercial purposes’ (see Deutsche See-Bestattungs-Genossenschaft , paragraph 22).
16. The Court therefore held, at paragraphs 23 and 25 of that judgment, that all navigation activity for commercial purposes comes within the scope of the exemption from the harmonised excise duty provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 8(1)(c) of Directive 92/81, without any distinction being made as to the purpose of the navigation referred to.
17. Thus, the purpose of a vessel’s voyage within European Union waters is irrelevant for the application of the exemption of mineral oils from excise duties when that navigation involves the provision of services for consideration.
18. As regards the technical characteristics of such navigation, the Court stated, at paragraph 40 of Jan De Nul , that manoeuvres carried out by a hopper dredger during its pumping and discharge of materials, that is to say, movements inherent in the carrying out of dredging activities, come within the scope of the term ‘navigation’ as used in the first subparagraph of Article 8(1)(c) of Directive 92/81. Thus, that term requires that the provision of services for consideration be inherent in the vessel’s movement.
20. It is apparent from the wording of that provision that the exemption at issue is subject to the requirement that the mineral oils be used as fuel for the purposes of navigation within European Union waters.
21. Furthermore, it is evident from the purpose of Directive 92/81, namely that Member States are to impose a harmonised excise duty on mineral oils, that the directive does not seek to establish general exemptions.
Procureur-generaal bij het hof van beroep te Antwerpen v Zaza Retail BV.
Date: 2011-11-17
17. In that regard, Article 3 of the Regulation makes provision for two types of insolvency proceedings. Insolvency proceedings opened, in accordance with Article 3(1), by the competent court of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of a debtor’s main interests is situated, described as the ‘main proceedings’, produce universal effects in that the proceedings apply to the debtor’s assets situated in all the Member States in which the Regulation applies. Although proceedings under Article 3(2) may be opened by the competent court of the Member State where the debtor has an establishment, those proceedings, described as ‘secondary proceedings’ or ‘territorial proceedings’, produce effects which are restricted to the assets of the debtor situated in the territory of the latter State (see, to that effect, Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC [2006] ECR I-3813, paragraph 28, and Case C‑444/07 MG Probud Gdynia [2010] ECR I‑417, paragraph 22).
30. That restrictive approach is apparent from a comparison of the provisions of Article 3(4)(b) and those of Article 29 relating to the right to request the opening of secondary proceedings. Whereas Article 29 gives that right to the liquidator in the main insolvency proceedings as well as any person or authority empowered by the law of the Member State in which the request to open proceedings is made, Article 3(4)(b) of the Regulation restricts the category of persons empowered to act to certain specified creditors showing a particular connection with the Member State within the territory of which the relevant establishment of the debtor is located. They are creditors established in that Member State and creditors of that establishment.
Deo Antoine Homawoo v GMF Assurances SA.
Date: 2011-11-17
28. As the Advocate General has noted in point 39 of his Opinion, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that the need for a uniform interpretation of European Union acts makes it impossible, in case of doubt, for the text of a provision to be considered in isolation but requires, on the contrary, that it should be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages (see, in particular, Case 9/79 Koschniske  [1979] ECR 2717, paragraph 6, and Case C‑199/08 Eschig  [2009] ECR I‑8295, paragraph 54).
34. Such an interpretation is the only one which ensures, in accordance with recitals 6, 13, 14 and 16 of the Regulation, the full attainment of the Regulation’s objectives, that is to say the predictability of the outcome of litigation, legal certainty as to the law applicable and the uniform application of that regulation in all the Member States.