European Commission v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 2016-09-21
33


In that regard, the General Court recalled, firstly, in paragraph 22 of the judgment under appeal, that the Court of Justice has previously held that it follows from a schematic interpretation of the relevant regulations that the adoption by the Commission of a decision on financial corrections in connection with the Cohesion Fund, as from 2000, was subject to the observance of a certain time limit, the length of which varied depending on the applicable rules (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraphs 76, 82, 83, 93 and 94, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraphs 76, 82, 83, 93 and 94).
34


The General Court continued, in paragraphs 23 to 25 of the judgment under appeal, that thus, pursuant to the combined provisions of Article H(2) of Annex II to Regulation No 1164/94, as amended, and Article 18(3) of Regulation No 1386/2002, the period at the end of which the Commission must adopt a decision on financial corrections was three months from the date of the hearing (judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 95, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 95). It held that, in accordance with Article 100(5) of Regulation No 1083/2006, the Commission is to take a decision on the financial correction within six months of the date of the hearing and, if no hearing takes place, the six-month period is to begin to run two months after the date of the letter of invitation sent by the Commission (judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 96, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 96). It also recalled that, in accordance with Article 145(6) of Regulation No 1303/2013, the Commission is to take a decision on the financial correction within six months of the date of the hearing or of the date of receipt of additional information where the Member State agrees to submit such additional information following the hearing, it being understood that, if no hearing takes place, the six-month period will begin to run two months after the date of the letter of invitation to the hearing sent by the Commission (judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 97, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 97).
35


In that regard, it must be made clear that, although Regulation No 1265/1999, which amended Regulation No 1164/94, entered into force on 1 January 2000, it is nevertheless apparent from the second paragraph of Article 108 of Regulation No 1083/2006 that Article 100 of that regulation is to apply from 1 January 2007, including to programmes from before the period from 2007 to 2013. It noted that that is, furthermore, in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure apply immediately after their entry into force (judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 98, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 98). The General Court added that, concerning Article 145 of Regulation No 1303/2013, under the terms of the second paragraph of Article 154 of that regulation, it applies with effect from 1 January 2014 (judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 99, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 99).
36


The General Court recalled, secondly, in paragraph 28 of the judgment under appeal, that the Court of Justice has held that failure by the Commission to comply with those time limits constituted an infringement of essential procedural requirements which was to be found by the European Union Court of its own motion (see judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited).
42


Thirdly, it clearly follows from the schematic interpretation of the provisions in question adopted by the Court of Justice that, although the time limit set for the Commission to make its finding has been amended many times by the applicable rules, the EU legislature has, on each occasion, intended to impose on it a precise time limit, taking the view that it was in the interest of both the EU and its Member States that the end of the financial corrections procedure be foreseeable, which implies the setting of a predetermined time limit for adopting the final decision, while leaving the Commission sufficient time to adopt that decision (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraphs 84 to 86 and 88, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraphs 84 to 86 and 88).
44


Fourthly, it is apparent from the judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission (C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraphs 10 to 12), and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission (C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraphs 10 to 12) that the discussions between the parties continued beyond the hearing in both cases in question and that the Commission had adopted the contested decision in those cases less than six months after the end of those discussions in one of them, facts which the Court of Justice would have taken into account if it had intended to restrict the scope of the interpretation given in those judgments.
66


It is indeed settled case-law that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see, inter alia, judgments of 4 July 2000, Bergadem and Goupil v Commission, C‑352/98 P, EU:C:2000:361, paragraph 34; of 6 March 2003, Interporc v Commission, C‑41/00 P, EU:C:2003:125, paragraph 15; and of 12 September 2006, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, C‑131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 49).
70


With regard to whether the first ground of appeal is well founded, it must be borne in mind that the Court of Justice has held on many occasions that, although the EU rules in force until the end of 1999 do not lay down a time limit for the adoption of a decision on financial corrections by the Commission, since 2000 that has, however, been subject to compliance with a time limit laid down in EU law (see judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraphs 75 to 82; of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraphs 75 to 82; of 22 October 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑429/13 P, EU:C:2014:2310, paragraph 29; of 4 December 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑513/13 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2412, paragraph 36; of 24 June 2015, Germany v Commission, C‑549/12 P and C‑54/13 P, EU:C:2015:412, paragraph 81, and of 24 June 2015, Spain v Commission, C‑263/13 P, EU:C:2015:415, paragraph 50).
71


In its judgments of 24 June 2015, Germany v Commission (C‑549/12 P and C‑54/13 P, EU:C:2015:412, paragraph 96), and of 24 June 2015, Spain v Commission (C‑263/13 P, EU:C:2015:415, paragraph 60), the Court furthermore classified that case-law as ‘established’.
75


On the one hand, the judgments of 27 January 1988, Denmark v Commission (349/85, EU:C:1988:34, paragraph 19 ), of 6 October 1993, Italy v Commission (C‑55/91, EU:C:1993:832, paragraph 69), of 4 July 1996, Greece v Commission (C‑50/94, EU:C:1996:266, paragraph 6), and of 22 April 1999, Netherlands v Commission, C‑28/94, EU:C:1999:191, paragraph 51), referred to in that regard by the Commission, concern the EU rules relating to the EAGGF which at that time contained no provision which could be regarded as comparable to the rules of EU law which led the Court of Justice to make the finding in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment.
81


Thus, it is following a schematic interpretation of the relevant EU rules that the Court of Justice interpreted those rules as meaning that, as from 2000, the Commission is required to comply with a legal time limit when adopting a decision on financial corrections (see judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraphs 56 to 82, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraphs 56 to 82).
84


As the Court of Justice has previously had occasion to point out in its judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission (C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 81), and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission (C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 81), Article 18 of Regulation No 1386/2002, in accordance with which the Commission set the parameters for the application of Regulation No 1164/94, as amended, can be understood only as confirming the existence of a legal time limit for the purposes of adoption of a decision on financial corrections.
89


It must be borne in mind that the Court of Justice has held on many occasions that it follows from Article 108 of Regulation No 1083/2006 that Article 100 thereof is applicable from 1 January 2007, including to programmes approved before that date but still in progress (see judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 98; of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 98; of 22 October 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑429/13 P, EU:C:2014:2310, paragraph 31; of 4 December 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑513/13 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2412, paragraph 45; of 24 June 2015, Germany v Commission, C‑549/12 P and C‑54/13 P, EU:C:2015:412, paragraph 84, and of 24 June 2015, Spain v Commission, C‑263/13 P, EU:C:2015:415, paragraph 53).
92


Such an application of that Article 100, entitled ‘Procedure’, is all the more justified since it complies with the principle that procedural rules are immediately applicable (see, in particular, judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 98, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 98).
100


It is clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice that Article H(2) of Annex II to Regulation No 1164/94, as amended, read in conjunction with Article 18(3) of Regulation No 1386/2002, provides that, in order to adopt a decision on financial corrections, the Commission is required to comply with a time limit of three months from the date of the hearing (see judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraphs 95 and 102, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraphs 95 and 102).
110


In order to rule on the merits of this ground of appeal, put forward in the alternative by the Commission, it must be noted that, on grounds identical to those set out in paragraphs 74 to 76 of the present judgment, the line of argument which that institution seeks to draw from the judgments of 27 January 1988, Denmark v Commission (349/85, EU:C:1988:34, paragraph 19), of 6 October 1993,Italy v Commission (C‑55/91, EU:C:1993:832, paragraph 69), of 4 July 1996, Greece v Commission (C‑50/94, EU:C:1996:266, paragraph 6), and of 22 April 1999, Netherlands v Commission (C‑28/94, EU:C:1999:191, paragraph 51), is irrelevant.