Acacia Srl v Pneusgarda Srl and Audi AG and Acacia Srl and Rolando D'Amato v Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG.
Date: 2017-12-20
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Furthermore, as regards the criticisms made by Porsche and Audi of the Advocate General’s Opinion, it must be borne in mind, first, that the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Rules of Procedure of the Court make no provision for interested parties to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion (judgment of 25 October 2017, Polbud — Wykonawstwo, C‑106/16, EU:C:2017:804, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
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Secondly, under the second paragraph of Article 252 TFEU, it is the duty of the Advocate General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, require the Advocate General’s involvement. In this regard, the Court is not bound either by the Opinion delivered by the Advocate General or by the reasoning which led to that Opinion. As a consequence, the fact that a party disagrees with the Advocate General’s Opinion, irrespective of the questions examined in the Opinion, cannot in itself constitute grounds justifying the reopening of the oral part of the procedure (judgment of 25 October 2017, Polbud — Wykonawstwo, C‑106/16, EU:C:2017:804, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
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It is settled case-law that in interpreting a provision of EU law it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part. The origins of a provision of EU law may also provide information relevant to its interpretation (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 50; of 1 July 2015, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, C‑461/13, EU:C:2015:433, paragraph 30; and of 18 May 2017, Hummel Holding, C‑617/15, EU:C:2017:390, paragraph 22).
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Admittedly, as Audi, Porsche and the German Government point out, a reference to the requirement that ‘the design is dependent’ on the appearance of the complex product was maintained in the wording of recital 13 of Regulation No 6/2002. However, in the light of the foregoing, that fact does not appear decisive. Moreover, as follows from the case-law of the Court, while the preamble to an EU measure may explain the latter’s content, it cannot be relied upon as a ground for derogating from the actual provisions of the measure in question (judgment of 10 January 2006, IATA and ELFAA, C‑344/04, EU:C:2006:10, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).
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It must be noted that Regulation No 6/2002 does not define the concept of ‘component part of a complex product’. It is, however, apparent from Article 3(b) and (c) of that regulation that, first, ‘product’ means any industrial or handicraft item, including inter alia parts intended to be assembled into a complex product and, secondly, ‘complex product’ means a product which is composed of multiple components which can be replaced permitting disassembly and re-assembly of the product. Furthermore, in the absence of any definition of the term ‘component part’ in that regulation, it must be understood in accordance with its usual meaning in everyday language (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 May 2006, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, C‑431/04, EU:C:2006:291, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).