Cruciano Siragusa v Regione Sicilia — Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo.
Date: 2014-03-06
20. Under Article 51(1) thereof, the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law. Article 6(1) TEU and Article 51(2) of the Charter specify that the provisions of the Charter are not to extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties. Accordingly, the Court is called upon to interpret, in the light of the Charter, the law of the European Union within the limits of the powers conferred on it (see Case C‑256/11 Dereci and Others  [2011] ECR I‑11315, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).
21. The Court has already observed that it has no jurisdiction to examine the compatibility with the Charter of national legislation falling outside the scope of EU law. On the other hand, if such legislation falls within the scope of EU law, the Court, when requested to give a preliminary ruling, must provide all the guidance as to interpretation needed in order for the national court to determine whether that legislation is compatible with the fundamental rights the observance of which the Court ensures (see Case C‑617/10 Åkerberg Fransson  [2013] ECR, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
22. That definition of the scope of the fundamental rights of the European Union is borne out by the explanations relating to Article 51 of the Charter, which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, have to be taken into consideration for the purposes of interpreting the Charter (see, to that effect, Case C‑279/09 DEB  [2010] ECR I‑13849, paragraph 32). According to those explanations, the obligation to respect fundamental rights defined in the context of the European Union is binding upon the Member States only in respect of matters covered by EU law.
24. However, it should be borne in mind that the concept of ‘implementing Union law’, as referred to in Article 51 of the Charter, requires a certain degree of connection above and beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those matters having an indirect impact on the other (see, to that effect, Case C‑299/95 Kremzow  [1997] ECR I‑2629, paragraph 16).
25. In order to determine whether national legislation involves the implementation of EU law for the purposes of Article 51 of the Charter, some of the points to be determined are whether that legislation is intended to implement a provision of EU law; the nature of that legislation and whether it pursues objectives other than those covered by EU law, even if it is capable of indirectly affecting EU law; and also whether there are specific rules of EU law on the matter or capable of affecting it (see Case C‑309/96 Annibaldi  [1997] ECR I‑7493, paragraphs 21 to 23; Case C‑40/11 Iida  [2012] ECR, paragraph 79; and Case C‑87/12 Ymeraga and Others  [2013] ECR, paragraph 41).
26. In particular, the Court has found that fundamental EU rights could not be applied in relation to national legislation because the provisions of EU law in the subject area concerned did not impose any obligation on Member States with regard to the situation at issue in the main proceedings (see Case C‑144/95 Maurin  [1996] ECR I‑2909, paragraphs 11 and 12).
27. As the interested parties which have submitted observations have argued, no specific obligations to protect the landscape, akin to those laid down by Italian law, are imposed on the Member States by the TEU and TFEU provisions referred to by the referring court; nor are such obligations imposed by the legislation relating to the Aarhus Convention, nor by Directives 2003/4 and 2011/92.
29. In Annibaldi , cited in the explanations relating to Article 51 of the Charter, the Court held that the fact that national legislation is capable of indirectly affecting the operation of a common organisation of the agricultural markets cannot in itself constitute a sufficient connection between that legislation and EU law ( Annibaldi , paragraph 22; see also Kremzow , paragraph 16).
31. It is also important to consider the objective of protecting fundamental rights in EU law, which is to ensure that those rights are not infringed in areas of EU activity, whether through action at EU level or through the implementation of EU law by the Member States.
32. The reason for pursuing that objective is the need to avoid a situation in which the level of protection of fundamental rights varies according to the national law involved in such a way as to undermine the unity, primacy and effectiveness of EU law (see, to that effect, Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft  [1970] ECR 1125, paragraph 3, and Case C‑399/11 Melloni  [2013] ECR, paragraph 60). However, there is nothing in the order for reference to suggest that any such risk is involved in the case before the referring court.
33. It follows from all the foregoing that it has not been established that the Court has jurisdiction to interpret Article 17 of the Charter (see, to that effect, Case C‑245/09 Omalet  [2010] ECR I‑13771, paragraph 18; see also the orders in Case C‑457/09 Chartry [2011] ECR I‑819, paragraphs 25 and 26; Case C‑134/12 Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor  [2012] ECR, paragraph 15; Case C‑498/12 Pedone  [2013] ECR, paragraph 15; and Case C‑371/13 SC Schuster & Co Ecologic  [2013] ECR, paragraph 18).
34. As for the principle of proportionality, that is one of the general principles of EU law which must be observed by any national legislation which falls within the scope of EU law or which implements that law (see, to that effect, Case 77/81 Zuckerfabrik Franken  [1982] ECR 681, paragraph 22; Case 382/87 Buet and EBS  [1989] ECR 1235, paragraph 11; Case C‑2/93 Exportslachterijen van Oordegem  [1994] ECR I‑2283, paragraph 20; and Joined Cases C‑422/09, C‑425/09 and C‑426/09 Vandorou and Others  [2010] ECR I‑12411, paragraph 65).