European Central Bank (ECB) and Others v Trasta Komercbanka and Others.
Date: 2019-11-05
54


Regarding that same appeal as lodged by Trasta Komercbanka, it should be borne in mind that the European Union is a Union based on the rule of law in which its institutions are subject to judicial review of the compatibility of their acts with, inter alia, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the general principles of law, that treaty having established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court to review the legality of acts of the EU institutions (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 April 1986, Les Verts v Parliament, 294/83, EU:C:1986:166, paragraph 23; of 29 June 2010, E and F, C‑550/09, EU:C:2010:382, paragraph 44; and of 30 May 2017, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, C‑45/15 P, EU:C:2017:402, paragraph 35). Individuals are therefore entitled to effective judicial protection of the rights they derive from the EU legal order (judgment of 18 January 2007, PKK and KNK v Council, C‑229/05 P, EU:C:2007:32, paragraph 109 and the case-law cited).
55


In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law, also referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, is a general principle of EU law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. That principle has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950. It is now reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter (judgments of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 35, and of 24 June 2019, Commission v Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court), C‑619/18, EU:C:2019:531, paragraph 49).
57


In order for such an action to be admissible, it is necessary to show that the person concerned has indeed made the decision to bring the action and that the lawyers who claim to represent that person have in fact been authorised to do so (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 January 2007, PKK and KNK v Council, C‑229/05 P, EU:C:2007:32, paragraph 113 and the case-law cited). It is precisely in order to ensure that that is indeed the case that Article 51(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court requires lawyers, where the party they represent is a legal person governed by private law, to lodge at the Registry of the General Court an authority to act given by that person, as failure to produce that authority to act may entail, in accordance with Article 51(4) of those Rules, the formal inadmissibility of the application.
59


However, as the Court has already emphasised, the autonomy enjoyed by the Member States in that regard is restricted by their obligation, in particular, to ensure compliance with the right to an effective remedy and to a fair hearing enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter (judgment of 8 November 2016, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK, C‑243/15, EU:C:2016:838, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).
103


It is apparent from the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, also recalled by the General Court in paragraph 64 of the order under appeal, that the condition that the decision forming the subject matter of the proceedings must be of direct concern to a natural or legal person, as laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, requires the fulfilment of two cumulative criteria, namely the contested measure must, first, directly affect the legal situation of the individual and, secondly, leave no discretion to the addressees who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from EU rules alone without the application of other intermediate rules (see, inter alia, judgments of 22 March 2007, Regione Siciliana v Commission, C‑15/06 P, EU:C:2007:183, paragraph 31; of 13 October 2011, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 66; and of 6 November 2018, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, Commission v Scuola Elementare Maria MontessoriandCommission v Ferracci, C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, EU:C:2018:873, paragraph 42).
109


Secondly, as is correctly noted by the ECB and the Commission, the General Court was wrong to take account of the non-legal, economic effects of the decision at issue on the situation of the shareholders of Trasta Komercbanka (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 February 2019, Council v Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association, C‑465/16 P, EU:C:2019:155, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited).
112


The foregoing considerations are not called into question by the arguments put forward by Trasta Komercbanka and its shareholders, summarised in paragraph 97 above, based on the case-law of the Courts of the European Union in the area of State aid and in the area of mergers. Thus, the recognition that some competitors of the addressees of an act of the European Union relating to those areas may be directly affected by that act is justified, not by the purely economic effects of the act in question on their situation, but by the fact that that act affects the legal situation of those competitors, in particular their right under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union not to be subject to distorted competition (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 November 2018, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, Commission v Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori and Commission v Ferracci, C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, EU:C:2018:873, paragraph 43).