Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo narių grupė.
Date: 2019-11-13
28


As a preliminary observation, it must be noted that, under the common agricultural policy, which, in accordance with Article 4(2)(d) TFEU, is a competence shared between the European Union and the Member States, the Member States have legislative powers which allow them, as is apparent from Article 2(2) TFEU, to exercise their competence to the extent that the European Union has not exercised its competence (judgment of 19 September 2013, Panellinios Sindesmos Viomikhanion Metapoiisis Kapnou, C‑373/11, EU:C:2013:567, paragraph 26).
29


Furthermore, according to settled case-law, where there is a regulation on the common organisation of the markets in a given sector, the Member States are under an obligation to refrain from taking any measures which might undermine or create exceptions to it. Rules which interfere with the proper functioning of a common organisation of the markets are also incompatible with such common organisation, even if the matter in question has not been exhaustively regulated by it (judgment of 26 May 2005, Kuipers, C‑283/03, EU:C:2005:314, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
30


Nevertheless, the establishment of a common market organisation does not prevent the Member States from applying national rules intended to attain an objective relating to the general interest other than those covered by that common market organisation, even if those rules are likely to have an effect on the functioning of the common market in the sector concerned (judgment of 23 December 2015, Scotch Whisky Association and Others, C‑333/14, EU:C:2015:845, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
37


As the Court has pointed out, in the absence of a pricing mechanism, the free formation of selling prices on the basis of fair competition is a component of Regulation No 1308/2013 and constitutes the expression of the principle of free movement of goods in conditions of effective competition (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 December 2015, Scotch Whisky Association and Others, C‑333/14, EU:C:2015:845, paragraph 20).
50


In addition, as recital 128 of that regulation makes clear, the regulation pursues the objective of ensuring the viable development of production and a resulting fair standard of living for dairy farmers, in accordance with the objectives of the common agricultural policy, as set out in Article 39(1) TFEU. To interpret Article 148 of Regulation No 1308/2013 as prohibiting Member States from adopting measures to combat unfair practices in the milk and milk products sector would run counter to that objective, as well as to the objective of ensuring the maintenance of effective competition in the markets for agricultural products, which is also one of the objectives of the common agricultural policy (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2013, Panellinios Sindesmos Viomikhanion Metapoiisis Kapnou, C‑373/11, EU:C:2013:567, paragraph 37).
51


In addition, it must be noted that, in the sector governed by the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products, the national authorities in principle retain jurisdiction to apply their national competition law to a milk producers’ cooperative in a powerful position on the national market (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 September 2003, Milk Marque and National Farmers’ Union, C‑137/00, EU:C:2003:429, paragraph 67).
55


However, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, during the period for transposition of a directive, the Member States to which it is addressed must refrain from taking any measures liable seriously to compromise the achievement of the result prescribed by that directive (judgments of 18 December 1997, Inter-Environnement Wallonie, C‑129/96, EU:C:1997:628, paragraph 45; of 22 November 2005, Mangold, C‑144/04, EU:C:2005:709, paragraph 67; and of 23 April 2009, VTB-VAB and Galatea, C‑261/07 and C‑299/07, EU:C:2009:244, paragraph 38). Although, in the present case, the Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Practices was adopted prior to the entry into force of Directive 2019/633, the authorities and courts in Lithuania must refrain so far as possible from interpreting that law in a manner which might seriously compromise, after the period for transposition has expired, attainment of the objective pursued by that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 October 2016, Milev, C‑439/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:818, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
56


In that context, it must be observed that rules of national law, such as those referred to in paragraph 53 of the present judgment, must nevertheless be appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective pursued and not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective (see, by analogy, judgments of 11 June 2015, Berlington Hungary and Others, C‑98/14, EU:C:2015:386, paragraph 64, and of 23 December 2015, Scotch Whisky Association and Others, C‑333/14, EU:C:2015:845, paragraph 28).
57


That review of proportionality must be carried out by taking into consideration, in particular, the objectives of the common agricultural policy and the proper functioning of the common market organisation, which necessitates that those objectives be weighed against the objective pursued by the national legislation, which is to combat unfair commercial practices (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 December 2015, Scotch Whisky Association and Others, C‑333/14, EU:C:2015:845, paragraph 28).