Cascina Tre Pini Ss v Ministero dell’Ambiente e della Tutela del Territorio e del Mare and Others.
Date: 2014-04-03
26. It follows therefrom that the adaptation of the list of SCIs which the Member States propose to the Commission under Article 4(1) of the Habitats Directive may include the declassification of a site on the list of SCIs which, in the absence of specific provisions, must be carried out following the same procedure as that for entry in that list.
27. In that regard, it must be noted that, although it follows from the rules governing the procedure for identifying sites eligible for designation as SACs, set out in Article 4(1) of the Habitats Directive, that Member States have a margin of discretion when making their site proposals, the fact none the less remains that they must do so in compliance with the criteria laid down by the directive (see, inter alia, Case C‑67/99 Commission  v Ireland  EU:C:2001:432, paragraph 33). It follows that, where the results of the surveillance undertaken by the Member States pursuant to Article 11 of the directive give rise to the conclusion that those criteria can irretrievably no longer be met, the Member States must of necessity, under Article 4(1) of the directive, make a proposal for the adaptation of the list of SCIs seeking to make that list meet those criteria once again.
28. Thus, when a site on the list of SCIs is definitively no longer capable of contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Habitats Directive and, accordingly, it is no longer warranted for the site to remain subject to the provisions of that directive, the Member State concerned is required to propose to the Commission that the site be declassified. If that State were to refrain from proposing its declassification, it could continue to use resources in vain to manage that site which would prove to be of no use to the conservation of natural habitats and species. In addition, keeping sites in the Natura 2000 network which no longer definitively contribute to the achievement of those objectives does not meet the quality requirements of that network.
29. The obligation on the Member States to propose to the Commission the declassification of a site on the list of SCIs which has become irretrievably unsuitable to achieve the objectives of the Habitats Directive, is all the greater when that site includes land belonging to an owner whose exercise of his right to property is restricted as a result of that listing, when it is no longer warranted for the site to remain subject to the provisions of the directive. As the Advocate General noted in point 39 of her Opinion, as long as the quality of the site in question meets the requirements for its classification, such restrictions of the right to property are, as a rule, justified by the objective of protecting the environment laid down in that directive (see, to that effect, Case C‑416/10 Križan and Others  EU:C:2013:8, paragraphs 113 to 115). However, where those qualities definitively disappear, continuing to restrict the use of that site might be an infringement of the right to property.
32. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive, to which Article 4(5) thereof refers, requires the Member States to protect the SCIs by adopting measures to avoid the deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species as well as disturbance of the species for which the areas have been designated. The failure of a Member State to fulfil that obligation of protecting a particular site does not necessarily justify the declassification of that site (see, by analogy, Case C‑418/04 Commission  v Ireland EU:C:2007:780, paragraphs 83 to 86). On the contrary, it is for that State to take the measures necessary to safeguard that site.
34. Furthermore, as regards the plans and projects which are not covered by Article 6(3) and (4) of the Habitats Directive when they are adopted, the Court has held that the possibility cannot be excluded that a Member State, by analogy with the procedure in derogation provided for in Article 6(4) of that directive, may, in a procedure under domestic law for assessing the environmental impacts of a plan or project capable of significantly affecting the interests of conserving a site, invoke a reason of public interest and, if the conditions laid down by that provision are essentially satisfied, authorise an activity which, subsequently, is no longer prohibited by Article 6(2). However, in order to be able to verify whether the conditions laid down by Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive have been met, the impacts of the plan or project must first have been analysed in accordance with Article 6(3) of that directive (Case C‑404/09 Commission  v Spain EU:C:2011:768, paragraphs 156 and 157).
41. In that regard, EU law requires only that the transposition into domestic law of the Habitats Directive, including that designation, actually ensure the full application of its provisions in a sufficiently clear and precise manner (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑507/04 Commission  v Austria  EU:C:2007:427, paragraph 89).
43. Consequently, EU law does not require the power conferred on the regional or local authorities to perform the obligations under that directive be supplemented by a subsidiary power of the State. In addition, the obligations on a Member State by virtue of that directive and, in particular, that of proposing the adaptation of the list of SCIs, do not mean, in terms of the domestic division of powers, that the Member State must, if necessary, act in the place of the regional or local authorities if they fail to act. None the less, EU law does require the arrangements within the national legal system to be in their entirety sufficiently effective to enable the requirements of the Habitats Directive to be correctly applied (see, to that effect, Case C‑8/88 Germany  v Commission  EU:C:1990:241, paragraph 13).
45. It must be born in mind that, in the context of the procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C‑617/10 Åkerberg Fransson  EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).