Promociones y Construcciones BJ 200 SL.
Date: 2013-06-13
14. In relation to the first argument, alleging that the referring court lacks jurisdiction, it should be recalled that it is not for the Court to determine whether the decision whereby a matter is brought before it was taken in accordance with the rules of national law governing the organisation of the courts and their procedure (see Case C‑39/94 SFEI and Others  [1996] ECR I‑3547, paragraph 24, and Case C‑213/04 Burstcher  [2005] ECR I‑10309, paragraph 30).
15. In addition, according to settled case-law, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of European Union law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, the judgment in Case C‑470/11 Garkalns [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited). Questions concerning European Union law therefore enjoy a presumption of relevance ( Garkalns , paragraph 18).
22. It is settled case-law that the wording used in one language version of a provision of European Union law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. Such an approach would be incompatible with the requirement of the uniform application of European Union law. Where there is a divergence between the various language versions, the provision in question must then be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see Case C‑149/97 Institute of the Motor Industry  [1998] ECR I‑7053, paragraph 16, and Case C‑451/08 Helmut Müller [2010] ECR I‑2673, paragraph 38).
23. With regard, first of all, to the general scheme of Article 199(1)(g) of Directive 2006/112, it must be noted that it constitutes an exception to the principle, set out in Article 193 of that directive, according to which VAT is payable by any taxable person carrying out a taxable supply of goods or services. Article 199 allows Member States to introduce a reverse charge mechanism, in the situations referred to in paragraphs 1(a) to (g) of that article, whereby the person liable for the payment of VAT is the taxable person who is the recipient of the transaction subject to VAT.
28. Second, as regards the objective pursued by Article 199(1)(g) of Directive 2006/112, it must be pointed out that, according to recital 42 in the preamble thereto, Member States should be able to introduce a reverse charge mechanism in certain sectors or for certain transactions in order to simplify the rules and counter tax evasion and avoidance. That provision thus allows the tax authorities to collect VAT imposed on the transactions at issue in cases where the debtor’s ability to pay that tax is compromised.
31. It is true that Article 199(1)(g) of Directive 2006/112 is an exception to the normal rules of that directive and must, for that reason, be strictly interpreted, in accordance with settled case-law. However, that strict interpretation must not have the result that that provision is deprived of its effectiveness (see C-395/11 BLV Wohn- und Gewerbebau  [2012] I‑0000, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited). Limiting the application of the reverse charge mechanism to the sale of immovable property carried out only during proceedings for the liquidation of the debtor’s assets would not help to ensure the full achievement of the objective pursued since the risk of tax evasion and avoidance exists from the moment at which the debtor has been declared insolvent.