larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Schlüsselverlag J.S. Moser GmbH, J. Wimmer Medien GmbH & Co. KG, Styria Medien AG, Zeitungs- und Verlags-Gesellschaft mbH, Eugen Ruß Vorarlberger Zeitungsverlag und Druckerei GmbH, "Die Presse" Verlags-Gesellschaft mbH and "Salzburger Nachrichten" Verlags-Gesellschaft mbH & Co. KG v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2003-09-25
32. The Merger Regulation is based on the principle of a clear division of powers between the supervisory authorities of the Member States and those of the Community.  The 29th recital in its preamble provides that   " concentrations not covered by this Regulation come, in principle, within the jurisdiction of the Member States" .  Conversely, the Commission has sole jurisdiction to take all the decisions relating to concentrations with a Community dimension and, under Article 9 of that regulation, to decide to refer to the competent authorities of a Member State the file on certain transactions affecting more particularly a   " market, within that Member State, which presents all the characteristics of a distinct market" .
Établissements Biret et Cie SA v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2003-09-30
63. However, the errors of law thus made by the Court of First Instance as regards the duty to state reasons and the scope of the judgment in  Atlanta  v  European Community  do not invalidate the contested judgment, if the operative part thereof and in particular the rejection of the plea at first instance concerning the SPS Agreement, appears founded on other legal grounds (see to that effect Case C-367/95 P  Commission  v  Sytraval and Brink ' s France  [1998] ECR I-1719, paragraph 47).
73. According to that judgment ( Portugal  v Council , paragraph 49) it is only where the Community intended to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the Community measure refers expressly to the precise provisions of the WTO agreements, that it is for the Community judicature to review the legality of the Community measure in question in the light of the WTO rules (see, as regards GATT 1947, Case 70/87  Fediol  v  Commission  [1989] ECR 1781, paragraphs 19 to 22, and Case C-69/89  Nakajima  v  Council  [1991] ECR I-2069, paragraph 31).
ARBED SA v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2003-10-02
19.  In all proceedings in which sanctions, especially fines or penalty payments, may be imposed, observance of the rights of the defence is a fundamental principle of Community law which must be complied with even if the proceedings in question are administrative proceedings (Case 85/76   Hoffmann-La Roche   v   Commission   [1979] ECR 461, paragraph 9).
20.  That principle requires, in particular, the inclusion in the statement of objections addressed by the Commission to an undertaking on which it intends to impose a penalty for infringement of competition rules of the essential factors taken into consideration against that undertaking, such as the facts alleged, the classification of those facts and the evidence on which the Commission relies, so that the undertaking may submit its arguments effectively during the administrative procedure brought against it (see, to that effect, Case 41/69   ACF Chemiefarma   v   Commission   [1970] ECR 661, paragraph 26; Case C-62/86   AKZO   v   Commission   [1991] ECR I-3359, paragraph 29; and Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85   Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others   v   Commission   [1993] ECR I-1307, paragraph 135).
21.  Given its importance, the statement of objections must specify unequivocally the legal person on whom fines may be imposed and be addressed to that person (see Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P   Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports and Others   v   Commission   [2000] ECR I-1365, paragraphs 143 and 146).
24.  It follows that the Court of First Instance was wrong to conclude from the facts of the present case, in paragraph 102 of the judgment under appeal, that the failure to address a statement of objections to the appellant was not such as to entail annulment of the contested decision, in so far as it concerned the appellant, on the ground of infringement of the rights of the defence.
Criminal proceedings against Hans van Lent.
Date: 2003-10-02
13.  As a preliminary point it must be recalled that although, in the absence of complete harmonisation in the field, the Member States may prescribe the conditions for the registration of vehicles travelling on their territory, the measures adopted cannot be exempt from the application of Articles 10 EC and 39 EC (see, by way of analogy, Case C-121/00   Hahn   [2002] ECR I-9193, paragraph 34).
14.  Any Community national who, irrespective of his place of residence and his nationality, has exercised the right to freedom of movement for workers and who has been employed in a Member State other than that of residence falls within the scope of Article 39 EC (Case C-419/92   Scholz   [1994] ECR I-505, paragraph 9, and Case C-385/00   De Groot   [2002] ECR I-11819 paragraph 76).
15.  Moreover, it is settled case-law that all of the EC Treaty provisions relating to the freedom of movement of persons are intended to facilitate the pursuit by Community nationals of occupational activities of all kinds throughout the Community, and preclude measures which might place Community nationals at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic activity in the territory of another Member State (Case C-370/90   Singh   [1992] ECR I-4265, paragraph 16; Case C-302/98   Sehrer   [2000] ECR I-4585, paragraph 32; and   De Groot  , cited above, paragraph 77).
16.  In that regard, it must be pointed out that provisions which preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin to exercise his right to freedom of movement therefore constitute an obstacle to that freedom even if they apply without regard to the nationality of the workers concerned (de Groot  , paragraph 78).
GEFCO SA v Receveur principal des douanes.
Date: 2003-10-02
51.  It must be stated that to prohibit in all circumstances the economic operator from adducing such proof would be to deprive Article 150(2) of the Customs Code of its practical effect.  One of the objectives of the outward processing procedure is to prevent customs duties from being charged on goods exported from the European Community for outward processing (see, to that effect, Case C-142/96   Wacker Werke   [1997] ECR I-4649, paragraph 21).  As the Advocate General correctly observes at point 66 of his Opinion, an interpretation which did not permit the proof in question to be adduced would be likely to compromise the attainment of that objective, since operators would be charged a higher rate of duty that would not be justified.
Criminal proceedings against Marco Grilli.
Date: 2003-10-02
41.  According to consistent case-law, that provision concerns national measures which have as their specific object or effect the restriction of patterns of exports and thereby the establishment of a difference in treatment between the domestic trade of a Member State and its export trade in such a way as to provide a particular advantage for national production or for the domestic market of the State in question at the expense of the production or of the trade of other Member States (Case 15/79   Groenveld   [1979] ECR 3409, paragraph 7).
42.  Unlike Article 28 EC, which concerns quantitative restrictions on imports and measures having equivalent effect to such restrictions, Article 29 EC prohibits only national measures which provide for a difference in treatment between products destined for export and those sold within the Member State concerned (Groenveld  , cited above, paragraphs 7 and 9).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2003-10-02
7. However, the Court has consistently held that the question whether there has been a failure to fulfil obligations must be examined on the basis of the position in which the Member State found itself at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C-455/00  Commission  v  Italy  [2002] ECR I-9231, paragraph 21).
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 2003-10-02
5. According to settled case-law, Member States cannot plead domestic circumstances or practical difficulties to justify non-transposition within prescribed time-limits (see, on this point, Case C-52/91  Commission  v  Netherlands  [1993] ECR I-3069, paragraph 36, and Case C-140/00  Commission  v  United Kingdom  [2002] ECR I-10379, paragraph 60).
Ireland v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2003-10-16
71.  Under Article 5 of the Treaty, the duty to cooperate in good faith governs relations between the Member States and the institutions.  It entails an obligation on the Member States to take all the measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law and imposes on Member States and the Community institutions mutual duties to cooperate in good faith (see order in Case C-2/88 Imm.   Zwartveld and Others   [1990] ECR I-3365, paragraph 17, and Case C-275/00   First and Franex   [2002] ECR I-10943, paragraph 49).
72.  It should be noted that, as the Advocate General stated in point 73 of his Opinion, the duty to cooperate in good faith is, by its very nature, reciprocal.
79.  First of all, the Commission's failure to reply to a letter is not, in principle, capable of giving rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the person who sent it.  In the present case, Ireland's letter of 26 January 1993 was itself a response to a request made by the Commission and did not call directly for a reply.
81.  Nor, finally, could the fact that the Commission did not call into question the aid granted to Coillte Teoranta prior to 1997 lead Ireland to believe that the grant of aid to that undertaking for loss of income would never be called into question in the future.  The Court has ruled on several occasions that, where the Commission has tolerated irregularities on grounds of fairness, the Member State concerned does not acquire any right to demand that the same position be taken with regard to irregularities committed in the following financial year by virtue of the principle of legal certainty or the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations (see, inter alia, Case C-54/95   Germany   v   Commission   [1999] ECR I-35, paragraph 12). This must apply   a fortiori   in cases in which the Commission had not detected the type of irregularities in question during the preceding financial years.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 2003-10-16
30.  It is not disputed that the Kingdom of Belgium is responsible for protecting the security not only of its national installations but also of the installations of international organisations within its territory, such as NATO.  It is therefore for the Belgian authorities to lay down the security measures necessary for the protection of such installations.
Flughafen Hannover-Langenhagen GmbH v Deutsche Lufthansa AG.
Date: 2003-10-16
37.  Recital 25 of the Directive states that   "access to airport installations must be guaranteed to suppliers authorised to provide ground-handling services and to airport users authorised to self-handle"   and   "it must be possible ... for such access to give rise to the collection of a fee"  .
38.  Under Article 16(1) and (3) of the Directive, entitled   "Access to installations"  ,   "Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that suppliers of groundhandling services and airport users wishing to self-handle have access to airport installations"   and   "[w]here access to airport installations gives rise to the collection of a fee, the latter shall be determined according to relevant, objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria"  .
39.  It follows that the managing body of the airport is authorised to collect a fee in return for granting access to airport   "installations"  .
40.  The reference to installations clearly relates to the infrastructure and the equipment made available by the airport. That interpretation is consistent with Article 2(a) of the Directive, which defines an airport as any area of land especially adapted for the landing, taking-off and manoeuvres of aircraft,   "including the ancillary installations"   which these operations may involve for the requirements of aircraft traffic and services, and the   "installations needed to assist commercial air services"  .
43.  That interpretation is also correct in the light of the Directive's objective of ensuring the opening-up of the groundhandling market which, according to Recital 5 of the Directive, must help, in particular, to reduce the operating costs of airline companies.
44.  Not only would the possibility for the managing body of an airport to charge an access fee in addition to the fee for use of the airport installations not facilitate access to the market concerned, it would also run directly counter to the objective of reducing the operating costs of airline companies and, in certain cases, would even lead to an increase in those costs. That would be the case if certain suppliers or self-handlers who, like Lufthansa, did not pay the access fee before the Directive was implemented, were now required, having regard to the criteria laid down in Article 16(3) of the Directive, to pay such a fee.
51.  The statement relating to the application of Article 16(3) of the Directive, which the Commission arranged to be entered in the minutes when the Directive was adopted and on which the Flughafen relies in support of its argument, likewise does not permit the inference that the commercial fee referred to therein, which may   "contribute ... to the self-financing of an airport"  , in fact constitutes a fee for market access. In any event, an interpretation based on such a statement cannot give rise to an interpretation different from that resulting from the actual wording of the provision concerned (se, to that effect, Case 429/85   Commission   v   Italy   [1988] ECR 843, paragraph 9).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2003-10-16
22.  The abovementioned national provisions are thus capable of hindering intra-Community trade and therefore constitute a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction prohibited by Article 28 EC (see Case 8/74   Dassonville   [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5, and Case C-383/97   Van der Laan   [1999] ECR I-731, paragraph 18).
24.  In any event, since Decree No 347/94 does not enable analyses and tests already carried out in an approval procedure in another Member State to be taken into account, the restriction on intra-Community trade which results from the need to obtain a declaration of approval issued by RINA does not fulfil the condition of proportionality and therefore cannot be justified in Community law (see, to that effect, Case C-400/96   Harpegnies   [1998] ECR I-5121,  paragraphs 34 and 35).
25.  Service Order No 57/2000 cannot remedy the incompatibility between Article 2(1) and (3) of Decree No 347/94 and Article 28 EC. The Court has consistently held that the incompatibility of national legislation with Community provisions, even provisions which are directly applicable, can be finally remedied only by means of national provisions of a binding nature which have the same legal force as those which must be amended (see, in particular, Case C-207/96   Commission   v   Italy   [1997] ECR I-6869, paragraph 26).
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2003-10-16
6. As the Court has consistently held, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in that Member State as it stood at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, in particular, Case C-71/99  Commission  v  Germany  [2001] ECR I-5811, paragraph 29; and Case C-110/00  Commission  v  Austria  [2001] ECR I-7545, paragraph 13).
Emil Färber GmbH & Co. KG v Landkreis Alzey-Worms.
Date: 2003-10-16
25.  Having regard to that new version of that provision, it must be concluded, first, that the interpretation given by the Court in paragraph 29 of   De Venhorst  , namely that the part of the fee referred to in Article 3(1) of Decision 88/408 is to be calculated on the basis of the unboned weight of the meat which is actually cut in the cutting plant, cannot be applied to the provision which now appears in Annex A, Chapter I, point 2, indent (a), to Directive 85/73.
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2003-10-16
8.  It must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see,   inter alia  , Case C-147/00   Commission   v   France   [2001] ECR I-2387, paragraph 26, and Case C-173/01   Commission   v   Greece   [2002] ECR I-6129, paragraph 7).
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 2003-10-16
17.  It is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in that Member State as it stood at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see,   inter alia  , Case C-71/99   Commission   v   Germany   [2001] ECR I-5811, paragraph 29, and Case C-110/00   Commission   v   Austria   [2001] ECR I-7545, paragraph 13).
Commission of the European Communities v Ireland.
Date: 2003-10-16
6.  It is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in the Member State as it stood at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see,   inter alia  , Case C-71/99   Commission   v   Germany   [2001] ECR I-5811, paragraph 29; and Case C-110/00   Commission   v   Austria   [2001] ECR I-7545, paragraph 13.
8.  Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly held that a Member State may not rely on provisions, practices or circumstances in its own legal order to justify failure to implement a directive within the prescribed period (see, in particular, Case C-352/01   Commission   v   Spain   [2002] ECR I-10263, paragraph 8).
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2003-10-16
13.  According to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C-143/02   Commission   v   Italy   [2003] ECR I-2877, paragraph 11; and Case C-446/01   Commission   v   Spain   [2003] ECR I-6053, paragraph 15).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 2003-10-16
19.  It must be observed, first, that in the absence of sufficiently precise Community criteria in a directive to delimit the obligations under the directive, it is for the Member States to determine, in their own territory, what are the most relevant criteria for ensuring, within the limits imposed by Community law and in particular by the directive, compliance with that directive (see, to that effect, Case C-245/00   SENA   [2003] ECR I-1251, paragraph 34).
20.  Moreover, as the Commission observed, Article 5(3) of the Directive authorises but does not oblige a Member State to exempt certain categories of establishments. Consequently, if the circumstances prevailing in the Member State in question do not enable a valid distinction to be drawn between categories of establishments, the obligation to pay the remuneration in question must be imposed on all the establishments concerned.
21.  Next, even assuming that other Member States do not apply correctly the public lending right as provided for in the Directive, it suffices to point out that, according to settled case-law, a Member State cannot justify its failure to perform its obligations under Community law by relying on the fact that other Member States are also in breach of their obligations (see Case C-173/99   BECTU   [2001] ECR I-4881, paragraph 56).
22.  Finally, with respect to the difficulties encountered by the federal authorities in convincing the federated entities to accept that an obligation to pay a remuneration for public lending should be imposed on the establishments falling within the scope of Article 1(3) of the Directive, it is settled case-law that a Member State cannot rely on provisions, practices or circumstances in its internal legal order to justify failure to comply with obligations and time-limits laid down by a directive (see Case C-419/01   Commission   v   Spain   [2003] ECR I-4947, paragraph 22).
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) v Wm. Wrigley Jr. Company.
Date: 2003-10-23
30.  Accordingly, signs and indications which may serve in trade to designate the characteristics of the goods or service in respect of which registration is sought are, by virtue of Regulation No 40/94, deemed incapable, by their very nature, of fulfilling the indication-of-origin function of the trade mark, without prejudice to the possibility of their acquiring distinctive character through use under Article 7(3) of Regulation No 40/94.
31.  By prohibiting the registration as Community trade marks of such signs and indications, Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94 pursues an aim which is in the public interest, namely that descriptive signs or indications relating to the characteristics of goods or services in respect of which registration is sought may be freely used by all.  That provision accordingly prevents such signs and indications from being reserved to one undertaking alone because they have been registered as trade marks (see, inter alia, in relation to the identical provisions of Article 3(1)(c) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1),   Windsurfing Chiemsee  , paragraph 25, and Joined Cases C-53/01 to C-55/01   Linde and Others   [2003] ECR I-3161, paragraph 73).
32.  In order for OHIM to refuse to register a trade mark under Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94, it is not necessary that the signs and indications composing the mark that are referred to in that article actually be in use at the time of the application for registration in a way that is descriptive of goods or services such as those in relation to which the application is filed, or of characteristics of those goods or services.  It is sufficient, as the wording of that provision itself indicates, that such signs and indications could be used for such purposes.  A sign must therefore be refused registration under that provision if at least one of its possible meanings designates a characteristic of the goods or services concerned.