X v Inspecteur van Rijksbelastingdienst and T.A. van Dijk v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2015-09-09
31. In particular, the Hoge Raad de r Nederlanden asks whether, since it takes the view that the answer to the question of interpretation of EU law raised before it is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt, the conditions set out in paragraph 16 of the judgment in Cilfit and Others  (283/81, EU:C:1982:335) may still be regarded as being met.
40. Moreover, the Court has held that in so far as an E 101 certificate establishes a presumption that posted workers are properly affiliated to the social security system of the Member State in which the undertaking which posted those workers is established, such a certificate is binding on the competent institution of the Member State to which those workers are posted (judgment in Herbosch Kiere , C‑2/05, EU:C:2006:69, paragraph 24).
41. The Court has also held that, as long as it has not been withdrawn or declared invalid by the authorities of the Member State which issued it, an E 101 certificate binds the competent institution and the courts of the Member State in which the workers are posted (judgment in Herbosch Kiere , C‑2/05, EU:C:2006:69, paragraph 33).
42. Moreover, since the E 101 certificate is binding on that competent institution, there can be no justification for the person who calls on that worker’s services not to act upon that certificate. If he has doubts as to the validity of the certificate, that person must however inform the institution in question (judgment in Banks and Others , C‑178/97, EU:C:2000:169, paragraph 47).
53. Article 267 TFEU confers jurisdiction on the Court to give preliminary rulings concerning both the interpretation of the Treaties and acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union and the validity of those acts. The second paragraph of that article provides that a national court or tribunal may refer such questions to the Court, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, and the third paragraph of that article provides that the national court or tribunal is bound to make a reference if there is no judicial remedy under national law against its decisions (judgment in Melki and Abdeli , C‑188/10 and C‑189/10, EU:C:2010:363, paragraph 40).
54. It should be remembered, in particular, that the obligation on national courts and tribunals against whose decision there is no judicial remedy to refer a matter to the Court of Justice under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU is based on cooperation, established with a view to ensuring the proper application and uniform interpretation of EU law in all the Member States, between national courts, in their capacity as courts responsible for the application of EU law, and the Court (judgment in Cilfit and Others , 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 7).
55. The Court has held that a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is required, where a question of EU law is raised before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the Court of Justice, unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the EU law provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. The Court has further held that the existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of EU law, the particular to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the EU (judgment in Cilfit and Others , 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 21).
57. It must be borne in mind that it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (judgment in Eon Aset Menidjmunt , C‑118/11, EU:C:2012:97, paragraph 76).
58. Moreover, the case-law as stated in Cilfit and Others (283/81, EU:C:1982:335) gives the national court sole responsibility for determining whether the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt and for deciding, as a result, to refrain from referring to the Court of Justice a question concerning the interpretation of EU law which has been raised before it (judgment in Intermodal Transports , C‑495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited) and take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it (judgment in Cilfit and Others , 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 16).
59. It follows therefrom that it is for the national courts alone against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, to take upon themselves independently the responsibility for determining whether the case before them involves an ‘acte clair’.