larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v Isaac International Limited.
Date: 2010-07-29
42. Under those circumstances, it must be held that the legislature expressly and specifically made entitlement to the exemption subject to the issue of such an authorisation. Applying Article 212a of the Customs Code to a case such as that in the main proceedings by considering that the mere fact that the importer has complied with the quantitative limit laid down in Article 14(c) of the Exempting Regulation is sufficient to conclude that ‘the other conditions for the application’ have been satisfied renders nugatory the condition requiring a prior authorisation. Since that article lays down an exemption from anti-dumping duty and must therefore be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, Case C‑48/98 Söhl & Söhlke  [1999] ECR I‑7877, paragraph 52), account must be taken of that condition for the purposes of interpreting Article 212a of the Customs Code.
43. Secondly, it must be pointed out that the abovementioned prior authorisation is of particular importance in the context of the rules laid down in the Exempting Regulation inasmuch as it permits the customs authorities to verify, at the material time, that all the requirements regarding the exemption from anti-dumping duty at issue have been satisfied.
44. Thus, application of Article 212a of the Customs Code cannot, in those circumstances, lead to the result that such an exemption from anti‑dumping duty, which is subject, by virtue of Article 14 of the Exempting Regulation, read in combination with Article 292 of the Implementing Regulation, to procedural conditions could be granted even where those conditions have not been satisfied.
Françoise-Eléonor Hanssens-Ensch v European Community.
Date: 2010-07-29
16. The EC Treaty provides for jurisdiction to be divided between the Community Courts and the national courts as regards judicial proceedings brought against the Community in which its liability for damage is at issue.
17. With regard to the Community’s non-contractual liability, such disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. Article 235 EC provides that the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to hear and determine actions seeking compensation for damage brought under the second paragraph of Article 288 EC, which covers such non-contractual liability. That jurisdiction of the Community Courts is exclusive (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑282/90 Vreugdenhil  v Commission  [1992] ECR I‑1937, paragraph 14, and Case C‑275/00 First and Franex  [2002] ECR I‑10943, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
18. On the other hand, so far as the Community’s contractual liability is concerned, the only provision of the Treaty which confers jurisdiction on the Court of Justice to hear and determine such cases is Article 238 EC, that is to say, under an arbitration clause in a contract concluded by or on behalf of the Community (see, to that effect, Case 426/85 Commission  v Zoubek  [1986] ECR 4057, paragraph 11, and Joined Cases C‑80/99 to C‑82/99 Flemmer and Others [2001] ECR I-7211, paragraph 42).
19. Since Article 235 EC refers only to the second paragraph of Article 288 EC, which concerns solely the non-contractual liability of the Community, the Community’s contractual liability being referred to in the first paragraph of Article 288 EC, it cannot be inferred from Article 235 EC that the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to hear and determine an action for damages based on the Community’s contractual liability (see, to that effect, Flemmer and Others , paragraph 42). It follows that, in the light of Article 240 EC, where there is no arbitration clause, proceedings concerning the Community’s contractual liability fall within the jurisdiction of the national courts (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 May 2009 in Case C‑214/08 P Guigard  v Commission , paragraph 41).
20. It follows from the foregoing that, in order to decide which court has jurisdiction to hear and determine a specific action brought against the Community seeking compensation for damage, it is necessary to determine whether the action in question concerns the Community’s contractual liability or its non-contractual liability.
24. The judgment in Case C‑330/88 Grifoni  v EAEC  [1991] ECR I‑1045, paragraph 20, relied on by Ms Hanssens-Ensch, cannot invalidate the above conclusion, since the action which led to that judgment was based on the contractual liability of the Community.
Panagiotis I. Karanikolas and Others v Ypourgos Agrotikis Anaptyxis kai Trofimon and Nomarchiaki Aftodioikisi Dramas, Kavalas, Xanthis.
Date: 2010-09-02
49. However, in order for that prohibition to be compatible with EU law and in conformity with the common fisheries policy, it had to comply with the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination, which are general principles of EU law and which, in the field of agriculture – such as fisheries – are embodied in the second subparagraph of Article 34(2) EC (see Case C‑535/03 Unitymark and North Sea Fishermen’s Organisation  [2006] ECR I‑2689, paragraph 53).
50. In order to be consistent with the principle of proportionality, the prohibition must be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it (see Unitymark and North Sea Fishermen’s Organisation , paragraph 56).
52. As regards the principle of non-discrimination, it should be borne in mind that that principle requires that comparable situations not be treated differently and that different situations not be treated alike unless such treatment is objectively justified (see Case C‑44/94 Fishermen’s Organisations and Others  [1995] ECR I‑3115, paragraph 46).
EMI Group Ltd v The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs.
Date: 2010-09-30
16. As a preliminary point, it must be noted that the Sixth Directive contains no definition of that term. It is necessary, therefore, when interpreting that term, to take account of the wording, context and objectives of the second sentence of Article 5(6) of the Sixth Directive (see, to that effect, Case C‑98/07 Nordania Finans and BG Factoring [2008] ECR I‑1281, paragraph 17 and case-law cited).
17. In that regard, it should be recalled that the first sentence of Article 5(6) of the Sixth Directive treats certain transactions for which no real consideration is received by the taxable person as supplies of goods effected for consideration subject to VAT, in accordance with Article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive. Under well‑established case‑law, the purpose of that provision is to ensure equal treatment as between a taxable person who applies goods for his own private use or for that of his staff and a final consumer who acquires goods of the same type (see, inter alia, Case C‑412/03 Hotel Scandic Gåsabäck [2005] ECR I‑743, paragraph 23 and the case‑law cited).
19. The second sentence of Article 5(6) constitutes an exception to that rule, since it nevertheless exempts from taxation applications for the giving of samples or the making of gifts of small value for business purposes (see, to that effect, Case C‑48/97 Kuwait Petroleum [1999] ECR I‑2323, paragraph 23).
20. Consequently, the wording of the second sentence of Article 5(6) of the Sixth Directive is to be construed narrowly, in such a way that the purpose of the first sentence thereof is not undermined, while ensuring that the exemption in respect of samples and gifts of small value is not deprived of its effectiveness (see, by analogy, Case C‑284/03 Temco Europe [2004] ECR I‑11237, paragraph 17, and Case C‑434/05 Horizon College [2007] ECR I‑4793, paragraph 16).
42. Without it being necessary to ascertain whether the expression ‘small value’ is a concept of European Union law or implicitly refers back to national law – those Member States which submitted observations and the European Commission having argued for the latter interpretation – it must be held that, in view of the wording, context and objectives of the second sentence of Article 5(6) of the Sixth Directive, that provision does not contain the guidance necessary for defining uniformly and precisely that expression. The Member States therefore have a certain margin of discretion as regards the interpretation of that provision, provided that they do not fail to have regard to the objective and role of the provision at issue within the scheme of the Sixth Directive (see, by analogy, Case C‑72/05 Wollny [2006] ECR I‑8297, paragraph 28).
European Commission v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 2010-09-30
21. The Court may, of its own motion, on a proposal from the Advocate General or at the request of the parties, order reopening of the oral procedure under Article 61 of its Rules of Procedure if it considers that it lacks sufficient information, or that the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument that has not been debated between the parties (Case C-28/08 P Commission v Bavarian Lager  [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 36 and case-law cited).
35. It should be emphasised that an action must be considered having regard only to the pleadings contained in the original applicat ion (Case C-256/98 Commission v France  [2000] ECR I-2487, paragraph 31, and Case C-508/03 Commission v United Kingdom  [2006] ECR I‑3969, paragraph 61).
36. It should also be noted that, under Articles 21(1) of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and 38(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure thereof, in any application made under Article 226 EC, the Commission must indicate the specific complaints on which the Court is called upon to rule (Cases C-52/90 Commission v Denmark  [1992] ECR I-2187, paragraph 17, and C-255/04 Commission v France  [2006], ECR I‑5251, paragraph 24).
37. These heads of claim must be set out unambiguously, so that the Court does not rule ultra petita  or indeed fail to rule on a complaint (Case C-296/01 Commission  v France  [2003] ECR I-13909, paragraph 121, and Case C-255/04 Commission v France , cited above, paragraph 24).
43. In relation to international conventions in general, it should be noted that, according to the case-law of the Court, if the Community is not a Contracting Party to a convention, in principle the Court is not competent to interpret the provisions of that convention in the context of preliminary proceedings (Case 130/73 Vandeweghe and Others  [1973] ECR 1329, paragraph 2; Order C‑162/98 Hartmann  [1998] ECR I-7083, paragraph 9; Case C-301/08 Bogiatzi  [2009] ECR I-10185, paragraph 24; and Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland  [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 61).
44. Specifically in relation to the 1957 Convention, it should be borne in mind that the Court has already held that it lacks jurisdiction to give a ruling on its interpretation, and on the obligations arising under it for the Member States since, despite the fact that that convention was linked to the Community and the functioning of its institutions, it was an international agreement concluded by the Member States which did not form an integral part of Community law (Case 44/84 Hurd [1986] ECR 29, paragraphs 20 to 22).
József Uzonyi v Mezőgazdasági és Vidékfejlesztési Hivatal Központi Szerve.
Date: 2010-09-30
29. The Court must therefore hold that Article 143ba of Regulation No 1782/2003 requires the new Member States to apply objective and non-discriminatory criteria when granting a separate sugar payment.
31. In that regard, the Court has consistently held that the prohibition on discrimination in the context of the common agricultural policy is merely a specific expression of the general principle of equal treatment, which requires that comparable situations not be treated differently and different situations not be treated alike unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, in particular, with regard to the second subparagraph of Article 34(2) EC, Case C‑313/04 Franz Egenberger [2006] ECR I‑6331, paragraph 33; Case C‑33/08 Agrana Zucker  [2009] ECR I‑5035, paragraph 46, and Case C‑365/08 Agrana Zucker  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 42).
Stadt Graz v Strabag AG and Others.
Date: 2010-09-30
33. However, Directive 89/665 lays down only the minimum conditions to be satisfied by the review procedures established in domestic law to ensure compliance with the requirements of EU law concerning public procurement (see, inter alia, Case C-327/00 Santex  [2003] ECR I-1877, paragraph 47, and Case C-315/01 GAT  [2003] ECR I-6351, paragraph 45). If there is no specific provision governing the matter, it is therefore for the domestic law of each Member State to determine the measures necessary to ensure that the review procedures effectively award damages to persons harmed by an infringement of the law on public contracts (see, by analogy, GAT , paragraph 46).
34. Although, therefore, the implementation of Article 2(1)(c) of Directive 89/665 in principle comes under the procedural autonomy of the Member States, limited by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, it is necessary to examine whether that provision, interpreted in the light of the general context and aim of the judicial remedy of damages, precludes a national provision such as that at issue in the main proceedings from making the award of damages conditional, in the circumstances set out in paragraph 30 of this judgment, on a finding that the contracting authority’s infringement of the law on public contracts is culpable.
37. According to settled case-law, while the Member States are required to provide legal remedies enabling the annulment of a decision of a contracting authority which infringes the law relating to public contracts, they are entitled in the light of the objective of rapidity pursued by Directive 89/665 to couple that type of review with reasonable limitation periods for bringing proceedings, so as to prevent the candidates and tenderers from being able, at any moment, to invoke infringements of that legislation, thus obliging the contracting authority to restart the entire procedure in order to correct such infringements (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C-470/99 Universale-Bau and Others  [2002] ECR I-11617, paragraphs 74 to 78; Santex , paragraphs 51 and 52; Case C-241/06 Lämmerzahl  [2007] ECR I‑8415, paragraphs 50 and 51; and Case C-406/08 Uniplex (UK)  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 38).
39. Against that background, the remedy of damages provided for in Article 2(1)(c) of Directive 89/665 can constitute, where appropriate, a procedural alternative which is compatible with the principle of effectiveness underlying the objective pursued by that directive of ensuring effective review procedures (see, to that effect, inter alia, Uniplex (UK) , paragraph 40) only where the possibility of damages being awarded in the event of infringement of the public procurement rules is no more dependent than the other legal remedies provided for in Article 2(1) of Directive 89/665 on a finding that the contracting authority is at fault.
Evets Corp. v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM).
Date: 2010-09-30
49. As regards, secondly, the argument relating to the practice of the EPO’s Boards of Appeal, suffice it to point out in that regard, as the General Court stated correctly in paragraphs 29 to 31 of the judgment under appeal, that the Community trade mark regime is an autonomous system with its own set of rules and objectives peculiar to it; it applies independently of any other system (see Case C‑238/06 P Develey  v OHIM  [2007] ECR I-9375, paragraph 71, and Case T‑32/00 Messe München  v OHIM (electronica) [2000] ECR II‑3829, paragraph 47).
Kronospan Mielec sp. z o.o. v Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Rzeszowie.
Date: 2010-10-07
19. In order to answer that question, it must first of all be noted that the third indent of Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive does not refer to professions, such as those of lawyers, consultants, accountants or engineers, but to services. The European Union legislature has used the professions mentioned in that provision as a means of defining the categories of services to which it refers (Case C‑145/96 von Hoffmann  [1997] ECR I‑4857, paragraph 15).
20. Consequently, it is necessary to establish whether research and development work, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, constitutes services which are principally and habitually carried out as part of the profession of engineer listed in the third indent of Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive (see, to that effect, von Hoffmann , paragraph 16).
24. It is important to add that, as is apparent from the case-law of the Court, the services referred to in Article 9(2)(c) of the Sixth Directive are characterised, inter alia, by the fact that they are provided for a number of different recipients, that is to say, all the people taking part, in a variety of capacities, in cultural, artistic, sporting, scientific, educational or entertainment activities (see Gillan Beach , paragraph 23).
Criminal proceedings against Martha Nussbaumer.
Date: 2010-10-07
17. It must be borne in mind at the outset that, although the Court may not, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, rule upon the compatibility of a provision of domestic law with European Union law or interpret domestic legislation or regulations, it may nevertheless provide the national court with an interpretation of European Union law on all such points as may enable that court to determine the issue of compatibility for the purposes of the case before it (see, inter alia, Case C-292/92 Hünermund and Others [1993] ECR‑I-6787, paragraph 8, and Joined Cases C‑285/99 and C‑286/99 Lombardini and Mantovani  [2001] ECR I‑9233, paragraph 27).
21. The Court inferred from this, at paragraph 30 of the judgment in Commission  v Italy , that the derogation in the second subparagraph of Article 3(2) of Directive 92/57 can refer only to the rule immediately preceding it, namely the rule requiring a safety and health plan to be drawn up.
22. Consequently, as the Court held at paragraph 35 of Commission  v Italy , Article 3(1) of Directive 92/57, the wording of which is clear and precise and which sets out unequivocally the requirement to appoint a coordinator for safety and health matters on any construction site on which more than one contractor is to be present, does not permit any derogation from that requirement.
30. In order to provide the referring court with a comprehensive answer, it should also be recalled that it has been consistently held that a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and that a provision of a directive cannot therefore be relied on as such against that individual (see Joined Cases C‑74/95 and C‑129/95 X  [1996] ECR I‑6609, paragraphs 23 to 25, and Joined Cases C‑387/02, C-391/02 and C‑403/02 Berlusconi and Others  [2005] ECR I‑3565, paragraphs 73 and 74).
Stils Met SIA v Valsts ieņēmumu dienests.
Date: 2010-10-07
29. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that it is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and for ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and the notes to the sections or chapters (see, inter alia, Case C‑173/08 Kloosterboer Sevices [2009] ECR I‑5347, paragraph 24).
37. It should also be noted that the Court has consistently held that both the notes to the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff and the Explanatory Notes to the Nomenclature of the Customs Cooperation Council are important means for ensuring the uniform application of the Tariff and as such may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (see, inter alia, Case C‑338/95 Wiener SI  [1997] ECR I‑6495, paragraph 11, and Case C‑276/00 Turbon International  [2002] ECR I‑1389, paragraph 22).
44. In that regard, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, where EU legislation does not specifically provide any penalty for an infringement or refers for that purpose to national legislation, Article 10 EC requires the Member States to take all the measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of EU law. For that purpose, while the choice of penalty remains within their discretion, they must ensure in particular that infringements of EU law are penalised under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive (see Case C-36/94 Siesse  [1995] ECR I-3573, paragraph 20, and Case C‑91/02 Hannl-Hofstetter [2003] ECR I‑12077, paragraph 17).
45. It follows from the above that the Member States are empowered to choose the measures which seem appropriate to them in the event of infringement of the provisions of Regulation No 1796/1999. They must, however, exercise that power in accordance with EU law and its general principles and, consequently, in accordance with the principle of proportionality (see, by analogy, Siesse , paragraph 21; Case C‑213/99 De Andrade [2000] ECR I-11083, paragraph 20; and Hannl-Hofstetter , paragraph 18).
Landkreis Bad Dürkheim v Aufsichts- und Dienstleistungsdirektion.
Date: 2010-10-14
37. It follows from the provisions referred to in paragraphs 32 to 36 of the present judgment that classification as ‘arable land’ or ‘permanent pasture’ and, consequently, as ‘agricultural area’, depends on the actual use of the land in question. Thus, an area must be classified as agricultural where is it used as arable land or permanent pasture within the meaning of Article 2 points (1) and (2) of Regulation No 796/2004.
39. For the sake of completeness, it must be noted that, as recitals 3, 21 and 24 in the preamble to Regulation No 1782/2003 make clear, environmental protection forms part of the objectives of the single payment scheme. The Court has also held that environmental protection, one of the essential objectives of the European Union, must be regarded as forming part of the common agricultural policy (Case C-428/07 Horvath  [2009] ECR I-6355, paragraph 29). Moreover, Article 2 point (1) of Regulation No 796/2004 expressly provides that arable land, and consequently agricultural areas pursuant to Article 2(a) of Regulation No 795/2004, is land maintained in good agricultural and environmental condition within the meaning of Article 5 of Regulation No 1782/2003.
47. Provided that an agricultural area is used for an agricultural activity within the meaning of Article 2(c) of Regulation No 1782/2003, it is irrelevant, for the purposes of Article 44(2), whether the activity has an essentially agricultural or nature conservation objective.
58. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, as indicated in paragraph 52 of this judgment, an area is allocated to a farmer’s holding where he has the power to manage that holding for the purposes of an agricultural activity.
60. According to the Court’s settled case-law, the meaning and scope of terms for which European Union law provides no definition must be determined by considering their usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they are part (Case C-336/03 easyCar  [2005] ECR I-1947, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
61. With regard to the single payment scheme, the concept of management does not imply, contrary to what is maintained by the ADD in its written observations, that the farmer has unlimited power over the area in question when using it for agricultural purposes.
62. However, the farmer must enjoy a degree of autonomy with regard to that area sufficient for the carrying-out of his agricultural activity, that being a matter for the referring court to assess, taking into account all the circumstances of the case.
63. In circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, it is important in particular that the farmer is not fully subject to the instructions of the national competent authority. Notwithstanding that authority’s instructions, the farmer must therefore be able to exercise a certain degree of decision-making power when using the area concerned.