Evroetil AD v Direktor na Agentsia "Mitnitsi".
Date: 2011-12-21
33. It should be borne in mind as a preliminary point that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts provided for by Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (Case C‑217/05 Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio  [2006] ECR I‑11987, paragraph 16 and case-law cited).
34. Where questions submitted by national courts concern the interpretation of a provision of EU law, the Court of Justice is bound, in principle, to give a ruling unless it is obvious that the request for a preliminary ruling is in reality designed to induce the Court to give a ruling by means of a fictitious dispute, or to deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions, or that the interpretation of EU law requested bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, or that the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio , paragraph 17 and case-law cited).
36.  Second, the alleged clarity of the answers to the questions referred in no way prevents a national court from making a reference for a preliminary ruling to this Court and does not have the effect of depriving this Court of jurisdiction to rule on such questions (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑428/06 to C‑434/06 UGT-Rioja and Others  [2008] ECR I‑6747, paragraphs 42 and 43 and case-law cited).
42. According to settled case-law, the need for uniform application and therefore interpretation of the various language versions of a provision of EU law requires, where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, that the provision in question be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (Case C‑72/95 Kraaijeveld and Others [1996] ECR I‑5403, paragraph 28, and Case C‑63/06 Profisa [2007] ECR I‑3239, paragraph 14).
48. According to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (Case C‑334/95 Krüger  [1997] ECR I‑4517, paragraphs 22 and 23, and Case C‑420/06 Jager [2008] ECR I‑1315, paragraph 46).
52. It should be borne in mind in that regard, first, that the provisions of Directive 2003/30 do not require the Member States to introduce, or maintain in force, a tax exemption scheme for biofuels. Consequently, no right to a tax exemption can be deduced from the provisions of that directive (see, to that effect, Case C‑201/08 Plantanol [2009] ECR I‑8343, paragraphs 33 to 38). Thus, contrary to what Evroetil and the referring court seem to consider, the classification of bioethanol for the purposes of Directive 2003/30 has no bearing on the tax treatment to be given under EU law to a product such as that at issue in the main proceedings.
56. The fact that the term ‘bioethanol’ is not found in the wording of that CN heading is irrelevant in that regard. In the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, inter alia, Case C‑142/06 Olicom [2007] ECR I‑6675, paragraph 16 and case-law cited). In the case of a product such as that at issue in the main proceedings, although it may show certain particularities relating inter alia to its method of production, it nevertheless remains, in the light of its objective characteristics and properties, ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of over 80%.
57. The fact that such a product is unsuitable for human consumption is equally irrelevant for its classification under CN code 2207. As is apparent from its very title, Directive 92/83 seeks to harmonise in a general manner the structures of excise duties on both alcoholic beverages and alcohol (Case C‑163/09 Repertoire Culinaire [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 27 and 29).
59. It is clear from the wording of that provision that the grant or refusal of an exemption is dependent on the denaturing method. If that method has been approved at EU level, the alcohol is exempted from excise duties under Article 27(1)(a). If, on the other hand, the alcohol contained in a product not intended for human consumption has been denatured in accordance with a method approved in a Member State, the exemption provided for by Article 27(1)(b) should be applied. Moreover, if the denaturing method is not one of those approved either by the EU rules or by national laws then the product cannot be exempted (Case C‑482/98 Italy  v Commission [2000] ECR I‑10861, paragraphs 40 and 41).
60. It should also be borne in mind in that regard that denaturing is a process designed to render alcohol toxic through the addition of certain substances so that it cannot be re-converted for use in food products (see, to that effect, Italy  v Commission , paragraphs 21 and 22; see also, by way of information, the Harmonised System Explanatory Notes relating to heading 2207 drawn up by the World Customs Organisation, to which reference is made by the Explanatory Notes for the CN relating to CN code 2207, adopted by the Commission under the second indent of Article 9(1)(a) and Article 10 of Regulation No 2658/87, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 254/2000 of 31 January 2000 (OJ 2000 L 28, p. 16), in the version thereof in force as at 1 January 2007 (OJ 2006 C 50, p. 1)).
66. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the third and fourth questions is that European Union law must be interpreted as meaning that a product such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which contains more than 98.5% ethyl alcohol and has not been denatured in a special denaturing procedure must be subject to the excise duty provided for in Article 19(1) of Directive 92/83, even where it was obtained from biomass using a technology which differs from the technology for the production of agricultural ethyl alcohol, contains substances making it unsuitable for human consumption, satisfies the requirements laid down in European standard prEN 15376 for bioethanol used as fuel and potentially meets the definition of bioethanol in Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2003/30.
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