Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners Co. Ltd v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2014-02-27
32. It can be seen from the above considerations that it was on the basis of an appraisal of the facts before it that the General Court decided that, in the circumstances, the interests of Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners had not been damaged as a consequence of the three-month time-limit having achieved its intended practical effect. This means that, by the first ground of appeal, Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners is in part effectively challenging the findings of fact made by the General Court and set out in paragraphs 61 to 64 of the judgment under appeal, regarding the question whether the purpose of that time-limit had been undermined in the particular circumstances of the case. However, it is settled law that, under Article 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal lies on a point of law only, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts. Accordingly, that appraisal does not, save where the facts are distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (see Case C‑416/04 P Sunrider v OHIM  [2006] ECR I‑4237, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
34. As to the remainder, it should be noted that the argument from Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners that the approach taken by the General Court would render the three-month time-limit redundant or useless is ineffective ab initio : the determinant line of reasoning adopted by the General Court in that regard – as set out in paragraph 68, inter alia, of the judgment under appeal – is based on the finding that Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners’ arguments had failed to prove that, if the Commission had not exceeded the three-month time‑limit, the Council might have adopted a different regulation more favourable to that company’s interests than the contested regulation.
40. The finding made by the General Court in paragraphs 68 and 70 of the judgment under appeal was not that Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners had to prove that, but for the procedural irregularity at issue, a different MET decision – and, accordingly, a more favourable dumping margin – would have been adopted; rather, that finding was, in essence, that it was for Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners to establish, in accordance with the line of authority on that point (see Foshan Shunde Yongjian Housewares & Hardware v Council , paragraph 94 and the case-law cited), that, if the Commission had complied with the three-month time-limit in question, the Council ‘might have’ adopted a different regulation more favourable to Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners’ interests than the contested regulation.
42. In any event, the arguments submitted by Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners in connection with that ground of appeal are ineffective ab initio since that company has not adduced any reasons to show that, if the Commission had complied with the three-month time-limit in question, the MET decision or the contested regulation might have been more favourable to Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners’ interests, and especially since it has not disputed before this Court the findings made in the judgment under appeal concerning the substance of the MET decision.
47. As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to assess the evidence. Save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, that appraisal does not therefore constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice. Furthermore, a distortion must be obvious from the documents before the Court, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (see, inter alia, Case C‑551/03 P General Motors v Commission  [2006] ECR I‑3173, paragraph 54; Case C‑535/06 P Moser Baer India v Council  [2009] ECR I‑7051, paragraph 33; and Case C‑552/10 P Usha Martin v Council and Commission  [2012] ECR, paragraph 27).