Laurent Gbagbo (C‑478/11 P), Katinan Justin Koné (C‑479/11 P), Akissi Danièle Boni-Claverie (C‑480/11 P), Alcide Djédjé (C‑481/11 P) and Affi Pascal N’Guessan (C‑482/11 P) v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2013-04-23
53. First, it must be stated that the General Court was correct to hold that it is entitled to examine of its own motion whether the time-limit for bringing proceedings has been observed, that being a matter of public policy (see, inter alia, Case 79/70 Müllers  v CES  [1971] ECR 689, paragraph 6, and Transportes Evaristo Molina  v Commission , paragraph 33).
56. That situation is a consequence of the particular nature of the contested measures, which at the same time resemble both measures of general application in that they impose on a category of addressees determined in a general and abstract manner a prohibition on, inter alia, making available funds and economic resources to persons and entities named in the lists contained in their annexes and also a bundle of individual decisions affecting those persons and entities (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation  v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I‑6351, paragraphs 241 to 244).
57. It must, moreover, be recalled that, as regards measures adopted on the basis of provisions relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, such as the contested measures, it is the individual nature of those measures which, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU and the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, permits access to the Courts of the European Union.
58. Having regard to those particular features and the consequent rules relating to publication and communication, the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU would not be applied consistently if, when applied to persons and entities who are named in the lists contained in the annexes to those measures, the starting point for the calculation of the period for bringing an action for annulment was, for those persons, fixed as the date of publication of the measure at issue and not as the date when that measure was communicated to them. The purpose of that communication is precisely to ensure that persons to whom the measures are addressed are able to defend their rights in the best possible conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in their applying to the Courts of the European Union ( Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation  v Council and Commission , paragraph 337).
62. Given that such notices are capable of enabling the persons concerned to identify the legal remedies available to them in order to challenge their designation in the lists concerned and the date when the period for bringing proceedings expires (Case C‑417/11 P Council  v Bamba [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 81), it is important that the appellants should not be able to defer the starting point of the period for bringing proceedings by relying on the fact that there was no direct communication or that they actually became aware of the contested measures at a later date. If such a possibility were, in the absence of force majeure , open to the appellants, it would jeopardise the very objective of a time-limit for bringing proceedings, which is to protect legal certainty by ensuring that European Union measures which produce legal effects may not indefinitely be called into question (see, inter alia, Case C‑178/95 Wiljo [1997] ECR I‑585, paragraph 19; Case C‑241/01 National Farmers’ Union [2002] ECR I‑9079, paragraph 34, and order of 15 November 2012 in Case C‑102/12 P Städter  v ECB , paragraph 12).
63. As regards, lastly, the appellants’ argument that the extension of the time-limit on account of distance by ten days as provided for in Article 102(2) of the General Court’s Rules of Procedure cannot be applied to them because they are established in a non-Member State, suffice it to observe that that argument is invalidated by the fact that the extension is for a single fixed period. It follows that the fact that the appellants were, during the period for bringing proceedings, in a non‑Member State, does not, in itself, mean that they were in a situation which was objectively different, with regard to the application of that time-limit, from the situation of persons and entities established within the European Union who were the subject of restrictive measures of the same kind.
64. It follows from all the foregoing that, even though the General Court erred in law by holding that the periods for bringing proceedings started to run on the dates of publication of the contested measures, those periods, which should have been calculated from the dates referred to in paragraph 61 of this judgment, had expired on 7 July 2011, the date when the actions were brought. That being the case, the second ground of appeal m ust be rejected (see, by analogy, Case C‑282/05 P Holcim (Deutschland)  v Commission [2007] ECR I‑2941, paragraph 33).
The first ground of appeal
Arguments of the parties
71. In that regard, it must first be recalled that the strict application of procedural rules serves the requirements of legal certainty and the need to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice (Case C‑426/10 P Bell & Ross  v OHIM [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 43 and case-law cited).
72. It must next be observed that, in accordance with the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 45 of the Statute of the Court, it is for the party concerned to establish, first, that abnormal circumstances, unforeseeable and outside his control, made it impossible for him to comply with the time‑limit for bringing proceedings laid down in the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and, secondly, that he could not guard against the consequences of those circumstances by taking appropriate steps without making unreasonable sacrifices (see, to that effect, Case C‑314/06 Société Pipeline Méditerranée et Rhône [2007] ECR I‑12273, paragraph 24 and case‑law cited).