French Republic and Ireland v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1996-02-29
18 A measure limiting the weight of carcases eligible for intervention cannot be regarded as a basic element of the matter to be dealt with and thus one which must be adopted by the Council in accordance with the procedure in Article 43 of the EEC Treaty (see, inter alia, Case 25/70 Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fuer Getreide und Futtermittel v Koester [1970] ECR 1161, paragraph 6). Albeit such a measure may lead to a reorientation of beef and veal production, its aim is to implement in the most appropriate way the intervention mechanism laid down by the Council in order to deal with the structural imbalance which, as is noted in the first recital in the preamble to Regulation No 2066/92, exists between supply and demand on the Community market for beef and veal.
22 Finally, since in the sphere of the common agricultural policy the Commission alone is able to monitor continually and closely trends on the agricultural markets and to act with urgency if the situation requires, the Council may find it necessary to confer on the Commission wide implementing powers (see, in particular, Case 23/75 Rey Soda v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero [1975] ECR 1279, paragraph 11). Wide powers of implementation are all the more justified in the present case in that they must be exercised in accordance with the "Management Committee" procedure, which allows the Council to reserve its right to intervene (Rey Soda, paragraph 13).
30 The Court has stated (see, in particular, Joined Cases C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93 Crispoltoni and Others v Fattoria Autonoma Tabacchi and Donatab [1994] ECR I-4863, paragraph 41) that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of Community law, requires that measures adopted by Community institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.
31 The Court has also held (see, inter alia, Case 29/77 Roquette Frères v Administration des Douanes [1977] ECR 1835, paragraphs 19 and 20) that where the evaluation of a complex economic situation is involved, the Commission and the Management Committee enjoy a wide measure of discretion. In reviewing the legality of the exercise of such discretion, the Court must confine itself to examining whether it discloses manifest error or constitutes misuse of power or a clear disregard of the limits of its discretion on the part of that institution.
32 The first question to be determined, therefore, is whether there was any manifest error in the Commission' s assessment of the relevant market situation.
49 The Court has consistently held that the prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 40(3) of the EEC Treaty is only a specific expression of the general principle of equality in Community law, which requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, inter alia, Case C-56/94 SCAC v ASIPO [1995] ECR I-1769, paragraph 27).
50 As noted above, the weight limit on carcases eligible for buying-in seeks to ensure stability on the market for beef and veal, thereby pursuing one of the objectives of the common agricultural policy, set out in Article 39(1)(c) of the EEC Treaty. In the pursuit of that objective all Community producers, regardless of the Member State in which they are based, must, together and in equal measure, bear the consequences of the decisions which the Community institutions are led to adopt in exercise of their powers in order to respond to the risk of an imbalance which may arise in the market between production and market outlets (see, inter alia, Case 203/86 Spain v Council [1988] ECR 4563, paragraph 29, and Crispoltoni and Others, cited above, paragraph 52).
59 Furthermore, whilst the protection of legitimate expectation is one of the fundamental principles of the Community, traders cannot have a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by the Community institutions in the exercise of their discretionary powers will be maintained; this is particularly true in an area such as common organization of markets which involves constant adjustments to meet changes in the economic situation (see, in particular, Crispoltoni and Others, cited above, paragraph 57). Traders cannot therefore claim to have a vested right to maintain an advantage which establishment of a common market organization has given them and which they have at a given time enjoyed (paragraph 58 of the same judgment).
67 The Court has held (see, inter alia, Case C-156/93 Parliament v Commission [1995] ECR I-2019, paragraph 31) that adoption by a Community institution of a measure with the exclusive purpose, or at any rate the main purpose, of achieving an end other than that stated or evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case constitutes misuse of power.
72 The Court has consistently held (see, inter alia, Case C-466/93 Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others v Bundesamt fuer Ernaehrung und Forstwirtschaft [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraph 16) that the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the EEC Treaty must be appropriate to the nature of the measure in question. The reasoning of the institution which adopted the measure must be stated clearly and unequivocally, so as to inform persons concerned of the justification for the measure adopted and to enable the Court to exercise its powers of review.
76 As regards the arguments concerning alleged errors of assessment in those recitals, the Court has held that such questions relate not to the issue of infringement of essential procedural requirements but to the substance of the case (see, in that regard, Case 49/69 BASF v Commission [1972] ECR 713, paragraph 14). The arguments have been examined in relation to the pleas of breach of the principle of proportionality and breach of the principle of protecting legitimate expectation.