Kingdom of the Netherlands v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2001-11-22
49 It is useful to begin by recalling the nature of the association with the OCTs laid down by the Treaty. That association is the subject of arrangements defined in Part Four of the Treaty (Articles 131 to 136), with the result that, failing express reference, the general provisions of the Treaty do not apply to the OCTs (see Case C-260/90 Leplat [1992] ECR I-643, paragraph 10).
52 The scheme of association with the OCTs confers advantages on those countries and territories in order to further their economic and social development. Those advantages are reflected, in particular, in the customs exemptions applicable to products originating in the OCTs when they are imported into the Community (see Case C-430/92 Netherlands v Commission [1994] ECR I-5197, paragraph 22).
53 However it is also apparent from the Court's case-law that, when the Council enacts measures under the second paragraph of Article 136 of the Treaty, it must take account not only of the principles in Part Four of the Treaty but also of the other principles of Community law, including those relating to the common agricultural policy (see Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission [1999] ECR I-769, paragraph 37, and Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar [2000] ECR I-675, paragraph 38).
54 That conclusion is, moreover, consistent with Article 3(r) and Article 131 of the Treaty, which provide that the Community is to promote the economic and social development of the OCTs, but without that promotion implying an obligation to give them privileged treatment (Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 38).
55 In weighing the various objectives laid down by the Treaty, the Council, which enjoys for that purpose a considerable margin of discretion reflecting the political responsibilities entrusted to it by the Treaty articles such as Article 136, may be prompted, in case of need, to curtail certain advantages previously granted to the OCTs (see Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar, cited above, paragraph 39).
58 Moreover, contrary to the Netherlands Government's claim, the competence of the Council to adopt safeguard measures is not confined to the situation set out in Article 134 of the Treaty. That provision only concerns one particular situation. It is not intended to restrict the Council's general competence, contained in the second paragraph of Article 136 of the Treaty, to lay down the details of and procedure for the implementation of the association having regard to all of the principles set out in the Treaty (see, to that effect, Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 41).
61 It should first be borne in mind that it is apparent from the Court's case-law that the Community institutions have been given a wide discretion in the application of Article 109 of the OCT Decision (see, to that effect, Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 48).
62 In cases involving such a discretion, the Community courts must restrict themselves to considering whether the exercise of that discretion contains a manifest error or constitutes a misuse of power or whether the Community institutions clearly exceeded the bounds of their discretion (see Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 48; see also to that effect Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 207, paragraph 40, and Case C-189/01 Jippes and Others [2001] ECR I-5689, paragraph 80).
63 The Community court's review must be limited in particular if, as in the present case, the Community institutions have to reconcile divergent interests and thus to select options within the context of the policy choices which are their own responsibility (see, to that effect, Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar, cited above, paragraph 53).
The quantities of rice originating in the OCTs imported into the Community
73 The Netherlands Government claims that the statement in the preamble to Regulation No 304/97, that rice originating in the OCTs is sold on the Community market at a lower price than that at which Community rice can be sold, is manifestly inaccurate.
74 It considers that, since the Community producers do not produce semi-milled rice, in order to compare prices it is necessary to calculate an equivalent milled price for rice originating in the OCTs. As for the choice of basis of comparison for the equivalent milled price, it considers that imports of paddy rice originating in the OCTs should not be taken into account. While Community rice marketed in its paddy state is processed directly into milled rice by the buyers, the paddy rice originating in the OCTs undergoes a two-stage process, being converted first into semi-milled rice in the OCTs, then into milled rice in the Community. The equivalent milled price of paddy rice originating in the OCTs therefore includes an additional cost as compared with Community milled rice, corresponding to the profit margin of the intermediary miller.
92 Given the Community institutions' wide discretion in the application of Article 109 of the OCT Decision, and the fact that that discretion can be exercised not only in relation to the nature and scope of the provisions which are to be adopted but also, to a certain extent, to the findings as to the basic facts (see, to that effect, Case C-150/94 United Kingdom v Council [1998] ECR I-7235, paragraph 55, and Case C-289/97 Eridania [2000] ECR I-5409, paragraph 48), it cannot be concluded that the Council committed a manifest error in its assessment of the information available to it when Regulation No 304/97 was adopted.
115 As for the alleged breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, it will be recalled that, according to settled case-law, traders cannot properly claim to have a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by the Community institutions within the limits of their discretionary power will be maintained (see Case C-284/94 Spain v Council [1998] ECR I-7309, paragraph 43).
116 It is true that it is also apparent from the Court's case-law that the Community institutions may not, without breaching the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, adopt measures that have the effect of depriving traders of rights they can legitimately claim, without invoking any overriding public interest (see, to that effect, Case C-152/88 Sofrimport v Commission [1990] ECR I-2477, paragraphs 26 and 27).
122 It should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, in order to establish whether a provision of Community law complies with the principle of proportionality, it must be ascertained whether the means which it employs are suitable for the purpose of achieving the desired objective and whether they do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it (Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament and Council [1997] ECR I-2405, paragraph 54; Case C-284/95 Safety Hi-Tech [1998] ECR I-4301, paragraph 57, and Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 52).
126 As for the argument of the Netherlands Government that the introduction of a minimum price would have inflicted less disturbance on the economy of the OCTs and would have been just as effective in achieving the objectives pursued, it should be pointed out that, whilst ensuring that the rights of the OCTs are respected, the Community court cannot, without risk of overriding the wide discretion of the Council, substitute its assessment for that of the Council as to the choice of the most appropriate measure to prevent disturbances to the Community market in rice if those measures have not been proved to be manifestly inappropriate for achieving the objective pursued (see, to that effect, Case C-280/93 Germany v Commission [1994] ECR I-4973, paragraph 94, and Jippes, cited above, paragraph 83).
132 Contrary to the applicant's claim, whilst it is true that the amount of guarantee must be paid in order to acquire the import licences, a guarantee of that type does not deprive those undertakings that are genuinely interested of the possibility of exporting rice to the Community since that sum is reimbursed to the undertaking if the import operation is carried out.
137 As the Court has repeatedly held, a measure is only vitiated by misuse of powers if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence to have been taken with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that stated or evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case (see Case 69/83 Lux v Court of Auditors [1984] ECR 2447, paragraph 30; Case C-331/88 Fedesa and Others [1990] ECR I-4023, paragraph 24; Case C-156/93 Parliament v Commission [1995] ECR I-2019, paragraph 31; and Case C-48/96 P Windpark Groothusen v Commission [1998] ECR I-2873, paragraph 52).
151 The fact nevertheless remains that the principle of legal certainty generally precludes a Community act from taking effect as from a date prior to its publication. It may however exceptionally be otherwise where the purpose to be attained so requires and the legitimate expectations of the persons concerned are properly respected (see Case 98/78 Racke [1979] ECR 69, paragraph 20; Case 99/78 Decker [1979] ECR 101, paragraph 8; Case 258/80 Rumi v Commission [1982] ECR 487, paragraph 11; and Case C-337/88 SAFA [1990] ECR I-1, paragraph 13).
163 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty must be appropriate to the nature of the measure in question. It must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the institution which enacted the measure so as to inform the persons concerned of the justification for the measure adopted and to enable the Court to exercise its powers of review (see Joined Cases C-63/90 and C-67/90 Portugal and Spain v Council [1992] ECR I-5073, paragraph 16; Case C-353/92 Greece v Council [1994] ECR I-3411, paragraph 19; and Joined Cases C-9/95, C-23/95 and C-156/95 Belgium and Germany v Commission [1997] ECR I-645, paragraph 44).
164 It is not necessary, however, for details of all relevant factual and legal aspects to be given, in so far as the question whether the statement of the grounds for a decision meets the requirements of Article 190 of the Treaty must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. This is a fortiori the case where the Member States have been closely associated with the process of drafting the contested measure and are thus aware of the reasons underlying that measure (see Case C-478/93 Netherlands v Commission [1995] ECR I-3081, paragraphs 49 and 50, and Case C-466/93 Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others II [1995] ECR I-3799, paragraph 16).