Somalfruit SpA and Camar SpA v Ministero delle Finanze and Ministero del Commercio con l'Estero.
Date: 1997-11-27
40 As to those submissions, it is to be remembered that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts provided for by Article 177 of the Treaty, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59).
41 However, the Court has no jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on a question submitted by a national court where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law or the examination of the validity of a rule of Community law sought by that court bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose or where the problem is hypothetical and the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-320/94, C-328/94, C-329/94, C-337/94, C-338/94 and C-339/94 RTI and Others [1996] ECR I-6471, paragraph 23, and Case C-134/95 USSL No 47 di Biella v INAIL [1997] ECR I-195, paragraph 12. The spirit of cooperation which must prevail in the preliminary-ruling procedure requires the national court, for its part, to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to assist in the administration of justice in the Member States and not to deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions (see, inter alia, Case C-83/91 Meilicke v ADV/ORGA [1992] ECR I-4871, paragraph 25, and Bosman, cited above, paragraph 60).
44 As regards the validity of the Council Regulation, it should be recalled that in Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-4973, paragraph 102, the Court dismissed the plea in law, put forward as a ground for annulment of that regulation, alleging that it was incompatible with the Lomé Convention and Protocol 5.
45 Question 1(a) and (c) relate in substance to the difference in the treatment of traditional and non-traditional imports of ACP bananas which was challenged by the Federal Republic of Germany in Case C-280/93 cited above. The Court held, on that point, that with respect to the establishment of a tariff quota, the import of bananas from ACP States fell under Article 168(2)(a)(ii) of the Lomé Convention. In accordance with Protocol 5, the Community was obliged to permit the access, free of customs duty, only of the quantities of bananas actually imported `at zero duty' in the best year before 1991 from each ACP State which was a traditional supplier. Moreover, Annexes LXXIV and LXXV relating to that Protocol confirmed that the Community's only obligation was to maintain the advantages, with respect to access of ACP bananas to the Community market, which the ACP States had before the Lomé Convention (Case C-280/93 Germany v Council, cited above, paragraph 101).
46 It must also be noted that, as stated in the Court's judgment in Case C-469/93 Chiquita Italia [1995] ECR I-4533, paragraph 59, Article 1 of Protocol 5 on bananas takes the form of a standstill clause. In other words, that provision aims to ensure the access of bananas from ACP States to their traditional markets upon conditions and according to rules which are no less favourable than those which existed when it entered into force. However, that guarantee of access benefits bananas from ACP States only up to the quantities imported when that provision entered into force.
49 According to the case-law of the Court, in order to establish whether a provision of Community law complies with the principle of proportionality, it must be ascertained whether the means which it employs are suitable for the purpose of attaining the desired objective and whether they do not go beyond what is necessary to attain it (see, inter alia, Case C-426/93 Germany v Council [1995] ECR I-3723, paragraph 42).
50 The Court has also stated on numerous occasions that, where the evaluation of a complex economic situation is involved, the Community institutions enjoy a wide measure of discretion. In reviewing the legality of the exercise of such discretion, the Court must confine itself to examining whether it is not vitiated by a manifest error or misuse of power or whether the institution in question has not manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion (see Case C-354/95 National Farmer's Union and Others [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 50).
62 According to the settled case-law of the Court, in the context of the common agricultural policy, since only the Commission is in a position to keep track of agricultural market trends and to act quickly where necessary, the Council may find it necessary to confer on it wide powers in that sphere (see, inter alia, Case 23/75 Rey Soda v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero [1975] ECR 1279, paragraph 11, and Case C-285/94 Italy v Commission [1997] ECR I-3519, paragraph 22). The limits of those powers must be determined by reference among other things to the essential general aims of the market organization (see Case 22/88 Vreugdenhil and Others [1989] ECR 2049, paragraph 16, and Case C-478/93 Netherlands v Commission [1995] ECR I-3081, paragraph 30).