larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Juan Miguel Iglesias Gutiérrez and Elisabet Rion Bea v Bankia SA and Others.
Date: 2015-10-15
21. In that connection, it must be recalled that the system of cooperation established by Article 267 TFEU is based on a clear division of responsibilities between the national courts and the Court of Justice. In proceedings brought on the basis of that article, the interpretation of provisions of national law is a matter for the courts of the Member States, not for the Court of Justice, and the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the compatibility of rules of national law with EU law. However, the Court does have jurisdiction to provide the national court with all the guidance as to the interpretation of EU law necessary to enable that court to determine whether those national rules are compatible with EU law (see, inter alia, order in Debiasi , C‑560/11, EU:C:2012:802, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
22. Although it is true that, on a literal reading of the referring court’s questions, the Court is being asked to rule on the compatibility of a provision of national law with EU law, there is nothing to prevent the Court from giving an answer that will be of use to the national court, by providing the latter with guidance as to the interpretation of EU law which will enable that court to rule itself on the compatibility of the national rules with EU law (see, inter alia, order in Debiasi , C‑560/11, EU:C:2012:802, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
26. The implementation of that system of control is a matter for both the Commission and the national courts, their respective roles being complementary but separate. Whilst assessment of the compatibility of aid measures with the internal market falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the Courts of the European Union, it is for the national courts to ensure that the rights of individuals are safeguarded in the event of a possible breach by State authorities of the prohibition laid down by Article 108(3) TFEU on putting a plan to grant aid into effect before the Commission has given a decision on the compatibility of that plan (see, to that effect, judgment in Deutsche Lufthansa , C‑284/12, EU:C:2013:755, paragraphs 27 and 28 and the case-law cited).
27. When the Commission, on conclusion of its investigation, adopts a positive decision as referred to in Article 7(3) of Regulation No 659/1999, it is then apparent that the objective referred to in paragraph 25 of this judgment has been safeguarded and that the aid concerned may be put into effect (see, to that effect, judgment in CELF and Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication , C‑199/06, EU:C:2008:79, paragraph 49).
Thomas Cook Belgium NV v Thurner Hotel GmbH.
Date: 2015-10-22
28. As the Court held in paragraph 30 of the judgment in Goldbet Sportwetten (C‑144/12, EU:C:2013:393), the defendant’s option of lodging a statement of opposition is designed to compensate for the fact that the system established by Regulation No 1896/2006 does not provide for the defendant’s participation in the European order for payment procedure by enabling him to contest the claim after the European order for payment has been issued.
31. Since the EU legislature intended to limit the review procedure to exceptional circumstances, the provision must necessarily be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, judgment in Commission  v Council , C‑111/10, EU:C:2013:785, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
47. In those circumstances, once the European order for payment had been served on the defendant in accordance with Regulation No 1896/2006, since it was not possible for it to be unaware of such a jurisdiction clause, the defendant could have considered whether the information provided by the claimant in the application form was false with regard, in this instance, to the jurisdiction of the court of origin. The defendant therefore had the opportunity of raising this under the opposition procedure laid down in Article 16 of Regulation No 1896/2006.
48. As is stated in recital 25 in the preamble to that regulation, the possibility, provided for in Article 20 of Regulation 1896/2006, of having the order for payment reviewed must not lead to the defendant being given a second opportunity to oppose the claim.
Bundesagentur für Arbeit - Familienkasse Sachsen v Tomislaw Trapkowski.
Date: 2015-10-22
26. Furthermore, it is common ground that the benefits at issue in the main proceedings, which are intended to alleviate the financial burdens involved in the maintenance of children, fall within the concept of ‘family benefits’ within the meaning of Regulation No 883/2004 (see judgments in Offermanns , C‑85/99, EU:C:2001:166, paragraph 41, and Lachheb , C‑177/12, EU:C:203:689, paragraph 35).
31. It is not for the Court of Justice to challenge that finding, based on the national law as interpreted by the national court (see, to that effect, judgment in Slanina , C‑363/08, EU:C:2009:732, paragraph 27).
32. As regards the applicability of the priority rules laid down in Article 68(1) of Regulation No 883/2004 it should be recalled that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, for a finding that such overlapping is present in a given case, it is not enough for such benefits to be due in the relevant child’s Member State of residence and to be, in parallel, merely capable of being due in another Member State, where one of the parents of that child works (judgment in Schwemmer , C‑16/09, EU:C:2010:605, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).
35. In order to answer that question, it should be recalled, first of all, that the deeming provisions included in in Article 67 of Regulation No 883/2004 has the effect that a person may claim family benefits for members of his family who reside in a Member State other than that responsible for paying those benefits, as if they resided in that Member State.
39. Accordingly, given that the parents of the child for whom family benefits are claimed fall within the definition of ‘persons concerned’ within the meaning of Article 60(1) of Regulation No 987/2009, authorised to claim payment of those benefits, it is conceivable that a parent who resides in a Member State other than that required to pay those benefits is the person entitled to receive those benefits, if all the other conditions laid down by national law are also met.
41. It is clear from all of the foregoing that Article 60(1), second sentence, of Regulation No 987/2009 must be interpreted as meaning that the deeming provision included these may lead to the grant of entitlement to family benefits to a person who does not reside in the Member State responsible for paying those benefits, where all the other conditions for the grant of those benefits laid down by national law are met, a matter which is for the referring court to determine.
The second question referred
44. The persons entitled to family benefits are, as is clear from Article 67 of Regulation No 883/200, to be determined in accordance with national law.
49. Therefore, where all the conditions for the grant of child benefits have been met and those benefits are actually granted, the issue as to which parent is regarded under national law as the person entitled to receive such benefits is irrelevant (see, to that effect, judgment in Hoever and Zachow , C‑245/94 and C‑312/94, EU:C:1996:379, paragraph 37).
European Commission v ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias.
Date: 2015-10-29
21. According to Article 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, there is a right of appeal on points of law only and that appeal must be based on grounds alleging lack of jurisdiction of the General Court, a breach of procedure before it which adversely affects the interests of the appellant and the infringement of EU law by the General Court (judgment in Commune de Millau and SEMEA  v Commission , C‑531/12 P, EU:C:2014:2008, paragraph 55).
22. The General Court therefore has exclusive jurisdiction to establish the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and to assess the evidence accepted. The establishment of those facts and the assessment of that evidence therefore do not, save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice (judgment in Commune de Millau and SEMEA  v Commission , C‑531/12 P, EU:C:2014:2008, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).
23. In this context, as was stated by the Advocate General in points 24 and 26 of his Opinion, it should be noted that the General Court’s examination of a contractual term cannot be considered to be an interpretation of law and cannot therefore be reviewed in the context of an appeal without encroaching upon the jurisdiction of the General Court to establish the facts. By contrast, the alleged infringement of EU law applicable to contracts is subject to a review by the Court such as that carried out in the context of an appeal.
54. With regard to the alleged distortion of the evidence by the General Court, although it is true that the Commission, in accordance with settled case-law, has expressly pleaded such distortion (see, inter alia, order in Walcher Meßtechnik  v OHIM , C‑374/14 P, EU:C:2015:101, paragraph 27), it should, however, be noted that, according to equally settled case-law, that distortion must be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and evidence (see judgment in Tomra Systems and Others  v Commission , C‑549/10 P, EU:C:2012:221, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
55. Moreover, as the Court has already held, a distortion of the evidence requires that the General Court must have manifestly exceeded the limits of a reasonable assessment of the evidence. It therefore does not suffice, in order to show such a distortion, to suggest a reading of that evidence different from that adopted by the General Court (see judgments in Activision Blizzard Germany  v Commission , C‑260/09 P, EU:C:2011:62, paragraph 57, and in Commission  v Aalberts Industries and Others , C‑287/11 P, EU:C:2013:445, paragraph 52).
B & S Global Transit Center BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2015-10-29
25. It should be noted that Articles 203 and 204 of the Customs Code have different spheres of application. Whilst the first provision covers conduct leading to the goods being removed from customs supervision, the second covers failure to fulfil obligations and non-compliance with the conditions of the various customs procedures which have no effect on customs supervision (judgment in DSV Road , C‑187/14, EU:C:2015:421, paragraph 22).
26. It is clear from the wording of Article 204 of the Customs Code that it applies only to situations which do not fall within the scope of Article 203 of that code (judgment in DSV Road , C‑187/14, EU:C:2015:421, paragraph 23).
27. It follows therefrom that, in order to determine which of those two articles forms the basis on which a customs debt on importation is incurred, it is necessary first of all to consider whether in the factual situation in question there was an unlawful removal from customs supervision within the terms of Article 203(1) of the Customs Code. Only if that question is answered in the negative is it possible that Article 204 of the Customs Code may apply (judgment in DSV Road , C‑187/14, EU:C:2015:421, paragraph 24).
28. With regard more particularly to the concept of removal from customs supervision, referred to in Article 203(1) of the Customs Code, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, that concept is to be interpreted as covering any act or omission the result of which is to prevent the competent customs authority, if only for a short time, from gaining access to goods under customs supervision and from carrying out the monitoring required under Article 37(1) of the Customs Code (judgment in DSV Road , C‑187/14, EU:C:2015:421, paragraph 25).
29. It is sufficient, for there to be ‘removal from customs supervision’, for the goods in question to have been objectively removed from possible controls, whether or not such controls have actually been carried out by the competent authority (judgment in SEK Zollagentur , C‑75/13, EU:C:2014:1759, paragraph 32).
36. Moreover, it should be noted that, in a situation in which the goods have been taken out of the customs territory of the European Union, the financial nature of the import duties does not preclude a customs debt from being incurred on the basis of Article 203(1) of the Customs Code, since Article 239 of that code provides for the repayment or remission of duties legally owed, subject to certain conditions (see, to that effect, judgment in Hamann International , C‑337/01, EU:C:2004:90, paragraph 34).
Benjámin Dávid Nagy v Vas Megyei Rendőr-főkapitányság.
Date: 2015-10-29
20. At the outset, it should be noted that, even though, formally, the referring court has limited its questions to the interpretation of Article 18 TFEU and Article 20(2)(a) TFEU, such a situation does not prevent the Court from providing the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of European Union law which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case before it, whether or not that court has specifically referred to them in the questions (see, to that effect, judgments in ING. AUER , C‑251/06, EU:C:2007:658, paragraph 38, and van Putten and Others , C‑578/10 to C‑580/10, EU:C:2012:246, paragraph 23).
21. The questions referred must be answered in the light of all the provisions of the Treaty and of secondary legislation which may be relevant to the problem (see, to that effect, judgments in Mutsch , 137/84, EU:C:1985:335, paragraph 10, and van Putten and Others , C‑578/10 to C‑580/10, EU:C:2012:246, paragraph 24).
23. As the European Commission correctly states, the Court has already held, in relation to a loan agreed between citizens resident in different Member States, that the cross-border lending of a vehicle free of charge constitutes a movement of capital within the meaning of Article 63 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment in van Putten and Others , C‑578/10 to C‑580/10, EU:C:201 2:246, paragraphs 28 and 36).
24. Since Article 63 TFEU is applicable and provides specific rules on non-discrimination, Article 18 TFEU does not apply (see, to that effect, judgment in Missionswerk Werner Heukelbach , C‑25/10, EU:C:2011:65, paragraph 19).
26. In that regard, it must be recalled that measures taken by a Member State which are liable to dissuade its residents from obtaining loans in other Member States constitute restrictions within the meaning of Article 63(1) TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission v Belgium , C‑478/98, EU:C:2000:497, paragraph 18, and van Putten and Others , C‑578/10 to C‑580/10, EU:C:2012:246, paragraph 40).
30. Thus, unless the vehicle registered in a different Member State is intended to be used essentially in Hungary on a permanent basis or if it is, in fact, used in that way, which it is for the referring court to determine, a national law such as that at issue in the main proceedings constitutes a restriction of the free movement of capital within the meaning of Article 63(1) TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment in van Putten and Others , C‑578/10 to C‑580/10, EU:C:2012:246, paragraph 50).
Bronius Jakutis and Kretingalės kooperatinė ŽŪB v Nacionalinė mokėjimo agentūra prie Žemės ūkio ministerijos and Lietuvos valstybė.
Date: 2015-11-12
52. In the absence of a definition in EU law of the ‘level of direct payments applicable in the Member States other than the new Member States’, referred to in Articles 10 and 121 of Regulation No 73/2009, that expression must be interpreted having regard to the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the EU legislature (see, to that effect, judgment in Szatmári Malom , C‑135/13, EU:C:2014:327, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
54. The purpose of that progressive rather than immediate introduction of those payments in the new Member States was not to slow down the restructuring of the agricultural sector and not to create significant disparities in income or social imbalances by the granting of aid not proportionate to the income level of farmers and the general population (see, to that effect, judgments in Bábolna , C‑115/10, EU:C:2011:376, paragraph 34, and Poland v Council , C‑273/04, EU:C:2007:622, paragraph 69).
59. Since the postulated connection between the respective levels of direct payments stems from the 2003 Act of Accession and, consequently, from provisions of primary law (see, to that effect, judgment in Parliament v Council , C‑413/04, EU:C:2006:741, paragraph 43), it must be assumed in the interpretation of Regulation No 73/2009 in so far as it reflects the provisions set out in Annex II of that Act of Accession.
90. Regarding the last mentioned principle, it must nevertheless be noted that, due to the fact that the agricultural situation in the new Member States was radically different from that in the Member States other than the new Member States, which prevents any valid comparison being made (judgment in Poland v Council , C‑273/04, EU:C:2007:622, paragraphs 87 and 88), the specific provisions of Articles 10 and 132 of Regulation No 73/2009, which meet the legitimate ground of applying, as from 2012, the rules for modulation in the new Member States, do not infringe the principle of non-discrimination.
93. It should be noted at the outset that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment in Rosselle , C‑65/14, EU:C:2015:339, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
103. According to settled case-law, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all EU languages. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgment in Ivansson and Others , C‑307/13, EU:C:2014:2058, paragraph 40).
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union.
Date: 2015-11-12
20. It is apparent from the settled case-law of the Court that the partial annulment of an EU act is possible only if the elements whose annulment is sought may be severed from the remainder of the act (see judgments in Commission  v Council , C‑29/99, EU:C:2002:734, paragraph 45, and Germany  v Commission , C‑239/01, EU:C:2003:514, paragraph 33). The Court has repeatedly ruled that that requirement of severability is not satisfied where the partial annulment of an act would have the effect of altering its substance (see judgment in Commission  v Parliament and Council , C‑427/12, EU:C:2014:170, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).
21. Review of whether elements of an EU act are severable requires consideration of the scope of those elements, in order to assess whether thei r annulment would alter the spirit and substance of the act (see judgment in Commission  v Estonia , C‑505/09 P, EU:C:2012:179, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited).
Verein für Konsumenteninformation v A1 Telekom Austria AG.
Date: 2015-11-26
20. As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that Directive 2002/22 is intended to create a harmonised regulatory framework which secures, in the electronic communications sector, the delivery of universal service, that is to say, of a defined minimum set of services to all end-users at an affordable price. According to Article 1(1) of that directive, one of its objectives is to ensure the availability throughout the Community of good-quality publicly available services through effective competition and choice (see, to that effect, judgment in Base and Others , C‑389/08, EU:C:2010:584, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
25. Having regard to those provisions, it can be concluded that the EU legislature recognised that undertakings providing electronic communications services may have a legitimate interest in being able to adjust the prices and charges for their services (see, by analogy, judgment in RWE Vertrieb , C‑92/11, EU:C:2013:180, paragraph 46).
Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main v Duval GmbH & Co. KG.
Date: 2015-11-26
23. It is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, inter alia, judgment in Douane Advies Bureau Rietveld , C‑541/13, EU:C:2014:2270, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
24. The Court has also held that the explanatory notes to the CN and those to the HS are an important aid for interpreting the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force. The wording of those notes must therefore be consistent with the provisions of the CN and cannot alter their scope. Where it is apparent that they are contrary to the wording of the headings of the CN and the section or chapter notes, the explanatory notes to the CN must be disregarded (see, inter alia, judgment in JVC France , C‑312/07, EU:C:2008:324, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
25. It must also be noted that the intended use of a product may also constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (see, inter alia, judgment in Douane Advies Bureau Rietveld , C‑541/13, EU:C:2014:2270, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
28. In paragraph 34 of the judgment in Raytek and Fluke Europe  (C‑134/13, EU:C:2015:82), the Court thus held inter alia, concerning a regulation of the European Commission which classified infrared thermal imagers under code 9025 19 20 of the CN, that that institution was entitled to conclude that since those apparatus are capable of measuring temperature and representing the measured values in figures, they performed a function covered by heading 9025 of the CN and should be classified as thermometers within the meaning of that heading.
35. As regards, finally, the statement in Section D of the HS Explanatory Notes according to which papers impregnated with chemical substances the colour of which varies in accordance with atmospheric humidity come within heading 3822 of the CN, it should be noted, first, that that statement relates to the group of goods classified as hygrometers and not to that of thermometers and that that group does not contain an equivalent statement as regards goods such as those at issue in the main proceedings. Secondly, it should be noted that, in the judgment in Douane Advies Bureau Rietveld  (C‑541/13, EU:C:2014:2270), which concerned goods similar to those at issue in the main proceedings, the Court held that heading 3822 of the CN had to be interpreted as meaning that such goods do not come within that heading.