Holcim (Deutschland) AG v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2007-04-19
29. The period of limitation for an action for liability of the Community cannot begin until all the requirements governing an obligation to provide compensation for damage are satisfied and, in particular, until the damage to be made good has materialised. Therefore, where the liability of the Community has its origin in a legislative measure, that period of limitation does not begin until the damaging effects of that measure have arisen.
30. A different solution would call into question the principle of autonomy of actions, by making the procedure for an action for damages depend on the completion of an action for annulment. That solution can be applied to disputes arising from individual measures. In those cases, the period of limitation begins as soon as the decision has produced its effects vis-à-vis the persons concerned by it.
31. In the present case, however, the damaging effects of the Cement decision arose vis-à-vis the applicant’s predecessors as soon as they were ordered to pay a fine. Those orders were coupled with the option, made available in order to avoid having to pay the fines immediately, of providing bank guarantees. Contrary to what is submitted by the applicant, the damaging effects of the Cement decision therefore did not arise when the Court of First Instance annulled that decision. It is in fact irrelevant, as regards the starting point of the period of limitation, that the Community’s unlawful conduct was established by a ruling of that Court.
33. In paragraph 68 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance erred in law by holding that the limitation period began to run as soon as the bank guarantees were provided. Whilst the claim for damages could no doubt have been brought as soon as the guarantees were provided, since at that time the damage caused by the contested Commission decision was certain as to the grounds and could be determined as to the scope, the period of limitation could not, for its part, begin until the financial loss had in fact materialised, that is, until the bank guarantee charges had begun to run. However, whatever date is used falls well before that on which the Court gave its ruling in the Cement judgment, which the applicant regards as being the starting date of the limitation period. The first part of the first plea in law must be rejected.
The second part, alleging that the damage was ongoing
35. The amount of the alleged damage therefore increased in proportion to the number of days which elapsed. The applicant is accordingly not justified in submitting that the loss was instantaneous in nature and limited to the provision of the bank guarantees alone. Consequently, the Court of First Instance was correct to hold, in paragraph 69 of the judgment under appeal, that the damage relied on by the applicant was ongoing. The second part of the first plea in law must therefore be rejected.
The third part, alleging interruption of the limitation period
47. For the non-contractual liability of the Community to arise, a number of conditions must be met, including, where the unlawfulness of a legal measure is at issue, the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals. As regards that condition, the decisive criterion for establishing that a breach of Community law is sufficiently serious is whether the Community institution concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion. Where that institution has only considerably reduced, or even no, discretion, the mere infringement of Community law may be sufficient to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach ( Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission , paragraphs 43 and 44)
48. The determining factor in deciding whether there has been such an infringement is not the general or individual nature of the act in question ( Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission , paragraph 46, and Case C-472/00 Commission v Fresh Marine [2003] ECR I-7541, paragraph 27).
50. The system of rules which the Court of Justice has worked out in relation to the non-contractual liability of the Community takes into account, inter alia, the complexity of the situations to be regulated, difficulties in the application or interpretation of the legislation and, more particularly, the margin of discretion available to the author of the act in question ( Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission , paragraph 40, and Commission v Fresh Marine , paragraph 24).
57. It follows that the applicant has not been able to show that the Court of First Instance erred in law by holding that, in the present case, there was not a sufficiently serious breach of Community law, a breach which alone could have given rise to the non-contractual liability of the Community. In the light of the cumulative nature of the conditions governing that liability, that consideration suffices to dismiss the appeal without having to rule on the third plea in law relating to the existence of a causal link between the conduct of which the Community is accused and the alleged damage.
Costs