Willy Kempter KG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas.
Date: 2008-02-12
13. In its judgment of 14 December 2000 in Case C-110/99 Emsland-Stärke  [2000] ECR I‑11569, at paragraph 48, the Court held that the condition that the goods must have been imported into a non-member country in order for the export refunds provided for by a Community regulation to be granted can be raised against the recipient of the refunds only before their grant.
34. In answering the first question, it should be remembered first of all that, in accordance with settled case-law, all the authorities of the Member States have the task of ensuring observance of the rules of Community law within the sphere of their competence (see Case C-8/88 Germany  v Commission  [1990] ECR I‑2321, paragraph 13, and Kühne & Heitz , paragraph 20).
35. It should also be remembered that the interpretation which, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 234 EC, the Court gives to a rule of Community law clarifies and defines, where necessary, the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be, or ought to have been, understood and applied from the time of its coming into force (see, inter alia, Case 61/79 Denkavit italiana  [1980] ECR 1205, paragraph 16; Case C-50/96 Deutsche Telekom  [2000] ECR I-743, paragraph 43; and Kühne & Heitz , paragraph 21). In other words, a preliminary ruling does not create or alter the law, but is purely declaratory, with the consequence that in principle it takes effect from the date on which the rule interpreted entered into force (see, to this effect, Case C-137/94 Richardson  [1995] ECR I‑3407, paragraph 33).
36. It follows that, in a case such as the main proceedings, a rule of Community law as thus interpreted must be applied by an administrative body within the sphere of its competence even to legal relationships which arose and were formed before the Court gave its ruling on the request for interpretation (see Kühne & Heitz , paragraph 22, and, to this effect, Case C-347/00 Barreira Pérez  [2002] ECR I‑8191, paragraph 44; Joined Cases C-453/02 and C-462/02 Linneweber and Akritidis  [2005] ECR I‑1131, paragraph 41; and Case C-292/04 Meilicke and Others  [2007] ECR I-1835, paragraph 34).
37. However, as the Court has pointed out, this case-law must be read in the light of the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the general principles recognised by Community law. Finality of an administrative decision, which is acquired upon expiry of reasonable time-limits for legal remedies or, as in the main proceedings, by exhaustion of those remedies, contributes to such legal certainty, with the consequence that Community law does not require that administrative bodies be placed under an obligation, in principle, to reopen an administrative decision which has become final in that way ( Kühne & Heitz , paragraph 24).
38. The Court has none the less held that specific circumstances may be capable, by virtue of the principle of cooperation arising from Article 10 EC, of requiring a national administrative body to review an administrative decision that has become final following the exhaustion of domestic remedies, in order to take account of the interpretation of a relevant provision of Community law given subsequently by the Court (see, to this effect, Kühne & Heitz , paragraph 27, and Joined Cases C-392/04 and C-422/04 i-21 Germany and Arcor  [2006] ECR I‑8559, paragraph 52).
39. As the referring court points out, in light of paragraphs 26 and 28 of Kühne & Heitz , the conditions capable of providing the basis for such an obligation of review that have been taken into account by the Court include the fact that the judgment of the court of final instance, by virtue of which the contested administrative decision became final, was, in the light of a decision given by the Court subsequent to it, based on a misinterpretation of Community law which was adopted without a question being referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under the third paragraph of Article 234 EC.
41. In this connection, it is to be noted that the system established by Article 234 EC with a view to ensuring that Community law is interpreted uniformly in the Member States instituted direct cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts by means of a procedure which is completely independent of any initiative by the parties (see, to this effect, Joined Cases 28/62, 29/62 and 30/62 Da Costa and Others  [1963] ECR 31, at 38; Case 62/72 Bollmann  [1973] ECR 269, paragraph 4; and Case C-261/95 Palmisani  [1997] ECR I‑4025, paragraph 31).
42. As the Advocate General explains in points 100 to 104 of his Opinion, the system of references for a preliminary ruling is based on a dialogue between one court and another, the initiation of which depends entirely on the national court’s assessment as to whether a reference is appropriate and necessary (see, to this effect, Case 126/80 Salonia  [1981] ECR 1563, paragraph 7).
45. It is to be noted that, while Community law does not require national courts to raise of their own motion a plea alleging infringement of Community provisions where examination of that plea would oblige them to go beyond the ambit of the dispute as defined by the parties, they are obliged to raise of their own motion points of law based on binding Community rules where, under national law, they must or may do so in relation to a binding rule of national law (see, to this effect, Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 van Schijndel and van Veen  [1995] ECR I‑4705, paragraphs 13, 14 and 22, and Case C-72/95 Kraaijeveld and Others  [1996] ECR I‑5403, paragraphs 57, 58 and 60).
46. Accordingly, the answer to the first question referred must be that, in the context of a procedure before an administrative body for review of an administrative decision that became final by virtue of a judgment, delivered by a court of final instance, which, in the light of a decision given by the Court subsequent to it, was based on a misinterpretation of Community law, Community law does not require the claimant to have relied on Community law in the legal action under domestic law which he brought against the administrative decision.
Question 2
55. It is true that, in its assessment of the factual circumstances of the case which gave rise to the judgment in Kühne & Heitz , the Court held that the length of the period within which the application for review had been made was to be taken into consideration and, in conjunction with the other circumstances indicated by the referring court, justified review of the contested administrative decision. Nevertheless, the Court did not require that an application for review necessarily had to be made immediately after the applicant had become aware of the decision of the Court on which the application was based.
57. It should nevertheless be pointed out that, in accordance with settled case-law, in the absence of Community rules in the field it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, provided, first, that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and, secondly, that they do not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness) (see, in particular, Case C-432/05 Unibet  [2007] ECR I-2271, paragraph 43, and Joined Cases C-222/05 to C-225/05 van der Weerd and Others  [2007] ECR I-4233, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
58. The Court has thus recognised that it is compatible with Community law to lay down reasonable time-limits for bringing proceedings in the interests of legal certainty (see, to this effect, Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral  [1976] ECR 1989, paragraph 5; Case 45/76 Comet  [1976] ECR 2043, paragraphs 17 and 18; Denkavit italiana , paragraph 23; Case C-208/90 Emmott  [1991] ECR I‑4269, paragraph 16; Palmisani , paragraph 28; Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum  [1997] ECR I‑4085, paragraph 48; and Case C-255/00 Grundig Italiana  [2002] ECR I‑8003, paragraph 34). Such time-limits are not liable to render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law ( Grundig Italiana , paragraph 34).
59. It follows from that settled case-law that the Member States may, on the basis of the principle of legal certainty, require an application for review and withdrawal of an administrative decision that has become final and is contrary to Community law as interpreted subsequently by the Court to be made to the competent administrative authority within a reasonable period.
60. Consequently, the answer to the second question referred must be that Community law does not impose any limit in time for making an application for review of an administrative decision that has become final. The Member States nevertheless remain free to set reasonable time-limits for seeking remedies, in a manner consistent with the Community principles of effectiveness and equivalence.
Costs