DSM NV v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1999-07-08
34 In the alternative, the Commission contends that, in any event, DSM's request that the Court of Justice order the Commission to repay the fine is inadmissible, since neither the Court of Justice nor the Court of First Instance may make such an order under Article 173 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 230 EC).
35 In that connection, it must be pointed out that DSM's request presupposes that the Court will uphold its appeal, annul the contested order, examine the admissibility of the application for revision of the judgment in DSM v Commission, cited above, hold it admissible, proceed to examine the substance of that application, grant it and go on to examine the application for annulment made at first instance. In that context, pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation No 17, the Court has unlimited jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 172 of the EC Treaty (now Article 229 EC).
36 It is settled case-law that, when exercising judicial review of legality under Article 173 of the Treaty, the Community judicature has no jurisdiction to issue directions (see, in particular, the order in Joined Cases C-199/94 P and C-200/94 P Pevasa and Inpesca v Commission [1995] ECR I-3709, paragraph 24). The same applies when the Community judicature has unlimited jurisdiction in accordance with Article 172 of the Treaty.
37 The appeal is therefore inadmissible in so far as it seeks an order from the Court directing the Commission to repay the fine paid by DSM.
Substance
First and second pleas in law: breach of Community law through misinterpretation of Article 41 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice and breach of the duty to state reasons, in that examination of the facts within the meaning of Article 41 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice was limited to the facts mentioned in paragraphs 6 and 15 of the contested order
42 As for the second limb of the first plea, it is clear from the actual wording of Article 41 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice that, in order for an application for revision to be admissible, the fact relied on must have been unknown to the party claiming revision when the judgment was given. The Court of First Instance was therefore perfectly correct in holding that since that condition was not satisfied there was no need to ascertain whether the facts relied on were new.
43 Lastly, with regard to the third limb of the first plea and the second plea, which it is appropriate to examine together, it must be borne in mind that, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 41 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, an application for revision must be based on the discovery of a new fact or facts. Under the second paragraph of Article 41, it is only if the Court finds that a new fact exists, recognises that it is of such a character as to lay the case open for revision and declares the application admissible on that ground that it can examine the substance of the case.
70 In that connection it must be held, first, that the complaint that the Court of First Instance did not deliver its judgments in related cases  on the same day concerns the main proceedings which were concluded by the judgment in DSM v Commission, cited above, and not the revision procedure that gave rise to the contested order, which is the subject of this appeal.