Dooel Uvoz-Izvoz Skopje Link Logistic N&N v Budapest Rendőrfőkapitánya.
Date: 2018-10-04
34


As regards the first objection of inadmissibility, it must be recalled that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court, before which the dispute has been brought and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, judgment of 5 June 2018, Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein, C‑210/16, EU:C:2018:388, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
35


It follows that questions relating to EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation or assessment of the validity of a provision of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, judgment of 31 May 2018, Zheng, C‑190/17, EU:C:2018:357, paragraph 21).
37


As regard the second objection of inadmissibility, it is indeed settled case-law that it is not for the Court to rule on the interpretation of provisions of national law, that being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national courts (judgment of 5 June 2018, Grupo Norte Facility, C‑574/16, EU:C:2018:390, paragraph 32).
40


The principle of proportionality is one of the general principles of EU law underlying the constitutional traditions common to the Member States that must be observed by national legislation which falls within the scope of EU law or implements that law (see, inter alia, order of 12 June 2014, Pańczyk,C‑28/14, not published, EU:C:2014:2003, paragraph 26). The principle of proportionality requires the Member States to adopt measures that are appropriate for attaining the objectives pursued and do not go beyond what is necessary for attaining them (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 April 2018, Egenberger, C‑414/16, EU:C:2018:257, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited).
42


The severity of a penalty must thus correspond to the seriousness of the offence concerned, that requirement following both from Article 52(1) of the Charter and from the principle of proportionality of penalties in Article 49(3) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 March 2018, Garlsson Real Estate and Others, C‑537/16, EU:C:2018:193, paragraph 56).
47


It should be recalled that, according to settled case-law of the Court, whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied on before the national courts by individuals against a Member State where the State has failed to transpose the directive into national law within the period prescribed or where it has failed to transpose it correctly (judgment of 15 February 2017, British Film Institute, C‑592/15, EU:C:2017:117, paragraph 13).
48


In this respect, the nature, general scheme and wording of the provision in question must be considered (judgment of 4 December 1974, van Duyn, 41/74, EU:C:1974:133, paragraph 12). That is the case in particular where the provision of the directive concerned lays down an obligation with no reservations or conditions which by its nature does not require the adoption of any further measure either of the EU institutions or of the Member States and leaves the Member States no discretionary power as regards its implementation (see, inter alia, judgments of 4 December 1974, van Duyn, 41/74, EU:C:1974:133, paragraphs 6 and 13, and of 22 December 2010, Gavieiro Gavieiro and Iglesias Torres, C‑444/09 and C‑456/09, EU:C:2010:819, paragraph 79).
52


It should be observed in this connection that the directive does not contain more precise rules with regard to the establishment of those national penalties and, in particular, that it does not establish any express criterion for the assessment of the proportionality of such penalties (judgment of 22 March 2017, Euro-Team and Spirál-Gép, C‑497/15 and C‑498/15, EU:C:2017:229, paragraph 38).
57


It should be recalled, however, that according to settled case-law the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by the directive and their duty under Article 4(3) TEU and Article 288 TFEU to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation are binding on all the authorities of the Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (see, inter alia, judgments of 14 September 2016, Martínez Andrés and Castrejana López, C‑184/15 and C‑197/15, EU:C:2016:680, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited, and of 24 January 2018, Pantuso and Others, C‑616/16 and C‑617/16, EU:C:2018:32, paragraph 42).
58


To fulfil that obligation, the principle of interpretation in conformity with EU law requires the national authorities to do everything within their power, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that EU law is fully effective and to achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (see, inter alia, judgments of 13 July 2016, Pöpperl, C‑187/15, EU:C:2016:550, paragraph 43, and of 28 June 2018, Crespo Rey, C‑2/17, EU:C:2018:511, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).
59


However, that principle of interpretation of national law in conformity with EU law has certain limits. Thus the obligation for a national court to refer to EU law when interpreting and applying the relevant rules of domestic law is limited by general principles of law and cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law that is contra legem (see, inter alia, judgment of 13 July 2016, Pöpperl, C‑187/15, EU:C:2016:550, paragraph 44).
61


However, it is also settled case-law that if such an interpretation is not possible the national court must fully apply EU law and protect the rights which EU law confers on individuals, disapplying if necessary any provision in so far as its application would, in the circumstances of the case, lead to a result contrary to EU law (judgment of 13 July 2016, Pöpperl, C‑187/15, EU:C:2016:550, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).