International Management Group v European Commission.
Date: 2019-01-31
51


As regards, in the first place, the Commission’s arguments referred to in paragraph 45 above based on its claim that the decisions at issue do not have binding legal effects, it is settled case-law that any provision or measure adopted by EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever form they might take, the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, a natural or legal person by bringing about a distinct change in their legal position may be the subject of an action for annulment (judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v Commission, 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 9; of 12 September 2006, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, C‑131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 54; and of 13 October 2011, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 37).
62


The Court has previously held that, when the effect of a decision adopted by the Commission when exercising its own powers against a specific person is, simply because that act was adopted, to cause that person to lose any chance of actually receiving EU funding, that effect should be regarded as a legally binding effect of that decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 April 1997, Geotronics v Commission, C‑395/95 P, EU:C:1997:210, paragraphs 14 and 15).
64


As regards, in the second place, the Commission’s reasoning set out in paragraph 46 above, according to which a financing decision, such as that in question in the present cases, should have been regarded as an act which does not produce any binding legal effect vis-à-vis third parties, it should be borne in mind that it is settled case-law that measures that are only intended to produce legal effects within the EU institution, body, office or agency which adopted the measure may not, in principle, be the subject of an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 February 1988, Les Verts v Parliament, 190/84, EU:C:1988:94, paragraph 8, and of 6 April 2000, Spain v Commission, C‑443/97, EU:C:2000:190, paragraph 28).
67


In that regard, a measure is to be regarded as merely confirming an earlier measure when it contains no new factual or legal elements as compared with the earlier measure (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 April 1970, Nebe v Commission, 24/69, EU:C:1970:22, paragraph 8, and of 3 April 2014, Commission v Netherlands and ING Groep, C‑224/12 P, EU:C:2014:213, paragraph 69).
80


Since the Commission disputes the admissibility of part of the complaints raised by IMG in support of the second ground of each of its appeals, it should be borne in mind at the outset that an appellant is entitled to challenge before the Court of Justice the interpretation and application of EU law by the General Court at first instance (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 July 2000, Salzgitter v Commission, C‑210/98 P, EU:C:2000:397, paragraph 43, and of 12 September 2006, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, C‑131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 51) and, in that connection, it is entitled to raise grounds of appeal which seek to criticise the legal merits of the assessments made by that court in the judgment under appeal (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 June 2011, Diputación Foral de Vizcaya and Others v Commission, C‑465/09 P to C‑470/09 P, not published, EU:C:2011:372, paragraph 146, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).