larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Dr. August Wolff GmbH & Co. KG Arzneimittel and Remedia d.o.o. v European Commission.
Date: 2019-03-27
24


EU institutions and bodies are required to respect the fundamental rights of the European Union, which include the right to good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2013, Ziegler v Commission, C‑439/11 P, EU:C:2013:513, paragraph 154).
26


In that regard, it should be made clear that the need for impartiality, required of institutions and bodies in carrying out their missions, is intended to guarantee equality of treatment, which is at the heart of the European Union. That requirement is intended, inter alia, to avoid a situation where there could be a conflict of interest on the part of officials or agents acting on behalf of those institutions and bodies. Having regard to the fundamental importance of ensuring the independence and probity of EU institutions and bodies as regards both their internal functioning and external reputation, the requirement of impartiality covers all circumstances in which an official or agent who is called upon to decide on an issue must reasonably consider that issue as being of such a nature as to be viewed by third parties as a possible source of impairment of his or her independence in that matter (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2007, Komninou and Others v Commission, C‑167/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:633, paragraph 57).
27


Thus, it is incumbent upon those institutions and bodies to comply with both components of the requirement of impartiality, which are, on the one hand, subjective impartiality, by virtue of which no member of the institution concerned may show bias or personal prejudice and, on the other, objective impartiality, under which there must be sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to possible bias on the part of the institution concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 December 2017, Spain v Council, C‑521/15, EU:C:2017:982, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited).
28


As regards, more particularly, the second component of the principle of impartiality, it should be made clear that, where a number of EU institutions or bodies are given separate responsibilities of their own in the context of a procedure that is liable to result in a decision adversely affecting a party, each of those institutions and bodies is required, in respect of its own activities, to comply with the requirement of objective impartiality. Consequently, even where only one of them has breached that requirement, such a breach is liable to render the decision adopted by the other at the end of the procedure at issue unlawful (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 December 2017, Spain v Council, C‑521/15, EU:C:2017:982, paragraph 94).
Canadian Solar Emea GmbH and Others v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2019-03-27
124


It should be noted, in that respect, that where an appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the General Court, the points of law examined at first instance may be raised again in the course of an appeal. If an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the General Court, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (judgment of 9 November 2017, SolarWorld v Council, C‑204/16 P, EU:C:2017:838, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
CJ v European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).
Date: 2019-04-03
According to the Court’s settled case-law,  in interpreting provisions of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only their wording but also the context in which they occur and the objectives pursued by the rules of which they form part (see, inter alia, judgment of 17 April 2018, Egenberger, C‑414/16, EU:C:2018:257, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
It is true that the ECDC denies that that irregularity is such as to justify annulment of the decision at issue. It argues, referring to the judgments of 29 October 1980, van Landewyck and Others v Commission (209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78, not published, EU:C:1980:248, paragraph 47), and of 23 April 1986, Bernardi v Parliament (150/84, EU:C:1986:167, paragraph 28), that a procedural irregularity will lead the annulment of a decision only if it is shown that had it not been for the irregularity the contested decision might have been substantively different.
Aqua Med sp. z o.o.v Irena Skóra.
Date: 2019-04-03
29


In accordance with the 13th recital of Directive 93/13, the wording ‘mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions’ in Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13 also covers rules which, according to the law, are to apply between the contracting parties provided that no other arrangements have been established.
39


Although the second question does not relate specifically to the interpretation of a particular provision of EU law, it is settled case-law that the Court must extract from all the factors provided by the referring court, and in particular from the statement of grounds contained in the order for reference, the provisions of EU law requiring an interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of the dispute (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2015, Surgicare, C‑662/13, EU:C:2015:89, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
42


Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13, read in conjunction with the 24th recital thereof, provides that Member States must ensure that, in the interests of consumers and of competitors, adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers by sellers or suppliers.
Proceedings brought by H. W.
Date: 2019-04-10
41


In that respect, it follows from Article 2(1) and Article 9 of Directive 2006/112 that that common system is based on the general principle that any activity of an economic nature is in principle to be subject to VAT (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 January 2017, National Roads Authority, C‑344/15, EU:C:2017:28, paragraph 36). Every service supplied for consideration by a taxable person is thus subject to VAT (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 March 2013, Commission v France, C‑197/12, not published, EU:C:2013:202, paragraph 30).
42


Second, as regards the possibility of derogating from the general principle that VAT is charged on every service supplied for consideration by a taxable person, the Court has previously held that all exemptions must be expressly provided for and precisely defined (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 March 1987, Commission v Netherlands, 235/85, EU:C:1987:161, paragraph 19). Moreover, the terms used to specify an exemption must in any event be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 July 2012, Deutsche Bank, C‑44/11, EU:C:2012:484, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited, and of 29 October 2015, Saudaçor, C‑174/14, EU:C:2015:733, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
50


Furthermore, that interpretation is in accordance with the principle that VAT is a tax to be borne by the final consumer. In that it is not possible under national law to add to the amount of fees to be charged an additional element corresponding to the VAT due, to regard that amount as already including VAT has the result that the taxable amount for the VAT to be collected by the tax authorities cannot exceed the consideration actually paid by the final consumer which is the basis for calculating the VAT ultimately borne by him (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 October 1996, Elida Gibbs, C‑317/94, EU:C:1996:400, paragraph 19, and of 7 November 2013, Tulică and Plavoşin, C‑249/12 and C‑250/12, EU:C:2013:722, paragraphs 34 and 35).
Proceedings brought by Valstybinė mokesčių inspekcija prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos.
Date: 2019-04-11
22


First of all, it should be recalled that it is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the referring court, in particular from the grounds of the order for reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject matter of the dispute in the main proceedings (judgment of 19 December 2018, AREX CZ, C‑414/17, EU:C:2018:1027, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
25


In order to ensure that Directive 2011/64 is applied in a uniform fashion, the terms in it must be interpreted independently, on the basis of the wording of the provisions in question and the scheme and aims of the directive (see, by analogy, judgment of 30 March 2006, Smits-Koolhoven, C‑495/04, EU:C:2006:218, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
X BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2019-04-11
In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties, as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (judgment of 22 February 2018, Kubota (UK) and EP Barrus, C‑545/16, EU:C:2018:101, paragraph 25  and the case-law cited).
It is also settled case-law that the explanatory notes adopted by the WCO in respect of the HS are an important aid for interpreting the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force (judgment of 13 September 2018, Vision Research Europe, C‑372/17, EU:C:2018:708, paragraph 23  and the case-law cited).
Since those notes are intended to facilitate the interpretation of the CN for the purposes of tariff classification, they must be interpreted in such a way as to ensure that the subheadings of the CN are properly applied. The wording of those notes must therefore be consistent with the provisions of the CN and cannot alter their scope (judgment of 5 March 2015, Vario Tek, C‑178/14, not published, EU:C:2015:152, paragraph 22  and the case-law cited).
In order to determine whether a monitor may be classified under that subheading, the Court has held that an assessment must be made, in the light of the characteristics and objective properties of the monitor in question, both as to the degree to which that monitor is capable of performing a number of functions and as to the standard of performance which the monitor achieves when performing those functions (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 February 2009, Kamino International Logistics, C‑376/07, EU:C:2009:105, paragraph 57). It is thus necessary to compare, on the one hand,  whether a monitor is suitable for use as a monitor in an automatic data-processing system and its performance in that area with, on the other, whether it is suitable for use in carrying out other functions and its performance when carrying out those functions, in order to establish its principal function and thereby determine its classification.
As regards the relevance of the ITA for determining the relevant tariff classification, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, even though the provisions of an agreement such as the ITA are not such as to create rights upon which individuals may rely directly before the courts under EU law, where the European Union has legislated in the field in question, the primacy of international agreements concluded by the European Union over provisions of secondary legislation means that such provisions must, so far as is possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those agreements (judgment of 14 July 2016, Sprengen v Pakweg Douane, C‑97/15, EU:C:2016:556, paragraph 48  and the case-law cited).
Mediterranean Shipping Company (Portugal) - Agentes de Navegação SA v Banco Comercial Português SA and Caixa Geral de Depósitos, SA.
Date: 2019-04-11
36


In accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, in order to interpret a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments of 17 November 1983, Merck, 292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12, and of 4 October 2018, ING-DiBa Direktbank Austria, C‑191/17, EU:C:2018:809, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
Italian Republic v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2019-04-30
40


In the first place, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the statement of reasons required by the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution that adopted that measure in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for it and to enable the Union judicature to exercise its power of review. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons for a measure meets the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (judgment of 17 March 2011, AJD Tuna, C‑221/09, EU:C:2011:153, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).
55


As a preliminary matter, it should be borne in mind that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law, requires that acts adopted by EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation in question; where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (judgment of 11 January 2017, Spain v Council, C‑128/15, EU:C:2017:3, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).
112


The right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, which is the corollary of the principle of legal certainty, extends to any individual in a situation where European Union authorities have caused him to entertain legitimate expectations. In whatever form it is given, information which is precise, unconditional and consistent and comes from authorised and reliable sources constitutes assurances capable of giving rise to such expectations. However, a person may not plead infringement of the principle unless he or she has been given precise assurances by the administration. Similarly, if a prudent and alert economic operator can foresee that the adoption of an EU measure is likely to affect his or her interests, he or she cannot plead that principle if the measure is adopted (see, to that effect, the judgment of 17 March 2011, AJD Tuna, C‑221/09, EU:C:2011:153, paragraphs 71 to 73 and the case-law cited).
A-Fonds v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst.
Date: 2019-05-02
45


As follows from the settled case-law of the Court, within the system established by the Treaty for supervision of State aid, the national courts and the Commission fulfil complementary but separate roles (see, to that effect, the judgments of 11 July 1996, SFEI and Others, C‑39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 41, and of 15 September 2016, PGE, C‑574/14, EU:C:2016:686, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
46


Whilst the assessment of the compatibility of aid measures with the internal market falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the European Union Courts, it is for the national courts to ensure that the rights of individuals are safeguarded where the obligation to give prior notification of State aid to the Commission pursuant to Article 108(3) EC has been infringed (see, to that effect, the judgment of 8 December 2011, Residex Capital IV, C‑275/10, EU:C:2011:814, paragraph 27). Such disregard, if relied on by individuals and confirmed by the national courts, must lead those courts to draw from it all the consequences in accordance with their national law, without their decisions, however, implying an assessment of the compatibility of the aid with the internal market, which is a matter within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the Court (see, to that effect, the judgment of 23 April 2002, Nygård, C‑234/99, EU:C:2002:244, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
47


It is also clear from the case-law of the Court that a national court has competence to assess whether the arrangements of an aid scheme comply with Treaty provisions which have direct effect, other than those relating to State aid, only if those arrangements can be evaluated separately and thus, although forming part of the aid scheme in question, are not necessary for the attainment of its objective or for its functioning (see, to that effect, the judgments of 22 March 1977, Iannelli & Volpi, 74/76, EU:C:1977:51, paragraph 14, and of 23 April 2002, Nygård, C‑234/99, EU:C:2002:244, paragraph 57).
48


By contrast, the arrangements of an aid may be so indissolubly linked to the object of the aid that it is impossible to evaluate them separately so that their effect on the compatibility or incompatibility of the aid viewed as a whole must therefore of necessity be determined in the light of the procedure prescribed in Article 108 TFEU (see, to that effect, the judgment of 22 March 1977, Iannelli & Volpi, 74/76, EU:C:1977:51, paragraph 14).
Sea Chefs Cruise Services GmbH v Ministre de l'Action et des Comptes publics.
Date: 2019-05-02
34


With regard to the right to a refund, the Court has already stated that the right of a taxable person established in a Member State to obtain the refund of VAT paid in another Member State, in the manner governed by Directive 2008/9, is the counterpart of such a person’s right established by Directive 2006/112 to deduct input VAT in his own Member State (judgment of 21 March 2018, Volkswagen, C‑533/16, EU:C:2018:204, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
35


Furthermore, the Court has clarified that, like the right to deduct, the right to a refund is a fundamental principle of the common system of VAT established by EU legislation, which is intended to relieve the operator entirely of the burden of the VAT due or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT therefore ensures neutrality of taxation of all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that they are themselves, in principle, subject to VAT (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 March 2018, Volkswagen, C‑533/16, EU:C:2018:204, paragraphs 37 and 38 and the case-law cited).
36


The right to deduct and, accordingly, to a refund is an integral part of the VAT scheme and in principle may not be limited. The right to deduct is exercisable immediately in respect of all taxes charged on input transactions (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 March 2018, Volkswagen, C‑533/16, EU:C:2018:204, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
39


So far as concerns the period for submitting a refund application, laid down in Article 7 of Eighth Directive 79/1072 in which the phrase ‘au plus tard’ (at the latest) was already set out, and which was reproduced in Article 15(1) of Directive 2008/9, the Court has held that that term is a clarification which states quite clearly that a refund application cannot validly be submitted after expiry of the period set to that end and that, accordingly, such a period is a limitation period, failure to comply with which brings about the forfeiture of the right to a VAT refund (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 June 2012, Elsacom, C‑294/11, EU:C:2012:382, paragraphs 26 and 33).
47


Furthermore, while it is clear from the case-law of the Court on limitation periods relating to VAT that a limitation period, the expiry of which has the effect of penalising the taxable person who has not been sufficiently diligent and has failed to claim deduction of input VAT within the prescribed time limits, by causing him to forfeit his right to deduct is, subject to compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, compatible with the VAT Directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 March 2018, Volkswagen, C‑533/16, EU:C:2018:204, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited), Article 20 of Directive 2008/9 applies when a refund application has already been made within the period laid down in Article 15 of that directive.
Budimex S.A. v Minister Finansów.
Date: 2019-05-02
21


It should be made clear at the outset that the VAT Directive establishes a common system of VAT based, inter alia, on a uniform definition of taxable transactions (judgment of 20 June 2013, Newey, C‑653/11, EU:C:2013:409, paragraph 39).
22


In particular, recital 24 of that directive states that the concepts of ‘chargeable event’ and ‘chargeability of VAT’ should be harmonised if the introduction of the common system of VAT and of any subsequent amendments thereto are to take effect at the same time in all Member States. The European Union legislature thereby intended maximum harmonisation of the date on which liability to pay VAT arises in all the Member States in order to ensure the uniform collection of that tax (judgment of 16 May 2013, TNT Express Worldwide (Poland), C‑169/12, EU:C:2013:314, paragraph 31).
27


Whilst it is true that construction or installation services are commonly regarded as supplied on the actual date the work is completed, the fact remains that, for a transaction to be regarded as a ‘taxable transaction’ within the meaning of the VAT Directive, economic and commercial realities form a fundamental criterion for the application of the common system of VAT, which must be taken into account (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 November 2018, MEO — Serviços de Comunicações e Multimédia, C‑295/17, EU:C:2018:942, paragraph 43).
28


In that context, it has been held that the relevant contractual terms constitute a factor to be taken into consideration when the supplier and the recipient in a ‘supply of services’ transaction within the meaning of the VAT Directive have to be identified (judgment of 20 June 2013, Newey, C‑653/11, EU:C:2013:409, paragraph 43).
30


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that a supply of services is taxable only if there is a legal relationship between the provider of the service and the recipient pursuant to which there is reciprocal performance, the remuneration received by the provider of the service constituting the value actually given in return for the service supplied to the recipient (judgment of 2 June 2016, Lajvér, C‑263/15, EU:C:2016:392, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
33


Second, it must be borne in mind that the taxable amount for the supply of services for consideration is the consideration actually received for them by the taxable person (judgment of 7 November 2013, Tulică and Plavoşin, C‑249/12 and C‑250/12, EU:C:2013:722, paragraph 33).
Valstybinė mokesčių inspekcija prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos v Akvilė Jarmuškienė.
Date: 2019-05-02
27


According to the case-law of the Court, as an exception to the common system applicable under the VAT Directive, the special scheme for small enterprises must be applied only to the extent necessary to achieve its objective and is to be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 September 2006, Commission v Austria, C‑128/05, EU:C:2006:612, paragraph 22).
35


The components of that single supply cannot be split, since that would be artificial in the light of the VAT system (see, by analogy, judgment of 18 January 2018, Stadion Amsterdam, C‑463/16, EU:C:2018:22, paragraph 22).
37


This conclusion is borne out by the objective of the special scheme for small enterprises. The latter provides for administrative simplifications intended to support the creation, activities and competitiveness of small undertakings, and to retain a reasonable relationship between the administrative charges connected with fiscal supervision and the small amounts of tax to be reckoned with. Thus, that scheme is aimed at sparing small undertakings and the tax authorities from such an administrative burden (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 October 2010, Schmelz, C‑97/09, EU:C:2010:632, paragraphs 63 and 68).