Feniks Sp. z o.o. v Azteca Products & Services SL.
Date: 2018-10-04
30


In this regard, it should be recalled that the Court has held that Regulations No 1215/2012 and No 1346/2000 should be interpreted in such a way as to avoid any overlap between the rules of law that those instruments lay down and any legal vacuum. Accordingly, actions excluded under Article 1(2)(b) of Regulation No 1215/2012 from the application of that regulation because they come under ‘bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings’, fall within the scope of Regulation No 1346/2000. Correspondingly, actions which fall outside the scope of Regulation No 1346/2000 fall within the scope of Regulation No 1215/2012 (judgment of 20 December 2017, Valach and Others, C‑649/16, EU:C:2017:986, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
31


The Court has also held that an action is related to bankruptcy or winding-up if it derives directly from the bankruptcy or winding-up and is closely connected with the proceedings for the liquidation of assets or composition proceedings (judgment of 12 February 2009, Seagon, C‑339/07, EU:C:2009:83, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
34


It should be recalled that Regulation No 1215/2012 aims to harmonise the rules regarding conflicting jurisdictions in civil and commercial matters by means of creating rules governing jurisdiction that are highly predictable. Therefore, the purpose of this regulation is to strengthen the legal protection of persons established in the European Union by enabling the applicant to identify easily the court in which he may sue and a normally well-informed defendant to reasonably foresee in which court he may be sued (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 2016, Granarolo, C‑196/15, EU:C:2016:559, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).
35


According to the Court’s settled case-law, the system of common rules on conferment of jurisdiction laid down in Chapter II of Regulation No 1215/2012 is based on the general rule, set out in Article 4(1) of that regulation, that persons domiciled in a Member State are to be sued in the courts of that State, irrespective of the nationality of the parties. It is only by way of derogation from that fundamental principle attributing jurisdiction to the courts of the defendant’s domicile that Section 2 of Chapter II of Regulation No 1215/2012 makes provision for certain special jurisdictional rules, such as those laid down in Article 7(1)(a) of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 2016, Granarolo, C‑196/15, EU:C:2016:559, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
36


In addition to the aforementioned jurisdiction of the courts of the defendant’s domicile there should be, as stated in recital 16 of this regulation, alternative grounds of jurisdiction based on a close connection between the court and the action or facilitation of the sound administration of justice.
37


The special jurisdictional rules must be interpreted restrictively and cannot give rise to an interpretation going beyond the cases expressly envisaged by that regulation (judgment of 14 July 2016, Granarolo, C‑196/15, EU:C:2016:559, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
38


Concerning the special jurisdiction laid down in Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation No 1215/2012 in actions concerning the concept of ‘matters relating to a contract’, this concept must be interpreted independently in order to ensure that it is applied uniformly in all the Member States (judgment of 7 March 2018, flightright and Others, C‑274/16, C‑447/16 and C‑448/16, EU:C:2018:160, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).
39


As the Court has consistently held, the application of this rule of special jurisdiction presupposes the establishment of a legal obligation freely consented to by one person towards another and on which the claimant’s action is based (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 January 2005, Engler, C‑27/02, EU:C:2005:33, paragraph 51; of 18 July 2013, ÖFAB, C‑147/12, EU:C:2013:490, paragraph 33; and of 21 January 2016, ERGO Insurance and Gjensidige Baltic, C‑359/14 and C‑475/14, EU:C:2016:40, paragraph 44).
40


The actio pauliana is based on the creditor’s personal claim against the debtor and seeks to protect whatever security he may have over the debtor’s estate (judgments of 10 January 1990, Reichert and Kockler, C‑115/88, EU:C:1990:3, paragraph 12, and of 26 March 1992, Reichert and Kockler, C‑261/90, EU:C:1992:149, paragraph 17).
41


It thus preserves the interests of the creditor with a view in particular to a subsequent enforcement of the debtor’s obligations (judgment of 26 March 1992, Reichert and Kockler, C‑261/90, EU:C:1992:149, paragraph 28).
44


It follows that the actio pauliana, once it is brought on the basis of the creditor’s rights created upon the conclusion of a contract, falls within ‘matters relating to a contract’ within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 39 of this judgment. It is thus necessary that in addition to the forum of the defendant’s domicile, there should be a supplementary ground of jurisdiction, namely that prescribed by Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation No 1215/2012, such jurisdiction meeting, with regard to the contractual origin of the relationship between the creditor and debtor, both the requirement for legal certainty and foreseeability and the aim to facilitate the sound administration of justice.
48


That conclusion reached in the previous paragraph is not in any way invalidated by the fact, arising in the present case from Article 531(1) of the Civil Code, that the action was brought against the third party and not the debtor. It must be borne in mind in that regard that the rule of special jurisdiction in matters relating to a contract provided for in Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation No 1215/2012 is based on the cause of action, not the identity of the parties (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 March 2018, flightright and Others, C‑274/16, C‑447/16 and C‑448/16, EU:C:2018:160, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).