United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the European Union.
Date: 1998-11-19
25 Before the various complaints made by the United Kingdom Government and by the German Government, which has intervened in its support, are examined, it should be noted that, as the Council has correctly observed, since its judgment of 13 March 1968 in Case 5/67 Beus v Hauptzollamt München [1968] ECR 83, the Court has consistently held that the scope of the obligation to provide reasons depends on the nature of the measure in question and that, in the case of measures of general application, the statement of reasons may be confined to indicating the general situation which led to its adoption, on the one hand, and the general objectives which it is intended to achieve, on the other.
26 Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly held that if the contested measure clearly discloses the essential objective pursued by the institution, it would be excessive to require a specific statement of reasons for the various technical choices made (see, inter alia, Case 250/84 Eridania and Others v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero [1986] ECR 117, paragraph 38).
36 With regard to the German Government's arguments concerning the lack of specific reasons pertaining to the principle of proportionality, the first point to note is that, contrary to the view taken by the Council, those arguments do not contravene Article 37(4) of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice.  That provision does not prevent an intervener from using arguments other than those used by the party it supports, provided the intervener seeks to support that party's submissions or seeks the rejection of the opposing party's submissions (Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen v High Authority [1961] ECR 1).  In this case, the argument in question concerns the ground of annulment alleging lack of reasoning, put forward by the applicant government, and is meant to support the form of order sought by the latter.  It must therefore be examined by the Court.
37 The German Government's argument is not, however, well founded.  While the principle of proportionality, as set forth in the third paragraph of Article 3b of the EC Treaty, constitutes a general principle of the Community legal system, an express reference to that principle in the preamble cannot be required (see, with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, laid down in the second paragraph of Article 3b, Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament and Council [1997] ECR I-2405, paragraph 28).
49 In accordance with the case-law of the Court, where complex economic situations are to be evaluated, the Community institutions enjoy a wide margin of discretion, particularly where they are acting within the framework of Article 113 of the Treaty.  Consequently, the lawfulness of a common commercial policy measure can be challenged on account of an error of assessment only if that measure appears manifestly inappropriate in relation to the objective pursued.  In particular, where the Council is called upon to evaluate the future effects of the provisions it enacts, which cannot be foreseen with any degree of certainty, that assessment is open to criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of the information available to it at the time of the adoption of the provisions in question.  Moreover, the Council's discretion in assessing a complex economic situation also extends, to a certain extent, to the establishment of the basic facts.
53 First of all, as the Council and the parties intervening in support of the form of order sought by it have observed, the Court has consistently held that the Community institutions enjoy a margin of discretion in their choice of the means needed to achieve the common commercial policy (Case 245/81 Edeka Zentrale v Germany [1982] ECR 2745, paragraph 27; Case 52/81 Faust v Commission [1982] ECR 3745, paragraph 27; Case 256/84 Koyo Seiko v Council [1987] ECR 1899, paragraph 20; Case 258/84 Nippon Seiko v Council [1987] ECR 1923, paragraph 34, and Case 260/84 Minebea v Council [1987] ECR 1975, paragraph 28).
54 In a situation of that kind, which involves an appraisal of complex economic situations, judicial review must be limited to verifying whether the relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the facts on which the contested choice is based have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error in the appraisal of those facts or a misuse of powers (see, inter alia, Case C-156/87 Gestetner Holdings v Council and Commission [1990] ECR I-781, paragraph 63).  That is a fortiori the case where, as in this instance, the act concerned is of general application.
55 In addition, the Court has considered that the discretion which the Council has when assessing a complex economic situation can be exercised not only  in relation to the nature and scope of the provisions which are to be adopted but also, to a certain extent, to the findings as to the basic facts, especially in the sense that the Council is free to base its assessment, if necessary, on findings of a general nature (Case 166/78 Italy v Council [1979] ECR 2575, paragraph 14). While the Council is required to take into consideration all the facts available to it, it cannot be required to examine in detail all the economic sectors concerned before it adopts an act of general application.
67 According to settled case-law, that provision cannot be interpreted as prohibiting the Community from enacting any measure liable to affect trade with non-member countries (Case 112/80 Dürbeck v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen [1981] ECR 1095, paragraph 44, and Case 245/81 Edeka Zentrale v Germany, cited above, paragraph 24).  As is clear from the actual wording of the provision, its objective of contributing to the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade cannot compel the institutions to liberalise imports from non-member countries where to do so would be contrary to the interests of the Community.  The Council was entitled, therefore, to consider that the actual circumstances warranted the imposition of quotas on the products at issue.
87 With regard to the second limb of the fourth ground, it should be pointed out that in spheres such as this, in which the Community institutions have a broad discretion, the lawfulness of a measure can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective pursued.  More specifically, where the Community legislature is obliged, in connection with the adoption of rules, to assess their future effects, which cannot be accurately foreseen, its assessment is open to criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of the information available to it at the time of the adoption of those rules.  The Court's review must be limited in that way in particular if the Council has to reconcile divergent interests and thus select options within the context of the policy choices which are its own responsibility (Germany v Council, cited above, paragraphs 90 and 91).
97 In that respect, it should be noted that the general principle of equality which is one of the fundamental principles of Community law precludes comparable situations from being treated in a different manner unless the difference in treatment is objectively justified (see, in particular, Joined Cases C-267/88 to C-285/88 Wuidart and Others [1990] ECR I-435, paragraph 13).