Dragoș Constantin Târșia v Statul român and Serviciul Public Comunitar Regim Permise de Conducere si Inmatriculare a Autovehiculelor.
Date: 2015-10-06
12. In that regard, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance (judgments in Fish Legal and Shirley , C‑279/12, EU:C:2013:853, paragraph 30, and Verder LabTec , C‑657/13, EU:C:2015:331, paragraph 29).
13. In particular, it is not for the Court of Justice, in the context of the judicial cooperation established by Article 267 TFEU, to call back into question or to verify the accuracy of the interpretation of national law made by the national court, as such interpretation falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of that court. In addition, when hearing a reference for a preliminary ruling from a national court, the Court of Justice must base its reasoning on the interpretation of national law as described to it by that court (see, to that effect, judgments in Winner Wetten , C‑409/06, EU:C:2010:503, paragraph 35; Padawan , C‑467/08, EU:C:2010:620, paragraph 22; and Logstor ROR Polska , C‑212/10, EU:C:2011:404, paragraph 30).
14. Furthermore, the Court may refuse to rule on questions referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgments in Nicula , C‑331/13, EU:C:2014:2285, paragraph 23, and Verder LabTec , C‑657/13, EU:C:2015:331, paragraph 29).
17. Moreover, it follows from the case-law of the Court that the classification, for the purposes of determining the applicable detailed rules for repayment of a national tax levied in breach of EU law, of the legal relationship established when that tax was levied between the tax authorities of a Member State and taxable persons is a matter which falls to be determined under national law (see, to that effect, judgment in IN. CO. GE.’90 and Others , C‑10/97 to C‑22/97, EU:C:1998:498, paragraph 26).
19. Regarding the plea of inadmissibility based on the purported existence, in the national legal system, of effective remedies which, in any event, would permit Mr Târşia to seek redress, it is sufficient to note that it is solely for the national court, which, in the dispute in the main proceedings, is asking whether it is possible for it to revise a final judicial decision made in the course of civil proceedings, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to deliver its judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see, to that effect, judgments in Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales , C‑118/08, EU:C:2010:39, paragraph 25, and Nicula , C‑331/13, EU:C:2014:2285, paragraph 21).
24. It is settled case-law that the right to a refund of taxes levied by a Member State in breach of rules of EU law is the consequence and complement of the rights conferred on individuals by provisions of EU law prohibiting such taxes, as interpreted by the Court. The Member States are therefore in principle required to repay taxes levied in breach of EU law (judgments in Littlewoods Retail and Ot hers , C‑591/10, EU:C:2012:478, paragraph 24; Irimie , C‑565/11, EU:C:2013:250, paragraph 20; and Nicula , C‑331/13, EU:C:2014:2285, paragraph 27).
25. In addition, where a Member State has levied taxes in breach of rules of EU law, individuals are entitled to reimbursement not only of the tax unduly levied but also of the amounts paid to that State or retained by it which relate directly to that tax. Accordingly, the principle of the obligation of Member States to repay with interest amounts of tax levied in breach of EU law follows from that law (see, to that effect, judgments in Littlewoods Retail and Others , C‑591/10, EU:C:2012:478, paragraphs 25 and 26, and Irimie , C‑565/11, EU:C:2013:250, paragraphs 21 and 22).
26. In the absence of EU legislation on the recovery of national taxes unduly levied, it is for each Member State, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions at law for safeguarding the rights which taxpayers derive from EU law (see, to that effect, judgments in Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral , 33/76, EU:C:1976:188, paragraph 5; Aprile , C‑228/96, EU:C:1998:544, paragraph 18; and Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation , C‑362/12, EU:C:2013:834, paragraph 31).
27. However, the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding the rights which taxpayers derive from EU law must not be any less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not be framed in such a way as to render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the legal order of the European Union (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments in Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral , 33/76, EU:C:1976:188, paragraph 5; Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales , C‑118/08, EU:C:2010:39, paragraph 31; and Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation , C‑362/12, EU:C:2013:834, paragraph 32).
28. In so far as the recovery of a tax declared incompatible with EU law is, in the present case, hindered by the existence of a final decision of a court or tribunal imposing payment of that tax, attention should be drawn to the importance, both in the legal order of the European Union and in national legal systems, of the principle of res judicata . In order to ensure both stability of the law and legal relations and the sound administration of justice, it is important that decisions of courts or tribunals which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the time-limits provided for in that connection can no longer be called into question (judgment in Impresa Pizzarotti , C‑213/13, EU:C:2014:2067, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).
29. Therefore, EU law does not require a national court to disapply domestic rules of procedure conferring finality on a judgment, even if to do so would make it possible to remedy a domestic situation which is incompatible with EU law (judgment in Impresa Pizzarotti , C‑213/13, EU:C:2014:2067, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
30. Nevertheless, if the applicable domestic rules of procedure provide the possibility, under certain conditions, for a national court to go back on a decision having the authority of res judicata  in order to render the situation compatible with national law, that possibility must prevail if those conditions are met, in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, so that the situation at issue is brought back into line with EU law (see, to that effect, judgment in Impresa Pizzarotti , C‑213/13, EU:C:2014:2067, paragraph 62).
32. It is clear from the case-law cited in paragraph 27 of the present judgment that the principle of equivalence prohibits a Member State from laying down less favourable procedural rules for claims for repayment of a tax based on a breach of EU law than those applicable to similar proceedings based on a breach of national law (see also judgment in Weber’s Wine World and Others , C‑147/01, EU:C:2003:533, paragraph 104).
34. In that regard, as was noted by the Advocate General in point 49 of his Opinion, the principle of equivalence requires equal treatment of claims based on a breach of national law and of similar claims based on a breach of EU law, not equivalence of national procedural rules applicable to different types of proceedings such as — as in the dispute in the main proceedings — civil proceedings on the one hand and administrative proceedings on the other. Furthermore, that principle is not relevant to a situation which — as in the dispute in the main proceedings — concerns two types of actions, both of which are based on a breach of EU law (judgment in ÖBB Personenverkehr , C‑417/13, EU:C:2015:38, paragraph 74).
36. Regarding the principle of effectiveness, it should be borne in mind that every case in which the question arises as to whether a provision of national procedural legislation makes the exercise of rights conferred on individuals by the legal order of the European Union impossible in practice or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of the rules concerned in the proceedings as a whole, the way in which the proceedings are conducted and the special features of those rules, before the various national bodies (see, to that effect, judgment in Asturcom Telecomunicaciones , C‑40/08, EU:C:2009:615, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
37. For those purposes, account must be taken, where appropriate, of the principles which form the basis of the national judicial system concerned, such as protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of proceedings (see, inter alia, judgments in Fallimento Olimpiclub , C‑2/08, EU:C:2009:506, paragraph 27, and Agrokonsulting-04 , C‑93/12, EU:C:2013:432, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
38. As is apparent from paragraph 28 of the present judgment, the Court has, on several occasions, emphasised the importance of the principle of res judicata (see also, to that effect, judgment in Köbler , C‑224/01, EU:C:2003:513, paragraph 38). Thus, it has been held that EU law does not require a judicial body automatically to go back on a judgment having the authority of res judicata  in order to take into account the interpretation of a relevant provision of EU law adopted by the Court after delivery of that judgment (judgment in Impresa Pizzarotti , C‑213/13, EU:C:2014:2067, paragraph 60).
40. None the less, in so far as the final judicial decision obliging Mr Târșia to pay a tax which, in essence, was subsequently declared incompatible with EU law, was taken by a national court adjudicating at last instance, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, by reason (inter alia) of the fact that an infringement, by such a decision, of rights deriving from EU law cannot thereafter normally be corrected, individuals cannot be deprived of the possibility of rendering the State liable in order to obtain legal protection of their rights (see, to that effect, judgments in Köbler , C‑224/01, EU:C:2003:513, paragraph 34, and Traghetti del Mediterraneo , C‑173/03, EU:C:2006:391, paragraph 31).