Belgische Staat and Directeur-Generaal van de Algemene Directie Controle en Bemiddeling van de FOD Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand en Energie v Movic BV and Others.
Date: 2020-07-16
It is settled case-law that it is for the Court to give the referring court full guidance on the interpretation of EU law in order to enable it to rule on the case before it (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 December 2008, Gysbrechts and Santurel Inter, C‑205/07, EU:C:2008:730, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2015, Baczó and Vizsnyiczai, C‑567/13, EU:C:2015:88, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited), reformulating, if necessary, the question referred.
In order to ensure, as far as possible, that the rights and obligations which derive from Regulation No 1215/2012 for the Member States and the persons to whom it applies are equal and uniform, the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ in Article 1(1) of that regulation should not be interpreted as a mere reference to the internal law of a Member State. That concept must be regarded as an autonomous concept to be interpreted by reference, first, to the objectives and scheme of that regulation and, second, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems (judgment of 7 May 2020, Rina, C‑641/18, EU:C:2020:349, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
Moreover, as is apparent from, inter alia,  recital 10 of Regulation No 1215/2012, the need to ensure the smooth functioning of the internal market and the need to ensure, in the interests of the harmonious administration of justice, that irreconcilable judgments will not be delivered in the Member States require a broad interpretation of that concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ (judgment of 28 February 2019, Gradbeništvo Korana, C‑579/17, EU:C:2019:162, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
Last, the Court has repeatedly held that, although certain actions where the opposing parties are a public authority and a person governed by private law may come within the scope of Regulation No 1215/2012, it is otherwise where the public authority is acting in the exercise of its public powers (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 April 2013, Sapir and Others, C‑645/11, EU:C:2013:228, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited, and of 12 September 2013, Sunico and Others, C‑49/12, EU:C:2013:545, paragraph 34).
The exercise of public powers by one of the parties to the action, because it exercises powers falling outside the scope of the ordinary legal rules applicable to relationships between private individuals, excludes such an action from ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 February 2007, Lechouritou and Others, C‑292/05, EU:C:2007:102, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited, and of 28 February 2019, Gradbeništvo Korana, C‑579/17, EU:C:2019:162, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
It follows that, in order to determine whether or not a matter falls within the scope of the concept of  ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, and, consequently, whether it comes within the scope of that regulation, it is necessary to determine the nature of the legal relationships between the parties to the action and the subject matter of the action or, alternatively, the basis of the action and the detailed rules applicable to it (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 October 1976, LTU, 29/76, EU:C:1976:137, paragraph 4, and of 28 February 2019, Gradbeništvo Korana, C‑579/17, EU:C:2019:162, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
As regards cessation actions and the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, the Court has previously held that an action concerning the prohibition on traders using unfair terms, within the meaning of Directive 93/13, in their contracts with consumers, in so far as it seeks to make relationships governed by private law subject to review by the courts, falls within the concept of a ‘civil matter’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 October 2002, Henkel, C‑167/00, EU:C:2002:555, paragraph 30). That case-law has subsequently been reiterated  and extended more generally to cessation orders under Directive 2009/22 (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 July 2016, Verein für Konsumenteninformation, C‑191/15, EU:C:2016:612, paragraphs 38 and 39).
In that respect, the Court has previously held that the fact that a power was introduced by legislation is not, in itself, decisive in order to conclude that a State authority acted in the exercise of public powers (see, by analogy, regarding the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of Regulation (EC)  No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents), and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 (OJ 2007 L 324, p. 79), judgment of 11 June 2015, Fahnenbrock and Others, C‑226/13, C‑245/13 and C‑247/13, EU:C:2015:383, paragraph 56).
However, the general scheme of Regulation No 1215/2012 does not require that the treatment of ancillary claims should necessarily be linked to the treatment of the primary claims (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2015, Aannemingsbedrijf Aertssen and Aertssen Terrassements, C‑523/14, EU:C:2015:722, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited), and consequently the international jurisdiction of a court of a Member State to hear a primary claim may be based on that regulation though that is not necessarily the case with regard to ancillary claims, and vice versa.