Italian Republic v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2001-10-25
28 In that connection, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent court to exercise its power of review (see, in particular, Case C-288/96 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-8237, paragraph 82, and Joined Cases C-15/98 and C-105/99 Italy and Sardinia Lines v Commission [2000] ECR I-8855, paragraph 65).
29 At the same time, the Court has clarified the scope of that obligation, stating that the requirement to state reasons must be evaluated according to the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 190 of the Treaty must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see Italy and Sardinia Lines v Commission, cited above, paragraph 65). That is a fortiori the case where the Member States have been closely associated with the process of drafting the contested measure and are thus aware of the reasons underlying the measure (see Case C-478/93 Netherlands v Commission [1995] ECR I-3081, paragraph 50).
42 It must observed, first, that neither in Community legislation nor in the case-law of the Court has it ever been established that application of the principle of relative stability to a stock of fish for which no TAC or quota has previously been fixed requires, whatever the circumstances, that the catch quotas should be based on a given number of years' fishing rather than on one year only. Flexibility regarding the reference period to be used is particularly important where the stock in question is managed under the auspices of an international fisheries organisation and the percentages allocated within the Community are normally based on decisions taken within the framework of that organisation.
44 Finally, it is settled case-law that the Community legislature enjoys a considerable power of discretion in circumstances where it is necessary to evaluate a complex economic situation, as is the case as far as the common agricultural and fisheries policies are concerned. Its discretion is not limited solely to the nature and scope of the measures to be taken but also, to some extent, to the finding of basic facts. Accordingly, in reviewing the exercise of such a power, the Court must confine itself to examining whether there has been a manifest error or misuse of power or whether the authority in question has clearly exceeded the bounds of its discretion (see to that effect, in particular, Case 113/88 Leukhardt [1989] ECR 1991, paragraph 20, Case C-4/96 NIFPO and Northern Ireland Fishermen's Federation [1998] ECR I-681, paragraphs 41 and 42, and Case C-179/95 Spain v Council [1999] ECR I-6475, paragraph 29).
80 According to settled case-law, there can be no discrimination unless different rules are applied to comparable situations or the same rule is applied to different situations (see, in particular, Case 8/82 Wagner [1983] ECR 371, paragraph 18, Case 283/83 Racke [1984] ECR 3791, paragraph 7, and Case C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland [1999] ECR I-2651, paragraph 26).