Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri and Others v Gianni Pantuso and Others.
Date: 2018-01-24
28


It should be borne in mind, next, that the obligation to provide appropriate remuneration is binding only in respect of the medical specialties which are common to all the Member States or to two or more of them and are mentioned in Article 5 or Article 7 of Council Directive 75/362/EEC of 16 June 1975 concerning the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications in medicine, including measures to facilitate the effective exercise of the right of establishment and freedom to provide services (OJ 1975 L 167, p. 1) (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2000, Gozza and Others, C‑371/97, EU:C:2000:526, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
29


It follows from settled case-law of the Court that the obligation on Member States to provide remuneration for periods of training in medical specialties, laid down by the Annex to Directive 75/363 as amended, is, in itself, unconditional and sufficiently precise (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 February 1999, Carbonari and Others, C‑131/97, EU:C:1999:98, paragraph 44, and of 3 October 2000, Gozza and Others, C‑371/97, EU:C:2000:526, paragraphs 34 and 41).
41


It is true that it follows from that case-law that Directive 75/363 as amended does not contain any definition either of the remuneration which is to be regarded as appropriate or of the methods by which that remuneration is to be fixed. Such definitions are in principle a matter for the Member States, which must adopt specific implementing measures in the field (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 February 1999, Carbonari and Others, C‑131/97, EU:C:1999:98, paragraph 45, and of 3 October 2000, Gozza and Others, C‑371/97, EU:C:2000:526, paragraphs 36).
42


Nevertheless, the Court has already held that the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by the directive and their duty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation is binding on all the authorities of Member States, including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts. Accordingly, in applying national law and in particular the provisions of a law which were specifically introduced in order to implement a directive, the national court is required to interpret its national law, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 February 1999, Carbonari and Others, C‑131/97, EU:C:1999:98, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
44


When ruling, inter alia, on references for a preliminary ruling brought for an interpretation of Directive 75/363 as amended, the Court has held that a national court is required, when it applies provisions of national law adopted either before or after a directive, to interpret them as far as possible in the light of the wording and the purpose of that directive (judgments of 25 February 1999, Carbonari and Others, C‑131/97, EU:C:1999:98, paragraph 54, and of 3 October 2000, Gozza and Others, C‑371/97, EU:C:2000:526, paragraph 45).
45


In this respect, it must be recalled that, even in the absence of specific national measures to transpose a directive, it is for the national court to interpret the national law, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive concerned in order to achieve the result sought by the directive, which requires that national court to do whatever lies within its jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by that law (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 December 2014, Schoenimport Italmoda Mariano Previti and Others, C‑131/13, C‑163/13 and C‑164/13, EU:C:2014:2455, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).
46


With regard to the purpose of the Annex to Directive 75/363 as amended, the Court has already held that it aims to ensure that the doctors concerned devote all their professional activity to their practical and theoretical training throughout the week, or, in the case of a specialist in part-time training, a significant proportion of it (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 February 1999, Carbonari and Others, C‑131/97, EU:C:1999:98, paragraph 33, and of 3 October 2000, Gozza and Others, C‑371/97, EU:C:2000:526, paragraph 43).
49


It is sufficient to recall that the Court of Justice has repeatedly held that if the result prescribed by that directive cannot be achieved by way of interpretation, by taking account of the entirety of domestic law and applying the methods of interpretation recognised by it, EU law requires the Member States to make good damage caused to individuals through failure to transpose that directive, provided that three conditions are fulfilled: the rule of law infringed is intended to confer rights on individuals and the content of those rights can be identified; the breach is sufficiently serious; and there is a direct causal link between the breach of the State’s obligation and the damage suffered by the persons affected (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 February 1999, Carbonari and Others, C‑131/97, EU:C:1999:98, paragraph 52).
50


In that regard, retroactive application in full of the measures implementing Directive 82/76 will enable the harmful consequences of its belated transposition to be remedied, provided that the directive was properly transposed. However, it is for the national court to ensure that reparation of the loss or damage sustained by the beneficiaries is adequate. Retroactive and proper application in full of the measures implementing Directive 82/76 will suffice for that purpose unless the beneficiaries establish the existence of complementary loss sustained on account of the fact that they were unable to benefit at the appropriate time from the financial advantages guaranteed by that directive with the result that such loss must also be made good (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 February 1999, Carbonari and Others, C‑131/97, EU:C:1999:98, paragraph 53, and of 3 October 2000, Gozza and Others, C‑371/97, EU:C:2000:526, paragraph 39).
53


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that since the transposition period for a directive is intended in particular to give the Member States the time necessary to adopt the transposing measures, those States cannot be reproached for not having yet adopted measures implementing it in national law (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 October 2016, Milev, C‑439/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:818, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
55


It is true that it follows from the Court’s case-law that, from the date upon which a directive has entered into force, the authorities and courts of the Member States must refrain as far as possible from interpreting domestic law in a manner which might seriously compromise, after the period for transposition has expired, attainment of the objective pursued by that directive (judgment of 27 October 2016, Milev, C‑439/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:818, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited.)