larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Markus Geltl v Daimler AG.
Date: 2012-06-28
25. The definition of the notion of ‘inside information’ under point 1 of Article 1 of that directive comprises four essential elements. Firstly, it must be of a precise nature. Secondly, the information must not have been made public. Thirdly, it must relate, directly or indirectly, to one or more financial instruments or their issuers. Fourthly, it must be information which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on the price of related derivative financial instruments. The first and fourth elements are defined more specifically in Article 1(1) and (2) respectively of Directive 2003/124.
33. Moreover, as is evident from recitals 2 and 12 in the preamble thereto, the purpose of Directive 2003/6 is to protect the integrity of the European Union financial markets and to enhance investor confidence in those markets. That confidence depends on, inter alia, investors being placed on an equal footing and protected against the improper use of insider information (see, to that effect, Case C-45/08 Spector Photo Group and Van Raemdonck [2009] ECR I-12073, paragraph 47, and Case C-445/09 IMC Securities  [2011] ECR I-5917, paragraph 27).
36. In such a situation, certain parties who possessed inside information could be in an advantageous position vis-à-vis other investors and be able to profit from that information, to the detriment of those who are unaware of it (see, to that effect, Spector Photo Group and Van Raemdonck , paragraph 48).
43. According to settled case-law, firstly, the wording used in one language version of a provision of European Union law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. Secondly, the various language versions of a text of European Union law must be given a uniform interpretation and hence, in the case of divergence between the language versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part (see Case C-215/10 Pacific World and FDD International  [2011] ECR I-7255, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
52. Secondly, an interpretation to the effect that, the greater the magnitude of the possible effect of a future event on the prices of the financial instruments concerned may be, the lower the degree of probability required in order for the information in question to be held to be precise, would imply that the two elements required for information to be inside information, set out in Article 1(1) and (2) of Directive 2003/124 respectively, namely that the information must be precise and must be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of the financial instruments concerned, are co-dependent.
53. The specific criteria set out in those two paragraphs are minimum conditions which must each be satisfied in order for information to be held to be ‘inside’ information within the meaning of point 1 of Article 1 of Directive 2003/6.
Michel Bourgès-Maunoury and Marie-Louise Heintz, wife of Bourgès-Maunoury v Direction des services fiscaux d’Eure-et-Loir.
Date: 2012-07-05
22. The Protocol thus makes a clear distinction between income of national origin which falls within the authority of the national tax administrations of the Member States, on the one hand, and income paid by the Union to its officials and other staff, which is exclusively subject to the law of the Union as regards its taxation, on the other. This division of reciprocal fiscal jurisdiction must exclude any taxation, direct or indirect, of income which is not within the jurisdiction of the Member States ( Humblet v Belgian State , 578; Case 260/86 Commission  v Belgium  [1988] ECR 955, paragraph 10; Case C-333/88 Tither [1990] ECR I-1133, paragraph 12, and Case C-229/98 Vander Zwalmen and Massart [1999] ECR I-7113, paragraph 21).
Content Services Ltd v Bundesarbeitskammer.
Date: 2012-07-05
32. In that regard, it must be stated that neither Directive 97/7 nor the documents relevant for its interpretation, such as the travaux préparatoires, provide clarification of the exact scope of the concept of ‘receive’ and ‘given’ in Article 5(1) of the directive. Therefore, the meaning of those terms must be determined by considering their usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they are part (see, to that effect, Case C-336/03 easyCar [2005] ECR I-1947, paragraphs 20 and 21).
34. As regards the context in which the terms in question are used, it should be recalled that Article 5(1) of Directive 97/7 seeks to ensure the communication to the consumer of the information necessary to the proper performance of the contract and, above all, to the exercise of his consumer rights, in particular his right of withdrawal. As the Italian Government states, that provision contains a series of requirements intended to protect consumers, who are the weak parties in contractual relations concluded at a distance.
36. The purpose of Directive 97/7 is to afford consumers extensive protection, by giving them a number of rights in relation to distance contracts. The objective of the European Union legislature is, as is apparent from recital 11 in the preamble to the directive, to avoid a situation where the use of means of distance communication leads to a reduction in the information provided to the consumer.
42. It follows that a durable medium, within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Directive 97/7, must ensure that the consumer, in a similar way to paper form, is in possession of the information referred to in that provision to enable him to exercise his rights where necessary.
43. Where a medium allows the consumer to store the information which has been addressed to him personally, ensures that its content is not altered and that the information is accessible for an adequate period, and gives consumers the possibility to reproduce it unchanged, that medium must be regarded as ‘durable’ within the meaning of that provision.
44. Such an approach is confirmed by the definition of ‘durable medium’ given by the European Union legislature in other legislative texts, in particular in Article 2(f) of Directive 2002/65, Article 2(12) of Directive 2002/92 and Article 3(m) of Directive 2008/48. Although those directives do not apply in the present case, there is nothing to indicate, as the Advocate General noted in point 36 of his Opinion, that they refer to a concept different from that used in Directive 97/7. That finding is all the more applicable to Directive 2011/83 which replaces Directive 97/7 as of 13 June 2014, and Article 2(10) thereof, which defines ‘durable medium’ according to the criteria noted in the previous paragraph.
Vodafone España SA v Ayuntamiento de Santa Amalia (C‑55/11) Ayuntamiento de Tudela (C‑57/11) and France Telecom España SA v Ayuntamiento de Torremayor (C‑58/11).
Date: 2012-07-12
23. In that regard it is settled case-law that the Court may order the reopening of the oral procedure in accordance with Article 61 of the Rules of Procedure if it considers that it lacks sufficient information or that the case should be examined on the basis of an argument which has not been the subject of debate between the parties (see, inter alia, Case C-284/06 Burda  [2008] ECR I-4571, paragraph 37, and Case C-323/09 Interflora and Interflora British Unit [2011] ECR I-8625, paragraph 22).
28. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, within the framework of the Authorisation Directive, Member States may not levy any fees or charges in relation to the provision of networks and electronic communication services other than those provided for by that directive (see, by analogy, Case C-339/04 Nuova società di telecomunicazioni [2006] ECR I-6917, paragraph 35, and Case C-85/10 Telefónica Móviles España [2011] ECR I-1575, paragraph 21).
29. As is apparent from recitals 30 to 32 and Articles 12 and 13 of the Authorisation Directive, Member States are thus only entitled to impose either administrative charges to cover the administrative costs incurred in the management, control and enforcement of the general authorisation scheme or fees for the rights of use for radio frequencies or numbers or rights to install facilities on, over or under public or private property.
32. Second, as the Advocate General noted at points 52 and 54 of her Opinion, the terms ‘facilities’ and ‘install’ refer to the physical infrastructure enabling provision of electronic communications networks and services and to their physical installation on the public or private property concerned.
37. In that regard, it should be noted that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied on before the national courts by individuals against the State where the latter has failed to implement the directive in domestic law by the end of the period prescribed or where it has failed to implement the directive correctly (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer and Others  [2004] ECR I-8835, paragraph 103; Joined Cases C-152/07 to C-154/07 Arcor and Others  [2008] ECR I-5959, paragraph 40, and Case C-282/10 Dominguez  [2012] ECR, paragraph 33).
Maurizio Giovanardi and Others.
Date: 2012-07-12
33. It is also undisputed that the Framework Decision, based on Articles 31 EU and 34 EU, is one of the acts referred to in Article 35(1) EU on which the Court may rule in a reference for a preliminary ruling and it is accepted that the referring court, acting in proceedings such as those in the main action, must be regarded as a court or tribunal of a Member State for the purposes of Article 35 EU (see, inter alia, Case C-507/10 X  [2011] ECR I-14241, paragraph 21).
36. Although, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, the Court cannot in a reference for a preliminary ruling give a ruling either on questions which fall within the national law of the Member States or on the compatibility of national provisions with European Union law, it can, nevertheless, provide a ruling on the interpretation of European Union law so as to enable the national court to decide the case before it (see, inter alia, Case C-60/05 WWF Italia and Others  [2006] ECR I-5083, paragraph 18).
37. Directive 2004/80 must be dismissed at the outset as irrelevant to this case. As is apparent from Article 1 thereof, the directive is intended to facilitate access to compensation by victims of violent intentional crime in cross-border situations, whereas it is not disputed that the proceedings before the referring court concern offences committed as a result of negligence and, what is more, in a purely national context.
44. First of all, while, as stated in recital 4 in the preamble to the Framework Decision, the victims of crime should be afforded a high level of protection (see, inter alia, Case C-404/07 Katz  [2008] ECR I-7607, paragraphs 42 and 46), the aim of the Framework Decision is simply to ensure that, within criminal proceedings as defined in Article 1(c) thereof, minimum standards are drawn up for the protection of victims of crime (Joined Cases C-483/09 and C-1/10 Gueye and Salmerón Sánchz [2011] ECR I-8263, paragraph 52).
46. Lastly, it is apparent from the very wording of Article 1(a) of the Framework Decision that that decision ensures, in principle, that the victim is entitled to compensation in criminal proceedings in respect of ‘acts or omissions that are in violation of the criminal law of a Member State’ and are the ‘direct’ cause of the harm (see Case C-467/05 Dell’Orto  [2007] ECR I-5557, paragraphs 53 and 57).
Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV (DVGW) — Technisch-Wissenschaftlicher Verein.
Date: 2012-07-12
20. Thus, national provisions governing the placing on the market of a construction product not covered by technical specifications harmonised or recognised at European Union level must, as provided for by Directive 89/106, comply with obligations under the Treaty, in particular with the principle of the free movement of goods as set out in Articles 28 EC and 30 EC (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2008 in Case C-227/06 Commission  v Belgium , paragraph 34).
22. According to settled case-law, all rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions, prohibited by Article 28 EC (Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5; Case C-270/02 Commission v Italy [2004] ECR I-1559, paragraph 18; and Commission  v Belgium , paragraph 40). Thus, the mere fact that an importer might be dissuaded from introduci ng or marketing the products in question in the Member State concerned constitutes a restriction on the free movement of goods for the importer (judgment of 24 April 2008 in Case C-286/07 Commission  v Luxembourg , paragraph 27).
23. Similarly, the Court has held that a Member State fails to fulfil its obligations under Articles 28 EC and 30 EC when, without valid justification, it encourages economic operators wishing to market in its territory construction products lawfully manufactured and/or marketed in another Member State to obtain national marks of conformity (see, to that effect, Commission  v Belgium , paragraph 69) or when it refuses to recognise the equivalence of approval certificates issued by another Member State (see, to that effect, Case C-432/03 Commission  v Portugal  [2005] ECR I-9665, paragraphs 41, 49 and 52).
J.J. Komen en Zonen Beheer Heerhugowaard BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2012-07-12
20. It should be noted at the outset that, according to consistent case-law, the terms used to specify an exemption such as that set out in Article 13 of the Sixth VAT Directive are to be interpreted strictly, since that exemption constitutes an exception to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all goods and services supplied for consideration by a taxable person. Nevertheless, the interpretation of those terms must be consistent with the objectives pursued by those exemptions and comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT. Thus, the requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to define the exemptions referred to in Article 13 should be construed in such a way as to deprive the exemptions of their intended effect (see Don Bosco Onroerend Goed , paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
21. The VAT exemption set out in Article 13B(g) of the Sixth VAT Directive applies to supplies of old buildings or parts of buildings and the land on which they stand. However, in accordance with Article 4(3)(a) of that directive, Member States are entitled to make the supply, before first occupation, of a building or parts of building and the land on which they stand liable to VAT.
33. As regards the argument that it is also necessary to take into consideration the common intention of the parties which, it is said, was to create a new building, it must be noted that the Court has already held that the declared intention of the parties concerning the VAT liability of a transaction must be taken into consideration, in the course of an overall assessment of the circumstances of a transaction, provided that it is supported by objective evidence (see, to that effect, Case 268/83 Rompelman  [1985] ECR 655, paragraph 24, and Case C-444/10 Schriever  [2011] ECR I-11071, paragraph 38).
34. That evidence includes the extent to which the transformation work carried out by the vendor had advanced at the time of supply and, as appropriate, the use of the immovable property at issue on the same date.
35. In that context, it is, if necessary, for the competent national courts to ensure that the transaction is not a wholly artificial arrangement which does not reflect economic reality and is set up with the sole aim of obtaining a tax advantage (see, to that effect, Case C-504/10 Tanoarch [2011] ECR I-10853, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
39. In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the question is that Article 13B(g) of the Sixth Directive, read in conjunction with Article 4(3)(a) of that directive, must be interpreted as meaning that the VAT exemption provided for in that first provision covers a supply of immovable property consisting of a plot of land and an old building undergoing transformation into a new building, such as that in issue in the main proceedings, where, at the time of that supply, the old building had only undergone partial demolition work and was, at least in part, still used as such.
Costs
Land Hessen v Florence Feyerbacher.
Date: 2012-07-19
45. In that regard, while it is indeed true that Article 15 of the Headquarters Agreement precludes the State in which the headquarters are situated from imposing on ECB staff substantive or procedural obligations in order to receive the benefits provided for by the ECB conditions of employment, that article does not in any way whatsoever oblige the Federal Republic of Germany, as the State in which the headquarters are situated, to provide for the parental allowance at issue in the main proceedings to be granted to ECB staff (see, by analogy, Bosmann , paragraph 27, and Joined Cases C-611/10 and C-612/10 Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak [2012] ECR I-0000, paragraph 45).
46. Likewise, that article does not deprive the Federal Republic of Germany, which does not make entitlement to such an allowance subject to conditions of employment or insurance, of the ability to grant that allowance to ECB staff members who reside in its territory, since the possibility of such a grant arises, in actual fact, from its legislation and the relevant provisions of European Union law do not exclude that possibility (see, by analogy, Bosmann , paragraphs 28, 31 and 32, and Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak, paragraphs 48 and 49).
Bawaria Motors sp. z o.o. v Minister Finansów.
Date: 2012-07-19
28. In this connection it should be noted that the scheme for the taxation of the profit margin made by the taxable dealer on the supply of second-hand goods such as those at issue in the main proceedings constitutes a special arrangement for VAT — derogating from the general scheme of Directive 2006/112 (see Case C-280/04 Jyske Finans  [2005] ECR I-10683, paragraph 35, and Case C-203/10 Auto Nikolovi  [2011] ECR I-1083, paragraph 46).
29. Consequently, Article 314 of Directive 2006/112, which identifies the cases in which this special arrangement is to be applied, must be construed narrowly. It follows that those cases are exhaustively listed, as the Advocate General pointed out in point 29 of his Opinion.
34. Article 136(b) must be construed narrowly. The exemption which it introduces constitutes an exception to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all goods supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, to that effect, Jyske Finans , paragraph 21). Moreover, that exemption falls, by virtue of the reference made to Article 136 in Article 314(b) of that directive, within the scope of the derogating margin scheme.
35. The exemption provided for by Article 136(b) of Directive 2006/112 therefore can apply only to supplies of goods on the acquisition of which value added tax did not become deductible in accordance with national legislation (see, to that effect, Jyske Finans , paragraph 24).
37. Otherwise, it reflects the general scheme of Article 314 of Directive 2006/112. As the Polish Government, the Commission and the Advocate General, in point 30 of his Opinion, have pointed out, the situations in which the margin scheme is applied, the list of which includes the exemption provided for in Article 136(b) of that directive, have in common that the person supplying the goods concerned to the taxable dealer could not deduct any of the input tax paid on the purchase of those goods and therefore bore that tax in its entirety.
Lietuvos geležinkeliai AB v Vilniaus teritorinė muitinė, Muitinės departamentas prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos.
Date: 2012-07-19
34. According to settled case-law, the various language versions of a provision of European Union law must be uniformly interpreted and, in the case of divergence between those versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see, inter alia, Case C-341/01 Plato Plastik Robert Frank [2004] ECR I-4883, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).
35. In that regard it should be borne in mind, first of all, that it is settled case-law in matters of VAT, which also applies in respect of customs duties, that the terms used to specify the exemptions are to be interpreted strictly, since those exemptions constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all goods and services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, to that effect, Case C-540/09 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken  [2011] ECR I-1509, paragraph 20).
40. It is true that where it is necessary to interpret a provision of secondary European Union law, preference should as far as possible be given to the interpretation which renders the provision consistent with the treaties and the general principles of European Union law (see, inter alia, Case C-314/89 Rauh  [1991] ECR I-1647, paragraph 17, and Case C-1/02 Borgmann  [2004] ECR I-3219, paragraph 30).
42. In LG’s submission, rail transport is in a competitive position vis-à-vis road transport, and there is no objective criterion justifying there being a distinction being drawn between the different categories of land vehicles. LG states in that regard that infringement of the general principle of equal treatment may be established, in matters relating to tax, by other kinds of discrimination which affect traders who are not necessarily in competition with each other but who are nevertheless in a similar situation in other respects (Case C-309/06 Marks & Spencer  [2008] ECR I-2283, paragraph 49).
44. It should be observed in that regard that the Court has consistently held that the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently, and different situations must not be treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified (Case C-344/04 IATA and ELFAA  [2006] ECR I-403, paragraph 95).
45. According to settled case-law, the principle of equal treatment, which applies in matters relating to VAT through the principle of fiscal neutrality, precludes treating similar goods and supplies of services, which are thus in competition with each other, differently for VAT purposes (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-259/10 and C-260/10 The Rank Group  [2011] ECR I-10947, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
46. However, the Court found in paragraph 96 of IATA and ELFAA  that different modes of transport are not generally interchangeable and that the situation of undertakings operating in each of those different transport sectors is accordingly not comparable.