Eoghan O'Hannrachain v European Parliament.
Date: 2003-06-05
14.  In that regard, it must be observed that the Court of First Instance was right to point out, in paragraphs 33 to 35 of the judgment under appeal, that the argument that the appointing authority could not decide to move on to the next stage of the recruitment procedure because it had received valid applications in the first stage is not founded.  According to settled case-law, the appointing authority has a wide discretion for the purpose of finding the candidates with the highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity (see, in particular, Joined Cases 12/64 and 29/64   Ley   v   Commission   [1965] ECR 107, 118, Case 135/87   Vlachou   v   Court of Auditors   [1988] ECR 2901, paragraph 23, and Case C-174/99 P   Parliament   v   Richard   [2000] ECR I-6189, paragraph 37).
16.  It follows that the appointing authority may go on to a subsequent stage of the recruitment procedure, even where there are one or more candidates who satisfy all the conditions and requirements set out in the vacancy notice for the post to be filled (Parliament   v   Richard  , paragraph 40).
17.  The Court of First Instance was also correct in pointing out, in paragraph 36 of the judgment under appeal, that a decision to have recourse to Article 29(2) of the Staff Regulations made during the course of a recruitment procedure which has been initiated need not necessarily be taken when the vacancy notices are published and need not be published (see Joined Cases 81/74 to 88/74   Marenco and Others   v   Commission   [1975] ECR 1247, paragraphs 21 and 23, Case 289/81   Mavridis   v   Parliament   [1983] ECR 1731, paragraph 23, and Case C-331/87   Exarchos   v   Parliament   [1989] ECR 4185).  It was thus entitled to conclude, in paragraph 37 of the judgment under appeal, that the appointing authority could decide to have recourse to the procedure under Article 29(2) of the Staff Regulations.
35.  In that connection, it must be recalled that under Article 225 EC and Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal lies on points of law only and that therefore the Court of First Instance alone has jurisdiction to find and appraise the facts, save where the factual inaccuracy of its findings results from the documents in the case before it.  The appraisal of the facts by the Court of First Instance does not constitute, save where the clear sense of the evidence produced before it is distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (see,   inter alia  , Case C-449/99 P   EIB   v   Hautem   [2001] ECR I-6733, paragraph 44, and Case C-184/01 P   Hirschfeldt   v   AEE   [2002] ECR I-10173, paragraph 40).
39.  That plea, which concerns the Parliament's obligation to state reasons, was not raised before the Court of First Instance.  It was, it is true, raised by Mr O'Hannrachain in his complaint beforehand.  However, it was not incorporated as such in the application initiating proceedings before the Court of First Instance.  To allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea in law which it has not raised before the Court of First Instance would be to allow it to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the Court of First Instance (Case C-155/98 P   Alexopoulou   v   Commission   [1999] ECR I-4069, paragraph 41).  Therefore, that plea must also be rejected as inadmissible.
46.  In that regard, it must be observed that, as is clear from paragraph 104 of the judgment under appeal, the concept of misuse of powers has a precise scope and refers to the use of powers by an administrative authority for a purpose other than that for which they were conferred on it.  A measure is only vitiated by misuse of powers if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence, to have been taken with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that stated or evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case (see Case C-110/97   Netherlands   v   Council   [2001] ECR I-8763, paragraph 137).
55.  In that regard, it must be observed that the Court of First Instance was right to hold, in paragraph 129 of the judgment under appeal, that it is clear from consideration of the pleas relied on that the Bureau, in deciding to appoint Mr Lopez Veiga, remained within reasonable limits and made no manifest error of assessment.  It must be observed in that regard that the Parliament has a wide discretion in its choice of the most appropriate means for meeting its personnel requirements (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 341/85, 251/86, 258/86, 259/86, 262/86 and 266/86, 222/87 and 232/87   Van der Stijl and Cullington   v   Commission   [1989] ECR 511, paragraph 11).  In the present case, it has not been established that the appointing authority breached the principle of sound management and good administration.