Proceedings brought by Finanzamt Linz and Finanzamt Kirchdorf Perg Steyr.
Date: 2019-11-14
45


In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, as the Court has found on many occasions, in a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, which is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, the national court alone has jurisdiction to find and assess the facts in the case in the main proceedings. In that context, the Court is only empowered to rule on the interpretation or validity of EU law in the light of the factual and legal situation as described by the referring court, in order to provide that court with such guidance as will assist it in resolving the dispute before it (judgment of 27 April 2017, A-Rosa Flussschiff, C‑620/15, EU:C:2017:309, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
54


With regard to the substance of the first question, it should be recalled that the notification requirement laid down in Article 108(3) TFEU is one of the fundamental features of the system of control put in place by the FEU Treaty in the field of State aid. Within that system, Member States are under an obligation, first, to notify to the Commission each measure intended to grant new aid or alter aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU and, secondly, not to implement such a measure until that institution has taken a final decision on the measure (judgment of 5 March 2019, Eesti Pagar, C‑349/17, EU:C:2019:172, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).
55


The obligation of the Member State concerned to notify any new aid to the Commission is set out in Article 2 of Regulation No 659/1999 (judgment of 21 July 2016, Dilly’s Wellnesshotel, C‑493/14, EU:C:2016:577, paragraph 32).
56


As the Court has held previously, measures taken after the entry into force of the FEU Treaty to grant or alter aid, whether the alterations relate to existing aid or initial plans notified to the Commission, must be regarded as new aid subject to the notification requirement laid down by Article 108(3) TFEU (see, inter alia, judgments of 9 August 1994, Namur-Les assurances du crédit, C‑44/93, EU:C:1994:311, paragraph 13, and of 20 May 2010, Todaro Nunziatina & C., C‑138/09, EU:C:2010:291, paragraph 46).
60


Further, according to the case-law of the Court, the examination of whether a measure constitutes aid, within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU, is to take into account, inter alia, those who are eligible to be granted that aid so as to verify, in particular, the selective nature of that measure (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 November 2001, Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke, C‑143/99, EU:C:2001:598, paragraphs 33 to 36, 40 and 55).
65


As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, in accordance with Article 109 TFEU, the Council is authorised to make any appropriate regulations for the application of Article 107 TFEU and Article 108 TFEU and may in particular determine the conditions in which Article 108(3) TFEU is to apply and the categories of aid exempt from the procedure under that provision. In addition, as provided for in Article 108(4) TFEU, the Commission may adopt regulations relating to the categories of State aid that the Council has, pursuant to Article 109 TFEU, determined may be exempt from the procedure provided for in Article 108(3) TFEU (judgment of 5 March 2019, Eesti Pagar, C‑349/17, EU:C:2019:172, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
66


Consequently, Regulation No 994/98, in accordance with which Regulation No 800/2008 was subsequently adopted, had itself been adopted pursuant to Article 94 of the EC Treaty (subsequently Article 89 EC and now Article 109 TFEU) (judgment of 5 March 2019, Eesti Pagar, C‑349/17, EU:C:2019:172, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). Regulation No 800/2008 was itself repealed and replaced by Regulation No 651/2014, which was also adopted under Regulation No 994/98.
67


It follows from the above that, notwithstanding the obligation of prior notification of each measure intended to grant or alter aid, which is incumbent on the Member States under the Treaties and, as follows from paragraph 54 of the present judgment, is one of the fundamental features of the system of monitoring in the field of State aid, if an aid measure adopted by a Member State fulfils the relevant conditions provided for in Regulation No 651/2014, that Member State may rely on the possibility of being exempt from its obligation to notify (see, with regard to Regulation No 800/2008, judgment of 21 July 2016, Dilly’s Wellnesshotel, C‑493/14, EU:C:2016:577, paragraph 36).
71


Accordingly, with regard to whether aid granted on the basis of an aid scheme such as the one at issue in the disputes in the main proceedings may be exempted from the notification requirement under Regulation No 651/2014, it should be noted that, much like Regulation No 800/2008, as a qualification of the general rule that there is the obligation to notify, Regulation No 651/2014 and the conditions laid down by it must be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, judgment of 21 July 2016, Dilly’s Wellnesshotel, C‑493/14, EU:C:2016:577, paragraph 37).
72


Such an approach is supported in the light of the aims of the general block exemption regulations, as referred to in recitals 4 and 5 of Regulation No 994/98. While the Commission is authorised to adopt such regulations, with a view to ensuring efficient supervision of the competition rules concerning State aid and simplifying administration, without weakening Commission monitoring in that area, the aim of such regulations is also to strengthen transparency and legal certainty. Fulfilling the conditions laid down by those regulations, including, therefore, those laid down by Regulation No 651/2014 enables those aims to be fully achieved (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 July 2016, Dilly’s Wellnesshotel, C‑493/14, EU:C:2016:577, paragraph 38).