larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Criminal proceedings against Franck Sleutjes.
Date: 2017-10-12
21


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court, before which the dispute has been brought and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need of a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (judgments of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin, C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraph 19, and of 8 December 2016, Eurosaneamientos and Others, C‑532/15 and C‑538/15, EU:C:2016:932, paragraph 27).
22


It follows that questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its object, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 8 December 2016, Eurosaneamientos and Others, C‑532/15 and C‑538/15, EU:C:2016:932, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
27


Consequently, the situation of a person, such as Mr Sleutjes, who has lodged an objection, the admissibility of which is being examined in appeal proceedings, against a penalty order made pursuant to Paragraph 407 et seq. of the StPO of which he was the addressee clearly falls within the scope of Directive 2010/64, with the result that that person must be able to exercise the right to interpretation and translation guaranteed by that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 October 2015, Covaci, C‑216/14, EU:C:2015:686, paragraph 27).
32


In the second place, as the Advocate General stated in point 33 of his Opinion, it follows both from recitals 14, 17 and 30 of Directive 2010/64 and from the very wording of Article 3 of that directive, in particular, of paragraph 1 thereof, that the right to translation provided for is designed to ensure that the persons concerned are able to exercise their right of defence and to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings (judgment of 15 October 2015, Covaci, C‑216/14, EU:C:2015:686, paragraph 43).
Kamin und Grill Shop GmbH v Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs Frankfurt am Main eV.
Date: 2017-10-12
20


At the outset, it should be emphasised that that provision, in so far as it allows Member States to exempt, subject to the conditions it lays down, certain operators from the control system governed by Article 27 of Regulation No 834/2007, introduces an exception to the rule enshrined in Article 28(1) of that regulation and must, as an exception to a rule, be interpreted restrictively (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 September 2013, Dansk Jurist- og Økonomforbund, C‑546/11, EU:C:2013:603, paragraph 41).
22


Next, it is settled case-law that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see judgment of 6 July 2017, Air Berlin, C‑290/16, EU:C:2017:523, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
Ypourgos Esoterikon and Ypourgos Ethnikis paideias kai Thriskevmaton v Maria-Eleni Kalliri.
Date: 2017-10-18
23


It follows that Directive 76/207 applies to a person seeking employment, and also in regard to the selection criteria and recruitment conditions of that employment (see, by analogy, the judgment of 28 July 2016, Kratzer, C‑423/15, EU:C:2016:604, paragraph 34).
25


By providing that persons who are of a height of less than 1.70m cannot be admitted to the examination for entry to the Greek police school, the law at issue in the main proceedings affects those workers’ recruitment conditions and must, therefore, be regarded as laying down rules relating to access to employment in the public sector within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a) of Directive 76/207 (see, by analogy, the judgments of 13 November 2014, Vital Pérez, C‑416/13, EU:C:2014:2371, paragraph 30, and of 15 November 2016, Salaberria Sorondo, C‑258/15, EU:C:2016:873, paragraph 25).
31


The Court has consistently held that indirect discrimination arises where a national measure, albeit formulated in neutral terms, works to the disadvantage of far more women than men (see, in particular, the judgments of 2 October 1997, Kording, C‑100/95, EU:C:1997:453, paragraph 16, and of 20 June 2013, Riežniece, C‑7/12, EU:C:2013:410, paragraph 39).
34


Although it is for the national court to establish whether such an objective justification exists, the Court of Justice, which is called on to provide answers of use to the national court, may provide guidance in order to enable the national court to give judgment (see, to that effect, the judgment of 10 March 2005, Nikoloudi, C‑196/02, EU:C:2005:141, paragraphs 48 and 49).
36


It should be recalled that the Court has already held that the concern to ensure the operational capacity and proper functioning of the police services constitutes a legitimate objective (see, as regards Article 4(1) of Council Directive 2000/78 of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16), the structure, provisions, and objective of which is largely comparable with those of Directive 76/207, the judgments of 13 November 2014, Vital Pérez, C‑416/13, EU:C:2014:2371, paragraph 44, and 15 November 2016, Salaberria Sorondo, C‑258/15, EU:C:2016:873, paragraph 38).
38


In that regard, while it is true that the exercise of police functions involving the protection of persons and goods, the arrest and custody of offenders and the conduct of crime prevention patrols may require the use of physical force requiring a particular physical aptitude, the fact remains that certain police functions, such as providing assistance to citizens or traffic control, do not clearly require the use of significant physical force (see, to that effect, the judgment of 13 November 2014, Vital Pérez, C‑416/13, EU:C:2014:2371, paragraphs 39 and 40).
Europamur Alimentación SA v Dirección General de Comercio y Protección del Consumidor de la Comunidad Autónoma de la Región de Murcia.
Date: 2017-10-19
29


The Court has repeatedly held that it has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on questions concerning provisions of EU law in situations where the facts in the main proceedings fell outside the scope of EU law, but where the provisions of EU law had been rendered applicable by national law, which, in dealing with situations outside the scope of EU law, followed the same approach as that provided for by the latter (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 October 2012, Nolan, C‑583/10, EU:C:2012:638, paragraph 45, and of 15 November 2016, Ullens de Schooten, C‑268/15, EU:C:2016:874, paragraph 53). In such a situation, it is clearly in the interest of the European Union that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, provisions taken from EU law should be interpreted uniformly (judgment of 18 October 2012, Nolan, C‑583/10, EU:C:2012:638, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
39


In that regard, the Court has held that the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive fully harmonises the rules relating to unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices and that the Member States may therefore not adopt stricter measures than those provided for in the directive, as expressly laid down in Article 4 thereof, even in order to achieve a higher level of consumer protection (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 January 2010, Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft, C‑304/08, EU:C:2010:12, paragraph 41, and order of 30 June 2011, Wamo, C‑288/10, EU:C:2011:443, paragraph 33).
42


Furthermore, the more restrictive measures which are prohibited also include, as noted by the Advocate General in points 62 to 64 of his Opinion, the reversal of the burden of proof provided for in Article 14 of the LOCM. Given that selling at a loss is not included among the practices referred to in Annex I to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, the imposition of a penalty for infringement of the prohibition of such selling at a loss must be preceded by an analysis, undertaken having regard to the facts of each particular case, of whether that selling is ‘unfair’ in the light of the criteria set out in Articles 5 to 9 of that directive, and cannot be based on a presumption which the trader is required to rebut (see, by analogy, judgment of 23 April 2009, VTB-VAB and Galatea, C‑261/07 and C‑299/07, EU:C:2009:244, paragraph 65, relating to the prohibition of combined offers to consumers).
Solar Electric Martinique v Ministre des Finances et des Comptes publics.
Date: 2017-10-19
25


In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the Court has repeatedly held that it has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on questions concerning provisions of EU law in situations where the facts of the cases being considered by the national courts were outside the scope of EU law but where those provisions of EU law had been rendered applicable by domestic law due to a reference made by that law to the content of those provisions (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2011, Cicala, C‑482/10, EU:C:2011:868, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited, and of 18 October 2012, Nolan, C‑583/10, EU:C:2012:638, paragraph 45).
26


Where, in regulating situations outside the scope of the EU measure concerned, national legislation seeks to adopt the same solutions as those adopted in that measure, it is clearly in the interest of the European Union that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, provisions taken from that measure should be interpreted uniformly (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 July 2011, Agafiţei and Others, C‑310/10, EU:C:2011:467, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited, and of 18 October 2012, Nolan, C‑583/10, EU:C:2012:638, paragraph 46).
27


Thus, an interpretation, by the Court, of provisions of EU law in situations outside its scope is justified where those provisions have been made applicable to such situations by national law directly and unconditionally, in order to ensure that those internal situations and situations governed by EU law are treated in the same way (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2011, Cicala, C‑482/10, EU:C:2012:868, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
29


An EU interest in the uniform interpretation of the concepts of ‘works of construction’ and ‘single transaction that may be characterised as works of construction’, in order to forestall future differences in interpretation, is indeed conceivable.
30


However, as the Advocate General stated in points 41 to 44 of his Opinion, in the first place, the relevant provisions of the Sixth Directive and of the VAT Directive cannot be regarded as having been transposed by Article 256 of the CGI.
Vion Livestock BV v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken.
Date: 2017-10-19
35


Nevertheless, it follows from settled case-law that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to have recourse not only to its wording but also the context in which it is used, taking into account the scheme and objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 November 1983, Merck, 292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12; of 26 June 1990, Velker International Oil Company, C‑185/89, EU:C:1990:262, paragraph 17, and of 27 September 2007, Teleos and Others, C‑409/04, EU:C:2007:548, paragraph 35).
41


That interpretation is capable of preserving the effectiveness of Article 14(1) of Regulation No 1/2005, which must be interpreted as meaning that, in order for transport involving a long journey for animals concerned which commences on the territory of the European Union and continues outside that territory to be authorised by the competent authority of the place of departure, the organiser of the journey must submit a journey log which is realistic and indicates that the provisions of that regulation will be complied with, including for the stages of the journey which are to take place in the territory of third countries (judgment of 23 April 2015, Zuchtvieh-Export, C‑424/13, EU:C:2015:259, paragraph 56).
Hansruedi Raimund v Michaela Aigner.
Date: 2017-10-19
22


According to the settled case-law of the Court, the interpretation of provisions of EU law requires account to be taken not only of their wording but also of the context in which they occur and the objectives of the rules of which they form part (judgments of 19 September 2000, Germany v Commission, C‑156/98, EU:C:2000:467, paragraph 50; of 25 October 2011, eDate Advertising and Others, C‑509/09 and C‑161/10, EU:C:2011:685, paragraph 54; and of 26 July 2017, Jafari, C‑646/16, EU:C:2017:586, paragraph 73).
40


In that context, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, in the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law, the Member States having none the less responsibility for ensuring that those rights are effectively protected in each case (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 September 2003, Köbler, C‑224/01, EU:C:2003:513, paragraph 47, and of 27 June 2013, Agrokonsulting, C‑93/12, EU:C:2013:432, paragraph 35).
41


In this respect, in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU, the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under EU law must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (judgments of 16 December 1976, Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral, 33/76, EU:C:1976:188, paragraph 5; of 14 December 1995, Peterbroeck, C‑312/93, EU:C:1995:437, paragraph 12; and of 27 June 2013, Agrokonsulting, C‑93/12, EU:C:2013:432, paragraph 36).
42


It follows from the Court’s case-law that the requirements stemming from the principles of equivalence and effectiveness apply, in particular, to the definition of the procedural rules governing actions based on EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 June 2013, Agrokonsulting, C‑93/12, EU:C:2013:432, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
A v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2017-10-19
28


The referring court shares the assessment of the Gerechtshof Amsterdam that the chain transactions in the main proceedings constituted abusive practices within the meaning of the judgment of 21 February 2006, Halifax and Others (C‑255/02, EU:C:2006:121, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited), namely transactions which were carried out not in the ordinary course of trade but solely for the purpose of advantages provided for by Union law, in particular Regulations Nos 2777/75 and 1484/95.
Air Berlin plc v Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs.
Date: 2017-10-19
27


As a preliminary point, it should be noted that both Directive 69/335 and Directive 2008/7, which repealed and replaced it, provided for complete harmonisation of the cases in which the Member States may levy indirect taxes on the raising of capital (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 June 2007, Commission v Greece, C‑178/05, EU:C:2007:317, paragraph 31, and of 1 October 2009, HSBC Holdings and Vidacos Nominees, C‑569/07, EU:C:2009:594, paragraph 25).
28


As the Court has already held, where a matter is harmonised at EU level, national measures relating thereto must be assessed in the light of the provisions of that harmonising measure and not of those of the FEU Treaty (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 October 2009, HSBC Holdings and Vidacos Nominees, C‑569/07, EU:C:2009:594, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
31


It is clear from the Court’s case-law that, in view of the objectives pursued by those directives, Articles 10 and 11 of Directive 69/335 and Article 5 of Directive 2008/7 must be interpreted broadly so as to ensure that the prohibitions laid down in those provisions are not denied practical effect (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 July 2004, Commission v Belgium, C‑415/02, EU:C:2004:450, paragraph 33; of 28 June 2007, Albert Reiss Beteiligungsgesellschaft, C‑466/03, EU:C:2007:385, paragraph 39; and of 1 October 2009, HSBC Holdings and Vidacos Nominees, C‑569/07, EU:C:2009:594, paragraph 34).
32


The Court has thus held that, in accordance with the objectives of Article 11 of Directive 69/335 and Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/7, the prohibition of the taxation of transactions for the raising of capital also applies to transactions which are not expressly covered by that prohibition, where such taxation is tantamount to taxing a transaction forming an integral part of an overall transaction with regard to the raising of capital (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 October 2014, Gielen, C‑299/13, EU:C:2014:2266, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
40


It should be recalled that to permit the levying of tax or duty on the initial acquisition of a newly issued security amounts in reality to taxing the very issue of that security as it forms an integral part of an overall transaction with regard to the raising of capital. The issue of securities is not an end in itself, and has no point until those securities find investors (judgments of 15 July 2004, Commission v Belgium, C‑415/02, EU:C:2004:450, paragraph 32, and of 1 October 2009, HSBC Holdings and Vidacos Nominees, C‑569/07, EU:C:2009:594, paragraph 32).
41


For Article 5(2)(a) of Directive 2008/7 to have practical effect, therefore, ‘issue’, for the purposes of that provision, must include the first acquisition of securities immediately consequent upon their issue (see, by analogy, judgments of 15 July 2004, Commission v Belgium, C‑415/02, EU:C:2004:450, paragraph 33, and of 1 October 2009, HSBC Holdings and Vidacos Nominees, C‑569/07, EU:C:2009:594, paragraph 33).
European Commission v Italian Republic.
Date: 2017-10-25
14


It follows from the rules governing proceedings before the EU Courts, in particular Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable before the General Court pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 53 of that Statute and Article 44(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, in the version applicable when the originating application was lodged, that the case is in principle determined and delimited by the parties and that the EU Courts cannot adjudicate ultra petita (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 December 2013, Commission v Ireland and Others, C‑272/12 P, EU:C:2013:812, paragraph 27).
15


While certain pleas may, and indeed must, be raised by the courts of their own motion, such as the question whether a statement of reasons for the decision at issue is lacking or is inadequate, which falls within the scope of essential procedural requirements, a plea going to the substantive legality of that decision, which falls within the scope of infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU, can, by contrast, be examined by the Courts of the European Union only if it is raised by the applicant (judgment of 10 December 2013, Commission v Irelandand Others, C‑272/12 P, EU:C:2013:812, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
26


The Italian Republic contends that the General Court correctly required the Commission, for the purposes of reclassifying the existing aid as new aid, to provide evidence that the infringement of the authorisation conditions for the existing aid scheme constitutes a substantial alteration to that scheme, which, in the opinion of that Member State, must be assessed having regard to Article 4(1) of Regulation No 794/2004. It is apparent from the case-law that it is only where the alteration made to existing aid is not clearly severable from the original aid scheme and that alteration also affects the actual substance of that original scheme that the latter is transformed into a new aid scheme (judgment of the Court of Justice of 9 October 1984, Heineken Brouwerijen, 91/83 and 127/83, EU:C:1984:307, paragraphs 21 and 22, and judgment of the General Court of 30 April 2002, Government of Gibraltar v Commission, T‑195/01 and T‑207/01, EU:T:2002:111). Furthermore, it follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the criteria laid down by case-law also apply where the alteration constitutes an infringement of the authorisation conditions for an existing aid scheme (judgment of 13 June 2013, HGA and Others v Commission, C‑630/11 P to C‑633/11 P, EU:C:2013:387, paragraphs 91, 94 and 95).
Jan Theodorus Arts v Veevoederbedrijf Alpuro BV.
Date: 2017-11-09
19


As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that, although a contract is characterised by the principle of freedom of the parties to arrange their own affairs, according to which, in particular, parties are free to enter into obligations with each other, limitations on freedom of contract may nonetheless arise from the applicable EU rules (judgment of 20 May 2010, Harms, C‑434/08, EU:C:2010:285, paragraph 36).
20


In particular, the contractual freedom of a person having payment entitlements cannot permit him to enter into commitments which contradict the objectives of Regulation No 73/2009 (see, by analogy, judgment of 20 May 2010, Harms, C‑434/08, EU:C:2010:285, paragraph 37).
25


In that regard, it is appropriate to recall that it would be manifestly contrary to those objectives to permit persons or entities not fulfilling the conditions laid down by that regulation to benefit from aid under the single payment scheme (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 May 2010, Harms, C‑434/08, EU:C:2010:285, paragraphs 39 and 45).
Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence v Association des producteurs vendeurs d’endives (APVE) and Others.
Date: 2017-11-14
37


Accordingly, in pursuit of the objectives of introducing a common agricultural policy and establishing a system of undistorted competition, Article 42 TFEU recognises that the common agricultural policy takes precedence over the objectives of the Treaty in the field of competition and also recognises the EU legislature’s power to decide to what extent the rules on competition are to be applied in the agricultural sector (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 October 1994, Germany v Council, C‑280/93, EU:C:1994:367, paragraph 61, and of 12 December 2002, France v Commission, C‑456/00, EU:C:2002:753, paragraph 33).
47


As the Court has already held, the common organisations of the markets in agricultural products are not a competition-free zone (judgment of 9 September 2003, Milk Marque and National Farmers’ Union, C‑137/00, EU:C:2003:429, paragraph 61).
48


On the contrary, the maintenance of effective competition on the markets for agricultural products is one of the objectives of the common agricultural policy and of the common organisation of the markets (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 September 2003, Milk Marque and National Farmers’ Union, C‑137/00, EU:C:2003:429, paragraphs 57 and 58).