Johannes Dietrich and Norbert Häring v Hessischer Rundfunk.
Date: 2021-01-26
In that respect, it should be recalled that, as far as the interpretation of provisions of national law is concerned, the Court is in principle required to rely on the description given in the order for reference. According to settled case-law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to interpret the internal law of a Member State (judgment of 17 December 2020, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin (Extradition to Ukraine), C‑398/19, EU:C:2020:1032, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).
It must also be borne in mind that the FEU Treaty contains no precise definition of ‘monetary policy’ but defines, in the provisions relating to that policy, both the objectives of monetary policy and the instruments which are available to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) for the purpose of implementing it (judgment of 11 December 2018, Weiss and Others, C‑493/17, EU:C:2018:1000, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
Since Article 128(1) TFEU does not make reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining the meaning and scope of the concept of ‘legal tender’ referred to therein, that concept is a concept of EU law that must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, which interpretation must take into account not only the wording of the provisions in which it appears but also the context of those provisions and the objective pursued by them (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2020, AFMB, C‑610/18, EU:C:2020:565, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
As the Advocate General observed in point 39 of his Opinion, where competence is conferred exclusively on the European Union,  the loss of competence by the Member States occurs immediately and, unlike in the case of areas falling within a shared competence, it does not matter, for the purposes of that loss, whether or not the European Union has exercised its competence (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 May 1981, Commission v United Kingdom, 804/79, EU:C:1981:93, paragraph 20).
It must be borne in mind in that regard that even though the preamble to an EU act has no binding legal force and cannot be relied on as a ground either for derogating from the actual provisions of the act in question or for interpreting those provisions in a manner that is clearly contrary to their wording, it may explain their content, since the recitals in that preamble constitute important elements for the purposes of interpretation that may clarify the intentions of the author of that act (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2019, Puppinck and Others v Commission, C‑418/18 P, EU:C:2019:1113, paragraphs 75 and 76 and the case-law cited).
As regards, more specifically, the reference in recital 19 of Regulation No 974/98 to ‘public reasons’, it should be noted that, whereas certain language versions of that recital, such as the German-language version, use the expression ‘reasons of public policy’, other language versions, such as the English or the  French, use the expression ‘public reasons’ or ‘reasons of public interest’. The wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot, however, serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. Thus, in the event of such a disparity, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and the purpose of the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2020, Naturschutzbund Deutschland – Landesverband Schleswig-Holstein,  C‑297/19, EU:C:2020:533, paragraph 43).
The principle of proportionality requires, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, that the measures concerned are appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and that they do not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2019, Spiegel Online, C‑516/17, EU:C:2019:625, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
In the present case, while it is for the referring court to ascertain whether the legislation at issue in the main proceedings complies with the conditions referred to in paragraphs 68 to 70 of the present judgment, the Court, when giving a preliminary ruling on a reference, may nonetheless, in appropriate cases, provide clarification to guide the national court in its decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 May 2019, Fundación Consejo Regulador de la Denominación de Origen Protegida Queso Manchego, C‑614/17, EU:C:2019:344, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).