larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Emirates Airlines - Direktion für Deutschland v Diether Schenkel.
Date: 2008-07-10
35. Finally, to regard a ‘flight’ within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 261/2004 as an outward and return journey would in fact have the effect of reducing the protection to be given to passengers under the regulation, which would be contrary to its objective of ensuring a high level of protection for passengers (see, to that effect, Case C‑344/04 IATA and ELFAA  [2006] ECR I‑403, paragraph 69).
39. It is settled case-law, however, that the principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see IATA and ELFAA , paragraph 95; Case C‑300/04 Eman and Sevinger  [2006] ECR I‑8055, paragraph 57; and Case C‑227/04 P Lindorfer  v Council  [2007] ECR I‑6767, paragraph 63).
40. In the light of all the above considerations, the concept of ‘flight’ within the meaning of Regulation No 261/2004 must be interpreted as consisting essentially in an air transport operation, being as it were a ‘unit’ of such transport, performed by an air carrier which fixes its itinerary.
43. It is true that the Montreal Convention forms an integral part of the Community legal order (see, to that effect, IATA and ELFAA , paragraphs 35 and 36). Moreover,  it is clear from Article 300(7) EC that the Community institutions are bound by agreements concluded by the Community and, consequently, that those agreements have primacy over secondary Community legislation (see, to that effect, Case C-61/94 Commission   v Germany  [1996] ECR I‑3989, paragraph 52).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2008-07-17
37. It follows from Articles 2 and 22 of the Sixth Directive, and from Article 10 EC, that every Member State is under an obligation to take all legislative and administrative measures appropriate for ensuring collection of all the VAT due on its territory. In that regard, Member States are required to check taxable persons’ returns, accounts and other relevant documents, and to calculate and collect the tax due.
38. Under the common system of VAT, Member States are required to ensure compliance with the obligations to which taxable persons are subject and they enjoy in that respect a certain measure of latitude, inter alia, as to how they use the means at their disposal.
39. That latitude is nevertheless limited by the obligation to ensure effective collection of the Community’s own resources and not to create significant differences in the manner in which taxable persons are treated, either within a Member State or throughout the Member States. The Court has held that the Sixth Directive must be interpreted in accordance with the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT, according to which economic operators carrying out the same transactions must not be treated differently in relation to the levying of VAT (Case C-382/02 Cimber Air  [2004] ECR I-8379, paragraph 24). Any action by Member States concerning VAT collection must comply with that principle.
46. It should be pointed out in that context that the prevention of tax evasion is an objective recognised and encouraged by the Sixth Directive (see Case C-255/02 Halifax and Others [2006] I-1609, paragraph 71, and Case C-162/07 Ampliscientifica and Amplifin  [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 29). Thus, Article 22(8) of the Sixth Directive calls on Member States to impose, where appropriate, additional obligations to prevent tax evasion.
cp-Pharma Handels GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Date: 2008-07-17
28. That is evidently all the more justified with regard to a file such as that concerning progesterone which, as the Court has already recognised, is particularly complex since it raises questions which are delicate and controversial from a scientific viewpoint ( Commission  v CEVA and Pfizer , paragraph 81).
29. That complexity is due to the fact that progesterone, in addition to therapeutic treatment, is liable to be used unlawfully as a growth stimulate and, currently, there are no reliable methods of analysis permitting distinction between endogenous progesterone, produced naturally by the animals, and exogenous progesterone, resulting from the administration of medicinal products, and therefore monitoring of the abusive use of that substance. Furthermore, the Commission, when it adopted Regulation No 1873/2003, was faced with a situation of ongoing scientific uncertainty with regard to the possible harmful effects of progesterone, characterised by divergent scientific opinions adopted by the CVMP, on the one hand, and by the SCVPH and other international scientific bodies, on the other (see, to that effect, Commission  v CEVA and Pfizer , paragraph 82).
40. Therefore, in accordance with the requirements of established case-law (see, inter alia, Case C‑367/95 P Commission  v Sytraval and Brink’s France  [1998] ECR I‑1719, paragraph 63; Joined Cases C‑346/03 and C‑529/03 Atzeni and Others  [2006] ECR I‑1875, paragraph 73; and Case C‑266/05 P Sison  v Council  [2007] ECR I‑1233, paragraph 80), the reasoning given for Regulation No 1873/2003 shows in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the Commission in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the Court to exercise its power of review.
Gävle Kraftvärme AB v Länsstyrelsen i Gävleborgs län.
Date: 2008-09-11
33. Having regard to the foregoing, the answer to the first question must be that, for the purposes of applying Directive 2000/76, where a co-generation plant comprises a number of boilers, each boiler and its associated equipment is to be regarded as constituting a separate plant.
The second question
35. In accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 3(5), a plant whose main purpose is the generation of energy or production of material products and which either uses waste as a regular or additional fuel or in which waste is thermally treated for the purpose of disposal is to be regarded as a co-incineration plant.
36. The second subparagraph of Article 3(5) states that, if co-incineration takes place in such a way that the main purpose of the plant is not the generation of energy or production of material products but rather the thermal treatment of waste, the plant is to be regarded as an incineration plant within the meaning of Article 3(4).
37. It is clear from the wording of those provisions that a co-incineration plant constitutes a particular form of incineration plant and that it is on the basis of the main purpose of a plant that the assessment of whether it is an incineration plant or a co-incineration plant is to be made.
40. Such an interpretation cannot, however, be accepted. Firstly, it conflicts with the clear wording of Directive 2000/76. As the Commission pointed out in its observations before the Court, it is apparent from the express wording of Article 3(5) of that directive that it is on the basis of their main purpose that co-incineration plants are to be distinguished from incineration plants. However, that provision does not specify any criterion with regard to the purpose for which the plant was built.
Caffaro Srl v Azienda Unità Sanitaria Locale RM/C.
Date: 2008-09-11
14. It must be observed, as a preliminary point, that Directive 2000/35 must be interpreted in the light of the aims pursued by the directive and the system it establishes (see, to that effect, Case C-465/04 Honyvem Informazioni Commerciali  [2006] ECR I-2879, paragraph 17).
15. In that connection, it is common ground that Directive 2000/35 simply aims to harmonise as far as possible certain payment rules and practices in the Member States in order to combat late payment in commercial transactions.
16. As the Court has already had occasion to observe, the directive governs only certain specific rules intended to combat such delays, namely, rules on interest for late payments (Article 3), retention of title (Article 4) and procedures for recovery of unchallenged claims (Article 5) (see Case C-302/05 Commission  v Italy  [2006] ECR I-10597, paragraph 23, and Case C-306/06 01051 Telecom  [2008] I-0000, paragraph 21).
17. Moreover, that directive refers to a number of areas in which national law is to apply. Such is the case, in particular, as is clear from recital 15 in the preamble, with regard to the various procedures of forced execution of an enforceable title and the conditions under which forced execution of such a title can be stopped or suspended ( Commission  v Italy , cited above, paragraph 24).
Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Lithuania.
Date: 2008-09-11
20. First of all, it is settled case-law that the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is to give the Member State concerned an opportunity to comply with its obligations under Community law, on the one hand, and, on the other, to avail itself of its right to defend itself against the objections formulated by the Commission (see, in particular, Case C-484/04 Commission  v United Kingdom  [2006] ECR I-7471, paragraph 24, and the case-law cited).
21. The proper conduct of that procedure constitutes an essential guarantee required by the EC Treaty not only in order to protect the rights of the Member State concerned, but also to ensure that any contentious procedure will have a clearly defined dispute as its subject-matter (see, Case C-34/04 Commission  v Netherlands  [2007] ECR I-1387, paragraph 49, and the case-law cited).
22. It follows, first, that the subject-matter of the proceedings under Article 226 EC is delimited by the pre-litigation procedure governed by that provision. Accordingly, the application must be based on the same grounds and pleas as the reasoned opinion (see, Case C-287/00 Commission v Germany  [2002] ECR I-5811, paragraph 18, and Case C-305/03 Commission  v United Kingdom  [2006] ECR I‑1213, paragraph 22).
23. Second, the reasoned opinion must contain a cogent and detailed exposition of the reasons which led the Commission to the conclusion that the Member State concerned has failed to fulfil one of its obligations under Community law (see, Commission  v Germany , cited above, paragraph 19, and Commission  v United Kingdom , cited above, paragraph 26).
40. It follows from the wording and the aim of the provision that it imposes on Member States, subject to technical feasibility, an obligation to achieve a result which is not limited to putting in place an appropriate regulatory framework, but which requires that the location information for all callers to the ‘112’ be actually transmitted to the emergency services.
52. In particular, a Member State cannot justify any delay in the implementation of that obligation by the fact that it has decided to put in place the ‘push’ method based on the automatic transmission of location information.
Armacell Enterprise GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office.
Date: 2008-09-18
54. It must first be recalled that Article 1(2) of Regulation No 40/94 specifies that a Community trade mark has a unitary character. Subject to certain exceptions (see in that regard Article 106, on the prohibition of use of Community trade marks, and Article 107, on prior rights applicable to particular localities, of Regulation No 40/94), the Community trade mark ‘shall have equal effect throughout the Community: it shall not be registered, transferred or surrendered or be the subject of a decision revoking the rights of the proprietor or declaring it invalid, nor shall its use be prohibited, save in respect of the whole Community’ (see Case C-9/93 IHT Internationale Heiztechnik and Danzinger  [1994] ECR I‑2789, paragraph 55).
55. Under Article 8(1)(b) and (2) of Regulation No 40/94, in the case where the earlier mark relied on in support of opposition proceedings is a Community trade mark, the trade mark in respect of which registration is sought will not be registered if, because of its identity with or similarity to the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the Community territory.
56. Contrary to what the appellant maintains, it does not follow from Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 that, for a Community trade mark to be refused registration under that provision, the likelihood of confusion must exist in all Member States and in all linguistic areas of the Community.
57. In fact, the unitary character of the Community trade mark means that an earlier Community trade mark can be relied on in opposition proceedings against any application for registration of a Community trade mark which would adversely affect the protection of the first mark, even if only in relation to the perception of consumers in part of the Community.
69. Pursuant to Article 225(1) EC and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal is limited to points of law. The Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence. The appraisal of those facts and the assessment of that evidence thus do not, save where those facts or evidence have been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (see, inter alia, Case C-104/00 P DKV  v OHIM  [2002] ECR I‑7561, paragraph 22; Case C‑173/04 P Deutsche SiSi-Werke  v OHIM  [2006] ECR I‑551, paragraph 35; and Case C-25/05 P Storck  v OHIM  [2006] ECR I‑5719, paragraph 40).
Birgit Bartsch v Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte (BSH) Altersfürsorge GmbH.
Date: 2008-09-23
15. It is apparent from the case-law of the Court that, where national rules fall within the scope of Community law and reference is made to the Court for a preliminary ruling, the Court must provide all the criteria of interpretation needed by the national court to determine whether those rules are compatible with the general principles of Community law (see to that effect, in particular, Case C‑144/04 Mangold  [2005] ECR I‑9981, paragraph 75).
16. Neither Directive 2000/78 nor Article 13 EC, however, enable a situation such as that in issue in the main proceedings to be brought within the scope of Community law.
17. On the one hand, the guidelines do not constitute a measure implementing Directive 2000/78 and, on the other hand, the death of Mr Bartsch occurred before the time-limit allowed to the Member State concerned for transposing the directive had expired.
18. Article 13 EC, which permits the Council of the European Union, within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the EC Treaty, to take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on age, cannot, as such, bring within the scope of Community law, for the purposes of prohibiting discrimination based on age, situations which, like that in the main proceedings, do not fall within the framework of measures adopted on the basis of that article, specifically Directive 2000/78 before the time-limit provided therein for its transposition has expired.
20. That judgment concerned the application of Article 6 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 12 EC), which confers directly, within the scope of application of the Treaty, the right to non-discrimination on grounds of nationality (see, in particular, Joined Cases C‑92/92 and C‑326/92 Phil Collins and Others  [1993] ECR I‑5145, paragraph 34).
24. That latter aspect, moreover, distinguishes this case from that which gave rise to the judgment in Mangold . In that case, the national rules in question were a measure implementing a Community directive, namely, Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43), by means of which those rules were thus brought within the scope of Community law (see Mangold , paragraph 75). By contrast, the guidelines at issue in the main proceedings do not correspond to measures transposing Community provisions.
25. In view of the above considerations, the answer to the first question must be that the application, which the courts of Member States must ensure, of the prohibition under Community law of discrimination on the ground of age is not mandatory where the allegedly discriminatory treatment contains no link with Community law. No such link arises either from Article 13 EC, or, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, from Directive 2000/78 before the time-limit allowed to the Member State concerned for its transposition has expired.
Questions 2 and 3
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2008-10-02
23. It must also be borne in mind that it is settled case-law that any derogations from the rules intended to ensure the effectiveness of the rights conferred by the EC Treaty in connection with public procurement must be strictly interpreted (see, to that effect, Case C‑71/92 Commission  v Spain  [1993] ECR I-5923, paragraph 36) and that the burden of proving the actual existence of exceptional circumstances justifying a derogation lies on the person seeking to rely on those circumstances (see, to that effect, Case C-328/92 Commission  v Spain [1994] ECR I-1569, paragraphs 15 and 16, and Commission v Italy , paragraphs 57 and 58).
25. In that regard, it is important to point out that, under Article 296(1)(b) EC, any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security and which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war materials, provided, however, that such measures do not alter the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes (see Commission  v Italy , paragraph 46).
30. At the outset, it must be pointed out that the requirement to impose an obligation of confidentiality in no way prevents the use of a competitive tendering procedure for the award of a contract ( Commission  v Italy , paragraph 52).
31. Therefore, resort to Article 2(1)(b) of Directive 93/36 to justify national legislation authorising the purchase of the helicopters in question by the negotiated procedure appears disproportionate as regards the objective of preventing the disclosure of sensitive information relating to their production. The Italian Republic has not shown that such an objective was unattainable within a competitive tendering procedure such as that specified by the same directive (see Commission  v Italy , paragraph 53).
X BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2008-10-02
20. It should be noted that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be found in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the Combined Nomenclature and of the notes to the sections or chapters (Case C-382/95 Techex  [1997] ECR I-7363, paragraph 11; Joined Cases C‑208/06 and C‑209/06 Medion and Canon Deutschland  [2007] ECR I‑7963, paragraph 34; and Case C-165/07 Ecco Sko  [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 27).
Interboves GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas.
Date: 2008-10-09
15. As the Advocate General observes in point 18 of his Opinion, point 48.4(d) of the annex to Directive 91/628 establishes a maximum of 28 hours of travel, interrupted by a minimum rest period of 1 hour after the first 14 hour section.
21. Secondly, the rules concerning journey times and resting periods, where transport is by sea, are governed by point 48.7(a) and (b) of that annex. Point 48.7(a) lays down the general provisions applicable to transport by sea and point 48.7(b) specifies the conditions under which a resting period of 12 hours is mandatory in the case of transport by roll-on/roll-off ferry on a regular and direct link between two geographical points of the Community (see, to that effect, Case C‑207/06 Schwaninger  [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 23, 24 and 30).
27. It must be noted, in this connection, that point 48.7(b) of the annex to Directive 91/628 provides that animals must be rested for 12 hours after unloading at the port of destination or in its immediate vicinity unless the journey time at sea is such that the voyage can be included in the general scheme of point 48.2 to 48.4.
39. Such an interpretation of point 48.7(b) would directly contravene the principal objective of Directive 91/628, which is the protection of animals during transport (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-37/06 and C-58/06 Viamex Agrar Handel and ZVK  [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 29), as well as the purpose of that directive, as explained inter alia in the eighth recital in the preamble thereto, which states that, for reasons of animal welfare, the transport over long distances of animals, including animals for slaughter, should be reduced as far as possible.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 2008-10-16
33. With regard to the argument relied upon by the Kingdom of Spain – according to which the profession of air traffic controller does not fall within the scope of Directives 89/48 and 92/51 since, in view of the lack of a ‘diploma’ within the meaning of those directives which would authorise the pursuit of that activity, it is not a ‘regulated profession’ – it should be pointed out that the concept of regulated profession within the meaning of the directive falls under Community law and that it follows from the definitions laid down in Article 1(c) and (d) of Directive 89/48 and 1(e) and (f) of Directive 92/51 that a provision must be considered to be regulated where access to the professional activity at issue or its exercise is governed by laws, regulations or administrative provisions creating a system under which that professional activity is expressly reserved to those who fulfil certain conditions and access to it is prohibited to those who do not fulfil them (see, to that effect, Case C‑313/01 Morgenbesser  [2003] ECR I‑13467, paragraph 49).
42. Furthermore, the fact that a ‘diploma’ does not take the form of a single document, but comprises a set of evidence, certificates or other documents is irrelevant, provided that the essential function of the diploma, regardless of the form it takes, is to confirm that the person concerned has successfully completed a defined course of studies which confers the professional qualifications required for the taking up of a regulated profession in the Member State concerned or in order to pursue it (see to that effect, regarding the classification of confirmation of success in an examination at the end of training as a ‘diploma’ within the meaning of Directive 89/48, Case C‑285/01 Burbaud  [2003] ECR I‑8219, paragraph 52).
53. It should be pointed out in that regard that Directives 89/48 and 92/51 do not establish a system of automatic recognition. Although they recognise the right of access to regulated professions, those directives, under their respective Articles 4(1)(b), allow the host State to require an applicant who is a national of another Member State to complete an adaptation period or to take an aptitude test, in particular where the matters covered by the education a nd training he has received differ substantially from those covered by the diploma required in the host Member State, or where the profession regulated in the host Member State comprises one or more regulated professional activities which are not in the profession regulated in the Member State from which the applicant originates or comes and that difference between the professional activities in the two Member States concerned corresponds to different specific training (see, regarding Directive 89/48, Case C‑39/07 Commission  v Spain  [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 39).