larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
NEW WAVE CZ, a.s. v ALLTOYS, spol. s r. o.
Date: 2017-01-18
19


In accordance with settled case-law of the Court, for the purpose of interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 17 March 2016, Liffers, C‑99/15, EU:C:2016:173, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited).
23


In the second place, that interpretation is also consistent with the objective of Directive 2004/48, which, as recital 10 indicates, is to approximate the legislation of the Member States as regards the means of enforcing intellectual property rights so as to ensure a high, equivalent and homogeneous level of protection in the internal market (judgment of 16 July 2015, Diageo Brands, C‑681/13, EU:C:2015:471, paragraph 71).
25


In the third place, it must be recalled that the right of information provided for in Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48 is a specific expression of the fundamental right to an effective remedy guaranteed in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and thereby ensures the effective exercise of the fundamental right to property, which includes the intellectual property right protected in Article 17(2) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, Coty Germany, C‑580/13, EU:C:2015:485, paragraph 29). That right of information thus enables the holder of an intellectual property right to identify who is infringing that right and take the necessary steps, such as making an application for the provisional measures set out in Article 9(1) and (2) or for damages as provided for in Article 13 of Directive 2004/48, in order to protect that right. Without full knowledge of the extent of the infringement of his intellectual property right, the rightholder would not be in a position to determine or calculate precisely the damages he was entitled to by reason of the infringement.
Sjelle Autogenbrug I/S v Skatteministeriet.
Date: 2017-01-18
29


In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in determining the scope of a provision of EU law, its wording, objective and context must all be taken into account (judgment of 3 March 2011, Auto Nikolovi, C‑203/10, EU:C:2011:118, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
31


It must be found that it is not apparent from that provision that the concept of ‘second-hand goods’, within the meaning thereof, excludes movable tangible property that is suitable for further use as it is or after repair, coming from other property in which it was incorporated as a component. The fact that used property which forms part of other property is separated from the latter does not call into question the characterisation of the property removed as ‘second-hand goods’, to the extent that it may be reused ‘as it is or after repair’.
32


In addition, in order to be characterised as ‘second-hand goods’, it is only necessary that the used property has maintained the functionalities it possessed when new, and that it may, therefore, be reused as it is or after repair.
39


The failure to apply those arrangements to spare parts, taken from end‑of-life vehicles purchased from private individuals, would be contrary to the objective of the special margin scheme which seeks, as is apparent from recital 51 of Directive 2006/112, to avoid double taxation and distortions of competition between taxable persons in the area of second-hand goods (see, to that effect, judgments of 1 April 2004, Stenholmen, C‑320/02, EU:C:2004:213, paragraph 25; of 8 December 2005, Jyske Finans, C‑280/04, EU:C:2005:753, paragraph 37; and of 3 March 2011, Auto Nikolovi, C‑203/10, EU:C:2011:118, paragraph 47).
40


Making transactions for the supply of such spare parts effected by a taxable dealer subject to VAT would lead to double taxation, in so far as, first, the sale price of those parts necessarily already takes account of input VAT paid at the time of the vehicle’s purchase by a person falling within Article 314(a) of Directive 2006/112 and, secondly, neither that person nor the taxable dealer was able to deduct that amount (see judgment of 3 March 2011, Auto Nikolovi, C‑203/10, EU:C:2011:118, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
43


In addition, the taxable amount determined in accordance with the profit margin scheme must be on the basis of accounts from which it may be ascertained that all the conditions for applying that scheme have been fulfilled.
Minister Finansów v Stowarzyszenie Artystów Wykonawców Utworów Muzycznych i Słowno-Muzycznych SAWP (SAWP).
Date: 2017-01-18
24


However, prior to that question, it should be determined whether such a transaction is carried out for consideration. Under Article 2(1)(c) of the VAT Directive, in order for such a supply of services to be covered by the directive it must in any event be made for consideration.
25


It should be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, a supply of services is made for consideration, within the meaning of the VAT Directive, only if there is a legal relationship between the provider of the service and the recipient pursuant to which there is reciprocal performance, the remuneration received by the provider of the service constituting the value actually given in return for the service supplied to the recipient (see judgment of 22 June 2016, Český rozhlas, C‑11/15, EU:C:2016:470, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
26


The Court has held that that is the case if there is a direct link between the service supplied and the consideration received, the sums paid constituting actual consideration for an identifiable service supplied in the context of such a legal relationship (judgment of 18 July 2007, Société thermale d’Eugénie-les-Bains, C‑277/05, EU:C:2007:440, paragraph 19).
30


It is apparent from the order for reference that fees such as those at issue in the main proceedings are intended to finance fair compensation for holders of reproduction rights. However, the fair compensation does not constitute the direct consideration for any supply of services, because it is linked to the harm resulting for those rightholders from the reproduction of their protected works without their authorisation (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 October 2010, Padawan, C‑467/08, EU:C:2010:620, paragraph 40).
Stowarzyszenie “Oławska Telewizja Kablowa” w Oławie v Stowarzyszenie Filmowców Polskich w Warszawie.
Date: 2017-01-25
23


Consequently, as the Court has already held, Directive 2004/48 lays down a minimum standard concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights and does not prevent the Member States from laying down measures that are more protective (see judgment of 9 June 2016, Hansson, C‑481/14, EU:C:2016:419, paragraphs 36 and 40).
30


Thus, it should be pointed out that, where an intellectual property right has been infringed, mere payment of the hypothetical royalty is not capable of guaranteeing compensation in respect of all the loss actually suffered, given that payment of that royalty would not, in itself, ensure reimbursement of any costs — referred to in recital 26 of Directive 2004/48 — that are linked to researching and identifying possible acts of infringement, compensation for possible moral prejudice (see, in this latter respect, judgment of 17 March 2016, Liffers, C‑99/15, EU:C:2016:173, paragraph 26) or payment of interest on the sums due. Indeed, OTK confirmed at the hearing that payment of twice the amount of the hypothetical royalty is equivalent in practice to compensation of an amount remaining below what the holder would be able to claim on the basis of ‘general principles’, within the meaning of Article 79(1)(3)(a) of the UPAPP.
BAWAG PSK Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft und Österreichische Postsparkasse AG v Verein für Konsumenteninformation.
Date: 2017-01-25
42


Referring, inter alia, to the definition of ‘durable medium’ contained in Article 3(m) of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ 2008 L 133, p. 66, and corrigenda OJ 2009 L 207, p. 14; OJ 2010 L 199, p. 40; OJ 2011 L 234, p. 46; and OJ 2015 L 36, p. 15), the Court has held that that medium must enable the consumer, in a similar way to paper form, to be in possession of the relevant information in order to enable him to exercise his rights, where necessary. What is relevant for the consumer is that he should be able to store the information which has been addressed to him personally, to rest assured that its content will not be altered, that the information will be accessible for an adequate period and that it will be possible to reproduce it unchanged (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 July 2012, Content Services, C‑49/11, EU:C:2012:419, paragraphs 42 to 44, and of 9 November 2016, Home Credit Slovakia, C‑42/15, EU:C:2016:842, paragraph 35).
45


That interpretation corresponds to the aims set out in recitals 21 and 22 of Directive 2007/64, namely: the protection of payment service users and, in particular, consumer protection.
Criminal proceedings against Gerrit van Vemde.
Date: 2017-01-25
25


Next, it must be observed that, according to settled case-law, the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (judgment of 28 July 2016, JZ, C‑294/16 PPU, EU:2016:610, paragraph 35).
26


Article 1(a) of Framework Decision 2008/909, which defines the concept of ‘judgment’ as a final decision, does not contain any reference to the law of the Member States, so that it must be held that that concept is an autonomous concept of EU law that must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union. To that end, account must also be taken of the terms of that provision, its context and the objectives of the legislation of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 July 2016, JZ, C‑294/16 PPU, EU:2016:610, paragraph 37).
30


Finally, regarding the scheme and the objectives pursued by the legislation of which the relevant provision is part, it must be recalled, as the Advocate General observes in points 45 to 48 of his Opinion, that Article 28(2) of Framework Decision 2008/909 constitutes an exception to the general scheme of Article 28(1) thereof, which provides that requests for the enforcement of a judgment and enforcement of a sentence received after 5 December 2011 are to be governed by the rules adopted by Member States pursuant to that framework decision. As an exception to the general scheme, the first of those provisions must be strictly interpreted.
Minister for Justice and Equality v Tomas Vilkas.
Date: 2017-01-25
30


Secondly, according to the Court’s settled case-law, for the purpose of interpreting a provision of EU law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments of 19 December 2013, Koushkaki , C‑84/12, EU:C:2013:862, paragraph 34, and of 16 November 2016, Hemming and Others , C‑316/15, EU:C:2016:879, paragraph 27).
31


In this connection, it should be recalled that the Framework Decision seeks, by the establishment of a new simplified and more effective system for the surrender of persons convicted or suspected of having infringed criminal law, to facilitate and accelerate judicial cooperation with a view to contributing to the objective set for the European Union of becoming an area of freedom, security and justice, on the basis of the high level of confidence which should exist between the Member States (judgments of 16 July 2015, Lanigan , C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 28, and of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru , C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraph 76).
32


In that context, Article 23 of the Framework Decision is designed in particular, like Articles 15 and 17 thereof, to accelerate judicial cooperation by imposing time limits for adopting decisions relating to a European arrest warrant which the Member States are obliged to comply with (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 May 2013, F , C‑168/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:358, paragraph 58, and of 16 July 2015, Lanigan , C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraphs 29 and 33).
37


Therefore, that interpretation would be such as to limit appreciably the effectiveness of the procedures provided for by the Framework Decision and, accordingly, to prevent full achievement of the objective pursued by it, which consists in facilitating judicial cooperation by the establishment of a more effective system for the surrender of persons convicted or suspected of having infringed criminal law.
47


The need for a uniform interpretation of a provision of EU law makes it impossible for the text of a provision to be considered, in case of doubt, in isolation but requires, on the contrary, that it should be interpreted on the basis of both the actual intention of the legislature and the objective pursued by the latter, in the light, in particular, of the versions drawn up in all languages (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 November 2001, Jany and Others , C‑268/99, EU:C:2001:616, paragraph 47, and of 19 September 2013, van Buggenhout and van de Mierop , C‑251/12, EU:C:2013:566, paragraphs 26 and 27).
56


In that regard, it is to be recalled that Article 23(3) of the Framework Decision constitutes an exception to the rule laid down in Article 23(2). Accordingly, the concept of force majeure as provided for in Article 23(3) must be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, judgments of 14 June 2012, CIVAD , C‑533/10, EU:C:2012:347, paragraphs 24 and 25, and of 18 July 2013, Eurofit , C‑99/12, EU:C:2013:487, paragraph 37).
Ultra-Brag AG v Hauptzollamt Lörrach.
Date: 2017-01-25
22


To that end, the three indents of Article 202(3) of that code describe the involvement of the person who is to be recognised as a debtor by reason of his participation in the unlawful introduction of goods. Thus, the first indent designates as a debtor the person who introduced the goods unlawfully, that is to say, the person who ought normally to have cleared the goods through customs and performed the declarant’s customs obligations. The second and third indents refer to persons who, although not required to carry out customs clearance operations under the provisions of that code, have nevertheless been involved in the unlawful introduction, either before or immediately after that introduction.
25


First of all, it is apparent from the wording of Article 202(3) of the code that the EU legislature intended to give a broad definition of the persons capable of being regarded as debtors of the customs debt in the event of the unlawful introduction of goods subject to import duties and that it also intended to lay down exhaustively the conditions for determining who are the debtors of customs debt (see judgments of 23 September 2004, Spedition Ulustrans, C‑414/02, EU:C:2004:551, paragraphs 25 and 39; of 3 March 2005 in Papismedov and Others, C‑195/03, EU:C:2005:131, paragraph 38; and of 17 November 2011, Jestel, C‑454/10, EU:C:2011:752, paragraphs 12 and 13).
26


The Court has, in addition, already held that the first indent of Article 202(3) of the Customs Code refers to the ‘person’ who introduced the goods, without specifying whether that means a natural person or a legal person. Therefore, any ‘person’, within the meaning of that provision, may be regarded as the debtor of the customs debt, that is to say the person who is to be regarded as having by his actions been responsible for the unlawful introduction of the goods (see judgments of 23 September 2004, Spedition Ulustrans, C‑414/02, EU:C:2004:551, paragraph 26, and of 3 March 2005, Papismedov and Others, C‑195/03, EU:C:2005:131, paragraph 39).
31


Where the unlawful introduction of goods into the customs territory of the European Union is carried out by an employee in the name and on behalf of the employer, the latter must be regarded as the person who, by his actions, is responsible for that unlawful introduction (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2004, Spedition Ulustrans, C‑414/02, EU:C:2004:551, paragraph 29).
38


The concept of ‘person concerned’, within the meaning of Article 212a of the Customs Code, must be understood, in the light of the wording of that provision, as referring to any natural or legal person who is considered to be a customs debtor under any of Articles 202 to 205 of that code, in particular on the ground that that person, by his actions, was the cause of the unlawful introduction of goods into the customs territory of the European Union.
French Republic v European Commission.
Date: 2017-01-26
46


It is true that, according to the Court’s case-law, failure to comply with the procedural rules relating to the adoption of an act adversely affecting an individual, such as a failure on the part of the Commission to adopt a decision within the time limit prescribed by the EU legislature, constitutes an infringement of essential procedural requirements, which it is a matter for the EU judicature to raise of its own motion (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 103, and of 24 June 2015, Germany v Commission, C‑549/12 P and C‑54/13 P, EU:C:2015:412,, paragraph 92).
68


However, it must be pointed out that where the grounds of a judgment of the General Court disclose an infringement of EU law but the operative part of the judgment is shown to be well founded for other legal reasons, the appeal must be dismissed (judgments of 10 December 2002, Commission v Camar and Tico , C‑312/00 P, EU:C:2002:736, point 57, and of 26 March 2009, SELEX Sistemi Integrati v Commission , C‑113/07 P, EU:C:2009:191, paragraph 81).
70


In that regard, even if the EU rules on the granting of aid and premiums do not expressly require Member States to introduce specific supervisory measures and inspection procedures, nevertheless, such an obligation may follow, in some cases implicitly, from the fact that under the rules in question it is for the Member States to organise an effective system of inspection and supervision (see judgments of 12 June 1990, Germany v Commission , C‑8/88, EU:C:1990:241, paragraph 16; of 14 April 2005, Spain v Commission , C‑468/02, not published, EU:C:2005:221, paragraph 35, and of 24 April 2008, Belgium v Commission , C‑418/06 P, EU:C:2008:247, paragraph 70).
Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides v Mostafa Lounani.
Date: 2017-01-31
41


In that regard, it must be noted that it is clear from recitals 3, 16 and 17 of Directive 2004/83 that the Geneva Convention constitutes the cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees and that the provisions of that directive for determining who qualifies for refugee status and the content of that status were adopted to guide the competent authorities of the Member States in the application of that convention on the basis of common concepts and criteria (judgment of 2 December 2014, A and Others, C‑148/13 to C‑150/13, EU:C:2014:2406, paragraph 45).
42


The provisions of Directive 2004/83 must, consequently, be interpreted in the light of its general scheme and purpose, and in a manner consistent with the Geneva Convention and the other relevant treaties referred to in Article 78(1) TFEU (judgments of 9 November 2010, B and D, C‑57/09 and C‑101/09, EU:C:2010:661, paragraph 78, and of 2 December 2014, A and Others, C‑148/13 to C‑150/13, EU:C:2014:2406, paragraph 46).
56


In that regard, it should be noted that questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court, in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgments of 14 April 2016, Polkomtel, C‑397/14, EU:C:2016:256, paragraph 37; of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin, C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraph 20, and of 13 October 2016, Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej and Petrotel, C‑231/15, EU:C:2016:769, paragraph 16).
72


In those circumstances, the competent authority of the Member State concerned may apply Article 12(2)(c) of Directive 2004/83 only after undertaking, for each individual case, an assessment of the specific facts brought to its attention with a view to determining whether there are serious reasons for considering that the acts committed by the person in question, who otherwise satisfies the qualifying conditions for refugee status, fall within the scope of that particular exclusion (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 November 2010, B and D, C‑57/09 and C‑101/09, EU:C:2010:661, paragraphs 87 and 94).
Carrefour Hypermarchés SAS v ITM Alimentaire International SASU.
Date: 2017-02-08
20


Accordingly, it should be noted that Directive 2006/114 carries out an exhaustive harmonisation of the conditions under which comparative advertising in Member States might be permitted and that such harmonisation implies by its nature that the lawfulness of comparative advertising throughout the European Union is to be assessed solely in the light of the criteria laid down by the European Union legislature (judgments of 8 April 2003, Pippig Augenoptik, C‑44/01, EU:C:2003:205, paragraph 44, and of 18 November 2010, Lidl, C‑159/09, EU:C:2010:696, paragraph 22).
21


Furthermore, according to settled case-law of the Court, since comparative advertising contributes to demonstrating, in an objective manner, the advantages of various comparable goods and thus to stimulating competition between suppliers of goods and services to the consumer’s advantage, the conditions to be met for such advertising must be interpreted in the sense most favourable to that advertising, while ensuring at the same time that comparative advertising is not used anticompetitively and unfairly or in a manner which affects adversely the interests of consumers (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 October 2001, Toshiba Europe, C‑112/99, EU:C:2001:566, paragraphs 36 and 37; of 19 September 2006, Lidl Belgium, C‑356/04, EU:C:2006:585, paragraph 22; and of 18 November 2010, Lidl, C‑159/09, EU:C:2010:696, paragraphs 20 and 21 and the case-law cited).
25


It follows from Article 4(c) of Directive 2006/114 that the prices must be compared objectively (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2006, Lidl Belgium, C‑356/04, EU:C:2006:585, paragraph 45).
31


It is for national courts to ascertain, in the light of the circumstances of each particular case, whether, bearing in mind the consumers to whom it is addressed, advertising may be misleading (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 November 2010, Lidl, C‑159/09, EU:C:2010:696, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited, and of 12 May 2011, Ving Sverige, C‑122/10, EU:C:2011:299, paragraph 51). In order to do that, national courts must, first, take into account the perception of an average consumer of the goods or services being advertised who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect and, secondly, take account of all the relevant factors in the case, having regard, as follows from Article 3 of Directive 2006/114, to the information contained in the advertisement at issue and, more generally, to all of its features (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 November 2010, Lidl, C‑159/09, EU:C:2010:696, paragraphs 47 and 48 and the case-law cited).