larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2007-12-18
56. Consequently, and by analogy with what applies in relation to the choice of the legal basis of a Community act, it must be concluded that in a situation such as that at issue in the present case the classification of a Community act as a proposal or initiative to build upon the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 5(1) of the Schengen Protocol must rest on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review, including in particular the aim and the content of the act (see Case C‑300/89 Commission  v Council  [1991] ECR I‑2867 (‘ Titanium dioxide’ ), paragraph 10; Case C‑176/03 Commission  v Council  [2005] ECR I‑7879, paragraph 45; and Case C‑440/05 Commission  v Council  [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 61).
Cementbouw Handel & Industrie BV v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2007-12-18
35. As is clear from recital 29 in its preamble and Article 21(1), Regulation No 4064/89 is based on the principle of a clear division of powers between the national and Community supervisory authorities in relation to concentrations (Case C‑170/02 P Schlüsselverlag J.S. Moser and Others v Commission [2003] ECR I-9889, paragraph 32, and Case C-42/01 Portugal v Commission [2004] ECR I-6079, paragraph 50).
36. The regulation also contains provisions, including in particular Article 10(1) and (2), the purpose of which is to restrict, for reasons of legal certainty and in the interest of the undertakings concerned, the length of the proceedings for investigating transactions which are the responsibility of the Commission ( Schlüsselverlag J.S. Moser and Others , paragraph 33, and Portugal v Commission , paragraph 51).
37. That demonstrates that the Community legislature intended to make a clear allocation between the interventions to be made by the national and by the Community authorities, and that it wished to ensure a control of mergers within deadlines compatible with both the requirements of sound administration and the requirements of the business world ( Schlüsselverlag J.S. Moser and Others , paragraph 34, and Portugal v Commission , paragraph 53).
39. The need for speed, which characterises the general scheme of Regulation No 4064/89 and which requires the Commission to comply with strict time-limits for the adoption of the final decision, failing which the operation is deemed compatible with the common market, also means that where the Commission has established, in relation to a particular concentration, its competence in the light of the criteria laid down under Articles 1(2) and (3) and 5 of the regulation, that competence cannot be challenged at any time or be in a state of constant flux.
52. As regards, in the second place, the alleged infringement of the principle of proportionality, it is necessary to acknowledge that decisions taken by the Commission in proceedings for the control of concentrations must satisfy the requirements of the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of Community law (see, inter alia, Case C-380/03 Germany v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-11573, paragraph 144).
53. However, it must be pointed out that the substantive rules of Regulation No 4064/89, in particular Article 2, confer on the Commission a certain discretion, especially with respect to assessments of an economic nature, and that, consequently, review by the Community judicature of the exercise of that discretion, which is essential for defining the rules on concentrations, must take account of the discretionary margin implicit in the provisions of an economic nature which form part of the rules on concentrations (Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France and Others v Commission [1998] ECR I-1375, paragraphs 223 and 224, and Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I-987, paragraph 38).
Société Pipeline Méditerranée et Rhône (SPMR) v Administration des douanes et droits indirects and Direction nationale du renseignement et des enquêtes douanières (DNRED).
Date: 2007-12-18
21. It is necessary to point out that the Community legal order does not, in principle, aim to define concepts on the basis of one or more national legal systems unless there is express provision to that effect (Case 64/81 Corman  [1982] ECR 13, paragraph 8; Case C‑296/95 EMU Tabac and Others [1998] ECR I‑1605, paragraph 30; Case C‑103/01 Commission  v Germany  [2003] ECR I‑5369, paragraph 33). In so far as Article 14(1) of Directive 92/12 provides, in its third sentence, that each Member State is to lay down the conditions under which the exemptions provided for in the first sentence of that provision are granted, that reference to national law does not affect the meaning or scope of the term ‘ force majeure ’ which appears in the first sentence.
23. According to settled case‑law established in various contexts, for example agricultural regulations or the rules on time‑limits for bringing an action laid down by Article 45 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, force majeure  is not limited to absolute impossibility but must be understood in the sense of abnormal and unforeseeable circumstances, extraneous to the operator concerned, the consequences of which, in spite of the exercise of all due care, could not have been avoided (see, to that effect, Case C‑195/91 P Bayer  v Commission  [1994] ECR I‑5619, paragraph 31, and Case C‑208/01 Parras Medina  [2002] ECR I‑8955, paragraph 19 and the case‑law cited).
24. It follows from this that, as the Court has already noted, ‘ force majeure ’ contains both an objective element relating to abnormal circumstances extraneous to the trader and a subjective element involving the obligation, on that person’s part, to guard against the consequences of the abnormal event by taking appropriate steps without making unreasonable sacrifices (see, to that effect, Bayer , paragraph 32, and the order in Case C‑325/03 P Zuazaga Meabe  v OHIM  [2005] ECR I‑403, paragraph 25).
25. However, it is also settled case‑law that, since force majeure  does not have the same scope in the various spheres of application of Community law, its meaning must be determined by reference to the legal context in which it is to operate (see, Case C‑124/92 An Bord Bainne Co-operative and Compagnie Inter-Agra  [1993] ECR I‑5061, paragraph 10, and Case C‑263/97 First City Trading and Others  [1998] ECR I‑5537, paragraph 41).
33. In particular, the requirement that the circumstances must be extraneous to the authorised warehousekeeper is not limited to those circumstances which are extraneous to him in a material or physical sense. Instead that requirement must be interpreted as referring to circumstances which are objectively outside the authorised warehousekeeper’s control or situated outside his sphere of responsibility (see, regarding the latter aspect, by analogy, Case 145/85 Denkavit  [1987] ECR 565, paragraph 16).
Frigerio Luigi & C. Snc v Comune di Triuggio.
Date: 2007-12-18
16. As a preliminary point, it should be observed that it is settled case-law that, in proceedings under Article 234 EC, which is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, any assessment of the facts in a case is a matter for the national court (see, inter alia, Case C‑235/95 Dumon and Froment [1998] ECR I‑4531, paragraph 25; Case C-13/05 Chacón Navas  [2006] ECR I‑6467, paragraph 32, and Case C‑251/06 ING. AUER [2007] ECR I-0000, paragraph 19).
22. It follows that Article 26(2) of Directive 92/50 precludes any national legislation which excludes candidates or tenderers entitled under the law of the Member State concerned to carry out the relevant service activity from the award of public services contracts with a value greater than the threshold for the application of Directive 92/50 solely on the ground that those candidates or tenderers do not have the legal form corresponding to a specific category of legal persons.
28. Suffice it to note in that regard that, according to established case-law, it is for the national court, to the full extent of its discretion under national law, to interpret and apply national law in conformity with the requirements of Community law. Where such an application is not possible, the national court must apply Community law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals, disapplying, if necessary, any contrary provision of domestic law (see, to that effect, Case 157/86 Murphy and Others  [1988] ECR 673, paragraph 11, and Case C‑208/05 ITC  [2007] ECR I‑181, paragraphs 68 and 69).
31. Since, as is apparent from paragraph 18 above, the facts at issue in the main proceedings fall within the scope of application of Directive 92/50 and the interpretation of that directive provides the information necessary to enable the referring court to resolve the case before it, an examination of the abovementioned Community provisions would be of purely academic interest. Consequently, in accordance with established case-law, there is no need to answer the third and fourth questions referred (see, to that effect, Case C-144/04 Mangold  [2005] ECR I-9981, paragraphs 36 and 37, and Case C-212/04 Adeneler and Others  [2006] ECR I-6057, paragraphs 42 and 43).
Costs
Per Grønfeldt and Tatiana Grønfeldt v Finanzamt Hamburg-Am Tierpark.
Date: 2007-12-18
14. Such a difference in treatment on the basis of the place of investment of the capital has the effect of discouraging a shareholder from investing his capital in a company established in another State and also has a restrictive effect on companies established in other States in that it constitutes an obstacle to their raising capital in Germany (see, to that effect, Case C‑446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation  [2006] ECR I‑11753, paragraph 166).
15. It is insignificant, in that regard, that the difference in treatment existed only for a limited period of time. That fact alone does not preclude the difference in treatment from having significant effects – as indeed shown in the facts in the main proceedings – or, therefore, from giving rise to a genuine obstacle to the free movement of capital.
16. In order for such a difference in treatment to be compatible with the provisions of the EC Treaty on the free movement of capital, it must concern situations which are not objectively comparable or be justified by an overriding reason of public interest ( Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , paragraph 167).
27. As also pointed out by the aforementioned Bundesfinanzhof in its order VIII B 107/04, to which the national court makes reference, a difference in treatment, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, does not appear to be justified by the need to ensure the coherence of the tax system, since no direct link has been established, for a shareholder, such as Mr Grønfeldt, between the tax advantage concerned and the offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax levy (see, to that effect, Case C‑319/02 Manninen  [2004] ECR I‑7477, paragraph 42, and Case C‑292/04 Meilicke and Others  [2007] ECR I‑1835, paragraph 26).
Heirs of Paul Chevassus-Marche v Groupe Danone, Société Kro beer brands SA (BKSA) and Société Évian eaux minérales d’Évian SA (SAEME).
Date: 2008-01-17
13. In Case C-104/95 Kontogeorgas [1996] ECR I-6643, the Court was called upon to interpret Article 7 of Directive 86/653 in a situation where the principal itself sold its goods to customers belonging to a geographical area which it had entrusted to a commercial agent. When asked whether that agent could claim commission for transactions concluded without any action on his part, the Court held, at paragraph 16 of the judgment, that Article 7 of that directive provides for entitlement to commission in two alternative cases. Paragraph 1 refers to the agent’s ongoing or previous activities, whereas paragraph 2 provides that a commercial agent is to be remunerated for all transactions entered into with customers belonging to a certain area or group, no mention being made of the need for any particular activity on the part of the agent.
14. In the situation in question in Kontogeorgas the Court held that the first indent of Article 7(2) of Directive 86/653 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a commercial agent is entrusted with a geographical area, he is entitled to commission on transactions concluded with customers belonging to that area, even if they were concluded without any action on his part ( Kontogeorgas , paragraph 19).
22. It is for the national court to establish whether or not the evidence before it, assessed in the light of the aim of protecting the commercial agent – which is one of the objectives of that directive (Case C-215/97 Bellone [1998] ECR I-2191, paragraph 13; Case C-381/98 Ingmar  [2000] ECR I-9305, paragraph 20; and Case C-465/04 Honyvem Informazioni Commerciali [2006] ECR I-2879, paragraph 19) – and of the obligation on the principal to act dutifully and in good faith under Article 4 of that directive, allow it to establish the existence of such action, be that action of a legal nature, for example through the intermediary of a representative, or of a factual nature.
Sophiane Gysen v Groupe S-Caisse d’Assurances sociales pour indépendants.
Date: 2008-02-14
17. Under the system of judicial cooperation established by Article 234 EC, it is for the Court of Justice to interpret provisions of Community law. As far as concerns nation provisions, it must be recalled that under that system their interpretation is a matter for the national courts (see Case C-37/92 Vanacker and Lesage [1993] ECR I-4947, paragraph 7).
23. Admittedly, Regulation No 259/68 – which established the Staff Regulations – cannot be treated as an international convention, because it was adopted, not by the Member States acting in accordance with the rules of international law, but by the Council as a European Community institution acting independently (see, to that effect, Case 38/69 Commission  v Italy  [1970] ECR 47, paragraph 11, and Case 91/79 Commission  v Italy  [1980] ECR 1099, paragraph 7), in the same way as the EC Treaty on which that regulation is based cannot be treated as an international social security convention. However, it must be recalled that, under the second paragraph of Article 249 EC, that regulation has general application, is binding in its entirety and is directly applicable in all Member States (see Case 137/80 Commission  v Belgium  [1981] ECR 2393, paragraph 7, and Case 186/85 Commission  v Belgium  [1987] ECR 2029, paragraph 21). Furthermore, as Ms Gysen submits, the second paragraph of Article 11 of the Staff Regulations itself expressly states that the latter are binding in their entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Telecom Italia SpA v Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze and Ministero delle Comunicazioni.
Date: 2008-02-21
17. First of all, it should be noted that, in proceedings brought under Article 234 EC, it is not for the Court to rule on the compatibility of national rules with provisions of Community law. On the other hand, the Court is competent to supply the national court with all the guidance as to the interpretation of Community law necessary to enable that court to rule on the compatibility of the national rules with the provisions of Community law (see, in particular, Case C-130/93 Lamaire  [1994] ECR I-3215, paragraph 10, and Case C-506/04 Wilson  [2006] ECR I‑8613, paragraphs 34 and 35).
18. In that regard, even if, formally, the national court has limited its question to the interpretation of Articles 11, 22 and 25 of Directive 97/13, that fact does not prevent the Court from providing the national court with all the elements of interpretation of Community law which may enable it to rule on the case before it, whether or not reference is made thereto in the question referred (see, in particular, Case C-329/05 Alevizos  [2007] ECR I-3505, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).
23. The Court has previously had the opportunity to examine the compatibility of Directive 97/13 with an annual charge imposed on a telecommunications undertaking and calculated on the basis of a percentage of its turnover in Albacom and Infostrada , cited above. In paragraph 41 of that judgment, the Court held that such a charge is contrary to the objectives sought by the Community legislature and goes beyond the common framework established by Directive 97/13. Moreover, it follows from paragraphs 33 and 42 of that judgment that such a charge is prohibited by Article 11 of that directive, which provides that the fees imposed on undertakings as part of authorisation procedures seek only to cover the administrative costs incurred in the delivery, management, review and application of individual licences. Since the fees imposed under Article 6 of that directive are limited in the same way, the same prohibition applies on the basis of that article.
42. Secondly, only Articles 6 and 11 of Directive 97/13 deal with the charges applicable to undertakings which hold authorisations in the telecommunications services sector (see, to that effect, Albacom and Infostrada , cited above, paragraph 26). As to individual licences, Article 11(1) of that directive provides that the fees imposed by the Member States on undertakings which hold those licences seek only to cover the administration costs generated by the work involved in implementing those licences ( Albacom and Infostrada , paragraph 25, and Joined Cases C-392/04 and C-422/04 i-21 Germany [2006] ECR I-8559, paragraph 28). The same consideration applies to the fees imposed by the Member States for general authorisations pursuant to Article 6 of Directive 97/13, which provides in addition for only one other form of financial contribution, namely contributions to the provision of universal service.
Malina Klöppel v Tiroler Gebietskrankenkasse.
Date: 2008-02-21
16. In this respect, first of all, it must be observed – as the Austrian Government submits – that Community law does not limit the power of the Member States to organise their social security schemes and that, in the absence of harmonisation at Community level, it is for the legislation of each Member State to lay down the conditions under which social security benefits are granted, as well as the amount of such benefits and the period for which they are granted. However, when exercising that power, the Member States must comply with Community law and, in particular, the EC Treaty provisions on freedom of movement for workers or again the freedom of every citizen of the European Union to move and reside in the territory of the Member States (Case C‑135/99 Elsen  [2000] ECR I‑10409, paragraph 33).
17. The principle of non-discrimination, as laid down in Article 39(2) EC and implemented, as far as concerns social security for migrant workers, by Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1408/71, prohibits not only overt discrimination based on the nationality of the beneficiaries of social security schemes but also all covert forms of discrimination which, through the application of other distinguishing criteria, lead in fact to the same result (see Case C‑332/05 Celozzi  [2007] ECR I‑563, paragraphs 13 and 23).
18. Accordingly, conditions imposed by national law must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory where, although applicable irrespective of nationality, they affect essentially migrant workers or the great majority of those affected are migrant workers, where they are applicable without distinction but can more easily be satisfied by national workers than by migrant workers, or where there is a risk that they may operate to the particular detriment of the latter ( Celozzi , paragraph 24).
19. The refusal to take into account, for the purposes of granting Ms Klöppel the Austrian childcare allowance, the period during which her partner, Mr Kraler, received a comparable benefit in Germany is likely to lead to such a result, given that, as a general rule, it is workers who are nationals of other Member Sates who, prior to their establishment in Austria, would have received family benefits paid in those other States.
Deutsche Post AG (C-287/06, C-288/06 and C-291/06), Magdeburger Dienstleistungs- und Verwaltungs GmbH (MDG) (C-289/06), Marketing Service Magdeburg GmbH (C-290/06) and Vedat Deniz (C-292/06) v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Date: 2008-03-06
36. Deutsche Post and the German Government nevertheless contend that permitting intermediaries access to the sorting offices and the corresponding discounts for a partial service with regard to the postal items which, owing to their weight and their price, fall within that company’s exclusive licence would threaten the financial stability of Deutsche Post. Those intermediaries would then be able to offer a lucrative group of customers, namely businesses, from which approximately 80% of all items come, the entire postal handling chain, at tariffs lower than those of Deutsche Post. For more expensive services, in particular distribution in rural areas, those intermediaries would then be able to turn to the services of the universal postal service provider, acting as sub-contractor, which would be bound to maintain in full its structure in terms of operations and personnel.
38. Thus, if it were to turn out that the grant to the intermediaries of the discounts currently agreed only for the business customers of Deutsche Post means that those discounts are excessive compared with the avoided costs, it would be open to the company to reduce those discounts to the extent necessary for all recipients.
44. Having regard to all of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred must be that the fifth indent of Article 12 of Directive 97/67 is to be interpreted as precluding refusal to apply to businesses which consolidate, on a commercial basis and in their own name, postal items from various senders the special tariffs which the national universal postal service provider grants, within the scope of its exclusive licence, to business customers for the deposit of minimum quantities of pre-sorted mail at its sorting offices.
Costs
Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones v Administración del Estado.
Date: 2008-03-06
13. That is the appropriate context in which to assess Recital (11) of the Framework Directive, according to which the Member States must, under the principle of the separation of regulatory and operational functions, guarantee the independence of the national regulatory authority or authorities (‘the regulatory authorities’) in order to ensure the impartiality of their decisions.
24. Although the Member States enjoy institutional autonomy as regards the organisation and the structuring of their regulatory authorities within the meaning of Article 2(g) of the Framework Directive, that autonomy may be exercised only in accordance with the objectives and obligations laid down in that directive.
25. Thus, in accordance with Article 3(2), (4) and (6) of the Framework Directive, the Member States must not only guarantee the functional independence of regulatory authorities in relation to the organisations providing electronic communications networks, equipment or services, but must also publish, in an easily accessible form, the tasks to be undertaken by the national regulatory authorities, and notify to the Commission the names of the regulatory authorities entrusted with carrying out those tasks, and their res pective responsibilities.
26. As a consequence, where those functions are to be discharged, even partially, by ministerial authorities, each Member State must ensure that those authorities are neither directly nor indirectly involved in ‘operational functions’ within the meaning of the Framework Directive.