larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Nintendo Co. Ltd and Others v PC Box Srl and 9Net Srl.
Date: 2014-01-23
21. In that regard, first of all it must be noted that Directive 2001/29 concerns, as is apparent inter alia from Article 1(1) thereof, the legal protection of copyright and related rights, including, for authors, exclusive rights to their works. As for works such as computer programs, they are protected by copyright provided that they are original, that is that they are their author’s own intellectual creation (see Case C‑5/08 Infopaq International  [2009] ECR I-6569, paragraph 35).
22. As regards the parts of a work, it should be borne in mind that there is nothing in Directive 2001/29 indicating that those parts are to be treated any differently from the work as a whole. It follows that they are protected by copyright since, as such, they share the originality of the whole work (see Infopaq International , paragraph 38).
23. That finding is not weakened by the fact that Directive 2009/24 constitutes a lex specialis  in relation to Directive 2001/29 (see Case C-128/11 UsedSoft [2012] ECR, paragraph 56). In accordance with Article 1(1) thereof, the protection offered by Directive 2009/24 is limited to computer programs. As is apparent from the order for reference, videogames, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, constitute complex matter comprising not only a computer program but also graphic and sound elements, which, although encrypted in computer language, have a unique creative value which cannot be reduced to that encryption. In so far as the parts of a videogame, in this case, the graphic and sound elements, are part of its originality, they are protected, together with the entire work, by copyright in the context of the system established by Directive 2001/29.
X BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2014-01-23
34. As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, when the Court is requested to give a preliminary ruling on a matter of classification for customs purposes, its task is to provide the national court with guidance on the criteria which will enable the latter to classify the products at issue correctly in the CN, rather than to effect that classification itself, a fortiori  since the Court does not necessarily have available to it all the information which is essential in that regard. In any event, the national court is in a better position to do so (Joined Cases C‑260/00 to C‑263/00 Lohmann and Medi Bayreuth [2002] ECR I‑10045, paragraph 26; Case C‑12/10 Lecson Elektromobile  [2012] ECR I‑14173, paragraph 15; and Joined Cases C-320/11, C-330/11, C-382/11 and C-383/11 Digitalnet and Others [2012] ECR, paragraph 61).
38. In order to determine the scope of the concept of ‘eliminating impurities’ within the meaning of Note 1 to Chapter 25 of the CN, which is the subject-matter of the first question, it is useful to turn to the Court’s settled case-law, in which it has been held that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, inter alia, Case C-183/06 RUMA [2007] ECR I‑1559, paragraph 27; Joined Cases C-208/06 and C-209/06 2007 Medion and Canon Deutschland  [2007] ECR I‑7963, paragraph 34; and Case C-568/11 Agroferm  [2013] ECR, paragraph 27).
39. Moreover, the intended use of a product may also constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (see RUMA , paragraph 36; Case C‑123/09 Roeckl Sporthandschuhe  [2010] ECR I‑4065, paragraph 28; and Agroferm , paragraph 41).
48. The HS Explanatory Notes, however, despite their lack of binding force, are an important means of ensuring the uniform application of the Common Customs Tariff and, as such, may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (Case C‑173/08 Kloosterboer Services [2009] ECR I-5347, paragraph 25, and Agroferm , paragraph 28).
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) v riha WeserGold Getränke GmbH & Co. KG.
Date: 2014-01-23
41. It is settled law that, for the purposes of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, the likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the mark applied for and the earlier mark are identical or similar, and that the goods or services covered in the application for registration are identical or similar to those in respect of which the earlier mark was registered, and that those conditions are cumulative ( Vedial  v OHIM , paragraph 51, and Case C‑234/06 P Il Ponte Finanziaria v OHIM  [2007] ECR I‑7333, paragraph 48).
E.ON Global Commodities SE v Agenţia Naţională de Administrare Fiscală - Direcţia Generală de Soluţionare a Contestaţiilor and Direcţia Generală a Finanţelor Publice a Municipiului București - Serviciul de administrare a contribuabililor nerezidenţi.
Date: 2014-02-06
42. In that regard, it must be observed that Article 1 of the Eighth Directive provides, in essence, two cumulative conditions which must be satisfied before a taxable person can be regarded as not being established in the territory of the country, and therefore entitled to a refund under Article 2 of that directive. First, the taxable person in question must not possess any establishment in the Member State where he is seeking to claim that refund. Secondly, he must not have made any supplies of goods or services in respect of which the place of supply is deemed to be in that Member State, with the exception of certain supplies of specified services.
46. It is apparent from settled case-law that, in order to be considered an establishment to which the supplies of goods and services by a taxable person are connected, an establishment must possess a sufficient degree of permanence and a structure adequate, in terms of human and technical resources, to carry out the transactions under consideration on an independent basis (see, to that effect, Case C‑190/95 ARO Lease [1997] ECR I‑4383, paragraph 16, and Case C‑390/96 Lease Plan Luxembourg [1998] ECR I‑2553, paragraph 24).
55. Further, as regards the argument of the Romanian Government, at the hearing, that E.ON, by maintaining its tax representative, created a legal vacuum, thereby depriving it of any possibility of obtaining a refund of VAT, it must be stated that, if the effect of the supplies of electricity concerned is to render the Eighth Directive inapplicable, the deduction of input VAT must, as a rule, be allowed if the substantive requirements are satisfied, even if the taxable person has failed to comply with some of the formal requirements. The principle of fiscal neutrality precludes a penalty consisting in a refusal of the right to a refund or the right to deduct (see Case C‑284/11 EMS-Bulgaria Transport [2012] ECR, paragraphs 71 and 77; see also, by analogy, Case C‑146/05 Collée [2007] ECR I‑7861, paragraph 31).
56. As regards, last, the enquiry raised by the referring court in its third question, it must be stated that, according to settled case‑law of the Court, whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied on before the national courts by individuals against the State where the State has failed to transpose the directive into national law within the time-limit or has transposed it incorrectly (see Case C‑549/11 Orfey Balgaria [2012] ECR, paragraph 51 and case‑law cited). It is clear that the provisions examined above, in particular Articles 1, 3 and 4 of the Eighth Directive and Articles 171 and 195 of the VAT Directive, satisfy those conditions.
Instituto Portuário e dos Transportes Marítimos (IPTM) v Navileme - Consultadoria Náutica Lda and Nautizende - Consultadoria Náutica Lda.
Date: 2014-02-06
10. It should be observed at the outset that, first, the right freely to provide services may be relied on by an undertaking as against the State in which it is established if the services are provided for persons established in another Member State and, second, that right includes the freedom for recipients of services to go to another Member State in order to receive a service there, without being obstructed by restrictions (see, inter alia, Case C‑224/97 Ciola  [1999] ECR I‑2517, paragraph 11 and the case‑law cited).
11. Likewise, persons established in a Member State who travel to another Member State as tourists or on a study trip must be regarded as recipients of services (see Case C‑211/08 Commission  v Spain  [2010] ECR I‑5267, paragraph 51 and the case‑law cited).
14. While such a provision of Portuguese law applies without distinction to nationals and non‑nationals and is not, therefore, based on the nationality of the candidates seeking to obtain a boating licence, it does, however, use as the distinguishing criterion their place of residence. It is settled case‑law that a provision of national law under which a distinction is drawn on the basis of residence is liable to operate mainly to the detriment of nationals of other Member States, as non-residents are in the majority of cases foreign nationals (see, to that, effect, Case C‑350/96 Clean Car Autoservice  [1998] ECR I‑2521, paragraph 29; Ciola , paragraph 14; and Case C‑382/08 Neukirchinger  [2011] ECR I‑139, paragraph 34).
18. It is next necessary to consider to what extent the restriction at issue in the main proceedings may be allowed as a derogation expressly provided for by Article 52 TFEU, applicable in this area by virtue of Article 62 TFEU, or justified, in accordance with the case-law of the Court, by overriding reasons in the public interest (see Case C‑176/11 HIT and HIT LARIX  [2012] ECR, paragraph 20). However, application of that measure would still have to be such as to ensure achievement of the objective in question and not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose (Case C‑379/11 Caves Krier Frères  [2012] ECR, paragraph 48 and the case‑law cited).
20. It is true that the objective of security and public policy, expressly provided for in Article 52 TFEU, to which the Portuguese Government refers, constitutes a legitimate objective that could, in principle, warrant a restriction of the freedom to provide services. Nevertheless, contrary to what that Government claims, the condition of residency at issue in the main proceedings cannot be justified by that objective. Recourse to such justification presupposes the existence of a genuine, sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society (Case C‑546/07 Commission  v Germany  [2010] ECR I‑439, paragraph 49 and the case‑law cited). The Portuguese Government does not, however, claim that such circumstances have been established in the present case.
Mömax Logistik GmbH v Bundesamt für Justiz.
Date: 2014-02-06
17. It must be borne in mind in that regard that it has been consistently held that the procedure provided for by Article 267 TFEU is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts by which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of European Union law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them (see, inter alia, Case C‑279/12 Fish Legal and Shirley  [2013] ECR, paragraph 29).
18. Questions on the interpretation of European Union law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling from a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Fish Legal and Shirley , paragraph 30).
29. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to consider whether the combined national provisions at issue in the main action are contrary to the principle of freedom of establishment under Article 49 TFEU (see, to that effect, Case C‑456/98 Centrosteel  [2000] ECR I‑6007, paragraph 18).
Helm Düngemittel GmbH v Hauptzollamt Krefeld.
Date: 2014-02-06
32. It is, admittedly, true that, according to the Court’s case-law, the movement certificate constitutes documentary evidence of the preferential origin of goods and to allow other means of proof to be adduced in addition to that evidence of origin would adversely affect the unity and security of the application of those free-trade agreements concluded with non-member countries (see, to that effect, Case C‑334/93 Bonapharma  [1995] ECR I‑319, paragraph 16). The requirement of valid proof of origin cannot, therefore, be considered to be a mere formality that may be overlooked where the place of origin is established by means of other evidence (see, to that effect, Case C‑386/08 Brita  [2010] ECR I‑1289, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
33. However, the Court has already held that it is for the authorities of the State of exportation to establish the origin of goods and that the customs officials of the Member States must in principle take into account the assessments made by the customs authorities of the State of exportation, in particular where the preferential treatment is established by an international agreement binding the European Union to a non-member country on the basis of reciprocal obligations (see, to that effect, Case C‑409/10 Afasia Knits Deutschland  [2011] ECR I‑13331, paragraph 29, and Case C‑438/11 Lagura Vermögensverwaltung  [2012] ECR, paragraphs 34 to 36 and the case-law cited).
34. Furthermore, the recognition, by the customs authorities of Member States, of decisions taken by the authorities of the State of exportation connected with the European Union under a free-trade agreement is necessary in order that the European Union can in turn demand, from the authorities of that country, respect for decisions taken by the customs authorities of Member states relating to the origin of products exported from the European Union to that State (see, to that effect, Case 218/83 Les Rapides Savoyards and Others  [1984] ECR 3105, paragraph 27).
37. Furthermore, it must be noted that international treaty law was codified, in essence, by the Vienna Convention and that the rules contained in that convention apply to an agreement concluded between a State and an international organisation, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement with Egypt, in so far as those rules are an expression of general international customary law (see, by analogy, Brita , paragraphs 40 and 41).
Directeur général des douanes et droits indirects and Chef de l’agence de la direction nationale du renseignement et des enquêtes douanières v Humeau Beaupréau SAS.
Date: 2014-02-06
32. Although the Explanatory Notes drawn up by the WCO are an important means of ensuring the uniform application of the Common Customs Tariff and, as such, may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (see, in particular, Case C‑568/11 Agroferm  [2013] ECR, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited), they do not have legally binding force (see, in particular, Case 798/79 Chem-Tec  [1980] ECR 2639, paragraph 11; Case C‑35/93 Develop Dr. Eisbein  [1994] ECR I‑2655, paragraph 21; and Case C‑558/11 Kurcums Metal  [2012] ECR, paragraph 30).
45. If the opposite were true, the tariff classification of the imported components would depend on a fact which not intrinsic to those goods, since the customs authorities are not in a position to ascertain whether components which were not presented to customs have to be worked or not before being capable of assembly with the imported components, which would undermine the objective of ease of verification by the customs and legal certainty which must govern that classification.
51. The conclusions of the Customs Code Committee, although they do not have legally binding force, they constitute an important means of ensuring the uniform application of the Customs Code by the customs authorities of the Member States and as such may be considered as a valid aid to the interpretation of the Code (see, inter alia, Case C‑165/07 Ecco Sko  [2008] ECR I‑4037, paragraph 47).
A. M. van der Ham and A. H. van der Ham-Reijersen van Buuren v College van Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland.
Date: 2014-02-27
32. Therefore, in accordance with settled case-law, that concept must be given an independent and uniform interpretation, having regard to the usual meaning of those words, the context of those articles and the objective pursued by the legislation of which they are part (see, inter alia, Case C‑420/11 Leth  [2013] ECR, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
Petra Würker v Familienkasse Nürnberg.
Date: 2014-02-27
28. According to the case-law, the ‘family allowances’ for which Articles 77 and 78 of Regulation No 1408/71 provide payment, are solely those benefits that match the definition in Article 1(u)(ii) of that regulation, to the exclusion of any other family benefit for dependent children (see, to that effect, Case C‑225/10 Pérez García and Others  [2011] ECR I‑10111, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
30. In that regard, it must, however, be borne in mind that, in accordance with its very wording, the first subparagraph of Article 78(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 1408/71 governs only the right to benefits for the ‘orphan of a deceased employed person’ (see Case 1/88 Baldi  [1989] ECR 667, paragraph 15, and Case C-619/11 Dumont de Chassart [2013] ECR, paragraph 35).
36. According to the case-law of the Court, the classification of a benefit in the general scheme of Regulation No 1408/71 is based essentially on the constituent elements of that benefit, in particular its purposes and the conditions on which it is granted, and not on the classification which is made by the national legislation (see, by analogy with the distinction between benefits excluded from the scope of Regulation No 1408/71 and benefits which fall within it, inter alia, Case 9/78 Directeur régional de la Sécurité sociale de Nancy [1978] ECR 1661, paragraph 12; Case C‑160/96 Molenaar  [1998] ECR I‑843, paragraph 19; and Case C‑177/12 Lachheb  [2013] ECR, paragraph 28).
44. The fact, noted by the referring court, that that pension for bringing up children contains essential elements of a pension acquired on the basis of an insured person’s own qualifying period as an employee under the German social security scheme, does not call that conclusion into question (see, by analogy, Case C‑43/99 Leclere and Deaconescu  [2001] ECR I-4265, paragraph 50).
Federaal agentschap voor de opvang van asielzoekers v Selver Saciri and Others.
Date: 2014-02-27
33. With regard, firstly, to the time from which the Member States are required to provide the material reception conditions, it is appropriate to note that the Court has already held that, regarding the period during which the material reception conditions must be granted to the applicants, that period is to begin when the asylum seeker applies for asylum (see, to that effect, Case C‑179/11 Cimade and GISTI  [2012] ECR, paragraph 39).
Dresser-Rand SA v Agenzia delle Entrate, Direzione Provinciale, Ufficio Controlli di Genova.
Date: 2014-03-06
27. It thus follows from the structure and wording of Article 17 of the VAT Directive that Article 17(2) contains an exhaustive list of derogations, which, accordingly, must be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, Case C‑169/12 TNT Express Worldwide  [2013] ECR, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
28. Finally, it should be recalled that the purpose of the transitional arrangements relating to VAT applicable to intra-Community trade established by the directive is to transfer the tax revenue to the Member State in which final consumption of the goods supplied takes place (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑536/08 and C‑539/08 X and Fiscale eenheid Facet-Facet Trading  [2010] ECR I‑3581, paragraph 30, and Case C‑84/09 X [2010] ECR I‑11645, paragraphs 22 and 31). Thus, the derogation in Article 17(2)(f) of the directive must be interpreted, in particular, in the light of that objective.
34. It must be recalled that, pursuant to the allocation of judicial functions between national courts and the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU, while the Court gives a preliminary ruling without, generally, having to look into the circumstances in which national courts were prompted to submit the questions and envisage applying the provision of European Union law which they have asked the Court to interpret, the position is different, however, in a case, in particular, where it is obvious that the provision of European Union law referred to the Court for interpretation is incapable of applying (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑297/88 and C‑197/89 Dzodzi  [1990] ECR I‑3763, paragraphs 39 and 40, and Case C‑64/06 Telefónica 02 Czech Republic  [2007] ECR I‑4887, paragraphs 22 and 23).