Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v UPC Magyarország kft.
Date: 2015-04-16
32. In this regard, it should be noted that, first, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive seeks to ensure a high level of consumer protection by carrying out a complete harmonisation of the rules relating to unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices (see, inter alia, judgments in Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag , C‑540/08, EU:C:2010:660, paragraph 27; Citroën Belux , C‑265/12, EU:C:2013:498, paragraph 20; CHS Tour Services , C‑435/11, EU:C:2013:574, paragraph 47; and Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs , C‑59/12, EU:C:2013:634, paragraph 34).
33. Secondly, the need for uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (see, inter alia, judgment in Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs , C‑59/12, EU:C:2013:634, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
34. In the first place, the Court has already held that the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive is characterised by a particularly wide scope ratione materiae  (judgments in Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag , C‑540/08, EU:C:2010:660, paragraph 21, and in Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs , C‑59/12, EU:C:2013:634, paragraph 40), since the EU legislature conferred a very broad meaning on the term ‘commercial practice’, for the purposes of that directive, Article 2(d) thereof defining it as ‘any act, omission, course of conduct or representation, commercial communication including advertising and marketing, by a trader’.
35. Thus, the sole criterion referred to in that provision is that the trader’s practice must be directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product or service to consumers (see, inter alia, judgments in Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft , C‑304/08, EU:C:2010:12, paragraph 39, and in CHS Tour Services , C‑435/11, EU:C:2013:574, paragraph 27).
43. In the light of the need to protect consumers which underlies that directive, those provisions cannot be interpreted as imposing conditions of that kind where they do not even set out such conditions explicitly (see, to that effect, judgment in CHS Tour Services , C‑435/11, EU:C:2013:574, paragraph 41).
50. In the present case, it is evident that, had it not been for the mistake as to the date made by UPC, the other party to the contract would not have terminated his contract with effect from 10 February 2011, where the relevant date was 10 January 2011, and that, with respect to the time which had elapsed between those two dates, an additional cost was imposed on that party. Moreover, as has already been stated in paragraph 48 of the present judgment, and by analogy with the Court’s ruling in the judgment in Purely Creative and Others  (C‑428/11, EU:C:2012:651, paragraph 57), the fact that the additional cost imposed on the consumer is insignificant is irrelevant in that regard.
51. The foregoing interpretation is supported by the fact that it makes it possible to guarantee the full effectiveness of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, by ensuring that, in accordance with the requirement to ensure a high level of consumer protection, set out in particular in Article 1 of that directive, unfair commercial practices are, in the words of the first subparagraph of Article 11(1) of that directive, combated effectively ‘in the interest of consumers’. As is apparent from, inter alia, recitals 7, 8, 11, 13 and 14 in the preamble, that directive establishes to that effect a general prohibition of unfair commercial practices that distort consumers’ economic behaviour (see judgment in Trento Sviluppo and Centrale Adriatica , C‑281/12, EU:C:2013:859, paragraph 32).
52. Moreover, the Court has already held that the provisions of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive are essentially designed with the consumer as the target and victim of unfair commercial practices in mind (see judgment in Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs , C‑59/12, EU:C:2013:634, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
53. The objective of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, which is to protect consumers in full against practices of that kind, relies on the assumption that, in relation to a trader, the consumer is in a weaker position, particularly with regard to the level of information, in that the consumer must be considered to be economically weaker and less experienced in legal matters than the other party to the contract (see judgment in Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs , C‑59/12, EU:C:2013:634, paragraph 35).
57. As the Court has already held, that directive therefore leaves the Member States a margin of discretion as to the choice of national measures intended, in accordance with Articles 11 and 13 of that directive, to combat unfair commercial practices, on condition that they are adequate and effective and that the penalties thus laid down are effective, proportionate and dissuasive (judgment in Köck , C‑206/11, EU:C:2013:14, paragraph 44).