larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2003-11-27
40. As the Court has consistently held (see, in particular, Case C-360/87  Commission  v  Italy  [1991] ECR I-791, paragraph 13), Member States must, in order to secure the full implementation of directives in law and not only in fact, establish a specific legal framework in the area in question.
56. It is settled case-law that the question whether there has been a failure to fulfil obligations must be examined in the light of the position in which the Member State found itself at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C-362/90  Commission  v  Italy  [1992] ECR I-2353, paragraph 10).
58. Accordingly, the action must be dismissed as inadmissible in so far as it relates to that provision of the Directive (see, to that effect,  Commission  v  Italy , cited above, paragraph 13).
68. It is clear from the Court ' s case-law that a provision which concerns only relations between Member States and the Commission need not, in principle, be transposed. Nevertheless, given that the Member States are under an obligation to ensure full compliance with Community law, the Commission may show that compliance with the provision of a directive governing such relations requires the adoption of specific measures transposing that provision into the national legal order (see, to that effect, Case C-72/02  Commission  v  Portugal  [2003] ECR I-6597, paragraphs 19 and 20).
83. It is settled case-law that for the transposition of a directive into the legal order of a Member State it is essential that the national legislation in question effectively ensures that the directive is fully applied, that the legal position under national law is sufficiently precise and clear and that individuals are made fully aware of their rights and obligations (see Case C-365/93  Commission  v  Greece  [1995] ECR I-499, paragraph 9, and Case C-97/01  Commission  v  Luxembourg  [2003] ECR I-5797, paragraph 32).
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom.
Date: 2003-11-27
10. It is, in that regard, settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, among others, Case C-63/02  Commission  v  United Kingdom  [2003] ECR I-821, paragraph 11).
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2003-11-27
11. As to those submissions, suffice it to state that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-211/02  Commission  v  Luxembourg  [2003] ECR I-2429, paragraph 6).
12. It also follows from settled case-law that a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal order in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, inter alia, Case C-286/01  Commission  v  France  [2002] ECR I-5463, paragraph 13).
Nina Kristiansen v Rijksdienst voor Arbeidsvoorziening.
Date: 2003-12-04
28. Secondly, it is clear from settled case-law that, in order to provide a satisfactory answer to the national court which has referred a question to it, the Court of Justice may deem it necessary to consider provisions of Community law to which the national court has not referred in its question (Case 35/85 Tissier  [1986] ECR 1207, paragraph 9; Case C-315/88 Bagli Pennacchiotti  [1990] ECR I-1323, paragraph 10, and Case C-107/98 Teckal  [1999] ECR I-8121, paragraph 39).
31. It should first be noted in this regard that, as the Advocate General has mentioned at point 33 of his Opinion, the Court has consistently held that Community law does not detract from the power of the Member States to organise their social security systems and that, in the absence of harmonisation at Community level, it is for the legislation of each Member State to determine both the conditions concerning the right or duty to be insured with a social security scheme and the conditions for entitlement to benefits. Nevertheless, the Member States must comply with Community law when exercising that power (Case C-157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms  [2001] ECR I-5473, paragraphs 44 to 46).
32. Secondly, as the Commission stated in its observations, the Conditions of Employment were adopted by means of a Council regulation which, by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 249 EC, has general application, is binding in its entirety and is directly applicable in all Member States. It follows that, in addition to having effects within the Community administration, the Conditions of Employment are binding on Member States in so far as their cooperation is necessary in order to give effect to those measures (Case 186/85 Commission  v Belgium  [1987] ECR 2029, paragraph 21).
34. Since it is based on the second subparagraph of Article 28a(1) of the Conditions of Employment, the complementary effect of the Community unemployment benefit system is binding on the Member States and cannot be disregarded by national legislation ( Commission  v Belgium , cited above, paragraph 23).
37. In that regard, suffice it to note, first, that, as was mentioned at paragraph 31 of this judgment, Community law does not detract from the power of the Member States to organise their social security systems and that, in the absence of harmonisation at Community level, it is for the legislation of each Member State to determine both the conditions concerning the right or duty to be insured with a social security scheme and the conditions for entitlement to benefits ( Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms , cited above, paragraphs 44 and 45).
AMOK Verlags GmbH v A & R Gastronomie GmbH.
Date: 2003-12-11
25.  With regard to the assessment by the Oberlandesgericht München of the rules in question in the light of Article 12 EC, it must be stated at the outset that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, that provision, which lays down the general principle of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, applies independently only to situations governed by Community law in respect of which the Treaty lays down no specific prohibition of discrimination (see Case C-100/01   Oteiza Olazabal   [2002] ECR I-10981, paragraph 25).
26.  So far as the freedom to provide services is concerned, that principle was given specific expression and effect by Article 49 EC (Case C-55/98   Vestergaard   [1999] ECR I-7641, paragraph 17).  It is for that reason unnecessary to rule on Article 12 EC.
29.  As the Commission has pointed out, that provision is defined in greater detail, within the area in question, by the Directive.  Article 4(1) of the Directive provides that the activity of representing a client in legal proceedings in another Member State must be pursued   "under the conditions laid down for lawyers established in that State"  , with the exception of   "any conditions requiring residence, or registration with a professional organisation, in that State"  .  Article 4(2), furthermore, provides that the rules of professional conduct of the host Member State must be observed in the pursuit of those activities.
36.  The fact that the party which has been successful in a dispute and which has been represented by a lawyer established in another Member State cannot also obtain reimbursement, from the unsuccessful party, of the fees of the lawyer practising before the court seised and to whom the successful party has had recourse, on the ground that such costs are not regarded as being necessary, is liable to make the transfrontier provision by a lawyer of his services less attractive.  Such a solution may have a deterrent effect capable of affecting the competitiveness of lawyers in other Member States.
Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure eV and Commission of the European Communities v Bayer AG.
Date: 2004-01-06
47. Under Article 225 EC and Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, whereby an appeal before the Court of Justice is limited to points of law, the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to establish the facts except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it and, second, to assess those facts, save where the evidence has been misinterpreted. When the Court of First Instance has established or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 225 EC only to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the Court of First Instance and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (Case C-7/95 P  Deere  v  Commission  [1998] ECR I-3111, paragraph 21).
61. Concerning the objection of inadmissibility raised by Bayer and EFPIA, it is sufficient to note that the question of the allocation of the burden of proof, although it may have an impact on the findings of fact by the Court of First Instance, is a question of law.  Therefore, this objection of inadmissibility is unfounded.
62. As to the merits, it should be noted that, in  Anic Partecipazioni , contrary to what BAI is suggesting, the Court of Justice did not modify the principle that, where there is a dispute as to the existence of an infringement of the competition rules, it is for the Commission to prove the infringement which it has found and to adduce evidence capable of demonstrating to the requisite legal standard the existence of circumstances constituting an infringement.
84. Concerning the complaints of alleged misinterpretation of the judgments in  Sandoz  and  Ford , on the ground that, in those judgments, the Court of Justice did not examine whether there was a system of subsequent monitoring and penalties before holding that there was an agreement prohibited by Article 85(1) of the Treaty, it should be reiterated that verification of the existence of such a system is not necessary in all cases for an agreement contrary to that provision to be considered to have been concluded.
117. Concerning the objection of inadmissibility raised by Bayer and EFPIA, the Court finds that the plea concerning absence of a meeting of minds does not in any way amount to calling into question the factual findings of the Court of First Instance.  On the contrary, it seeks to challenge the legal value that the latter attributed to the genuine wishes of the wholesalers in spite of their purported declared intention.  Therefore, the objection of inadmissibility is unfounded.
K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health.
Date: 2004-01-07
25. Benefits granted under a pension scheme which essentially relates to the employment of the person concerned form part of the pay received by that person and come within the scope of Article 141 EC (see, in particular, Case C-262/88  Barber  [1990] ECR I-1889, paragraph 28, and Case C-351/00  Niemi  [2002] ECR I-7007, paragraph 40).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 2004-01-07
32. Although Article 4(c) of Directive 90/388 does not lay down a period within which the obligation to rebalance tariffs must be fulfilled, the fact remains that several elements of Directive 96/19 state that the rebalancing of tariffs must be carried out at a sustained rate in order to facilitate the opening of the telecommunications market to competition. Thus, as the Advocate General stated in paragraphs 58 to 60 of his Opinion, it is clear from reading the 20th and 5th recitals in the preamble to Directive 96/19 together with Article 4(c) of Directive 90/388 that the Member States were bound to phase out the restrictions on tariff rebalancing as soon as possible after the entry into force of Directive 96/19 and at the latest by 1 January 1998. The Member States with less developed networks or with very small networks were to adopt a detailed timetable for the implementation of their obligation.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 2004-01-07
26. It is true that the Court has held that transposing a directive into national law does not necessarily require the provisions of the directive to be enacted in precisely the same words in a specific express legal provision of national law and that the general legal context may be sufficient if it actually ensures the full application of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner (see inter alia Case 29/84  Commission  v  Germany  [1985] ECR 1661, paragraph 23, Case 247/85  Commission  v  Belgium  [1987] ECR 3029, paragraph 9, and Case C-217/97  Commission  v  Germany  [1999] ECR I-5087, paragraph 31).
Criminal proceedings against X.
Date: 2004-01-07
25. The Court has already had occasion to rule in favour of the admissibility of a request for a preliminary ruling arising in the context of a preparatory inquiry in criminal proceedings, which could have resulted in an order that no further action be taken, a summons to appear, or an acquittal (see, to that effect, Case 14/86  Pretore di Salò  [1987] ECR 2545, paragraphs 10 and 11).
28. Finally, the choice of the most appropriate time to refer a question to the Court for a preliminary ruling lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national court (see, in particular, Joined Cases 36/80 and 71/80  Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association and Others  [1981] ECR 735, paragraphs 5 to 8; Case 72/83  Campus Oil and Others  [1984] ECR 2727, paragraph 10; Case C-66/96  Høj Pedersen and Others  [1998] ECR I-7327, paragraphs 45 and 46, and Case C-236/98  JämO  [2000] ECR I-2189, paragraphs 30 and 31).
59. Moreover, according to settled case-law, national courts are required to interpret their national law within the limits set by Community law, in order to achieve the result intended by the Community rule in question (see Case C-106/89  Marleasing  [1990] ECR I-4135, paragraph 8, and Case C-262/97  Engelbrecht  [2000] ECR I-7321, paragraph 39).
61. However, a particular problem arises where the principle of compatible interpretation is applied to criminal matters. As the Court has also held, that principle finds its limits in the general principles of law which form part of the Community legal system and, in particular, in the principles of legal certainty and non-retroactivity. In that regard, the Court has held on several occasions that a directive cannot, of itself and independently of a national law adopted by a Member State for its implementation, have the effect of determining or aggravating the liability in criminal law of persons who act in contravention of the provisions of that directive (see, in particular,  Pretore di Salò , paragraph 20; Case C-168/95  Arcaro  [1996] ECR I-4705, paragraph 37, and Joined Cases C-74/95 and C-129/95  X  [1996] ECR I-6609, paragraph 24).
62. Even though in the case at issue in the main proceedings the Community rule in question is a regulation, which by its very nature does not require any national implementing measures, and not a directive, Article 11 of Regulation No 3295/94 empowers Member States to adopt penalties for infringements of Article 2 of that regulation, thereby making it possible to transpose to the present case the Court ' s reasoning in respect of directives.
63. If the national court reaches the conclusion that national law does not prohibit the transit of counterfeit goods across Austrian territory, the principle of non-retroactivity of penalties, as enshrined in Article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which is a general principle of Community law common to the constitutional traditions of the Member States, would prohibit the imposition of criminal penalties for such conduct, even if the national rule were contrary to Community law.
Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co. v Putsch GmbH.
Date: 2004-01-07
16. In order better to define its scope in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings it should be borne in mind that, by a limitation of the effects of the rights derived from Article 5 of Directive 89/104 by the proprietor of a trade mark, Article 6 of that directive seeks to reconcile the fundamental interests of trade-mark protection with those of free movement of goods and freedom to provide services in the common market in such a way that trade mark rights are able to fulfil their essential role in the system of undistorted competition which the Treaty seeks to establish and maintain (see,  inter alia , Case C-63/97  BMW  [1999] ECR I-905, paragraph 62).
24. In answering that question, the only test mentioned in Article 6(1) of Directive 89/104 is whether the indication of geographical origin is used in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters. The condition of   " honest practice"  constitutes in substance the expression of a duty to act fairly in relation to the legitimate interests of the trade mark owner ( BMW , cited above, paragraph 61).
25. The mere fact that there exists a likelihood of aural confusion between a word mark registered in one Member State and an indication of geographical origin from another Member State is therefore insufficient to conclude that the use of that indication in the course of trade is not in accordance with honest practices. In a Community of 15 Member States, with great linguistic diversity, the chance that there exists some phonetic similarity between a trade mark registered in one Member State and an indication of geographical origin from another Member State is already substantial and will be even greater after the impending enlargement.
26. It follows that, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, it is for the national court to carry out an overall assessment of all the relevant circumstances. Since the case concerns bottled drinks, the circumstances to be taken into account by that court would include in particular the shape and labelling of the bottle in order to assess, more particularly, whether the producer of the drink bearing the indication of geographical origin might be regarded as unfairly competing with the proprietor of the trade mark.
Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce v Penycoed Farming Partnership.
Date: 2004-01-15
28. The additional milk levy scheme is based on a distinction between reference quantities for milk sold directly for consumption and those for milk delivered to purchasers (see, to that effect, Case C-288/97  Consorzio Caseifici dell ' Altopiano di Asiago  [1999] ECR I-2575, paragraph 18).
29. In the case of direct sales, the producer pays the levy due to the competent body of the Member State in accordance with Article 2(3) of Regulation No 3950/92.  As regards deliveries, the purchaser liable for the levy pays to that body the amount due, which he deducts from the price of milk paid to producers who owe the levy or, failing this, collects by any appropriate means, as indicated in Article 2(2) of Regulation No 3950/92.  In both cases, the levy is thus payable by the producers.
32. The fact that the purchaser does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils, his function as the person liable likewise does not allow the producer to be substituted for the purchaser for the benefit of the competent body.  Such a penalty would presuppose the prior existence of a legal basis defining its conditions and scope (see, to that effect, Case C-352/92  Milchwerke Köln  v  Wuppertal  [1994] ECR I-3385, paragraph 22, and Case C-277/98  France  v  Commission  [2001] ECR I-8453, paragraph 37). However, there is no such legal basis in this case.
36. Where a Community regulation does not specifically provide any penalty for an infringement or refers for that purpose to national laws, regulations and administrative provisions, Article 10 EC requires the Member States to take all measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law (Case 68/88  Commission  v  Greece  [1989] ECR 2965, paragraph 23; Case C-326/88  Hansen  [1990] ECR I-2911, paragraph 17;  Milchwerke Köln  v  Wuppertal , cited above, paragraph 23; Case C-36/94  Siesse  [1995] ECR I-3573, paragraph 20; Case C-177/95  Ebony Maritime and Loten Navigation  [1997] ECR I-1111, paragraph 35, and Case C-167/01  Inspire Art  [2003] ECR I-10155, paragraph 62).
37. The obligation based on Article 10 EC also extends to the initiation of any proceedings under administrative, fiscal or civil law for the collection or recovery of duties or levies which have been fraudulently evaded or for damages ( Milchwerke Köln  v  Wuppertal , paragraph 23).
38. Accordingly, the Member States are required to take measures to ensure collection of the levy in any cases where the mechanism provided for in Article 2(2) of Regulation No 3950/92 has been frustrated.
39. That obligation entails the power to take action directly against the producer in order to recover the amount payable by the latter in respect of the additional levy on milk where it is established that the producer did not pay it to the purchaser and the latter is not taking due steps to collect it from the producer.
Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e Forestali v Consorzio Produttori Pompelmo Italiano Soc. Coop. arl. (COPPI).
Date: 2004-01-22
27. In order to provide a satisfactory answer to the national court which has referred a question to it, the Court of Justice may deem it necessary to consider provisions of Community law to which the national court has not referred in its question (Case C-315/88  Bagli Pennacchiotti  [1990] ECR I-1323, paragraph 10, and Case C-107/98  Teckal  [1999] ECR I-8121, paragraph 39).
28. In that regard, COPPI, the Italian Government and the Commission correctly maintain that the provisions which enable a satisfactory answer to be given to the question referred are not only Article 23 of Regulation No 4253/88, but also Article 24 thereof.
29. It follows from the preceding considerations that the national court is asking, in essence, by the question referred, whether the first subparagraph of Article 23(1) of Regulation No 4253/88 is to be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of an action programme financed by the EAGGF, a Member State which has granted financial assistance from the EAGGF can revoke that assistance and require partial repayment thereof from the final beneficiaries or whether Article 24 of that regulation precludes such measures.
Observations submitted to the Court
40. That principle is enshrined in the first subparagraph of Article 23(1) of Regulation No 4253/88, which provides that, in order to guarantee completion of operations carried out by public or private promoters, Member States are to take the necessary measures in implementing the operations to verify on a regular basis that operations financed by the Community have been properly carried out, to prevent and to take action against irregularities and to recover any amounts lost as a result of an irregularity or negligence.
47. Admittedly, it follows from the Court ' s case-law that the Commission also has power, under Article 24(2) of Regulation No 4253/88, to cancel assistance and to require the final recipients to repay that assistance (see, to that effect,  Conserve Italia  v  Commission , cited above, paragraph 88).  However, that fact cannot call in question the power, under the first subparagraph of Article 23(1) of that regulation, of a Member State in a situation such as that in this case, to adopt such measures.
48. In view of the preceding considerations, the answer to the question referred must be that the first subparagraph of Article 23(1) of Regulation No 4253/88 is to be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of an action programme financed by the EAGGF, where an examination reveals a breach of the conditions laid down for the implementation of a programme ' s operations, a Member State which has granted financial assistance from the EAGGF may, in order to prevent and to take action against irregularities, revoke that assistance and require partial repayment thereof from the final recipients.