SolarWorld AG v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2017-11-09
23


It should be noted, in the first place, that, where an appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the General Court, the points of law examined at first instance may be raised again in the course of an appeal. Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the General Court, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (judgment of 19 January 2017, Commission v Total and Elf Aquitaine, C‑351/15 P, EU:C:2017:27, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
25


In the second place, it should be pointed out that a possible error by the General Court in the assessment of the severability of a provision of an act of EU law is an error of law which is subject to review by the Court of Justice (for such a review, see, inter alia, judgment of 29 March 2012, Commission v Estonia, C‑505/09 P, EU:C:2012:179, paragraphs 110 to 122).
36


It is clear from the settled case-law of the Court of Justice that the partial annulment of an EU act is possible only if the elements whose annulment is sought may be severed from the remainder of the act. In that regard, the Court of Justice has repeatedly held that the requirement of severability is not satisfied in the case where the partial annulment of an act would have the effect of altering its substance (judgment of 12 November 2015, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, C‑121/14, EU:C:2015:749, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
37


Consequently, review of whether elements of an EU act are severable requires consideration of the scope of those elements in order to assess whether their annulment would alter the spirit and substance of the act (judgments of 29 March 2012, Commission v Estonia, C‑505/09 P, EU:C:2012:179, paragraph 112, and of 12 November 2015, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, C‑121/14, EU:C:2015:749, paragraph 21).
62


At the outset, it should be recalled that, in an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is, in principle, confined to a review of the findings of law on the pleas argued at first instance (judgment of 17 September 2015, Total v Commission, C‑597/13 P, EU:C:2015:613, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
65


In the first place, it should be recalled, in that regard, that that article is not intended to change the system of judicial review laid down by the Treaties, and particularly the rules relating to the admissibility of direct actions before the Courts of the European Union (judgments of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 97, and of 24 November 2016, Ackermann Saatzucht and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑408/15 P and C‑409/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:893, paragraph 49).
66


In the second place, the protection conferred by Article 47 of the Charter does not require an individual to be unconditionally entitled to bring an action for annulment of such an EU legislative act directly before the courts of the European Union (judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 105).
67


In the third place, it is settled case-law that judicial review of compliance with the European Union legal order is ensured, as can be seen from Article 19(1) TEU, by the Court of Justice and by the courts and tribunals of the Member States. To that end, the FEU Treaty has established, by Articles 263 and 277 TFEU, on the one hand, and Article 267 TFEU, on the other, a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of European Union acts, and has entrusted such review to the European Union judicature (judgments of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraphs 90 and 92, and of 19 December 2013, Telefónica v Commission, C‑274/12 P, EU:C:2013:852, paragraph 57).