GAEC Jeanningros v Institut national de l’origine et de la qualité (INAO) and Others.
Date: 2020-01-29
23


In assessing the impact of the Commission’s approval of such an amendment on the action seeking annulment of the decision made by the national authorities in respect of that amendment, which is pending before a national court, it should be borne in mind that Regulation No 1151/2012 establishes a division of powers between the Member State concerned and the Commission (see, by analogy, judgment of 6 December 2001, Carl Kühne and Others, C‑269/99, EU:C:2001:659, paragraph 50).
24


The Court has held that Council Regulation (EEC) No 2018/92 of 14 July 1992 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ 1992 L 208, p. 1) — which laid down a registration procedure corresponding, in essence, to the registration procedure set out in Articles 49 to 52 of Regulation No 1151/2012 — created a system of division of powers, in the sense that, in particular, the decision to register a name as a PDO could be made by the Commission only if the Member State concerned had submitted to it an application for that purpose, and that such an application could be made only if that Member State had checked that the application was justified. That system of division of powers is attributable particularly to the fact that registration assumes that it has been verified that a certain number of conditions have been met, which requires, to a large extent, detailed knowledge of matters particular to that Member State, which the competent authorities thereof are best placed to check (see, by analogy, judgments of 6 December 2001, Carl Kühne and Others, C‑269/99, EU:C:2001:659, paragraph 53, and of 2 July 2009, Bavaria and Bavaria Italia, C‑343/07, EU:C:2009:415, paragraph 66).
25


Furthermore, taking into account the decision-making power which thus belongs to national authorities under that system of division of powers, it is for national courts alone to rule on the lawfulness of measures adopted by those authorities — such as measures relating to the application to register a name — which constitute a necessary step in the procedure for adopting an EU act, since the EU institutions have, with regard to those measures, only limited, if any, discretion, whereas the measures adopted by those institutions — such as registration decisions — are subject to judicial review by the Court (see, by analogy, judgments of 6 December 2001, Carl Kühne and Others, C‑269/99, EU:C:2001:659, paragraphs 57 and 58, and of 2 July 2009, Bavaria and Bavaria Italia, C‑343/07, EU:C:2009:415, paragraphs 70 and 71).
26


It follows that it is for national courts to rule on any irregularity that may vitiate a national act, such as a measure relating to an application to register a name, making a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling where appropriate, on the same terms as those on which they review any definitive act adopted by the same national authority which is capable of adversely affecting third parties (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 December 1992, Oleificio Borelli v Commission, C‑97/91, EU:C:1992:491, paragraphs 11 to 13; of 6 December 2001, Carl Kühne and Others, C‑269/99, EU:C:2001:659, paragraph 58; and of 2 July 2009, Bavaria and Bavaria Italia, C‑343/07, EU:C:2009:415, paragraph 57).
27


The EU Courts do not in fact have jurisdiction, in actions brought under Article 263 TFEU, to rule on the lawfulness of measures adopted by national authorities. That position cannot be altered by the fact that the measure in question forms part of a Union decision-making procedure (see, by analogy, judgment of 3 December 1992, Oleificio Borelli v Commission, C‑97/91, EU:C:1992:491, paragraphs 9 and 10).
29


In that connection, as regards applications for amendments to a product specification for a PDO which are not minor, it has been noted in the aforementioned paragraph 21 that, by virtue of the reference made in the first subparagraph of Article 53(2) of Regulation No 1151/2012, those applications are subject to the same procedure as that applicable to the registration of a PDO.
32


It should be noted in that regard that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, under the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, it is for the courts of the Member States to ensure that a person’s rights enjoy judicial protection under EU law, Article 19(1) TEU, moreover, requiring Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law (judgments of 8 November 2016, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK, C‑243/15, EU:C:2016:838, paragraph 50, and of 26 July 2017, Sacko, C‑348/16, EU:C:2017:591, paragraph 29).
33


That requirement on the part of the Member States corresponds to the right to an effective remedy before an impartial tribunal enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, which is a reaffirmation of the principle of effective judicial protection (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 July 2017, Sacko, C‑348/16, EU:C:2017:591, paragraphs 30 and 31, and of 26 June 2019, Craeynest and Others, C‑723/17, EU:C:2019:533, paragraph 54) and is referred to, moreover, in connection with the registration procedure, in Article 49(4) of Regulation No 1151/2012.
36


It follows that the decision by which the Commission approves such an application for an amendment is based on the decision made by the authorities of the Member State concerned in respect of that application and, accordingly, is necessarily influenced by the latter decision, particularly since the discretion conferred on the Commission at the time of that approval is, in essence, as is clear from recital 58 of Regulation No 1151/2012, limited to checking that the application contains the information required and does not appear to be vitiated by manifest errors (see, by analogy, judgments of 6 December 2001, Carl Kühne and Others, C‑269/99, EU:C:2001:659, paragraph 54, and of 2 July 2009, Bavaria and Bavaria Italia, C‑343/07, EU:C:2009:415, paragraph 67).
39


Any possible annulment of such a decision taken by the national authorities would deprive the Commission’s decision of any basis and, consequently, entail a review of the case by the Commission (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 October 2017, Global Steel Wire and Others v Commission, C‑454/16 P to C‑456/16 P and C‑458/16 P, not published, EU:C:2017:818, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).