Bericap Záródástechnikai Bt. v Plastinnova 2000 Kft.
Date: 2012-11-15
53. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case‑law, Article 267 TFEU gives national courts the widest discretion in referring matters to the Court if they consider that a case pending before them raises questions involving the interpretation of provisions of European Union law, or consideration of their validity, which are necessary for the resolution of the case before them. National courts are, moreover, free to exercise that discretion at whatever stage of the proceedings they consider appropriate (see Case C‑173/09 Elchinov [2010] ECR I‑8889, paragraph 26 and the case‑law cited).
54. The Court has thus concluded that the existence of a national procedural rule cannot call into question the discretion of national courts not ruling at final instance to make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling where they have doubts, as in the main proceedings, as to the interpretation of European Union law ( Elchinov , paragraph 25, and Case C‑396/09 Interedil  [2011] ECR I‑9915, paragraph 35).
55. Furthermore, the Court has held that a court which is not ruling at final instance must be free, if it considers that a higher court’s legal ruling could lead it to give a judgment contrary to European Union law, to refer to the Court questions which concern it (see Elchinov , paragraph 27 and the case‑law cited).
58. According to settled case‑law, the Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra  [2001] ECR I‑2099, paragraph 39; Case C‑466/04 Acereda Herrera  [2006] ECR I‑5341, paragraph 48; and Joined Cases C‑94/04 and C‑202/04 Cipolla and Others  [2006] ECR I‑11421, paragraph 25).
63. In that regard, it is sufficient to state that the question whether a procedure for the invalidation of a utility model constitutes a procedure which is intended to ensure that intellectual property rights are enforced does not relate to the admissibility of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling but concerns the substance of those questions (see, by analogy Joined Cases C‑295/04 to C‑298/04 Manfredi and Others  [2006] ECR I‑6619, paragraph 30, and Case C‑467/08 Padawan  [2010] ECR I‑10055, paragraph 27). Consequently, such a submission cannot result in the rejection of the reference for a preliminary ruling at the stage of the assessment as to its admissibility.
67. In that regard, it must be pointed out at the outset that the Agreement establishing the WTO, of which the TRIPs Agreement forms part, has been signed by the European Union and subsequently approved by Decision 94/800. Therefore, according to settled case‑law, the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement now form an integral part of the European Union legal order and, within the framework of that legal order, the Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of that agreement (see Case C‑431/05 Merck Genéricos – Produtos Farmacêuticos  [2007] ECR I‑7001, paragraph 31 and the case‑law cited).
75. Thus, all the abovementioned provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, the Paris Convention and Directive 2004/48 (‘the relevant provisions’) are intended to govern only the aspects of intellectual property rights related to, first, the enforcement of those rights and, secondly, to infringement of them, by requiring that there must be effective legal remedies designed to prevent, terminate or rectify any infringement of an existing intellectual property right.
76. In that regard, as is apparent from Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, a procedure which is intended to ensure the enforcement of an intellectual property right presupposes that that right has been lawfully acquired (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑154/04 and C‑155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and Others  [2005] ECR I‑6451, paragraph 128).
77. If follows, as is moreover also apparent from Article 2(1) of Directive 2004/48, that the relevant provisions simply ensure the enforcement of the various rights enjoyed by persons who have acquired intellectual property rights, namely the proprietors of such rights, and cannot be interpreted as being intended to govern the various measures and procedures available to persons who, like the applicant in the main proceedings, without themselves being the proprietors of such rights, dispute the intellectual property rights acquired by others.