larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Wucher Helicopter GmbH and Euro-Aviation Versicherungs AG v Fridolin Santer.
Date: 2015-02-26
24. It should be noted at the outset that it is settled case-law that exceptions are to be interpreted strictly so that general rules are not negated (see judgment in Commission v United Kingdom , C‑346/08, EU:C:2010:213, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
33. It is common ground in that regard that the Montreal Convention forms an integral part of the European Union legal order and that the Court has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling concerning its interpretation (see judgments in IATA and ELFAA , C‑344/04, EU:C:2006:10, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited and paragraph 40, and Walz , C‑63/09, EU:C:2010:251, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
Christie’s France SNC v Syndicat national des antiquaires.
Date: 2015-02-26
15. In the first place, the Court recalls that one of the objectives in adopting Directive 2001/84 was, as is clear from recitals 3 and 4 thereto, to ensure that authors of graphic and plastic works of art share in the economic success of their original works of art (see, to that effect, judgment in Fundación Gala-Salvador Dalí and VEGAP , C‑518/08, EU:C:2010:191, paragraph 27).
18. In that respect, the Court observes that, since Directive 2001/84 requires the Member States to provide for a resale royalty, those States must be considered responsible for ensuring that such a royalty is actually paid, if the relevant provisions of the directive are not to be deprived of all practical effect (see, by analogy, judgment in Stichting de Thuiskopie , C‑462/09, EU:C:2011:397, paragraph 34).
26. The need for a uniform interpretation of a provision of EU law means that, where there is divergence between the various language versions of the provision, the latter must be interpreted by reference to the context and purpose of the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, DR and TV2 Danmark , C‑510/10, EU:C:2012:244, paragraph 45, and Bark , C‑89/12, EU:C:2013:276, paragraph 40).
29. In particular, it is apparent from those recitals that there is no need to eliminate differences between national laws which cannot be expected to affect the functioning of the internal market and that, in order to leave as much scope for national decision as possible, it is sufficient to limit the harmonisation exercise to those domestic provisions that have the most direct impact on the functioning of the internal market (see, to that effect, Fundación Gala-Salvador Dalí and VEGAP , EU:C:2010:191, paragraphs 27 and 31).
ŠKO–Energo s. r. o. v Odvolací finanční ředitelství.
Date: 2015-02-26
18. As is apparent from its wording — according to which, during the period at issue, Member States are to allocate at least 90% of the emission allowances free of charge — Article 10 of Directive 2003/87 precludes charges imposed in respect of the allocation of allowances themselves (judgment in Iberdrola and Others , C‑566/11, C‑567/11, C‑580/11, C‑591/11, C‑620/11 and C‑640/11, EU:C:2013:660, paragraph 27).
19. However, the Court stated that neither Article 10 of Directive 2003/87 nor any other provision of the directive concerns the use of those emission allowances or expressly restricts the right of Member States to adopt measures which may affect the economic implications of using such allowances (judgment in Iberdrola and Others , EU:C:2013:660, paragraph 28).
20. Consequently, Member States are free, as a rule, to adopt economic policy measures, such as price controls on the markets for certain essential goods or resources, determining the manner in which the value of the emission allowances allocated free of charge to producers is to be passed on to consumers (judgment in Iberdrola and Others , EU:C:2013:660, paragraph 29).
21. Nevertheless, the adoption of such measures must not neutralise the principle that emission allowances are allocated free of charge; nor may it undermine the objectives pursued by Directive 2003/87 (judgment in Iberdrola and Others , EU:C:2013:660, paragraph 30).
22. In this regard, the allocation ‘free of charge’ under Article 10 of Directive 2003/87 precludes not only the direct fixing of a price for the allocation of emission allowances but also the subsequent levying of a charge in respect of their allocation (judgment in Iberdrola and Others , EU:C:2013:660, paragraph 31).
25. Furthermore, such a measure, which, as indicated in the decision to refer, was intended to obtain additional revenue for operators of photovoltaic power stations, pursues objectives different from those of Directive 2003/87. Consequently, it cannot be regarded as a more stringent protective measure for the purposes of Article 193 TFEU (see, by analogy, the judgments in Deponiezweckverband Eiterköpfe , C‑6/03, EU:C:2005:222, paragraphs 49 and 52, and Azienda Agro-Zootecnica Franchini and Eolica di Altamura , C‑2/10, EU:C:2011:502, paragraph 50).
28. It should also be observed that the interpretation advocated by the Czech Government would be contrary to the objective of Article 10 of Directive 2003/87 of temporarily reducing the economic impact of the introduction by the European Union of a greenhouse gas emission allowances market by preventing a loss of competitiveness in certain production sectors covered by that directive (judgment in Iberdrola and Others , EU:C:2013:660, paragraph 39). With a view to compliance with the principle of equality, such an objective implies that the limitation to 10% of the number of allowances which may be allocated for consideration should be assessed from the point of view of operators in each of the sectors concerned and not in relation to all the allowances allocated by the Member State.
Ministero delle Politiche Agricole, Alimentari e Forestali v Federazione Italiana Consorzi Agrari Soc.coop.arl - Federconsorzi in concordato preventivo and Liquidazione Giudiziale dei Beni Ceduti ai Creditori della Federazione Italiana Consorzi Agrari Soc. coop. arl - Federconsorzi.
Date: 2015-02-26
32. Furthermore, modifications to the disadvantage of a creditor of the State, made by a legislative act adopted during the period prescribed for transposition of Directive 2011/7, of the interest on a debt arising from the performance of a contract concluded before 16 March 2013 may not in any event be regarded as being capable of seriously compromising the attainment of the objective pursued by that directive (see judgment in Inter-Environnement Wallonie , C‑129/96, EU:C:1997:628, paragraph 45), as Article 12(4) of that directive gives Member States the option of excluding contracts concluded before that date, and the Member State concerned could therefore consider exercising that option.
Modelo Continente Hipermercados SA v Autoridade Para As Condições de Trabalho - Centro Local do Lis (ACT).
Date: 2015-03-05
19. Finally, as the Advocate General observed in point 34 of his Opinion, the fourth question appears to relate to an interpretation of principles of Portuguese law and lacks any reference to EU law. It should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU is based on a clear separation of functions between the courts and tribunals of the Member States and the Court of Justice. The Court is empowered to rule only on the interpretation or the validity of the acts of EU law referred to in Article 267 TFEU. In that context, it is not for the Court to rule on the interpretation of provisions of national law or to decide whether the referring court’s interpretation of them is correct (see judgment in Texdata Software , C‑418/11, EU:C:2013:588, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
27. However, in accordance with settled case-law, the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, which must take into account the context of that provision and the purpose of the legislation in question (see, inter alia, judgments in Fish Legal and Shirley , C‑279/12, EU:C:2013:853, paragraph 42, and Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds , C‑201/13, EU:C:2014:2132, paragraph 14).
European Commission v French Republic.
Date: 2015-03-05
25. In that regard, it should be noted that Article 96 of the VAT Directive provides that the same rate of VAT, namely, the standard rate, is applicable to supplies of goods and services. As an exception to that principle, Article 98(1) of the VAT Directive gives the Member States the option of applying either one or two reduced rates of VAT. In accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 98(2), the reduced rates of VAT can apply only to supplies of goods and services in the categories set out in Annex III to the VAT Directive (judgment in K , C‑219/13, EU:C:2014:2207, paragraphs 21 and 22).
26. As regards the argument raised by the French Republic and the Kingdom of Belgium that the supply of electronic books is covered by point 6 of Annex III to the VAT Directive, it should be borne in mind that, in determining the scope of a provision of EU law, its wording, context and objectives must all be taken into account (see, inter alia, judgment in NCC Construction Danmark , C‑174/08, EU:C:2009:669, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
30. That interpretation is supported by the context of that provision. That provision is an exception to the principle that Member States are to apply a standard rate of VAT to transactions subject to VAT and must therefore be interpreted strictly (see, inter alia, judgment in Commission v Spain , C‑360/11, EU:C:2013:17, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
32. Similarly, as the French Republic rightly argued, by drawing up Annex III to Directive 2006/112, the EU legislature intended that essential commodities and goods and services having social or cultural objectives may be subject to a reduced rate of VAT, provided that those goods or services pose no or little risk of distortion to competition (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission v Netherlands , C‑41/09, EU:C:2011:108, paragraph 52).
42. Contrary to what the French Republic and the Kingdom of Belgium argue, that interpretation is not undermined by the principle of fiscal neutrality, which was intended by the EU legislature to reflect, in matters relating to VAT, the general principle of equal treatment (judgment in NCC Construction Danmark , EU:C:2009:669, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
43. The principle of fiscal neutrality cannot extend the scope of reduced rates of VAT to the supply of electronic books (see, to that effect, judgment in Zimmermann , C‑174/11, EU:C:2012:716, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). Point 6 of Annex III to the VAT Directive is not a provision which, unequivocally, extends the scope of reduced rates of VAT to the supply of electronic books. On the contrary, as is clear from paragraph 49 above, such a supply is not covered by that provision.
Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH v AOK Sachsen-Anhalt – Die Gesundheitskasse and Betriebskrankenkasse RWE.
Date: 2015-03-05
37. For the purposes of answering that question, it should be recalled that, as is apparent from Article 6(1) of Directive 85/374, a product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all the circumstances into account, including the presentation of the product, the use to which it could reasonably be expected that it would be put and the time when the product was put into circulation. Moreover, according to the sixth recital in the preamble to that directive, that assessment must be carried out having regard to the reasonable expectations of the public at large.
39. With regard to medical devices such as the pacemakers and implantable cardioverter defibrillators at issue in the main proceedings, it is clear that, in the light of their function and the particularly vulnerable situation of patients using such devices, the safety requirements for those devices which such patients are entitled to expect are particularly high.
42. Moreover, such an interpretation is consistent with the objectives pursued by the EU legislature, seeking to ensure, in particular, as is apparent from the second and seventh recitals in the preamble to Directive 85/374, a fair apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological production between the injured person and the producer.
46. It is apparent from the Court’s case-law that full and proper compensation for persons injured by a defective product must be available for the kind of damage referred to in the preceding paragraph (see judgment in Veedfald , C‑203/99, EU:C:2001:258, paragraph 27).
47. As observed by the Advocate General at points 61 to 63 of his Opinion, the notion of ‘damage caused by death or personal injuries’ within the meaning of section (a) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of Directive 85/374 must, having regard to the objective of protecting consumer health and safety pursued by that directive in accordance with the first and sixth recitals in the preamble thereto, be given a broad interpretation.
Jean-Bernard Lafonta v Autorité des marchés financiers.
Date: 2015-03-11
21. The first point to note is that, according to recitals 2 and 12 to Directive 2003/6, the purpose of that directive is to protect the integrity of the EU financial markets and to enhance investor confidence in those markets. That confidence depends on, inter alia, investors being placed on an equal footing and protected against the improper use of insider information (see, to that effect, judgments in Spector Photo Group and Van Raemdonck , C‑45/08, EU:C:2009:806, paragraph 47; IMC Securities , C‑445/09, EU:C:2011:459, paragraph 27; and Geltl , C‑19/11, EU:C:2012:397, paragraph 33).
24. Thus, the definition of ‘inside information’ under that provision comprises four essential elements: (i) the information must be of a precise nature; (ii) the information must not have been made public; (iii) it must relate, directly or indirectly, to one or more financial instruments or their issuers; and (iv) it must be information which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on the price of related derivative financial instruments. (see, to that effect, judgment in Geltl , EU:C:2012:397, paragraph 25).
25. The Court has pointed out that, owing to its non-public and precise nature and its ability to influence significantly the prices of the financial instruments concerned, inside information grants the insider in possession of such information an advantage in relation to all the other actors on the market, who are unaware of it (see judgment in Spector Photo Group and Van Raemdonck , EU:C:2009:806, paragraph 52).
28. The Court has held that those two elements, essential to the definition of ‘inside information’ and defined more closely in Article 1 of Directive 2003/124, are mutually independent and constitute minimum conditions, each of which must be met if information is to be regarded as ‘inside’ information for the purposes of point (1) of Article 1 of Directive 2003/6 (see, to that effect, judgment in Geltl , EU:C:2012:397, paragraphs 52 and 53).
E.ON Földgáz Trade Zrt v Magyar Energetikai és Közmű-szabályozási Hivatal.
Date: 2015-03-19
46. Concerning, next, the objective pursued by Regulation No 1775/2005, as referred to in paragraph 41 of the present judgment, the principles set out in Article 5 of that regulation, read in conjunction with the Annex thereto, must be interpreted as constituting protective measures adopted in the interests of users wishing to gain access to the network and therefore capable of conferring rights on them (see, by analogy, judgment in Tele2 Telecommunication , C‑426/05, EU:C:2008:103, paragraph 34).
49. In accordance with settled case-law, when there are no EU rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of every Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law, but the Member States are, however, responsible for ensuring that those rights are effectively protected in every case (judgment in Mono Car Styling , C‑12/08, EU:C:2009:466, paragraph 48 and case-law cited).
50. Thus, whilst it is, in principle, for national law to determine an individual’s standing and legal interest in bringing proceedings, EU law nevertheless requires, in addition to observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, that the national legislation should not undermine the right to effective judicial protection, as provided for in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) (see, to that effect, judgment in Mono Car Styling , C‑12/08, EU:C:2009:466, paragraph 49 and case-law cited).
C More Entertainment AB v Linus Sandberg.
Date: 2015-03-26
24. Firstly, as follows from the wording of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, and in particular from the terms ‘any communication to the public of their works, … including the making available to the public’, the concept of ‘making available to the public’, also used in Article 3(2) of that directive, forms part of the wider ‘communication to the public’.
25. Secondly, it is apparent from Article 3(2) of that directive that, in order to be classified as an act of ‘making available to the public’ within the meaning of that article, an act must meet, cumulatively, both conditions set out in that provision, namely that members of the public may access the protected work from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.
26. As is clear from the explanatory memorandum to the Commission Proposal of 10 December 1997 (COM(97) 628), which led to the adoption of Directive 2001/29, confirmed by recital 25 in the preamble to that directive, ‘making available to the public’, for the purposes of Article 3 of the directive, is intended to refer to ‘interactive on-demand transmissions’ characterised by the fact that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them (see, to that effect, judgment in SCF , C‑135/10, EU:C:2012:140, paragraph 59).
32. Furthermore, in accordance with recital 20 in the preamble to Directive 2001/29, that directive is based on principles and rules already laid down in the directives in force in the area of intellectual property, including Directive 92/100 (see judgment in Football Association Premier League and Others , C‑403/08 and C‑429/08, EU:C:2011:631, paragraph 187).
"Litaksa" UAB v "BTA Insurance Company" SE.
Date: 2015-03-26
23. According to the settled case-law of the Court, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objects of the rules of which it is part (judgments in Csonka and Others , C‑409/11, EU:C:2013:512, paragraph 23, and Vnuk , C‑162/13, EU:C:2014:2146, paragraph 42).
25. With that system, the EU legislature imposed on each Member State the obligation to ensure, subject to clearly defined exceptions, that every owner or keeper of a vehicle normally based in its territory takes out a policy with an insurance company for the purpose of covering, at least up to the limits established by EU law, his civil liability arising as a result of that vehicle (judgment in Csonka and Others , C‑409/11, EU:C:2013:512, paragraph 28).
28. Furthermore, it should be recalled that the essentials of an insurance transaction are, as generally understood, that the insurer undertakes, in return for prior payment of a premium, to provide the insured, in the event of materialisation of the risk covered, with the service agreed when the contract was concluded (judgments in CPP , C‑349/96, EU:C:1999:93, paragraph 17, and Skandia , C‑240/99, EU:C:2001:140, paragraph 37).
Lourdes Cachaldora Fernández v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS) and Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social (TGSS).
Date: 2015-04-14
25. In that regard, whilst it is established that EU law respects the power of the Member States to organise their social security systems and that, in the absence of harmonisation at EU level, it is for the legislation of each Member State to determine the conditions for the grant of social security benefits, the fact nevertheless remains that, when exercising that power, Member States must comply with EU law (see, to that effect, judgments in Watts , C‑372/04, EU:C:2006:325, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited, and Somova , C‑103/13, EU:C:2014:2334, paragraphs 33 to 35 and the case-law cited).
28. As regards the question whether legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings constitutes indirect discrimination, as the referring court suggests, it is apparent from the settled case-law of the Court that indirect discrimination arises where a national measure, albeit formulated in neutral terms, works to the disadvantage of far more women than men (see, in particular, judgments in Brachner , C‑123/10, EU:C:2011:675, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited, and Elbal Moreno , C‑385/11, EU:C:2012:746, paragraph 29).
30. In that regard, it should be noted that, as is apparent from the order for reference, the national provision at issue is not applicable to all part-time workers, but only to workers who have had a gap in their contributions during the reference period of eight years preceding the date of the event giving rise to the invalidity, when that gap follows a period of part-time work. Accordingly, general statistical data concerning the group of part-time workers, taken as a whole, are not relevant to establish that many more women than men are affected by that provision.
36. In that regard, it must be pointed out that it is clear from its preamble that the Framework Agreement relates to the ‘employment conditions of part-time workers, recognising that matters concerning statutory social security are for decision by the Member States’.
37. Furthermore, as is apparent from the case-law of the Court, the term ‘employment conditions’, within the meaning of the Framework Agreement, covers pensions which depend on an employment relationship between the worker and the employer, excluding statutory social security pensions, which are determined less by that relationship than by considerations of social policy (judgment in Elbal Moreno , C‑385/11, EU:C:2012:746, paragraph 21).