larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
„Polihim-SS" EOOD v Mitnitsa – Svishtov.
Date: 2016-06-02
45


According to the settled case-law of the Court, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objects of the rules of which it is part (judgment of 26 March 2015 in Litaksa, C‑556/13, EU:C:2015:202, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
53


Thirdly, it must be noted, as regards the context of Directive 2008/118, that Article 7(2)(a) thereof refers, in particular to the possibility of an irregular departure of excise goods from a duty suspension arrangement. Since the expression ‘irregular departure’ cannot be understood other than as meaning the physical removal of goods from such an arrangement, the use of that expression in that provision confirms the reading that the release for consumption, within the meaning thereof, takes place at the time of the physical removal of excise goods from a duty suspension arrangement.
55


It follows from the foregoing considerations that Article 7(2) of Directive 2008/118 must be interpreted as meaning that the sale of excise goods held by an authorised warehousekeeper in a tax warehouse does not bring about their release for consumption until the time at which those goods are physically removed from that tax warehouse.
57


In that regard, it must be noted that Directive 2003/96 does not govern how proof of use of energy products for purposes giving rise to a right to exemption is to be adduced. On the contrary, as is clear from Article 14(1) of that directive, it gives the Member States the responsibility for laying down the conditions referred to in that provision, in order to ensure the correct and straightforward application of such exemptions and to prevent any evasion, avoidance or abuse.
59


The fact remains that the Member States, when exercising their power to lay down the conditions to which exemption from excise duty provided for in Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/96 is subject, must comply with the general principles of law which form part of the legal order of the European Union, including, inter alia, the principle of proportionality (see, by analogy, judgment of 9 October 2014 in Traum, C‑492/13, EU:C:2014:2267, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
62


In those circumstances, the refusal by the national authorities, in a case such as that of the main proceedings, to exempt heavy fuel oils from excise duty on the sole ground that the person declared by the authorised warehousekeeper as being their consignee does not have the status of end-user authorised under national law to receive energy products exempt from excise duty, without it being checked, on the basis of the evidence provided, whether the basic requirements necessary for those heavy fuel oils to be used for purposes giving entitlement to exemption are met at the time of their removal from the tax warehouse, goes beyond what is necessary to ensure the correct and straightforward application of those exemptions and to prevent any evasion, avoidance or abuse (see, by analogy, judgment of 27 September 2007 in Collée, C‑146/05, EU:C:2007:549, point 29).
Photo USA Electronic Graphic, Inc. v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2016-06-02
It follows that the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to establish the facts or, in principle, to examine the evidence
         which the General Court accepted in support of those facts. Provided that that evidence has been properly obtained and the
         general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been
         observed, it is for the General Court alone to assess the value to be attached to the evidence produced before it. Save where
         the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, that appraisal does not therefore constitute a point of law which is subject
         as such to review by the Court of Justice (judgment of 11 September 2014 in Gem-Year Industrial and Jinn-Well Auto-Parts (Zhejiang) v Council, C‑602/12 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2203, paragraph 37).
Such distortion must, nonetheless, be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry
         out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (judgment of 11 September 2014 in Gem-Year Industrial and Jinn-Well Auto-Parts (Zhejiang) v Council, C‑602/12 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2203, paragraph 38).
Furthermore, it is settled case-law that the determination of injury caused to the EU industry requires an appraisal of complex
         economic situations and judicial review of such an appraisal must therefore be limited to verifying whether relevant procedural
         rules have been complied with, whether the facts relied on have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest
         error in the appraisal of those facts or a misuse of powers. That is particularly the case as regards the determination of
         the factors injuring the EU industry in an anti-dumping investigation (judgment of 10 September 2015 in Bricmate, C‑569/13, EU:C:2015:572, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
The Court has previously held that it is for the parties pleading the illegality of a regulation such as the regulation at
         issue to adduce evidence to show the impact of factors capable of having an effect on the injury caused to the EU industry.
         Such parties must show in particular that those factors could have had such an impact that the claim alleging injury to the
         EU industry and a causal link between that injury and the dumped imports could not be relied on (see, to that effect, judgment
         of 19 December 2013 in Transnational Company ‘Kazchrome’ and ENRC Marketing v Council, C‑10/12 P, not published, EU:C:2013:865, paragraph 28).
George Karim v Migrationsverket.
Date: 2016-06-07
17


It follows that, in a situation in which a third-country national, having made a first asylum application in a Member State, left the territory of the Member States for a period of at least three months before making a new asylum application in another Member State, Article 19(2) of Regulation No 604/2013 requires the Member State in which the new asylum application has been made to complete, on the basis of the rules laid down in that regulation, the process for determining the Member State responsible for examining that new application.
22


In that regard, it must be stated that it is clear from paragraphs 30 to 61 of the judgment of 7 June 2016 in Ghezelbash (C‑63/15) that Article 27(1) of Regulation No 604/2013, read in the light of recital 19 thereof, provides an asylum applicant with an effective remedy against a transfer decision made in respect of him, which may, inter alia, concern the examination of the application of that regulation and which may therefore result in a Member State’s responsibility being called into question, even where there are no systemic deficiencies in the asylum process or in the reception conditions for asylum applicants in that Member State, resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
23


Furthermore, although the application of Regulation No 604/2013 is based essentially on that process that is conducted to establish the Member State responsible, designated on the basis of the criteria set out in Chapter III of that regulation (judgment of 7 June 2016 in Ghezelbash, C‑63/15, paragraph 41), it must be stated that the rule set out in the second subparagraph of Article 19(2) of that regulation establishes the framework within which that process must be conducted when the third-country national in question, after having made a first asylum application in a Member State, left the territory of the Member States for a period of at least three months before making a new asylum application in another Member State.
26


Consequently, in order to satisfy itself that the contested transfer decision was adopted following a proper application of the process for determining the Member State responsible laid down in that regulation, the court dealing with an action challenging a transfer decision must be able to examine the claims made by an asylum applicant who invokes an infringement of the rule set out in the second subparagraph of Article 19(2) of that regulation.
27


In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 27(1) of Regulation No 604/2013, read in the light of recital 19 thereof, must be interpreted to the effect that, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, an asylum applicant may, in an action challenging a transfer decision made in respect of him, invoke an infringement of the rule set out in the second subparagraph of Article 19(2) of that regulation.
Proceedings brought by István Balogh.
Date: 2016-06-09
28


As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that the Court has consistently held that it may, with a view to providing the court which has referred a question to it with an answer which will be of use to it, find it necessary to consider provisions of EU law which the national court has not referred to in its questions. Furthermore, where necessary, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (see, inter alia, judgments of 13 March 2014 in SICES and Others, C‑155/13, EU:C:2014:145, paragraph 23, and 11 February 2015 in Marktgemeinde Straßwalchen and Others, C‑531/13, EU:C:2015:79, paragraph 37).
35


In order to answer that question, it should be noted that the Court has consistently held that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, judgment of 21 May 2015 in Rosselle, C‑65/14, EU:C:2015:339, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
53


A procedure for the recognition of decisions imposing convictions handed down by the courts of other Member States, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, prior to the entry of those convictions in the criminal record, which, moreover, requires the transmission and translation of those decisions, is likely to delay considerably that entry, complicate the exchange of information between Member States, deprive the automatic translation system established by Decision 2009/316 of any effectiveness and jeopardise the attainment of the objectives pursued by Framework Decision 2009/315 and Decision 2009/316.
54


In addition, and more generally, such a procedure conflicts with the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions in criminal matters laid down in Article 82(1) TFEU, which replaced Article 31 EU, on which Framework Decision 2009/315 and Decision 2009/316 are based. That principle precludes the recognition by a Member State of the decisions handed down by the courts of another Member State being conditional on the application, in the first of those Member States, of a judicial procedure for that purpose, such as the special procedure at issue in the main proceedings.
55


It follows from all the foregoing that Framework Decision 2009/315 and Decision 2009/316 preclude the implementation of national legislation establishing a special procedure for the recognition of a decision handed down by the court of another Member State, such as the procedure at issue in the main proceedings.
Medical Imaging Systems GmbH (MIS) v Hauptzollamt München.
Date: 2016-06-09
22


In that regard, it is necessary, first, to note the settled case-law, in accordance with which, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (judgment of 18 May 2011 in Delphi Deutschland, C‑423/10, EU:C:2011:315, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
23


The explanatory notes drawn up by the Commission as regards the CN and by the World Customs Organisation as regards the HS are an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force (judgment of 18 May 2011 in Delphi Deutschland, C‑423/10, EU:C:2011:315, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
24


Moreover, according to equally settled case-law, the intended use of a product may also constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (judgments of 20 June 2013 in Agroferm, C‑568/11, EU:C:2013:407, paragraph 41, and of 4 March 2015 in Oliver Medical, C‑547/13, EU:C:2015:139, paragraph 47). In addition, the intended use of a product is a relevant criterion only where the classification cannot be made on the sole basis of the objective characteristics and properties of the product (judgments of 16 December 2010 in Skoma-Lux, C‑339/09, EU:C:2010:781, paragraph 47, and of 28 April 2016, in Oniors Bio, C‑233/15, EU:C:2016:305, paragraph 33).
29


If such a situation occurs, it is necessary to apply general rule 3(a) for the interpretation of the CN, according to which ‘the heading which provides the most specific description shall be preferred to headings providing a more general description’. It is only where the application of that rule does not allow an appropriate classification of certain goods, in particular where there is no specific tariff heading for the classification of those goods (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 May 2001 in VauDe Sport, C‑288/99, EU:C:2001:262, paragraph 21, and of 15 November 2012 in Kurcums Metal, C‑558/11, EU:C:2012:721, paragraph 36), that it is necessary to apply general rule 3(b) for the interpretation of the CN and to classify such goods ‘as if they consisted of the material or component which gives them their essential character’.
30


As is apparent from paragraph 26 of the present judgment, there is a specific heading for the classification of goods such as those at issue in the main proceedings, in this case heading 6211 of the CN, which includes subheading 6211 33 10 00 0 thereof.
María Pilar Planes Bresco v Comunidad Autónoma de Aragón.
Date: 2016-06-09
33


Consequently, as the Advocate General stated in point 25 of her Opinion, in order for areas declared by a farmer with a view to obtaining area aid to be eligible within the meaning of Article 44(2), they must satisfy three conditions, that is to say, first, they must be an agricultural area, secondly, they must be part of the farmer’s agricultural holding, and thirdly, they must not be taken up by permanent crops or forests, or be used for non-agricultural activities (see judgment of 2 July 2015 in Demmer, C‑684/13, EU:C:2015:439, paragraph 54).
35


It follows from those provisions that classification as ‘permanent pasture’, and consequently, as an ‘agricultural area’, depends on the actual use of the land in question, and that an area must be classified as ‘agricultural’ where, inter alia, it is used as permanent pasture (judgment of 14 October 2010 in Landkreis Bad Dürkheim, C‑61/09, EU:C:2010:606, paragraph 37).
37


The Court has already held in that regard that agricultural areas are allocated to a farmer’s holding where the farmer has the power to manage those areas for the purposes of an agricultural activity, that is to say, where the farmer enjoys a degree of autonomy with regard to those areas sufficient for the carrying-out of his agricultural activity (see judgments of 14 October 2010 in Landkreis Bad Dürkheim, C‑61/09, EU:C:2010:606, paragraphs 58 and 62; of 2 July 2015 in Wree, C‑422/13, EU:C:2015:438, paragraph 44; and in Demmer, C‑684/13, EU:C:2015:439, paragraph 58).
46


In that regard, the Court has already held that environmental protection, one of the essential objectives of the European Union, must be regarded as forming part of the common agricultural policy (judgment of 16 July 2009 in Horvath, C‑428/07, EU:C:2009:458, paragraph 29) and, more specifically, that it forms part of the objectives of the single payment scheme (judgment of 14 October 2010 in Landkreis Bad Dürkheim, C‑61/09, EU:C:2010:606, paragraph 39), as is clear from recitals 3, 21 and 24 of Regulation No 1782/2003.
47


Secondly, Regulation No 1782/2003, as is clear from recital 24, aims to replace the previous system of direct production aid with a system of direct aid for agricultural holdings, decoupled from production and paid directly to the farmers to supplement their income (see judgment of 5 February 2015 in Agrooikosystimata, C‑498/13, EU:C:2015:61, paragraph 40).
Saint Louis Sucre, formerly Saint Louis Sucre SA, formerly Saint Louis Sucre SNC v Directeur général des douanes et droits indirects.
Date: 2016-06-16
34


It must be borne in mind in that regard that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 11 November 2015 in Pujante Rivera, C‑422/14, EU:C:2015:743, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
45


Moreover, as the Advocate General observed, in point 77 of her Opinion, the fact of continuing to refer to a ‘foreseeable’ overall loss, even after the adjustment provided for in Article 15(2) and (3) of Regulation No 1260/2001, so far as concerns the 2001/2002 to 2005/2006 marketing years, implies that the loss may not yet have been incurred in its entirety. The Court has also held that the method for calculating the estimated total loss is designed, in any event, to establish, in a forward looking and conventional way, the losses caused by disposing of surplus Community production (judgment of 8 May 2008 in Zuckerfabrik Jülich and Others, C‑5/06 and C‑23/06 to C‑36/06, EU:C:2008:260, paragraph 43).
52


In those circumstances, given the fact that the European Union legislature enjoys a wide discretionary power in matters concerning agriculture corresponding to the political responsibilities given to it by Articles 40 to 43 TFEU and that, consequently, judicial review must be limited to verifying that the measure in question is not vitiated by any manifest error or misuse of powers and that the authority concerned has not manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretionary power (judgment of 14 March 2013 in Agrargenossenschaft Neuzelle, C‑545/11, EU:C:2013:169, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited), it does not appear that the Council committed a manifest error, a misuse of power or exceeded the limits of its discretionary power by providing that, as regards the 2005/2006 marketing year, the exportable surplus existing at the end of that year would be taken into consideration, which necessarily included the quantities of sugar held in stock at the end of that year.
Kreissparkasse Wiedenbrück v Finanzamt Wiedenbrück.
Date: 2016-06-16
30


That being the case, Article 175(1) of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted by taking account of the context of that provision and the objectives pursued by that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 April 2016 in Marchon Germany, C‑315/14, EU:C:2016:211, paragraph 29).
35


In that regard, it is common ground that the reason why Member States have the possibility under Article 173(2) of Directive 2006/112 to derogate from the method set out in Article 173(1) of that directive of calculating the deductible proportion is to enable them to achieve, with regard to, inter alia, the specific characteristics of the taxable person’s activities, greater accuracy in determining the extent of the right to deduct (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2014 in Banco Mais, C‑183/13, EU:C:2014:2056, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
47


Reading those two provisions together indicates that, on the one hand, where an adjustment proves to be necessary because of the change in one of the factors used to determine the amount to be deducted, the amount of that adjustment must be calculated in such a way that the final amount to be deducted corresponds to that to which the taxable person would have been entitled if that change had been initially taken into account. On the other hand, the calculation of that amount entails taking into account the same factors as those initially taken into consideration, with the exception of the factor that has been changed.
48


The rounding-up rule laid down in Article 175(1) of Directive 2006/112 constitutes a factor taken into consideration in order to determine the initial amount to be deducted (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 2016 in Wolfgang und Wilfried Rey Grundstücksgemeinschaft, C‑332/14, EU:C:2016:417, paragraph 46).
Odvolací finanční ředitelství v Český rozhlas.
Date: 2016-06-22
20


In that regard, it must be recalled that, within the framework of the VAT system, taxable transactions presuppose the existence of a transaction between the parties in which a price or consideration is stipulated. Thus, where a person’s activity consists exclusively of providing services for no direct consideration, there is no basis of assessment and the services are therefore not subject to VAT (see judgments of 3 March 1994 in Tolsma, C‑16/93, EU:C:1994:80, paragraph 12; 29 October 2009 in Commission v Finland, C‑246/08, EU:C:2009:671, paragraph 43; and 27 October 2011 in GFKL Financial Services, C‑93/10, EU:C:2011:700, paragraph 17).
21


It follows from this that a supply of services is effected ‘for consideration’ within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the Sixth VAT Directive, and hence is taxable, only if there is a legal relationship between the provider of the service and the recipient, pursuant to which there is reciprocal performance, the remuneration received by the provider of the service constituting the value actually given in return for the service supplied to the recipient (see judgments of 3 March 1994 in Tolsma, C‑16/93, EU:C:1994:80, paragraph 14; 29 October 2009 in Commission v Finland, C‑246/08, EU:C:2009:671, paragraph 44; and 27 October 2011 in GFKL Financial Services, C‑93/10, EU:C:2011:700, paragraph 18).
22


In that context, the Court has repeatedly held that the notion of the ‘supply of services effected for consideration’, within the meaning of Article 2(1), requires the existence of a direct link between the service provided and the consideration received (see judgments of 5 February 1981 in Coöperatieve Aardappelenbewaarplaats, 154/80, EU:C:1981:38, paragraph 12; 8 March 1988 in Apple and Pear Development Council, 102/86, EU:C:1988:120, paragraph 12; 3 March 1994 in Tolsma, C‑16/93, EU:C:1994:80, paragraph 13; 29 October 2009 in Commission v Finland, C‑246/08, EU:C:2009:671, paragraph 45; and 27 October 2011 in GFKL Financial Services, C‑93/10, EU:C:2011:700, paragraph 19).
Nissan Jidosha KK v European Union Intellectual Property Office.
Date: 2016-06-22
43


It must be pointed out that, in accordance with settled case-law, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all EU languages. Where there is a divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and the purpose of the rules of which it forms part (see judgment of 9 April 2014 in GSV, C‑74/13, EU:C:2014:243, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).