Unione Nazionale Industria Conciaria (UNIC) and Unione Nazionale dei Consumatori di Prodotti in Pelle, Materie Concianti, Accessori e Componenti (Uni.co.pel) v FS Retail and Others.
Date: 2015-07-16
21. The referring court considers, first of all, referring to the judgment in Eggers  (13/78, EU:C:1978:182, paragraph 25), that the provisions in question of Law No 8/2013 may constitute measures whose effect is equivalent to quantitative restrictions contrary to EU law, since a presumption of quality which is linked to a requirement that the whole or part of the production process should take place on national territory, thereby restricting or treating unfavourably a process some or all of the phases whereof are carried out in other Member States, is incompatible with the single market.
29. In that respect, it must be noted that a technical regulation cannot be applied if it has not been notified in accordance with Article 8(1) of Directive 98/34, or if, though notified, it has been adopted and implemented before the end of the three month standstill period required under Article 9(1) of that directive (see judgments in CIA Security International , C‑194/94, EU:C:1996:172, paragraphs 41, 44 and 54, and Unilever , C‑443/98, EU:C:2000:496, paragraph 49).
31. However, since the questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance (judgment in Melki and Abdeli , C‑188/10 and C‑189/10, EU:C:2010:363, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited), the questions asked by the referring court should be answered.
The first and third questions
33. Given that those two questions concern both the interpretation of the FEU Treaty and that of Directive 94/11, it must be noted that, in accordance with settled case-law, any national measure in an area which has been the subject of exhaustive harmonisation at EU level must be assessed in the light of the provisions of that harmonising measure and not those of the Treaty (judgments in Gysbrechts and Santurel Inter , C‑205/07, EU:C:2008:730, paragraph 33, and in Commission  v Belgium , C‑421/12, EU:C:2014:2064, paragraph 63).
35. To that end, the Court must interpret those provisions taking into account not only their wording but also the context in which they occur and the objectives of the rules of which they form part (see judgment in Sneller , C‑442/12, EU:C:2013:717, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
41. As regards, in the second place, the assessment in the light of Directive 94/11, it must be recalled that the measures for the liberalisation of trade between Member States, such as Directive 94/11, apply in identical fashion to goods originating in Member States and to goods from non-member countries which are in free circulation in the European Union. In that respect, the Court has made it clear that, as regards free movement of goods within the European Union, goods in free circulation are definitively and wholly assimilated to goods originating in Member States (see, to that effect, Tezi Textiel v Commission , 59/84, EU:C:1986:102, paragraph 26).
44. In that respect, it must be recalled that the Court has already held, as regards the interpretation of Article 34 TFEU, that the purpose of indications of origin or origin-marking, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, is to enable consumers to distinguish between domestic and imported goods and that this enables them to assert any prejudices which they may have against foreign goods. Within the internal market, the origin-marking requirement not only makes the marketing in a Member State of goods produced in other Member States in the sectors in question more difficult, it also has the effect of slowing down economic interpenetration in the European Union by handicapping the sale of goods produced as the result of a division of labour between Member States (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission  v United Kingdom , 207/83, EU:C:1985:161, paragraph 17).
45. Furthermore, it is clear from the case-law in relation to Article 34 TFEU that language requirements such as those laid down by the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings constitute a barrier to intra-Community trade in so far as goods coming from other Member States have to be given different labelling involving additional packaging costs (judgment in Colim , C‑33/97, EU:C:1999:274, paragraph 36).
54. In that respect, it must be recalled that the Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to provide a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment in Stark , C‑293/10, EU:C:2011:355, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
59. That provision provides a common definition of the concept of the origin of goods, which constitutes an indispensable means of ensuring the uniform application of the common customs tariff and of all other measures adopted, in relation to the importation or exportation of goods, by the European Union or by the Member States (see, to that effect, judgment in Gesellschaft für Überseehandel , 49/76, EU:C:1977:9, paragraph 5).