larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Agostinho da Silva Martins v Dekra Claims Services Portugal SA.
Date: 2019-01-31
28


The requirement for consistency in the application of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations (judgment of 21 January 2016, ERGO Insurance and Gjensidige Baltic, C‑359/14 and C‑475/14, EU:C:2016:40, paragraph 43) supports the harmonisation wherever possible of the interpretation of the concepts used by those two regulations which are, in functional terms, identical. It must therefore be held that, irrespective of the fact that certain language versions of the Rome II Regulation use different terminology compared to the Rome I Regulation, ‘dispositions impératives dérogatoires’ (‘overriding mandatory provisions’), within the meaning of Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation, fall within the definition of ‘lois de police’ (‘overriding mandatory provisions’), within the meaning of Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation, so that the Court’s interpretation of the latter concept also applies to ‘dispositions impératives dérogatoires’ (‘overriding mandatory provisions’) within the meaning of Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation.
29


In that connection, it must be borne in mind that the Court has already pointed out, in the context of the Rome Convention, that the plea relating to the existence of a ‘mandatory rule’ within the meaning of the legislation of the Member State concerned must be interpreted strictly (judgment of 17 October 2013, Unamar, C‑184/12, EU:C:2013:663, paragraph 49).
30


It is settled case-law of the Court that it is, in that context, for the national court, in the course of its assessment of whether the national law which it proposes to substitute for that expressly chosen by the parties to the contract is a ‘mandatory rule’, to take account not only of the exact terms of that law, but also of its general structure and of all the circumstances in which that law was adopted in order to determine whether it is mandatory in nature in so far as it appears that the legislature adopted it in order to protect an interest judged to be essential by the Member State concerned (judgment of 17 October 2013, Unamar, C‑184/12, EU:C:2013:663, paragraph 50).
38


In that connection, it must be observed, first, that there is nothing in the wording or the objectives of Directive 2009/103 to suggest that it is intended to lay down conflict-of-law rules (judgment of 21 January 2016, ERGO Insurance and Gjensidige Baltic, C‑359/14 and C‑475/14, EU:C:2016:40, paragraph 40).
39


That directive is in fact limited to requiring Member States to adopt measures guaranteeing that the victim of a road traffic accident and the owner of the vehicle involved in that accident are protected (judgment of 21 January 2016, ERGO Insurance and Gjensidige Baltic, C‑359/14 and C‑475/14, EU:C:2016:40, paragraph 39).
NK.
Date: 2019-02-07
18


As a preliminary point, it must be noted that, in accordance inter alia with Article 1 thereof, Regulation No 561/2006 aims to harmonise the conditions of competition with regard to the road sector and to improve working conditions and road safety, those objectives meaning in particular that, in principle, road transport vehicles must be equipped with an approved tachograph enabling compliance with driving times and drivers’ rest periods to be monitored (judgment of 13 March 2014, A. Karuse, C‑222/12, EU:C:2014:142, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
21


In that regard, it must be noted that, as an exception to Articles 5 to 9 of Regulation No 561/2006, the conditions under which Article 13(1)(p) of that regulation applies are to be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, regarding Article 13(1)(d) of that regulation, judgment of 28 July 2011, Seeger, C‑554/09, EU:C:2011:523, paragraph 33). Moreover, the scope of that exception must be determined in the light of the aims pursued by the rules at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2014, A. Karuse, C‑222/12, EU:C:2014:142, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
25


In that regard, it must be noted that, as the Court has previously held concerning the exception to the obligation to use tachographs provided for in Article 14a(2)(c) of Regulation (EEC) No 543/69 of the Council of 25 March 1969 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport (OJ, English Special Edition 1969(I), p. 170), as amended by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2827/77 of 12 December 1977 (OJ 1977 L 334, p. 1) (‘Regulation No 543/69’), which is worded in terms substantially similar to those of the exception in Article 13(1)(p) of Regulation No 561/2006, that exception aims to encourage commercial activities to which the transport itself is incidental, and can apply solely to transport operations involving short distances, carried out in the interests of individual farms and corresponding to the normal needs of such farms as regards the supply of livestock or the sale of their produce (judgment of 28 March 1985, Hackett and Others, 91/84 and 92/84, EU:C:1985:153, paragraphs 16 and 19).
26


It is in the light of that aim that the Court of Justice precluded transports which, as regards the distances covered, the power of the vehicles used and the intensity of their use, have precisely those characteristics which justified the generalisation of the use of tachographs, namely the risk that vehicles may be overused and drivers overworked, with all the undesirable consequences for the social protection of transport workers, road safety, and the maintenance of proper conditions of competition in the sector in question, from being covered by the exception set out in Article 14a(2)(c) of Regulation No 543/69 (judgment of 28 March 1985, Hackett and Others, 91/84 and 92/84, EU:C:1985:153, paragraph 21).
Ronny Rohart v Federale Pensioendienst.
Date: 2019-02-13
14


It should be noted that EU law does not detract from the power of the Member States to organise their social security systems and that, in the absence of harmonisation at EU level, it is for the legislation of each Member State to determine the conditions for the grant of social security benefits. Nevertheless, the Member States must comply with EU law when exercising that power, which includes the principles identified by the Court in its case-law relating to the interpretation of the principle of sincere cooperation in conjunction with the Staff Regulations (judgment of 10 September 2015, Wojciechowski, C‑408/14, EU:C:2015:591, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
15


In this connection, the Court has previously held that the Staff Regulations were adopted by means of a Council regulation, namely Regulation No 259/68, which, by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 288 TFEU, is of general application, is binding in its entirety and is directly applicable in all Member States and that it follows that, in addition to having effects within the EU administration, the Staff Regulations are also binding on Member States in so far as their cooperation is necessary in order to give effect to those regulations (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2015, Wojciechowski, C‑408/14, EU:C:2015:591, paragraphs 36 and 41 and the case-law cited).
24


Nor can that government rely on the fact that Mr Rohard could have, pursuant to Article 42 of the Staff Regulations, made a retroactive payment to the EU pension scheme in order for that period to be taken into account for the purpose of his pension under that scheme. That provision merely lays down an option, which every official concerned is free to decide whether or not to exercise, to make voluntary contributions to that scheme. Consequently, an official’s decision not to exercise that option cannot result in the loss of his rights under the national pension scheme, except for the loss of the voluntary and optional nature of those contributions (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2015, Wojciechowski, C‑408/14, EU:C:2015:591, paragraph 52).
Staat der Nederlanden v Warner-Lambert Company LLC.
Date: 2019-02-14
31


It must be noted at the outset that, in accordance with the essential aims of Directive 2001/83, inter alia, that of safeguarding public health, Article 6(1), first subparagraph, of that directive provides that no medicinal product may be placed on the market of a Member State unless a marketing authorisation has been issued by the competent authorities of that State in accordance with that directive or an authorisation has been issued in accordance with the centralised procedure provided for in Regulation No 726/2004 for the medicinal products referred to in the annex to that regulation (judgments of 29 March 2012, Commission v Poland, C‑185/10, EU:C:2012:181, paragraph 26, and of 23 January 2018, F. Hoffmann-La Roche and Others, C‑179/16, EU:C:2018:25, paragraph 53).
32


The principle of a mandatory marketing authorisation also applies, according to the second subparagraph of Article 6(1) of Directive 2001/83, when a medicinal product has been granted an initial marketing authorisation in accordance with the first subparagraph of that provision, in so far as, in that case, any additional strengths, pharmaceutical forms, administration routes, presentations, as well as any variations and extensions are also to be granted an authorisation in accordance with that first subparagraph or be included in the initial marketing authorisation (judgment of 21 November 2018, Novartis Farma, C‑29/17, EU:C:2018:931, paragraph 70).
41


The rationale behind this exception is not to delay entry on the market of generic medicinal products until expiry of all patents which may include several indications or dosage forms of the reference medicinal product, without any relaxation of the requirements of safety and efficacy which must be met by generic medicinal products (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 October 2014, Olainfarm, C‑104/13, EU:C:2014:2316, paragraphs 27 and 28).
Vetsch Int. Transporte GmbH v Zollamt Feldkirch Wolfurt.
Date: 2019-02-14
31


As the Court has previously held, exemption from import VAT is thus subject to the importer subsequently making an intra-Community supply which is itself exempt under Article 138 of the VAT Directive, and it therefore depends on compliance with the substantive conditions laid down in that article (judgment of 20 June 2018, Enteco Baltic, C‑108/17, EU:C:2018:473, paragraph 47). The same applies where, as in the present case, the supply of goods consists in the transfer of those goods to another Member State.
33


For the purposes of exemption from VAT, an intra-Community transfer, which is defined in the first subparagraph of Article 17(1) of the VAT Directive as the transfer by a taxable person of goods forming part of his business assets to another Member State, is to be treated, in particular, as an intra-Community supply in respect of which there is provision for exemption from VAT in Article 138 of that directive (see, as regards the corresponding provisions of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1), judgment of 20 October 2016, Plöckl, C‑24/15, EU:C:2016:791, paragraph 29).
Rebecka Jonsson v Société du Journal L’Est Républicain.
Date: 2019-02-14
27


In that regard, it must be pointed out that, in the absence of harmonisation of domestic mechanisms for the apportionment of procedural costs and subject to the provisions of Regulation No 861/2007, the procedural rules for determining such apportionment are a matter for the domestic legal order of each Member State, in accordance with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the latter. However, those rules must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) or such as to make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (see, by analogy, judgment of 13 December 2012, Szyrocka, C‑215/11, EU:C:2012:794, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
Tomás Horgan and Claire Keegan v Minister for Education & Skills and Others.
Date: 2019-02-14
25


Thus the only relevant criterion for the purposes of applying the new rules on the salary scale and classification on that scale is whether the person concerned is a ‘new entrant to the public service as of 1 January 2011’, regardless of the age of the public servant at the date at which he or she was recruited. Accordingly, that criterion, which renders the application of the new rules dependant exclusively on the date of recruitment as an objective and neutral factor, is manifestly unconnected to any taking into account of the age of the persons recruited (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 December 2008, Centeno Mediavilla and Others v Commission, C‑443/07 P, EU:C:2008:767, paragraphs 81 and 83).
27


It follows from the foregoing that the new remuneration conditions introduced by Ireland are not based on a criterion which is inextricably or indirectly linked to the age of the teachers, so that it cannot be considered that the new rules establish a difference of treatment on grounds of age (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 June 2012, Tyrolean Airways Tiroler Luftfahrt Gesellschaft, C‑132/11, EU:C:2012:329, paragraphs 29 and 30).
28


Having regard to those considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted to the effect that a measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings which, as of a specific date, provides for the application on the recruitment of new teachers of a salary scale and classification on that scale which are less advantageous than that applied, under the rules previous to that measure, to teachers recruited before that date does not constitute indirect discrimination on the grounds of age within the meaning of that provision.
Oeuvre d’assistance aux bêtes d’abattoirs (OABA) v Ministre de l'Agriculture et de l'Alimentation and Others.
Date: 2019-02-26
44


Second, the protection of animal welfare is the main objective pursued by Regulation No 1099/2009, as is clear from the title of the regulation and from recital 2 thereof, and such protection is as required by Article 13 TFEU, pursuant to which, in formulating and implementing the European Union’s policies, the European Union and the Member States are to pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 May 2018, Liga van Moskeeën en Islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen and Others, C‑426/16, EU:C:2018:335, paragraphs 63 and 64).
47


Thus, Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1099/2009, read in conjunction with recital 20 of that regulation, lays down the principle that an animal should be stunned prior to its death and goes so far as to establish this as an obligation. As the Advocate General stated, in essence, in point 43 of his Opinion, scientific studies have shown that pre-stunning is the technique that compromises animal welfare the least at the time of killing.
48


While it is true that Article 4(4) of Regulation No 1099/2009, read in the light of recital 18 thereof, permits the practice of ritual slaughter as part of which an animal may be killed without first being stunned, that form of slaughter, which is authorised only by way of derogation in the European Union and solely in order to ensure observance of the freedom of religion (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 May 2018, Liga van Moskeeën en Islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen and Others, C‑426/16, EU:C:2018:335, paragraphs 55 to 57), is insufficient to remove all of the animal’s pain, distress and suffering as effectively as slaughter with pre-stunning, which, in accordance with Article 2(f) of that regulation, read in the light of recital 20 thereof, is necessary to cause the animal to lose consciousness and sensibility in order significantly to reduce its suffering.
Ilmārs Rimšēvičs and European Central Bank v Republic of Latvia.
Date: 2019-02-26
45


Nevertheless, according to the settled case-law of the Court, it is necessary, in order to interpret a provision of EU law, to consider not only its wording but also its context and the objectives of the legislation of which it forms part (see, in particular, judgment of 17 April 2018, Egenberger, C‑414/16, EU:C:2018:257, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
57


In that regard, although it is true that the authors of the Treaties have ascribed only limited powers to the Union in criminal matters, it is nonetheless apparent from the case-law of the Court that EU law sets certain limits to the powers of Member States in such matters (judgment of 15 September 2011, Dickinger and Ömer, C‑347/09, EU:C:2011:582, paragraph 31). Indeed, that power of the Member States must be exercised in line with not only the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 2 February 1989, Cowan, 186/87, EU:C:1989:47, paragraph 19, and of 19 January 1999, Calfa, C‑348/96, EU:C:1999:6, paragraph 17), but also EU law as a whole, in particular primary EU law. Consequently, the national rules of criminal procedure may not preclude the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by the second subparagraph of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, wherever that provision is applicable.
Konkurrensverket v SJ AB.
Date: 2019-02-28
48


According to settled case-law, the meaning and scope of terms for which EU law provides no definition must be determined according to their meaning in everyday language whilst considering the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they form part (judgment of 12 June 2018, Louboutin and Christian Louboutin, C‑163/16, EU:C:2018:423, paragraph 20).
UAB „Bene Factum“ v Valstybinė mokesčių inspekcija prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos.
Date: 2019-02-28
21


As the Court has held, ethyl alcohol contained in a product which is not intended for human consumption and which has been denatured in accordance with a method approved in a Member State benefits from the exemption provided for in Article 27(1)(b) of Directive 92/83 (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 December 2000, Italy v Commission, C‑482/98, EU:C:2000:672, paragraph 41).
22


It would be contrary to Directive 92/83 to withhold exemption for a product which meets the conditions laid down in Article 27(1)(b) solely because it has been found that the use for which it is actually intended does not correspond with the name assigned to it by the trader (judgment of 7 December 2000, Italy v Commission, C‑482/98, EU:C:2000:672, paragraph 42).
Criminal proceedings against Detlev Meyn.
Date: 2019-02-28
16


It should be recalled, from the outset, that Article 2(1) of Directive 2006/126 provides for the mutual recognition, without any formality, of driving licences issued by Member States (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 October 2017, I, C‑195/16, EU:C:2017:815, paragraph 34).
26


It is nevertheless clear from the Court’s settled case-law that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives of the rules of which it forms part (judgment of 26 September 2018, Baumgartner, C‑513/17, EU:C:2018:772, paragraph 23).
28


The imposition, under Directive 2006/126, of an obligation of mutual recognition of driving licences issued by the Member States is the result of the laying down, by that directive, of the minimum requirements for the issue of a Community driving licence.
29


Accordingly, it is for the issuing Member State to investigate whether the minimum conditions imposed by EU law, particularly those relating to residence and fitness to drive laid down in Article 7(1) of Directive 2006/126, have been satisfied and, therefore, whether the issuing of a driving licence is justified (judgment of 26 October 2017, I, C‑195/16, EU:C:2017:815, paragraph 46).
30


It follows that, once the authorities of one Member State have issued a driving licence, it is no longer possible for the other Member States to investigate whether the conditions for issue laid down by that directive have been met, since the possession of a driving licence issued by one Member State has to be regarded as constituting proof that its holder satisfied those conditions on the day on which that licence was issued (judgment of 26 October 2017, I, C‑195/16, EU:C:2017:815, paragraph 47).
BMB sp. z o.o. v European Union Intellectual Property Office.
Date: 2019-03-06
In the present case, contrary to the requirements which flow from the case-law of the Court of Justice, BMB, merely asserting that the sign at issue covered by the earlier international registration was registered as a figurative mark, has not expressly alleged distortion of the facts examined by the General Court (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 October 2015, Commission v ANKO, C‑78/14 P, EU:C:2015:732, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
It should be noted in that regard that, in any event, the judgment of the tribunal de grande instance de Paris (Regional Court, Paris), handed down in a dispute connected to trade mark infringement proceedings, cannot bind the adjudicating bodies of EUIPO in invalidity proceedings, such as those in question in the present case, as neither the parties nor the subject matter of those proceedings are identical (see, by analogy, judgment of 21 July 2016, Apple and Pear Australia and Star Fruits Diffusion v EUIPO, C‑226/15 P, EU:C:2016:582, paragraphs 52 and 63).