Criminal proceedings against TG and UF.
Date: 2020-10-01
As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the procedure provided for by Article 267 TFEU is an instrument for cooperation between the Court and national courts by means of which the Court provides national courts with the criteria for the interpretation of European Union law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them (see, inter alia, judgment of 27 November 2012, Pringle, C‑370/12, EU:C:2012:756, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited).
In the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court, before which the dispute has been brought and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (judgment of 25 July 2018, AY (Mandat d’arrêt – Témoin), C‑268/17, EU:C:2018:602, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
It follows that questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for this Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its object, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 25 July 2018, AY (Mandat d’arrêt – Témoin), C‑268/17, EU:C:2018:602, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
Thus, since the order for reference serves as the basis for the procedure followed before the Court, it is essential that the national court should, in that decision, set out the factual and legislative context of the dispute in the main proceedings and give at the very least some explanation of the reasons for the choice of the EU law provisions which it seeks to have interpreted and of the link it establishes between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the proceedings pending before it (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 26 January 1993, Telemarsicabruzzo and Others, C‑320/90 to C‑322/90, EU:C:1993:26, paragraph 6, and of 9 March 2017, Milkova, C‑406/15, EU:C:2017:198, paragraph 73).
As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, according to the Court’s case-law, Article 325(1) and (2) TFEU obliges the Member States to counter illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the European Union through effective deterrent measures and, in particular, obliges them to take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union as they take to counter fraud affecting their own interests (judgment of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
In that regard, the Court has already held that the Member States have freedom to choose the applicable penalties, which may take the form of administrative penalties, criminal penalties or a combination of the two, whilst specifying that, in cases of serious fraud, criminal penalties may nevertheless be essential (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 September 2015, Taricco and Others, C‑105/14, EU:C:2015:555, paragraph 39).
Member States therefore have a precise obligation as to the result to be achieved that is not subject to any condition regarding the application of the rule laid down in Article 325 (1) and (2) TFEU. Those provisions therefore have the effect, in accordance with the principle of the precedence of EU law, in their relationship with the domestic law of the Member States, of rendering automatically inapplicable, merely by their entering into force, any conflicting provision of national law (see to that effect, judgment of 8 September 2015, Taricco and Others, C‑105/14, EU:C:2015:555, paragraphs 51 and 52).
Although criminal penalties may be essential to enable Member States to combat certain cases of serious fraud in an effective and dissuasive manner (judgments of 8 September 2015, Taricco and Others, C‑105/14, EU:C:2015:555, paragraph 39, and of 5 December 2017, M.A.S. and M.B., C‑42/17, EU:C:2017:936, paragraph 34), such penalties are required in order to ensure that national law is dissuasive and are not intended to permit the recovery of sums paid but not due.