larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Georges Platbrood v Office national des pensions (ONP).
Date: 1999-11-18
25 It should be recalled first of all that the Court has held that a national rule must be regarded as a provision for reduction of benefit if the calculation which it requires to be made has the effect of reducing the amount of pension which the person concerned may claim because he receives a benefit from another Member State (ONP v Conti, paragraph 25).
26 In that same judgment, the Court stressed that provisions for reduction of benefits cannot be rendered exempt from the conditions and limits of application laid down in Regulation No 1408/71 by categorising them as rules for calculating the amount payable (ONP v Conti, paragraph 24).
Georges Tzoanos v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1999-11-18
23 The finding of the Court of First Instance that Mr Tzoanos had not provided the necessary evidence in that regard is a finding of fact which comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and cannot be called into question in the context of an appeal (see, to this effect, Case C-283/90 P Vidrányi v Commission [1991] ECR I-4339, paragraph 12, and Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-667, paragraph 10).
34 In that regard, it should be pointed out that, according to the principle that the rights of the defence must be observed, an official must have the opportunity to comment on every document which the institution intends to use against him (see, in particular, Vidrányi, paragraph 20). Where an official is not given such an opportunity the undisclosed documents must not be taken into consideration as evidence.  However, the exclusion of certain documents used by the Commission is of no significance except to the extent to which the Commission's objection can be proved only by reference to those documents (Case 107/82 AEG v Commission [1983] ECR 3151, paragraphs 24 to 30).
Unitron Scandinavia A/S and 3-S A/S, Danske Svineproducenters Serviceselskab v Ministeriet for Fødevarer, Landbrug og Fiskeri.
Date: 1999-11-18
18 It is sufficient to observe, on this point, that it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (see, inter alia, Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59).  A request from a national court may be refused by the Court of Justice only where it is obvious that the interpretation of a Community rule or assessment of its validity which is sought bears no relation to the facts or purpose of the main action, or if the Court of Justice does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions (see, in particular, Bosman, paragraph 61; Case C-60/98 Butterfly Music v CEMED [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraph 13).
31 It should be noted, however, that the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality cannot be interpreted restrictively.  It implies, in particular, an obligation of transparency in order to enable the contracting authority to satisfy itself that it has been complied with.
Commission of the European Communities v Ireland.
Date: 1999-11-25
11 With respect to the difficulties, encountered by the Irish Government, in implementing the Directive in due time, it is settled case-law that a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, inter alia, Case C-401/98 Commission v Greece [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraph 9).
12 As regards the Irish Government's request for proceedings to be stayed, it should be observed that, if the Member State to which a reasoned opinion has been issued has not, by the end of the period which it is for the Commission to lay down pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 169 of the Treaty, put an end to the infringement with which it is charged, the Commission is at liberty to decide whether or not to bring the matter before the Court (see Case C-329/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 4159). Since the Commission stated in its reply that it was maintaining the action, it is not appropriate to stay proceedings.
DAT-SCHAUB amba v Ministeriet for Fødevarer, Landbrug og Fiskeri.
Date: 1999-12-16
27 It should also be noted that, according to settled case-law, the system of differentiated export refunds is intended to gain or to maintain access for Community exports to the markets of the non-member countries concerned, the reason for differentiated refunds being the desire to take account of the particular characteristics of each import market in which the Community wishes to play a part (see Case 89/83 Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v Dimex [1984] ECR 2815, paragraph 8, and Case C-299/94 Anglo Irish Beef Processors International and Others v Minister for Agriculture, Food and Forestry [1996] ECR I-1925, paragraph 21).
28 It is essential for that purpose of the system of differentiated refunds that products in respect of which a subsidy is granted in the form of a refund actually reach their market of destination so that they can be marketed there (see Anglo Irish Beef Processors International, paragraph 28).
29 Thus, in accordance with the provisions of Regulation No 3665/87, payment of refunds is conditional, in the case of differentiated refunds, on the product having been imported into a non-member country and on the formalities for its release for consumption having been completed (see Case C-263/97 R v Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce, ex parte First City Trading and Others [1998] ECR I-5537, paragraph 27).
30 The fact that the product is re-exported before being released for consumption in the country of destination therefore rules out the possibility of its being regarded, for the purposes of payment of the differentiated refund, as having been imported within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Regulation No 3665/87 (see Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v Dimex, paragraph 17, and Anglo Irish Beef Processors International, paragraph 23).
35 In the second place, as regards the question whether that provision complies with the principle of proportionality, it must be pointed out that effective supervision is essential to the proper functioning of the system of refunds, as the refunds can be paid only if the goods are correctly identified (see Case 276/84 Metelmann v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1985] ECR 4057, paragraph 11).
36 The Court held in that judgment, with respect to the repackaging of a product in different units, that the principle of proportionality does not preclude it being held that any alteration in the presentation of the goods entails forfeiture of the refund, where it is liable to render customs control more difficult and for that reason to affect the proper functioning of the system of refunds (Metelmann, paragraph 13).
Economic and Social Committee of the European Communities v E.
Date: 1999-12-16
10 In that respect, it is settled case-law that, where the Court of First Instance has found or assessed facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 168a of the EC Treaty (now Article 225 EC) to review the legal nature of those facts and the legal consequences thereof as determined by the Court of First Instance (see, to that end, Case C-136/92 P Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraph 49).
12 Next, it is the settled case-law of the Court of Justice that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures, and that freedom of expression, which is enshrined in Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, is one of those general principles (see Case C-219/91 Ter Voort [1992] ECR I-5485, paragraphs 34 and 35).
13 Finally, as regards the Community civil service, the Court has held that the obligation of allegiance to the Communities imposed on officials in the Staff Regulations cannot be interpreted in such a way as to conflict with the right to freedom of expression (see Oyowe and Traore, paragraph 16).
17 However, where the grounds of a judgment of the Court of First Instance disclose an infringement of Community law but the operative part of the judgment is shown to be well founded on other legal grounds, the appeal must be dismissed (see Case C-320/92 P Finsider v Commission [1994] ECR I-5697, paragraph 37).
18 That is the case here, because if the Court of First Instance had classified the facts correctly in law, it would not have found any infringement of Articles 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations and would have been bound to annul the contested decision.
G. Everson and T.J. Barrass v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and Bell Lines Ltd.
Date: 1999-12-16
22 Where, as in the main proceedings in this case, the employer has several places of establishment in different Member States, it is necessary, for the purpose of determining the competent guarantee institution, to refer, as an additional criterion and in the light of the social objectives of the Directive, to the place in which the employees are employed.  That will in most cases correspond to the social and language environment with which they are familiar.
23 In the main proceedings here, in contrast to the position in Mosbæk, where the insolvent employer did not have any establishment in the territory of the Member State in which the employee was working, the employer concerned was established within the territory of the United Kingdom, since it had a branch in Avonmouth employing more than 200 persons, including the applicants in the main proceedings. In such a case, the institution which must settle any outstanding claims is that of the Member State within whose territory the branch is established.
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 1999-12-16
24 It must therefore be held that, by failing to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply fully with Directive 92/49 and Directive 92/96 and, in particular, by not transposing those directives with regard to mutual societies governed by the Code de la Mutualité, the French Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under those directives.
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 1999-12-16
10 Secondly, it is settled case-law that a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, inter alia, Case C-401/98 Commission v Greece [1999] ECR I-5543, paragraph 9).
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 1999-12-16
12 It should be observed at the outset that there are no grounds for the Court to suspend the proceedings.
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 1999-12-16
10 The Court has consistently held, in this regard, that a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-401/98 Commission v Greece [1999] ECR I-5543, paragraph 9).
Kingdom of the Netherlands and Gerard van der Wal v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2000-01-11
17 It is true that the general principle of Community law under which every person has a right to a fair trial, inspired by Article 6 of the ECHR (see, inter alia, Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, paragraphs 20 and 21), comprises the right to a tribunal that is independent of the executive power in particular (on that point, see in particular the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 18 June 1971 in the case of De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v Belgium, Series A, No 12, paragraph 78).  However, it is not possible to deduce from that right, as the Court of First Instance did in paragraphs 47 to 51 of the contested judgment, that the court hearing a dispute is necessarily the only body empowered to grant access to the documents in the proceedings in question.  Nor can such a general principle be deduced from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.
24 It follows from the above that documents supplied by the Commission to national courts are often documents which it already possessed or which, although drafted with a view to particular proceedings, merely refer to the earlier documents, or in which the Commission merely expresses an opinion of a general nature, independent of the data relating to the case pending before the national court.  In relation to those documents, the Commission must assess in each individual case whether they fall within the exceptions listed in the code of conduct adopted by Decision 94/90.
26 In those cases, national law may preclude the disclosure of those documents and compliance with that law may be regarded as a public interest worthy of protection under the exceptions provided for by Decision 94/90.
27 That is, however, not enough to exonerate the Commission entirely from its obligation to disclose those documents. In so far as they are held by the Commission, such documents fall within the scope of Decision 94/90, which provides for the widest public access possible.  Any exception to that right of access must therefore be interpreted and applied strictly.
Staatssecretaris van Financiën v J. Heerma.
Date: 2000-01-27
14 Secondly, on the basis of the judgment in Case C-230/94 Enkler [1996] ECR I-4517, the national court held that Mr Heerma was carrying on an economic activity within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the Sixth Directive, in so far as he had granted a lease of the cattle shed for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis.
18 In so far as the activity at issue is concerned, there is between the partnership and the partner no relationship of employer and employee similar to that mentioned in the first subparagraph of Article 4(4) of the Sixth Directive which would preclude the independence of the partner. On the contrary, the partner, in letting tangible property to the partnership, acts in his own name, on his own behalf and under his own responsibility, even if he is at the same time manager of the lessee partnership. The lease in question was granted neither by the management nor by the representatives of the partnership.
19 In those circumstances, contrary to what the Netherlands Government claims, it is irrelevant that the partner confines his activity to letting an item of tangible property to the partnership of which he is a member. That circumstance is of no consequence for the purpose of determining whether the partner is acting independently, within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the Sixth Directive, in carrying on the economic activity concerned but may, at most, have a bearing on the question whether there can be said to be an economic activity at all, within the meaning of that article. In that respect, however, as the national court observed, it is clear from paragraph 22 of the judgment in Enkler, cited above, that the letting of tangible property constitutes exploitation of such property which must be classified as an `economic activity' within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the Sixth Directive if it is done for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis.
Miguel Amengual Far v Juan Amengual Far.
Date: 2000-02-03
10 In that regard, it must be stated, as the Advocate General points out in point 7 of his Opinion of 18 March 1999, and as is clear from the other language versions of Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive and from the context of that article, that the second subparagraph of that provision allows Member States to provide for further exclusions to the scope of the exemption laid down for the letting of immovable property (see, to this effect, the judgment in Case C-63/92 Lubbock Fine [1993] ECR I-6665, paragraph 13).
13 Furthermore, it is clear from the actual words of Article 13B(b) and C of the Sixth Directive that the latter has left the Members States wide discretion as to whether the transactions concerned are to be exempt or taxed.
Silke-Karin Mahlburg v Land Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.
Date: 2000-02-03
20 As the Court has observed, only women can be refused employment on grounds of pregnancy and such a refusal therefore constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex (Case C-177/88 Dekker [1990] ECR I-3941, paragraph 12).
21 It must, however, be pointed out that, in contrast to the Dekker case, cited above, the unequal treatment in a case such as the present is not based directly on the woman's pregnancy but on a statutory prohibition on employment attaching to that condition.
24 It must be pointed out, first of all, that the Court has held that dismissal of a pregnant woman recruited for an indefinite period cannot be justified on grounds relating to her inability to fulfil a fundamental condition of her employment contract. The availability of an employee is necessarily, for the employer, a precondition for the proper performance of the employment contract. However, the protection afforded by Community law to a woman during pregnancy and after childbirth cannot be dependent on whether her presence at work during maternity is essential to the proper functioning of the undertaking in which she is employed. Any contrary interpretation would render ineffective the provisions of the Directive (Case C-32/93 Webb [1994] ECR I-3567, paragraph 26).
25 Secondly, a statutory prohibition on night-time work by pregnant women, which is in principle compatible with Article 2(3) of the Directive, cannot, however, serve as a basis for terminating a contract for an indefinite period (see to that effect Case C-421/92 Habermann-Beltermann [1994] ECR I-1657, paragraphs 18 and 25). Such a prohibition takes effect only for a limited period in relation to the total length of the contract (Habermann-Beltermann, cited above, paragraph 23).
26 Lastly, the Court has held, in Case C-136/95 Thibault [1998] ECR I-2011, paragraph 26, that the exercise of the rights conferred on women under Article 2(3) of the Directive cannot be the subject of unfavourable treatment regarding their access to employment or their working conditions and that, in that light, the result pursued by the Directive is substantive, not formal, equality.
27 It follows from that case-law that the application of provisions concerning the protection of pregnant women cannot result in unfavourable treatment regarding their access to employment, so that it is not permissible for an employer to refuse to take on a pregnant woman on the ground that a prohibition on employment arising on account of the pregnancy would prevent her being employed from the outset and for the duration of the pregnancy in the post of unlimited duration to be filled.
29 The Court has already held, in that regard, that a refusal to employ a woman on account of her pregnancy cannot be justified on grounds relating to the financial loss which an employer who appointed a pregnant woman would suffer for the duration of her maternity leave (Dekker, cited above, paragraph 12). The same conclusion must be drawn as regards the financial loss caused by the fact that the woman appointed cannot be employed in the post concerned for the duration of her pregnancy.
Entidad de Gestión de Derechos de los Productores Audiovisuales (Egeda) v Hostelería Asturiana SA (Hoasa).
Date: 2000-02-03
25 It is clear from the foregoing that Article 1(2)(a) and (3) of the Directive does not provide information to enable the Court to answer the question whether the reception by a hotel establishment of satellite or terrestrial television signals and their distribution by cable to the various rooms of that hotel constitutes an act of communication to the public or reception by the public.
26 That finding is corroborated, moreover, by the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the Information Society, presented by the Commission on 21 January 1998 (OJ 1998 C 108, p. 6).
Deutsche Post AG v Gesellschaft für Zahlungssysteme mbH GZS) (C-147/97) and Citicorp Kartenservice GmbH (C-148/97).
Date: 2000-02-10
37 To reply to that question, as reformulated, it should first be noted that a body such as Deutsche Post, which has been granted exclusive rights as regards the collection, carriage and delivery of mail, must be regarded as an undertaking to which the Member State concerned has granted exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 90(1) of the Treaty (Case C-320/91 Corbeau [1993] ECR I-2533, paragraph 8).
38 Also, it is settled case-law that an undertaking having a statutory monopoly over a substantial part of the common market may be regarded as holding a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty (see Case C-179/90 Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova v Siderurgica Gabrielli [1991] ECR I-5889, paragraph 14, Case C-18/88 RTT v GB-Inno-BM [1991] ECR I-5941, paragraph 17, and Corbeau, cited above, paragraph 9).
39 The Court has had occasion to state in this respect that although the mere fact that a Member State has created a dominant position by the grant of exclusive rights is not as such incompatible with Article 86, the Treaty none the less requires the Member States not to adopt or maintain in force any measure which might deprive that provision of its effectiveness (see Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 35, and Corbeau, cited above, paragraph 11).
60 As the Court has stated in relation to a refusal to sell on the part of an undertaking holding a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty, such action would be inconsistent with the objective laid down by Article 3(g) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 3(g) EC), as explained in Article 86, in particular in subparagraphs (b) and (c) of its second paragraph (Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207, paragraph 183).