larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Staatsanwaltschaft Köln and Bundesamt für Güterverkehr v KA.
Date: 2021-07-08
It must be borne in mind, in that regard, that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national courts before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of each case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, if the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling. It follows that questions concerning EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may thus refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 February 2013, Melloni, C‑399/11, EU:C:2013:107, paragraphs 28 and 29 and the case-law cited).
It should be observed that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. The Court has a duty to interpret all provisions of EU law which national courts need in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court by those courts (judgment of 28 June 2018, Crespo Rey, C‑2/17, EU:C:2018:511, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
Consequently, even if, formally, the referring court has limited its questions to the interpretation of Article 8(2) and Article 1(5)(d) of Regulation No 1072/2009, that does not prevent this Court from providing the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of EU law that may be of assistance in adjudicating in the case pending before it, whether or not the referring court has referred to them in the wording of its questions. It is, in this regard, for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision to make the reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject matter of the dispute (judgment of 28 June 2018, Crespo Rey, C‑2/17, EU:C:2018:511, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
ClientEarth v European Commission.
Date: 2021-10-06
60


In this regard, it must be noted that it follows from the Court’s case-law that, in order to state in the manner required the grounds for conducting the review, a party requesting the internal review of an administrative act under environmental law is required to put forward facts or legal arguments of sufficient substance to give rise to serious doubts as to the assessment made in that act by the EU institution or body (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 September 2019, TestBioTech and Others v Commission, C‑82/17 P, EU:C:2019:719, paragraph 69).
133


The appellant also submits that, contrary to what the General Court held, the precautionary principle is not limited to conferring on public authorities the power to adopt a specific measure, but must be applied when those authorities act, as is apparent from, inter alia, the judgments of 9 September 2011, Dow AgroSciences and Others v Commission (T‑475/07, EU:T:2011:445, paragraph 144), and of 25 July 2018, Confédération paysanne and Others (C‑528/16, EU:C:2018:583, paragraph 50).