larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2005-12-01
25. In those circumstances, the measures referred to in the first indent, subparagraphs (b) and (c), of the forms of order sought by the United Kingdom constitute, at the most, a confirmatory measure and an implementing measure respectively in relation to the decision already contained in the letter of 22 November 2002. They cannot, therefore, be challenged separately.
30. In that connection, it should be noted that applications for final payment within the meaning of Article 52(5) of Regulation No 1260/1999, submitted by the Member States, must at least contain the information which the Commission needs in order to proceed with the final conclusion of those projects and payment of the sums claimed (see, to that effect, Case C-84/96 Netherlands  v Commission  [1999] ECR I‑6547, paragraph 57).
Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2005-12-01
19. It should be noted in this regard that an action for annulment must be available in the case of all measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have legal effects (see, in particular, Case C-443/97 Spain  v Commission  [2000] ECR I‑2415, paragraph 27 and case-law cited).
28. As was pointed out by the Advocate General at paragraph 59 of his Opinion, it is clear from Articles 15(6), 34(3) and 35 of the regulation, read together, that, in such a procedure, the Commission has a mere consultative role and is not empowered to adopt any legally binding act, except where any amendments relate to the elements contained in the decision on the contribution of the Structural Funds within the meaning of Article 34(3) of the regulation. That is not, however, alleged to be so in the present case.
30. While the contested document and notes may have the effect of informing the Member States that they are running the risk of Community financing being refused for some of the expenditure incurred, in accordance with a different interpretation of the same provision of the regulation, this is none the less a mere consequence of fact and not a legal effect the contested document and notes are intended to have (see, to that effect, Case 60/81 IBM v Commission  [1981] ECR 2639, paragraph 19).
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union.
Date: 2005-12-06
41. To begin with, it should be recalled that, according to the Court’s case-law, where there are obstacles to trade, or it is likely that such obstacles will emerge in the future, because the Member States have taken, or are about to take, divergent measures with respect to a product or a class of products which bring about different levels of protection and thereby prevent the product or products from moving freely within the Community, Article 95 EC authorises the Community legislature to intervene by adopting appropriate measures, in compliance both with Article 95(3) EC and with the legal principles mentioned in the EC Treaty or identified in the case-law (Case C‑434/02 Arnold André  [2004] ECR I‑11825, paragraph 34; Case C‑210/03 Swedish Match  [2004] ECR I‑11893, paragraph 33; and Joined Cases C‑154/04 and C‑155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and Others  [2005] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 32).
43. In those circumstances, action by the Community legislature on the basis of Article 95 EC was justified with respect to smoke flavourings used or intended for use in or on foods.
44. It must also be emphasised that, as the Advocate General observes in point 18 of her Opinion, that provision is used as legal basis only where it is actually and objectively apparent from the legal act that its purpose is to improve the conditions of the establishment and functioning of the internal market.
45. Next, it should be observed that by the expression ‘measures for the approximation’ in Article 95 EC the authors of the Treaty intended to confer on the Community legislature a discretion, depending on the general context and the specific circumstances of the matter to be harmonised, as regards the harmonisation technique most appropriate for achieving the desired result, in particular in fields which are characterised by complex technical features.
46. That discretion may be used in particular to choose the most appropriate harmonisation technique where the proposed approximation requires physical, chemical or biological analyses to be made and scientific developments in the field concerned to be taken into account. Such evaluations relating to the safety of products correspond to the objective imposed on the Community legislature by Article 95(3) EC of ensuring a high level of protection of health.
59. It also follows that, contrary to the United Kingdom’s submissions, the regulation does not have the incidental effect of harmonising the conditions of the internal market (see on this point Case C‑209/97 Commission  v Council  [1999] ECR I‑8067, paragraph 35), but is intended to approximate the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States in the field of smoke flavourings.
European Central Bank v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 2005-12-08
31. Article 8(1) of the Agreement expressly and unambiguously makes the refund of turnover tax subject to the condition, not fulfilled in the present case, that that tax be ‘invoiced separately’.  Although an interpretation of a provision of an Agreement ‘in the light’ of its legal context is possible in principle to resolve a drafting ambiguity, such an interpretation cannot have the result of depriving the clear and precise wording of that provision of all effectiveness.
Possehl Erzkontor GmbH v Hauptzollamt Duisburg.
Date: 2005-12-08
19. According to settled case-law, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs tariff purposes is in general to be found in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and of the notes to the sections or chapters (Case C-396/02 DFDS [2004] ECR I-8439, paragraph 27; Case C-495/03 Intermodal Transports  [2005] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 47).
20. The Explanatory Notes to the CN and those to the HS are an important aid for interpreting the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force. The wording of those Notes must therefore be consistent with the provisions of the CN and cannot alter their scope ( Intermodal Transports, cited above, paragraph 48) .
21. According to the general rules, the heading which provides the most specific description is to be preferred to headings providing a more general description. In this case, subheading 2519 90 10 provides, as regards the objective characteristics and properties of fused magnesia, and in particular on account of the fact that this subheading refers expressly to ‘magnesium oxide’, a more specific description than subheading 2519 90 90.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 2005-12-15
28. It follows from Case C-298/95 Commission  v Germany  [1996] ECR I-6747, paragraph 24, that Article 5 of Directive 79/923 imposes on Member States the obligation to establish specific programmes in order to reduce pollution of shellfish waters.
De Groot en Slot Allium BV and Bejo Zaden BV v Ministre de l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Industrie and Ministre de l'Agriculture, de l'Alimentation, de la Pêche et des Affaires rurales.
Date: 2006-01-10
68. That being so, the question arises whether any other provision of Community law, to which the national court does not refer, precludes the Order of 17 May 1990, which allows only traditional shallots to be marketed as ‘shallots’. The Court may be moved to take into consideration rules of Community law to which the national court has not referred in its question, in order to provide that court with a satisfactory answer (Case C-271/01 COPPI [2004] ECR I‑1029, paragraph 27, and Case C-60/03 Wolff & Müller [2004] ECR I-9553, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited there).
70. On that point, it should be recalled that the free movement of goods is a fundamental principle of the EC Treaty which finds expression in the prohibition laid down in Article 28 EC of quantitative restrictions on intra-Community imports and all measures having equivalent effect.
71. The prohibition in Article 28 EC of measures having equivalent effect to restrictions covers all rules enacted by the Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade (see, inter alia, Case C-192/01 Commission v Denmark [2003] ECR I-9693, paragraph 39, and Case C‑41/02 Commission  v Netherlands [2004] ECR I-11375, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited there).
74. The fact that producers are compelled to use names which are unknown to consumers, or less highly regarded by them, is likely to make the marketing of the products in question more difficult and thus impede trade between Member States (see, to that effect, Case C-12/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-459, paragraph 82 and the case-law cited there).
76. In that context, the Court has already held that it is legitimate for a Member State to ensure that consumers are properly informed about the products which are offered to them, thus giving them the possibility of making their choice on the basis of that information. In particular, Member States may, for the purpose of protecting consumers, require those concerned to alter the description of a foodstuff where a product offered for sale under a particular name is so different, in terms of its composition or production, from the products generally understood as falling within that description within the Community that it cannot be regarded as falling within the same category. However, where the difference is of minor importance, appropriate labelling should be sufficient to provide the purchaser or consumer with the necessary information ( Commission v Spain , paragraphs 84 to 86 and the case-law cited there).
Ynos kft v János Varga.
Date: 2006-01-10
35. It must, however, be pointed out that the order for reference states that the facts in the main proceedings occurred before the Republic of Hungary acceded to the European Union.
36. The Court has jurisdiction to interpret the Directive only as regards its application in a new Member State with effect from the date of that State’s accession to the European Union (see, to that effect, Case C-321/97 Andersson and Wåkerås-Andersson [1999] ECR I-3551, paragraph 31).
Algemene Scheeps Agentuur Dordrecht BV v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst - Douanedistrict Rotterdam.
Date: 2006-01-12
25. The first point to be noted is that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 300(7) EC, the HS Convention binds the Community institutions. The Community, under Article 3 of that convention, undertook not to alter the scope of the HS (see, to that effect, Case C‑309/98 Holz Geenen  [2000] ECR I‑1975, paragraph 13). In this connection, it is also important to note that the primacy of international agreements concluded by the Community over secondary Community legislation (Case C-344/04 IATA and Others  [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraph 34) requires that the latter, in so far as possible, be interpreted in conformity with those agreements (Case C‑61/94 Commission  v Germany  [1996] ECR I-3989, paragraph 52, and Case C‑286/02 Bellio F.lli  [2004] ECR I-3465, paragraph 33).
26. Furthermore, it is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, inter alia, Case C-396/02 DFDS  [2004] ECR I-8439, paragraph 27, and Case C-495/03 Intermodal Transports  [2005] ECR I-0000, paragraph 47).
27. The explanatory notes drawn up, as regards the CN, by the Commission of the European Communities and, as regards the HS, by the WCO are an important aid to interpretation of the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force (see, inter alia, DFDS , paragraph 28, and Intermodal Transports , paragraph 48).
28. The content of those notes to the CN must therefore be compatible with its provisions and may not alter the scope of those provisions (see, in particular, Case C‑280/97 ROSE Electrotechnik  [1999] ECR I-689, paragraph 23, Case C‑42/99 Eru Portuguesa  [2000] ECR I-7691, paragraph 20, and Intermodal Transports , paragraph 48).
Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber.
Date: 2006-01-17
29. The answer to be given to the national court must therefore be that Article 3(1) of the Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that the court of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of the debtor’s main  interests is situated at the time when the debtor lodges the request to open insolvency proceedings retains jurisdiction to open those proceedings if the debtor moves the centre of his main interests to the territory of another Member State after lodging the request but before the proceedings are opened.
Costs
Asian Institute of Technology (AIT) v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2006-01-19
35. The Court observes in this connection that the application of Article 113 does not guarantee that an oral procedure will take place, as the Court of First Instance may, under Article 114(3) of its Rules of Procedure, to which Article 113 of those rules refers, give judgment following a solely written procedure.
Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2006-01-26
43. It is settled case-law that the choice of the legal basis for a Community measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, which include in particular the aim and the content of the measure (see, inter alia, Case C-300/89 Commission  v Council  (‘ Titanium dioxide ’) [1991] ECR I-2867; paragraph 10, Case C-269/97 Commission  v Council  [2000] ECR I-2257, paragraph 43; Case C‑211/01 Commission  v Council  [2003] ECR I-8913, paragraph 38; and Case C‑338/01 Commission  v Council , paragraph 54).
45. It follows that, as the Court held in paragraph 60 of its judgment in Case C‑338/01, if the Treaty contains a more specific provision that is capable of constituting the legal basis for the measure in question, that measure must be founded on such provision. That is, in particular, the case with regard to Article 93 EC so far as concerns the harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation.
46. It must also be pointed out that Article 95(2) EC expressly excludes certain areas from the scope of that article. This is in particular the case with regard to ‘fiscal provisions’, the approximation of which cannot therefore take place on the basis of that article (Case C-338/01, paragraph 61).
49. First, it can be seen from the first two recitals in the preamble to Regulation No 1798/2003 that its purpose is to combat tax evasion and tax avoidance and to ensure compliance with the laws on VAT, to the benefit of the national budgets and of the sound operation of the internal market.
52. The exchange of information thus set up is justified solely by the purpose of correctly assessing the VAT owed by taxable persons in order to ensure more efficient collection of the tax.
Declan O'Byrne v Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd and Sanofi Pasteur SA.
Date: 2006-02-09
24. In relation to the concept of putting into circulation referred to in Article 7 of the Directive, the Court has held that exemption from liability because the product has not been put into circulation covers, primarily, the cases in which a person other than the producer has caused the product to leave the process of manufacture. Uses of the product contrary to the producer’s intention, for example where the manufacturing process is not yet complete, and use for private purposes or in similar situations are also excluded from the scope of the directive (Case C-203/99 Veedfald [2001] ECR I-3569, paragraph 16).
25. In the same context, the Court decided, at paragraph 15 of Veedfald , that the cases exhaustively listed by Article 7 of the Directive by which a producer may exempt himself from liability, are to be interpreted strictly. Such an interpretation seeks to protect the interests of the victims of damage caused by a defective product.
26. Article 11 of the Directive, the purpose of which is to place a time-limit on the exercise of the rights conferred by the Directive on the victim, is, on the other hand, of a neutral character. As is clear from the 10 th  recital in the preamble to the Directive, the aim of that provision is to satisfy the requirements of legal certainty in the interests of the parties involved. The establishment of the time-limits within which the victim’s action must be brought must therefore satisfy objective criteria.
34. In that regard it must be observed that the Directive does not determine the procedural mechanisms which it is appropriate to apply when a victim brings an action for liability for defective products and makes an error as to the identity of the producer. It is therefore, as a rule, for national procedural law to determine the conditions in accordance with which one party may be substituted for another in the context of such an action.
35. However, it must be observed that the class of persons liable against whom an injured person is entitled to bring an action under the system of liability laid down by the Directive is defined in Articles 1 and 3 of the Directive (Case C-402/03 Skov and Bilka  [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraph 32). Since the Directive seeks to achieve a complete harmonisation in the matters it regulates, its determination in those provisions of the class of persons liable must be regarded as exhaustive ( Skov and Bilka , paragraph 33).
Plumex v Young Sports NV.
Date: 2006-02-09
19. By its first question, the national court asks, essentially, whether any hierarchy exists between service through agencies and service by post, whereby the first method takes precedence over the second where both have been validly effected.
20. It must be observed at the outset that there is nothing in the wording of the Regulation to indicate that it introduced a hierarchy between those methods of service. Neither the recitals in its preamble nor its provisions state that a method of transmission and service, used in accordance with the rules of the Regulation, would rank below the method of service through agencies.
21. Moreover, it follows from the spirit and purpose of the Regulation that it is intended to ensure that judicial documents are served effectively, while respecting the legitimate interests of the persons on whom they are served. Although all the methods of service provided for by the Regulation can ensure, as a rule, that those interests are respected, it must be conceivable, in view of that purpose, to use one or other, or indeed two or more at once of those methods of service which appear the most suitable or appropriate in light of the circumstances of the case.
22. In view of the foregoing, the answer to the first question must be that the Regulation does not establish any hierarchy between service through agencies and service by post and, consequently, it is possible to serve a judicial document by one or other or both of those methods.
The second question
25. In that respect, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, it is solely for the national courts before which actions are brought, and which must bear the responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the special features of each case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which they submit to the Court. Consequently, where the questions referred involve the interpretation of Community law, the Court is, in principle, obliged to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra  [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 38, and Case C-18/01 Korhonen and Others  [2003] ECR I-5321, paragraph 19).
31. It follows from all those considerations that, where service is effected more than once in accordance with the Regulation, account must be taken of the service effected first. There is nothing in the Regulation to preclude the application of such an approach to the relationship between service through agencies and service by post. Accordingly, where service is effected by both those methods, in order to determine vis-à-vis the person on whom service is effected the point from which time starts to run for the purposes of a procedural time-limit linked to effecting service, reference must be made to the date of service by post, where that occurred first.
Carmen Sarkatzis Herrero v Instituto Madrileño de la Salud (Imsalud).
Date: 2006-02-16
35. First, it must be noted that the Court has held that Directive 76/207 applies to employment in the public service. That directive is of general application, a factor inherent in the very nature of the principle which it lays down (see Case 248/83 Commission  v Germany  [1985] ECR 1459, paragraph 16).
36. As the Advocate General observed in point 34 of her Opinion, Article 2(1) of Directive 76/207 prohibits any discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex and Article 3 et seq. of the same directive define the areas in which there is to be no discrimination. Thus, direct and indirect discrimination are prohibited as regards conditions for access to employment, including selection criteria and recruitment conditions, access to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance, vocational training, advanced vocational training and retraining and also as regards work experience, conditions of employment, working conditions and participation in an organisation which represents workers or others.
37. In the exercise of the rights conferred under Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207, women cannot be the subject of unfavourable treatment regarding their access to employment and working conditions, since the aim of the directive, in that respect, is to ensure substantive, not formal equality (see, to that effect, Case C-136/95 Thibault  [1998] ECR I-2011, paragraph 26).
38. Thus the application of provisions concerning the protection of pregnant women cannot result in unfavourable treatment regarding their access to employment, so that it is not permissible for an employer to refuse to take on a pregnant woman on the ground that a prohibition on employment arising on account of the pregnancy would prevent her being employed from the outset and for the duration of the pregnancy in the post of unlimited duration to be filled (Case C-207/98 Mahlburg  [2000] ECR I-549, paragraph 27).
39. Lastly, as regards the taking into consideration of a period of maternity leave in respect of attaining a higher grade in the professional hierarchy, the Court has held that a female worker is protected in her employment relationship against any unfavourable treatment on the ground that she is or has been on maternity leave and that a woman who is treated unfavourably because of absence on maternity leave suffers discrimination on the ground of her pregnancy and of that leave (see Case C-284/02 Sass  [2004] ECR I-11143, paragraphs 35 and 36).