Syndicat OP 84 v Établissement national des produits de l’agriculture et de la mer (FranceAgriMer).
Date: 2013-06-13
21. In relation to those objectives, it is apparent from the first, third and fourth recitals of Regulation No 4045/89, read in conjunction, that that regulation seeks to strengthen the effectiveness of inspections for which Member States are responsible in order to prevent and eliminate irregularities that may exist in the context of the EAGGF (see Joined Cases C-671/11 to C‑676/11 Unanimes and Others [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 17).
22. To ensure that national scrutiny is actually carried out and executed correctly and, accordingly, that the need to protect the financial interests of the European Union is served, Regulation No 4045/89 makes that scrutiny itself sub ject to supervision and coordination on the part of the Commission, reflecting the reasoning of the tenth recital. Article 2 specifically of that regulation seeks to organise the uniform system for scrutiny under the supervision of the Commission. Article 2(4) ensures inter alia that scrutiny is to some extent systematic and to some extent regular (see Unanimes and Others , paragraph 18).
29. That provision merely lays down organisational rules in order to secure the effectiveness of the scrutiny and, as is apparent from paragraph 22 above, governs the relations between the Member States and the European Union for the purposes of safeguarding the European Union’s financial interests. On the other hand, that provision does not apply to relations between scrutiny authorities and the operators scrutinised.
30. Accordingly, Article 2(4) of Regulation No 4045/89 cannot, in particular, be construed as conferring upon the operators concerned a right enabling them to oppose checks other or broader than those envisaged by that provision. Moreover, in so far as it might have the effect of preventing the recovery of aid which has been unlawfully collected or used, such a right would imperil the protection of the financial interests of the European Union (see Unanimes and Others , paragraph 29).
31. In any event, the checks required under Regulation No 4045/89 concern operators who voluntarily signed up for the support scheme established by the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF and who, in order to receive aid, accepted the performance of inspections to verify that the European Union’s resources had been used properly. Those operators cannot validly call into question the lawfulness of such scrutiny simply because it was not in conformity with the organisational rules concerning the relations between the Member States and the Commission (see Unanimes and Others , paragraph 30).
32. The fact remains that legal certainty for the operators scrutinised vis-à-vis the public authorities who carry out those inspections and who decide, where appropriate, whether to bring proceedings is ensured by the rule laid down in Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European Communities financial interests (OJ 1995 L 312, p. 1), under which proceedings are, as a rule, time-barred after four years have elapsed from the time of the infringement of a provision of European Union law as a result of an act or omission on the part of an economic operator, which has, or would have, the effect of adversely affecting the budget of the European Union. As the Court has already observed, in general, time-bars fulfil the function of ensuring legal certainty (see Case C‑278/02 Handlbauer  [2004] ECR I‑6171, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).