Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1997-03-20
18 Thus, in the German Government's view, the Commission disregarded the rule that, in proceedings before the Court under Article 169 of the Treaty, the subject-matter of the dispute is not determined solely by the default alleged, but also by the points relied on in support of the complaints raised against the Member State concerned.
22 On that point, it should be noted first that the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is to give the Member State concerned an opportunity, on the one hand, to comply with its obligations under Community law and, on the other, to avail itself of its right to defend itself against the complaints made by the Commission (Case 293/85 Commission v Belgium [1988] ECR 305, paragraph 13).
23 As the Court has consistently held (see, in particular, Case C-296/92 Commission v Italy [1994] ECR I-1, paragraph 11), the subject-matter of an action brought under Article 169 of the Treaty is delimited by the pre-litigation procedure provided for by that article.  Consequently, the action cannot be founded on any complaints other than those formulated in the reasoned opinion (see also Case C-157/91 Commission v Netherlands [1992] ECR I-5899, paragraph 17).
24 The Court has also held (see, in particular, Case 301/81 Commission v Belgium [1983] ECR 467, paragraph 8) that the reasoned opinion must contain a cogent and detailed exposition of the reasons which led the Commission to the conclusion that the Member State concerned had failed to fulfil one of its obligations under the Treaty.
35 On that point, it is settled law (see, in particular, Commission v Germany, cited above, paragraph 15) that the transposition of a directive into national law does not necessarily require its provisions to be formally incorporated verbatim in express, specific legislation; a general legal context may, depending on the content of the directive in question, be adequate for the purpose, provided that it does indeed guarantee the full application of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner so that, where the directive is intended to create rights for individuals, the persons concerned can ascertain the full extent of their rights and, where appropriate, rely on them before the national courts.  That condition is of particular importance where the directive in question is intended to confer rights on nationals of other Member States (Case C-365/93 Commission v Greece [1995] ECR I-499, paragraph 9).
37 That view is not affected by the German Government's argument that the two directives are so detailed that the national authorities could recognize, and individuals perceive, the right to freedom of movement on the basis of their provisions alone.  The right of persons to rely in law on a directive against a Member State in specific circumstances is no more than a minimum guarantee, arising from the binding nature of the obligation imposed on the Member States by the effect of directives under the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty, which cannot justify a Member State's absolving itself from taking in due time implementing measures sufficient to meet the purpose of each directive (see, inter alia, Case 102/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 1473, paragraph 12).
38 As regards the argument that the Länder administrative authorities were informed of the implications of the two directives at issue, it should be recalled that a Member State cannot discharge its obligations under a directive by means of a mere circular which can be amended by the administration at will (Case 239/85 Commission v Belgium [1986] ECR 3645, paragraph 7).