larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
W. P. Willems and Others v Burgemeester van Nuth and Others.
Date: 2015-04-16
26. The first questions in Cases C‑446/12, C‑448/12 and C‑449/12 and the second question in Case C‑447/12 concerned the validity of Article 1(2) of Regulation No 2252/2004. They corresponded to the question referred for a preliminary ruling which gave rise to the judgment in Schwarz (C‑291/12, EU:C:2013:670).
46. The Court has already held, in its judgment in Schwarz (C‑291/12, EU:C:2013:670), that the use and storage of biometric data for the purposes specified in Article 4(3) of that regulation are compatible with the requirements of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.
48. It follows, in particular, that Regulation No 2252/2004 does not require a Member State to guarantee in its legislation that biometric data will not be used or stored by that State for purposes other than those mentioned in Article 4(3) of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment in Schwarz , C‑291/12, EU:C:2013:670, paragraph 61).
49. Next, as regards Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must be respected where national legislation falls within the scope of EU law. In other words, the applicability of EU law entails the applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter (judgments in Åkerberg Fransson , C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraphs 20 and 22, and Texdata Software , C‑418/11, EU:C:2013:588, paragraphs 71 to 73).
51. The foregoing considerations are without prejudice to any examination by the national courts of the compatibility of all the national measures relating to the use and storage of biometric data with their national law and, if appropriate, with the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (see, to that effect, judgment in Schwarz , C‑291/12, EU:C:2013:670, paragraph 62).
Hermann Lutz v Elke Bäuerle.
Date: 2015-04-16
27. With regard to the categorisation of a right to attach the credit balance on bank accounts as a ‘right in rem’, it should be noted that Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1346/2000 mentions, among the ‘rights in rem’ referred to in Article 5(1) of that regulation, the exclusive right to have a claim met. In addition, as is apparent from recital 25 of that regulation, the basis, validity and extent of a right in rem should normally be determined according to the lex situs .
34. However, Article 13 of Regulation No 1346/2000 does provide for an exception to the general rule, in Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1346/2000, that the law applicable to insolvency proceedings and their effects is to be the lex fori concursus . That exception, which, as stated in recital 24 of that regulation, aims to protect legitimate expectations and the certainty of transactions in Member States other than that in which proceedings are opened, must be interpreted strictly, and its scope cannot go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.
36. It must therefore be held that Article 13 of Regulation No 1346/2000 is not, in principle, applicable to acts which take place after the opening of insolvency proceedings.
46. Secondly, whilst Article 12(1)(d) of the Rome I Regulation states that prescription and limitation of actions are governed by ‘the law applicable to a contract’, it must be held that those provisions do not apply to actions to set transactions aside falling within Articles 4 and 13 of Regulation No 1346/2000. Those articles constitute a lex specialis  in relation to the Rome I Regulation and must be interpreted in the light of the objectives pursued by Regulation No 1346/2000.
49. In those circumstances, the answer to the second question is that Article 13 of Regulation No 1346/2000 must be interpreted as meaning that the defence which it establishes also applies to limitation periods or other time-bars relating to actions to set aside transactions under the lex causae .
The third question
LFB Biomédicaments SA and Others v Ministre des Finances et des Comptes publics and Ministre des Affaires sociales et de la Santé.
Date: 2015-04-16
16. LFB and PFM submit that the obligation to state reasons provided for in Article 6(5) of Directive 89/105 concerns all measures for covering medicinal products under the health insurance scheme. The Court’s case-law has established the principle that Article 6 of that directive is to be interpreted broadly (judgments in Commission  v Austria , C‑424/99, EU:C:2001:642 and Commission  v Finland , C‑229/00, EU:C:2003:334). LFB and PFM observe that the Decree of 21 February 2012 leads to a lower level of coverage and, correlatively, a reduction in the demand for the medicinal products removed from the list in question.
23. The Commission, relying on a purposive interpretation of Directive 89/105, submits that the obligation to state reasons provided for in Article 6 thereof must be interpreted broadly (see judgments in Commission  v Austria , C‑424/99, EU:C:2001:642, paragraphs 24 to 32; Commission  v Finland , C‑229/00, EU:C:2003:334, paragraphs 37 to 40; Pohl-Boskamp , C‑317/05, EU:C:2006:684, and Commission  v Austria , C‑311/07, EU:C:2008:431, paragraph 29). It submits that Article 6(3) to (5) of that directive is accordingly applicable to a decision such as the Decree of 21 February 2012.
26. It should be noted that the purpose of Directive 89/105, according to Article 1 thereof, is to ensure that any national measure to control the prices of medicinal products for human use or to restrict the range of medicinal products covered by the national health insurance systems complies with the requirements of that directive (judgment in Commission  v Finland , C‑229/00, EU:C:2003:334, paragraph 37  and the case-law cited).
27. According to the sixth recital in the preamble to Directive 89/105, ensuring the effectiveness of that directive also requires that the persons concerned can verify that the official entry of medicinal products on the list corresponds to objective criteria and that there is no discrimination between national medicinal products and those from other Member States (judgment in Commission  v Finland , C‑229/00, EU:C:2003:334, paragraph 39).
28. According to the fifth recital in the preamble to Directive 89/105, its main purpose is to ensure transparency of pricing, including the manner in which it operates in individual cases and the criteria on which it is based, and to provide public access to pricing arrangements for all those involved in the market in medicinal products in the Member States (see, to that effect, judgment in Pohl-Boskamp , C‑317/05, EU:C:2006:684, paragraph 29).
29. The Court has also held that the decisions pursuant to which certain medicinal products qualify for higher-rate cover constitute a means of determining the extent of the range of medicinal products covered by the health insurance scheme and likely to be used in the treatment of such or such an illness (judgment in Commission  v Finland , C‑229/00, EU:C:2003:334, paragraph 38).
European Commission v Kingdom of Sweden.
Date: 2015-04-21
17. According to the Commission, the Kingdom of Sweden is required to implement the exemption laid down in Article 132(1)(a) of Directive 2006/112 even if it considers that it can better ensure fiscal neutrality by means other than the exemption. The Commission relies in this respect on the judgment in Commission  v Spain  (C‑204/03, EU:C:2005:588, paragraph 28).
28. On this point, it should be recalled that the Court has previously held that the term ‘public postal services’ in Article 13A(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive 77/388, the wording of which is reproduced identically in Article 132(1)(a) of Directive 2006/112, must be interpreted to cover operators, whether they are public or private, who undertake to provide in a Member State all or part of the ‘universal postal service’ within the meaning of Directive 97/67 (see, to that effect, judgment in TNT Post UK , C‑357/07, EU:C:2009:248, paragraph 40).
35. Where an obligation derives from an interpretation of EU law by the Court, the Court has clarified and defined the meaning and scope of the rule as it ought to have been understood and applied from the time of its entry into force, so that the Member States should, from that time, have interpreted and applied EU law as it follows from the Court’s judgment, even if that was later. It is otherwise only if, for reasons of legal certainty, the Court has exceptionally restricted, as regards the past, the opportunity of relying on the law as thus interpreted with a view to reopening legal relationships (see judgment in Denkavit Italiana , 61/79, EU:C:1980:100, paragraphs 16 and 17), which is not the case with the judgment in TNT Post UK  (C‑357//07, EU:C:2009:248).
Drukarnia Multipress sp. z o.o. v Minister Finansów.
Date: 2015-04-22
22. According to settled case-law of the Court, in the interpretation of a provision of EU law, account must be taken not only of its wording but also of the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it forms part, and if appropriate of the origins of those rules (see, to that effect, judgments in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others  v Parliament and Council , C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 50; Koushkaki , C‑84/12, EU:C:2013:862, paragraph 34; and Bouman , C‑114/13, EU:C:2015:81, paragraph 31).
23. In the present case, it is appropriate to examine, in the first place, the context of Article 2(1)(b) and (c) of Directive 2008/7. It follows from Article 2(1) of that directive that the definition of ‘capital company’ is a wide one and is not tied to any specific form of company (see, to that effect, judgment in Amro Aandelen Fonds , 112/86, EU:C:1987:488, paragraph 8).
26. Moreover, Article 2(2) of Directive 2008/7 deems any other company, firm, association or legal person operating for profit to be a capital company. The objective of that provision is to prevent the choice of a particular legal form from resulting in the different fiscal treatment of transactions which, from an economic point of view, are equivalent, the provision thus making it possible to cover entities which, while having the same economic function as capital companies properly so called, namely the earning of a profit by the pooling of capital in a separate set of assets, do not satisfy the criteria to be a ‘capital company’ as defined in Article 2(1) of that directive (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission  v Greece , C‑178/05, EU:C:2007:317, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
27. While Article 9 of Directive 2008/7 leaves the Member States the option of not regarding the entities listed in Article 2(2) of that directive as capital companies for the purposes of charging capital duty, no possibility of derogation is provided for in respect of the entities referred to in Article 2(1) of the directive, which lays down, in a mandatory and uniform manner for all Member States, the companies to be regarded as capital companies within the meaning of that directive (judgment in ING. AUER , C‑251/06, EU:C:2007:658, paragraph 21).
Zuchtvieh-Export GmbH v Stadt Kempten.
Date: 2015-04-23
35. It should be noted, as a preliminary point, that it follows, first of all, from recital 1 of Regulation No 1/2005 that that regulation is based on Protocol (No 33) on protection and welfare of animals, annexed to the EC Treaty, under which the Community and the Member States, in formulating and implementing the Community’s policies on inter alia agriculture and transport, are to pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals. According to the case-law, the protection of animal welfare is a legitimate objective in the public interest, the importance of which was reflected, in particular, in the adoption by the Member States of that protocol (see, to that effect, Viamex Agrar Handel and ZVK , C‑37/06 and C‑58/06, EU:C:2008:18, paragraph 22, and Nationale Raad van Dierenkwekers en Liefhebbers and Andibel , C‑219/07, EU:C:2008:353, paragraph 27). The substance of Protocol No 33 is henceforth to be found in Article 13 TFEU, which is a provision of general application of the FEU Treaty, contained in Part One thereof, setting out the ‘Principles’.
56. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred is that Article 14(1) of Regulation No 1/2005 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order for transport involving a long journey for animals concerned which commences on the territory of the European Union and continues outside that territory to be authorised by the competent authority of the place of departure, the organiser of the journey must submit a journey log which, in the light of the arrangements for the journey as planned, is realistic and indicates that the provisions of that regulation will be complied with, including for the stages of the journey which are to take place in the territory of third countries, that authority being empowered, should that not be the case, to require changes to those arrangements to ensure compliance with those provisions throughout the journey.
Costs
Nationale-Nederlanden Levensverzekering Mij NV v Hubertus Wilhelmus van Leeuwen.
Date: 2015-04-29
21. In that regard, the Court has held that it is apparent from the express wording of Article 31(3), Annex II and recital 23 in the preamble to the third life assurance directive that the additional information Member States may require in accordance with that article must be clear, accurate and necessary for a proper understanding of the essential characteristics of assurance products proposed to the policyholder (judgment in Axa Royale Belge , C‑386/00, EU:C:2002:136, paragraph 24).
22. An obligation to provide additional information can therefore be imposed only where it is necessary to achieving the objective of informing the policyholder and where the information required is clear and accurate in order to achieve that objective and thus, in particular, in order to guarantee the insurance companies a sufficient level of legal certainty (see, to that effect, judgment in Parliament  v Council , C‑48/14, EU:C:2015:91, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited). As the Advocate General noted in point 60 of her Opinion, if information is general and vague, it will not be ‘information that is necessary’ for the purposes described in Article 31(3) of the third life assurance directive.
SMK kft v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Dél-alföldi Regionális Adó Főigazgatósága and Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal.
Date: 2015-04-30
27. As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. With this in mind, the Court of Justice may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (see judgment in Douane Advies Bureau Rietveld , C‑541/13, EU:C:2014:2270, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
31. The VAT Directive, which replaced the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1), includes Title V dealing with the place of taxable transactions. In that title, Chapter 3 relates to the place of supply of services, and Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 3 lay down the general rules for determining the place of taxation of those supplies and particular provisions relating to specific supplies of services. Like Article 9(2) and (3) of the Sixth Directive 77/388, Articles 44 to 59 of the VAT Directive contain rules which determine the specific places of reference for tax purposes (see judgment in Welmory , C‑605/12, EU:C:2014:2298, paragraphs 37 and 38).
32. In accordance with well-established case-law of the Court, the object of the provisions determining the point of reference for tax purposes of supplies of services is to avoid, first, conflicts of jurisdiction which may result in double taxation and, secondly, non-taxation (judgment in Welmory , C‑605/12, EU:C:2014:2298, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
33. Thus a provision such as Article 55 of the VAT Directive determines the point of reference for tax purposes of a supply of services and delimits the competences of the Member States. For that purpose, it aims to create a rational delimitation of the respective areas covered by national rules on VAT by determining in a uniform manner the point of reference for tax purposes of supplies of services (see, to that effect, judgment in Welmory , C‑605/12, EU:C:2014:2298, paragraphs 50 and 51).
"Gazprom" OAO v Lietuvos Respublika.
Date: 2015-05-13
29. In order to determine whether a dispute falls within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001, reference must be made solely to the subject-matter of the dispute (judgment in Rich , C‑190/89, EU:C:1991:319, paragraph 26).
33. An injunction issued by a court of a Member State requiring a party to arbitration proceedings not to continue proceedings before a court of another Member State is contrary to the general principle which emerges from the case-law of the Court that every court seised itself determines, under the applicable rules, whether it has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute before it. It should be borne in mind in that regard that Regulation No 44/2001, apart from a few limited exceptions, does not authorise the jurisdiction of a court of a Member State to be reviewed by a court in another Member State. That jurisdiction is determined directly by the rules laid down by that regulation, including those relating to its scope. Thus in no case is a court of one Member State in a better position to determine whether the court of another Member State has jurisdiction (see judgment in Allianz and Generali Assicurazioni Generali , C‑185/07, EU:C:2009:69, paragraph 29).
34. The Court has held in particular that obstructing, by means of such an injunction, the exercise by a court of a Member State of the powers conferred on it by Regulation No 44/2001 runs counter to the trust which the Member States accord to one another’s legal systems and judicial institutions and is liable to bar an applicant who considers that an arbitration agreement is void, inoperative or incapable of being performed from access to the court before which he nevertheless brought proceedings (see, to this effect, judgment in Allianz and Generali Assicurazioni Generali , C‑185/07, EU:C:2009:69, paragraphs 30 and 31).
40. Finally, unlike the injunction at issue in the case which gave rise to the judgment in Allianz and Generali Assicurazioni Generali  (C‑185/07, EU:C:2009:69, paragraph 20), failure on the part of the Ministry to comply with the arbitral award of 31 July 2012 in the context of the proceedings relating to initiation of an investigation in respect of the activities of a legal person is not capable of resulting in penalties being imposed upon it by a court of another Member State. It follows that the legal effects of an arbitral award such as that at issue in the main proceedings can be distinguished from those of the injunction at issue in the case which gave rise to that judgment.
43. Since the New York Convention governs a field excluded from the scope of Regulation No 44/2001, it does not relate to a ‘particular matter’ within the meaning of Article 71(1) of that regulation. Article 71 governs only the relations between that regulation and conventions falling under the particular matters that come within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001 (see, to this effect, judgment in TNT Express Nederland , C‑533/08, EU:C:2010:243, paragraphs 48 and 51).
Ralf Schräder v Community Plant Variety Office.
Date: 2015-05-21
72. First, it is settled case-law that the obligation for the General Court, under Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 thereof and Article 81 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, to state reasons does not require the General Court to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case. The reasoning of the General Court may therefore be implicit on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know the reason for the General Court’s decision and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (see, inter alia, judgment in Nexans and Nexans France  v Commission , C‑37/13 P, EU:C:2014:2030, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
81. It must be noted at the outset that it follows from Article 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice that the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to find the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and, secondly, to assess those facts. However, when the General Court has found or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 256 TFEU to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the General Court and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (see, inter alia, judgment in CB  v Commission , C‑67/13 P, EU:C:2014:2204, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
Charlotte Rosselle v Institut national d'assurance maladie-invalidité (INAMI) and Union nationale des mutualités libres (UNM).
Date: 2015-05-21
30. According to the settled case-law of the Court, the right to maternity leave granted to pregnant workers must be regarded as a particularly important mechanism of protection under employment law. The EU legislature thus considered that the fundamental changes to the living conditions of the persons concerned during the period of at least 14 weeks preceding and after childbirth constituted a legitimate ground on which they could suspend their employment, without the public authorities or employers being allowed in any way to call the legitimacy of that ground into question (judgments in Kiiski , C‑116/06, EU:C:2007:536, paragraph 49; in Betriu Montull , C‑5/12, EU:C:2013:571, paragraph 48; and in D. , C‑167/12, EU:C:2014:169, point 32).
43. According to the Court’s settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments in Merck , 292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12; in TNT Express Nederland , C‑533/08, EU:C:2010:243, paragraph 44; and in Utopia , C‑40/14, EU:C:2014:2389, paragraph 27).
44. In that respect, it should be borne in mind that the objective of Directive 92/85, which was adopted on the basis of Article 118a of the EEC Treaty, is to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or who are breastfeeding (judgments in Paquay , C‑460/06, EU:C:2007:601, paragraph 27; in Danosa , C‑232/09, EU:C:2010:674, paragraph 58; and D. , C‑167/12, EU:C:2014:169, paragraph 29).
45. In that context, and as can be seen from the 17th recital in the preamble to Directive 92/85, in view of the risk that the provisions relating to maternity leave would be ineffective if rights connected with the employment contract were not maintained, the EU legislature provided, in Article 11(2)(b) of Directive 92/85, that maintenance of a payment to, and/or entitlement to an adequate allowance for workers to whom the directive applies must be ensured in the case of the maternity leave referred to in Article 8 of that directive (see, to that effect, judgment in Boyle and Others , C‑411/96, EU:C:1998:506, paragraph 30).