Skov Æg v Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S and Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S v Jette Mikkelsen and Michael Due Nielsen.
Date: 2006-01-10
22. In Case C‑52/00 Commission  v France  [2002] ECR I‑3827, paragraph 16, Case C‑154/00 Commission  v Greece  [2002] ECR I‑3879, paragraph 12, and Case C‑183/00 González Sánchez  [2002] ECR I‑3901, paragraph 25, the Court held that the margin of discretion available to the Member States to make provision for product liability is entirely determined by the Directive itself and must be inferred from its wording, purpose and structure.
23. The Court considered those criteria and concluded that the Directive seeks to achieve, in the matters regulated by it, complete harmonisation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States ( Commission  v France , paragraph 24, and Commission  v Greece , paragraph 20).
29. It follows that it was after weighing up the parts played by the various economic operators involved in the production and distribution chain that the choice was made to allocate liability for damage caused by defective products in principle to producers, and only in certain defined cases to importers and suppliers, in the legal system established by the Directive.
32. On this point, it must be observed that the class of persons liable against whom an injured person is entitled to bring an action under the system of liability laid down by the Directive is defined in Articles 1 and 3 of the Directive (see paragraphs 29 and 30 above).
33. Since the Directive, as pointed out in paragraph 23 above, seeks to achieve complete harmonisation in the matters regulated by it, its determination in Articles 1 and 3 of the class of persons liable must be regarded as exhaustive.
34. Article 3(3) of the Directive provides for the supplier to be liable only in the case where the producer cannot be identified. By laying down in Paragraph 10 of Law No 371 that the supplier is to be answerable directly to injured persons for defects in a product, the Danish legislature therefore extended the class of persons liable against whom the injured person is entitled to bring proceedings under the system of liability laid down by the Directive beyond the limits fixed by the Directive.
39. On this point, it should be recalled that in Commission  v France , paragraph 21, Commission  v Greece , paragraph 17, and González Sánchez , paragraph 30, the Court held, after analysing the wording, purpose and structure of the Directive, that Article 13 could not be interpreted as leaving it open to the Member States to maintain a general system of product liability different from that provided for in the Directive.
42. On this point, first, it must be recalled that, where a statement recorded in Council minutes is not referred to in the wording of a provision of secondary legislation, it cannot be used for the purpose of interpreting that provision (see, in particular, Case C‑292/89 Antonissen  [1991] ECR I‑745, paragraph 18, and Case C‑375/98 Epson Europe  [2000] ECR I‑4243, paragraph 26).
47. On this point, it must be recalled that in Commission  v France , paragraph 22, Commission  v Greece , paragraph 18, and González Sánchez , paragraph 31, the Court held that Article 13 of the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that the system of rules put in place by the Directive does not preclude the application of other systems of contractual or non-contractual liability based on other grounds, such as fault or a warranty in respect of latent defects.
50. According to settled case-law, the interpretation which the Court, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 234 EC, gives to a rule of Community law clarifies and where necessary defines the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be, or ought to have been, understood and applied from the time of its coming into force. It follows that the rule as thus interpreted can, and must, be applied by the courts even to legal relationships arising and established before the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation, provided that in other respects the conditions for bringing before the courts having jurisdiction an action relating to the application of that rule are satisfied (see, inter alia, Case 24/86 Blaizot  [1988] ECR 379, paragraph 27, and Case C‑415/93 Bosman  [1995] ECR I‑4921, paragraph 141).
51. It is only exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the Community legal order, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling in question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely that those concerned should have acted in good faith and that there should be a risk of serious difficulties (see, inter alia, Case C‑57/93 Vroege  [1994] ECR I‑4541, paragraph 21, and Case C‑372/98 Cooke  [2000] ECR I‑8683, paragraph 42).