larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Kingdom of Spain v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2006-09-12
66. As regards Articles 17 EC and 19 EC, which are in Part Two of the Treaty, relating to citizenship of the Union, only the latter of those provisions deals, in paragraph 2, with the right to vote for the European Parliament. That article is confined to applying the principle of non‑discrimination on grounds of nationality to the exercise of that right, by providing that every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national is to have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State.
70. However, neither Article 190 EC nor the 1976 Act defines expressly and precisely who are to be entitled to the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament. In themselves, those provisions do not exclude, therefore, a person who is not a citizen of the Union, such as a QCC resident in Gibraltar, from being entitled to the right to vote and stand for election. However, it must be ascertained whether there is, as the Kingdom of Spain submits, a clear link between citizenship of the Union and the right to vote and stand for election which requires that that right be always limited to citizens of the Union.
74. Moreover, while citizenship of the Union is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to receive the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for (Case C‑184/99 Grzelczyk  [2001] ECR I‑6193, paragraph 31), that statement does not necessarily mean that the rights recognised by the Treaty are limited to citizens of the Union.
78. It follows from all of those considerations that, in the current state of Community law, the definition of the persons entitled to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament falls within the competence of each Member State in compliance with Community law, and that Articles 189 EC, 190 EC, 17 EC and 19 EC do not preclude the Member States from granting that right to vote and to stand as a candidate to certain persons who have close links to them, other than their own nationals or citizens of the Union resident in their territory.
Commission of the European Communities v Maria Dolores Fernández Gómez.
Date: 2006-09-14
44. Even if the email at issue does contain a decision, case-law provides that it is only the contract of employment which produces legal effects in respect of the persons covered by the Staff Regulations (see, to that effect, Case 329/85 Castagnoli  v Commission  [1987] ECR 3281, paragraphs 10 and 11, and order in Case 95/87 Contini  v Commission  [1988] ECR 2537, paragraph 8). As it is, it is common ground that the respondent did not raise any objection to the terms of her contract, which were explained in the accompanying letter of 19 January 2000, within the statutory time‑limits.
46. A measure which contains no new factor as compared with a previous measure constitutes a purely confirmatory measure and cannot therefore have the effect of setting a fresh time-limit (see Case 23/80 Grasselli  v Commission  [1980] ECR 3709, paragraph 18).
Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Austria.
Date: 2006-09-28
22. Firstly, it should be recalled that Article 24(1) of the Sixth Directive gives Member States the option of applying a special scheme to small undertakings, which constitutes an exception to the normal rules of the directive (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑308/96 and C‑94/97 Madgett and Baldwin  [1998] ECR I‑6229, paragraph 34).   Like the other special schemes provided for in Articles 25 and 26 of the directive, the scheme under Article 24 must be applied only to the extent necessary to achieve its objective (see, to that effect, Case C‑280/04 Jyske Finans  [2005] ECR I‑10683, paragraph 35).  Moreover, it is settled case-law that any exception to or derogation from a general rule is to be interpreted strictly (Case C‑83/99 Commission  v Spain  [2001] ECR I‑445, paragraph 19, and Case C‑321/02 Harbs  [2004] ECR I‑7101, paragraph 27).
25. Article 24(1) of the Sixth Directive provides that Member States have the option ‘of applying simplified procedures such as flat-rate schemes for charging and collecting the tax’.  The wording of the provision does not show that they may exempt small undertakings totally from their obligation to pay VAT, since it permits the charging procedures merely to be simplified and makes no mention of any possibility of exempting the undertaking concerned entirely from VAT.  Moreover, in the case of an exemption such as that laid down by the regulation of the Finance Minister, moreover, the VAT is not charged, so that the ‘charging procedures’, even very simplified ones, to which that provision expressly refers no longer exist.  In addition, the ‘flat-rate schemes’ referred to as examples of simplified charging procedures are an illustration of the fact that, under the arrangement envisaged by that provision, undertakings are actually required to pay VAT.  Thus, the concept of ‘simplified procedures’ cannot include a total lack of charging and collecting of the tax.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 2006-10-05
20. Under the Court’s case-law, the existence of an infringement in an action based on Article 226 EC must be assessed in the light of the Community legislation in force at the close of the period prescribed by the Commission for the Member State concerned to comply with its reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C‑61/94 Commission v Germany  [1996] ECR I‑3989, paragraph 42, and Case C‑365/97 Commission v Italy  [1999] ECR I‑7773, paragraph 32).
21. Although the claims as stated in the application cannot in principle be extended beyond the infringements alleged in the operative part of the reasoned opinion and in the letter of formal notice, it is none the less true that the Commission has standing to seek a declaration that a Member State has failed to fulfil obligations which were created in the initial version of a Community measure, subsequently amended or repealed, and which were maintained in force under the new provisions. Conversely, the subject-matter of the dispute cannot be extended to obligations arising under new provisions which do not correspond to those arising under the initial version of the measure concerned, as otherwise it would constitute a breach of the essential procedural requirements of infringement proceedings (see, to this effect, Case C‑363/00 Commission v Italy  [2003] ECR I‑5767, paragraph 22).
22. It is not disputed that the obligations arising under Article 6(3)(a) and (b), Article 9(1), Article 10(1) and Article 11 of Regulation No 1150/2000 were already applicable under Article 6(2)(a) and (b), Article 9(1), Article 10(1) and Article 11 of Regulation No 1552/89 (see, concerning Articles 9(1) and 11, Case C‑363/00 Commission v Italy , paragraph 23).
48. In that regard, it is important to note at the outset that the legislation concerning the recovery of customs debts must be interpreted in the light of the aim of securing efficient and rapid availability of the Community’s own resources (see inter alia, to that effect, Case C‑112/01 SPKR  [2002] ECR I‑10655, paragraph 34, and Case C‑460/01 Commission v Netherlands  [2005] ECR I‑2613, paragraphs 60, 63, 69 and 70).
53. Under Article 11 of Regulation No 1150/2000, any delay in making the entry in the account referred to in Article 9(1) of that regulation gives rise to the payment of interest by the Member State concerned at the interest rate applicable to the entire period of delay. That interest is payable in respect of any delay, regardless of the reason for the delay in making the entry in the Commission’s account (see, inter alia, Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 91).
Commission of the European Communities v Portuguese Republic.
Date: 2006-10-05
32. Notwithstanding the existence of certain differences between the Guarantee and Guidance Sections of the EAGGF, the principles that derive from the Court’s case-law on the provisions of the regulations governing the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF, which require aid to be paid in full, are, as the Advocate General has observed at points 67 to 70 of his Opinion, applicable to the present case since the specific features of both of these sections are of secondary importance when compared with their shared feature, namely the fact that they are funded by the Community budget, allowing them to grant financial assistance in the form of subsidies for actions in their respective spheres of competence. Such assistance, which has the same single financial source, is subject in each case to the same rules for payment, such as the rule which requires that the amount received by the beneficiary must be the same as the one granted to him.
33. Thus, concerning the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF, the Court of Justice has held that Article 15(3) of Regulation No 1765/92 and Article 30a of Regulation No 805/68 prohibit the authorities in the Member States from making a deduction from the payments made or from demanding the payment of administrative fees charged for processing applications and having the effect of reducing the amount of the aid ( Kellinghusen and Ketelsen , paragraph 21).
35. That line of argument cannot be accepted. The prohibition on deductions cannot be interpreted in a purely formal manner as covering only deductions which are actually made on the occasion of payments. Thus the prohibition on any deduction must of necessity extend to all charges which are directly and inseparably linked to the amounts disbursed (see by analogy, concerning the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF, Case C‑312/02 Sweden v Commission  [2004] ECR I‑9247, paragraph 22).
ASM Lithography BV v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst-Douane Zuid/kantoor Roermond.
Date: 2006-10-05
41. However, the fact that in the present case the customs duties were, when they were paid, lawfully collected on account of the absence of a request by ASM Lithography for application of Article 122(c) of the Customs Code cannot have the consequence that those duties must subsequently be assimilated, despite a later request being made to that effect, to duties legally owed for the purposes of Article 236(1) of the Customs Code since, firstly, the absence of a request at the time when the customs duties were paid is the result of an error consisting in an involuntary omission which cannot be regarded as the definitive exercise of a choice, which is by definition voluntary, and, secondly, it is common ground that the duties legally owed following such a request would have been lower than the amount paid or even zero (see, to that effect, Case C-468/03 Overland Footwear  [2005] ECR I-8937, paragraphs 68 and 69).
Amalia Valeško v Zollamt Klagenfurt.
Date: 2006-10-05
36. The purpose of that directive, as its title suggests, is to harmonise exemptions from turnover tax and excise duty on imports in international travel. As is clear from the recitals in its preamble and from those in the preambles to the directives subsequently amending it, the aim is to liberalise still further the system of taxes on imports in travel in order to facilitate such travel (Case C-394/97 Heinonen  [1999] ECR I-3599, paragraph 25).
37. In addition, in the field covered by Directive 69/169, the Member States retain only the limited powers granted them by the actual provisions of the directive and of the directives amending it (Case C-96/91 Commission  v Spain  [1992] ECR I-3789, paragraph 10, and the case-law there cited).
58. As the Advocate General pointed out in point 35 of his Opinion, fiscal legislation is an important and effective instrument for discouraging consumption of those products and, therefore, for the protection of public health.
74. Since that national legislation is justified in the light of one of the measures referred to in Article 24 of the Act of Accession, in this case the transitional measure provided for in Section 6(2) of Annex XIII to that act, the question of the compatibility of that legislation with other provisions of primary law, such as Articles 23 EC, 25 EC and 26 EC, can no longer arise.
Commission of the European Communities v Portuguese Republic.
Date: 2006-10-26
19. That provision thus establishes a procedure intended to ensure, by means of a prior examination, that a plan or project which is not directly connected with or necessary to the management of the site concerned but likely to have a significant effect on it is authorised only to the extent that it will not adversely affect the integrity of that site (Case C‑127/02 Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging  [2004] ECR I‑7405, paragraph 34).
20. In that regard, the Court has already held that a plan or project such as the one in question may be granted authorisation only on the condition that the competent national authorities are certain that it will not have adverse effects on the integrity of the site concerned.  That is so where no reasonable scientific doubt remains as to the absence of such effects ( Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging , paragraphs 56 and 59).
24. The fact that, after its completion, the project may not have produced such effects is immaterial to that assessment.  It is at the time of adoption of the decision authorising implementation of the project that there must be no reasonable scientific doubt remaining as to the absence of adverse effects on the integrity of the site in question (see, to that effect, Case C‑209/02 Commission  v Austria  [2004] ECR I‑1211, paragraphs 26 and 27, and Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging , paragraphs 56 and 59).
25. In those circumstances, the Portuguese authorities had the choice of either refusing authorisation for the project or of authorising it under Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive, provided that the conditions laid down therein were satisfied (see, to that effect, Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging , paragraphs 57 and 60).
35. That provision, which permits a plan or project which has given rise to a negative assessment under the first sentence of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive to be implemented on certain conditions, must, as a derogation from the criterion for authorisation laid down in the second sentence of Article 6(3), be interpreted strictly.
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2006-10-26
8. It is appropriate at the outset to note that the Court may of its own motion examine whether the conditions laid down in Article 226 EC for bringing an action for failure to fulfil obligations are satisfied (see, inter alia, Case C-362/90 Commission  v Italy  [1992] ECR I-2353, paragraph 8; Case C-525/03 Commission  v Italy  [2005] ECR I-9405, paragraph 8; and Case C-98/04 Commission  v United Kingdom  [2006] ECR I-4003, paragraph 16).
9. In that regard, it is important to note that the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is to give the Member State concerned an opportunity to comply with its obligations under Community law or to avail itself of its right to defend itself against the complaints made by the Commission (Case 293/85 Commission  v Belgium  [1988] ECR 305, paragraph 13, and order in Case C‑266/94 Commission  v Spain  [1995] ECR I‑1975, paragraph 16). The proper conduct of that procedure thus constitutes an essential guarantee required by the EC Treaty in order to protect the rights of the Member State concerned. It is only when that guarantee is observed that the contentious procedure before the Court can enable it to judge whether that State has in fact failed to fulfil the obligations breach of which the Commission alleges (order in Commission  v Spain , cited above, paragraphs 17 and 18). More specifically, the purpose of the letter of formal notice in the pre-litigation procedure is to delimit the subject-matter of the dispute and to indicate to the Member State, which is invited to submit its observations, the factors enabling it to prepare its defence (Case C-145/01 Commission  v Italy  [2003] ECR I-5581, paragraph 17).
16. In that respect, it follows from settled case-law that, under Article 39 EC, where, in recruiting staff for posts which do not fall within the scope of Article 39(4) EC, a public body of a Member State provides for account to be taken of candidates’ previous employment in the public service, that body may not, in relation to Community nationals, make a distinction according to whether such employment was in the Member State of that body or in another Member State (see, inter alia, Case C‑419/92 Scholz  [1994] ECR I‑505, paragraph 12; Commission  v Italy , cited above, paragraph 14; and the judgment of 23 February 2006 in Case C-205/04 Commission  v Spain , not published in the ECR, paragraph 14).
17. As regards Article 7 of the Regulation, it must be borne in mind that it constitutes merely the specific expression of the principle of non-discrimination laid down by Article 39(2) EC within the specific field of conditions of employment and work and that it must, therefore, be interpreted in the same way as Article 39 EC ( Commission  v Spain , cited above, paragraph 15).
Turbon International GmbH v Oberfinanzdirektion Koblenz.
Date: 2006-10-26
10. It is apparent from the decision of the referring court that, following that judgment, Turbon International challenged before the referring court that part of the Court of Justice’s reasoning set out in paragraph 30 of that judgment, according to which the mechanical and electronic functioning of the printer is not dependent on the presence of an ink cartridge such as that at issue in the main proceedings. Turbon International maintains that such a premiss is factually inaccurate and that the Court wrongly inferred from this that an ink cartridge such as that at issue in the main proceedings cannot be regarded as ‘part’ of a printer within the meaning of CN heading 8473.
16. It is settled case‑law that, in the interests of legal certainty and for ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN. The explanatory notes drawn up by the Commission  of the European Communities as regards the CN and by the World Customs Organisation as regards the HS are an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force (see Case C-14/05 Anagram International  [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 20)
17. It is also apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the word ‘part’, within the meaning of heading 8473 of the CN, implies a whole for whose operation the part is essential (C-339/98 Peacock  [2000] ECR I-8947, paragraph 21).
20. Since the product at issue is composed of different materials and neither of the two subheadings mentioned above is more specific than the other, the sole provision to which recourse may be had for the purpose of classifying the goods is general rule 3(b) (see, to that effect, Case 253/87 Sportex  [1988] ECR 3351, paragraph 7).
21. Under Under that general rule, in carrying out the tariff classification of goods it is necessary to identify, from among the materials of which they are composed, the one which gives them their essential character. This may be done by determining whether the goods would retain their characteristic properties if one or other of their constituents were removed from them ( Sportex , paragraph 8; see also, to that effect, C-288/99 VauDe Sport  [2001] ECR I-3683, paragraph 25, and Turbon International , paragraph 26).
22. In the same way, as stated by paragraph VIII of the explanatory note to the HS on general rule 3(b), the factor which determines the essential character of the goods may, depending on the type of goods, be determined for example, by the nature of the material or component, its bulk, quantity, weight or value, or the role of a constituent material in relation to the use of the goods.
Alois Kibler jun. v Land Baden-Württemberg.
Date: 2006-10-26
21. Furthermore, it is important to point out, firstly, that it was apparent from the general scheme of the provisions concerning the additional levy on milk of which Regulation No 857/84 was an integral part that a reference quantity could be allocated to a farmer only if he had the status of a producer (Case C-341/89 Ballmann  [1991] ECR I-25, paragraph 9) and, secondly, that the Court has confirmed that principle in its case-law subsequent to the amendments made to Regulation No 857/84 by repeatedly holding that, where a reference quantity has already been allocated, a transferee who takes over the land must have the status of a producer in order for him to qualify for transfer of the reference quantity attaching thereto (see, inter alia, Case C-15/95 EARL de Kerlast  [1997] ECR I-1961, paragraph 24, and Thomsen , paragraph 33). Therefore, an express reference to the term ‘producer’ in the first subparagraph of Article 7(1) of Regulation No 857/84 cannot be required.
22. Doubt is in no way cast on that interpretation by the arguments of the German Government that, firstly, the reference quantity is always transferred with the holding, even where the landlord does not have the status of a producer, unless the Member States have exercised their  power to allocate in accordance with Article 7(4) of Regulation No 857/84 all or part of the reference quantity to the departing lessee and, secondly, that in the case which gave rise to the judgment in Case 5/88 Wachauf  [1989] ECR 2609 the landlord  who took over the holding was not a producer. It is apparent from the term ‘holding’ referred to in Article 12(1)(d) of Regulation No 857/84, which the Court has moreover interpreted in paragraph 11 of Wachauf , that for the purposes of that regulation, the holding is all the production units operated by the producer. Since the same term is referred to in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 857/84 and points 2, 3 and 4 of the first subparagraph of Article 7 of Regulation No 1546/88, those provisions must be interpreted uniformly. Furthermore, in so far as those provisions pursue the same objective and given that the latter provision cited is the measure implementing the former, clearly, in the interests of legal certainty, those provisions must be given a uniform interpretation.
27. That outcome is not, as the national court has itself observed, in conflict with the fundamental right to property since the right to property safeguarded by the Community legal order does not include the right to dispose, for profit, of an advantage, such as the reference quantities allocated in the context of the common organisation of a market, which does not derive from the assets or occupational activity of the person concerned (Case C-2/92 Bostock  [1994] ECR I-955, paragraph 19).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2006-10-26
23. It is to be noted at the outset that that directive does not harmonise all the rules relating to late payments in commercial transactions since it governs only certain specific rules intended to combat such delays, namely, rules on interest for late payments (Article 3), retention of title (Article 4) and procedures for recovery of unchallenged claims (Article 5).
24. Moreover, that directive refers to a number of areas in which national law is to apply. It is clear from recitals 15 and 19 in the preamble that that is the case in particular with regard to the various procedures of forced execution of an enforceable title, the conditions under which forced execution of such a title can be stopped or suspended and the way contracts are concluded.