larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Entertainment Bulgaria System EOOD v Direktor na Direktsia „Obzhalvane i danachno-osiguritelna praktika“ - Sofia.
Date: 2017-11-15
30


Second, it must be noted that, pursuant to the settled case-law of the Court, the fundamental principle of VAT neutrality requires that deduction of input VAT due or paid be allowed if the substantive requirements are satisfied, even if the taxable person has failed to comply with some of the formal requirements (see judgment of 9 July 2015, Salomie and Oltean, C‑183/14, EU:C:2015:454, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).
31


The Court has also held that identification for VAT purposes, provided for in Article 214 of Directive 2006/112, is only a formal requirement for the purposes of control, and cannot undermine, inter alia, the right to deduct VAT in the case where the substantive conditions that give rise to that right are satisfied (judgment of 9 July 2015, Salomie and Oltean, C‑183/14, EU:C:2015:454, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).
32


It follows, in particular, that a taxable person for VAT purposes cannot be prevented from exercising his right of deduction in respect of input VAT due or paid on the ground that he was not identified as a taxable person for those purposes before using the goods purchased in the context of his taxed activity (judgment of 9 July 2015, Salomie and Oltean, C‑183/14, EU:C:2015:454, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).
42


Pursuant to Article 169(a) of Directive 2006/112, the right to deduct therefore depends on whether that right exists where all of those transactions are carried out within the territory of the same Member State (see, by analogy, judgment of 22 December 2010, RBS Deutschland Holdings, C‑277/09, EU:C:2010:810, paragraph 32). The Court has held, in that regard, that the right to deduct may be applied regardless of whether or not the output transaction is subject to a payment of VAT in other Member States (see also, by analogy, judgment of 22 December 2010, RBS Deutschland Holdings, C‑277/09, EU:C:2010:810, paragraph 41).
Robeco Hollands Bezit NV and Others v Stichting Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM).
Date: 2017-11-16
25


Although it is for the national court alone to rule on the classification of the EFS system in accordance with the particular circumstances of the case at issue in the main proceedings, the Court does, however, have jurisdiction to elicit from the provisions of Directive 2004/39, in this case Article 4(1)(14), the criteria that the national court may or must apply to that end (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 December 2015, Banif Plus Bank, C‑312/14, EU:C:2015:794, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
European Commission v Bilbaína de Alquitranes, SA and Others.
Date: 2017-11-22
22


It follows from settled case‑law of the Court that the obligation of the General Court to state reasons requires it to disclose its reasoning clearly and unequivocally, in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the decision taken and the Court of Justice to exercise its power of review (see, inter alia, judgment of 7 January 2004, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P, EU:C:2004:6, paragraph 372, and order of 1 June 2017, Universidad Internacional de la Rioja v EUIPO, C‑50/17 P, not published, EU:C:2017:415, paragraph 12).
34


It should be observed in this regard, as the General Court held, in essence, in paragraph 23 of the judgment under appeal, that, if the Commission is to be able to classify a substance pursuant to Regulation No 1272/2008, account being taken of the complex scientific and technical assessments which it must undertake, it must be recognised as enjoying a broad discretion (judgments of 18 July 2007, Industrias Químicas del Vallés v Commission, C‑326/05 P, EU:C:2007:443, paragraph 75, and of 21 July 2011, Etimine, C‑15/10, EU:C:2011:504, paragraph 60).
35


The exercise of that discretion is not, however, excluded from review by the Court. In particular, where a party claims that the institution competent in the matter has committed a manifest error of assessment, the EU judicature must verify whether that institution has examined, carefully and impartially, all the relevant facts of the individual case on which that assessment was based (see, inter alia, judgments of 21 November 1991, Technische Universität München, C‑269/90, EU:C:1991:438, paragraph 14; of 18 July 2007, Industrias Químicas del Vallés v Commission, C‑326/05 P, EU:C:2007:443, paragraph 77; of 6 November 2008, Netherlands v Commission, C‑405/07 P, EU:C:2008:613, paragraph 56; and of 22 December 2010, Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços, C‑77/09, EU:C:2010:803, paragraph 57). That duty to act diligently is inherent in the principle of sound administration and applies generally to the actions of the EU administration (judgment of 4 April 2017, European Ombudsman v Staelen, C‑337/15 P, EU:C:2017:256, paragraph 34; see also, to that effect, judgment of 29 March 2012, Commission v Estonia, C‑505/09 P, EU:C:2012:179, paragraph 95).
Salvador Benjumea Bravo de Laguna v Esteban Torras Ferrazzuolo.
Date: 2017-11-23
26


Secondly, it must be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, it is not for the Court of Justice to determine whether the decision whereby a matter is brought before it was taken in accordance with the rules of national law governing the organisation of the courts and their procedure (judgment of 7 July 2016, Genentech, C‑567/14, EU:C:2016:526, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
27


Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts and tribunals, by means of which the former provides the latter with interpretation of such EU law as is necessary for them to give judgment in cases upon which they are called to adjudicate (judgment of 5 July 2016, Ognyanov, C‑614/14, EU:C:2016:514, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).
28


In accordance with equally settled case-law, Article 267 TFEU gives national courts the widest discretion in referring matters to the Court if they consider that a case pending before them raises questions involving the interpretation of provisions of EU law, or consideration of their validity, which are necessary for the resolution of the case before them. National courts are, moreover, free to exercise that discretion at whatever stage of the proceedings they consider appropriate (judgment of 5 July 2016, Ognyanov, C‑614/14, EU:C:2016:514, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
29


Lastly, it must be borne in mind that, under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, when there is no judicial remedy under national law against the decision of a court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal is, in principle, obliged to bring the matter before the Court of Justice, where a question relating to the interpretation of EU law is raised before it (see, in particular, judgment of 9 September 2015, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, C‑160/14, EU:C:2015:565, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
Gasorba SL and Others v Repsol Comercial de Productos Petrolíferos SA.
Date: 2017-11-23
28


It follows that a decision taken on the basis of Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 cannot create a legitimate expectation in respect of the undertakings concerned as to whether their conduct complies with Article 101 TFEU. As the Advocate General observed in point 39 of her Opinion, the commitment decision cannot ‘legalise’ the market behaviour of the undertaking concerned, and certainly not retroactively.
29


Nonetheless, national courts cannot overlook that type of decision. Such acts are, in any event, in the nature of a decision. In addition, both the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU and the objective of applying EU competition law effectively and uniformly require the national court to take into account the preliminary assessment carried out by the Commission and regard it as an indication, if not prima facie evidence, of the anticompetitive nature of the agreement at issue in the light of Article 101(1) TFEU.
30


In those circumstances, the answer to the first question is that Article 16(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that a commitment decision concerning certain agreements between undertakings, adopted by the Commission under Article 9(1) of that regulation, does not preclude national courts from examining whether those agreements comply with the competition rules and, if necessary, declaring those agreements void pursuant to Article 101(2) TFEU.
Banco Santander, SA v Cristobalina Sánchez López.
Date: 2017-12-07
36


The system of protection introduced by Directive 93/13 is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as regards both his bargaining power and his level of knowledge. This situation leads to the consumer agreeing to terms drawn up in advance by the seller or supplier without being able to influence the content of those terms (judgments of 10 September 2014, Kušionová, C‑34/13, EU:C:2014:2189, paragraph 48, and of 1 October 2015, ERSTE Bank Hungary, C‑32/14, EU:C:2015:637, paragraph 39).
37


Thus, failing effective review of the potential unfairness of the terms of a contract from which the right to enforcement arises, observance of the rights conferred under Directive 93/13 cannot be guaranteed (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 March 2013, Aziz, C‑415/11, EU:C:2013:164, paragraph 59, and of 18 February 2016, FinanmadridEFC, C‑49/14, EU:C:2016:98, paragraph 46).
38


As regards, in particular, a procedure conducted by a notary for the enforcement of a mortgage, it should be noted that adequate and effective means to stop the use of unfair terms in consumer contracts must include provisions enabling consumers to be guaranteed effective judicial protection by making it possible for them to contest the contract at issue in legal proceedings, including in the enforcement phase, and under reasonable procedural conditions, so that the exercise of their rights is not subject to conditions, in particular time limits or costs, which make it excessively difficult or in practice impossible to exercise the rights guaranteed by Directive 93/13 (judgment of 1 October 2015, ERSTE Bank Hungary, C‑32/14, EU:C:2015:637, paragraph 59).
46


Second, although it has been held, in particular as regards enforcement proceedings for mortgages, that, failing effective review of the potential unfairness of contractual terms in the instrument on the basis of which the property is seized, observance of the rights conferred under Directive 93/13 cannot be guaranteed (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 March 2013, Aziz, C‑415/11, EU:C:2013:164, paragraph 59, and of 18 February 2016, Finanmadrid EFC, C‑49/14, EU:C:2016:98, paragraph 46), it must be emphasised that the instrument on which the action brought before the referring court is based is, in the present case, the instrument of ownership as entered in the land register and not the mortgage loan agreement, the security for which has been enforced extra-judicially.
Boguslawa Zaniewicz-Dybeck v Pensionsmyndigheten.
Date: 2017-12-07
38


For the purpose of providing a useful answer to the national court, it should be noted, first, that Regulation No 1408/71 does not set up a common scheme of social security, but allows different national social security schemes to exist, its sole objective being to ensure the coordination of those schemes. Thus, according to settled case-law, Member States retain the power to organise their own social security schemes (see, inter alia, judgment of 21 February 2013, Salgado González, C‑282/11, EU:C:2013:86, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
39


Therefore, in the absence of harmonisation at EU level, it is for the legislation of each Member State to determine, in particular, the conditions for entitlement to benefits (judgment of 21 February 2013, Salgado González, C‑282/11, EU:C:2013:86, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
40


In exercising those powers, Member States must nonetheless comply with EU law and, in particular, with the provisions of the FEU Treaty giving every citizen of the Union the right to move and reside within the territory of the Member States (judgment of 21 February 2013, Salgado González, C‑282/11, EU:C:2013:86, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
57


It should be noted in that regard that it is established case-law that Article 50 of Regulation No 1408/71 covers cases where the periods of employment of the worker under the legislation of the States to which he was subject were relatively short, with the result that the total amount of benefits payable by those States does not provide a reasonable standard of living (judgments of 30 November 1977, Torri, 64/77, EU:C:1977:197, paragraph 5, and of 17 December 1981, Browning, 22/81, EU:C:1981:316, paragraph 12).
58


In order to remedy that situation, Article 50 of Regulation No 1408/71 provides that where the legislation of the State of residence makes provision for a minimum benefit, the benefit payable by that State will be increased by a supplement equal to the difference between the total benefits payable by the various Member States to whose legislation the worker was subject and that minimum benefit (judgment of 30 November 1977, Torri, 64/77, EU:C:1977:197, paragraph 6).
Syndicat national de l'industrie des technologies médicales (Snitem) and Philips France v Premier ministre and Ministre des Affaires sociales et de la Santé.
Date: 2017-12-07
24


In that regard, it must be stated that the wording of Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 93/42 was amended by Article 2 of Directive 2007/47, recital 6 of which states that software is a medical device in its own right when specifically intended by the manufacturer to be used for one or more of the medical purposes set out in the definition of a medical device. That recital further states that software for general purposes, when used in a healthcare setting, is not a medical device. The EU legislature thus made unequivocally clear that, in order for software to fall within the scope of Directive 93/42, it is not sufficient that it be used in a medical context; it is also necessary that the intended purpose, defined by the manufacturer, is specifically medical (judgment of 22 November 2012, Brain Products, C‑219/11, EU:C:2012:742, paragraphs 16 and 17). Software which does not meet that condition may fall within the scope of that directive only if it is an accessory to a medical device within the meaning of Article 1(2)(b) thereof. That software should then be treated, for the purposes of that directive, in accordance with Article 1(1) thereof, as a medical device in its own right.
35


Consequently, and to the extent that such software constitutes a medical device, it must, pursuant to Article 17(1) of that directive, compulsorily bear the CE marking of conformity when it is placed on the market. Once the marking has been obtained, the product, having regard to that function, may be placed on the market and circulate freely in the European Union without having to undergo any additional procedure, such as a new certification (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 November 2009, Nordiska Dental, C‑288/08, EU:C:2009:718, paragraph 21).
Merck Sharp & Dohme Corporation v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks.
Date: 2017-12-07
45


It is also apparent from the Court’s case-law that, unless it has been granted a marketing authorisation as a medicinal product, a patented product may not give rise to the grant of an SPC (judgment of 15 January 2015, Forsgren, C‑631/13, EU:C:2015:13, paragraph 34).
Wilber López Pastuzano v Delegación del Gobierno en Navarra.
Date: 2017-12-07
19


It should be recalled that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, judgments of 24 June 2008, Commune de Mesquer, C‑188/07, EU:C:2008:359, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited, and of 21 May 2015, Verder LabTec, C‑657/13, EU:C:2015:331, paragraph 29).
23


It should be noted that, according to the case-law of the Court, the principal purpose of Directive 2003/109 is the integration of third-country nationals who are settled on a long-term basis in the Member States (judgments of 26 April 2012, Commission v Netherlands, C‑508/10, EU:C:2012:243, paragraph 66, and of 2 September 2015, CGIL and INCA, C‑309/14, EU:C:2015:523, paragraph 21).
27


Moreover, the Court has already pointed out in its judgment of 8 December 2011, Ziebell (C‑371/08, EU:C:2011:809, paragraphs 82 and 83), that the adoption of such a measure may not be ordered automatically following a criminal conviction, but rather requires a case-by-case assessment which must, in particular, have regard to the elements mentioned in Article 12(3) of Directive 2003/109.
Antonio Miravitlles Ciurana and Others v Contimark SA and Jordi Socias Gispert.
Date: 2017-12-14
29


In that regard, it is apparent from recitals 1 and 2 of Directive 2009/101 that the directive is intended to coordinate national provisions concerning disclosure, the validity of obligations entered into by, and the nullity of, companies limited by shares or otherwise having limited liability. As regards Directive 2012/30, recital 3 thereof states that the aim of that directive is to ensure minimum equivalent protection for both shareholders and creditors of public limited liability companies. To that end, that directive coordinates the national provisions relating to the formation of such companies, and to the maintenance, increase and reduction of their capital (see, concerning Directive 2012/30, judgment of 19 July 2016, Kotnik and Others, C‑526/14, EU:C:2016:570, paragraph 86).
34


Since Article 19 of Directive 2012/30 does not impose any specific obligation on the Member States in this regard, the situation at issue in the main proceedings cannot be assessed in the light of the provisions of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2014, Julián Hernández and Others, C‑198/13, EU:C:2014:2055, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
Proceedings brought by Anstar Oy.
Date: 2017-12-14
32


As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that the Court has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of a harmonised standard within the meaning of Article 2(11) of Regulation No 305/2011, the references of which have been published by the Commission in the Official Journal of the European Union, Series C (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 October 2016, James Elliott Construction, C‑613/14, EU:C:2016:821, paragraph 47).
33


That said, when the Court is asked to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of such a harmonised standard, it is for the national court, on the basis of the Court’s interpretation and in the light of the facts available to it, to determine the technical standard applicable to a particular product (see, by analogy, with reference to tariff classification, judgments of 7 November 2002, Lohmann and Medi Bayreuth, C‑260/00 to C‑263/00, EU:C:2002:637, paragraph 26, and of 28 April 2016, Oniors Bio, C‑233/15, EU:C:2016:305, paragraph 28).
Grzegorz Chudaś and Irena Chudaś v DA Deutsche Allgemeine Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft AG.
Date: 2017-12-14
33


In so far as the referring court expresses uncertainty as to whether the objectives of Regulation No 805/2004 could lead to a different conclusion, it must be borne in mind that the primary objective of that legislation is, in accordance with Article 1 thereof, to create a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims in order to permit, by laying down minimum standards, the free circulation of judgments, court settlements and authentic instruments throughout all Member States without any intermediate proceedings needing to be brought in the Member State of enforcement prior to recognition of enforcement. However, given that the conditions for the application of the derogation from the common system of recognition of judgments established by that regulation are to be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 March 2012, G, C‑292/10, EU:C:2012:142, paragraph 64), that objective cannot call into question the interpretation of the scope of that regulation which follows from the wording of Article 7 thereof.
Impresa di Costruzioni Ing. E. Mantovani SpA and Guerrato SpA v Provincia autonoma di Bolzano and Others.
Date: 2017-12-20
20


In that regard, it should be recalled that questions concerning EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court for a preliminary ruling only where it is obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 8 September 2015, Taricco and Others, C‑105/14, EU:C:2015:555, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
28


According to settled case-law, the fact that the referring court’s question refers to certain provisions of EU law does not mean that the Court may not provide the national court with all the guidance on points of interpretation which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to those points in its question. It is, in that regard, for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the referring court, in particular from the grounds of the order for reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject matter of the dispute (see, inter alia, judgment of 22 October 2015, Impresa Edilux and SICEF, C‑425/14, EU:C:2015:721, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
31


In accordance with settled case-law, Article 45(2) of Directive 2004/18 does not provide for uniform application at EU level of the grounds of exclusion it mentions, since the Member States may choose not to apply those grounds of exclusion, or to incorporate them into national law with varying degrees of rigour according to legal, economic or social considerations prevailing at national level. In that context, Member States have the power to make the criteria laid down in Article 45(2) less onerous or more flexible (judgment of 14 December 2016, Connexxion Taxi Services, C‑171/15, EU:C:2016:948, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
32


Member States therefore enjoy some discretion in determining the requirements governing the application of the optional grounds for exclusion laid down in Article 45(2) of Directive 2004/18.
41


In accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 31 of the present judgment, the Member State is entitled to ease the requirements governing the application of the optional grounds for exclusion and, thus, to waive the application of a ground for exclusion in the event of a dissociation between the tenderer and the conduct constituting an offence. In the present case, it is also entitled to determine the requirements governing that dissociation and to require, as Italian law does, that the tenderer inform the contracting authority of a conviction of its director, even if the conviction is not yet final.