larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Republic of Austria v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2003-09-11
49. The Court observes that it is settled case-law that the statement of reasons required by Article 253 EC must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community Court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see,  inter alia , Case C-367/95 P  Commission  v  Sytraval and Brink ' s France  [1998] ECR I-1719, paragraph 63, and Case C-76/00 P  Petrotub and Republica  v  Council  [2003] ECR I-79, paragraph 81).
62. The protocols and annexes to an act of accession constitute provisions of primary law which, unless that act provides otherwise, may not be suspended, amended or repealed otherwise than in accordance with the procedures established for review of the original Treaties (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 31/86 and 35/86 LAISA and CPC España  v  Council  [1988] ECR 2285, paragraph 12).
99. With respect to the head of complaint concerning failure to state reasons, it is settled case-law that it is not necessary for details of all relevant factual and legal aspects to be given in the statement of reasons, in so far as the question whether the statement of reasons for a measure meets the requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. This is  a fortiori  the case where the Member States have been closely associated with the process of drafting the contested measure and are thus aware of the reasons underlying that measure (see Case C-301/97  Netherlands  v  Council  [2001] ECR I-8853, paragraph 188 and the case-law cited there).
Maria Walcher v Bundesamt für Soziales und Behindertenwesen Steiermark.
Date: 2003-09-11
30. For the purposes of answering the two questions referred by the national court, which can be examined together, it should first be recalled that Directive 80/987 is intended to apply to all categories of employee defined as such by the national law of a Member State, with the exception of those listed in the annex to the directive (Case C-334/92  Wagner Miret  [1993] ECR I-6911, paragraph 12). Under Austrian law, a person in Ms Walcher ' s position is an employee.
31. Article 3(1) of Directive 80/987 requires Member States to take the measures necessary to ensure that guarantee institutions guarantee, subject to Article 4 of that directive, payment of employees ' outstanding claims resulting from contracts of employment or employment relationships and relating to pay for the period prior to a given date.
37. Although the Court cannot substitute its assessment for that of a national court, which is the only forum competent to establish the facts of the case before it, it must be pointed out that the application of a national rule intended to prevent abuse must not prejudice the full effect and uniform application of Community law in the Member States. In particular, it is not open to national courts to compromise the objectives pursued by the directive in question (see, to that effect, Case C-367/96  Kefalas and Others  [1998] ECR I-2843, paragraph 22).
38. Inasmuch as it establishes an exception to the general rule, Article 10(a) of Directive 80/987 must be construed narrowly. In addition, it must be interpreted in a way which is compatible with the social purpose of that directive, which is to guarantee employees a minimum level of Community protection in the event of the employer ' s insolvency through payment of outstanding claims resulting from contracts of employment or employment relationships and relating to pay for a specific period (Case C-373/95  Maso and Others  [1997] ECR I-4051, paragraph 56; Case C-125/97  Regeling  [1998] ECR I-4493, paragraph 20, and Case C-441/99  Gharehveran  [2001] ECR I-7687, paragraph 26).
Kingdom of Spain v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2003-09-11
65. The Court has already held that the purpose of the exclusion period for the adjustment of accounts is to protect Member States against the absence of legal certainty which would exist if the Commission were able to call into question expenditure incurred several years before the adoption of a compliance decision (Case C-130/99  Spain  v  Commission  [2002] ECR I-3005, paragraph 133). A Member State may only however claim the protection of this period to the extent that it complies with its own obligations under Community legislation, in particular with regard to the spontaneous communication of information required for checks.
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2003-09-11
7. It is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see,  inter alia ,  Case C-71/99  Commission  v  Germany  [2001] ECR I-5811, paragraph 29, and Case C-110/00  Commission  v  Austria  [2001] ECR I-7545, paragraph 13).
9. Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held that a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances in its own legal order to justify failure to implement a directive within the prescribed period (see,  inter alia , Case C-352/01  Commission  v  Spain  [2002] ECR I-10263, paragraph 8).
Commission of the European Communities v Ireland.
Date: 2003-09-11
10. In that regard, it must be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see,  inter alia ,  Case C-177/01  Commission  v  France  [2002] ECR I-5137, paragraph 13).
Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2003-09-18
65. It should be recalled that Article 8(1) of Regulation No 729/70 imposes on the Member States the obligation to take the measures necessary to satisfy themselves that the transactions financed by the EAGGF are actually carried out and are executed correctly, to prevent and deal with irregularities and to recover sums lost as a result of irregularities or negligence, even if the specific Community act does not expressly provide for the adoption of particular supervisory measures (Case C-373/99  Greece  v  Commission  [2001] ECR I-9619, paragraph 9).
66. In addition, although the Commission is required to justify its decision to refuse to charge expenditure effected by a Member State to the EAGGF Guarantee section by providing evidence of serious reasonable doubt as to the existence or appropriateness of checks carried out in that Member State, it is nevertheless not obliged to provide details of the inadequacy of those checks or the inaccuracy of the data provided by the Member State. It is the latter which is best placed to collect and verify the data required and to provide proof concerning the genuineness of the checks and the inaccuracy of the Commission ' s claims (see to that effect Case C-54/95  Germany  v  Commission  [1999] ECR I-35, paragraph 35; Case C-247/98  Greece  v  Commission  [2001] ECR I-1, paragraph 7; and Case C-377/99  Germany  v  Commission  [1999] ECR I-7421, paragraph 95).
111. It is appropriate to point out that in Case C-247/98  Greece  v  Commission  (paragraphs 18, 19 and 32) and Case C-373/99  Greece  v  Commission  (paragraphs 36 to 39), cited above, which relate to the financial years 1994 and 1995, respectively, the Court already dismissed the arguments put forward by the Hellenic Republic to justify the practice of deductions.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2003-09-18
35. Where the Commission refuses to charge certain expenditure to the EAGGF on the ground that it was incurred as a result of a breach of Community rules for which a Member State can be held responsible, the Commission is not required to demonstrate exhaustively that the checks carried out by the Member States are inadequate, but to provide evidence of the serious and reasonable doubt it entertains concerning the checks carried out by the national authorities. The reason for this mitigation of the burden of proof on the Commission is that it is the State which is best placed to collect and check the data required for the clearance of EAGGF accounts, and which is consequently required to adduce the most detailed and comprehensive evidence both that its checks are actually carried out and, if appropriate, that the Commission ' s assertions are incorrect (see,  inter alia , Case C-377/99  Germany  v  Commission  [2002] ECR I-7421, paragraph 95).
53. As regards the type of correction applied, it should be noted that, in the light of Document VI/5330/97, a flat-rate correction may be applied where it is not possible to determine precisely the losses suffered by the Community.
56. The correction rate of 2% is the lowest of the applicable rates. As the Commission pointed out, it could have applied a 5% correction in view of the guidelines laid down in Document VI/5330/97 but it took into account, in particular, the measures which the United Kingdom authorities had taken as soon as the errors committed in 1997 were discovered.
Tommaso Morellato v Comune di Padova.
Date: 2003-09-18
29. In that regard, it should be remembered that the need to alter the packaging or the labelling of imported products prevents such requirements from constituting selling arrangements within the meaning of the judgment in  Keck and Mithouard  (Case C-33/97  Colim  [1999] ECR I-3175, paragraph 37, and Case C-12/00  Commission  v  Spain  [2003] ECR I-459, paragraph 76).
30. Accordingly, legislation of a Member State which prohibits a product that is lawfully manufactured and marketed in another Member State from being put on sale in the first Member State without being subjected to new packaging of a specific type that complies with the requirements of that legislation cannot be held to concern selling arrangements within the meaning of  Keck and Mithouard .
31. The Court has pointed out that the reason why legislation imposing certain selling arrangements falls outside the scope of Article 30 of the Treaty is that it is not such as to prevent the access of imported products to the market of that Member State or to impede it any more than it impedes the access of domestic products ( Keck and Mithouard , paragraph 17, and Case C-384/93  Alpine Investments  [1995] ECR I-1141, paragraph 37).
44. It is clear from the case-law of the Court that the response to the questions thus reformulated must be affirmative (see,  inter alia , Case 106/77  Simmenthal  [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 21, and Case C-358/95  Morellato  [1997] ECR I-1431, paragraph 18).
Peter Pflücke v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit.
Date: 2003-09-18
31. Articles 4, 5 and 10 of Directive 80/987, which permit the Member States not only to set the detailed rules regarding the organisation, financing and operation of the guarantee institution, but also to limit, in certain circumstances, the protection which it is designed to provide to employees, provide for neither a temporal limitation of the rights that employees derive from that directive nor a restriction on Member States ' freedom to set a time-limit for lodging applications.
34. As to those principles, it is settled case-law that such time-limits prescribed in national law may not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic applications (principle of equivalence) and may not be framed in such a way as to render impossible in practice the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness) (see, in particular, Case 33/76  Rewe  [1976] ECR 1989, paragraph 5, and Case C-159/00  Sapod Audic  [2002] ECR I-5031, paragraph 52).
35. More specifically, it is incorrect to take the view, as the national court appears to do, that the setting of a time-limit for lodging applications is per se incompatible with the principle of effectiveness solely because it will necessarily mean that employees who fail to comply with the time-limit will not in fact benefit from the protection introduced by Directive 80/987 (see, to that effect, Case C-78/98  Preston and Others  [2000] ECR I-3201, paragraph 34).
36. It also follows from that case-law that the setting of reasonable time-limits essentially satisfies the principle of effectiveness, inasmuch as it constitutes an application of the principle of legal certainty (see, in particular,  Preston and Others , cited above, paragraph 33).  In a situation such as the one at issue in the main proceedings, the more time that passes after the employer becomes insolvent, the more difficult it is to establish the veracity of claims for pay, which could reduce legal certainty.
37. However, as regards payment of claims for salary which, by their very nature, are of great importance to the individual concerned, the shortness of the time-limit prescribed should not have the result that the individual concerned does not in practice succeed in complying with that time-limit, so that he does not benefit from the protection that Directive 80/987 is specifically intended to guarantee him.
48. It is settled case-law that if the national court finds that the national provision laying down the time-limit is not compatible with the requirements of Community law and that no compatible interpretation of that provision is possible, that court must refuse to apply it (see, to that effect, Case 106/77  Simmenthal  [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 21, Case C-91/92  Faccini Dori  [1994] ECR I-3325, paragraph 26, and Case C-188/00  Kurz  [2002] ECR I-10691, paragraph 69).
Albacom SpA (C-292/01) and Infostrada SpA (C-293/01) v Ministero del Tesoro, del Bilancio e della Programmazione Economica and Ministero delle Comunicazioni.
Date: 2003-09-18
25. Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13 provides that Member States are to ensure that any fees imposed on undertakings which hold individual licences seek only to cover the administration costs generated by the work involved in implementing those licences. Article 11(2) nevertheless allows the national regulatory authorities to impose charges where scarce resources are to be used.
26. Aside from the fees and charges mentioned in Article 11 and the fees intended to cover administrative costs related to the general authorisation procedure laid down in Article 6, Directive 97/13 expressly provides for only one type of financial charge, namely financial contributions to the provision of universal service, referred to in Article 6 and in paragraph 3(2) of the annex to the directive.
33. It should be noted, however, that Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13 expressly provides that Member States are to ensure that any fees imposed on undertakings as part of authorisation procedures seek only to cover the administrative costs incurred by the licensing system. In relation to that general provision set out in Article 11(1), Article 11(2) inserts a reservation limited to the case of scarce resources.
34. The wording of Article 11(2) therefore calls for a restrictive interpretation and, in any event, cannot in itself be extrapolated as advocated by the Italian Government.
35. Directive 97/13, as is clear from the first, third and fifth recitals in its preamble, is among the measures adopted for the complete liberalisation of telecommunications services and infrastructures as from 1 January 1998, which also include Directive 96/19 with regard to the implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets. To that end, Directive 97/13 establishes a common framework for general authorisations intended to make a significant contribution to the entry of new operators into the market.
36. In addition to laying down rules for authorisation procedures and the content of authorisations, that framework sets out the nature and scope of financial payments related to those procedures which Member States may impose on undertakings in the field of telecommunications services.
37. As stated in the 12th recital in the preamble to Directive 97/13, those charges must be based on objective, non-discriminatory and transparent criteria. Moreover, they must not conflict with the objective of the complete liberalisation of the market, which implies opening it completely to competition.
38. In that regard, as the Advocate General argues in point 52 of his Opinion, the common framework of general authorisations and individual licences for telecommunications services which the directive seeks to establish would be rendered redundant if Member States were free to establish the financial charges to be borne by undertakings in the sector.
41. It follows that such a charge is contrary to the objectives sought by the Community legislature and goes beyond the common framework established by Directive 97/13.
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Hacene Akrich.
Date: 2003-09-23
50. In order to benefit in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings from the rights provided for in Article 10 of Regulation No 1612/68, the national of a non-Member State, who is the spouse of a citizen of the Union, must be lawfully resident in a Member State when he moves to another Member State to which the citizen of the Union is migrating or has migrated.
51. That interpretation is consistent with the structure of the Community provisions seeking to secure freedom of movement for workers within the Community, whose exercise must not penalise the migrant worker and his family.
55. As regards the question of abuse mentioned at paragraph 24 of the  Singh  judgment, cited above, it should be mentioned that the motives which may have prompted a worker of a Member State to seek employment in another Member State are of no account as regards his right to enter and reside in the territory of the latter State provided that he there pursues or wishes to pursue an effective and genuine activity (Case 53/81  Levin  [1982] ECR 1035, paragraph 23).
58. That said, where the marriage is genuine and where, on the return of the citizen of the Union to the Member State of which he is a national, his spouse, who is a national of a non-Member State and with whom he was living in the Member State which he is leaving, is not lawfully resident on the territory of a Member State, regard must be had to respect for family life under Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 (hereinafter   " the Convention" ). That right is among the fundamental rights which, according to the Court ' s settled case-law, restated by the preamble to the Single European Act and by Article 6(2) EU, are protected in the Community legal order.
59. Even though the Convention does not as such guarantee the right of an alien to enter or to reside in a particular country, the removal of a person from a country where close members of his family are living may amount to an infringement of the right to respect for family life as guaranteed by Article 8(1) of the Convention. Such an interference will infringe the Convention if it does not meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of that article, that is unless it is in accordance with the law, motivated by one or more of the legitimate aims under that paragraph and necessary in a democratic society, that is to say justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (Case C-60/00  Carpenter  [2002] ECR I-6279, paragraph 42).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2003-09-25
30. However under Article 8(1)(a) and Article 2(2) of Directive 92/81, in conjunction with Article 2 of Directive 92/82, lubricating oils may be subject to excise duty only if intended for use, offered for sale or used as motor fuel or heating fuel. In other cases they must be exempted from the harmonised excise duty.
31. The Court has already held that to allow the Member States to levy another indirect tax on products which must be exempted from harmonised excise duty under Article 8(1)(b) of Directive 92/81 would render that provision entirely ineffective ( Braathens , paragraph 24).
32. The same reasoning may be applied to the exemption laid down in Article 8(1)(a) of Directive 92/81.
33. The Member States cannot therefore rely on the right conferred by Article 3(2) of Directive 92/12 to maintain or introduce national taxes for specific purposes in respect of products which must be exempted from the harmonised excise duty in accordance with Article 8(1) of Directive 92/81 (see, to this effect,  Braathens , paragraph 25).
36. It must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (Case C-147/00  Commission  v  France  [2001] ECR I-2387, paragraph 26; Case C-173/01  Commission  v  Greece  [2002] ECR I-6129, paragraph 7 and Case C-114/02  Commission  v  France  [2003] ECR I-3783, paragraph 9).
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 2003-09-25
11. The Commission rejects entirely the arguments put forward by the German Government relating to the existence of particular features in its internal legal order, and to the fact that, for reasons of procedural economy, it chose to implement the Directive and other, subsequent, environmental protection directives simultaneously.
15. First of all, it is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see,  inter alia , Case C-147/00  Commission  v  France  [2001] ECR I-2387, paragraph 26; Case C-173/01  Commission  v  Greece  [2002] ECR I-6129, paragraph 7; and Case C-114/02  Commission  v  France  [2003] ECR I-3783, paragraph 9).
17. The fact that an implementing measure will be adopted shortly is irrelevant and cannot deprive the Commission of all legal interest in bringing an action for failure to fulfil obligations since, in accordance with settled case-law, the Commission decides in the exercise of its discretion whether or not it is appropriate to bring such an action (see, in particular, Case C-383/00  Commission  v  Germany  [2002] ECR I-4219, paragraph 19).
18. It must be added that, according to equally settled case-law, a Member State may not rely on provisions, practices or circumstances in its internal legal order to justify failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down by a directive (see,  inter alia , Case C-276/98  Commission  v  Portugal  [2001] ECR I-1699, paragraph 20, and Case C-114/02  Commission  v  France , cited above, paragraph 11).