The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd (C-27/00) and Omega Air Ltd , Aero Engines Ireland Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority (C-122/00).
Date: 2002-03-12
46 On this point, it should be borne in mind that it is settled case-law that the statement of reasons required by Article 253 EC must be adapted to the nature of the act in question. It must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the Community institution which adopted the measure in such a way as to make the persons concerned aware of the reasons for the measure and to enable the Court to exercise its power of review. It follows from the case-law that it is not necessary for details of all relevant factual and legal aspects to be given. The question whether the statement of the grounds for an act meets the requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, to that effect, Case C-180/96 United Kingdom v Commission [1998] ECR I-2265, paragraph 70, and Case C-352/96 Italy v Council [1998] ECR I-6937, paragraph 40).
47 The Court has also held that if the contested measure clearly discloses the essential objective pursued by the institution, it would be excessive to require a specific statement of reasons for the various technical choices made (Case C-168/98 Luxembourg v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-9131, paragraph 62).
51 It would have been desirable to have given a more detailed explanation of the choice of by-pass ratio as the sole criterion and of its being fixed at 3. However, the statement of reasons in a regulation of general application cannot be required to specify the various facts, frequently very numerous and complex, on the basis of which the regulation was adopted, nor a fortiori to provide a more or less complete technical evaluation of those facts (see Case 87/78 Welding [1978] ECR 2457, paragraph 11). That is particularly the case where the relevant factual and technical elements are well known to the circles concerned.
62 On this point, it should be remembered that it is settled case-law that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of Community law, requires that measures adopted by Community institutions should not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives pursued by the legislation in question, and where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, in particular, Case C-331/88 Fedesa and Others [1990] ECR I-4023, paragraph 13, Case C-180/96 United Kingdom v Commission, cited above, paragraph 96, and Case C-101/98 UDL [1999] ECR I-8841, paragraph 30).
63 It is also settled case-law, with respect to judicial review of the conditions mentioned in the preceding paragraph, that the Community legislature has wide legislative powers in the field of the common transport policy as regards the adoption of appropriate common rules (see, to that effect, in particular, Joined Cases C-248/95 and C-249/95 SAM Schiffahrt and Stapf [1997] ECR I-4475, paragraph 23).
64 In reviewing the exercise of such powers, the Court cannot substitute its own assessment for that of the Community legislature, but must confine itself to examining whether that latter assessment contains a manifest error or constitutes a misuse of powers or whether the authority in question clearly exceeded the bounds of its discretion (see, in particular, SAM Schiffahrt and Stapf, paragraph 24).
65 Moreover, the Court's case-law also shows that where, as in this case, implementation by the Council of a common policy requires it to assess a complex economic situation, its discretion is exercisable not only in relation to the nature and scope of the provisions which are to be adopted but also, to a certain extent, to the findings as to the basic facts, especially in the sense that it is free to base its assessment, if necessary, on findings of a general nature (see, in particular, SAM Schiffahrt and Stapf, paragraph 25).
79 On this point, it is settled case-law that the general principle of equality, which is one of the fundamental principles of Community law, requires that similar situations are not treated differently and different situations not treated alike unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, to that effect, SAM Schiffahrt and Stapf, paragraph 50, and Case C-292/97 Karlsson and Others [2000] ECR I-2737, paragraph 39).
89 On this point, suffice it to say that Omega misunderstands the basis of the Court's case-law. The decisive factor here is that the resolution of disputes concerning WTO law is based, in part, on negotiations between the contracting parties. Withdrawal of unlawful measures is indeed the solution recommended by WTO law, but other solutions are also authorised, for example settlement, payment of compensation or suspension of concessions (see, to that effect, Portugal v Council, paragraphs 36 to 39).
90 In those circumstances, to require the judicial organs to refrain from applying rules of domestic law which are inconsistent with the WTO agreements would have the consequence of depriving the legislative or executive organs of the contracting parties of the possibility of finding negotiated solutions, even on a temporary basis (see, to that effect, Portugal v Council, paragraph 40).
91 It follows that the WTO agreements, interpreted in the light of their subject-matter and purpose, do not determine the appropriate legal means of ensuring that they are applied in good faith in the domestic legal order of the contracting parties (see Portugal v Council, paragraph 41).
92 It is common ground, moreover, that some of the contracting parties, which are among the most important trading partners of the Community, have concluded from the subject-matter and purpose of the WTO agreements that they are not among the rules in the light of which their judicial organs are to review the lawfulness of their rules of domestic law (see Portugal v Council, paragraph 43).
93 It follows from all the above considerations that, having regard to their nature and structure, the WTO agreements are not in principle among the rules in the light of which the Court is to review the lawfulness of acts of the Community institutions (see Portugal v Council, paragraph 47).
94 It is only where the Community intended to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the Community measure refers expressly to precise provisions of the WTO agreements, that it is for the Court to review the lawfulness of the Community measure in question in the light of the WTO rules (see Portugal v Council, paragraph 49).