larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Melli Bank plc v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2012-03-13
38. It is settled case-law (see, by analogy, Case 292/82 Merck  [1983] ECR 3781, paragraph 12, and Case C‑480/08 Teixeira [2010] ECR I‑1107, paragraph 48) that the General Court has taken into consideration, in interpreting Article 7(2)(d) of Regulation No 423/2007, the wording of that provision and the context in which it occurs and also the objects of the rules of which it is part.
52. According to settled case-law, the principle of proportionality is one of the general principles of European Union law and requires that measures implemented through provisions of European Union law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (Case C‑491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco  [2002] ECR I‑11453, paragraph 122; Joined Cases C‑453/03, C‑11/04, C‑12/04 and C‑194/04 ABNA and Others  [2005] ECR I‑10423, paragraph 68; and Case C‑58/08 Vodafone and Others [2010] ECR I‑4999, paragraph 51).
58. In those circumstances, the General Court did not err in law in holding, in paragraph 103 of the judgment under appeal, that where the funds of an entity identified as being engaged in nuclear proliferation are frozen there is a not insignificant danger that that entity may exert pressure on the entities it owns or controls in order to circumvent the effect of the measures applying to it and that the freezing of the funds of those entities is necessary and appropriate in order to ensure the effectiveness of the measures adopted and to ensure that those measures are not circumvented.
92. It is necessary to reject from the outset the plea that the contested decision was not notified. As the Advocate General pointed out in point 66 of his Opinion, that plea was not raised before the General Court. In an appeal the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is in principle confined to review of the findings of law on the pleas argued at first instance (Case C‑544/09 P Germany  v Commission  [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 63).
93. With regard to the obligation to provide a statement of reasons, the appellant does not challenge the principle that that obligation must be assessed by reference to the circumstances of each case, which the General Court recalled in paragraphs 143 to 145 of the judgment under appeal. It does however contend that the General Court erred in law in holding that the statement of reasons for the contested decision was sufficient and satisfied the obligation laid down in Article 15(3) of Regulation No 423/2007 to give individual and specific reasons for that decision.
Portuguese Republic v Transnáutica - Transportes e Navegação SA.
Date: 2012-03-22
61. In addition, contrary to what Transnáutica claims, the Portuguese Republic’s appeal does not concern the General Court’s assessment of the facts but rather its assessment that the legal conditions for applying Article 239 of the Customs Code are fulfilled in circumstances such as those of the present case. That assessment of the General Court may be examined by the Court of Justice in an appeal (see, to that effect, Case C-204/07 P C.A.S.  v Commission  [2008] ECR I-6135, paragraph 83).
65. In that connection, it should be recalled that Article 905 of the Implementing Regulation – pursuant to which the Member State to which the authority belongs may apply to the Commission to determine, on the basis of the information placed before it, whether a special situation exists such as to justify the remission of duties – contains a general fairness clause intended to cover the exceptional situation in which a declarant might find himself in comparison with other operators engaged in the same business, where the customs authority has not itself been able, on the basis of the grounds adduced, to take a decision regarding the remission of duties (see C-86/97 Trans-Ex-Import  [1999] ECR I-1041, paragraphs 18 to 21, and De Haan , paragraph 52).
Criminal proceedings against Rareş Doralin Nilaş and Others.
Date: 2012-03-22
31. Fourth, as regards the provisions of Directive 2004/39 mentioned in the first and second questions which, according to Mr Nilaş, Mr Dascăl and the Romanian Government, are irrelevant in this case, it should be recalled that the fact that a national court has, formally speaking, worded a question by referring to certain provisions of European Union law does not preclude the Court from providing to the national court all the elements of interpretation which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to them in its questions. It is, in this context, for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision referring the questions, the points of European Union law which require interpretation, regard being had to the subject-matter of the dispute (see, inter alia, Case C‑115/08 ČEZ [2009] ECR I‑10265, paragraph 81, and Joined Cases C‑307/09 to C-309/09 Vicoplus and Others  [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22).
48. Finally, it must be stated, as is clear in particular from recitals 2, 5 and 44 in the preamble to Directive 2004/39, that its objectives consist, inter alia, in protecting investors, preserving the efficient and orderly functioning of financial markets and the transparency of transactions. To permit a market which does not satisfy the conditions set out in paragraph 43 of the present judgment to be classified as a regulated market solely because it is operated by the operator of another market authorised as a regulated market risks undermining those objectives.
VELECLAIR SA v Ministre du Budget, des Comptes publics et de la Réforme de l’État.
Date: 2012-03-29
25. First, Article 17(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive, which also uses the terms ‘due or paid’, as shown in paragraph 19 of this judgment, must be understood as meaning that the question whether the VAT due on the earlier or later sale of the goods concerned has or has not been paid to the public purse is irrelevant to the taxable person’s right to deduct (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑354/03, C‑355/03 and C‑484/03 Optigen and Others  [2006] ECR I‑483, paragraph 54).
27. Third, it should be stated that the above interpretation complies with the objectives of the Sixth Directive in so far as it enables authorities to ensure that the right to deduct, which in principle may not be limited, remains an integral part of the VAT scheme and can continue to be exercisable immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on transactions relating to inputs (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑439/04 and C‑440/04 Kittel and Recolta Recycling  [2006] ECR I‑6161, paragraph 47).
29. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the rules governing deduction are meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT due or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT consequently ensures complete neutrality of taxation of all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that those activities are themselves subject to VAT (see, inter alia, Kittel and Recolta Recycling , paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
32. First, as is clear from settled case-law, preventing tax evasion, avoidance and abuse is an objective recognised and encouraged by the Sixth Directive. It is for the person requesting deduction of VAT to prove that the conditions for receipt of that deduction have been met and if the tax authorities find that the right to deduct has been exercised fraudulently, they are permitted to claim repayment of the deducted sums retroactively. In addition, it is a matter for the national court to refuse to allow the right to deduct where it is established, on the basis of objective evidence from the case-file, that that right is being relied on for fraudulent ends (see, inter alia, Kittel and Recolta Recycling , paragraphs 54 and 55 and the case‑law cited).
34. Lastly, the fact that the taxable person for the purposes of VAT on importation is also the holder of the right to deduct that VAT does not seem likely to increase the risk of VAT evasion or abuse. On the contrary, as the European Commission has pointed out, the fact that one and the same person is both the taxable person for the purposes of VAT and the holder of the right to deduct is comparable to the situation in the context of the reverse charge procedure provided for in the Sixth Directive. As the EU legislature reiterated in Recital 42 in the preamble to Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1), that system enables authorities, inter alia, to counter the tax evasion and avoidance observed in certain types of transactions.
Belgian State v BLM SA.
Date: 2012-03-29
15. BLM, of which Mr Bertrand Losfeld is the managing director, does not require Mr Losfeld to pay rent for the private use of part of the building at issue. However, he is liable for personal income tax on the benefit in kind, calculated on a flat-rate basis of 75% private occupation of the building.
29. Although the Court could simply have held that, in circumstances such as those of the case which gave rise to the judgment in Seeling , there could not, by definition, be any agreement as to the conditions of the letting, it examined whether that situation could be treated as the letting of immovable property for the purposes of Article 13(B)(b) of the Sixth Directive and concluded in that regard, in paragraph 51 of its judgment, that it is a feature of such a situation not only that no rent is paid but also that there is no agreement on the duration of the right of enjoyment, the right of occupation of the dwelling, or the exclusion of third parties.
31. Accordingly, the answer to the question referred is that point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 6(2) and Article 13(B)(b) of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which – despite the fact that the characteristics of the leasing or the letting of immovable property for the purposes of Article 13(B)(b) are not present – treats as a supply of services exempt from VAT under that provision the private use, by the staff of a taxable person which is a legal person, of part of a building constructed or owned by virtue of a right in rem in immovable property, held by that taxable person, where the input tax on that business asset is deductible.
32. In that connection, it is for the referring court to determine whether, in a situation such as that at issue in the case before it, a finding can be made that there is a letting of immovable property for the purposes of Article 13(B)(b) of the Sixth Directive.
Costs
Interseroh Scrap and Metal Trading GmbH v Sonderabfall-Management-Gesellschaft Rheinland-Pfalz mbH (SAM).
Date: 2012-03-29
43. In that regard, Articles 15(1), 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, provide, respectively, for the right to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen or accepted occupation, the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property. Moreover, according to settled case‑law, both the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or business are general principles of European Union law (see Case C‑280/93 Germany  v Council  [1994] ECR I‑4973, paragraph 78; Joined Cases C‑20/00 and C‑64/00 Booker Aquaculture and Hydro Seafood  [2003] ECR I‑7411, paragraph 68; Joined Cases C‑154/04 and C‑155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and Others [2005] ECR I‑6451, paragraph 126; and Joined Cases C‑453/03, C‑11/04, C‑12/04 and C‑194/04 ABNA and Others  [2005] ECR I‑10423, paragraph 87). Moreover, according to settled case‑law, the protection of business secrets is a general principle of European Union law (see Case C‑450/06 Varec  [2008] ECR I‑581, paragraph 49 and the case‑law cited).
Criminal proceedings against Minh Khoa Vo.
Date: 2012-04-10
46. Those obligations must be discharged in such a way as to ensure that the provisions of European Union law are fully effective (see, to that effect, Case 106/77 Simmenthal  [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 24, and Joined Cases C‑188/10 and C‑189/10 Melki and Abdeli  [2010] ECR I‑5667, paragraph 43). Where necessary, the national courts have a duty to seek outcomes which achieve a proper balance in relation to provisions which, if applied, might call in question the effectiveness or consistency of European Union legislation.
Pro-Braine ASBL and Others v Commune de Braine-le-Château, intervener: Veolia es treatment SA.
Date: 2012-04-19
31. As has been established by the Court, the term ‘project’ refers to works or interventions involving alterations to the physical aspect of the site (Case C‑275/09 Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest and Others  [2011] ECR I‑1753, paragraphs 20, 24 and 38).
The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v Able UK Ltd.
Date: 2012-04-26
13. It is settled case‑law that the wording used in one language version of a provision of European Union (‘EU’) law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. Such an approach would be incompatible with the requirement for uniform application of EU law. Where there is divergence between the various language versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see, inter alia, Case C‑41/09 Commission  v Netherlands  [2011] ECR I‑831, paragraph 44 and the case‑law cited).
14. Here, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case‑law, VAT exemptions, which include that provided for by Article 151(1)(c) of the VAT Directive, must be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that such tax is to be levied on each service supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑116/10 Feltgen and Bacino Charter Company  [2010] ECR I‑14187, paragraph 19 and the case‑law cited).
22. However, according to the Court’s settled case‑law, in interpreting a provision of European Union law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, Feltgen and Bacino Charter Company , paragraph 12 and the case‑law cited).
SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd.
Date: 2012-05-02
33. With respect to international law, both Article 2 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Article 9(2) of the TRIPs Agreement provide that copyright protection extends to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.
35. In a judgment delivered after the reference for a preliminary ruling had been lodged in the present case, the Court interpreted Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250 as meaning that the object of the protection conferred by that directive is the expression in any form of a computer program, such as the source code and the object code, which permits reproduction in different computer languages (judgment of 22 December 2010 in Case C‑393/09 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace [2010] ECR I‑13971, paragraph 35).
37. Thus, the object of protection under Directive 91/250 includes the forms of ex pression of a computer program and the preparatory design work capable of leading, respectively, to the reproduction or the subsequent creation of such a program ( Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace , paragraph 37).
38. From this the Court concluded that the source code and the object code of a computer program are forms of expression thereof which, consequently, are entitled to be protected by copyright as computer programs, by virtue of Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250. On the other hand, as regards the graphic user interface, the Court held that such an interface does not enable the reproduction of the computer program, but merely constitutes one element of that program by means of which users make use of the features of that program ( Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace , paragraphs 34 and 41).
45. The Court also points out that the finding made in paragraph 39 of the present judgment cannot affect the possibility that the SAS language and the format of SAS Institute’s data files might be protected, as works, by copyright under Directive 2001/29 if they are their author’s own intellectual creation (see Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace , paragraphs 44 to 46).
65. The Court has already held that the various parts of a work enjoy protection under Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/29, provided that they contain some of the elements which are the expression of the intellectual creation of the author of the work (Case C‑5/08 Infopaq International [2009] ECR I‑6569, paragraph 39).
67. It is only through the choice, sequence and combination of those words, figures or mathematical concepts that the author may express his creativity in an original manner and achieve a result, namely the user manual for the computer program, which is an intellectual creation (see, to that effect, Infopaq International , paragraph 45).
Migrationsverket v Nurije Kastrati and Others.
Date: 2012-05-03
38. However, the referring court alone has jurisdiction to determine the importance which should be attributed to such a submission. It is for the Court of Justice to rule on the matter in the light of the factual and legal considerations set out in the order for reference (Case C‑306/09 B. [2010] ECR I‑10341, paragraph 47).
Kingdom of Spain v European Commission.
Date: 2012-05-03
27. In accordance with the case‑law of the Court, the communication written pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation No 1663/95 must inform the Government concerned fully about the Commission’s reservations, so that it can fulfil the warning function given to it by that provision (see Case C‑170/00 Finland  v Commission  [2002] ECR I‑1007, paragraph 34, and Case C‑153/01 Spain  v Commission  [2004] ECR I‑9009, paragraph 93).
28. It follows that Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1663/95 requires that the irregularity which the Member State concerned is alleged to have committed should be stated with sufficient precision in the written communication provided for in the first subparagraph of that provision, with the result that the Member State is fully informed of it. Thus, a communication which does not meet that requirement cannot be regarded as a written communication within the terms of that provision.
29. Furthermore, a failure to observe that condition laid down in Article 8(1) of that regulation deprives of its substance the procedural guarantee accorded to Member States by the fifth point of Article 5(2)(c) of Regulation No 729/70 and the fifth subparagraph of Article 7(4) of Regulation No 1258/1999, which limits the period in respect of which expenditure can be refused financing by the EAGGF (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑158/00 Luxembourg  v Commission  [2002] ECR I‑5373, paragraph 24, and Case C‑300/02 Greece  v Commission  [2005] ECR I‑1341, paragraph 70).
45. It must be borne in mind that, in paragraphs 41 to 43 of the judgment in Case C‑329/00 Spain  v Commission , the Court held that the date which must be regarded as decisive as regards assessment of whether expenditure was effected within the period of 24 months referred to in the fifth point of Article 5(2)(c) of Regulation No 729/70 and the fifth subparagraph of Article 7(4) of Regulation No 1258/1999 must be that on which the final amount of the compensatory aid is fixed and the balance paid by the Member State concerned.
Amia SpA, in liquidation v Provincia Regionale di Palermo.
Date: 2012-05-24
27. In that regard, it must first be borne in mind that the question whether a national provision must be disapplied in as much as it conflicts with European Union law arises only if no compatible interpretation of that provision proves possible (judgment of 24 January 2012 in Case C‑282/10 Dominguez , paragraph 23).
28. The Court has consistently held that when national courts apply domestic law they are bound to interpret it, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive concerned in order to achieve the result sought by the directive and consequently to comply with the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU. This obligation to interpret national law in conformity with European Union law is inherent in the system of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, since it permits national courts, for the matters within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of European Union law when they determine the disputes before them ( Dominguez , paragraph 24 and the case‑law cited).
29. The principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with European Union law also requires national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that the directive in question is fully effective and achieves an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (see Dominguez , paragraph 27 and the case‑law cited).
33. In that regard, it is clear from the settled case‑law of the Court that, whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied upon before the national courts by individuals against the State where the latter has failed to implement the directive in domestic law by the end of the period prescribed or where it has failed to implement the directive correctly ( Dominguez , paragraph 33 and the case‑law cited).
34. In the present case, Article 10 of Directive 1999/31 fulfils those criteria as it imposes on Member States, in unequivocal terms, a precise obligation as to the result to be achieved that is not coupled with any condition regarding application of the rule laid down by it. That provision requires the Member States to take measures to ensure that the price charged for waste disposal in a landfill covers all the costs involved in the setting up and operation of the facility ( Pontina Ambiente , paragraph 35).
38. Since Article 10 of Directive 1999/31 and Articles 1 to 3 of Directive 2000/35 have direct effect, they are binding on all the authorities of the Member States, that is to say, not merely the national courts but also all administrative bodies, including decentralised authorities, and those authorities are required to apply them (see, to that effect, Case 103/88 Costanzo  [1989] ECR 1839, paragraphs 30 to 33 and Case C‑243/09 Fuß [2010] ECR I‑9849, paragraph 61 and the case‑law cited).