Uszodaépítő kft v APEH Központi Hivatal Hatósági Főosztály.
Date: 2010-09-30
22. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the national courts provided for by Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where questions submitted by national courts concern the interpretation of a provision of European Union law, the Court of Justice is bound, in principle, to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra  [2001] ECR I‑2099, paragraph 38; Case C‑103/08 Gottwald  [2009] ECR I‑9117, paragraph 16; and Case C‑82/09 Dimos Agiou Nikolaou  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 14).
23. It follows that the presumption that questions referred by national courts for a preliminary ruling are relevant may be rebutted only in exceptional cases, where it is quite obvious that the interpretation which is sought of the provisions of European Union law referred to in the questions bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or to its purpose (see, inter alia, Gottwald , paragraph 17 and case-law cited).
30. The fact that the national court has, formally speaking, worded the questions referred for a preliminary ruling with reference solely to provisions of the Sixth Directive does not preclude the Court from providing to the national court all the elements of interpretation which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to them in the wording of its questions (see, to that effect, Case C‑115/08 ČEZ  [2009] ECR I‑10265, paragraph 81, and Case C‑341/08 Petersen  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 48).
31. In that regard, it must be observed that, as is clear from the third recital of Directive 2006/112, that directive is a recasting of the existing legislation on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to VAT, and in particular the Sixth Directive, and does not in principle involve any material changes to that legislation.
34. In that regard, it must be recalled, first, that the right to deduct provided for in Articles 167 and 168 of Directive 2006/112 is an integral part of the VAT scheme and in principle may not be limited. The right to deduct is exercisable immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on transactions relating to inputs (Case C‑368/09 Pannon Gép Centrum  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 37 and case-law cited).
35. The deduction system is meant to relieve the taxpayer entirely of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT consequently ensures complete neutrality of taxation of all economic activities provided that they are themselves subject in principle to VAT (Case C‑408/98 Abbey National  [2001] ECR I-1361, paragraph 24; Case C‑25/03 HE  [2005] ECR I‑3123, paragraph 70; and Joined Cases C‑439/04 and C-440/04 Kittel and Recolta Recycling  [2006] ECR I‑6161, paragraph 48).
37. As regards, second, the procedures for exercising the right to deduct VAT, such as those referred to in Article 178 of Directive 2006/112, since a reverse charge procedure under Article 199(1)(a) of that directive is at issue, only the procedure referred to in Article 178(f) is applicable. Therefore, a taxable person who is liable as the recipient of services for the VAT relating thereto is not obliged to hold an invoice drawn up in accordance with the formal requirements of Directive 2006/112 in order to be able to exercise his right to deduct, and only has to fulfil the formalities laid down by the Member State concerned in the exercise of the option conferred by Article 178(f) of that directive (see, to that effect, Case C‑90/02 Bockemühl [2004] ECR I-3303, paragraph 47).
38. It is apparent from the case-law that the formalities thus laid down by the Member State concerned, which must be complied with by a taxable person in order to be able to exercise the right to deduct VAT, should not exceed what is strictly necessary for the purposes of verifying the correct application of the reverse charge procedure (see, to that effect, Bockemühl , paragraph 50).
39. In that regard, it has already been held that the principle of fiscal neutrality requires deduction of input tax to be allowed if the substantive requirements are satisfied, even if the taxable person has failed to comply with some of the formal requirements (Joined Cases C‑95/07 and C-96/07 Ecotrade  [2008] ECR I-3457, paragraph 63).
40. Therefore, where the tax authority has the information necessary to establish that the taxable person is, as the recipient of the supply of services at issue, liable to VAT, Articles 167, 168 and 178(f) of Directive 2006/112 preclude legislation which imposes, in relation to the right of that taxable person to deduct that tax, additional conditions which may have the effect of rendering that right ineffective for practical purposes (see, to that effect, Bockemühl , paragraph 51 and Ecotrade , paragraph 64).