larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
European Commission v Roumanie.
Date: 2011-04-14
15. It is settled case-law that the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is to give the Member State concerned an opportunity, on the one hand, to comply with its obligations under European Union law and, on the other, to avail itself of its right to defend itself against the complaints formulated by the Commission (see, inter alia, Case C‑147/03 Commission v Austria  [2005] ECR I‑5969, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
16. The opportunity for the Member State concerned to submit its observations, even if it chooses not to avail itself thereof, constitutes an essential guarantee intended by the FEU Treaty, adherence to which is an essential formal requirement of the procedure for finding that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations (see, inter alia, Case 211/81 Commission  v Denmark  [1982] ECR 4547, paragraph 9).
19. Such a situation is therefore clearly distinguishable from the situation, invoked by the Commission, that gave rise to the judgment in Commission  v Luxembourg . In that case, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg had failed to mention any measure transposing the directive in question in the course of the pre-litigation procedure and had merely let it be understood that the measures necessary for implementation were about to be adopted. It was not until after the Commission brought proceedings before the Court that the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg submitted, in its defence, that a law transposing the directive in question correctly had been adopted. In such circumstances, the Court has held that, if the pre-litigation procedure attained its objective of protecting the rights of the Member State concerned, the latter cannot complain that the Commission has extended or altered the subject-matter of the action as defined by the pre-litigation procedure on the ground that the Commission, after alleging a failure by the Member State to transpose a directive, has specified in its reply that the implementation pleaded for the first time by the Member State concerned in its defence is incorrect or incomplete so far as certain provisions of the directive are concerned ( Commission  v Luxembourg , paragraphs 54 to 56).
Vlaamse Dierenartsenvereniging VZW and Marc Janssens v Belgische Staat.
Date: 2011-04-14
42. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for by Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (see, to that effect, Case C‑138/08 Hochtief and Linde-Kca-Dresden  [2009] ECR I‑9889, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
43. The right to determine the questions to be put to the Court thus devolves upon the national court alone and the parties may not change their tenor ( Hochtief and Linde-Kca-Dresden , paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
44. In addition, to alter the substance of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling, or to answer the additional questions mentioned by the applicants in the main proceedings in their observations, would be incompatible with the Court’s function under Article 267 TFEU and with its duty to ensure that the governments of the Member States and the parties concerned are given the opportunity to submit observations under Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, bearing in mind that under that provision only the order of the national court is notified to the interested parties (see, to that effect, Hochtief and Linde-Kca-Dresden , paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
47. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, by virtue of the very nature of regulations and of their function in the system of sources of European Union law, the provisions of regulations generally have immediate effect in the national legal systems without it being necessary for the national authorities to adopt measures of application or without it being necessary for the European Union legislature to adopt supplementary legislation (Case C‑367/09 SGS Belgium and Others  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
48. Some of the provisions of a regulation, even if supplemented by an implementing decision, may, however, necessitate, for their implementation, the adoption of national measures of application (see, by analogy, Case C-403/98 Monte Arcosu  [2001] ECR I-103, paragraph 26).
70. Those passports cannot therefore be classified as ‘products’ within the meaning of the case-law of the Court; nor can Directive 98/34 apply to them. Consequently, specifications such as those contained in the Belgian legislation at issue in the main proceedings cannot be classified as technical specifications which, in accordance with Article 8 of that directive, must be communicated in advance to the Commission and, failing that, must not be applied by the national court (see, to that effect, Case C‑20/05 Schwibbert  [2007] ECR I‑9447, paragraphs 33 and 44 and the case-law cited).
Novo Nordisk AS v Ravimiamet.
Date: 2011-05-05
32. Indeed, as the Court has held, advertising of medicinal products is liable to harm public health, the safeguarding of which is the essential aim of Directive 2001/83 (see Case C‑421/07 Damgaard [2009] ECR I‑2629, paragraph 22, and Case C‑62/09 Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 34).
37. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, as is stated in the second recital in the preamble to Directive 2001/83, the safeguarding of public health is the essential aim of that directive ( Damgaard , paragraph 22).
Evropaïki Dynamiki - Proigmena Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE v European Commission.
Date: 2011-05-05
82. The Court of Justice thus has no jurisdiction to establish the facts or, in principle, to examine the evidence which the General Court accepted in support of those facts. Provided that the evidence has been properly obtained and the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the General Court alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced to it. Save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, that appraisal does not therefore constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice (see, in particular, Case C‑551/03 P General Motors  v Commission  [2006] ECR I‑3173, paragraphs 51 and 52 and case-law cited).
European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 2011-05-05
25. It must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation obtaining in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C-9/07 Commission  v France  [2007] ECR I-121, paragraph 8, and Case C‑48/10 Commission  v Spain  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 30).
27. The Court has repeatedly held that a benefit is regarded as a social security benefit where it is granted, without any individual and discretionary assessment of personal needs, to recipients on the basis of a statutorily defined position and relates to one of the risks expressly listed in Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1408/71 (see, inter alia, Hosse , paragraph 37, and Commission  v Parliament and Council , paragraph 56).
36. According to the Court’s settled case-law, the equal treatment rule which appears in Article 7 of Regulation No 1612/68 prohibits not only overt discrimination on grounds of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result (see, inter alia, Case C‑57/96 Meints  [1997] ECR I‑6689, paragraph 44, and Case C‑269/07 Commission  v Germany  [2009] ECR I‑7811, paragraph 53).
39. With regard to the argument put forward by the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the different fields of application of Regulations No 1612/68 and No 1408/71, it is sufficient to note that, although those two regulations do not have the same scope ratione personae , the fact remains that, since Regulation No 1612/68 is of general application as regards the free movement of workers, Article 7(2) thereof may apply to social advantages which, at the same time, fall specifically within the scope of Regulation No 1408/71 (Case C‑111/91 Commission  v Luxembourg  [1993] ECR I‑817, paragraphs 20 and 21, and Case C‑85/96 Martínez Sala  [1998] ECR I‑2691, paragraph 27).
Delphi Deutschland GmbH v Hauptzollamt Düsseldorf.
Date: 2011-05-18
21. As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, when the Court is requested to give a preliminary ruling on a matter of classification for customs purposes, its task is to provide the national court with guidance on the criteria which will enable the latter to classify the products at issue correctly in the CN, rather than to effect that classification itself, a fortiori since the Court does not necessarily have available to it all the information which is essential in that regard. In any event, the national court is in a better position to do so (Case C‑423/09 X  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 14 and case-law cited).
23. It is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, inter alia, X , paragraph 15 and case-law cited).
24. The explanatory notes drawn up by the European Commission as regards the CN and by the World Customs Organisation as regards the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System are an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force ( X , paragraph 16 and case-law cited).
26. With regard to the interpretation of the scope of subheading 8536 69 of the CN, it is necessary to take into account also the explanatory notes, even if they refer to subheadings 8536 69 10 to 8536 69 90 of the CN, as amended by Regulation No 1214/2007. Since the wording of those subheadings is identical to that of the same subheadings of the CN, as amended by Regulation No 1810/2004, Regulation No 1719/2005 and Regulation No 1549/2006, a different meaning should not, in principle, be given to the latter from that which should be given to the former, taking account of the explanatory notes.
29. Where goods permit that sort of connection in that way, it must be held that they are covered by subheading 8536 69 of the CN, and the facts that those goods do not ensure the insulation of the connection at the connection point or that they represent only some of the plugs and sockets manufactured subsequently are not in themselves relevant. Since that subheading does not include any reference to such circumstances, it must be concluded that they have no effect on the classification of those goods for customs purposes (see, by analogy, Case 40/88 Weber  [1989] ECR 1395, paragraph 16, and X , paragraph 34).
European Commission v Republic of Malta.
Date: 2011-05-19
32. In that regard, it is established case-law that, in proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations, it is for the Commission to prove the existence of the alleged infringement and to provide the Court with the information necessary for it to determine whether the infringement is made out, and the Commission may not rely on any presumption for that purpose (see, in particular, Case C‑287/03 Commission v Belgium  [2005] ECR I‑3761, paragraph 27, and the judgment of 10 June 2010 in Case C‑37/09 Commission v Portugal , not published in the ECR, paragraph 28).
David Barcenilla Fernández (C-256/10) and Pedro Antonio Macedo Lozano (C-261/10) v Gerardo García SL.
Date: 2011-05-19
41. Further, according to established case-law, the freedom to choose the ways and means of ensuring that a directive is implemented does not affect the obligation imposed on all Member States to which the directive is addressed to adopt all the measures necessary to ensure that the directive concerned is fully effective in accordance with the objective which it pursues (Case C-268/06 Impact [2008] ECR I-2483, paragraph 40 and case-law cited) and to ensure, where the directive is intended to create rights for individuals, that they can, where appropriate, rely on them before the national courts (Case C-361/88 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR  I‑2567, paragraph 15).
European Commission v Portuguese Republic.
Date: 2011-05-24
40. In accordance with its case-law, the Court may of its own motion examine whether the conditions laid down in Article 226 EC for bringing an action for failure to fulfil obligations are satisfied (Case C‑362/90 Commission  v Italy [1992] ECR I‑2353, paragraph 8, and Case C‑417/02 Commission  v Greece [2004] ECR I‑7973, paragraph 16).
41. It is settled case-law that, in the context of proceedings under Article 226 EC, the existence of a failure to fulfil obligations must be assessed in the light of the European Union legislation in force at the close of the period prescribed by the Commission for the Member State concerned to comply with its reasoned opinion (see, in particular, Case C‑61/94 Commission  v Germany [1996] ECR I‑3989, paragraph 42; Case C‑377/03 Commission  v Belgium [2006] ECR I‑9733, paragraph 33, and Case C‑416/07 Commission  v Greece [2009] ECR I‑7883, paragraph 27). It is clear that Directive 2005/36 repealed Directive 89/48 from 20 October 2007, in other words after the expiry of the period prescribed in the reasoned opinion.
42. However, as the Court has already held, although the claims as stated in the application cannot as a rule be extended beyond the infringements alleged in the operative part of the reasoned opinion and in the letter of formal notice, the fact nevertheless remains that the Commission has standing to seek a declaration that a Member State has failed to fulfil obligations which were created in the original version of a European Union measure, subsequently amended or repealed, and which were maintained in force under the provisions of a new European Union measure. Conversely, the subject‑matter of the dispute cannot be extended to obligations arising under new provisions which do not correspond to those arising under the original version of the measure concerned, for otherwise it would constitute a breach of the essential procedural requirements of infringement proceedings (see, in that regard, Case C‑365/97 Commission  v Italy [1999] ECR I‑7773, paragraph 36; Case C‑363/00 Commission  v Italy [2003] ECR I‑5767, paragraph 22, and Case C‑416/07 Commission  v Greece , cited above, paragraph 28).
43. Consequently, the claims stated in the Commission’s application seeking a declaration that the Portuguese Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Directive 2005/36 are, in principle, admissible, on condition that the obligations under that directive are analogous to those arising under Directive 89/48 (see, by analogy, Case C‑416/07 Commission  v Greece , cited above, paragraph 29).
European Commission v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 2011-05-26
60. In that regard, it is appropriate to note that the Court may of its own motion, or on a proposal from the Advocate General, or at the request of the parties, order the reopening of the oral procedure in accordance with Article 61 of the Rules of Procedure if it considers that it lacks sufficient information, or that the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties (see, in particular, Case C‑42/07 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International [2009] ECR I‑7633, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
61. However, neither the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union nor its Rules of Procedure make provision for the parties to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion (see Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International , paragraph 32).
66. As regards the time at which the Commission chose to bring the proceedings against the Kingdom of Spain, it is sufficient to observe that it is for the Commission, in performing the task conferred upon it by Article 211 EC, to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty are applied and verify whether the Member States have acted in accordance with those provisions. If the Commission considers that a Member State has infringed provisions of the Treaty, it is for it to determine whether it is expedient to take action against that State and what provisions the State has infringed, and to choose the time at which it will initiate infringement proceedings; the considerations which determine its choice of time cannot affect the admissibility of its action (see Case C‑35/96 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I‑3851, paragraph 27; Case C‑33/04 Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I‑10629, paragraph 66; and Case C‑531/06 Commission  v Italy  [2009] ECR I‑4103, paragraph 23).
90. It is clear, moreover, from the case-law of the Court that, where a contract contains elements relating both to a public works contract and another type of contract, it is the main object of the contract which determines which body of European Union rules on public contracts is to be applied in principle (see, to that effect, Auroux and Others , paragraph 37).
91. That determination must be made in the light of the essential obligations which predominate and which, as such, characterise the transaction, as opposed to those which are only ancillary or supplementary in nature and are required by the very object of the contract (Case C‑412/04 Commission  v Italy [2008] ECR I‑619, paragraph 49).
94. According to settled case-law, in proceedings under Article 226 EC for failure to fulfil obligations, it is for the Commission to prove that failure. It is the Commission, indeed, which must place before the Court all the information needed to enable the Court to establish that failure, and in so doing the Commission may not rely on any presumptions (Case C‑490/09 Commission v Luxembourg [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
Gebhard Stark v D.A.S. Österreichische Allgemeine Rechtsschutzversicherung AG.
Date: 2011-05-26
25. In that regard, it is settled case-law that the Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to provide a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Case C‑188/07 Commune de Mesquer  [2008] ECR I-4501, paragraph 30).
28. It follows from both the 11th recital in the preamble to Directive 87/344 and Article 4(1) of that directive that the interest of persons covered by legal expenses insurance means that the insured person must have the freedom to choose his own lawyer or other person appropriately qualified under national law for the purpose of any judicial or administrative proceedings.
29. In that regard, the Court has already held that Article 4(1) of Directive 87/344, which provides for the right freely to choose a representative, is of general application and is obligatory in nature (see, to that effect, Case C‑199/08 Eschig  [2009] ECR I‑8295, paragraph 47).
31. In paragraphs 65 and 66 of Eschig , however, the Court pointed out that Directive 87/344 does not seek to harmonise completely the Member States’ legal expenses insurance contracts, with the result that, as EU law currently stands, the Member States remain free to determine the body of rules applicable to those contracts, on condition that those comply with EU law, and in particular with Article 4 of Directive 87/344.
33. Consequently, freedom of choice, within the terms of Article 4(1) of Directive 87/344, does not mean that Member States are obliged to require insurers, in all circumstances, to cover in full the costs incurred in connection with the defence of an insured person, irrespective of the place where the person professionally entitled to represent that person is established in relation to the court or administrative authority with jurisdiction to deal with a dispute, on condition that that freedom is not rendered meaningless. That would be the case if the restriction imposed on the payment of those costs were to render de facto impossible a reasonable choice of representative by the insured person. In any event, it is for the national courts, if an action is brought before them in this regard, to determine whether or not there is any such restriction.
34. Moreover, national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings does not exclude the freedom of contracting parties to agree that legal expenses insurance is also to cover the reimbursement of costs relating to the involvement of representatives who are not established at the place of the court having jurisdiction, possibly against payment of a higher premium by the insured person.
European Commission v French Republic.
Date: 2011-06-09
19. The transposition of that provision requires the Member States not only to adopt a comprehensive legislative framework but also to implement concrete and specific protection measures (see, to that effect, Case C‑183/05 Commission  v Ireland  [2007] ECR I‑137, paragraph 29).
20. Similarly, the system of strict protection presupposes the adoption of coherent and coordinated measures of a preventive nature (judgment of 16 March 2006 in Case C‑518/04 Commission  v Greece , paragraph 16, and Commission  v Ireland , paragraph 30).
21. Such a system of strict protection must therefore enable the effective avoidance of deterioration or destruction of breeding sites or resting places of the animal species listed in Annex IV(a) to the Habitats Directive (see, to that effect, Case C‑103/00 Commission  v Greece  [2002] ECR I‑1147, paragraph 39).
22. Finally, it must be recalled that it is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-103/00 Commission  v Greece , paragraph 23, and Case C‑531/06 Commission  v Italy [2009] ECR I‑4103, paragraph 98).