C. D. v S. T.
Date: 2014-03-18
29. As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that the objective of Directive 92/85, which was adopted on the basis of Article 118a EC, to which Article 153 TFEU corresponds, is to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or who are breastfeeding (Case C‑460/06 Paquay  [2007] ECR I‑8511, paragraph 27, and Case C‑232/09 Danosa  [2010] ECR I‑11405, paragraph 58).
32. According to the case-law of the Court, the right to maternity leave granted to pregnant workers must be regarded as a particularly important mechanism of protection under employment law. The European Union legislature thus considered that the fundamental changes to the living conditions of the persons concerned during the period of at least 14 weeks preceding and after childbirth constituted a legitimate ground on which they could suspend their employment, without the public authorities or employers being allowed in any way to call the legitimacy of that ground into question (Case C‑116/06 Kiiski [2007] ECR I‑7643, paragraph 49, and Case C‑5/12 Betriu Montull  [2013] ECR, paragraph 48).
33. As the European Union legislature acknowledged in the 14th recital in the preamble to Directive 92/85, pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or who are breastfeeding are in an especially vulnerable situation which makes it necessary for the right to maternity leave to be granted to them but which, particularly during that leave, cannot be compared to that of a man or a woman on sick leave (see Case C‑411/96 Boyle and Others [1998] ECR I‑6401, paragraph 40, and Betriu Montull , paragraph 49).
34. That maternity leave from which the female worker benefits is intended, first, to protect a woman’s biological condition during and after pregnancy and, secondly, to protect the special relationship between a woman and her child over the period which follows pregnancy and childbirth, by preventing that relationship from being disturbed by the multiple burdens which would result from the simultaneous pursuit of employment (see, in particular, Case 184/83 Hofmann [1984] ECR 3047, paragraph 25; Kiiski , paragraph 46; and Betriu Montull , paragraph 50).
46. As regards discrimination as referred to in Article 2(1)(a) and (b) of that directive, the refusal to provide maternity leave in the situation outlined by the referring tribunal constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a) if the fundamental reason for that refusal applies exclusively to workers of one sex (see, to that effect, Case C‑177/88 Dekker [1990] ECR I‑3941, paragraph 10; Case C‑421/92 Habermann-Beltermann  [1994] ECR I‑1657, paragraph 14; and Mayr , paragraph 50).
48. The Court has consistently held that indirect discrimination on grounds of sex arises where a national measure, albeit formulated in neutral terms, puts considerably more workers of one sex at a disadvantage than the other (see, to that effect, Case C‑1/95 Gerster  [1997] ECR I‑5253, paragraph 30; Case C‑123/10 Brachner  [2011] ECR I‑10003, paragraph 56; and Case C‑7/12 Riežniece  [2013] ECR, paragraph 39).