Republic of Estonia v European Parliament and Council of the European Union.
Date: 2015-06-18
11. According to settled case-law of the Court, partial annulment of an EU act is possible only if the elements the annulment of which is sought may be severed from the remainder of the act (see, inter alia, judgment in Commission  v Council , C‑29/99, EU:C:2002:734, paragraph 45, and judgment in Commission  v Parliament and Council , C‑427/12, EU:C:2014:170, paragraph 16).
12. The Court has repeatedly ruled that that requirement of severability is not satisfied where the partial annulment of an act would have the effect of altering its substance (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission  v Poland , C‑504/09 P, EU:C:2012:178, paragraph 98 and the case-law cited).
28. As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law, requires that measures implemented through provisions should be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it (see, inter alia, judgments in British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco , C‑491/01, EU:C:2002:741, paragraph 122, and Digital Rights Ireland and Others , C‑293/12 and C‑594/12, EU:C:2014:238, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
29. With regard to judicial review of the conditions referred to in the previous paragraph, the EU legislature must be allowed broad discretion in an area such as that involved in the present case, which entails political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see judgments in British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco , C‑491/01, EU:C:2002:741, paragraph 123, and Vodafone and Others , C‑58/08, EU:C:2010:321, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).
39. Finally, as regards the Republic of Estonia’s argument that the principle of proportionality has been infringed since the EU legislature did not take account of its particular situation as a Member State which is advanced in electronic administration, it should be noted that Directive 2013/34 has an impact in all Member States and requires that a balance between the different interests involved is ensured, taking account of the objectives of that Directive. Therefore, the attempt to strike such a balance, taking into account not the particular situation of a single Member State, but that of all EU Member States, cannot be regarded as being contrary to the principle of proportionality.
44. It is appropriate to bear in mind that Article 5(3) TEU refers to the principle of subsidiarity which provides that the European Union, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, is to take action only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the European Union. Furthermore, Protocol 2, in Article 5, lays down guidelines for the purposes of determining whether those conditions are met (judgment in Luxembourg  v Parliament and Council , C‑176/09, EU:C:2011:290, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).
45. As regards an area, in this case the improvement of the conditions of freedom of establishment, which is not among those for which the European Union has exclusive competence, it must be considered whether the objective of the proposed action could be better achieved at EU level (see judgment in British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco , C‑491/01, EU:C:2002:741, paragraph 180).
48. The interdependence of the two objectives pursued by the Directive means that the EU legislature could legitimately take the view that it had to include a special scheme for small undertakings, and that, because of that interdependence, that twofold objective could best be achieved at EU level (see, to that effect, judgment in Vodafone and Others , C‑58/08, EU:C:2010:321, paragraph 78).
53. The subsidiarity principle is not intended to limit the EU’s competence on the basis of the situation of any particular Member State taken individually, but requires only that the proposed action can, by reason of its scale or effects, be better achieved at EU level, given its objectives listed in Article 3 TEU and provisions specific to various areas, including to the various freedoms, such as the freedom of establishment, laid down in the Treaties.
58. It should be borne in mind that, although the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the EU authority which adopted the contested measure so as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the Court to exercise its review, it is not required to go into every relevant point of fact and law (see, int er alia, judgment in Commission  v Council , C‑122/94, EU:C:1996:68, paragraph 29).
59. More particularly, it is not possible to require that the statement of reasons should set out the various facts, often very numerous and complex, on the basis of which a directive was adopted, or a fortiori that it should provide a more or less complete evaluation of those facts (see, by analogy, judgment in Italy  v Council and Commission , C‑100/99, EU:C:2001:383, paragraph 63).
60. Consequently, if the contested measure clearly discloses the essential objective pursued by the institution, it would be excessive to require a specific statement of reasons for each of the technical choices made by the institution (see, in particular, judgment in Italy  v Council and Commission , C‑100/99, EU:C:2001:383, paragraph 64).
61. Moreover, it follows from the case-law of the Court that observance of the obligation to state reasons must be evaluated not only according to the wording of the contested act, but also according to its context and the circumstances of each case, in particular the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations (judgment in VBA  v Florimex and Others , C‑265/97 P, EU:C:2000:170, paragraph 93).
62. In that regard, it is important to emphasise that the Republic of Estonia participated, in accordance with the arrangements laid down in the FEU Treaty, in the legislative procedure which led to the adoption of the Directive, which is addressed to it in the same way as to the other Member States represented in the Council under Article 55 of that directive. Therefore, and in any event, the Republic of Estonia cannot validly complain that the Parliament and the Council, the authors of the Directive, did not place it in a position to know the reasons for the choice of measures which they intended to implement.