larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Portuguese Republic v Council of the European Union.
Date: 1996-12-03
21 As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that the Court has consistently held that the use of Article 235 as the legal basis for a measure is justified only where no other provision of the Treaty gives the Community institutions the necessary power to adopt the measure in question (see, inter alia, Case 45/86 Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493, paragraph 13, and Case C-271/94 Parliament v Council [1996] ECR I-1689, paragraph 13).
22 In the context of the organization of the powers of the Community, the choice of the legal basis for a measure must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review.  Those factors include in particular the aim and content of the measure (see in particular Case C-300/89 Commission v Council [1991] ECR I-2867, paragraph 10, and Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council [1996] ECR I-5755, paragraph 25).
37 In order to qualify as a development cooperation agreement for the purposes of Article 130y of the Treaty, an agreement must pursue the objectives referred to in Article 130u.  Article 130u(1) in particular makes it clear that those are broad objectives in the sense that it must be possible for the measures required for their pursuit to concern a variety of specific matters.  That is so in particular in the case of an agreement establishing the framework of such cooperation.
38 That being so, to require a development cooperation agreement concluded between the Community and a non-member country to be based on another provision as well as on Article 130y and, possibly, also to be concluded by the Member States whenever it touches on a specific matter would in practice amount to rendering devoid of substance the competence and procedure prescribed in Article 130y.
79 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that, even if the argument of the Portuguese Government were well founded, the conclusion of the Agreement would in any event require the Council to act by a qualified majority and the Parliament to be consulted in accordance with the first sentence of Article 228(2) and the first subparagraph of Article 228(3).  The submission put forward by the Portuguese Government is therefore purely formal in purport, since even if Article 113 of the Treaty is redundant as a legal basis for the conclusion of the Agreement that fact cannot affect the determination of the content of the contested Agreement (see, to that effect, Case 45/86 Commission v Council, cited above, paragraph 12, and Case 131/86 United Kingdom v Council [1988] ECR 905, paragraph 11).
John Reisdorf v Finanzamt Köln-West.
Date: 1996-12-05
15 That objection must be dismissed.  It is clear from the actual wording of the order for reference that the national court is seeking an interpretation by the Court of Article 18(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive.  Provided that the questions submitted concern the interpretation of a provision of Community law, the Court gives its ruling without, in principle, having to look into the circumstances in which a national court was prompted to submit the questions and envisages applying the provision of Community law which it has asked the Court to interpret (see to that effect Case C-67/91 Dirección General de Defensa de la Competencia v Asociación Española de Banca Privada and Others [1992] ECR I-4785, paragraphs 25 and 26, and Case C-62/93 BP Supergas v Greek State [1995] ECR I-1883, paragraph 10).
16 The matter would be different only if it were apparent either that the procedure provided for in Article 177 had been diverted from its true purpose and was being used in fact to lead the Court to give a ruling by means of a contrived dispute, or that the provision of Community law referred to the Court for interpretation was manifestly incapable of applying (see to that effect Case C-67/91, paragraph 26, and Case C-62/93, paragraph 10, both cited above).  That is not so in this case.
22 It is apparent from Article 18(1)(a), read in conjunction with Article 22(3), that exercise of the right to deduct input tax is normally dependent on possession of the original of the invoice or of the document which, under the criteria determined by the Member State in question, may be considered to serve as an invoice.  As pointed out by the Advocate General in paragraph 17 of his Opinion, the different language versions of those provisions which were authentic at the time of adoption of the Sixth Directive confirm that interpretation, even though the wording of Article 22(3)(c) in the German text does not indicate as clearly that the task of the Member States is to lay down the criteria determining whether another document may serve as an invoice.
24 That power of the Member States is consistent with one of the aims of the Sixth Directive, that of ensuring that VAT is levied and collected, under the supervision of the tax authorities (see the seventeenth recital in the preamble and Article 22(2) and (8)).  In that regard, the Court held in Joined Cases 123/87 and 330/87 Jeunehomme and EGI v Belgian State [1988] ECR 4517, at paragraphs 16 and 17, that the Member States may require invoices to contain additional information to ensure the correct levying of VAT and permit supervision by the authorities, in so far as such particulars do not, by reason of their number or technical nature, render the exercise of the right to deduct input tax practically impossible or excessively difficult.
Ministero delle Finanze v Foods Import Srl.
Date: 1996-12-12
17 That conclusion is not in fact in contradiction with the Court's settled case-law to the effect that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CCT and of the notes to the sections or chapters (see, in particular, Case C-459/93 Thyssen Haniel Logistic [1995] ECR I-1381, paragraph 8).  The species to which a fish belongs is an objective property, defined by the wording of the CCT heading.  Moreover, the requirement that the objective characteristics and properties of products must be ascertainable when customs clearance is obtained (Case C-233/88 Van de Kolk [1990] ECR I-265, paragraph 12) does not presuppose that differences between products are apparent.  Certain characteristics of a product may be identifiable only microscopically (Case 175/82 Dinter [1983] ECR 969) or by means of sensory analysis (Van de Kolk, cited above).  Indeed, a product's classification may depend on the process by which it is manufactured or the geographical origin of some of its constituents, those being characteristics which are not necessarily apparent (Case 40/88 Weber [1989] ECR 1395).
24 That provision lays down three cumulative conditions for waiver by the competent authorities of post-clearance recovery of import duties: non-collection must have been due to an error by the authorities, the person liable must have acted in good faith, or in other words he must not have been reasonably able to detect the authorities' error, and he must have complied with all the provisions laid down by the legislation in force so far as his customs declaration was concerned (Joined Cases C-153/94 and C-204/94 Faroe Seafood and Another [1996] ECR I-2465, paragraph 83).
25 This Court has consistently held that, if those three conditions are satisfied, the person liable is entitled to waiver of recovery (Case C-348/89 Mecanarte [1991] ECR I-3277, paragraph 12, and Faroe Seafood, cited above, paragraph 84).$
30 In the present case, the nature of the error committed may be assessed in the light of a number of circumstances. As the Advocate General points out in paragraph 40 of his Opinion, the fact that the authorities persisted in their error over a period of some three years would suggest that the issue was not a simple one.  There was terminological confusion arising from the use of the usual names of the fish and, more particularly, from the fact that the terms `cod', `stockfisch' or `baccalà' generally designate not specific species of fish but families of species or even preservation treatment applied to certain species.
Georgios Kontogeorgas v Kartonpak AE.
Date: 1996-12-12
16 Those arguments must be accepted.  It is clear from the wording of Article 7 of the Directive that provision is made for two alternative cases of entitlement to commission.  Article 7(1) refers to the agent's ongoing or previous activities, whereas Article 7(2) provides that a commercial agent is to be remunerated for all transactions entered into with customers belonging to a certain area or group, no mention being made of the need for any particular activity on the part of the agent.  The distinction between the two situations is further confirmed  by the fact that Article 7(2) of the Directive expressly employs the word `also'.  That paragraph cannot, therefore, be interpreted to the effect that activity on the part of the agent is also required.  Such an interpretation would, moreover, result in Article 7(2) of the Directive being rendered otiose since, where the commercial agent has found the customer in question, Article 7(1) applies.
19 The reply to the first question must therefore be that the first indent of Article 7(2) of the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that, where a commercial agent is responsible for a geographical area, he is entitled to commission on transactions concluded with customers belonging to that area, even if they were concluded without any action on his part.
Question 2
25 It should first be noted, with respect to this question, that Article 7(2) of the Directive does not indicate the criteria which must be taken into consideration where the customer is a legal person whose seat is not situated in the place where its business is run and its commercial activity carried on.  That provision must therefore be interpreted in the light of its context and the aim of the Directive (see Case 327/82 Ekro [1984] ECR 107, paragraph 11, and Case C-7/90 Vandevenne and Others [1991] ECR I-4371, paragraph 6).
The Queen v Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce, ex parte Accrington Beef Co. Ltd and Others.
Date: 1996-12-12
15 It is sufficient, on that point, to note that, since the contested provisions are contained in a Community regulation and are addressed in general terms to categories of persons defined in the abstract and to situations determined objectively, it is not obvious that an action by the applicants challenging that regulation under Article 173 of the Treaty would have been admissible.
20 It must be remembered, however, that in the sphere of the common agricultural policy the Council may find it necessary to confer on the Commission wide implementing powers, since the Commission alone is able to monitor continually and closely trends on the agricultural markets and to act speedily if the situation requires.  Wide powers of implementation are all the more justified in the present case in so far as they must be exercised in accordance with the `management committee' procedure, which allows the Council to reserve its right to intervene (Joined Cases C-296/93 and C-307/93 France and Ireland v Commission [1996] ECR I-795, paragraph 22).
33 The Court has consistently held that traders cannot claim a legitimate expectation that an existing situation capable of being altered by the Community institutions in the exercise of their discretionary power will be maintained, and that that applies particularly in an area such as the common organization of the markets whose purpose involves constant adjustments to meet changes in the economic situation (see, in particular, Case C-350/88 Delacre and Others v Commission [1990] ECR I-395, paragraph 33).
39 The Court has consistently held that the statement of the reasons on which regulations are based is not required to specify the often very numerous and complex matters of fact or of law dealt with in the regulations, provided that the latter fall within the general scheme of the body of measures of which they form part, and that in order to satisfy the requirements of Article 190 of the Treaty it is sufficient that the statement of reasons is appropriate to the nature of the measure in question.  The reasoning of the institution which adopted the measure must be stated clearly and unequivocally, so as to inform persons concerned of the justification for the measure adopted and to enable the Court to exercise its powers of review (see, in particular, Case 250/84 Eridania and Others v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero [1986] ECR 117, paragraphs 37 and 38, and France and Ireland v Commission, cited above, paragraph 72).
49 The Court has consistently held that the prohibition of discrimination set out in Article 40(3) of the EC Treaty is merely a specific expression of the general principle of equal treatment in Community law, according to which comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, in particular, Case 106/83 Sermide v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero and Others [1984] ECR 4209, paragraph 28).
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1996-12-12
9 In this regard, it is sufficient to point out that, as the Court has consistently held, a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, inter alia, the judgment of 17 October 1996 in Case C-312/95 Commission v Luxembourg [1996] ECR I-0000, paragraph 9).
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1996-12-12
16 In those circumstances, it is particularly important that directives should be transposed by measures which are indisputably binding.  In all cases where non-implementation of the measures required by a directive could endanger human health, the persons concerned must be in a position to rely on mandatory rules in order to be able to assert their rights (see, to this effect, Case C-361/88 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-2567, paragraph 16, Case C-59/89 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-2607, paragraph 19, and Case C-58/89 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-4983, paragraph 14).
18 In all events, as regards the procedural difficulties relied on by the German Government to explain the delay in transposing Directives 78/659 and 79/923, it is sufficient to recall that, as the Court has held repeatedly, a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-147/94 Commission v Spain [1995] ECR I-1015, paragraph 5, Case C-259/94 Commission v Greece [1995] ECR I-1947, paragraph 5, and Case C-253/95 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-2423, paragraph 12).
22 It must be held, first, that Article 5 of Directives 78/659 and 79/923 lays down an obligation for Member States to establish programmes in order to reduce pollution and to ensure that the designated waters conform, within respectively five and six years following their designation, to both the values set for the parameters indicated in the respective annexes and the notes contained in columns G and I thereof.
24 It follows clearly from the wording of Article 5 of Directives 78/659 and 79/923 as well as from the detailed arrangements for monitoring water quality laid down by those directives that Member States have an obligation to establish specific programmes in order to reduce pollution of fresh waters and shellfish waters within five and six years respectively.
26 It should also be stressed that the objective of reducing water pollution caused by effluent pursued by such general programmes does not necessarily correspond to the more specific objective of Directive 78/659, which is to improve the quality of fresh waters in order to support fish life.
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 1996-12-12
13 According to established case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in the Member State as it stood at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C-289/94 Commission v Italy [1996] ECR I-4405, paragraph 20).
Ligue royale belge pour la protection des oiseaux ASBL and Société d'études ornithologiques AVES ASBL v Région Wallonne, intervener: Fédération royale ornithologique belge ASBL.
Date: 1996-12-12
15 It should first be pointed out that the Court has held, at paragraph 38 of its judgment in Case 262/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 3073, that the capture and sale of wild birds with a view to keeping them for use as live decoys or for recreational purposes in fairs and markets may constitute judicious use authorized by Article 9(1)(c) of the Directive.
18 The breeding and reproduction of protected species in captivity may constitute such a solution if they prove to be possible (Case 247/85 Commission v Belgium [1987] ECR 3029, paragraph 41).
Commission of the European Communities v Sociedade de Curtumes a Sul do Tejo Ldª (Socurte), Revestimentos de Cortiça Ldª (Quavi) and Sociedade Transformadora de Carnes Ldª (Stec).
Date: 1997-01-09
31 It must be stated in that regard that notification of the Community acts referred to in the fifth paragraph of Article 173 and Article 191 of the EC Treaty necessarily involves the communication of a detailed account of the contents of the measure notified and of the reasons on which it is based.  In the absence of such an account, the third party concerned would be denied precise knowledge of the contents of the act in question and of the reasons for which it was adopted, which would enable him to bring proceedings effectively against that decision (see, in particular, with regard to Article 191, Case 58/88 Olbrechts v Commission [1989] ECR 2643, paragraph 10).
36 It must be stated in that regard that the appraisal by the Court of First Instance of the evidence put before it is not reviewable unless it is established that that Court erred in law (see, in particular, Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-667, paragraph 42).
Unità Socio-Sanitaria Locale nº 47 di Biella (USSL) v Istituto nazionale per l'assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro (INAIL).
Date: 1997-01-16
12 Given the context in which the national court made the reference to the Court, it should be pointed out at the outset that, according to settled case-law, the Court has no jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on a question submitted by a national court where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law sought by that court bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose or where the problem is hypothetical and the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 61).
17 Secondly, it follows from settled case-law that, within the framework of proceedings brought under Article 177 of the Treaty, the Court does not have jurisdiction to give a ruling on the compatibility of a national measure with Community law.  However, it does have jurisdiction to supply the national court with a ruling on the interpretation of Community law so as to enable that court to determine whether such compatibility exists in order to decide the case before it (see, in particular, Case 223/78 Grosoli [1979] ECR 2621, paragraph 3).
19 According to settled case-law, Articles 48, 52 and 59 of the Treaty cannot be applied to activities which are confined in all respects within a single Member State (Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraph 37; Case C-332/90 Steen [1992] ECR I-341, paragraph 9; and Joined Cases C-29/94 to C-35/94 Aubertin and Others [1995] ECR I-301, paragraph 9).
Eckehard Pastoors and Trans-Cap GmbH v Belgian State.
Date: 1997-01-23
16 However, as the Court has consistently held, the rules regarding equality of treatment between nationals and non-nationals forbid not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead to the same result (Case 22/80 Boussac v Gerstenmeier [1980] ECR 3427, paragraph 9; Case C-175/88 Biehl v Administration des Contributions [1990] ECR I-1779, paragraph 13).
17 The Court has also held that a national rule which draws a distinction on the basis of residence, in that non-residents are denied certain benefits which are, conversely, granted to persons residing within national territory, is liable to operate mainly to the detriment of nationals of other Member States, since non-residents are in the majority of cases foreigners, and thus to constitute indirect discrimination by reason of nationality (Case C-279/93 Finanzamt Köln v Schumacker [1995] ECR I-225, paragraphs 28 and 29).
19 That finding, however, is not sufficient under the Court's case-law for such legislation to be held to be incompatible with Article 6 of the Treaty.  For that, it would also be necessary for the legislation in question to be incapable of being justified by objective circumstances (Case C-398/92 Mund & Fester v Hatrex Internationaal Transport [1994] ECR I-467, paragraphs 16 and 17).
21 It is indeed the case that the harmonization and cooperation brought about at Community level in civil and commercial matters by the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968, concerning the jurisdiction of the courts and the enforcement of judgments in those areas, do not cover criminal matters, and that there is no analogous convention between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany to secure the enforcement of court decisions in criminal matters.  There is therefore a real risk that enforcement of a judgment against a non-resident would be impossible or, at least, considerably more difficult and onerous.
22 That situation therefore objectively justifies a difference in treatment between resident and non-resident offenders, the obligation imposed on the latter to pay a sum by way of security being appropriate to prevent them from avoiding an effective penalty simply by declaring that they do not consent to the immediate levying of the fine and opting for the continuation of normal criminal proceedings.
24 Under the Court's case-law, however, where a Community regulation does not lay down any specific penalty for infringement but refers to national provisions, Member States retain a discretion as to the choice of penalties, which must in any event be effective, dissuasive and proportionate (Case C-7/90 Vandevenne and Others [1991] ECR I-4371, paragraph 11).  Those penalties must thus be appropriate and necessary to achieve the aim pursued, without going beyond what is essential in order to attain it (Case 299/86 Drexl [1988] ECR 1213, paragraph 18).
ANDRE en Co. NV v Belgian State.
Date: 1997-01-23
23 Furthermore, the objective of Regulation No 926/80 is not to protect traders generally from any disadvantage arising from existing contracts.  As the Court noted in Case 152/80 Debayser and Others [1981] ECR 1291, paragraph 12, which concerned Regulation No 1608/74, replaced by Regulation No 926/80, the purpose which the provisions of Regulation No 1608/74 were designed to fulfil was not to provide traders engaged in the performance of contracts containing predetermined conditions with full protection against the application of MCAs following a monetary measure.