Fédération Cynologique Internationale v Federación Canina Internacional de Perros de Pura Raza.
Date: 2013-02-21
26. It should first of all be recalled that in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, which are based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions referred concern the interpretation of European Union law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C-119/05 Lucchini [2007] ECR I-6199, paragraph 43; Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige  [2011] ECR I-527, paragraph 15; and Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate Advertising and Others [2011] ECR I-10269, paragraph 32).
27. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling from a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Lucchini , paragraph 44; TeliaSonera Sverige , paragraph 16; and eDate Advertising and Others , paragraph 33).
30. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the fact that the parties to the main proceedings did not raise a point of European Union law before the referring court does not preclude the latter from bringing the matter before the Court of Justice. In providing that a request for a preliminary ruling may be submitted to the Court where ‘a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State’, the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU are not intended to restrict this procedure exclusively to cases where one or other of the parties to the main proceedings has taken the initiative of raising a point concerning the interpretation or the validity of European Union law, but also extend to cases where a question of this kind is raised by the court or tribunal itself, which considers that a decision thereon by the Court of Justice is ‘necessary to enable it to give judgment’ (Case 126/80 Salonia [1981] ECR 1563, paragraph 7, and Case C-251/11 Huet [2012] ECR, paragraph 23).
33. First of all, it should be noted that Article 9(1) of the Regulation does not make any distinction on the basis of whether the third party is the proprietor of a Community trade mark or not. Thus, that provision grants the proprietor of a Community trade mark an exclusive right to prevent ‘any third party’, not having its consent, from using, in the course of trade, any signs liable to infringe its mark (see, by analogy, Case C-488/10 Celaya Emparanza y Galdos Internacional  [2012] ECR, paragraphs 33 and 34).
48. That finding may be applied, mutatis mutandis , to the context of Community trade marks, in such a way that the possibility for the proprietor of an earlier Community trade mark to bring infringement proceedings against the proprietor of a later registered Community trade mark cannot render either the bringing of an application for a declaration of invalidity before OHIM or the mechanisms for prior control available under the procedure for registering Community trade marks devoid of all purpose.
49. It is, furthermore, important to emphasise the need to preserve the essential function of the trade mark, which is to guarantee to consumers the origin of the goods (Case C-206/01 Arsenal Football Club  [2002] ECR I-10273, paragraph 51).
50. In that regard, the Court has repeatedly held that the exclusive right under Article 9(1) of the Regulation was conferred in order to enable the trade mark proprietor to protect his specific interests as proprietor of the mark, that is to say, to ensure that the trade mark can fulfil its own function (Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08 Google France and Google [2010] ECR I-2417, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).