larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2000-02-24
17 It should be observed at the outset that the harmonisation achieved by the excise duty directives and by those on structures is no more than partial. The latter are essentially confined to classifying products on the basis of objective factors, connected in particular with the production methods employed, to defining the conditions governing chargeability to excise duty, to organising a system for circulation of the products subject to excise duty, to determining the tax base of the excise duties and to fixing minimum rates.
18 Moreover, it was in view of the different fiscal traditions in the Member States in this regard and the frequent recourse to indirect taxes for the purpose of implementing non-budgetary policies that the Council inserted Article 3(2) in the excise duty directive.
19 That provision is designed to allow the Member States to establish, in addition to the minimum excise duty fixed by the directive on structures, other indirect taxes having a specific purpose, that is to say, a purpose other than a budgetary purpose.
21 The Court has consistently held in regard to a situation of this kind that, where a provision of Community law is open to several interpretations, preference must be given to that interpretation which ensures that the provision retains its effectiveness (see, inter alia, Case 187/87 Saarland and Others v Minister for Industry, Post and Telecommunications and Tourism and Others [1988] ECR 5013, paragraph 19).
22 Further, where there is divergence between the various language versions of a Community text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see, inter alia, Case C-372/88 Milk Marketing Board of England and Wales v Cricket St Thomas Estate [1990] ECR I-1345, paragraph 19).
26 In this regard, it follows both from a comparison of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 3 and of the third recital in the preamble to the excise duty directive, which envisages concomitantly the hypotheses contemplated by Article 3, that that directive is intended to prevent additional indirect taxes from improperly obstructing trade. That would, in particular, be the case if traders were subject to formalities other than those provided for by the Community legislation on excise duty or VAT, in view of the fact that such formalities are liable to vary from one Member State to another.
27 In those circumstances, it must be held that Article 3(2) of the excise duty directive does not require Member States to comply with all rules applicable for excise duty or VAT purposes as far as determination of the tax base, calculation of the tax, and chargeability and monitoring of the tax are concerned. It is sufficient that the indirect taxes pursuing specific objectives should, on these points, accord with the general scheme of one or other of these taxation techniques as structured by the Community legislation.
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2000-03-09
13 It is accepted, and is not disputed by the Italian Government, that, by virtue of the general nature of its terms, Law No 82/94 is intended to apply to every provider of services, whether or not established in Italy, and irrespective of whether or not the provider offers its services in Italy on an occasional or regular basis. More particularly, it must be pointed out that this legislation does not exclude from its scope a provider of services who is established in a Member State other than the Italian Republic and who, under the legislation of its Member State of establishment, already satisfies formal requirements equivalent to those under the Italian Law.
14 It has consistently been held that such national provisions do not comply with the requirements of Article 59 of the Treaty (see, in particular, the judgment of 23 November 1999 in Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Arblade and Others [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 33 to 35).
16 Suffice it to hold in this regard that even if, in practice, the authorities of a Member State do not apply to nationals of other Member States the national provisions which are at variance with Community law, that fact is not such as to remove the breach of Community law which those provisions represent.
17 The Court has consistently held that the incompatibility of national legislation with Community provisions, even provisions which are directly applicable, can be finally remedied only by means of national provisions of a binding nature which have the same legal force as those which must be amended. Mere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the authorities and are not given the appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the proper fulfilment of obligations under the Treaty (see, in particular, Case C-197/96 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-1489, paragraph 14).
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v LFZ Nordfleisch AG.
Date: 2000-03-21
36 However, acceptance of the payment declaration does not authorise the customs administration to pay the trader that advance. That payment can be made only after the exporter has then submitted a request in writing to that end, the exporter thus having the opportunity to decide the date of the payment of the advance or, where the destination of the goods has been changed, to renounce that payment totally.
40 In the absence of any Community provisions to the contrary, it is permissible for the exporter to withdraw its request for advance payment of the refund before the customs authority takes its decision on that request. In that case, the customs authority is not entitled to call in the security lodged by the exporter but must release it in its entirety.
42 The security cannot be kept in order to penalise non-compliance with the other obligations under the export refund system. Where the customs warehousing scheme has not been duly complied with or where the time-limits laid down by the rules have not been observed, sanctions are laid down elsewhere, in particular pursuant to Articles 39 and 43 of Regulation No 3719/88.
Association Greenpeace France and Others v Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche and Others.
Date: 2000-03-21
44 Next, observance of the precautionary principle is reflected in the notifier's obligation, laid down in Article 11(6) of Directive 90/220, immediately to notify the competent authority of new information regarding the risks of the product to human health or the environment and the competent authority's obligation, laid down in Article 12(4), immediately to inform the Commission and the other Member States about this information and, secondly, in the right of any Member State, provided for in Article 16 of the directive, provisionally to restrict or prohibit the use and/or sale on its territory of a product which has received consent where it has justifiable reasons to consider that it constitutes a risk to human health or the environment.
54 It should also be observed that, where the administrative implementation of a Community decision is a matter for the national authorities, the judicial protection guaranteed by Community law affords individuals the right to challenge, indirectly, the legality of that decision before the national court and to ask it to refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the validity of that decision. In such a case, the Court of Justice alone has competence to declare a Community act to be invalid (see the judgment in Case 314/85 Foto Frost [1987] ECR 4199, paragraph 17).
55 It follows that, where the national court finds that, owing to irregularities in the conduct of the examination of the notification by the competent national authority provided for in Article 12(1) of Directive 90/220, it was not proper for that authority to forward the dossier with a favourable opinion to the Commission as provided for in paragraph 2 of that provision, that court must refer the matter to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling if it considers that those irregularities are such as to affect the validity of the Commission's favourable decision, setting out the reasons for which it believes that the decision must be held to be invalid and, if necessary, ordering suspension of application of the measures for implementing that decision until the Court of Justice has ruled on the question of validity (see, to this effect, the judgment in Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest [1991] ECR I-415, paragraph 24).
Berliner Kindl Brauerei AG v Andreas Siepert.
Date: 2000-03-23
20 As regards the aims of the Directive, it is clear from the recitals in the preamble thereto that it was adopted with the dual aim of ensuring both the creation of a common consumer credit market (recitals 3 to 5) and the protection of consumers who avail themselves of such credit (recitals 6, 7 and 9).
21 In fact, it is with a view to protecting the consumer against unfair credit terms and to enabling him to have full knowledge of the terms of the future performance of the agreement entered into that Article 4 provides that, at the time of concluding such an agreement, the borrower must have to hand all information which could have a bearing on the implications of his undertaking, one such element being the security required.
24 By virtue of its scheme and aims, therefore, the Directive is to be distinguished from Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises (OJ 1985 L 372, p. 31). The sole restriction which the latter directive places on the types of contract falling within its scope ratione materiae is that they must concern the supply of goods or services, provided that the purposes pursued by the consumers can be regarded as outside their trade or profession. It seeks to protect such consumers by conferring upon them a general right to terminate a contract which has been entered into, not on the initiative of the customer but of the trader, when the customer may not have been able to appreciate all the implications. It was specifically on the basis of the aim of that directive that the Court held that a contract for the benefit of a third party - more specifically, a contract of guarantee concluded in consequence of a doorstep sale - cannot be excluded a priori from its scope (see Case C-45/96 Dietzinger [1998] ECR I-1199, paragraph 19).
Criminal proceedings against Berendse-Koenen M.G. en Berendse H.D. Maatschap.
Date: 2000-03-23
23 Furthermore, it should be pointed out that, in issuing the prohibition on administering clenbuterol to fattening cattle over 14 weeks old and holding, having in stock, buying or selling fattening cattle over 14 weeks old to which that substance has been administered, the Netherlands authorities discharged their obligations under Directive 86/469 (Albers, paragraph 23).
24 A national rule such as that laid down by Article 3(1) of the Verordening, read in conjunction with Article 2 thereof, does not therefore constitute a unilateral measure designed to protect individual interests of the Member State which enacted it, but is adopted in order to comply with a directive of the Council in the general interest of the Community (Case 46/76 Bauhuis v Netherlands [1977] ECR 5, paragraphs 28 and 29).
25 That being so, a rule such as that at issue in the main proceedings, whereby a Member State discharges its obligations under Directive 86/469, cannot be characterised as a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports within the meaning of Article 30 of the Treaty.
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2000-03-23
21 As regards, first, the French Government's arguments relating to the difficulties encountered in implementing the provisions of the directive on explosives owing, first, to their lack of precision, it has consistently been held that practical difficulties which emerge when it comes to implementing a Community measure cannot constitute a ground for a Member State to exonerate itself from fulfilling its obligations (see, in particular, Case 128/78 Commission v United Kingdom [1979] ECR 419, paragraph 10, and Case C-374/89 Commission v Belgium [1991] ECR I-367, paragraph 10).
26 Since it thus refers to a measure which is subsequently to implement the provisions intended to transpose Article 10 of the directive, the decree of 6 May 1995 cannot be regarded as effecting a complete and accurate transposition of that directive (see, to that effect, Case C-263/96 Commission v Belgium [1997] ECR I-7453, paragraph 26).
28 As regards, last, the implementing order adopted on 25 May 1999 to which the French Government refers, it should be pointed out that, in an action under Article 169 of the Treaty, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation obtaining in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C-315/98 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraph 11).
Holz Geenen GmbH v Oberfinanzdirektion München.
Date: 2000-03-28
13 At the outset it must be recalled that the Council has conferred upon the Commission, acting in cooperation with the customs experts of the Member States, a broad discretion to define the subject-matter of tariff headings falling to be considered for the classification of particular goods. However, the Commission's power to adopt the measures mentioned in Article 9(1)(a), (b), (d) and (e) of Regulation No 2658/87 does not authorise it to alter the subject-matter of the tariff headings which have been defined on the basis of the HS established by the Convention whose scope the Community has undertaken, under Article 3 thereof, not to modify (see Case C-267/94 France v Commission [1995] ECR I-4845, paragraphs 19 and 20).
14 It is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and for ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN. The explanatory notes drawn up, as regards the CN, by the Commission and, as regards the HS, by the Customs Cooperation Council (the HSENs), may be an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force (see Case C-405/97 Mövenpick Deutschland v Hauptzollamt Bremen [1999] ECR I-2397, paragraph 18).
15 In addition, the intended use of a product may constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product's objective characteristics and properties (see Case C-459/93 Thyssen Haniel Logistic [1995] ECR I-1381, paragraph 13).
Coöperatieve Vereniging De Verenigde Bloemenveilingen Aalsmeer BA (VBA) v Vereniging van Groothandelaren in Bloemkwekerijproducten (VGB), Florimex BV, Inkoop Service Aalsmeer BV and M. Verhaar BV.
Date: 2000-03-30
79 To allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea in law which it has not raised before the Court of First Instance would be to authorise it to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the Court of First Instance. In an appeal the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is thus confined to review of the findings of law on the pleas argued before the Court of First Instance (see, in particular, the order in Case C-422/97 P Sateba v Commission [1998] ECR I-4913, paragraph 30).
91 Under Articles 168a of the EC Treaty (now Article 225 EC), and 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, however, an appeal may be based only on grounds relating to the infringement of rules of law, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts (see, in particular, Case C-8/95 P New Holland Ford v Commission [1998] ECR I-3175, paragraph 25).
92 The Court of First Instance alone has jurisdiction, first, to make a finding as to the facts, save where the substantive inaccuracy of such findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and, second, to assess those facts (New Holland Ford v Commission, cited above, paragraph 25). Furthermore, such inaccuracy must be obvious without its being necessary to undertake a fresh assessment of the facts (New Holland Ford v Commission, cited above, paragraph 72).
94 As to the alleged contradiction between the contested judgment and the judgment in Florimex and VGB v Commission, cited above, in which the Court of First Instance described as an inadequate statement of reasons what it held, in the contested judgment, to be an error of fact or of assessment, reference should be made to the judgment delivered today in Case C-265/97 P VBA v Florimex and Others, paragraphs 140 to 143, from which it follows, first, that the Court of First Instance committed an error in law when it held that the contested decision did not contain a sufficient statement of reasons in that regard and, secondly, that the aforementioned decision was vitiated in that respect by a manifest error of assessment. The Court of First Instance was therefore right, in the contested judgment, in finding that the Commission had committed an error of assessment on that point.
Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2000-04-04
43 According to settled case-law, in the context of the organisation of the powers of the Community the choice of the legal basis for a measure must rest on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review. Those factors include in particular the aim and the content of the measure (see, in particular, Case C-271/94 Parliament v Council, cited above, paragraph 14 and Case C-42/97 Parliament v Council [1999] ECR I-869, paragraph 36).
45 Furthermore, Community measures must be adopted in accordance with the Treaty rules in force at the time of their adoption. It would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty if, in determining the legal basis of such a measure, account were to be taken of an alleged development in relations between institutions which does not yet find confirmation in any provisions of the Treaties currently in force or in the provisions of a treaty which has not yet entered into force.
47 As the Court has pointed out in Case C-180/96 United Kingdom v Commission [1998] ECR I-2265, paragraph 133, and the case-law cited therein, it is clear from settled case-law that Article 43 of the Treaty is the appropriate legal basis for any legislation concerning the production and marketing of agricultural products listed in Annex II to the Treaty which contributes to the attainment of one or more of the objectives of the common agricultural policy set out in Article 39 of the Treaty.
48 The Court has also stated that, according to the third subparagraph of Article 129(1) of the Treaty, health protection requirements form a constituent part of the Community's other policies and that, as the Court has consistently held, efforts to attain objectives of the common agricultural policy cannot disregard requirements relating to the public interest such as the protection of consumers or protection of the health and life and humans and animals, requirements which Community institutions must take into account in exercising their powers (Case C-180/96 United Kingdom v Commission, cited above, paragraph 120).
49 Moreover, the protection of health contributes to the attainment of the objectives of the common agricultural policy which are laid down in Article 39(1) of the Treaty, particularly where agricultural production is directly dependent on demand amongst consumers who are increasingly concerned to protect their health (Case C-180/96 United Kingdom v Commission, cited above, paragraph 121).
56 The fifth and sixth recitals in the preamble to the contested regulation also refer to the obligation to identify and register animals intended for intracommunity trade, referred to in Article 3(1)(c) of Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intracommunity trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market (OJ 1990 L 224, p. 29), which the Court held was correctly adopted on the basis of Article 43 of the Treaty (Case C-180/96 United Kingdom v Council, cited above, paragraph 135).
Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Köln eV v Adolf Darbo AG.
Date: 2000-04-04
19 On that point, it should be observed that, according to settled case-law, it is solely for the national courts before which proceedings are pending, and which must assume responsibility for the judgment to be given, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of each case both the need for a preliminary ruling to enable them to give judgment and the relevance of the questions which they submit to the Court (see, inter alia, Case C-264/96 ICI v Colmer (HMIT) [1998] ECR I-4695, paragraph 15, and Joined Cases C-215/96 and C-216/96 Bagnasco and Others [1999] ECR I-135, paragraph 20). Consequently, Darbo's request that the question be reformulated in the terms which it indicates cannot be granted.
Substance
20 As the Court has held on several occasions in relation to provisions similar to Article 2(1)(a) of the Directive, designed to prevent any deception of consumers and contained in a number of secondary legislative measures that are either of general application or are sectoral in scope, it is for the national court to assess whether an appellation, brand name or advertising statement may be misleading, taking into account the presumed expectations of an average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect (see, in particular, Case C-303/97 Sektkellerei Kessler [1999] ECR I-513, paragraph 36).
22 As regards, first, pectin, it need merely be pointed out that its presence in d'arbo jam is indicated on the label on the packaging in accordance with Article 3(1), point (2), and Article 6(4)(a) and Article 6(5)(a) of the Directive. As the Court has already acknowledged (Case C-51/94 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I-3599, paragraph 34), consumers whose purchasing decisions depend on the composition of the products in question will first read the list of ingredients, the display of which is required by Article 6 of the Directive. In those circumstances, an average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect could not be misled by the term naturally pure used on the label simply because the jam contains pectin gelling agent whose presence is duly indicated on the list of its ingredients (see, to the same effect, Case C-383/97 Van der Laan [1999] ECR I-731, paragraph 37).
28 In those circumstances, even if it is assumed that, in certain cases, consumers might be unaware of that fact and thereby be misled, that risk remains minimal and cannot therefore justify a barrier to the free movement of goods (see, to that effect, Case C-238/89 Pall [1990] ECR I-4827, paragraph 19, Case C-470/93 Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Köln v Mars [1995] ECR I-1923, paragraph 19, and Commission v Germany, cited above, paragraph 34).