SKW Stahl-Metallurgie GmbH and SKW Stahl-Metallurgie Holding AG v European Commission.
Date: 2016-06-16
33


In that regard, it should be observed that, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to find and assess the facts and, in principle, to examine the evidence it accepts in support of those facts. Provided that the evidence has been properly obtained and the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the General Court alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced to it. Save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, that assessment does not therefore constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice (judgment of 9 July 2015 in InnoLux v Commission, C‑231/14 P, EU:C:2015:451, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
37


In that respect, it must be recalled that the question whether the General Court could, properly in law, conclude that the Commission had failed in its duty to state reasons is a question of law subject to the review of the Court of Justice on appeal (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 November 2008 in Netherlands v Commission, C‑405/07 P, EU:C:2008:613, paragraph 44; 3 September 2009 in Moser Baer India v Council, C‑535/06 P, EU:C:2009:498, paragraph 34, and 16 February 2012, Council and Commission v Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP, C‑191/09 P and C‑200/09 P, EU:C:2012:78, paragraph 108).
39


It must be recalled that the obligation to state reasons laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU is an essential procedural requirement, as distinct from the question whether the reasons given are correct, which goes to the substantive legality of the contested measure. The reasoning of a decision consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that decision is based. If those grounds are vitiated by errors, the latter will vitiate the substantive legality of the decision, but not the statement of reasons in it, which may be adequate even though it sets out reasons which are incorrect. It follows that objections and arguments intended to establish that a measure is not well founded are irrelevant in the context of a ground of appeal alleging breach of Article 296 TFEU (judgment of 18 June 2015 in Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
40


It must also be recalled that, although the statement of reasons for an EU measure, which is required by the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU, must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the author of the measure in question, so as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the Court to exercise its power of review, it is not required to go into every relevant point of fact and law. In addition, the question whether the obligation to provide a statement of reasons has been satisfied must be assessed with reference not only to the wording of the measure but also to its context and the whole body of legal rules governing the matter in question (judgment in Gauweiler and Others, C‑62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
50


In that connection, as regards the third ground, the Court has already ruled, on appeal against the judgment of 3 March 2011 in Siemens and VA Tech Transmission & Distribution v Commission (T‑122/07 to T‑124/07, EU:T:2011:70), relied on by the appellants, that the Commission’s power to impose penalties does not extend to the power to determine the shares of the fine specific to each of the joint and several co-debtors in the context of their reciprocal relationships, but that it is for the national courts to determine those shares, in compliance with EU law, by applying national law (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 April 2014 in judgment in Commission and Others v Siemens Österreich and Others, C‑231/11 P to C‑233/11 P, EU:C:2014:256, paragraph 58 and 67).
69


However, it is the Court’s settled case-law that an infringement of the rights of the defence results in the annulment of the contested measure only if, without such an irregularity, the outcome of the procedure might have been different (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 July 2014 in Kamino International Logistics and Datema Hellmann Worldwide Logistics, C‑129/13 and C‑130/13, EU:C:2014:2041, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited), which it is for the undertaking concerned to show (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 June 2006 in SGL Carbon v Commission, C‑308/04 P, EU:C:2006:433, paragraph 98).