larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Eko-Tabak s.r.o. v Generální ředitelství cel.
Date: 2017-04-06
28


In that regard, there being no definition of the words ‘cut’ and ‘split’ in that directive, it is necessary, in order to determine the scope of those words, to refer to their usual and everyday accepted meanings (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, Sommer Antriebs- und Funktechnik, C‑369/14, EU:C:2015:491, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited). Those words, the usual meaning of which is very wide, refer, inter alia, as regards the first, to the result of the process of removing a part or a piece of something with a sharp instrument, and, as regards the second, to the result of the process of breaking up or dividing something.
31


It follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice, in essence, that simple handling intended to make an unfinished tobacco product capable of being smoked, such as merely inserting a roll of tobacco into a cigarette tube, is not ‘industrial processing’ (see, by analogy, judgments of 24 September 1998, Brinkmann, C‑319/96, EU:C:1998:429, paragraphs 18 and 20, and of 10 November 2005, Commission v Germany, C‑197/04, EU:C:2005:672, paragraphs 31 and 32).
Jyske Finans A/S v Ligebehandlingsnævnet, acting on behalf of Ismar Huskic.
Date: 2017-04-06
27


The words ‘particular disadvantage’ used in that provision must be understood as meaning that it is particularly persons of a given ethnic origin who are at a disadvantage because of the measure at issue (judgment of 16 July 2015, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria, C‑83/14, EU:C:2015:480, paragraph 100).
31


Nonetheless, as observed in paragraph 27 above, the concept of ‘indirect discrimination’ within the meaning of Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/43 is applicable only if the allegedly discriminatory measure has the effect of placing a person of a particular ethnic origin at a disadvantage.
32


As the Advocate General observed in point 64 of his Opinion, for the purposes of ascertaining whether a person has been subject to unfavourable treatment, it is necessary to carry out, not a general abstract comparison, but a specific concrete comparison, in the light of the favourable treatment in question.
Costin Popescu v Guvernul României and Others.
Date: 2017-04-26
35


It should be recalled here that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision or be given priority over the other language versions. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all EU languages. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and purpose of the rules of which it forms part (judgments of 28 July 2016, Edilizia Mastrodonato, C‑147/15, EU:C:2016:606, paragraph 29, and of 22 September 2016, Breitsamer und Ulrich, C‑113/15, EU:C:2016:718, paragraph 58).
36


First, as regards the general scheme of Directive 2006/126, it must be noted that the directive establishes a single model Community driving licence designed to replace the various driving licences in existence in the Member States, and introduces a new category of driving licence for mopeds. It thus prescribes and defines in Article 4 the various categories of driving licence with which the Member States, which have each already defined their own categories of driving licence, must establish equivalences (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 April 2012, Hofmann, C‑419/10, EU:C:2012:240, paragraph 40).
37


In this context, the Court has held that Article 13 of Directive 2006/126, headed ‘Equivalences between non-Community model licences’, in which the disputed expression ‘entitlement to drive granted’ appears, aims solely to govern the question of equivalences between rights acquired before the implementation of the directive and the various categories of driving licence defined by the directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 April 2012, Hofmann, C‑419/10, EU:C:2012:240, paragraph 41), that is, between the various categories of driving licence established by the Member States and those resulting from the directive.
39


That conclusion is confirmed by an examination of the travaux préparatoires for Directive 2006/126, which show that Article 13(2) of the directive was added on the initiative of the European Parliament, which justified the addition by stating that the replacement of old driving licences should not under any circumstances result in the loss or restriction of acquired rights with regard to the authorisation to drive different categories of vehicle (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 April 2012, Hofmann, C‑419/10, EU:C:2012:240, paragraph 42).
Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg v Jost Pinckernelle.
Date: 2017-04-27
31


In that regard, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, for the purpose of interpreting a provision of EU law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 17 March 2016, Liffers, C‑99/15, EU:C:2016:173, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited).
43


In that context, recital 1 to the REACH regulation indicates that the latter should ensure, in particular, the free movement of goods. In that regard, the Court has specified that the REACH Regulation concerns the internal market (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 March 2016, Canadian Oil Company Sweden and Rantén, C‑472/14, EU:C:2016:171, paragraph 32). Recital 2 of that regulation states that the efficient functioning of the internal market for substances can be achieved only if requirements for substances do not differ significantly from Member State to Member State. According to recital 7 of that regulation, to preserve the integrity of the internal market and to ensure a high level of protection for human health, especially the heath of workers, and the environment, it is necessary to ensure that manufacturing of substances in the Community complies with Community law, even if those substances are exported.
46


In that regard, it must be recalled that, in accordance with Article 126 of the REACH Regulation, Member States are to lay down the provisions on penalties applicable for infringement of the provisions of that regulation, Article 5 of which requires registration of substances, in particular when they are imported, and are to take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. Moreover, the penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
Onix Asigurări SA v Istituto per la Vigilanza Sulle Assicurazioni (IVASS).
Date: 2017-04-27
39


It must be noted, however, that the need for a uniform interpretation of EU regulations makes it impossible, where there are doubts, for the text of a provision to be considered in isolation but requires, on the contrary, that it should be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages (judgment of 19 September 2013, Van Buggenhout and Van de Mierop, C‑251/12, EU:C:2013:566, paragraph 27).
41


That being so, it must be pointed out that the wording of Article 40(6) of Directive 92/49, considered in isolation, does not enable an answer to be given to the question referred. In those circumstances, it is necessary to consider the context in which that provision occurs, and the objectives pursued by that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 June 2015, CO Sociedad de Gestión y Participación and Others, C‑18/14, EU:C:2015:419, paragraph 27).
Asklepios Kliniken Langen-Seligenstadt GmbH v Ivan Felja and Asklepios Dienstleistungsgesellschaft mbH v Vittoria Graf.
Date: 2017-04-27
17


In that connection, the Court has held, in the case of a ‘static’ contractual clause and in the context of Directive 77/187, that the latter does not in any way indicate that the EU legislature intended the transferee to be bound by collective labour agreements other than the one in force at the time of the transfer and, consequently, that the terms and conditions be subsequently amended through the application of a new collective labour agreement concluded after the transfer (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 March 2006, Werhof, C‑499/04, EU:C:2006:168, paragraph 29).
18


The objective of Directive 77/187 was merely to safeguard the rights and obligations of employees in force on the day of the transfer. On the other hand, the Directive was not intended to protect mere expectations to rights and, therefore, hypothetical advantages flowing from future changes to collective agreements (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 March 2006, Werhof, C‑499/04, EU:C:2006:168, paragraph 29).
19


While it follows from the case-law of the Court, referred to in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment, that Article 3 of Directive 2001/23 must be interpreted as meaning that it does not require a ‘static’ clause to be treated as ‘dynamic’, the Court also observed that a contract is characterised by the principle of freedom of the parties to arrange their own affairs, according to which, in particular, parties are free to enter into obligations with each other (judgment of 9 March 2006, Werhof, C‑499/04, EU:C:2006:168, paragraph 23).
22


However, the Court has stated, in the case of a ‘dynamic’ contractual clause, that Directive 2001/23 does not aim solely to safeguard the interests of employees in the event of transfer of an undertaking, but seeks to ensure a fair balance between the interests of those employees, on the one hand, and those of the transferee, on the other. More particularly, it makes clear that the transferee must be in a position to make the adjustments and changes necessary to carry on its operations (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Alemo-Herron and Others, C‑426/11, EU:C:2013:521, paragraph 25 and of 11 September 2014, Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, C‑328/13, EU:C:2014:2197, paragraph 29).
23


More specifically, Article 3 of Directive 2001/23, read in the light of the freedom to conduct a business, requires that the transferee must be able to assert its interests effectively in a contractual process to which it is party and to negotiate the aspects determining changes in the working conditions of its employees with a view to its future economic activity (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Alemo-Herron and Others, C‑426/11, EU:C:2013:521, paragraph 33).
28


It is the referring court alone which has jurisdiction to assess the facts and interpret the national legislation (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 February 2016, Ince, C‑336/14, EU:C:2016:72, paragraph 88).
RFA International, LP v European Commission.
Date: 2017-05-04
In those circumstances, the appeal is admissible. That said, that conclusion is without prejudice to the examination of the admissibility of certain arguments considered individually (judgment of 14 June 2016, Marchiani v Parliament, C‑566/14 P, EU:C:2016:437, paragraph 34).
With regard to the second part of the first ground of appeal, it is sufficient to note that, in the context of an appeal, the purpose of review by the Court of Justice is, inter alia, to consider whether the General Court responded to the requisite legal standard to all the arguments raised by the appellant (judgment of 15 April 2010, Gualtieri v Commission, C‑485/08 P, EU:C:2010:188, paragraph 40), not to consider the level of detail with which the defendant’s arguments were summarised.
Such adjustments are made automatically by the EU institutions pursuant to the provisions of Article 2(9) of the Basic Regulation (see, by analogy, judgment of 7 May 1987, Minebea v Council, 260/84, EU:C:1987:206, paragraph 43).
Next, it is apparent from the wording and broad scheme of Article 2(10) of that regulation that an adjustment to the export price or to the normal value may be made only to take account of differences in relation to factors which affect both prices, such as differences in commission paid in respect of the sales under consideration, and which thus affect their comparability, in order to ensure that the comparison is made at the same level of trade (judgment of 16 February 2012, Council and Commission v Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP, C‑191/09 P and C‑200/09 P, EU:C:2012:78, paragraph 53).
Lastly, the Court has held that adjustments made under Article 2(10) of the Basic Regulation are different, as regards both their purpose and the conditions under which they are applied, from adjustments made in the construction of the export price. Whereas the latter adjustments are intended to determine the export price corresponding to normal trading conditions, the adjustments made under Article 2(10) are intended to rectify the export price or the normal value already calculated pursuant to the rules laid down in Article 2(3) to (9) of the regulation. The adjustments provided for by Article 2(10) of the basic regulation are made by reference to objective factors corresponding to the particular features of each market (domestic or export), and have a varying impact on conditions and terms of sale, thus affecting price comparability (see, by analogy, judgment of 7 May 1987, Minebea v Council, 260/84, EU:C:1987:206, paragraphs 41 and 42).
HanseYachts AG v Port D’Hiver Yachting SARL and Others.
Date: 2017-05-04
17


The referring court considers that the conditions for application of Article 27(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 are met in so far as the main action before the Tribunal de commerce de Toulon (Commercial Court, Toulon) and the action in the main proceedings are between the same parties and involve the same object and the same cause of action. It points out that it is apparent from the case-law of the Court, in particular the judgments of 25 October 2012, Folien Fischer and Fofitec (C‑133/11, EU:C:2012:664, paragraphs 42 et seq.), and of 19 December 2013, Nipponkoa Insurance (C‑452/12, EU:C:2013:858, paragraph 41 et seq.), that the fact that the main proceedings consist of an action for a negative declaration does not preclude a finding of lis pendens.
24


In that regard, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (judgment of 27 February 2014, Cartier parfums-lunettes and Axa Corporate Solutions assurances, C‑1/13, EU:C:2014:109, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, it is without prejudging the issue of the international jurisdiction of the referring court that the Court will answer the question referred.
28


As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that the mechanism to resolve situations of lis pendens is objective and automatic and is based on the chronological order in which the courts concerned were seised (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2015, Aannemingsbedrijf Aertssen and Aertssen Terrassements, C‑523/14, EU:C:2015:722, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
29


In that context, Article 30 of that regulation defines uniformly and independently the time when a court is to be deemed to be seised for the purposes of the application of Section 9 of Chapter II of that regulation, and in particular Article 27 thereof relating to lis pendens (judgment of 22 October 2015, Aannemingsbedrijf Aertssen and Aertssen Terrassements, C‑523/14, EU:C:2015:722, paragraph 57). By virtue of point 1 of Article 30 thereof, interpretation of which has been requested by the referring court, a court is to be deemed to be seised at the time when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document is lodged with it, provided that the applicant has not subsequently failed to take the steps he was required to take to have service effected on the respondent.
34


It must nevertheless be stated that it is for the national court to assess whether such an interpretation of that article is to be adopted, since, in accordance with settled case-law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to interpret the internal law of a Member State (see, inter alia, judgment of 13 December 2012, Caves Krier Frères, C‑379/11, EU:C:2012:798, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
Proceedings brought by A Oy.
Date: 2017-05-04
23


It must be observed that Article 148(c) of Directive 2006/112 exempts, inter alia, hire, repairs and maintenance if the latter pertains to something used for the operation of vessel covered by point (a) of that article. Essentially, Article 148(c) therefore lays down a requirement for the existence of a link between the supply of services made and the operation of the vessel concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 July 1985, Berkholz, 168/84, EU:C:1985:299, paragraph 21).
Kingdom of Sweden v European Commission.
Date: 2017-05-11
46


That general presumption does not exclude the possibility of demonstrating that a given document, disclosure of which has been requested, is not covered by that presumption, or that there is an overriding public interest justifying disclosure of the document concerned by virtue of the last clause of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 (judgment of 14 November 2013, LPN and Finland v Commission, C‑514/11 P and C‑605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738, paragraph 66).
47


With regard to the alleged obligation of the Commission to examine specifically and individually documents to which access is requested which relate to an EU Pilot procedure, the General Court rightly noted, referring to paragraph 68 of the judgment of 14 November 2013, LPN and Finland v Commission (C‑514/11 P and C‑605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738), in paragraph 83 of the judgment under appeal, that such an obligation would render the general presumption of confidentiality ineffective.
51


Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the General Court did not err in law in holding that the Commission is able to take as its basis, when relying on the exception concerning investigations laid down in the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, a general presumption of confidentiality applying to certain categories of documents to refuse access to documents relating to an EU Pilot procedure, without making a specific and individual examination of the documents requested.
56


The Court has previously held that the onus is on the party arguing for the existence of an overriding public interest to rely on specific circumstances to justify the disclosure of the documents concerned and that setting out purely general considerations cannot provide an appropriate basis for establishing that an overriding public interest prevails over the reasons justifying the refusal to disclose the documents in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 November 2013, LPN and Finland v Commission, C‑514/11 P and C‑605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738, paragraphs 93 and 94 and the case-law cited).
63


As the General Court correctly noted in paragraph 100 of the judgment under appeal, it is settled case-law of the Court of Justice that the legality of an EU measure must be assessed on the basis of the facts and the law as they stood at the time when the measure was adopted (judgment of 3 September 2015, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission, C‑398/13 P, EU:C:2015:535, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
Minister Finansów v Posnania Investment SA.
Date: 2017-05-11
25


It must be remembered, first of all, that the VAT Directive establishes a common system of VAT based on, inter alia, a uniform definition of taxable transactions (judgment of 20 June 2013, Newey, C‑653/11, EU:C:2013:409, paragraph 39).
31


Concerning, fourthly, the question whether the transaction transferring ownership of immovable property to a public entity — in this instance, the transfer of land to a municipality — in payment of tax arrears can be considered to have been made for consideration, it should be noted that a supply of goods is made ‘for consideration’, within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a) of the VAT Directive, only if there is a legal relationship between the supplier and the purchaser entailing reciprocal performance, the price received by the supplier constituting the value actually given in return for the goods supplied (judgments of 27 April 1999, Kuwait Petroleum, C‑48/97, EU:C:1999:203, paragraph 26, and of 21 November 2013, Dixons Retail, C‑494/12, EU:C:2013:758, paragraph 32).
35


Consequently, there is no legal relationship entailing reciprocal performance, within the meaning of the Court’s case-law cited in paragraph 31 of this judgment.
36


As such, a transaction providing property in lieu of payment, the purpose of which is to discharge a tax debt, cannot be considered to be a transaction effected for consideration within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a) of the VAT Directive, and cannot be subject to VAT.
37


It should, nonetheless, be added that, although the national court has sole jurisdiction to determine the facts in the case before it and to interpret the national legislation, in preliminary ruling proceedings the Court, which is called on to provide answers of use to the national court, may provide guidance based on the documents in the file in the main proceedings and on the observations submitted to it, in order to enable the national court to give judgment (judgment of 24 February 2015, Grünewald, C‑559/13, EU:C:2015:109, paragraph 32).
40


It follows from the Court’s case-law that the purpose of that provision is to ensure equal treatment as between a taxable person who applies goods for his own private use or for that of his staff, on the one hand, and a final consumer who acquires goods of the same type, on the other (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 July 2014, BCR Leasing IFN, C‑438/13, EU:C:2014:2093, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
41


In order to attain that objective, Article 16 of the VAT Directive treats as a supply of goods for consideration the application, by a taxable person, of goods forming part of his business assets for his private use or for that of his staff, or their disposal free of charge or, more generally, their application for purposes other than those of his business, where the VAT on those goods or the component parts thereof was wholly or partly deductible (judgment of 17 July 2014, BCR LeasingIFN, C‑438/13, EU:C:2014:2093, paragraph 24).
The Shirtmakers BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2017-05-11
21


In that regard, it must, first of all, be noted that the Court has consistently held that it follows from the need for uniform application of EU law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, having regard to the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (judgments of 3 September 2014, Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds, C‑201/13, EU:C:2014:2132, paragraph 14, and of 12 December 2013, Christodoulou and Others, C‑116/12, EU:C:2013:825, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
28


Finally, such an interpretation is consistent with the objectives pursued by the European Union’s customs valuation rules. According to the settled case-law of the Court, the objective of that legislation is to introduce a fair, uniform and neutral system excluding the use of arbitrary or fictitious customs values. The customs value must therefore reflect the real economic value of an imported product and take into account all of the elements of that product that have economic value (judgment of 19 March 2009, Mitsui & Co. Deutschland, C‑256/07, EU:C:2009:167, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).