larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
David Maxwell Middleburgh v Chief Adjudication Officer.
Date: 1991-10-04
14 Secondly, it must be noted that at the material time the Community legislature had not yet adopted the necessary measures, in the area of freedom of establishment, to ensure the payment of child benefits to persons residing in the territory of the Member States. Such measures, which were essential, especially in order to ensure that benefits are in fact used for the upkeep of dependent children and to avoid overlapping payments, were subsequently adopted by Council Regulation (EEC) No 3427/89 of 30 October 1989 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 and Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation No 1408/71 (Official Journal 1989 L 331, p. 1), which brought self-employed persons within the scope of application of Article 73 of Regulation No 1408/71.
15 It follows that Member State legislation which precluded the payment of child benefit in respect of the children resident in another Member State of a self-employed person was not incompatible with Article 52 of the Treaty so long as those measures had not been adopted by the Council.
B. J. van Dalfsen and others v B. van Loon and T. Berendsen.
Date: 1991-10-04
19 Secondly it should be noted that the Court has stated in the judgment in Case 258/83 (Brennero v Wendel [1984] ECR 3971, paragraph 15), that the concept of "judgment given on the appeal" appearing in the second paragraph of Article 37 of the Convention must be restrictively interpreted and has ruled that under the general scheme of the Convention, and in the light of one of its principal objectives which is to simplify procedures in the State in which enforcement is sought, that provision cannot be extended so as to enable an appeal in cassation to be lodged against a judgment other than that given on the appeal, for instance against a preliminary or interlocutory order requiring preliminary inquiries to be made.
21 It follows from the foregoing that, since the object of the Convention is to facilitate the free movement of judgments by establishing a simple and rapid procedure in the Contracting State in which application is made for the enforcement of a foreign judgment, the expression "judgment given on the appeal" in the second paragraph of Article 37 of the Convention must be interpreted as denoting only judgments deciding on the substance of the appeal lodged against an order for the enforcement of a judgment given in another Contracting State, to the exclusion of judgments given under Article 38 of the Convention.
Commission of the European Communities v Walter Gill.
Date: 1991-10-04
12 From those considerations the Court of First Instance deduced that in order to satisfy the second paragraph of Article 78 of the Staff Regulations the official was not required to establish that the disease or aggravation arose in the course of or in connection with the performance of his duties with the Communities within the meaning of Article 3(2) of the Insurance Rules.
25 Questions concerning the origin of a disease are by their nature medical questions. It follows that in this regard neither the appointing authority nor the Court of First Instance may substitute their own opinion for the conclusions of the Invalidity Committee.
Fonds voor Arbeidsongevallen v Madeleine De Paep.
Date: 1991-10-04
18 In that connection it should be pointed out that according to the case-law of the Court the provisions of Title II of Regulation No 1408/71, including Article 14, constitute a complete and uniform system of conflict rules (see in particular the judgment in Case 60/85 Luijten v Raad van Arbeid [1986] ECR 2365) and that those provisions are intended not only to prevent the simultaneous application of a number of national legislative systems and the complications which might ensue, as a result, but also to ensure that the persons covered by Regulation No 1408/71 are not left without social security cover because there is no legislation applicable to them. In particular, the conditions concerning the right of a person to become affiliated to a social security scheme may not have the effect of excluding from the scope of the legislation at issue persons to whom it applies pursuant to Regulation No 1408/71 (judgment in Case C-2/89 Kits van Heijningen [1990] ECR I-1755, paragraphs 12 and 20).
Caisse auxiliaire d'assurance maladie-invalidité and Institut national d'assurance maladie-invalidité v Napoléon and Jocelyne Faux.
Date: 1991-10-15
23 The fact that Mrs Desse received unemployment benefits in France and not in Belgium was a necessary consequence of the application of Community law. It follows from the actual terms of Article 19(1) of Regulation No 36/63 that a wholly unemployed frontier worker may claim unemployment benefits solely from the Member State in which he resides (see judgment in Case 1/85 Miethe v Bundesanstalt fuer Arbeit [1986] ECR 1837, paragraph 10, on the interpretation of Article 71(1)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71, which is worded in largely the same terms as Article 19(1) of Regulation No 36/63).
25 It is true, as the Court has pointed out on several occasions (see, for example, the judgment in Case 14/67 Landesversicherungsanstalt Rheinland-Pfalz v Welchner [1967] ECR 331) and as INAMI has argued, that both Regulation No 3 (Article 1(p)) and Regulation No 1408/71 (Article 1(r) ), applicable in the main proceedings, state that "insurance periods" mean periods defined or treated as such by the legislation under which they were completed.
26 It must be stated, however, that in a situation such as that in the main proceedings that interpretation would mean that a frontier worker who had registered as unemployed in the Member State of residence pursuant to Article 19(1) of Regulation No 36/63 would be refused, in the Member State in which he was last employed, benefits for incapacity for work which he could have claimed if he had registered as seeking employment in that Member State and if, as a result, his period of unemployment had been treated as a period of sickness insurance.
27 The Court has consistently held (see judgments in Case 9/67 Colditz v Caisse d' Assurance Vieillesse des Travailleurs Salariés de Paris [1967] ECR 229, Case 24/75 Petroni v Office National des Pensions pour Travailleurs Salariés [1975] 1149, paragraph 13, and Case C-10/90 Masgio v Bundesknappschaft [1991] ECR I-1119, paragraph 18) that the objective of Articles 48 to 51 of the Treaty would not be attained if, after exercising their right of free movement, migrant workers were to lose social security advantages guaranteed by the legislation of a single Member State.
28 It follows from the foregoing that the provisions defining insurance periods in Regulations No 3 and No 1408/71 may not be interpreted as meaning that they may result in depriving migrant workers of the advantages which they could have claimed under the legislation of a single Member State, thus posing an obstacle to the objective pursued by Articles 48 to 51 of the Treaty (see judgments in the Colditz case, above, and in Case 100/78 Rossi v Caisse de Compensation pour Allocations Familiales des Régions de Charleroi et Namur [1979] ECR 831 and Case 733/79 Caisse de Compensation pour Allocations Familiales des Régions de Charleroi et Namur v Laterza [1980] ECR 1915).
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v Werner Faust Offene Handelsgesellschaft KG.
Date: 1991-10-16
12 As the Court has consistently held, it follows from that principle that measures imposing financial charges on economic agents are lawful provided that the measures are appropriate and necessary for the attainment of the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question. Of course, where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, the least onerous measures must be used and the charges imposed must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, for example, the judgment in Case 265/87 Schraeder v Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989] ECR 2237, paragraph 21). Thus, in order to answer the second question, it is first necessary to recall the objective of Regulation No 3429/80.
16 On the basis of those various provisions, the levy of the additional amount was introduced by Regulation No 3249/80 as a protective measure. Whilst that measure was not among those expressly envisaged by Regulation No 521/77, it has nevertheless been recognized as lawful by the Court (see the judgment in Case 345/82 Wuensche Handelsgesellschaft v Federal Republic of Germany [1984] ECR 1995, paragraph 24).
27 In that respect, it must be added that, as the Court held in its judgment in Case 77/86 The Queen v Customs and Excise, ex parte National Dried Fruit Trade Association [1988] ECR 757, paragraph 29, concerning a countervailing charge imposed as a protective measure in respect of dried grapes, such a charge is not unlawful merely because it is set at a fixed rate. Its legality depends on a whole range of factors, such as the prices charged for imports and the requirements of effectively achieving the desired aim.
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft GmbH & Co. KG.
Date: 1991-10-16
13 As the Court has consistently held, it follows from that principle that measures imposing financial charges on economic agents are lawful provided that the measures are appropriate and necessary for the attainment of the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question. Of course, where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, the least onerous measures must be used and the charges imposed must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, for example, the judgment in Case 265/87 Schraeder v Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989] ECR 2237, paragraph 21). Thus, in order to answer the second question, it is first necessary to recall the objective of Regulation No 3429/80.
17 On the basis of those various provisions, the levy of the additional amount was introduced by Regulation No 3249/80 as a protective measure. Whilst that measure was not among those expressly envisaged by Regulation No 521/77, it has nevertheless been recognized as lawful by the Court (see the judgment in Case 345/82 Wuensche Handelsgesellschaft v Federal Republic of Germany [1984] ECR 1995, paragraph 24).
28 In that respect, it must be added that, as the Court held in its judgment in Case 77/86 The Queen v Customs and Excise, ex parte National Dried Fruit Trade Association [1988] ECR 757, paragraph 29, concerning a countervailing charge imposed as a protective measure in respect of dried grapes, such a charge is not unlawful merely because it is set at a fixed rate. Its legality depends on a whole range of factors, such as the prices charged for imports and the requirements of effectively achieving the desired aim.
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft GmbH & Co. KG.
Date: 1991-10-16
13 As the Court has consistently held, it follows from that principle that measures imposing financial charges on economic agents are lawful provided that the measures are appropriate and necessary for the attainment of the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question. Of course, where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, the least onerous measures must be used and the charges imposed must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, for example, the judgment in Case 265/87 Schraeder v Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989] ECR 2237, paragraph 21). Thus, in order to answer the second question, it is first necessary to recall the objective of Regulations Nos 796/81 and 1755/81.
17 On the basis of those various provisions, the levy of the additional amount was introduced by Regulations Nos 796/81 and 1755/81 as a protective measure. Whilst that measure was not among those expressly envisaged by Regulation No 521/77, it has nevertheless been recognized as lawful by the Court (see the judgment in Case 345/82 Wuensche Handelsgesellschaft v Federal Republic of Germany [1984] ECR 1995, paragraph 24) in relation to a measure of exactly the same kind, Commission Regulation No 3429/80 adopting protective measures applicable to imports of preserved mushrooms (Official Journal 1980 L 358, p. 66).
28 In that respect, it must be added that, as the Court held in its judgment in Case 77/86 The Queen v Customs and Excise, ex parte National Dried Fruit Trade Association [1988] ECR 757, paragraph 29, concerning a countervailing charge imposed as a protective measure in respect of dried grapes, such a charge is not unlawful merely because it is set at a fixed rate. Its legality depends on a whole range of factors, such as the prices charged for imports and the requirements of effectively achieving the desired aim.
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1991-10-17
13 It should be borne in mind in this regard that, as the Court has consistently held (see in particular the judgment in Case C-131/88 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-825, paragraph 6), the transposition of a directive into domestic law does not necessarily require that its provisions be incorporated formally and verbatim in express, specific legislation; a general legal context may, depending on the content of the directive, be adequate for the purpose provided that it does indeed guarantee the full application of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner so that, where the directive is intended to create rights for individuals, the persons concerned can ascertain the full extent of their rights and, where appropriate, rely on them before the national courts.
14 It is to be noted in this connection that, as appears from the second recital in the preamble to Directive 75/440, that directive and, in consequence, Directive 79/869 which supplements it are intended to protect public health and, to that end, to ensure the exercise of surveillance over surface water intended for the abstraction of drinking water and over the purification treatment of such water. This implies therefore that whenever non-compliance with the measures required by the directives in question might endanger the health of persons, those concerned should be able to rely on mandatory rules in order to enforce their rights. A further reason why it is necessary to lay down the values to be complied with in provisions which are indisputably binding is, moreover, so that the operators of surface water sampling points may know precisely which obligations apply to them.
23 The Federal Republic of Germany asserts first of all that the exceeding of the category A1 limiting values cannot entail an obligation to effect improvements and that, in any event, the method of treatment applied where the limiting value is exceeded due to the nature of the soil is that laid down in respect of the next lower category. That method is applied in Germany wherever there are no improvement plans for category A2 water.
25 It follows from the actual wording of that article that each Member State is to draw up a systematic plan of action for the improvement of all water the parameters of which are capable of improvement, and that that plan must comprise stages, taking account of certain priorities and economic and technical constraints. In Member States whose federal states or regions are competent to act in the matter, that plan may make appropriate coordination necessary.
Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1991-10-17
12 As the Court has consistently held (see judgments in Case 326/85 Netherlands v Commission [1987] ECR 5091, at paragraph 7, Case 332/85 Germany v Commission [1987] ECR 5143, at paragraph 7, and Case 347/85 United Kingdom v Commission [1988] ECR 1749, at paragraph 11), those provisions permit the Commission to charge to the Fund only sums paid in accordance with the rules laid down in the various sectors of agricultural production while leaving the Member States to bear the burden of any other sums paid, and in particular any amounts which the national authorities wrongly believed themselves authorized to pay or not to collect in the context of the common organization of the markets.
14 It follows from the foregoing reasoning that the Commission is not entitled, when managing the common agricultural policy, to commit funds which fail to comply with the rules governing the common organization of the market in question.
16 It follows from the foregoing reasoning that the Commission, while awaiting the final decision on the clearance of the annual accounts, has power to reduce the payment of amounts due under monthly advances according to the state of the account of each Member State with the EAGGF when it establishes that the national body has, contrary to Community law, failed to collect certain payments intended for the EAGGF or effected certain expenditure chargeable to the Fund.
18 In that respect, it must be noted that decisions concerning monthly advances adopted during the year on the basis of the only data available at that time are merely interim and temporary in nature and cannot prejudge the final and conclusive decision on the annual clearance of accounts. That decision is taken at the conclusion of the specific procedure giving effect to the audi alteram partem rule, during which the Member States concerned are provided with all the guarantees necessary for them to present their point of view.
Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1991-10-17
12 As the Court has consistently held (see judgments in Case 326/85 Netherlands v Commission [1987] ECR 5091, at paragraph 7, Case 332/85 Germany v Commission [1987] ECR 5143, at paragraph 7, and Case 347/85 United Kingdom v Commission [1988] ECR 1749, at paragraph 11), those provisions permit the Commission to charge to the Fund only sums paid in accordance with the rules laid down in the various sectors of agricultural production while leaving the Member States to bear the burden of any other sums paid, and in particular any amounts which the national authorities wrongly believed themselves authorized to pay or not to collect in the context of the common organization of the markets.
14 It follows from the foregoing reasoning that the Commission is not entitled, when managing the common agricultural policy, to commit funds which fail to comply with the rules governing the common organization of the market in question.
16 It follows from the foregoing reasoning that the Commission, while awaiting the final decision on the clearance of the annual accounts, has power to reduce the payment of amounts due under monthly advances according to the state of the account of each Member State with the EAGGF when it establishes that the national body has, contrary to Community law, failed to collect certain payments intended for the EAGGF or effected certain expenditure chargeable to the Fund.
18 In that respect, it must be noted that decisions concerning monthly advances adopted during the year on the basis of the only data available at that time are merely interim and temporary in nature and cannot prejudge the final and conclusive decision on the annual clearance of accounts. That decision is taken at the conclusion of the specific procedure giving effect to the audi alteram partem rule, during which the Member States concerned are provided with all the guarantees necessary for them to present their point of view.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 1991-10-17
6 The Spanish Government considers that Article 28(3)(b) of the Sixth Directive authorizes the exemption in question. Article 28(3) reads: "during the transitional period referred to in paragraph 4, Member States may: ... (b) continue to exempt the activities set out in Annex F under conditions existing in the Member State concerned", and Annex F includes at Point 2 "services supplied by authors, artists, performers". At the time the Sixth Directive was adopted as well as immediately before accession of the Kingdom of Spain to the European Communities the provision of services in question was exempt in Spain from the tax which VAT superseded.
7 Since the Kingdom of Spain subjected the provision of the services in question to the general scheme of VAT by Law No 30/1985 which entered into force on 1 January 1986 it could no longer subsequently claim the right to continue to exempt those activities pursuant to Article 28(3)(b) of the Sixth Directive.
8 The Spanish Government contended in addition that the extension of the transitional scheme on exemptions beyond the period provided for in Article 28(4) allows Article 28(4)(3)(b) to be interpreted as meaning that Member States may reintroduce into their law the exemption of the activities in question, in particular where it is necessary to ensure equality of treatment for authors residing in their territory in relation to authors residing in the territory of other Member States who continue to grant such exemption.
9 Although in interpreting a provision of Community law it is necessary to take account of how the law stands at the date when the provision in question must be applied (see, inter alia, Opinion 1/78 of 4 October 1979, point 44, [1979] ECR 2871), the extension of the transitional scheme of exemptions from VAT beyond the period originally provided for cannot justify the right of Member States to grant exemptions which they were not authorized to grant. Such a right would compromise the object of Article 28(3)(b) which is to enable a progressive adjustment of the national laws in the areas in question.