ET Agrokonsulting-04-Velko Stoyanov v Izpalnitelen direktor na Darzhaven fond ‘Zemedelie’ — Razplashtatelna agentsia.
Date: 2013-06-27
35. It is the Court’s settled case-law that, in the absence of European Union rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State, in accordance with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States, to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from European Union law, the Member States having none the less responsibility for ensuring that those rights are effectively protected in each case (see, to that effect, Case C-224/01 Köbler  [2003] ECR I‑10239, paragraph 47; Case C‑268/06 Impact  [2008] ECR I‑2483, paragraphs 44 and 45; Case C‑12/08 Mono Car Styling  [2009] ECR I‑6653, paragraph 48; and Joined Cases C‑317/08 to C-320/08 Alassini and Others  [2010] ECR I-2213, paragraph 47).
36. In this respect, in accordance with the principle of loyal cooperation now enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU, the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under European Union law must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by European Union law (principle of effectiveness) (see, in particular, to that effect, Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe‑Zentral  [1976] ECR 1989, paragraph 5; Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck [1995] ECR I-4599, paragraph 12; and Case C-416/10 Križan and Others  [2013] ECR I-0000, paragraph 85).
37. It follows from the Court’s case-law that the requirements stemming from the principles of equivalence and effectiveness apply both to the designation of the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction to hear and determine actions based on European Union law and to the definition of the procedural rules governing such actions (see Impact , paragraph 47, and Alassini and Others , paragraph 49).
38. The observance of those requirements must be analysed by reference to the role of the rules concerned in the procedure viewed as a whole, to the conduct of that procedure and to the special features of those rules, before the various national instances (see, to that effect, Peterbroeck , paragraph 14; Case C‑326/96 Levez  [1998] ECR I-7835, paragraph 44; and Case C-63/08 Pontin  [2009] ECR I‑10467, paragraphs 46 and 47 and the case-law cited).
39. So far as concerns, first of all, the principle of equivalence, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that observance of that principle requires that the national rule at issue be applied without distinction, whether the action is based on rights which individuals derive from European Union law or whether it is based on an infringement of national law, where the purpose and cause of action are similar. It is for the national court, which has direct knowledge of the detailed procedural rules applicable, to ascertain whether the actions concerned are similar as regards their purpose, cause of action and essential characteristics (see, to that effect, Pontin , paragraph 45 and the case-law cited, and Case C-591/10 Littlewoods Retail and Others  [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 31).
48. As regards, next, the principle of effectiveness, it must be recalled that, from the point of view of the analysis required by the case-law cited at paragraph 38 above, the question whether a national procedural provision renders the exercise of an individual’s rights under the European Union legal order impossible in practice or excessively difficult must be assessed taking into consideration, as appropriate, the principles which lie at the basis of the national legal system concerned, such as the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of the proceedings (see inter alia, to that effect, Peterbroeck , paragraph 14, and Pontin , paragraph 47).
50. First, it must be examined whether a farmer wishing to challenge an administrative act by the Direktor concerning him must participate in person in the legal proceedings. In this connection, it is apparent from the observations submitted to the Court that an individual in a position such as that of Agrokonsulting is not obliged to appear in person but can be represented by a lawyer, a spouse, a first-degree relative in the ascending or descending line, legal counsel or an employee with legal training. The Bulgarian Government adds that legal aid is granted where it is demonstrated that an individual does not have sufficient resources to pay for a lawyer’s services. In addition, according to that government, the costs, including lawyers’ fees, are awarded to the party who is successful in such an action, if that party has applied for them. Costs are also awarded to the applicant where the case is closed following the withdrawal of the contested administrative act. Furthermore, according to the Direktor, in actions concerning administrative acts issued by him, a statement by the applicant that the contested act is unlawful is sufficient to shift the burden of proving the lawfulness of that act onto the authorities. So far as necessary, it is for the referring court, which, unlike the Court in a case referred under Article 267 TFEU, has jurisdiction to interpret Bulgarian law, to verify these points.
56. Fourthly, it is not inconceivable, in that latter regard, that the fact that disputes are concentrated before the referring court allows that court to acquire specific expertise by ruling on issues relating to agricultural aid, thereby limiting the average length of the proceedings. Furthermore, as the German Government in particular has pointed out, a centralised court, specialising in agricultural aid, seems likely to ensure uniform practice throughout the national territory, thereby contributing to legal certainty.
59. So far as concerns, lastly, Article 47 of the Charter, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that that provision constitutes a reaffirmation of the principle of effective judicial protection, a general principle of European Union law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 (see to that effect, inter alia, Case 222/84 Johnston  [1986] ECR 1651, paragraph 18; Case C-432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271, paragraph 37; and Case C-334/12 RX-II Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 40).