larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Aro Tubi Trafilerie SpA v Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze.
Date: 2006-03-30
26. In that regard, it is settled case-law that the nature of a tax, duty or charge must be determined by the Court, under Community law, according to the objective characteristics by which it is levied, irrespective of its classification under national law (Joined Cases C-197/94 and C-252/94 Bautiaa and Société française maritime  [1996] ECR I-505, paragraph 39).
27. As regards, as in the present case, proportional duty of 1% on the value of contributions of capital to capital companies, it must be found that the event giving rise to such duty is the contribution itself and not some other transaction or preliminary formality, so that such duty must, in principle, be classified as ‘capital duty’ and not a ‘tax akin to capital duty’ for the purposes of Directive 69/335 (see, to that effect, Bautiaa and Société française maritime , paragraph 40).
29. It must, first, be recalled that the transactions which are, or may be, subjected by the Member States to capital duty are laid down in Article 4 of Directive 69/335 (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-280/91 Viessmann  [1993] ECR I-971, paragraph 12; Bautiaa and Société française maritime , paragraphs 31 and 32; and Case C-152/97 Agas  [1998] ECR I-6553, paragraphs 19 and 20).
33. A comparison of those two provisions prompts the finding that the ‘increase in the capital’ referred to in Article 4(1)(c) of Directive 69/335 entails a formal increase in a company’s capital by means of either an issue of new shares or an increase in the nominal value of the existing shares (see, to that effect, Case 270/81 Felicitas Rickmers-Linie  [1982] ECR 2771, paragraph 15, and Case C-494/03 Senior Engineering Investments [2006] I-0000, paragraph 33).
34. On the other hand, and inasmuch as the ‘assets of the company’ are defined as all the property which the members have contributed, together with any increase in its value (see, to that effect, Case C-38/88 Siegen  [1990] ECR I-1447, paragraph 12), the ‘increase in the assets’ within the meaning of Article 4(2)(b) of Dire ctive 69/335 includes, in principle, every kind of increase in the net assets of a capital company ( Senior Engineering Investments , paragraph 34). Thus, the Court has classified as an ‘increase in the assets’ within the meaning of that provision, for example, a transfer of profits (see Case C-49/91 Weber Haus  [1992] ECR I-5207, paragraph 10), an interest-free loan (see, in particular, Case C-392/00 Norddeutsche Gesellschaft zur Beratung und Durchführung von Entsorgungsaufgaben bei Kernkraftwerken  [2002] ECR I-7397, paragraph 18), an absorption of losses (see Siegen , paragraph 13), and the waiver of a claim (Case C-15/89 Deltakabel  [1991] ECR I-241, paragraph 12).
Elizabeth Florence Emanuel v Continental Shelf 128 Ltd.
Date: 2006-03-30
15. Since neither the Statute of the Court of Justice nor the Rules of Procedure make provision for the parties to submit observations in reply to the Opinion of the Advocate General (see the order of 4 February 2000 in Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar  [2000] ECR I-665, paragraph 2), Ms Emanuel’s observations cannot be accepted.
16. However, the Court may, of its own motion, on a proposal from the Advocate General or at the request of the parties, reopen the oral procedure, in accordance with Article 61 of its Rules of Procedure, if it considers that it lacks sufficient information, or that the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties (see Case C-309/99 Wouters and Others  [2002] ECR I-1577, paragraph 42; Case C-434/02 Arnold André  [2004] ECR I‑11825, paragraph 27; and Case C-210/03 Swedish Match  [2004] ECR I-11893, paragraph 25).
19. In order to determine whether a body is a court or tribunal within the meaning of that provision, which is a question governed by Community law alone, the Court takes into account a number of factors, such as whether the body concerned is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent (see, in particular, Case 61/65 Vaassen-Göbbels  [1966] ECR 261; Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult  [1997] ECR I-4961, paragraph 23; and Case C-416/96 Nour Eddline El-Yassini  [1999] ECR I-1209, paragraph 17).
43. Article 2 of Directive 89/104 contains a list, described as a list of examples in the seventh recital in the preamble to that directive, of signs which may constitute a trade mark, provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings, that is to say to fulfil the trade mark’s function as an indicator of origin. That list expressly includes personal names ( Nichols , paragraph 22).
44. As the Commission pointed out, for the trade mark to be able to fulfil its essential role in the system of undistorted competition which the Treaty seeks to establish and maintain, it must offer a guarantee that all the goods or services bearing it have been manufactured or supplied under the control of a single undertaking which is responsible for their quality (see, in particular, Arsenal Football Club , paragraph 48).
47. Nevertheless, the circumstances for refusing registration referred to in Article 3(1)(g) of Directive 89/104 presuppose the existence of actual deceit or a sufficiently serious risk that the consumer will be deceived (Case C-87/97 Consorzio per la tutela del formaggio Gorgonzola  [1999] ECR I-1301, paragraph 41).
A. C. Smits-Koolhoven v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2006-03-30
17. The first point to be noted here is that Directive 95/59 was adopted as part of a policy designed to harmonise the structures of excise duty on manufactured tobacco, to ensure that competition in the different categories of manufactured tobacco belonging to the same group was not distorted (Case C‑216/98 Commission  v Greece  [2000] ECR I-8921, paragraph 18). In order to ensure that it is applied in a uniform fashion, the terms in that directive must be interpreted independently on the basis of the wording of the provisions in question and the purpose of the directive (see, to that effect, Case C‑389/02 Deutsche See‑Bestattungs‑Genossenschaft  [2004] ECR I-3537, paragraph 19).
29. In addition, Directive 95/59 can be distinguished, by its objective and by the wording of the second subparagraph of Article 7(2) thereof, from Directive 65/65. Article 1(2) of the latter lays down two alternative and complementary definitions of medicinal products relating, on the one hand, to medicinal products ‘by virtue of their presentation’ and, on the other hand, to medicinal products ‘by virtue of their function’ (see Case 227/82 Van Bennekom  [1983] ECR 3883, paragraph 22, and Case C‑219/91 Ter Voort  [1992] ECR I-5485, paragraph 11).
30. In the first place, the objective of Directive 65/65, which essentially seeks to protect consumers by ensuring that public health is safeguarded, warrants such a wide definition, which gives that directive a broad scope. As the Court stated in paragraph 17 of Van Bennekom , the criterion of the ‘presentation’, which stems from the first subparagraph of Article 1(2) of the directive in question, is designed to catch not only medicinal products having a genuine therapeutic or medical effect but also those which are not sufficiently effective or do not have the effect which consumers would be entitled to expect from the way in which they are presented, in order to protect the consumer not only from harmful or toxic medicinal products, but also from a variety of products used instead of the proper remedies. The objective of Directive 95/59, recalled in p aragraph 17 of this judgment, is completely different and does not warrant such a broad definition.
Cynthia Mattern and Hajrudin Cikotic v Ministre du Travail et de l'Emploi.
Date: 2006-03-30
16. The right granted to the spouse of a migrant worker by that article is linked to the rights which that worker enjoys under Article 39 EC (see Case 131/85 Gül  [1986] ECR 1573, paragraph 20).
18. As the Court has held, the concept of ‘worker’ within the meaning of Article 39 EC has a specific Community meaning and must not be interpreted narrowly. Any person who pursues activities which are real and genuine, to the exclusion of activities on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary, must be regarded as a ‘worker’. The essential feature of an employment relationship is, according to that case-law, that for a certain period of time a person performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration (see, in particular, Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum  [1986] ECR 2121, paragraphs 16 and 17, and Case C-456/02 Trojani  [2004] ECR I-7573, paragraph 15).
21. According to settled case-law, the fact that the training period may be regarded as practical preparation directly related to the actual pursuit of the occupation in point is not a bar to the application of Article 39 EC if the training period is completed under the conditions of genuine and effective activity as an employed person (see, in particular, Lawrie-Blum , paragraph 19, and Case C-109/04 Kranemann  [2005] ECR I-2421, paragraph 13).
22. In addition, whilst it is clear that remuneration for services performed constitutes an essential feature of an employment relationship, the fact remains that neither the origin of the funds from which the remuneration is paid nor the limited amount of that remuneration can have any consequence in regard to whether or not the person is a worker for the purposes of Community law (see Case 53/81 Levin  [1982] ECR 1035, paragraph 16, and Kranemann , paragraph 17).
25. As the Advocate General correctly observed in point 33 of her Opinion, the right conferred by Article 11 of the Regulation on family members of migrant workers to pursue employed activity is not a direct right to free movement, since that provision benefits the migrant worker whose family includes a national of a third country as a spouse or dependent child.
ED & F Man Sugar Ltd v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas.
Date: 2006-04-06
15. In that connection, the Court has held on numerous occasions that a penalty, even of a non-criminal nature, cannot be imposed unless it rests on a clear and unambiguous legal basis (Case 117/83 Könecke  [1984] ECR 3291, paragraph 11; Emsland-Stärke , paragraph 56; and Case C-210/00 Käserei Champignon Hofmeister  [2002] ECR I-6453, paragraph 52).
Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging v Staat der Nederlanden.
Date: 2006-04-06
24. Without it being necessary to consider that question in detail, it must be noted that the Court has already held that a period of leave guaranteed by Community law cannot affect the right to take another period of leave guaranteed by that law (Case C-519/03 Commission  v Luxembourg  [2005] ECR I-3067, paragraph 33). Thus, in the event of the aggregation of several periods of leave guaranteed by Community law at the end of a year, the carrying forward of annual leave or part thereof to the following year may be inevitable.
26. Harmonisation at Community level in relation to the organisation of working time is intended to guarantee better protection of the safety and health of workers by ensuring that they are entitled to minimum rest periods, particularly paid annual leave, and adequate breaks (see Case C‑173/99 BECTU  [2001] ECR I‑4881, paragraph 38, and Case C‑14/04 Dellas and Others  [2005] ECR I-0000, paragraph 41).
28. The entitlement of every worker to paid annual leave must be regarded as a particularly important principle of Community social law from which there can be no derogations and the implementation of which by the competent national authorities must be confined within the limits expressly laid down by the directive itself (see, particularly, BECTU , cited above, paragraph 43, and Case C-342/01 Merino Gómez  [2004] ECR I-2605, paragraph 29).
29. The directive also embodies the rule that a worker must normally be entitled to actual rest, with a view to ensuring effective protection of his safety and health, since it is only where the employment relationship is terminated that Article 7(2) permits an allowance to be paid in lieu of paid annual leave ( BECTU , paragraph 44, and Merino Gómez , cited above, paragraph 30).
30. Admittedly, the positive effect which that leave has for the safety and health of the worker is deployed fully if it is taken in the year prescribed for that purpose, namely the current year. However, the significance of that rest period in that regard remains if it is taken during a later period.
32. In any event, the possibility of financial compensation in respect of the minimum period of annual leave carried over would create an incentive, incompatible with the objectives of the directive, not to take leave or to encourage employees not to do so.
Standesamt Stadt Niebüll.
Date: 2006-04-27
12. In order to determine whether a body making a reference is a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 234 EC, which is a question governed by Community law alone, the Court takes account of a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes , whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent (see, in particular, Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult  [1997] ECR I-4961, paragraph 23, and the case-law cited; Joined Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98 Gabalfrisa and Others  [2000] ECR I-1577, paragraph 33; Case C-178/99 Salzmann  [2001] ECR I-4421, paragraph 13; and Case C-182/00 Lutz and Others [2002] ECR I-547, paragraph 12).
13. Furthermore, whilst Article 234 EC does not make a reference to the Court subject to there having been an inter partes  hearing in the proceedings in the course of which the national court refers a question for a preliminary ruling (see Case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries  [1994] ECR I-1783, paragraph 12), it follows none the less from that article that a national court may refer a question to the Court only if there is a case pending before it and if it is called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature (see orders in Case 138/80 Borker  [1980] ECR 1975, paragraph 4, and in Case 318/85 Greis Unterweger  [1986] ECR 955, paragraph 4; and judgments in Case C-111/94 Job Centre  [1995] ECR I-3361, paragraph 9; Salzmann , paragraph 14; Lutz , paragraph 13; and Case C-165/03 Längst  [2005] ECR I-5637, paragraph 25).
14. Therefore, when it exercises administrative authority, without at the same time being called on to decide a dispute, the referring body, even if it satisfies the other conditions mentioned in paragraph 12 of the present judgment, cannot be regarded as exercising a judicial function (see Job Centre , paragraph 11; Salzmann , paragraph 15; and Lutz , paragraph 14).
European Parliament v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2006-05-02
35. The appropriate legal basis on which an act must be adopted should be determined according to its content and main object (see, in particular, Case C-155/91 Commission  v Council  [1993] ECR I-939, paragraphs 19 to 21, and Netherlands  v Parliament and Council , paragraph 27).
36. In that regard, Article 308 EC may be used as the legal basis for a measure only where no other provision of the Treaty gives the Community institutions the necessary power to adopt it (Case 45/86 Commission  v Council [1987] ECR 1493, paragraph 13, and Case C-350/92 Spain  v Council [1995] ECR I-1985, paragraph 26).
37. Thus, the Court has already held that the Community may use Article 308 EC as the basis for creating new intellectual property rights in addition to national rights (see Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-5267, paragraph 59; Spain  v Council , paragraphs 23 and 27; and Netherlands  v Parliament and Council , paragraph 24). Recourse to Article 308 EC as a legal basis is, by contrast, excluded where the Community act in question does not provide for the introduction of a new protective right at Community level, but merely harmonises the rules laid down in the laws of the Member States for granting and protecting that right ( Netherlands  v Parliament and Council , paragraph 25).
38. Article 95 EC empowers the Community legislature to adopt measures to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market and they must genuinely have that object, contributing to the elimination of obstacles to the economic freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, which include the freedom of establishment (see, in particular, Case C-376/98 Germany  v Parliament and Council  [2000] ECR I-8419, paragraphs 83, 84 and 95, and Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco  [2002] ECR I-11453, paragraph 60).
39. Recourse to Article 95 EC as a legal basis is also possible if the aim is to prevent the emergence of obstacles to trade resulting from heterogeneous development of national laws; the emergence of such obstacles must, however, be likely and the measure in question must be designed to prevent them (see, to that effect, Spain  v Council , paragraph 35; Germany  v Parliament and Council , paragraph 86; Netherlands  v Parliament and Council , paragraph 15; and British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco , paragraph 61).
The Queen, on the application of: Diane Barker v London Borough of Bromley.
Date: 2006-05-04
40. Thus, while this term is modelled on certain elements of national law, it remains a Community concept which, contrary to the submissions of Bromley LBC and the United Kingdom Government, falls exclusively within Community law. According to settled case-law, the terms used in a provision of Community law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope are normally to be given throughout the Community an autonomous and uniform interpretation which must take into account the context of the provision and the purpose of the legislation in question (see, to this effect, Case 327/82 Ekro  [1984] ECR 107, paragraph 11; Case C‑287/98 Linster  [2000] ECR I-6917, paragraph 43; and Case C-201/02 Wells  [2004] ECR I-723, paragraph 37).
43. First, according to Article 2(1) of Directive 85/337, projects likely to have significant effects on the environment, as referred to in Article 4 of the directive read in conjunction with Annexes I and II thereto, must be made subject to an assessment with regard to their effects before development consent is given ( Wells , paragraph 42).
46. Having regard to those points, it is therefore the task of the national court to verify whether the outline planning permission and decision approving reserved matters which are at issue in the main proceedings constitute, as a whole, a ‘development consent’ for the purposes of Directive 85/337 (see, in this connection, the judgment delivered today in Case C-508/03 Commission  v United Kingdom  [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 101 and 102).
47. Second, as the Court explained in Wells , at paragraph 52, where national law provides for a consent procedure comprising more than one stage, one involving a principal decision and the other involving an implementing decision which cannot extend beyond the parameters set by the principal decision, the effects which a project may have on the environment must be identified and assessed at the time of the procedure relating to the principal decision. It is only if those effects are not identifiable until the time of the procedure relating to the implementing decision that the assessment should be carried out in the course of that procedure.
48. If the national court therefore concludes that the procedure laid down by the rules at issue in the main proceedings is a consent procedure comprising more than one stage, one involving a principal decision and the other involving an implementing decision which cannot extend beyond the parameters set by the principal decision, it follows that the competent authority is, in some circumstances, obliged to carry out an environmental impact assessment in respect of a project even after the grant of outline planning permission, when the reserved matters are subsequently approved (see, in this regard, Commission  v United Kingdom , paragraphs 103 to 106). This assessment must be of a comprehensive nature, so as to relate to all the aspects of the project which have not yet been assessed or which require a fresh assessment.
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2006-05-04
16. It is appropriate at the outset to note that the Court may of its own motion examine the question whether the conditions laid down in Article 226 EC for the bringing of an action for failure to fulfil obligations are satisfied (see, inter alia, Case C-362/90  Commission  v  Italy  [1992] ECR I-2353, paragraph 8, and Case C-525/03  Commission  v Italy  [2005] ECR I-9405, paragraph 8).
17. The reasoned opinion, provided for in Article 226 EC, must contain a coherent and detailed exposition of the reasons which led the Commission to the conclusion that the Member State concerned had failed to fulfil one of its obligations under the Treaty (see, inter alia, Case C-279/94 Commission  v Italy  [1997] ECR I‑4743, paragraphs 15 and 19).
18. The reasoned opinion and therefore the action, which, according to settled case-law, illustrated inter alia by the judgment in Case C‑234/91 Commission  v Denmark  [1993] ECR I‑6273, paragraph 16, may not be based on pleas and grounds other than those put forward in that opinion, must therefore set out the complaints coherently and precisely in order that the Member State and the Court may appreciate exactly the scope of the infringement of Community law complained of, a condition which is necessary in order to enable the Member State to avail itself of its right to defend itself and the Court to determine whether there is a breach of obligations as alleged.