larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
European Commission v French Republic.
Date: 2013-03-14
13. It must be noted that the purpose of the Directive is to lay down a number of rules on the holding, movement and monitoring of products subject to excise duty, in particular so as to ensure that chargeability of excise duty is identical in all the Member States (Case C‑5/05 Joustra [2006] ECR I‑11075, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
14. In that context, the Directive draws a distinction between, on the one hand, products held for commercial purposes and, on the other hand, products held for private purposes ( Joustra , paragraph 28).
15. As regards products held for private purposes, Article 8 of the Directive provides that excise duties are payable in the Member State in which they were acquired ( Joustra , paragraph 31). By contrast, as regards products held for commercial purposes, Article 9(1) of the Directive states, in essence, that excise duty becomes chargeable in the Member State in which the products are held.
27. It should be recalled that where a particular sphere has been the subject of exhaustive harmonisation at Community level, any national measure relating thereto must be assessed in the light of the provisions of the harmonising measure and not those of the Treaty (Case C‑463/01 Commission v Germany [2004] ECR I‑11705, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
Magdeburger Mühlenwerke GmbH v Finanzamt Magdeburg.
Date: 2013-03-21
40. As regards the question when the investment subsidy at issue in the main proceedings was granted, it should be observed that aid must be considered to be granted at the time that the right to receive it is conferred on the beneficiary under the applicable national rules.
45. Moreover, the incentive effect of a State aid measure falls within the examination of its compatibility with the internal market (see, to that effect, Case C‑544/09 P Germany v Commission  [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 68). Accordingly, it must be added that the circumstance that the Law of 22 January 1996 on investment subsidies might have had an incentive effect for the investment at issue is not relevant for determining when aid must be considered to be granted.
Salzburger Flughafen GmbH v Umweltsenat.
Date: 2013-03-21
29. As regards the establishment of thresholds or criteria to determine whether such a project must be made subject to an environmental impact assessment, it must be borne in mind that, indeed, Article 4(2)(b) of Directive 85/337 confers a measure of discretion on the Member States in that regard. However, that discretion is limited by the obligation set out in Article 2(1) of the directive to make projects likely, by virtue inter alia of their nature, size or location, to have significant effects on the environment subject to an impact assessment (see, to that effect, WWF and Others , paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
30. Thus, the criteria and/or thresholds mentioned in Article 4(2)(b) of Directive 85/337 are designed to facilitate examination of the actual characteristics of any given project in order to determine whether it is subject to the requirement to carry out an assessment, and not to exempt in advance from that obligation certain whole classes of projects listed in Annex II to that directive which may be envisaged on the territory of a Member State (see, to that effect, WWF and Others , paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
31. The Court has already held that a Member State which established criteria or thresholds at a level such that, in practice, an entire class of projects would be exempted in advance from the requirement of an impact assessment would exceed the limits of its discretion under Articles 2(1) and 4(2) of Directive 85/337 unless all projects excluded could, when viewed as a whole, be regarded as not being likely to have significant effects on the environment (see, to that effect, WWF and Others , paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
37. In that regard, in accordance with the case-law of the Court, it can be necessary to take account of the cumulative effect of projects in order to avoid a circumvention of the objective of the European Union legislation by the splitting of projects which, taken together, are likely to have significant effects on the environment (see, to that effect, Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest and Others , paragraph 36 and the case-law cited). It is for the referring court to examine, in the light of that case-law, whether and to what extent the effects on the environment of the projects referred to in paragraph 15 of this judgment and the projects already carried out during 2003 and 2004 must be assessed as a whole.
41. In accordance with the case-law of the Court, if the discretion conferred on Member States by Article 4(2) of Directive 85/337, read in conjunction with Article 2(1) thereof has been exceeded, it is for the authorities of the Member State to take, according to their relevant powers, all the general or particular measures necessary to ensure that projects are examined in order to determine whether they are likely to have significant effects on the environment and, if so, to ensure that they are subject to an impact assessment (see, to that effect, Kraaijeveld and Others , paragraph 61, and WWF and Others , paragraphs 70 and 71).
Blanka Soukupová v Ministerstvo zemědělství.
Date: 2013-04-11
26. In those circumstances, while the definition of ‘normal retirement age’ within the meaning of the second indent of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 1257/1999, in the absence of harmonisation at European Union level, falls within the competence of the Member States, the fact nevertheless remains that, for the purposes of the application of that regulation, Member States may not rely on the difference in treatment that Article 7(1) of Directive 79/7 authorises them to retain when defining retirement age in the field of social security. The European Union legislature cannot be regarded, on the basis of that reference to a concept which has not been harmonised, as having empowered Member States, in the implementation of that regulation, to adopt measures which would infringe the general principles of European Union law and fundamental rights (see, to that effect, Case C-540/03 Parliament  v Council  [2006] ECR I-5769, paragraphs 22 and 23).
28. Consequently, in implementing Regulation No 1257/1999, the Member States are required, pursuant to Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, to respect the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination, enshrined in Articles 20, 21(1) and 23 of that charter.
29. According to settled case-law, the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination require that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, in particular, Case C-354/95 National Farmers’ Union and Others  [1997] ECR I-4559, paragraph 61; Case C-152/09 Grootes  [2010] ECR I-11285, paragraph 66; and Case C-236/09 Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others  [2011] ECR I-773, paragraph 28).
35. As regards the consequences of failure to observe the principle of equal treatment in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, it must be recalled that, in accordance with established case-law, where discrimination contrary to European Union law has been established, as long as measures reinstating equal treatment have not been adopted, observance of the principle of equality can be ensured only by granting to persons within the disadvantaged category the same advantages as those enjoyed by persons within the favoured category (see Case C-18/95 Terhoeve  [1999] ECR I-345, paragraph 57; and Case C-399/09 Landtová  [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 51). The disadvantaged person must therefore be placed in the same position as the person enjoying the advantage concerned.
Karl Berger v Freistaat Bayern.
Date: 2013-04-11
31. In order to provide the referring court with a helpful answer to allow it to resolve the dispute before it, the Court considers that it is also necessary to give an interpretation of the second subparagraph of Article 17(2) of Regulation No 178/2002 even if that provision is not specifically mentioned in the request for a preliminary ruling before it (see to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑243/09 Fuß [2010] ECR I‑9849, paragraph 39 and case-law cited).
Mindo Srl v European Commission.
Date: 2013-04-11
21. In accordance with settled case-law, it follows from the second paragraph of Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Articles 168(1)(d) and 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see Case C‑274/99 P Connolly  v Commission [2001] ECR I‑1611, paragraph 121, and judgment of 24 January 2013 in Case C‑646/11 P 3F v Commission , paragraph 51).
29. The obligation to state the reasons on which a judgment is based arises under Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, which applies to the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute, and Article 81 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. It has consistently been held that the statement of the reasons on which a judgment of the General Court is based must clearly and unequivocally disclose that court’s reasoning in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the decision taken and the Court of Justice to exercise its power of review (see Case C‑288/11 P Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle  v Commission [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited).
30. It should be noted, moreover, that insufficiency or lack of reasoning constitutes an infringement of an essential procedural requirement and is a matter of public policy which the European Union judicature must raise of its own motion (see, to that effect, Case C‑265/97 P VBA  v Florimex and Others [2000] ECR I‑2061, paragraph 114, and order of 7 December 2011 in Case C‑45/11 P Deutsche Bahn  v OHIM , paragraph 57).
European Commission v Ireland.
Date: 2013-04-11
23. Furthermore, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C‑286/12 Commission  v Hungary  [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 41).
24. In the present case, Ireland does not dispute that, at the end of the period prescribed in the reasoned opinion, the measures required in order to ensure that the installations concerned would be brought into line with the provisions referred to in Article 5 of the IPPC Directive, as well as the measures to ensure compliance with Article 5, had not been taken.
Kingdom of Spain and Italian Republic v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2013-04-16
16. The purpose of the contested decision is to authorise the 25 Member States mentioned in the first article thereof to exercise between themselves the competences conferred by Article 118 TFEU so far as concerns the creation of protection by a unitary patent.
26. It follows that the plea claiming that the Council had no competence to authorise the enhanced cooperation in question must be rejected.
The second plea in law: misuse of powers
Arguments of the parties
33. A measure is vitiated by misuse of powers only if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence to have been taken solely, or at the very least chiefly, for ends other than those for which the power in question was conferred or with the aim of evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case (see, to that effect, Case C‑442/04 Spain  v Council  [1998] ECR I‑3517, p. 49 and case-law cited).
67. Having regard to this duty to ensure accordance with Article 118 TFEU, the enhanced cooperation in question must establish measures for the creation of European intellectual property rights to provide uniform protection of intellectual property rights.
68. With regard, on the other hand, to the expressions ‘throughout the Union’ and ‘Union-wide’ used in Article 118 TFEU, it must be held that it is inherent in the fact that the competence conferred by that article is, in this instance, exercised within the ambit of enhanced cooperation that the European intellectual property right so created, the uniform protection given by it and the arrangements attaching to it will be in force, not in the Union in its entirety, but only in the territory of the participating Member States. Far from amounting to infringement of Article 118 TFEU, that consequence necessarily follows from Article 20(4) TEU, which states: ‘Acts adopted in the framework of enhanced cooperation shall bind only participating Member States.’
Steinel Vertrieb GmbH v Hauptzollamt Bielefeld.
Date: 2013-04-18
28. The Court of Justice notes, at the outset, that, according to settled case‑law, the procedure established in Article 267 TFEU is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, with the result that it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (see Case C‑373/08 Hoesch Metals and Alloys  [2010] ECR I‑951, paragraph 59).
29. In those circumstances, it is not appropriate to extend the examination of the question referred to determine whether the products in dispute imported by Steinel Vertrieb fall within the scope of the CFL‑i Regulations on the basis of grounds not referred to by the national court, namely the assessment made by the national authorities of the subheadings of the CN code in which the product at issue in the main proceedings are to be classed (see, by analogy, Hoesch Metals and Alloys , paragraph 60). Consequently, it must be inferred from the order for reference that the national court refrained from asking the Court to rule on that issue (see, to that effect, Case C‑30/93 AC‑ATEL Electronics Vetriebs  [1994] ECR I‑2305, paragraph 19).
33. In that regard, it should be pointed out that the actual wording of Article 1(1) of each of the CFL‑i Regulations, and in particular, the words ‘falling within CN code ex 8539 31 90’, allows it to be concluded that the possible classification of a product under that heading does not automatically result in the imposition on that product of an anti-dumping duty under that provision (see Case C‑90/92 Dr. Tretter  [1993] ECR I‑1‑3569, paragraph 13, and Case C‑99/94 Birkenbeul [1996] ECR I‑1791, paragraph 15).
34. That interpretation cannot be set aside on grounds of the need for a uniform application, within the European Union, of the customs rules which would result from a literal interpretation of the provision in question. Such a uniform application must be ensured by a clear, exact and complete formulation of the European Union rules in question (see Case C‑136/91 Findling Wälzlager  [1993] ECR I‑1793, paragraph 14).
35. Nor can that interpretation be set aside on the ground that the interested parties may obtain a review of the regulations imposing anti-dumping duties under Article 11 of the basic regulation. Such a review may be justified only in certain conditions (see, to that effect, Findling Wälzlager , paragraph 15).
37. Moreover, according to settled case‑law, in interpreting a provision of European Union law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objects of the rules of which it is part (see Birkenbeul , paragraph 12).
Meliha Veli Mustafa v Direktor na fond ‘Garantirani vzemania na rabotnitsite i sluzhitelite’ kam Natsionalnia osiguritelen institut.
Date: 2013-04-18
30. First, it should be noted that Article 2(1) of Directive 2008/94 brings the case within the scope of that directive and, in so doing, makes it subject to the conditions laid down in that directive concerning the triggering of the guarantee (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑94/95 and C‑95/95 Bonifaci and Others and Berto and Others  [1997] ECR I‑3969, paragraph 36, and Case C‑373/95 Maso and Others  [1997] ECR I‑4051, paragraph 46).
31. In that regard, it is clear from the actual wording of Article 2(1) of Directive 2008/94 that, in order for an employer to be deemed to be in a state of insolvency, it is necessary for a request to have been made for the opening of collective proceedings based on the insolvency of the employer, as provided for under the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of a Member State, involving the partial or total divestment of the employer’s assets and the appointment of a liquidator or a person performing a similar task, and for the competent authority under those provisions to have either decided to open the proceedings or established that the employer’s undertaking or business has been definitively closed down and that the available assets are insufficient to warrant the opening of such proceedings.
32. Accordingly, it is apparent that, in order for the guarantee provided by Directive 2008/94 to apply, two conditions must be satisfied. First, there must have been a request for the opening of proceedings based on the insolvency of the employer and, second, there must have been a decision either to open those proceedings or, where the available assets are insufficient to warrant the opening of such proceedings, it must have been established that the undertaking has been definitively closed down.
42. Lastly, it should be observed that the first paragraph of Article 11 of Directive 2008/94 does not affect the option of Member States to apply or introduce laws, regulations or administrative provisions which are more favourable to employees and therefore to extend the guarantee period appropriately, if they see fit (see, to that effect, Case C‑160/01 Mau  [2003] ECR I‑4791, paragraph 32).
European Commission v Ireland.
Date: 2013-04-25
45. It should be noted in that regard that it is settled case‑law that a Member State cannot plead the situation prevailing in its domestic legal order to justify failure to observe obligations laid down by a directive (see Case C‑496/09 Commission  v Italy  [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 87 and the case‑law cited). Moreover, the procedure laid down in Article 258 TFEU is based on the objective finding that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaties or secondary legislation. Article 258 TFEU enables the Commission to institute proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations each time it forms the view that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under Community law, without its being required to draw distinctions based on the nature or gravity of the infringement (judgment of 22 December 2008 in Case C‑189/07 Commission v Spain , not published in the ECR, paragraph 33 and the case‑law cited).
Rose Marie Bark v Galileo Joint Undertaking.
Date: 2013-04-25
36. It is settled case-law that the wording used in one language version of a provision of European Union law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. Such an approach would be incompatible with the requirement of the uniform application of European Union law (see Case C‑149/97 Institute of the Motor Industry  [1998] ECR I‑7053, paragraph 16; and Case C‑187/07 Endendijk  [2008] ECR I‑2115, paragraph 23).
40. Moreover, where there is divergence between two language versions of a European Union legal text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, Case C‑510/10 DR and TV2 Danmark [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 45).
European Commission v Ryanair Ltd.
Date: 2013-05-16
28. Where it has in its possession information, from whatever source, regarding alleged unlawful aid, the Commission is required, under Article 10(1) of Regulation No 659/1999, immediately to examine the possible existence of aid and its compatibility with the internal market. The examination of such information, on the basis of that provision, gives rise to the initiation of the preliminary examination stage under Article 108(3) TFEU (see, to that effect, Case C‑322/09 P NDSHT v Commission  [2010] ECR I‑11911, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
29. At that stage, and where it considers that there are insufficient grounds for taking a view on the case, the Commission, in accordance with the second sentence of Article 20(2) of Regulation No 659/1999, must communicate that finding to the interested parties which have sent it the information in question and must also allow those parties to submit additional comments within a reasonable period (see, to that effect, Athinaïki Techniki v Commission , paragraph 39).
30. Article 13(1) of Regulation No 659/1999, which is applicable in the context of an examination of alleged unlawful aid, obliges the Commission to close that preliminary examination stage by adopting a decision pursuant to Article 4(2), (3) or (4) of that regulation, that is to say, a decision finding that aid does not exist, raising no objections or initiating the formal investigation procedure, since that institution is not authorised to persist in its failure to act during the preliminary examination stage ( Athinaïki Techniki v Commission , paragraph 40).
35. It follows that a preliminary examination under Articles 10(1) and 20(2) of Regulation No 659/1999 must lead to a decision adopting a position on the information provided (see, to that effect, NDSHT v Commission , paragraph 55 in fine ).