larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 2007-01-11
25. To that end, Article 1 of that regulation establishes the principle of freedom to provide maritime cabotage services within the European Community. The conditions governing the application of the principle of freedom to provide services, which are laid down in particular in Article 49 EC, have thus been extended to include maritime cabotage (see Case C-205/99 Analir and Others ECR I-1271, paragraph 20).
26. On the other hand, it follows from Article 51(1) EC, read in conjunction with Article 80(2) EC, that services falling within the sea transport sector, but not within the scope of Regulation No 3577/92 or other rules adopted on the basis of Article 80(2) EC, remain governed by the legislation of Member States, in compliance with Article 54 EC and other general provisions of the Treaty (see, to that effect Case 167/73 Commission  v France  [1974] ECR 359, paragraph 32).
27. In the present case, since the Commission based its application only on the complaint of infringement of Article 1 of Regulation No 3577/92, it is appropriate solely to examine whether towage services in open sea, which fall under sea transport for the purposes of Article 80(2) EC, are covered by that regulation and constitute ‘maritime transport services within a Member State (maritime cabotage)’ as defined in Article 2(1) thereof. It is not for the Court to give a ruling that goes beyond the grounds for complaint and form of order sought in the Commission’s application under Article 226 EC (see, to that effect, Case C‑255/04 Commission  v France [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraph 24, and case-law cited).
28. In that regard, it is clear that Article 2(1) of Regulation No 3577/92 does not expressly mention towage. However, since the list of ‘maritime cabotage services’ for the purposes of that article is introduced by the term ‘in particular’, it cannot in principle be regarded as exhaustive.
32. In those conditions, to infer from the term ‘in particular’ in Article 2(1) of Regulation No 3577/92 that it can extend the scope of that provision to any service related, incidental or ancillary to the provision of maritime transport services within the Member States, whether or not that service has the essential characteristics of maritime cabotage as expressly defined therein, would be contrary not only to the purpose of that regulation, but also to legal certainty as to the scope of that regulation.
Commission of the European Communities v Ireland.
Date: 2007-01-11
17. It is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C‑282/02 Commission  v Ireland  [2005] ECR I‑4653, paragraph 40).
29. As noted by the Advocate General in point 24 of his Opinion, the transposition of Article 12(1) of the Directive requires the Member States not only to adopt a comprehensive legislative framework but also to implement concrete and specific protection measures (see, to that effect, Case C‑103/00 Commission  v Greece  [2002] ECR I‑1147, paragraphs 34 to 39).
30. Similarly, the system of strict protection presupposes the adoption of coherent and coordinated measures of a preventive nature (Case C‑518/04 Commission  v Greece , not published in the ECR, paragraph 16).
39. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, in an action for failure to fulfil obligations brought under Article 226 EC it is for the Commission to prove that the obligation has not been fulfilled without being able to rely on any presumption (Case C‑221/04 Commission  v Spain  [2006] ECR I‑4515, paragraph 59 and the case‑law cited).
47. Second, suffice it to state that, by providing that acts which unintentionally interfere with or destroy breeding sites or resting places of wild species do not constitute an offence, section 23(7)(b) of the Wildlife Act does not satisfy the requirements of Article 12(1)(d) of Directive 92/43, which prohibits such acts, whether they are intentional or not (see, to that effect, Case C‑6/04 Commission  v United Kingdom  [2005] ECR I‑9017, paragraph 79).
Vonk Dairy Products BV v Productschap Zuivel.
Date: 2007-01-11
31. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the scope of Community regulations must not be extended to cover abuses on the part of a trader (Case 125/76 Cremer  [1977] ECR 1593, paragraph 21, and Emsland-Stärke , paragraph 51).
33. That evidence involves first, a combination of objective circumstances from which it is apparent that, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by the Community rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved, and, second, a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage from the Community rules by creating artificially the conditions laid down for obtaining it (Case C-515/03 Eichsfelder Schlachtbetrieb  [2005] ECR I-7355, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited). The existence of that subjective element can be established, inter alia, by evidence of collusion between the exporter receiving the refunds and the importer of the goods in a non-member country other than the country of importation.
34. It is for the national court to verify whether the factors constituting such an abuse are present in the case before it in accordance with the rules of evidence of national law, provided that the effectiveness of Community law is not undermined ( Emsland-Stärke , paragraph 54 and the case-law cited, and Eichsfelder Schlachtbetrieb , paragraph 40).
41. As stated, in essence, by Advocate General Sharpston at paragraph 82 of her Opinion, an irregularity is continuous or repeated for the purposes of the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 where it is committed by a Community operator who derives economic advantages from a body of similar transactions which infringe the same provision of Community law.
43. It is for the national court to verify, in accordance with the rules of evidence of national law, provided that the effectiveness of Community law is not undermined, whether action constituting a continued or repeated irregularity has taken place in the case in the main proceedings.
B.A.S. Trucks BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2007-01-11
27. It should be noted at the outset that it is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be found in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the combined nomenclature and of the notes to the sections or chapters (see, inter alia, DFDS , paragraph 27; Case C‑495/03 Intermodal Transports  [2005] ECR I‑8151, paragraph 47; and Case C-445/04 Possehl Erzkontor  [2005] ECR I-10721, paragraph 19).
28. The explanatory notes drawn up, as regards the combined nomenclature, by the Commission and, as regards the HS, by the World Customs Organisation may be an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various headings but do not have legally binding force (see Case C-405/97 Mövenpick Deutschland  [1999] ECR I-2397, paragraph 18).
29. In addition, the intended use of a product may constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (see Case C-459/93 Thyssen Haniel Logistic  [1995] ECR I-1381, paragraph 13).
30. As the Court observed in paragraph 31 of DFDS , the wording of subheading 8704 10 of the CN requires that a vehicle meets two conditions to be classifiable thereunder, namely be a ‘dumper’ and be designed for use off-highway.
35. As a general rule, in the light of the inherent characteristics of the dumpers covered by subheading 8704 10 of the CN, namely off-the-road wheels, special earth-moving tyres and limited speed and area of operation, such vehicles seem to be intended primarily for the transport of materials in quarries, mines or on building sites, that is to say, off-highway. Those characteristics distinguish them from other vehicles intended for the transport of goods in so far as, unlike those vehicles, they are primarily intended to be driven on ground other than paved, public roads.
36. It follows from the foregoing that, in order to be classifiable under subheading 8704 10 of the CN, dumpers must have been specially designed for off-highway use for the transport and unloading of materials.
40. It is for the national authorities to ascertain on a case-by-case basis, under the court’s supervision, whether a truck is designed specifically and primarily for off-highway use or whether, on the contrary, it is designed primarily to be used on paved, public roads. Accordingly, it is appropriate to establish on the basis of all the characteristics of the vehicle concerned whether it has the essential characteristics listed in the relevant explanatory notes to the combined nomenclature and to the HS.
José Perez Naranjo v Caisse régionale d'assurance maladie (CRAM) Nord-Picardie.
Date: 2007-01-16
26. The Court has already examined the exportability of the supplementary allowance and has ruled that to make its payment conditional on residence within French territory is incompatible with Article 10(1) of Regulation No 1408/71 (see Joined Cases 379/85 to 381/85 and 93/86 Giletti and Others  [1987] ECR I-955, paragraph 17, and Case C-236/88 Commission  v France  [1990] ECR I-3163, paragraphs 14 and 20).
29. It is clear from the case-law of the Court that the provisions in Article 10a of Regulation No 1408/71 derogating from the principle of the exportability of social security benefits must be interpreted strictly. That provision can apply only to benefits which satisfy the conditions defined in Article 4(2a) of Regulation No 1408/71, that is, benefits which are both special and non-contributory, and are listed in Annex IIa to that regulation (see, to that effect, Case C-160/02 Skalka  [2004] ECR I-5613, paragraph 19, and Case C-154/05 Kersbergen-Lap and Dams-Schipper  [2005] ECR I-0000, paragraph 25).
32. The Court has already held that a special benefit, within the meaning of Article 4(2a) of Regulation No 1408/71, is defined by its purpose. It must either replace or supplement a social security benefit and be in the nature of social assistance justified on economic and social grounds and fixed by legislation setting objective criteria (see Skalka , paragraph 25, and Kersbergen-Lap and Dams-Schipper , paragraph 30).
36. As regards whether the supplementary allowance is contributory, it is clear from the case-law that the determining criterion in that respect is how the benefit concerned is actually financed. The Court must consider whether that financing comes directly or indirectly from social contributions or from public resources (see, to that effect, Skalka , paragraph 28, and Kersbergen-Lap and Dams-Schipper , paragraph 36). However, such an examination may require an analysis of the national regulations and practices in such detail and depth that it would exceed the Court's role in the framework of the preliminary ruling procedure and, therefore, in order to produce a conclusive result, the subsequent cooperation of the national court may be necessary.
Estager SA v Receveur principal de la recette des douanes de Brive.
Date: 2007-01-18
21. In that respect, it should be noted that, at paragraphs 30 to 34 of its judgment in Case C-19/03 Verbraucher-Zentrale Hamburg [2004] ECR I‑8183, the Court has already had occasion to examine the objectives of Regulation No 1103/97.
22. It is clear from that examination that the regulation was intended to ensure that the transition to the euro took place without affecting obligations already entered into by citizens and firms. To that end, the fourth recital in its preamble states that ‘... legal certainty at an early stage will allow preparations by citizens and firms to proceed under good conditions’. The seventh recital states that ‘... it is a generally accepted principle of law that the continuity of contracts and other legal instruments is not affected by the introduction of a new currency’. The seventh recital also specifies that the objective of the provisions of Regulation No 1103/97 on that continuity of contracts ‘is to provide legal certainty and transparency to economic agents, in particular for consumers ...’. The first sentence of Article 3 of the regulation provides that ‘[t]he introduction of the euro shall not have the effect of altering any term of a legal instrument or of discharging or excusing performance under any legal instrument, nor give a party the right unilaterally to alter or terminate such an instrument’ ( Verbraucher-Zentrale Hamburg , paragraph 31).
24. The setting of rules relating to conversion operations also shares the objective that the transition to the euro should be neutral. The attempt to ensure that those operations are as neutral as possible, for both citizens and firms, presupposes, as the 12th recital in the preamble to Regulation No 1103/97 indicates, that ‘a high degree of accuracy in conversion operations’ is guaranteed. Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1103/97 thus provides that conversion rates are to ‘be adopted with six significant figures’. Article 4(2) provides that ‘[t]he conversion rates shall not be rounded or truncated when making conversions’, while Article 4(3) states that ‘[i]nverse rates derived from the conversion rates shall not be used’, the latter provision seeking, according to the 10th recital in the preamble to the regulation, to avoid ‘significant inaccuracies, notably if large amounts are involved’. ( Verbraucher-Zentrale Hamburg , paragraph 32).
City Motors Groep NV v Citroën Belux NV.
Date: 2007-01-18
24. However, it cannot be inferred from that omission that express termination clauses are now prohibited in so far as they constitute a restriction on competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC. Article 5(3) of Regulation No 1475/95 was not in any way intended to grant a block exemption to certain restrictions on competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC, but simply introduced a possibility which did not restrict the contractual freedom of the parties, as exercised under the applicable national law (see, to that effect, Case C‑125/05 Vulcan Silkeborg  [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraph 47).
28. It thus follows from the foregoing that no provision in Regulation No 1400/2002 prohibits the parties to an agreement falling within the scope of that regulation from providing for an express termination clause such as that at issue in the main proceedings (see, to that effect, Case C‑230/96 Cabour  [1998] ECR I-2055, paragraph 37). Accordingly, the validity of such a clause is governed in principle not by the regulation but by national law alone.
33. Furthermore, in the event of a breach by a supplier of the condition for application of the block exemption set out in Article 3(4) of Regulation No 1400/2002, the national court must be in a position to draw all the necessary inferences, in accordance with national law, concerning both the validity of the agreement at issue with regard to Article 81 EC and compensation for any harm suffered by the distributor where there is a causal relationship between that harm and an agreement or practice prohibited under Article 81 EC (see, to that effect, Case C‑453/99 Courage and Crehan  [2001] ECR I-6297, paragraph 26, and Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi and Others  [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 60, 61 and 90).
34. As to whether the intervention of an independent expert, arbitrator or national court should precede termination or whether the effects of that termination should be suspended pending a decision as to its validity, it must be pointed out that, in the absence of Community rules governing the matter, and since there is no provision in Regulation No 1400/2002 containing such a requirement, as follows from paragraph 27 of this judgment, it is for the legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive directly from Community law, provided that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness) (see, inter alia, Courage and Crehan , paragraph 29, and Manfredi and Others , paragraphs 62 and 71).
Finanzamt Dinslaken v Gerold Meindl.
Date: 2007-01-25
21. At the outset, it should be recalled, first, that, although direct taxation falls within the competence of the Member States, the latter must none the less exercise that competence in accordance with Community law and must therefore avoid any discrimination on the basis of nationality (see, to that effect, Case C‑209/01 Schilling and Fleck-Schilling  [2003] ECR I‑13389, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited) and, secondly, that the rules regarding equal treatment forbid not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result ( Schumacker , paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
22. It is settled case-law that discrimination can arise only through the application of different rules to comparable situations or the application of the same rule to different situations ( Schumacker , paragraph 30, and Gschwind , paragraph 21).
23. In relation to direct taxes, the situations of residents and non‑residents in a State are generally not comparable, because the income received in the territory of a State by a non-resident is in most cases only a part of his total income, which is concentrated at his place of residence, and because a non-resident’s personal ability to pay tax, determined by reference to his aggregate income and his personal and family circumstances, is easier to assess at the place where his personal and financial interests are centred, which in general is the place where he has his usual abode (Case C‑169/03 Wallentin  [2004] ECR I‑6443, paragraph 15, and the case-law cited).
28. In addition, the residence condition for the spouse is a requirement which German nationals will be able to satisfy more easily than nationals of other Member States who have settled in Germany in order to pursue an economic activity there, in so far as the members of their families more frequently live outside that Member State (see, by analogy, Case C‑87/99 Zurstrassen  [2000] ECR I-3337, paragraph 19).
29. In those circumstances, the decision of the Finanzamt to treat Mr Meindl as a single taxpayer even though he is married and received the entire taxable income of the household in the State of his residence, on the ground that his wife has retained her residence in another Member State and received there income not subject to tax, which exceeded both 10% of the household’s income and DEM 24 000, cannot be justified. The State of residence of such a taxpayer is the only State which can take account of the taxpayer’s personal and family circumstances, since he is not only resident in that State but, additionally, receives the entire taxable income of the household there (see, by analogy, Zurstrassen , paragraph 23).
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2007-02-01
20. At the outset, it should be noted that the Court may examine of its own motion whether the conditions imposed by Article 226 EC for the bringing of an action for failure to fulfil obligations are satisfied (see, in particular, Case C-362/90 Commission  v Italy  [1992] ECR I-2353, paragraph 8, and Case C-525/03 Commission  v Italy  [2005] ECR I-9405, paragraph 8).
21. In that procedure, the reasoned opinion and the action must set out the Commission’s complaints coherently and precisely in order that the Member State and the Court may appreciate exactly the scope of the infringement of Community law complained of, a condition which is necessary in order to enable the Member State to avail itself of its right to defend itself and the Court to determine whether there is a breach of obligations as alleged (see, to this effect, Case C-98/04 Commission  v United Kingdom  [2006] ECR I-4003, paragraph 18).
25. Consequently, since the present action for failure to fulfil obligations is founded on contradictory arguments, it does not satisfy the requirements of coherence and precision referred to in paragraph 21 of this judgment.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Date: 2007-02-15
49. With regard to the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission against that plea in defence, suffice it to note that such an objection is contrary to the general principle of respect for the rights of the defence.  According to the case-law of the Court, the proper conduct of the pre-litigation procedure constitutes an essential guarantee required by the EC Treaty not only in order to protect the rights of the Member State concerned, but also to ensure that any contentious procedure will have a clearly defined dispute as its subject-matter (see the order in Case C‑266/94 Commission  v Spain  [1995] ECR I-1975, paragraph 17).  Thus, once the subject-matter has been defined, the Member State has the right to raise all the pleas available to it in order to defend itself.  Moreover, there is no rule of procedure which requires the Member State concerned to put forward, during the pre-litigation procedure, all the arguments in its defence, in an application based on Article 226 EC (see Case C‑414/97 Commission  v Spain  [1999] ECR I‑5585, paragraph 19).
Issue of new fishing licences
53. Even if the Commission could, under the procedure laid down in Article 226 EC, have taken action against the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the basis of other provisions of Community law in respect of the system for issuing new fishing licences, as the Advocate General observed in point 45 of her Opinion, it is common ground that the breach of such provisions does not constitute the subject-matter of the failure to fulfil obligations complained of (see Case C‑6/04 Commission  v United Kingdom  [2005] ECR I‑9017, paragraphs 58 to 60, and Case C‑225/04 Commission  v France  [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 24).