Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others v Premier ministre, Ministre de l’Écologie et du Développement durable and Ministre de l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Industrie.
Date: 2008-12-16
23. The general principle of equal treatment, as a general principle of Community law, requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, inter alia, Case 106/83 Sermide  [1984] ECR 4209, paragraph 28; Joined Cases C‑133/93, C‑300/93 and C‑362/93 Crispoltoni and Others  [1994] ECR I‑4863, paragraphs 50 and 51; and Case C‑313/04 Franz Egenberger  [2006] ECR I‑6331, paragraph 33).
25. A breach of the principle of equal treatment as a result of different treatment presumes that the situations concerned are comparable, having regard to all the elements which characterise them.
26. The elements which characterise different situations, and hence their comparability, must in particular be determined and assessed in the light of the subject-matter and purpose of the Community act which makes the distinction in question. The principles and objectives of the field to which the act relates must also be taken into account (see, to that effect, Case 6/71 Rheinmühlen Düsseldorf  [1971] ECR 823, paragraph 14; Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel and Others  [1977] ECR 1753, paragraph 8; Case C‑280/93 Germany  v Council  [1994] ECR I‑4973, paragraph 74; and Joined Cases C‑364/95 and C‑365/95 T. Port  [1998] ECR I‑1023, paragraph 83).
29. According to recital 5 in the preamble to Directive 2003/87, its objective is to establish that scheme in order to contribute to fulfilling the commitments of the Community and its Member States under the Kyoto Protocol, which aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere to a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, with the ultimate objective of protection of the environment.
30. Community policy on the environment, to which the legislative act at issue in the main proceedings relates, and one of whose principal objectives is the protection of the environment, aims, in accordance with Article 174(2) EC, at a high level of protection and is based in particular on the precautionary principle, the principle that preventive action should be taken, and the polluter-pays principle (see Case C‑157/96 National Farmers’ Union and Others  [1998] ECR I‑2211, paragraph 64, and Joined Cases C‑14/06 and C‑295/06 Parliament and Denmark  v Commission  [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).
31. While the ultimate objective of the allowance trading scheme is the protection of the environment by means of a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, the scheme does not of itself reduce those emissions but encourages and promotes the pursuit of the lowest cost of achieving a given amount of emissions reductions, as appears inter alia from point 3 of the Green Paper and point 2 of the statement of reasons in the Commission Proposal. The benefit for the environment depends on the stringency of the total quantity of allowances allocated, which represents the overall limit on emissions allowed by the scheme.
32. It also appears that the economic logic of the allowance trading scheme consists in ensuring that the reductions of greenhouse gas emissions required to achieve a predetermined environmental outcome take place at the lowest cost. By allowing the allowances that have been allocated to be sold, the scheme is intended to encourage a participant in the scheme to emit quantities of greenhouse gases that are less than the allowances originally allocated him, in order to sell the surplus to another participant who has emitted more than his allowance.
39. According to the case-law, for the Community legislature to be accused of breaching the principle of equal treatment, it must have treated comparable situations differently, thereby subjecting some persons to disadvantages as opposed to others (see Joined Cases 17/61 and 20/61 Klöckner-Werke and Hoesch  v High Authority  [1962] ECR 325, 345; Case 250/83 Finsider  v Commission  [1985] ECR 131, paragraph 8; and Case C‑462/99 Connect Austria  [2003] ECR I‑5197, paragraph 115).
46. The principle of equal treatment will not, however, be infringed if the different treatment of the steel sector on the one hand and the chemical and non-ferrous metal sectors on the other is justified.
47. A difference in treatment is justified if it is based on an objective and reasonable criterion, that is, if the difference relates to a legally permitted aim pursued by the legislation in question, and it is proportionate to the aim pursued by the treatment (see, to that effect, Case 114/76 Bela-Mühle Bergmann  [1977] ECR 1211, paragraph 7; Case 245/81 Edeka Zentrale  [1982] ECR 2745, paragraphs 11 and 13; Case C‑122/95 Germany  v Council  [1998] ECR I‑973, paragraphs 68 and 71; and Case C‑535/03 Unitymark and North Sea Fishermen’s Organisation  [2006] ECR I‑2689, paragraphs 53, 63, 68 and 71).
48. Since a Community legislative act is concerned, it is for the Community legislature to demonstrate the existence of objective criteria put forward as justification and to provide the Court with the necessary information for it to verify that those criteria do exist (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 124/76 and 20/77 Moulins et Huileries de Pont-à-Mousson and Providence agricole de la Champagne  [1977] ECR 1795, paragraph 22, and Case C‑122/95 Germany  v Council , paragraph 71).
Observations submitted to the Court
57. The Court acknowledges that in the exercise of the powers conferred on it the Community legislature has a broad discretion where its action involves political, economic and social choices and where it is called on to undertake complex assessments and evaluations (see Case C‑344/04 IATA and ELFAA  [2006] ECR I‑403, paragraph 80). In addition, where it is called on to restructure or establish a complex system, it is entitled to have recourse to a step-by-step approach (see, to that effect, Case 37/83 Rewe-Zentrale  [1984] ECR 1229, paragraph 20; Case C‑63/89 Assurances du crédit  v Council and Commission  [1991] ECR I‑1799, paragraph 11; and Case C‑233/94 Germany  v Parliament and Council  [1997] ECR I‑2405, paragraph 43) and to proceed in the light of the experience gained.
58. However, even where it has such a discretion, the Community legislature is obliged to base its choice on objective criteria appropriate to the aim pursued by the legislation in question (see, to that effect, Case 106/81 Kind  v EEC  [1982] ECR 2885, paragraphs 22 and 23, and Sermide , paragraph 28), taking into account all the facts and the technical and scientific data available at the time of adoption of the act in question (see, to that effect, Case C‑284/95 Safety Hi-Tech  [1998] ECR I‑4301, paragraph 51).
59. When exercising its discretion, the Community legislature must, in addition to the principal objective of protecting the environment, fully take into account all the interests involved (see, concerning measures relating to agriculture, Joined Cases C‑96/03 and C‑97/03 Tempelman and van Schaijk  [2005] ECR I‑1895, paragraph 48, and Case C‑504/04 Agrarproduktion Staebelow  [2006] ECR I‑679, paragraph 37). In examining the burdens associated with various possible measures, it must be considered that, even if the importance of the objectives pursued is such as to justify even substantial negative economic consequences for certain operators (see, to that effect, Case C‑331/88 Fedesa and Others  [1990] ECR I‑4023, paragraphs 15 to 17, and Case C‑86/03 Greece  v Commission  [2005] ECR I‑10979, paragraph 96), the Community legislature’s exercise of its discretion must not produce results that are manifestly less appropriate than those that would be produced by other measures that were also suitable for those objectives.