ArcelorMittal Atlantique et Lorraine SASU v Ministre de l’Écologie, du Développement durable et de lʼÉnergie.
Date: 2017-07-26
20


In this respect, according to the third subparagraph of Article 10a(1) of Directive 2003/87, no greenhouse gas allowance is to be allocated free of charge in respect of electricity production, with the exception of, inter alia, electricity produced from waste gases.
22


As the Advocate General noted in point 30 of his Opinion, waste gases are a by-product inevitably emitted during the production of coke or steel. It is not disputed that, from both an economic and ecological point of view, the recovery of those gases is greatly more beneficial than bleeding them off.
31


It should be noted that the Commission has broad discretion in determining the benchmarks in individual sectors or subsectors under Article 10a(2) of Directive 2003/87. That exercise entails, on the institution’s part, choices and complex technical and economic assessments as well. The legality of a measure adopted in that area can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate (judgments of 8 September 2016, Borealis and Others, C‑180/15, EU:C:2016:647, paragraph 45, and of 26 October 2016, Yara Suomi and Others, C‑506/14, EU:C:2016:799, paragraph 37).
32


It is clear from recital 11 of Decision 2011/278 that, when no data were available or the data collected did not comply with the benchmarking methodology, information on present levels of emissions and consumptions and on most efficient techniques, mainly derived from the BREFs, was used to derive benchmark values. In particular, due to a lack of data on the treatment of waste gases, heat exports and electricity production, the values for the product benchmarks for coke and hot metal were derived from calculations of direct and indirect emissions based on information on relevant energy flows provided by the relevant BREF and default emission factors set out in the LDSD 2007 (judgments of 8 September 2016, Borealis and Others, C‑180/15, EU:C:2016:647, paragraph 47, and of 26 October 2016, Yara Suomi and Others, C‑506/14, EU:C:2016:799, paragraph 39).
33


Furthermore, in respect of waste gases generated during the production of hot metal, according to recital 32 of Decision 2011/278 the product benchmarks take account of the efficient energy recovery of waste gases and emissions related to use of those gases. To that end, for the determination of the benchmark values for products of which the production generates waste gases, the carbon content of those waste gases has been taken into account to a large extent (judgments of 8 September 2016, Borealis and Others, C‑180/15, EU:C:2016:647, paragraph 48, and of 26 October 2016, Yara Suomi and Others, C‑506/14, EU:C:2016:799, paragraph 40).
37


It should be noted that, as stated in paragraph 31 of this judgment, the Commission has broad discretion to determine the benchmarks in individual sectors or subsectors under Article 10a(2) of Directive 2003/87. Therefore, the legality of a measure adopted in that area can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate (judgments of 8 September 2016, Borealis and Others, C‑180/15, EU:C:2016:647, paragraph 45, and of 26 October 2016, Yara Suomi and Others, C‑506/14, EU:C:2016:799, paragraph 37).
47


Had the Commission failed to take into account the installation producing a sintered ore substitute it would have adopted a decision contrary to the purpose of Article 10a(1) of Directive 2003/87, which is to provide incentives for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and energy efficient techniques by taking account of the most efficient techniques, substitutes, alternative production processes, high efficiency cogeneration, efficient energy recovery of waste gases, use of biomass and capture and storage of CO2, where such facilities are available and do not encourage an increase in emissions.
52


In that regard it must be noted that, according to settled case-law, the statement of reasons required by that provision must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose clearly and unequivocally the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted it, in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for it and to enable the Community judicature to exercise its power of review. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, inasmuch as the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, inter alia, judgment of 6 September 2006, Portugal v Commission, C‑88/03, EU:C:2006:511, paragraph 88 and the case-law cited).
53


Moreover, if the contested measure clearly discloses the essential objective pursued by the institution, it would be excessive to require a specific statement of reasons for each of the technical choices made by the institution (judgment of 12 July 2005, Alliance for Natural Health and Others, C‑154/04 and C‑155/04, EU:C:2005:449, paragraph 134).