Alexios Anagnostakis v European Commission.
Date: 2017-09-12
23


As a preliminary point, it should be noted that under Article 11(4) TEU, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, Union citizens may, subject to certain conditions, take the initiative of inviting the Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where those citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.
24


The right to undertake an ECI constitutes, as does, in particular, the right to petition the Parliament, an instrument concerning the right of citizens to participate in the democratic life of the Union, provided for in Article 10(3) TEU, in that it allows them to apply directly to the Commission in order to submit to it a request inviting it to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union, for the purposes of the application of the Treaties.
28


In that regard, in so far as, by its first ground of appeal, the appellant argues that the General Court erred in law by finding that that decision was sufficiently reasoned, it should be noted that the obligation to inform the organisers of the reasons for the refusal to register their proposed ECI, as provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 4(3) of Regulation No 211/2011, constitutes a specific expression, with regard to the ECI, of the obligation to state reasons for legal acts enshrined in Article 296 TFEU. It has been consistently held, with regard to that article, that the statement of reasons must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question, in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Court to exercise its power of review (see, inter alia, judgment of 6 March 2003, Interporc v Commission, C‑41/00 P, EU:C:2003:125, paragraph 55).
29


As is also apparent from settled case-law, the requirement to state reasons must be assessed by reference to the circumstances of the case. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all of the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons for a measure meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (judgments of 29 September 2011, Elf Aquitaine v Commission, C‑521/09 P, EU:C:2011:620, paragraph 150 and of 21 December 2016, Club Hotel Loutraki and Others v Commission, C‑131/15 P, EU:C:2016:989, paragraph 47).
42


Moreover, the appellant disputes the statement of reasons for that decision in so far as the proposed ECI at issue does not, he claims, manifestly fall outside the Commission’s powers under the provisions referred to in that decision. However, it should be noted that that argument does not relate to the obligation to state reasons as an essential procedural requirement, but to the separate question of the merits of those reasons, which is a question of the substantive legality of the contested decision (judgment of 29 September 2011, Elf Aquitaine v Commission, C‑521/09 P, EU:C:2011:620, paragraph 146 and the case-law cited). It must therefore be examined in the context of the reply to the second to fourth grounds of appeal.
45


At the outset, it should be noted that, as regards, first, the process of registering a proposed ECI, under Article 4 of Regulation No 211/2011 it is for the Commission to examine whether such a proposal fulfils the conditions for registration laid down, inter alia, in paragraph 2(b) of that Article. In accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of that article, information relating to the subject matter and objectives of the proposed ECI, provided by the organisers of the ECI, compulsorily or on an optional basis, in accordance with Annex II to that regulation, must therefore be taken into consideration.
47


Furthermore, it should be pointed out that, as stated in recital 10 of that regulation, the decision on the registration of a proposed ECI, within the meaning of Article 4 of that regulation, must be taken in accordance with the principle of good administration, which entails, in particular, the obligation for the competent institution to conduct a diligent and impartial examination which, moreover, takes into account all the relevant features of the case.
48


These requirements, that are inherent in the principle of good administration, apply generally to the actions of the European Union administration in its relations with the public (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 April 2017, Ombudsman v Staelen, C‑337/15 P, EU:C:2017:256, paragraph 34) and, therefore, also in the context of the right to submit an ECI as an instrument of citizen participation in the democratic life of the European Union.
49


Moreover, in accordance with the objectives pursued by that instrument, as set out in recitals (1) and (2) of Regulation No 211/2011 and consisting, inter alia, in encouraging citizen participation and making the Union more accessible, the registration condition provided for in Article 4(2)(b) of that regulation must be interpreted and applied by the Commission, when it receives a proposal for an ECI, in such a way as to ensure easy accessibility to the ECI.
50


Accordingly, it is only if a proposed ECI, in view of its subject matter and objectives, as reflected in the mandatory and, where appropriate, additional information that has been provided by the organisers pursuant to Annex II to Regulation No 211/2011, is manifestly outside the scope of the powers under which the Commission may present a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purposes of the application of the Treaties, that the Commission is entitled to refuse to register that proposed ECI pursuant to Article 4(2)(b) of that regulation.
55


In the second place, it is also settled case-law that, in an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is, in principle, confined to review of the findings of law on the pleas argued at first instance (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 April 2014, FLSmidth v Commission, C‑238/12 P, EU:C:2014:284, paragraph 42, and of 22 May 2014, ASPLA v Commission, C‑35/12 P, EU:C:2014:348, paragraph 39).
67


As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that, in accordance with settled case-law, the choice of the legal basis for a legal act of the Union must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, which include the aim and content of the measure (judgments of 29 April 2004 in Commission v Council, C‑338/01, EU:C:2004:253, paragraph 54, of 19 July 2012, Parliament v Council, C‑130/10, EU:C:2012:472, paragraph 42, and of 18 December 2014, United Kingdom v Council, C‑81/13, EU:C:2014:2449, paragraph 35).