larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Eni SpA and Others v Premier ministre and Ministre de l’Environnement, de l’Énergie et de la Mer.
Date: 2017-12-20
21


The Court held that that directive had established only a framework within which it fell to the Member States to define general policies on security of supply and that, as stated in recital 3 of the directive, it constituted only a minimum common approach to security of natural gas supply. The Court also held that Directive 2004/67 accorded a broad margin of discretion to the Member States with regard to the methods of achieving the aims pursued by the directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 July 2008, Commission v Spain, C‑207/07, not published, EU:C:2008:428, paragraphs 43 and 44).
Binca Seafoods GmbH v European Commission.
Date: 2017-12-20
44


It must be borne in mind that, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person is admissible only in so far as that person has an interest in having the contested act annulled. Such an interest requires that the annulment of that act must be capable, in itself, of having legal consequences and that the action may therefore, through its outcome, procure an advantage to the party which brought it (judgments of 4 June 2015, Andechser Molkerei Scheitz v Commission, C‑682/13 P, not published, EU:C:2015:356, paragraph 25; of 17 September 2015, Mory and Others v Commission, C‑33/14 P, EU:C:2015:609, paragraph 55, as well as order of 6 April 2017, Proforec v Commission, C‑176/16 P, not published, EU:C:2017:290, paragraph 32).
45


According to that case-law, it is for the applicant to prove its interest in bringing proceedings, which is an essential and fundamental prerequisite for any legal proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 September 2015, Mory and Others v Commission, C‑33/14 P, EU:C:2015:609, paragraph 58). In particular, in order for an action seeking annulment of an act, submitted by a natural or legal person, to be admissible, the applicant must justify in a relevant manner its interest in the annulment of that act (judgment of 4 June 2015, Andechser Molkerei Scheitz v Commission, C-682/13 P, not published, EU:C:2015:356, paragraphs 26 to 28, and order of 6 April 2017, Proforec v Commission, C‑176/16 P, not published, EU:C:2017:290, paragraphs 33 and 34).
59


In the second place, it is not for the Court, at the stage of the examination of admissibility, to make a definitive finding on the competitive relationship between Binca and the fish producers allegedly favoured by the regulation at issue or between organic pangasius and the other fish from organic aquaculture for the purpose of determining whether Binca has an interest in bringing proceedings (see, by analogy, judgment of 28 January 1986, Cofaz and Others v Commission, 169/84, EU:C:1986:42, paragraph 28). In the present case, it is sufficient to establish that Binca has justified in a relevant way the interest which it has in the annulment of the regulation at issue.
Soha Sahyouni v Raja Mamisch.
Date: 2017-12-20
28


However, it is clear from settled case-law of the Court that the interpretation of a provision of EU law may be relevant in cases in which, although the facts of the main proceedings are outside the direct scope of EU law, the provisions of EU law have been made applicable by national legislation, which, in dealing with situations confined in all respects within a single Member State, follows the same approach as that provided for by EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2016, Ullens de Schooten, C‑268/15, EU:C:2016:874, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).
36


In order to answer that question, it is necessary to interpret that provision, which defines the substantive scope of that regulation, by taking into consideration not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2013, Csonka and Others, C‑409/11, EU:C:2013:512, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
Comité Interprofessionnel du Vin de Champagne v Aldi Süd Dienstleistungs-GmbH & Co.OHG.
Date: 2017-12-20
34


In the second place, the Court has previously held, in its judgment of 14 July 2011, Bureau national interprofessionnel du Cognac (C‑4/10 and C‑27/10, EU:C:2011:484, paragraph 55), in relation to the interpretation of Article 16(a) of Regulation No 110/2008, the wording and purpose of which are similar to those of Article 118m(2)(a) of Regulation No 1234/2007 and Article 103(2)(a) of Regulation No 1308/2013, that the use of a mark containing a geographical indication, or a term corresponding to that indication and its translation, with respect to spirit drinks which do not meet the relevant specifications, constitutes, in principle, for the purposes of Article 16(a) of Regulation No 110/2008, a direct commercial use of that geographical indication.
38


As the Court observed in paragraph 82 of the judgment of 14 September 2017, EUIPO v Instituto dos Vinhos do Douro e do Porto (C‑56/16 P, EU:C:2017:693), in connection with the protection of PDOs and PGIs, Regulation No 1234/2007 constitutes an instrument of the common agricultural policy essentially intended to assure consumers that agricultural products bearing a geographical indication registered under that regulation have, because of their provenance from a particular geographical area, certain specific characteristics and, accordingly, offer a guarantee of quality due to their geographical provenance, with the aim of enabling agricultural operators to secure higher incomes in return for a genuine effort to improve quality, and of preventing improper use of those designations by third parties seeking to profit from the reputation which those products have acquired by their quality.
58


With regard to the concept of ‘evocation’, it should also be noted that, according to settled case-law, that concept covers, inter alia, a situation where the term used to designate a product incorporates part of a protected designation, so that when the consumer is confronted with the name of the product, the image triggered in his mind is that of the product whose designation is protected (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 January 2016, Viiniverla, C‑75/15, EU:C:2016:35, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). The incorporation of the name of the PDO in its entirety in that of the foodstuff concerned to indicate the taste of the foodstuff does not, therefore, correspond to that situation.
Peter Nowak v Data Protection Commissioner.
Date: 2017-12-20
31


For information to be treated as ‘personal data’ within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46, there is no requirement that all the information enabling the identification of the data subject must be in the hands of one person (judgment of 19 October 2016, Breyer, C‑582/14, EU:C:2016:779, paragraph 43). It is also undisputed that, in the event that the examiner does not know the identity of the candidate when he/she is marking the answers submitted by that candidate in an examination, the body that set the examination, in this case the CAI, does, however, have available to it the information needed to enable it easily and infallibly to identify that candidate through his identification number, placed on the examination script or its cover sheet, and thereby to ascribe the answers to that candidate.
33


As the Court has held previously, the scope of Directive 95/46 is very wide and the personal data covered by that directive is varied (judgment of 7 May 2009, Rijkeboer, C‑553/07, EU:C:2009:293, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
56


In so far as the written answers submitted by a candidate at a professional examination and any comments made by an examiner with respect to those answers are therefore liable to be checked for, in particular, their accuracy and the need for their retention, within the meaning of Article 6(1)(d) and (e) of Directive 95/46, and may be subject to rectification or erasure, under Article 12(b) of the directive, the Court must hold that to give a candidate a right of access to those answers and to those comments, under Article 12(a) of that directive, serves the purpose of that directive of guaranteeing the protection of that candidate’s right to privacy with regard to the processing of data relating to him (see, a contrario, judgment of 17 July 2014, YS and Others, C‑141/12 and C‑372/12, EU:C:2014:2081, paragraphs 45 and 46), irrespective of whether that candidate does or does not also have such a right of access under the national legislation applicable to the examination procedure.
57


In that context, it must be recalled that the protection of the fundamental right to respect for private life means, inter alia, that any individual may be certain that the personal data relating to him is correct and that it is processed in a lawful manner. As is apparent from recital 41 of Directive 95/46, it is in order to be in a position to carry out the necessary checks that the data subject has, under Article 12(a) of the directive, a right of access to the data relating to him which is being processed. That right of access is necessary, inter alia, to enable the data subject to obtain, depending on the circumstances, the rectification, erasure or blocking of his data by the data controller and consequently to exercise the right set out in Article 12(b) of that directive (judgment of 17 July 2014, YS and Others, C‑141/12 and C‑372/12, EU:C:2014:2081, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
Brigitte Schlömp v Landratsamt Schwäbisch Hall.
Date: 2017-12-20
46


First of all, it must be observed that those provisions of the Lugano II Convention are drafted in terms almost identical to the corresponding articles of Regulations No 44/2001 and 1215/2012.
47


As also observed by the Advocate General in paragraph 27 of his Opinion, the objective of a uniform interpretation of the equivalent provisions of the Lugano II Convention and of Regulation No 44/2001 and any amendment to it is clear, in particular, from the final recital in Protocol No 2 on the uniform interpretation of the Convention and on the Standing Committee (OJ 2007 L 339, p. 27) and Article 1 thereof, according to which any court applying and interpreting that convention are to ensure a converging interpretation of equivalent provisions.
49


Next, having regard to the parallel approach existing between the mechanism to resolve situations of lis pendens introduced by the Lugano II Convention and Regulations No 44/2001 and 1215/2012, and in light of the objective of a uniform interpretation set out in paragraph 47 of the present judgment, it must be held that Article 27 of the Lugano II Convention is objective and automatic and is based on the chronological order in which the courts concerned were seised (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 May 2017, HanseYachts, C‑29/16, EU:C:2017:343, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
51


Finally, as far as concerns the conditions laid down in Article 27(1) of the Lugano II Convention, relating to the identity of the parties and the cause of action brought before the courts of different States, it must be observed that, as is clear from the case-law of the Court relating to the interpretation of Article 27 of Regulation No 44/2001, which is transposable to the interpretation of Article 27 of the Lugano II Convention, that an action seeking to have the defendant held liable for causing loss has the same cause of action as an action brought by that defendant seeking a declaration that he is not liable for that loss (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2013, NIPPONKOA Insurance, C‑452/12, EU:C:2013:858, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
E.
Date: 2018-01-16
48


First, as regards the possibility for the Finnish authorities to issue a return decision accompanied by an entry ban to E in those circumstances, it is clear from the wording of Article 6(2) of Directive 2008/115 that those authorities were required to issue such a return decision and, in accordance with Article 11 thereof, to accompany it with an entry ban, provided that public order and national security so require which is, however, for the national court to ascertain in the light of the relevant case-law of the Court (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 June 2015, Zh. And O., C‑554/13, EU:C:2015:377, paragraphs 50 to 52 and 54).
49


In that case, it must be recalled that a Member State is required to assess the concept of ‘risk to public policy’, within the meaning of Article 7(4) of Directive 2008/115 on a case-by-case basis, in order to ascertain whether the personal conduct of the third-country national concerned poses a genuine and present risk to public policy, bearing in mind that the mere fact that that national has been criminally convicted is not sufficient by itself to present such a risk (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 June 2015, Zh. And O., C‑554/13, EU:C:2015:377, paragraphs 50 and 54).
53


Thus, the authorities of the Member State consulted are required in accordance with the principle of loyal cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU to take a position on the maintenance or withdrawal of the residence permit of the third-country national concerned, and that within a reasonable time, adapted to the nature of the case, so as to give them the time necessary to collect the relevant information (see, for example, judgment of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraph 97).
CORPORATE COMPANIES s.r.o.. v Ministerstvo financí ČR.
Date: 2018-01-17
24


In that regard, it should be noted, as is apparent both from the title and the preamble of that directive, that its aim is the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 April 2013, Jyske Bank Gibraltar, C‑212/11, EU:C:2013:270, paragraph 46).
European Commission v Czech Republic.
Date: 2018-01-25
35


In that regard, it must be recalled that it is settled case-law that transposing a directive into national law does not necessarily require its provisions to be reproduced verbatim in an express, specific law or regulation; a general legal context may be sufficient, provided that it does effectively ensure the full application of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner (judgment of 30 June 2016, Commission v Poland, C‑648/13, EU:C:2016:490, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).
47


However, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 12 October 2017, Kamin und Grill Shop, C‑289/16, EU:C:2017:758, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd and Others v European Commission.
Date: 2018-02-01
According to settled case-law, it follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Articles 168(1)(d) and 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (judgments of 4 July 2000, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission, C‑352/98 P, EU:C:2000:361, paragraph 34, and of 24 January 2013, 3F v Commission, C‑646/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:36, paragraph 51). An appeal that does not have such characteristics cannot be the subject of a legal assessment which would allow the Court of Justice to exercise its function in the area under examination and to carry out its review of legality (judgment of 7 November 2013, Wam Industriale v Commission, C‑560/12 P, not published, EU:C:2013:726, paragraph 44).
It should be recalled that point 13 of the 2006 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (OJ 2006 C 210, p. 2; ‘the 2006 Guidelines’) provides in respect of the calculation of fines that ‘in determining the basic amount of the fine to be imposed, the Commission will take the value of … sales of goods or services to which the infringement directly or indirectly relates’. While that concept of the ‘value of sales’ cannot be extended to cover sales which do not fall within the scope of the infringement, it cannot be limited only to the value of sales for which it is established that they were actually affected by that infringement. Having regard to the objective pursued by point 13 of the 2006 guidelines, which consists in adopting as the starting point for the calculation of the fine imposed on an undertaking an amount which reflects the economic significance of the infringement and the size of the undertaking’s contribution to it, the concept of the ‘value of sales’ must therefore be understood as referring to sales on the market concerned by the infringement (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2013, Team Relocations and Others v Commission, C‑444/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:464, paragraphs 76, 77 and 81).
European Commission v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 2018-02-08
41


Under Article 17(1)(a)(i) of Directive 2008/118, excise goods may be moved under a duty suspension arrangement within the territory of the European Union, inter alia, from a tax warehouse in one Member State to a tax warehouse in another Member State. It is a feature of that arrangement that the excise duty on the products covered by it is not yet payable, although the chargeable event for taxation purposes has already taken place. Consequently, as regards the excise goods, that arrangement postpones the chargeability of excise duty until one of the conditions of chargeability is met (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 January 2016, BP Europa, C‑64/15, EU:C:2016:62, paragraph 22).
42


The departure of such goods, including irregular departure, from that arrangement is considered as a ‘release for consumption’ pursuant to Article 7(2)(a) of Directive 2008/118 (judgment of 28 January 2016, BP Europa, C‑64/15, EU:C:2016:62, paragraph 23).
43


Furthermore, the Court has already held that ‘release for consumption’ within the meaning of Article 7 of Directive 2008/118 occurs at the time excise goods physically leave a duty suspension arrangement (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 June 2016, Polihim-SS, C‑355/14, EU:C:2016:403, paragraphs 53 and 55).
48


It is clear, first, from the scheme of Directive 2008/118, and from the provisions concerning the definition and operation of tax warehouses and suspension arrangements, such as Article 4(7) and (11), Article 15(2) and Articles 16 and 17, that an excise good which is held outside a suspension arrangement must at some point and in some way have been released for consumption within the meaning of Article 7(1) of Directive 2008/118 (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 April 2001, Van de Water, C‑325/99, EU:C:2001:201, paragraph 34).
49


Accordingly, since the re-fuelling of vehicles such as those at issue in the present case must be characterised as a ‘departure’ and, consequently, as a ‘release for consumption’ within the meaning of Article 7 of Directive 2008/118, the fact that the fuels are subsequently or even concurrently placed under a ‘customs export procedure’ has no bearing on the chargeability of the excise duty (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 April 2010, Dansk Transport og Logistik, C‑230/08, EU:C:2010:231, paragraphs 80 and 81).
Mitnitsa Varna v „SAKSA“ ООD.
Date: 2018-02-22
28


It should be observed as a preliminary point that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU, providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. With this in mind, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (judgment of 16 February 2017, Aramex Nederland, C‑145/16, EU:C:2017:130, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
31


According to the settled case-law of the Court, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and of the notes to the section or chapter (judgment of 19 October 2017, Lutz, C‑556/16, EU:C:2017:777, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). The objective characteristics and properties of products must be capable of being assessed at the time of customs clearance (judgment of 26 May 2016, Latvijas propāna gāze, C‑286/15, EU:C:2016:363, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
32


In the present case, it should be noted that CN subheading 2710 19 43, the wording of which refers to gas oils with a sulphur content not exceeding 0.001% by weight comes under CN heading 2710, which concerns petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, other than crude. For the purposes of that heading, additional note 2 to Chapter 27 of the CN defines the concept of ‘gas oils’ in point (e) thereof.
36


Furthermore, while SAKSA claims that the product in question was sold, after being imported, as gas oil (diesel fuel), it should be noted that the intended use of a product is a relevant criterion only if the classification cannot be made on the sole basis of the objective characteristics and properties of the product (judgment of 16 February 2017, Aramex Nederland, C‑145/16, EU:C:2017:130, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). That is not the case here, for it is clear from the distillation characteristics of that product that it does not, for the purposes of CN heading 2710, fall within the definition of gas oils, within the meaning of additional note 2(e).
39


It is true that it may be inferred from the case-law of the Court that a harmonised standard, drawn up by an organisation governed by private law, may be considered to be part of the EU legal order when that standard was conceived, managed and monitored by the Commission and when it produces binding legal effects following publication of its references in the Official Journal of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 October 2016, James Elliott Construction, C‑613/14, EU:C:2016:821, paragraphs 40, 43 and 44).