larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Denkavit Futtermittel GmbH v Land Baden-Württemberg.
Date: 1991-06-20
18 It should next be pointed out that, according in particular to the judgment in Case 76/86 Commission v Germany [1989] ECR 1021, it follows from Article 30 et seq. of the Treaty that national rules, adopted in the absence of common or harmonized rules and applicable without distinction to national products and to products imported from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, are compatible with the Treaty only in so far as they are necessary on grounds relating to public interest listed in Article 36 of the Treaty or in order to satisfy imperative requirements relating, inter alia, to fair trading and consumer protection.
24 Such a requirement must, however, be satisfied by means which are not disproportionate to the ends in view and which hinder as little as possible the importation of products which are lawfully manufactured and marketed in other Member States. The affixing to compound feedingstuffs of the mandatory indication of all the ingredients of which they are composed in descending order of their proportion, may be regarded as a means which is appropriate and proportionate to the aims pursued, since it is accepted that labelling is one of the means that least restricts the free movement of those products within the Community.
Polysar Investments Netherlands BV v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen.
Date: 1991-06-20
12 According to the Court' s judgment in Case C-186/89 Van Tiem v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1990] ECR I-4363, Article 4 of the Sixth Directive confers a very wide scope on value added tax; the term "exploitation", within the meaning of Article 4(2), refers, in accordance with the requirements of the principle that the system of value added tax should be neutral, to all transactions, whatever their legal form, by which it is sought to obtain income from the goods in question on a continuing basis.
13 It does not follow from that judgment, however, that the mere acquisition and holding of shares in a company is to be regarded as an economic activity, within the meaning of the Sixth Directive, conferring on the holder the status of a taxable person. The mere acquisition of financial holdings in other undertakings does not amount to the exploitation of property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis because any dividend yielded by that holding is merely the result of ownership of the property.
14 It is otherwise where the holding is accompanied by direct or indirect involvement in the management of the companies in which the holding has been acquired, without prejudice to the rights held by the holding company as shareholder.
17 The answer to Question 1 must therefore be that Article 4 of the Sixth Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that a holding company whose sole purpose is to acquire holdings in other undertakings, without involving itself directly or indirectly in the management of those undertakings, without prejudice to its rights as a shareholder, does not have the status of a taxable person for the purposes of value added tax and therefore has no right to deduct tax under Article 17 of the Sixth Directive. The fact that the holding company belongs to a world-wide group of undertakings, which appears outwardly under a single name, is not relevant to the company' s classification as a taxable person for the purposes of value added tax.
Question 2
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
Date: 1991-06-26
20 The Court has already held that the first paragraph of Article 95 is infringed where the taxation on the imported product and that on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria, which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product (Case 45/75 REWE v Hauptzollamt Landau [1976] ECR 181).
21 It follows that the system of taxation at issue can be considered to be compatible with the first paragraph of Article 95 only if it is proved to be so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported beer being taxed more heavily than domestic beer.
22 In order to ascertain whether that condition is fulfilled, the tax burden imposed on imported beer on the basis of the losses of hot wort calculated on a flat-rate basis must be compared with the lowest tax burden actually borne by domestic beer, which can only be determined by reference to the wastage rate of the most efficient domestic brewery.
Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company (Samad) and Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company (Safco) v Council of the European Communities.
Date: 1991-06-27
15 Secondly, according to the well-established case-law of the Court (see most recently the judgment of 18 June 1991 in Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925), fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law, whose observance is ensured by the Court. Consequently, it is necessary when interpreting Article 7(4) of the basic regulation to take account in particular of the requirements stemming from the right to a fair hearing, a principle whose fundamental character has been stressed on numerous occasions in the case-law of the Court (see in particular the judgment of 17 October 1989 in Case 85/87 Dow Benelux v Commission [1989] ECR 3137). Those requirements must be observed not only in the course of proceedings which may result in the imposition of penalties, but also in investigative proceedings prior to the adoption of anti-dumping regulations which, despite their general scope, may directly and individually affect the undertakings concerned and entail adverse consequences for them.
16 It should be added that, with regard to the right to a fair hearing, any action taken by the Community institutions must be all the more scrupulous in view of the fact that, as they stand at present, the rules in question do not provide all the procedural guarantees for the protection of the individual which may exist in certain national legal systems.
17 Consequently, in performing their duty to provide information, the Community institutions must act with all due diligence by seeking, as the Court stated in its judgment of 20 March 1985 in Case 264/82 Timex v Council and Commission [1985] ECR 849, to provide the undertakings concerned, as far as is compatible with the obligation not to disclose business secrets, with information relevant to the defence of their interests, choosing, if necessary on their own initiative, the appropriate means of providing such information. In any event, the undertakings concerned should have been placed in a position during the administrative procedure in which they could effectively make known their views on the correctness and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the evidence presented by the Commission in support of its allegation concerning the existence of dumping and the resultant injury.
Manuel Martínez Vidal v Gemeenschappelijke Medische Dienst.
Date: 1991-06-27
9 That difference, which was underlined by the national court, cannot form the basis for an interpretation of Article 51(1) to the effect that, in a case of invalidity, the competent institution may either ask the institution of the place of residence to carry out an examination or arrange an examination itself. If, in such a case, an examination is carried out only at the request of the competent institution, it is because an examination is not always needed. If it does take place, it is carried out by the institution of the place of residence. However, the competent institution may, if it considers it necessary, arrange for an additional examination.
10 Article 51 does not, however, specify the place where such an additional examination is to take place.
11 In connection with the examination for which provision is made in Article 18(5) in cases of sickness and maternity, the Court considered that concern for the health of the worker concerned required that he should not have to return to the Member State in which the competent institution was situated in order to undergo there a medical examination (judgment in Case 22/86 Rindone [1987] ECR 1339, at paragraph 21).
12 That restriction on the right of the institution responsible for payment to carry out examinations cannot be accepted in the case of invalidity.
13 While, in a case of sickness, there is a risk that the recovery of the person concerned will be seriously impaired by the journey, a worker suffering from invalidity cannot be presumed to run that risk. Fitness to travel must thus be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
14 Moreover, under the legislation of the various Member States the differences are particularly pronounced with regard to invalidity. In order to determine the degree of invalidity under that legislation, the examinations necessary require the participation of various experts, in particular, in the case of the Netherlands, in the fields of medicine, employment and law. If all those experts were required to make the journey, substantial expense would be incurred and it is not certain that they would find in the Member State in which the person concerned was staying or residing all the facilities necessary to carry out the examinations.
15 It follows that, in a case where the state of health of the person concerned so allows, he is required, when asked by the institution responsible for payment, to go to the Member State of that institution in order to undergo there an examination by a doctor of the institution' s choice.
16 Nevertheless, it would be to disregard the objective of Article 51(1), which is intended to protect, as far as possible, recipients of the benefits referred to therein from the inconveniences caused by such journeys, were the persons concerned obliged to bear the travel and accommodation expenses incurred in connection with medical examinations because they were living in another Member State.
Department of Health and Social Security v Christopher Stewart Barr and Montrose Holdings Ltd.
Date: 1991-07-03
16 In that regard it must be pointed out that, as the United Kingdom rightly emphasizes, the rule laid down in Article 4 of Protocol No 3 cannot be interpreted in such a way as to be used as an indirect means of applying on the territory of the Isle of Man provisions of Community law which are not applicable there by virtue of Article 227(5)(c) of the EEC Treaty and Article 1 of Protocol No 3, such as the rules on the free movement of workers.
17 However, contrary to the view taken by the United Kingdom, the principle of equal treatment laid down by Article 4 of Protocol No 3 is not limited exclusively to the matters governed by Community rules which are referred to in Article 1 of that protocol. Article 1 relates to the free movement of goods, whilst Article 4 applies to natural and legal persons. Article 4 must therefore be regarded as an independent provision so far as its scope is concerned. It must be interpreted as precluding any discrimination between natural and legal persons from the Member States in relation to situations which, in territories where the Treaty is fully applicable, are governed by Community law.
18 Since the right to take up employment is a matter governed by Community law, the rule laid down by Article 4 of Protocol No 3 applies to that right even though Community nationals cannot thereby obtain on the Isle of Man the benefit of the rules on the free movement of workers.
19 In the light of those considerations, the possibility that nationals of some Member States of the Community may suffer discrimination by comparison with nationals of other Member States, as regards certain types of employment, cannot be regarded as affecting the compatibility with Community law of the requirement of a work permit for other types of employment, provided that requirement is applied without discrimination to all Community nationals. Contrary to the view taken by the defendants in the main proceedings, the possibility of discrimination in the case of certain types of employment does not necessarily have the effect of rendering the entire system established by the Control of Employment Act incompatible with Community law.
Association de Soutien aux Travailleurs Immigres (ASTI) v Chambre des employés privés.
Date: 1991-07-04
11 In the field of freedom of movement for workers the fundamental principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality is laid down in Article 48(2) of the Treaty. The principle is restated in the fifth and sixth recitals in the preamble to Regulation No 1612/68 and in several individual provisions of that regulation, in particular Articles 7 and 8, which are referred to in the question put by the national court.
15 It should be pointed out that the scope of Article 8(1), a provision which constitutes a particular expression of the principle of non-discrimination in the specific field of workers' participation in trade-union organizations and activities, cannot be limited on the basis of considerations relating to the legal form of the body in question.
19 In that regard, it should be observed that, as may already be seen from the judgment in Case 149/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 3881, paragraph 15, the exclusion from "taking part in the management of bodies governed by public law and from holding an office governed by public law" laid down in Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1612/68 corresponds to the derogation contained in Article 48(4) of the Treaty and merely permits workers from other Member States to be debarred in some circumstances from certain activities which involve participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law.
20 Consequently, the exclusion of workers from other Member States from the right to vote in elections to the occupational guilds can be justified, under Article 8(1), neither by the legal nature of the guild in question under national law nor by the fact that certain of its functions could involve participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law.
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 1991-07-09
47 It must first be pointed out in this regard that, according to the well established case-law of the Court (see in particular the judgment of 26 February 1976 in Case 52/75 Commission v Italy [1976] ECR 277), a Member State cannot justify its failure to fulfil obligations under the Treaty by pointing to the fact that other Member States have also failed, and continue to fail, to fulfil their own obligations. Under the legal order established by the Treaty, the implementation of Community law by Member States cannot be made subject to a condition of reciprocity. Articles 169 and 170 of the Treaty provide suitable means of redress for dealing with the failure by Member States to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty.
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 1991-07-10
17 Furthermore, as the Court held in its judgment in Case 427/85 Commission v Germany [1988] ECR 1123, at paragraph 13, Article 5 of Directive 77/249 may not have the effect of imposing upon a lawyer providing services requirements for which there is no equivalent in the professional rules which would apply in the absence of any provision of services within the meaning of the Treaty.
24 A preliminary point to bear in mind is that the Court, ruling in the matter of freedom of establishment, pointed out in its judgment in Case 107/83 Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v Klopp [1984] ECR 2971, at paragraph 20, that although, in view of the special nature of the legal profession, the host Member State must have the right, in the interests of the due administration of justice, to require that lawyers enrolled at a Bar in its territory should practise in such a way as to maintain sufficient contact with their clients and the judicial authorities and abide by the rules of the profession, those requirements must not prevent the nationals of other Member States from exercising properly a right guaranteed to them by the Treaty.
25 So far as the freedom to provide services is concerned, all restrictions thereon are to be abolished, according to Article 59 of the Treaty, in order in particular to enable a person providing a service to pursue his activity in the State where the service is provided under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals, to use the wording of the third paragraph of Article 60 of the Treaty.
26 The aim of those provisions is primarily to enable the person providing the service to pursue his activities in the host Member State without suffering discrimination in favour of nationals of that State. As the Court pointed out in its judgment in Case 279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305, at paragraph 16, those provisions do not mean that all national legislation applicable to nationals of that State and usually applied to the permanent activities of persons established therein may be similarly applied in their entirety to the temporary activities of persons who are established in other Member States.
35 In the first place, as the Court stated in its judgment in Klopp, at paragraph 21, modern methods of transport and telecommunications enable lawyers to maintain the necessary contacts with clients and the judicial authorities. Furthermore, the expeditious conduct of the proceedings, in compliance with the principle that both sides must be given the opportunity to state their case, can be ensured by imposing on the lawyer providing services obligations which restrict the pursuit of his activities to a lesser extent. That aim could therefore be achieved by requiring the lawyer providing services to have an address for service at the chambers of the lawyer in conjunction with whom he works, where notifications from the judicial authority in question could be duly served.
Jean Neu and others v Secrétaire d'Etat à l'Agriculture et à la Viticulture.
Date: 1991-07-10
12 That point of view must be upheld. It is settled case-law (see, in particular, the judgment in Joined Cases 201/85 and 202/85 Klensch v Secrétaire d' Etat [1986] ECR 3477, paragraph 21) that, when it is necessary to interpret a provision of secondary Community law, preference should as far as possible be given to the interpretation which renders the provision consistent with the provisions of the Treaty and the general principles of Community law.
13 In that respect, it must be stated that the freedom to pursue a trade or profession, which, according to the consistent case-law of the Court (see, in particular, the judgments in Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, paragraphs 31 to 33, and in Case 265/87 Schraeder v Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989] ECR 2237, paragraph 15), forms part of the general principles of Community law, includes, as a specific expression of that freedom, the freedom to choose whom to do business with. That freedom of choice would not be guaranteed if a change of dairy by a producer, of his own volition, were capable of leading to a reduction in his individual reference quantity as a result of the allocation of a part thereof to the national reserve, when no such reduction can be made where the producer continues to supply the same dairy. Rules to that effect would be such as to discourage producers from changing purchaser in order to supply the dairy offering them the most favourable conditions.
Commission of the European Communities v Portuguese Republic.
Date: 1991-07-11
22 In that connection, it should be noted that, according to the Court' s case-law, the reasoned opinion must contain a coherent and detailed statement of the reasons which persuaded the Commission that the State concerned had failed to fulfil one of its obligations under the Treaty (judgment in Case 274/83 Commission v Italy [1985] ECR 1077). However, the Commission cannot be required to indicate in the reasoned opinion what steps should be taken to eliminate the impugned conduct.
Elsie Rita Johnson v Chief Adjudication Officer.
Date: 1991-07-11
19 This means, firstly, that a person who has given up his or her occupational activity in order to attend to the upbringing of his or her children does not fall within the scope of Directive 79/7/EEC as a worker whose activity has been interrupted by one of the risks specified in the directive, since the interruption of employment due to the bringing up of children is not one of the risks listed in Article 3(1)(a) of the directive.
20 Secondly, it means that that person may still be regarded as falling within the scope of Directive 79/7/EEC as a person seeking employment whose search is made impossible by the materialization of one of the risks specified in Article 3(1)(a) of the directive.
25 It must be observed, however, that according to the first recital of the preamble to Directive 79/7/EEC and Article 1 thereof, the directive has in view only the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security. As far as the social protection of mothers remaining at home is concerned, it follows from Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 79/7/EEC that the acquisition of entitlement to benefits following periods of interruption of employment due to the upbringing of children is still a matter for the Member States to regulate.
29 It appears from the documents before the Court that the effect of Section 165A of the Social Security Act 1975, which lays down the conditions entitling the person concerned to claim a benefit, is that a person who has not claimed payment of the non-contributory invalidity pension before the abolition of that benefit may not claim automatic entitlement to the severe disablement allowance under Regulation 20(1) of the Social Security (Severe Disablement Allowance) Regulations 1984.
32 As the Court of Justice held in paragraph 10 of its judgment in Borrie Clarke, cited above, the directive does not provide for any derogation from the principle of equal treatment laid down in Article 4(1) of the directive so as to authorize the continuation of the discriminatory effects of earlier provisions of national law. Therefore, after 22 December 1984, the date on which the period laid down by the directive for bringing national legislation into conformity with the directive expired, a Member State may not maintain any inequalities of treatment.
34 Finally, it must be observed, as the Court of Justice held in paragraph 9 of its judgment in Borrie Clarke, cited above, that, standing by itself, and in the light of the objective and contents of the directive, Article 4(1) is sufficiently precise to be relied upon by an individual before a national court so as to lead that court to set aside any national provision not in conformity with that article.