larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Stanisław Pieńkowski v Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Lublinie.
Date: 2018-02-28
25


It follows from those provisions and, in particular, from the term ‘dispatched’ in Article 146(1)(b) that the export of goods is effected and the exemption of the supply of goods for export becomes applicable when the right to dispose of the goods as owner has been transferred to the purchaser and the supplier establishes that those goods have been dispatched or transported outside the European Union and that, as a result of that dispatch or that transport, they have physically left the territory of the European Union (judgment of 19 December 2013, BDV Hungary Trading, C‑563/12, EU:C:2013:854, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
32


Admittedly, as is apparent from Article 131 of the VAT Directive, the exemptions provided for in Chapters 2 to 9 of Title IX of that directive, in which Articles 146 and 147 are found, apply in accordance with conditions which the Member States are to lay down for the purposes of ensuring the correct and straightforward application of those exemptions and of preventing any possible evasion, avoidance or abuse. In addition, Article 273 of the VAT Directive provides that Member States may impose other obligations which they deem necessary to ensure the correct collection of VAT and to prevent evasion.
33


In that regard, the Court has already ruled that in the exercise of the powers conferred on them by Articles 131 and 273 of the VAT Directive, the Member States must respect the general principles of law that form part of the legal order of the European Union, including, in particular, the principles of legal certainty and proportionality and the principle of protection of legitimate expectations (judgment of 19 December 2013, BDV Hungary Trading, C‑563/12, EU:C:2013:854, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
34


In particular, as regards the principle of proportionality, the Court has already held that, in accordance with that principle, the Member States must employ means which, whilst enabling them effectively to achieve the objectives pursued by their domestic laws, cause the least possible detriment to the objectives and principles laid down by the relevant EU legislation (judgment of 19 December 2013, BDV Hungary Trading, C‑563/12, EU:C:2013:854, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
38


However, the Court has held that, in circumstances where the conditions for export exemption laid down in Article 146(1)(b) of the VAT Directive, in particular the requirement that the goods concerned leave the customs territory of the European Union, are satisfied, no liability to pay VAT arises in respect of such a supply. In those circumstances, there is no longer, in principle, any risk of tax evasion or loss of tax which could justify the transaction concerned being taxed (judgment of 19 December 2013, BDV Hungary Trading, C‑563/12, EU:C:2013:854, paragraph 40).
Collect Inkasso OÜ and Others v Rain Aint and Others.
Date: 2018-02-28
36


The minimum standards set out in Chapter III of Regulation No 805/2004 express the EU legislature’s intention to ensure that procedures leading to the adoption of judgments concerning uncontested debts offer adequate guarantees of respect for the rights of the defence in the Member State of origin (see, by analogy, judgment of 9 March 2017, Zulfikarpašić, C‑484/15, EU:C:2017:199, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited), taking account of the fact that, in principle, there is no review thereof in the Member State of enforcement.
37


Indeed, as follows from the case-law of the Court, those minimum standards, which include indication of the address of the institution concerned, seek to ensure, in accordance with recital 12 of Regulation No 805/2004, that the debtor is informed, firstly, about the court action against him, the requirements for his active participation in the proceedings to contest the claim at issue and, secondly, the consequences of his non-participation in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence. In the specific case of a decision delivered in default, for the purposes of Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation No 805/2004, those minimum procedural standards thus seek to ensure the existence of adequate guarantees of respect for the rights of the defence (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 June 2016, Pebros Servizi, C‑511/14, EU:C:2016:448, paragraph 44).
Proceedings brought by Doris Margret Lisette Mahnkopf.
Date: 2018-03-01
32


First of all, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law of the Court, it follows from the need for uniform application of EU law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (judgment of 18 October 2016, Nikiforidis, C‑135/15, EU:C:2016:774, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited); that interpretation must take into account not only its wording but also its context and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, inter alia, judgment of 18 May 2017, Hummel Holding, C‑617/15, EU:C:2017:390, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
36


To that end, Regulation No 650/2012 provides for the creation of a European Certificate of Succession which must enable every heir, legatee or beneficiary mentioned in the certificate to prove in another Member State his status and succession rights (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 October 2017, Kubicka, C‑218/16, EU:C:2017:755, paragraph 59).
42


Finally, as the Advocate General has also observed in particular in point 102 of his Opinion, classification of the share falling to the surviving spouse under a provision of national law such as Paragraph 1371(1) of the BGB as succession-related allows information concerning that share to be included in the European Certificate of Succession, with all the effects described in Article 69 of Regulation No 650/2012. According to Article 69(1) of that regulation, the European Certificate of Succession is to produce effects in all Member States, without any special procedure being required. Article 69(2) provides that the person mentioned in the certificate as the legatee is to be presumed to have the status and the rights stated in the certificate with no conditions and/or restrictions being attached to those rights other than those stated in the certificate (judgment of 12 October 2017, Kubicka, C‑218/16, EU:C:2017:755, paragraph 60).
DOCERAM GmbH v CeramTec GmbH.
Date: 2018-03-08
20


According to the Court’s settled case-law, it follows from the need for a uniform application of EU law that, where a provision thereof makes no reference to the law of the Member States with regard to a particular concept, that concept must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union which must take into account the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (judgments of 19 July 2012, A, C‑33/11, EU:C:2012:482, paragraph 27, and of 7 September 2017, Schottelius, C‑247/16, EU:C:2017:638, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
25


It follows that, under the system laid down by Regulation No 6/2002, appearance is the decisive factor for a design (judgment of 21 September 2017, Easy Sanitary Solutions and EUIPO v Group Nivelles, C‑361/15 P and C‑405/15 P, EU:C:2017:720, paragraph 62).
Proceedings brought by Astellas Pharma GmbH.
Date: 2018-03-14
26


Therefore, once that general agreement is acknowledged, the competent authorities of those Member States may not, when making their decision on the placing on the market of that medicinal product in their territory, call into question the outcome of that procedure. Apart from being contrary to the wording of Article 28(5) of Directive 2001/83, such an interpretation would deprive the decentralised procedure of all meaning and would, inter alia, compromise the attainment of the objective of free movement of medicinal products set out in recital 14 of that directive (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 October 2008, Synthon, C‑452/06, EU:C:2008:565, paragraph 32).
Christian Picart v Ministre des Finances et des Comptes publics.
Date: 2018-03-15
16


It should be noted in this respect that the Court has already held that, in certain circumstances and in the light of the applicable provisions, nationals of a Contracting Party may claim rights under the AFMP not only against the country towards which they exercise freedom of movement but also against their own country (judgment of 28 February 2013, Ettwein, C‑425/11, EU:C:2013:121, paragraph 33).
18


In that regard, it should be noted that Chapter III of Annex I to the AFMP, which deals with self-employed persons, contains Articles 12 and 13, which define that scope of application.
22


In the first place, as is apparent from the wording of Article 12(1) of Annex I to the AFMP, the right of establishment, within the meaning of that provision, is restricted to natural persons who are nationals of a Contracting Party and wish to become established in the territory of another Contracting Party in order to pursue a self-employed activity in that territory.
23


Thus, in order for that provision to apply, the person concerned must pursue his self-employed activity in the territory of a Contracting Party other than that of which he is a national.
26


As regards that provision, it should be recalled that the Court held, in its judgment of 28 February 2013, Ettwein (C‑425/11, EU:C:2013:121, paragraphs 34 and 35), that the situation of a self-employed couple who had transferred their residence from their State of origin to Switzerland, while maintaining their activity in that State of origin, and who returned every day from the place of their professional activity to their place of residence, came within the scope of that provision.
29


Finally, as regards the interpretation of Article 43 EC (now Article 49 TFEU) deriving from the judgment of 7 September 2006, N (C‑470/04, EU:C:2006:525), suffice it to recall that, as the Swiss Confederation has not joined the internal market of the European Union, the interpretation given to the provisions of EU law concerning that market cannot automatically be applied by analogy to the interpretation of the AFMP, unless there are express provisions to that effect laid down by that agreement itself (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 November 2009, Grimme, C‑351/08, EU:C:2009:697, paragraph 29; of 11 February 2010, Fokus Invest, C‑541/08, EU:C:2010:74, paragraph 28; and of 15 July 2010, Hengartner and Gasser, C‑70/09, EU:C:2010:430, paragraph 42).
SC Cali Esprou SRL v Administraţia Fondului pentru Mediu.
Date: 2018-03-15
22


In that regard, it should be noted, on the one hand, that the ‘polluter-pays’ principle, referred to in Article 15 and the 29th recital of Directive 94/62 requires, according to that recital, that ‘all those involved in the production, use, import and distribution of packaging and packaged products become more aware of the place of packaging waste generation’ and ‘agree to assume liability’. That principle does not cover only those directly responsible for the production of waste, but has a broader scope. It also covers those who contribute to that production of waste, which includes importers and distributors of packaged products (see, by analogy, judgment of 30 March 2017, VG Čistoća, C‑335/16, EU:C:2017:242, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
35


It is appropriate to add that the Court has held that Article 15 of Directive 94/62 does not carry out an exhaustive harmonisation of the national measures in the fields covered by that directive, as recalled in paragraph 20 of this judgment, but authorises the Council to adopt economic instruments to promote the implementation of the objectives set by that directive or, in the absence of such measures, authorises the Member States, acting ‘in accordance with the obligations arising out of the Treaty’, to adopt measures to implement those objectives. Thus, that provision also requires the application of the relevant provisions of the FEU Treaty (judgment of 12 November 2015, Visnapuu, C‑198/14, EU:C:2015:751, paragraph 47).
37


The Court has held on a number of occasions that a pecuniary charge constitutes internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 TFEU if it relates to a general system of internal dues applied systematically to categories of products in accordance with objective criteria irrespective of the origin or destination of the products (see, inter alia, judgments of 8 June 2006, Koornstra, C‑517/04, EU:C:2006:375, paragraph 16, and of 8 November 2007, Stadtgemeinde Frohnleiten and Gemeindebetriebe Frohnleiten, C‑221/06, EU:C:2007:657, paragraph 31).
38


In addition, waste is to be regarded as products within the meaning of Article 110 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 1992, Commission v Belgium, C‑2/90, EU:C:1992:310, paragraphs 25 to 28).
41


It is settled case-law that an infringement of Article 110 TFEU occurs when the tax on the imported product and the tax on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different way and under different conditions so that the imported product, even if only in certain cases, is more heavily taxed (judgments of 12 November 2015, Visnapuu, C‑198/14, EU:C:2015:751, paragraph 59, and of 16 June 2016, Commission v Portugal, C‑200/15, not published, EU:C:2016:453, paragraph 24).
Enzo Di Puma v Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Consob) and Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Consob) v Antonio Zecca.
Date: 2018-03-20
20


In its judgment of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson (C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraphs 34 and 36), the Court held, first, that Article 50 of the Charter precludes that, after the imposition of a final administrative penalty having a criminal nature for the purposes of that article, criminal proceedings in relation to the same acts be brought against the same person, but, secondly, that it is for a national court to determine whether the remaining penalties are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. In view of that case-law, the referring court asks whether Article 50 of the Charter must be interpreted as authorising proceedings for an administrative fine following a final criminal judgment, which has res judicata effect, holding that there was no offence, where those proceedings may appear necessary in order to comply with the obligation to provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties.
26


In that regard, it must be noted that Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/6, read in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 thereof, requires Member States to have rules on effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for violations of the prohibition on insider dealing. Although the Court has held that Article 14(1) of that directive merely requires Member States to provide administrative penalties presenting those characteristics, without requiring Member States also to lay down criminal sanctions against authors of insider dealing (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 December 2009, Spector Photo Group and Van Raemdonck, C‑45/08, EU:C:2009:806, paragraph 42), the fact remains that Member States are also entitled to provide for a duplication of criminal and administrative sanctions, complying, however, with the limits imposed by EU law and, in particular, those resulting from the ne bis in idem principle guaranteed by Article 50 of the Charter, the latter applying, in accordance with Article 51(1) thereof, when implementing that law.
31


Moreover, in light of the importance of the principle of res judicata both in the legal order of the EU and in national legal orders, the Court has held that EU law does not preclude the application of national procedural rules conferring res judicata effects on a judicial decision (see, to that effect, as regards the principle of effectiveness, judgments of 10 July 2014, Impresa Pizzarotti, C‑213/13, EU:C:2014:2067, paragraphs 58 and 59, and of 6 October 2015, Târşia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraphs 28 and 29).
41


Such a limitation of the ne bis in idem principle may however be justified on the basis of Article 52(1) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 May 2014, Spasic, C‑129/14 PPU, EU:C:2014:586, paragraphs 55 and 56; of 20 March 2018, Menci, C‑524/15, EU:C:2018:197, paragraph 40, and of 20 March 2018, Garlsson Real Estate, C‑537/16, EU:C:2018:193, paragraph 42).
J. Klein Schiphorst v Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen.
Date: 2018-03-21
28


Under Article 8 of the EC-Switzerland Agreement, the contracting parties are to make provision, in accordance with Annex II to the agreement, for the coordination of social security systems with the aim in particular of determining the legislation applicable and paying benefits to persons residing in the territory of the contracting parties. Section A(1) of Annex II to the EC-Switzerland Agreement provides for the application, between the parties, of Regulation No 883/2004. Thus, and since, according to Article 1(2) of that annex, ‘the term “Member State(s)” contained in the legal acts referred to in section A of this Annex shall be understood to include Switzerland in addition to the States covered by the relevant legal acts of the European Union’, the provisions of that regulation also cover the Swiss Confederation.
29


In those circumstances, the situation of the appellant in the main proceedings, a Dutch national, subject to Netherlands legislation with regard to unemployment benefits, who has gone to Switzerland to seek work there, falls within the scope of Regulation No 883/2004.
31


In that regard, it should be noted that, according to recitals 4 and 45 of Regulation No 883/2004, the purpose of that regulation is to coordinate Member States’ social security systems in order to guarantee that the right to free movement of persons can be exercised effectively. That regulation modernised and simplified the rules contained in Regulation No 1408/71, while retaining the same objective as the latter.
34


According to the settled case-law of the Court, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only the wording of that provision, but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 8 November 2016, Ognyanov, C‑554/14, EU:C:2016:835, paragraph 31).
46


It follows that Article 64(1)(c) of Regulation No 883/2004 guarantees export of unemployment benefits for three months only; however it allows that period to be extended up to a maximum of six months under national law.
Agnieška Anisimovienė and Others v bankas „Snoras“ AB, in liquidation and Others.
Date: 2018-03-22
78


That said, it is settled case-law that, where there is a divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see, inter alia, judgments of 30 May 2013, Genil 48 and Comercial Hostelera de Grandes Vinos, C‑604/11, EU:C:2013:344, paragraph 38, and of 17 May 2017, ERGO Poist’ovňa, C‑48/16, EU:C:2017:377, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
83


In accordance with the second recital of Directive 94/19, the deposit-guarantee schemes provided for by that directive have the aim of protecting individuals against deposits in a credit institution becoming unavailable. In providing for such deposit-guarantee schemes, Directive 94/19 is intended, as its first and fourth recitals indicate, both to protect depositors and to ensure the stability of the banking system, by preventing massive withdrawal of deposits not only from a credit institution in difficulties but also from healthy institutions following a loss of public confidence in the soundness of the banking system.
85


In the present instance, it should be recalled, first, that the funds upon which Ms Anisimovienė and Others and Mr Raišelis base their claims were no longer credited to the accounts held by those individuals with Snoras on the day when deposits in it became unavailable. Second, the future transferable securities to which they had subscribed and of which that credit institution was to be the issuer were ultimately not issued before it was declared insolvent. In addition, as regards those transferable securities, whilst the bonds at issue in Case C‑109/16 are among the ‘debts evidenced by a certificate’ envisaged in Article 1(1) of Directive 94/19, the shares at issue in Case C‑688/15, on the other hand, are equity securities, with respect to which that directive provides no guarantee (judgment of 21 December 2016, Vervloet and Others, C‑76/15, EU:C:2016:975, paragraphs 66 and 67).
89


According to the Court’s settled case-law, the meaning and scope of terms for which EU law provides no definition must be determined by reference to their usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they are part (judgment of 20 December 2017, Erzeugerorganisation Tiefkühlgemüse, C‑516/16, EU:C:2017:1011, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
107


First, in the judgment of 25 June 2015, Indėlių ir investicijų draudimas and Nemaniūnas (C‑671/13, EU:C:2015:418, paragraph 58), the Court held that the provisions of Directive 97/9 relating to delimitation of the funds and instruments covered by the compensation schemes for which it provides, including Article 1(4) and the second subparagraph of Article 2(2), are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to be capable of being relied on directly by individuals before the national courts.