Estrella Rodríguez Sánchez v Consum Sociedad Cooperativa Valenciana.
Date: 2016-06-16
42


By order of 13 July 2015, which was adopted in response to that request, the referring court indicated, inter alia, that the leave following which Mrs Rodríguez Sánchez made the above request had been taken in accordance with Article 48(4) of the Workers’ Statute. It further pointed out that, in Spain, maternity leave taken on such a basis is regarded as parental leave within the meaning of Clause 2 of the revised Framework Agreement.
44


As the Court has already pointed out in relation to paragraph 9 of the general considerations of the Framework Agreement on parental leave annexed to Directive 96/34, which is drafted in similar terms to paragraph 15 of the general conditions of the revised Framework Agreement, parental leave is granted to parents to enable them to take care of their child and may be taken until the child has reached a given age up to 8 years. Maternity leave has a different purpose. It is intended to protect a woman’s biological condition and the special relationship between a woman and her child over the period which follows pregnancy and childbirth, by preventing that relationship from being disturbed by the multiple burdens which would result from the simultaneous pursuit of employment (see judgment of 14 April 2005 in Commission v Luxembourg, C‑519/03, EU:C:2005:234, paragraph 32).
45


Moreover, it should be noted that, in its judgment of 19 September 2013 in Betriu Montull (C‑5/12, EU:C:2013:571), the Court has already given judgment on the classification to be given, in respect of EU law, to leave taken on the basis of Article 48(4) of the Workers’ Statute by a mother at the time of the birth of her child.
48


It results from all of the foregoing that Clause 6(1) of the revised Framework Agreement, which relates to situations in which a worker returns to work following ‘parental leave’, cannot be interpreted as also covering a situation in which a worker returns from ‘maternity leave’ within the meaning of Directive 92/85, such as the situation of the applicant in the main proceedings when she made the request referred to in paragraph 40 above.
52


In that order of 16 March 2016, the referring court appears to suggest that, in so far as the request initially made by Mrs Rodríguez Sánchez on her return from maternity leave to change her working hours was followed, during the proceedings before the referring court and as is apparent from paragraph 29 above, by a reiteration of that request on a different basis of national law, it is no longer necessary, in the light of the time which had passed between those two requests, to consider that the second request was made once the applicant in the main proceedings had returned from maternity leave.
53


However, even supposing that it may be considered that, given the time which had passed between those two requests, the second request should no longer be considered to be a request made after the maternity leave, the fact nonetheless remains that the second request can also not be regarded as a request to change working hours or working pattern made after a ‘return from parental leave’ within the meaning of Clause 6(1) of the revised Framework Agreement, since the applicant in the main proceedings was not ‘returning’ to work following such leave.
54


It is true that, in accordance with settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, judgment of 24 April 2012 in Kamberaj, C‑571/10, EU:C:2012:233, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
55


However, it is also settled case-law that it is for the Court to examine the conditions in which a case has been referred to it by the national court, in order to assess whether it has jurisdiction. The spirit of cooperation which must prevail in preliminary ruling proceedings requires the national court for its part to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to contribute to the administration of justice in the Member States and not to give opinions on general or hypothetical questions (see, inter alia, judgment of 24 April 2012 in Kamberaj, C‑571/10, EU:C:2012:233, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
58


As regards, first of all, the third question referred, it should be pointed out that that question essentially concerns the issues as to (i) the conditions under which it may be considered that national provisions or agreements between social partners ensure a correct transposition into national law of Clause 6(1) of the revised Framework Agreement, and (ii) whether provisions such as Article 34(8) of the Workers’ Statute or Article 14(7) of Consum SCV’s internal rules satisfy such conditions.
59


It has already been stated in paragraphs 48 and 53 above, however, that it is evident that a situation such as that of the applicant in the main proceedings does not fall within the scope of Clause 6(1) of the revised Framework Agreement — an interpretation of which is sought by the referring court — with the result that it is not apparent how an answer from the Court to the third question referred would have any bearing on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings.
60


It is worth pointing out, in that respect, that the Court has repeatedly held that it has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on questions concerning EU provisions in situations where the facts of the cases being considered by the national courts were outside the scope of EU law but where those provisions of EU law had been rendered applicable by domestic law due to a reference made by that law to the content of those provisions (see, inter alia, judgment of 18 October 2012 in Nolan, C‑583/10, EU:C:2012:638, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).