Firma Ernst Kollmer Fleischimport und -export v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas.
Date: 2015-10-06
20. As a preliminary point, it must, first, be recalled that, in the absence of EU sectoral rules or of national legislation providing for specific rules on the limitation period, the four-year limitation rule laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 is applicable to irregularities which are detrimental to the European Union’s financial interests (see, to that effect, judgment in Pfeifer & Langen , C‑564/10, EU:C:2012:190, paragraphs 39 and 40 and the case-law cited).
21. Second, it should be noted that Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 applies to the present case, even though the facts at issue in the main proceedings date from 1992 and 1993. The Court has already held that the limitation period provided for by that provision applies to irregularities committed before the entry into force of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment in Josef Vosding Schlacht-, Kühl- und Zerlegebetrieb and Others , C‑278/07 to C‑280/07, EU:C:2009:38, paragraph 34).
22. According to settled case-law of the Court, in determining the scope of provisions of EU law, in this case Article 1(2) and the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95, their wording, context and objectives must all be taken into account (judgment in Angerer , C‑477/13, EU:C:2015:239, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
24. The commission of an irregularity with which the limitation period begins to run therefore requires two conditions to be satisfied, namely an economic operator’s act or omission that infringed EU law and a prejudice, or potential prejudice, caused to the budget of the European Union.
25. In circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, where an infringement of EU law has been discovered after the occurrence of the prejudice, the limitation period begins to run from the time when the irregularity was committed, namely from the time when both the economic operator’s act or omission that infringed EU law and the prejudice caused to the budget of the European Union or budgets managed by it have occurred.
26. Such a finding is consistent with the aim of Regulation No 2988/95 which, under Article 1(1) of the regulation, is intended to protect the European Union’s financial interests. The date from which the limitation period begins to run ( dies a quo ) is the date of the event that last occurs, namely either the date of the occurrence of the prejudice, where the prejudice occurs after the act or omission infringing EU law, or the date of that act or omission, where the advantage at issue has been granted before the act or omission. This thus facilitates the pursuit of the aim of protecting the European Union’s financial interests.
27. Moreover, that conclusion is not called into question by the Greek Government’s submission that the dies a quo is the day that the competent authorities discover the irregularity. That view is contrary to the Court’s case-law that the date on which the authorities become aware of an irregularity is irrelevant to the starting point of the limitation period (judgment in Pfeifer & Langen , C‑52/14, EU:C:2015:381, paragraph 67).
28. Indeed, according to the case-law of the Court, the public service owes a general obligation of diligence when verifying the legality of payments made by it that are borne by the European Union budget (judgment in Ze Fu Fleischhandel GmbH and Vion Trading , C‑201/10 and C‑202/10, EU:C:2011:282, paragraph 44). To admit that the dies a quo is the day of the relevant irregularity’s discovery would run contrary to that obligation of diligence.
32. In those circumstances, ‘prejudice’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Regulation No 2988/95 occurs on the date that the definitive decision is made to grant the advantage at issue, in the present case the export refunds. It is from that time that a prejudice is in fact caused to the budget of the European Union. That prejudice could not be considered to exist before the date on which the advantage was definitively granted unless it were accepted that the limitation period for recovering an advantage is capable of running already from a time at which the advantage has not yet been granted.