ZX v Ryanair DAC.
Date: 2019-04-11
24


As a preliminary point, it should be observed that Regulation No 261/2004 does not contain rules on the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States, so that the issue of jurisdiction must be examined in the light of Regulation No 1215/2012 (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2009, Rehder, C‑204/08, EU:C:2009:439, paragraph 28).
27


Although Regulation No 1215/2012 lays down rules of special jurisdiction, set out in particular under Section 2 of Chapter II of that regulation, the applicant in the main proceedings did not bring her claim for compensation in relation to a flight operated between Porto and Barcelona before the referring court under the rule of special jurisdiction based on the place of performance of the obligation, which forms the basis of the application contained in Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation, as interpreted by the Court (judgment of 9 July 2009, Rehder, C‑204/08, EU:C:2009:439, paragraph 43), on the ground that that court is situated in the place of departure or the place of arrival of the aircraft concerned.
28


Similarly, while the provisions under Section 4 of Chapter II of Regulation No 1215/2012, on ‘Jurisdiction over consumer contracts’, also establish a rule of special jurisdiction for consumers, and although an airline passenger may be considered to be a consumer, it should be noted that Article 17(3) of that regulation states that Section 4 ‘shall not apply to a contract of transport other than a contract which, for an inclusive price, provides for a combination of travel and accommodation’.
33


It is settled case-law of the Court that two criteria serve to determine whether legal proceedings relating to the operations of a branch are linked to a Member State. First, the concept of ‘branch’ implies a centre of operations which has the appearance of permanency, such as the extension of a parent body. It must have a management and be materially equipped to negotiate business with third parties, so that they do not have to deal directly with the parent body. Secondly, the dispute must concern either acts relating to the operations of a branch, or commitments entered into by such a branch on behalf of the parent body, if those commitments are to be performed in the State in which that branch is situated (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 July 2012, Mahamdia, C‑154/11, EU:C:2012:491, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited, and of 5 July 2018, flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines, C‑27/17, EU:C:2018:533, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
35


It follows that there is no evidence serving to establish the branch’s involvement in the legal relationship between Ryanair and the applicant in the main proceedings, with the result that that the referring court cannot have jurisdiction to hear the dispute in the main proceedings pursuant to Article 7(5) of Regulation No 1215/2012 (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 July 2018, flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines, C‑27/17, EU:C:2018:533, paragraph 63).
38


The first sentence of Article 26(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 provides for a rule of jurisdiction based on the entering of an appearance by the defendant in respect of all disputes where the jurisdiction of the court seised is not derived from other provisions of that regulation. That provision applies also in cases where the court has been seised in breach of the provisions of that regulation and implies that the entering of an appearance by the defendant may be considered to be a tacit acceptance of the jurisdiction of the court seised and thus a prorogation of that court’s jurisdiction (judgments of 20 May 2010, ČPP Vienna Insurance Group, C‑111/09, EU:C:2010:290, paragraph 21, and of 27 February 2014, Cartier parfums-lunettes and Axa Corporate Solutions assurances, C‑1/13, EU:C:2014:109, paragraph 34).