Márton Urbán v Vám- és Pénzügyőrség Észak-alföldi Regionális Parancsnoksága.
Date: 2012-02-09
22. However, it is clear that that regulation does not contain more precise rules with regard to the establishment of those national penalties and, in particular, that it does not establish any express criterion for the assessment of the proportionality of such penalties.
23. According to settled case-law, in the absence of harmonisation of European Union legislation in the field of penalties applicable where conditions laid down by arrangements under that legislation are not complied with, Member States are empowered to choose the penalties which seem to them to be appropriate. They must, however, exercise that power in accordance with European Union law and its general principles, and consequently in accordance with the principle of proportionality (see, inter alia, Case C‑262/99 Louloudakis  [2001] ECR I‑5547, paragraph 67, and Case C‑188/09 Profaktor Kulesza, Frankowski, Jóźwiak, Orłowski  [2010] ECR I‑7639, paragraph 29).
24. Thus, in the present case, the measures imposing penalties permitted under national legislation must not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑379/08 and C‑380/08 ERG and Others  [2010] ECR I‑2007, paragraph 86).
25. In the context of Regulations No 3821/85 and No 561/2006, those objectives are, firstly, the improvement of working conditions of drivers to whom those regulations apply and the improvement of road safety in general and, secondly, the establishment of common rules on driving times, drivers’ breaks and rest periods and their monitoring.
41. Consequently, the imposition of flat-rate fines for all breaches of the rules on the use of record sheets, without adjustment of the amount of the penalty in line with the seriousness of the breach, appears to be disproportionate in the light of the objectives pursued by the European Union legislation.
44. In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the first and second questions referred is that the requirement of proportionality laid down in Article 19(1) and (4) of Regulation No 561/2006 must be interpreted as precluding a system of penalties, such as that introduced by Government Decree No 57/2007, which provides for the imposition of a flat-rate fine for all breaches, no matter how serious, of the rules on the use of record sheets laid down in Articles 13 to 16 of Regulation No 3821/85.
The third and fourth questions
47. With regard, firstly, to the compatibility of the institution of strict liability with the principle of proportionality, the Court has already ruled that a system of strict liability penalising breaches of a regulation, in particular in the area of social legislation relating to road transport, is not in itself incompatible with Community law (see, to that effect, Case C‑326/88 Hansen  [1990] ECR I‑2911, paragraphs 14 to 19, and Case C‑7/90 Vandevenne and Others  [1991] ECR I‑4371, paragraphs 16 and 17; see, by analogy, with regard to other fields, Case C‑177/95 Ebony Maritime and Loten Navigation  [1997] ECR I‑1111, paragraph 36).
48. According to the Court, the imposition of a system of strict liability is not disproportionate in relation to the objectives pursued if that system is such as to encourage the persons concerned to comply with the provisions of a regulation and where the objective pursued is a matter of public interest which may justify the introduction of such a system (see, to that effect, Hansen , paragraph 19).
53. Secondly, with regard to the severity of the fine provided for by the system of penalties at issue in the main proceedings, it is appropriate to recall the case-law cited in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the present judgment, according to which the Member States are empowered to choose the sanctions which seem to them to be appropriate. The Member States are, however, required to exercise that power in accordance with European Union law and its general principles, and consequently in accordance with the principle of proportionality. Measures imposing penalties must not, therefore, inter alia, exceed the limits of what is necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question or be disproportionate to those aims.
54. It is, however, necessary to point out, in that respect, that Member States are required to comply with the principle of proportionality not only as regards the determination of factors constituting an infringement and the determination of the rules concerning the severity of fines, but also as regards the assessment of the factors which may be taken into account in the fixing of a fine.