larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Agenzia delle Entrate - Ufficio di Genova 1 v Porto Antico di Genova SpA.
Date: 2007-10-25
10. As a preliminary point, it should be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, although direct taxation falls within the competence of the Member States, the latter must none the less exercise that competence consistently with Community law (Case C-80/94 Wielockx [1995] ECR I-2493, paragraph 16, and Case C-319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I-7477, paragraph 19). In particular, the national provision must not obstruct the functioning of the mechanism established by Regulation No 4253/88 (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-36/80 and 71/80 Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association & Others [1981] ECR 735, paragraph 15).
13. The Court has already ruled on the scope of the second subparagraph of Article 21(3) of Regulation No 4253/88, in the context of sums paid under the Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). It held that the prohibition of deductions set out in that provision could not be interpreted in a purely formal manner as covering only deductions which are actually made on the occasion of payments and thus that the prohibition on any deduction must of necessity extend to all charges which are directly and inseparably linked to the amounts disbursed (Case C-84/04 Commission v Portugal [2006] ECR I-9843, paragraph 35).
16. Yet the fact remains that the taxation provided for by Presidential Decree No 917/86 is separate from the amount of the Community grants paid to Porto Antico. That taxation does not represent a specific levy linked to the financial aid from which the company has benefited, but applies without distinction to all of the income of that company.
18. It follows that deductions or retentions which have the effect of reducing the amount of the Community grants received by the beneficiary which do not have a direct and inseparable link with the latter, such as those resulting from taxation of the kind laid down under Presidential Decree No 917/86, do not obstruct the effective application of the mechanism established by Regulation No 4253/88, and, therefore, that the regulation does not preclude the imposition of such deductions or retentions.
19. In addition, it should be added that, contrary to what  Porto Antico contend, the differences which exist between the beneficiaries of the Structural Funds, by reason of the different rates of taxation imposed in the Member States on amounts received by way of Community assistance, cannot be considered as being liable to breach the principle of equal treatment, which precludes comparable situations from being treated in a different manner unless the difference in treatment is objectively justified (see, inter alia, Case C-189/01 Jippes and Others [2001] ECR I-5689, paragraph 129, and Case C-479/04 Laserdisken [2006] ECR I-8089, paragraph 68).
Ministero delle Finanze - Ufficio IVA di Milano v CO.GE.P. Srl.
Date: 2007-10-25
25. Thus, so far as the Consortium is concerned, the cumulative conditions required to apply the rule of treatment as a non-taxable person under the first subparagraph of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive, namely, that the activities must be carried out by a body governed by public law and they must be carried out by that body acting as a public authority, are not fulfilled (see, to that effect, Case C‑446/98 Fazenda Pública  [2000] ECR I‑11435, paragraph 15).
26. As regards the question of whether the legal relationship at issue in the main proceedings is covered by the concept of ‘leasing or letting of immovable property’ within the meaning of Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive, it must be noted, first, that according to settled case-law the exemptions provided for in Article 13 of the Directive have their own independent meaning in Community law and must therefore be given a Community definition (see Case C‑275/01 Sinclair Collis  [2003] ECR I‑5965, paragraph 22; Case C‑284/03 Temco Europe  [2004] ECR I‑11237, paragraph 16; Case C‑428/02 Fonden Marselisborg Lystbådehavn [2005] ECR I‑1527, paragraph 27).
27. Secondly, the terms used to specify the exemptions provided for by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, inter alia, Case 358/97 Commission  v Ireland [2000] ECR I‑6301, paragraph 52; Case C‑150/99 Stockholm Lindöpark  [2001] ECR I‑493, paragraph 25; and Sinclair Collis , paragraph 23).
28. However, the requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify exemptions must be construed in such a way as to deprive the exemptions of their intended effect (see Temco Europe , paragraph 17).
29. Thirdly, Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive does not define ‘leasing or letting’, nor does it refer to relevant definitions adopted under the laws of the Member States (see Case C‑326/99 Goed Wonen [2001] ECR I‑6831, paragraph 44).
30. That provision must therefore be interpreted in the light of the context in which it is used, and of the objectives and the scheme of the Sixth Directive, having particular regard to the underlying purpose of the exemption which it establishes (see, to that effect, Goed Wonen , paragraph 50, and Fonden Marselisborg Lystbådehavn , paragraph 28).
31. In its case-law, the Court has stated that the leasing or letting of immovable property within the meaning of Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive is essentially the conferring by a landlord on a tenant, for an agreed period and in return for payment, of the right to occupy property as if that person were the owner and to exclude any other person from enjoyment of such a right (see, to that effect, Goed Wonen , paragraph 55; Case C‑409/98 Mirror Group  [2001] ECR I‑7175, paragraph 31; Case C‑269/00 Seeling  [2003] ECR I‑4101, paragraph 49; and Temco Europe , paragraph 19).
Fortum Project Finance SA.
Date: 2007-10-25
36. In that regard it should be recalled first of all that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, where a provision of Community law is open to several interpretations, preference must be given to that interpretation which ensures that the provision retains its effectiveness (Case C‑434/97 Commission  v France [2000] ECR I‑1129, paragraph 21, and case-law cited).
Criminal proceedings against Fredrik Granberg.
Date: 2007-11-15
26. As the Court has already stated, the purpose of the Directive is to lay down a number of rules on the holding, movement and monitoring of products subject to excise duty, in particular so as to ensure that chargeability of excise duties is identical in all the Member States (Case C-296/95 EMU Tabac and Others [1998] ECR I-1605, paragraph 22; Case C-325/99 van de Water [2001] ECR I-2729, paragraph 39; Case C-395/00 Cipriani [2002] ECR I-11877, paragraph 41; and Case C-5/05 Joustra [2006] ECR I-11075, paragraph 27).
27. In that regard, Article 8 of the Directive established the general principle that excise duties on products purchased by private individuals for their own use and transported by them are payable in the Member State where they were acquired (see, to that effect, Joustra , paragraphs 31 and 33).
30. It must be pointed out that, as an exception to a general rule, the provision must be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C-83/99 Commission v Spain [2001] ECR I-445, paragraph 19; Case C-5/01 Belgium v Commission [2002] ECR I-11991, paragraph 56; and C-43/04 Stadt Sundern [2005] ECR I-4491, paragraph 27).
49. As the Court has already ruled, the Directive draws a distinction between, on the one hand, those products and, on the other hand, products held for private purposes, in respect of which no document is required (see, to that effect, EMU Tabac and Others , paragraph 23, and Joustra , paragraph 28).
50. As Article 8 provides that, for products held for private purposes, excise duty is payable in the Member State in which they were purchased, no document is required when they are transported to another Member State (see, to that effect, EMU Tabac and Others , paragraph 24).
Deutsche Telekom AG v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Date: 2007-11-22
28. As regards the scheme of the new regulatory framework, it must be pointed out, first of all, that the obligations imposed on an undertaking with a dominant position on a given market were laid down in the very wording of the former regulatory framework, whereas in the new regulatory framework, it is the national regulatory authorities who have the power to define the relevant market and apply the regulatory instruments to the market definition. Similarly, those authorities carry out the analysis of the market and designate the undertakings having significant power in that market.
Alfredo Nieto Nuño v Leonci Monlleó Franquet.
Date: 2007-11-22
17. In that regard, since the Community provision being interpreted lacks a definition to that effect, a trade mark certainly cannot be required to be well known ‘throughout’ the territory of the Member State and it is sufficient for it to be well known in a substantial part of it (see, by analogy, Case C-375/97 General Motors  [1999] ECR I‑5421, paragraph 28, concerning the kindred concept of the ‘reputation’ of a trade mark for which Article 5(2) of the Directive refers also to an assessment ‘in the Member State’).
Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Malta.
Date: 2007-11-29
8. It follows that, at the relevant date for ascertaining whether there has been a failure to fulfil obligations, which is determined by the expiry of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C-323/01 Commission  v Italy  [2002] ECR I‑4711, paragraph 8, and Case C‑388/02 Commission  v Ireland  [2003] ECR I‑12173, paragraph 6), the Republic of Malta had not communicated the plans and outlines required under Article 11 of the Directive.
Kerstin Sundelind Lopez v Miguel Enrique Lopez Lizazo.
Date: 2007-11-29
26. That interpretation would, moreover, be contrary to the objective pursued by Regulation No 2201/2003. As is clear from Recitals 4 and 8 in the preamble to Regulation No 1347/2000, whose provisions on the jurisdiction to hear questions relating to divorce are essentially repeated in Regulation No 2201/2003, the latter regulation aims to lay down uniform conflict of law rules for divorce in order to ensure a free movement of persons which is as wide as possible. Consequently, Regulation No 2201/2003 applies also to nationals of non‑Member States whose links with the territory of a Member State are sufficiently close, in keeping with the grounds of jurisdiction laid down in that regulation, grounds which, according to Recital 12 in the preamble to Regulation No 1347/2000, are based on the rule that there must be a real link between the party concerned and the Member State exercising jurisdiction.
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 2007-12-06
27. First, according to settled case-law, in proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations pursuant to Article 226 EC, it is for the Commission to prove the allegation that the obligation has not been fulfilled. It is the Commission which must provide the Court with the evidence necessary for the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled, and it may not rely on any presumption (Case 62/89 Commission  v France  [1990] ECR I‑925, paragraph 37, and Case C-341/02 Commission  v Germany  [2005] ECR I-2733, paragraph 35).
29. Thirdly, as regards the relationship between Article 9(1) and Article 9(2) of the Sixth Directive, the Court has repeatedly held that Article 9(2) sets out a number of specific instances of places where certain services are deemed to be supplied, whereas Article 9(1) lays down the general rule on the matter. The object of those provisions is to avoid, first, conflicts of jurisdiction, which may result in double taxation, and, secondly, non-taxation (see, inter alia, Case 168/84 Berkholz  [1985] ECR 2251, paragraph 14; Case C-327/94 Dudda  [1996] ECR I-4595, paragraph 20; and SPI , paragraph 15).
30. Consequently, when interpreting Article 9 of the Sixth Directive, Article 9(1) in no way takes precedence over Article 9(2). In every situation, the question which arises is whether it is covered by one of the instances mentioned in Article 9(2). If not, it falls within the scope of Article 9(1) (see, inter alia, Dudda , paragraph 21, and SPI , paragraph 16).
31. In that regard, it must be stated that the third indent of Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive refers not to professions, such as those of lawyers, consultants, accountants or engineers, but to services. The Community legislature has used the professions mentioned in that provision as a means of defining the categories of services to which it refers (see von Hoffmann , paragraph 15). The expression ‘other similar services’ refers not to some common feature of the disparate activities mentioned in the third indent of Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive but to services similar to those of each of those activities, viewed separately. A service must thus be regarded as similar to those of one of the activities mentioned in that provision when they both serve the same purpose (see, to that effect, Case C‑167/95 Linthorst, Pouwels en Scheres  [1997] ECR I‑1195, paragraphs 19 to 22, and von Hoffmann , paragraphs 20 and 21).
36. As for services principally and habitually carried out as part of a lawyer’s profession, the Court has stated that they are those of representing or defending the interests of a person ( von Hoffmann , paragraph 17).
Gabriele Walderdorff v Finanzamt Waldviertel.
Date: 2007-12-06
16. According to settled case-law, the exemptions provided for in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive have their own independent meaning in Community law and must therefore be given a Community definition (see Case C‑358/97 Commission  v Ireland  [2000] ECR I‑6301, paragraph 51; Case C‑315/00 Maierhofer  [2003] ECR I‑563, paragraph 25; Case C‑275/01 Sinclair Collis  [2003] ECR I‑5965, paragraph 22; Case C‑284/03 Temco Europe  [2004] ECR I‑11237, paragraph 16; Case C‑428/02 Fonden Marselisborg Lystbådehavn  [2005] ECR I‑1527, paragraph 27; and Case C‑455/05 Velvet & Steel Immobilien  [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 15).
17. In the absence of a definition of ‘leasing’ and ‘letting of immovable property’ in Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive, the Court has defined the letting of immovable property, within the meaning of that provision, as the landlord of property assigning to the tenant, in return for rent and for an agreed period, the right to occupy his property and to exclude any other person from it (see, to that effect, Case C‑326/99 ‘Goed Wonen’  [2001] ECR I‑6831, paragraph 55; Case C‑409/98 Mirror Group  [2001] ECR I‑7175, paragraph 31; Case C‑108/99 Cantor Fitzgerald International  [2001] ECR I‑7257, paragraph 21; and also Commission  v Ireland,  paragraphs 52 to 57; Sinclair Collis , paragraph 25; Temco Europe, paragraph 19; and Fonden Marselisborg Lystbådehavn , paragraph 30).
18. In accordance with the case-law, the terms used to specify the exemptions provided for by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive, including ‘leasing’ and ‘letting of immovable property’ are to be interpreted strictly, since those exemptions constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, inter alia, Case C‑150/99 Stockholm Lindöpark  [2001] ECR I‑493, paragraph 25; and also Commission  v Ireland , paragraphs 52 and 55; Sinclair Collis , paragraph 23; Temco Europe , paragraph 17; and Fonden Marselisborg Lystbådehavn , paragraph 29).
19. In the main proceedings, it is common ground that Ms Walderdorff entered into a contract with the angling club whereby, on payment of consideration she granted the right to fish in several areas of water for a period of 10 years. The Court has already ruled that an area which is wholly or partly underwater can itself be categorised as immovable property that can be leased or let (see, to that effect, Fonden Marselisborg Lystbådehavn , paragraph 34, and Case C‑166/05 Heger  [2006] ECR I‑7749, paragraph 20).
Commission of the European Communities v Ferriere Nord SpA.
Date: 2007-12-06
27. In that regard, it should be recalled that only measures the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position are acts or decisions which may be the subject of an action for annulment (see, inter alia, Case C‑131/03 P Reynolds Tobacco and Others  v Commission  [2006] ECR I‑7795, paragraph 54, and the case-law cited).
29. Nevertheless, as is clear from the findings of the Court of First Instance in paragraphs 14 and 16 of the judgment under appeal with regard to the contested acts, those acts must be regarded as giving notice of enforcement of a decision taken previously, that is to say the Welded steel mesh decision. As such, whether they occur before or after any time-bar, those acts cannot be regarded as having produced legal effects binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, Ferriere Nord. In reality, they merely constitute acts purely preparatory to enforcement. Neither the former nor the latter acts constitute acts open to challenge (see, to that effect, Case C‑46/03 United Kingdom  v Commission  [2005] ECR I‑10167, paragraph 25, and Reynolds Tobacco and Others  v Commission , paragraph 55).
33. In any event, the fact remains that, although the requirement as to legal effects which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in its legal position must be interpreted in the light of the principle of effective judicial protection, such an interpretation cannot have the effect of setting aside that condition without going beyond the jurisdiction conferred by the EC Treaty on the Community courts ( Reynolds Tobacco and Others  v Commission , paragraph 81).
BATIG Gesellschaft für Beteiligungen mbH v Hauptzollamt Bielefeld.
Date: 2007-12-13
34. It should be pointed out, in that context, that, as the Court has already held, the cigarette market particularly lends itself to the development of unlawful trade (see Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco  [2002] ECR I-11453, paragraph 87, and Case C‑222/01 British American Tobacco  [2004] ECR I‑4683, paragraph 72).
38. The Court held that Directive 92/12 does not preclude the Member States from laying down national rules which, in a case where tax markings go missing, place the financial responsibility for the loss of those markings on the purchaser ( Heintz van Landewijck , paragraph 41).
39. The Court also held that such national rules cannot be regarded as contrary to the principle of proportionality. It found that a national law which allowed the purchaser of tax markings to obtain reimbursement simply by claiming that they had gone missing would be likely to encourage abuse and evasion, the prevention of which is precisely one of the objectives pursued by Community law ( Heintz van Landewijck , paragraphs 42 and 43).
40. It found, accordingly, that national rules which place the financial responsibility on the purchaser where tax markings go missing, contribute to the achievement of the aim of preventing the fraudulent use of those markings and do not exceed what is necessary to pursue that objective, since they do not exclude any possibility of reimbursement or offsetting in other situations, such as the loss of the markings due to accident or force majeure ( Heintz van Landewijck , paragraph 44).
41. The Court expressly dismissed the argument that the risk that the missing tax markings would be misused was minimal, finding that there was nevertheless a risk of abuse ( Heintz van Landewijck , paragraph 45).
57. It is apparent from that provision that, since the tax authorities of the Member State which issued the tax markings are not able to certify that those markings have been destroyed, the products to which those markings were affixed will give rise to payment of excise duties at the same time in both the Member State in which they were released for consumption and in the State in which they are intended to be consumed. By that provision, the Community legislature favoured the prevention of abuse and fraud to the detriment of the principle that taxation should occur in only one Member State.
FBTO Schadeverzekeringen NV v Jack Odenbreit.
Date: 2007-12-13
26. Thus, to interpret the reference in Article 11(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 to Article 9(1)(b) of that regulation as permitting the injured party to bring proceedings only before the courts having jurisdiction under that latter provision, that is to say, the courts for the place of domicile of the policy holder, the insured or the beneficiary, would run counter to the actual wording of Article 11(2). The reference leads to a widening of the scope of that rule to categories of plaintiff other than the policy holder, the insured or the beneficiary of the insurance contract who sue the insurer. Thus, the role of that reference is to add injured parties to the list of plaintiffs contained in Article 9(1)(b).
28. That line of reasoning is also based on a teleological interpretation of the provisions at issue in the main p roceedings. According to Recital 13 in the preamble to Regulation No 44/2001, the regulation aims to guarantee more favourable protection to the weaker party than the general rules of jurisdiction provide for (see, to that effect, Group Josi , paragraph 64, Société financière et industrielle du Peloux , paragraph 40, and Case C-77/04 GIE Réunion européenne and Others [2005] ECR I-4509, paragraph 17). To deny the injured party the right to bring an action before the courts for the place of his own domicile would deprive him of the same protection as that afforded by the regulation to other parties regarded as weak in disputes in matters relating to insurance and would thus be contrary to the spirit of the regulation. Moreover, as the Commission correctly observes, Regulation No 44/2001 strengthened such protection as compared with the protection resulting from application of the Brussels Convention.
31. In light of all the foregoing considerations the reply to the question referred for a preliminary ruling must be that the reference in Article 11(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 to Article 9(1)(b) of that regulation is to be interpreted as meaning that the injured party may bring an action directly against the insurer before the courts for the place in a Member State where that injured party is domiciled, provided that a direct action is permitted and the insurer is domiciled in a Member State.
Costs
Commission of the European Communities v Ireland.
Date: 2007-12-18
29. It follows from the case-law of the Court that, without prejudice to the obligation of the Member States, under Article 10 EC, to facilitate the achievement of the Commission’s tasks, which consist in particular, pursuant to Article 211 EC, in ensuring that the provisions of the Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied (Case C‑494/01 Commission  v Ireland  [2005] ECR I‑3331, paragraph 42), in an action for failure to fulfil obligations it is incumbent upon the Commission to prove the allegation that the obligation has not been fulfilled. It is the Commission’s responsibility to place before the Court the information needed to enable the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled, and in so doing the Commission may not rely on any presumption (see, in particular, Case 96/81 Commission  v Netherlands  [1982] ECR 1791, paragraph 6; Case C‑404/00 Commission  v Spain  [2003] ECR I‑6695, paragraph 26; and Case C‑135/05 Commission  v Italy  [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 26).
36. In that regard, as follows from the case-law cited in paragraph 29 of this judgment, it is, in the present case, incumbent upon the Commission to place before the Court the information needed to enable the Court to establish that a public contract has been awarded, and in so doing the Commission may not rely on any presumption in that regard.