„Vakarų Baltijos laivų statykla“ UAB v Valstybinė mokesčių inspekcija prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos.
Date: 2017-07-13
24


According to the case-law of the Court, the provisions of Directive 2003/96 concerning exemptions must receive an autonomous interpretation, based on their wording and on the objectives pursued by that directive (judgments of 1 December 2011, Systeme Helmholz, C‑79/10, EU:C:2011:797, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited, and of 21 December 2011, Haltergemeinschaft, C‑250/10, not published, EU:C:2011:862, paragraph 19).
25


It follows from the wording of Article 14(1)(c) of Directive 2003/96 that the exemption laid down by that provision is subject to the requirement that the energy products be used as fuel for the purposes of navigation within European Union waters (see, by analogy, judgments of 10 November 2011, Sea Fighter, C‑505/10, EU:C:2011:725, paragraph 20, and of 21 December 2011, Haltergemeinschaft, C‑250/10, not published, EU:C:2011:862, paragraph 21).
26


Concerning the term ‘navigation’, referred to in Article 14(1)(c) of Directive 2003/96, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that all navigation activity for commercial purposes comes within the scope of the exemption laid down by that provision, regardless of the purpose of that navigation (see, to that effect, judgments of 1 April 2004, Deutsche See-Bestattungs-Genossenschaft, C‑389/02, EU:C:2004:214, paragraphs 23, 25 and 29; of 1 March 2007, Jan De Nul, C‑391/05, EU:C:2007:126, paragraph 36, and of 10 November 2011, Sea Fighter, C‑505/10, EU:C:2011:725, paragraph 16).
27


Thus, the purpose of a ship’s journey within European Union waters is irrelevant for the application of that exemption when that navigation involves the provision of a service for consideration (see, by analogy, judgments of 1 March 2007, Jan De Nul, C‑391/05, EU:C:2007:126, paragraph 37, and of 10 November 2011, Sea Fighter, C‑505/10, EU:C:2011:725, paragraph 17).
28


In that regard, the Court has stated that the term ‘navigation’ requires that the provision of a service for consideration be inherent in the ship’s journey (see, to that effect, judgments of 1 March 2007, Jan De Nul, C‑391/05, EU:C:2007:126, paragraph 40, and of 10 November 2011, Sea Fighter, C‑505/10, EU:C:2011:725, paragraph 18).
29


It is apparent from the expression ‘other than for the carriage of passengers or goods or for the supply of services for consideration’, used in Article 14(1)(c), second paragraph, of Directive 2003/96, that the ‘navigation’ covered by the exemption laid down in Article 14(1)(c) relates to uses where a boat is used directly for the supply of services for consideration (see, by analogy, judgment of 1 December 2011, Systeme Helmholz, C‑79/10, EU:C:2011:797, paragraph 21).
30


Consequently, navigation operations which are not directly used for the supply of a service for consideration cannot be assimilated to the use of a boat for commercial purposes, within the meaning and for the purposes of the application of that provision, and, accordingly, do not fall within the scope of that exemption (see, by analogy, judgment of 1 December 2011, Systeme Helmholz, C‑79/10, EU:C:2011:797, paragraph 27).
31


As to the term ‘[European Union] waters’, referred to in Article 14(1)(c) of Directive 2003/96, that term relates to all waters which can be used by all sea-going vessels, including those which have the greatest capacity, capable of travelling maritime routes for commercial purposes (see, by analogy, judgment of 1 March 2007, Jan De Nul, C‑391/05, EU:C:2007:126, paragraph 32).
32


Moreover, it follows from the purpose of Directive 2003/96, under which the Member States are to tax energy products, that the directive does not seek to establish general exemptions (judgments of 1 December 2011, Systeme Helmholz, C‑79/10, EU:C:2011:797, paragraph 23, and of 21 December 2011, Haltergemeinschaft, C‑250/10, not published, EU:C:2011:862, paragraph 23).
33


In particular, the exemption laid down by Article 14(1)(c) of that directive is designed to facilitate trade within the European Union, particularly the movement of goods and the freedom to provide services capable of taking place within European Union waters. By that exemption, the EU legislature intended to promote the equality of certain tax conditions under which the transport undertakings or other services which ply those waters operate (see, by analogy, judgment of 1 March 2007, Jan De Nul, C‑391/05, EU:C:2007:126, paragraphs 24 and 25).
34


In that context, it emerges from recital 23 of Directive 2003/96 that that exemption is based on compliance with existing international obligations and the maintaining of the competitive position of EU undertakings (see, by analogy, judgment of 1 December 2011, Systeme Helmholz, C‑79/10, EU:C:2011:797, paragraph 24).
42


In that regard, it must be observed that, both the general scheme and the purpose of Directive 2003/96 are based on the principle that energy products are taxed in accordance with their actual use (judgment of 2 June 2016, ROZ-ŚWIT, C‑418/14, EU:C:2016:400, paragraph 33).
43


In so far as Directive 2003/96 does not lay down any particular control mechanism for the use of fuel for navigation nor measures to combat tax evasion connected with the sale of fuel, it is for Member States to provide such mechanisms and such measures in their national legislation, in conformity with EU law, and to lay down the conditions for the exemptions set out in Article 14(1) of that directive (see, by analogy, judgments of 2 June 2016, ROZ-ŚWIT, C‑418/14, EU:C:2016:400, paragraph 23, and of 2 June 2016, Polihim-SS, C‑355/14, EU:C:2016:403, paragraph 57).
44


That said, the Court has held that the unconditional nature of an obligation to grant an exemption cannot be affected at all by the degree of latitude afforded to Member States by introductory wording such as that contained in Article 14(1), according to which exemptions are granted by those States ‘under conditions which they shall lay down for the purpose of ensuring the correct and straightforward application of such exemptions and of preventing any evasion, avoidance or abuse’ (judgment of 17 July 2008, Flughafen Köln/Bonn, C‑226/07, EU:C:2008:429, paragraph 31).
45


Furthermore, the Court has also held that when exercising their power to lay down the conditions for the exemption from excise duty provided for in Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/96, the Member States must comply with the general principles of law which form part of the legal order of the European Union, including, inter alia, the principle of proportionality (judgment of 2 June 2016, Polihim-SS, C‑355/14, EU:C:2016:403, paragraph 59).
46


Thus, the refusal by the national authorities to exempt energy products from excise duty on the sole ground that certain conditions that must be complied with under national law in order to obtain that exemption are not fulfilled, without it being checked, on the basis of the evidence provided, whether the substantive requirements necessary for those energy products to be used for purposes giving entitlement to exemption are met, goes beyond what is necessary to ensure the correct and straightforward application of those exemptions and to prevent any evasion, avoidance or abuse (see, by analogy, judgment of 2 June 2016, Polihim-SS, C‑355/14, EU:C:2016:403, paragraph 62).
51


Therefore, legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which makes the application of the exemption laid down by Article 14(1)(c) of Directive 2003/96 conditional on compliance with formal requirements unrelated to the actual use of the energy products concerned nor to the substantive requirements of that provision, calls in question the unconditional nature of the obligation to exempt laid down by that provision and infringes the principle of proportionality.