Aannemingsbedrijf Aertssen NV and Aertssen Terrassements SA v VSB Machineverhuur BV and Others.
Date: 2015-10-22
27. Accordingly, given the wording of that provision, decisions given on civil matters by a criminal court fall within the scope of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment in Krombach , C‑7/98, EU:C:2000:164, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
28. Further, Article 1(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 indicates that only certain matters expressly mentioned in that regulation are excluded from the concept of civil and commercial matters (see, to that effect, judgment in Mahamdia , C‑154/11, EU:C:2012:491, paragraph 38).
29. In accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, in order to ensure, as far as possible, that the rights and obligations which derive from that regulation for the Member States and the persons to whom it applies are equal and uniform, the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ should not be interpreted as a mere reference to the internal law of one or other of the States concerned. That concept must be regarded as an autonomous concept to be interpreted by reference, first, to the objectives and scheme of Regulation No 44/2001 and, second, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems (judgments in Schneider , C‑386/12, EU:C:2013:633, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited, and flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines , C‑302/13, EU:C:2014:2319, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
30. In order to determine whether or not a matter falls within the scope of that regulation, the factors which characterise the nature of the legal relationships between the parties to the dispute or the subject-matter thereof must be examined (judgment in flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines , C‑302/13, EU:C:2014:2319, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
31. In that regard, in paragraph 19 of the judgment in Sonntag (C‑172/91, EU:C:1993:144), the Court held that, even though it is joined to criminal proceedings, a civil action for compensation for injury to an individual resulting from a criminal offence continues to be civil in nature. In the legal systems of the contracting States, the Court held, the right to obtain compensation for injury suffered as a result of conduct regarded as culpable under criminal law is generally recognised as being a civil-law right.
32. In this case, while the aim of the complaint seeking to join a civil action to proceedings is to set in motion a criminal prosecution and while the investigation undertaken by the Belgian court is criminal in nature, the fact remains that its purpose is also to resolve a dispute between private persons concerning compensation for harm which one of those persons considers it has suffered as a result of the fraudulent conduct of others. Consequently, the legal relationship between the parties concerned in the main proceedings must be classified as ‘a private law relationship’ and is therefore covered by the ‘concept of civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of Regulation No 44/2001 (see, by analogy, judgment in Realchemie Nederland , C‑406/09, EU:C:2011:668, paragraph 41).
33. Further, the general scheme of that regulation does not require that the treatment of ancillary proceedings should necessarily be linked to that of the main proceedings (see, by analogy, judgment in Cavel , 120/79, EU:C:1980:70, paragraphs 7 to 9).
38. It must be recalled that the concepts used in Article 27 of that regulation, in order to determine whether lis pendens  exists, must be interpreted independently, by reference to the scheme and objectives of that regulation (judgment in Cartier parfums-lunettes and Axa Corporate Solutions assurances , C‑1/13, EU:C:2014:109, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
39. One of the objectives of Regulation No 44/2001, as stated in recital 15 thereof, is to minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings and to ensure that irreconcilable judgments will not be given where a number of courts have jurisdiction to hear the same dispute. That is why the European Union legislature sought to put in place a mechanism which is clear and effective in order to resolve situations of lis pendens . It follows that, in order to achieve those objectives, Article 27 of that regulation must be interpreted broadly (see, to that effect, judgments in Mærsk Olie & Gas , C‑39/02, EU:C:2004:615, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited, and Cartier parfums-lunettes and Axa Corporate Solutions assurances , C‑1/13, EU:C:2014:109, paragraph 40).
40. In the wording of Article 27 of that regulation, that article is to apply where the parties to two disputes pending before the courts of different Member States are the same and where the proceedings have the same cause of action, and that provision imposes no additional condition (see, to that effect, judgment in Gubisch Maschinenfabrik , 144/86, EU:C:1987:528, paragraph 14).
41. As regards, first, the question whether the parties are the same for the purposes of Article 27 of Regulation No 44/2001, it is apparent from the judgments in Sonntag (C‑172/91, EU:C:1993:144, paragraph 19) and Cavel  (120/79, EU:C:1980:70, paragraphs 7 to 9), that the right to obtain compensation for harm suffered as a result of conduct which is subject to criminal prosecution remains a civil matter in that the general scheme of that regulation does not require that the treatment of ancillary proceedings should necessarily be linked to the treatment of the main proceedings. The question whether the parties are the same cannot depend on the position of one or other of the parties in the two proceedings (judgment in Tatry , C‑406/92, EU:C:1994:400, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
43. As regards, secondly, ‘the cause’ of an action for the purposes of Article 27 of Regulation No 44/2001, that comprises the facts and the rule of law relied on as the basis of the action (see, to that effect, judgment in Mærsk Olie & Gas , C‑39/02, EU:C:2004:615, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
45. As regards, thirdly, ‘the object’ of an action for the purposes of Article 27 of Regulation No 44/2001, the Court has stated that this means the end the action has in view (see, to that effect, judgment in Gantner Electronic , C‑111/01, EU:C:2003:257, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited). The latter concept cannot be restricted to the claims being formally identical (see, to that effect, judgment in Gubisch Maschinenfabrik , 144/86, EU:C:1987:528, paragraph 17) and is to be interpreted broadly (see, to that effect, judgment in Nipponkoa Insurance Co . (Europe) , C‑452/12, EU:C:2013:858, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
48. Further, it must be recalled, first, that the mechanism introduced by Regulation No 44/2001 to resolve situations of lis pendens is objective and automatic (see, by analogy, judgment in Gantner Electronic , C‑111/01, EU:C:2003:257, paragraph 30) and is based on the chronological order in which the courts concerned were seised (see, to that effect, judgments in Weber , C‑438/12, EU:C:2014:212, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited, and, by analogy, A , C‑489/14, EU:C:2015:654, paragraph 30).
55. Further, in so far as the substantive conditions laid down in paragraph 40 of the present judgment are met, lis pendens  exists from the moment when two courts of different Member States are definitively seised of legal proceedings, that is to say, before the defendants have been able to state their position (see, to that effect, judgment in Gantner Electronic , C‑111/01, EU:C:2003:257, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
56. Regulation No 44/2001 does not set out in which circumstances the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal first seised is to be regarded as ‘established’ within the meaning of Article 27 of that regulation (judgment in Cartier parfums-lunettes and Axa Corporate Solutions assurances , C‑1/13, EU:C:2014:109, paragraph 31). However, as stated in paragraph 48 of this judgment, the procedural rule laid down in that article is based on the chronological order in which the courts or tribunals concerned have been seised.
57. Article 30 of that regulation defines uniformly and independently the time when a court is to be deemed to be seised for the purposes of the application of Section 9 of Chapter II of that regulation, relating to lis pendens . Under Article 30, a court is deemed to be seised either at the time when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document is lodged with the court, provided that the plaintiff has not subsequently failed to take the steps he was required to take to have service effected on the defendant, or, if a document has to be served before being lodged with the court, at the time when it is received by the authority responsible for service, provided that the plaintiff has not subsequently failed to take the steps he was required to take to have the document lodged with the court. Two methods of bringing proceedings before national courts or tribunals are envisaged, either by the lodging of the document initiating proceedings at the court or tribunal or by service of that document.