Trafilerie Meridionali SpA v European Commission.
Date: 2016-09-14
31


In fact, in paragraph 92 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court correctly recalled the case-law of the Court of Justice stating that an undertaking which has participated in such a single and complex infringement through its own conduct, which fell within the definition of an agreement or a concerted practice having an anticompetitive object for the purposes of Article 101(1) TFEU and was intended to help bring about the infringement as a whole, may accordingly be liable also in respect of the conduct of other undertakings in the context of the same infringement throughout the period of its participation in the infringement where it is shown that the undertaking intended, through its own conduct, to contribute to the common objectives pursued by all the participants and that it was aware of the offending conduct planned or put into effect by other undertakings in pursuit of the same objectives or that it could reasonably have foreseen it and was prepared to take the risk (judgment of 6 December 2012 in Commission v Verhuizingen Coppens, C‑441/11 P, EU:C:2012:778, point 42).
40


In so far as the appellant alleges, by the line of argument put forward under the present ground of appeal, that the General Court infringed the obligation to state reasons in that, in paragraphs 391 and 392 of the judgment under appeal, it did not respond to the requisite legal standard to the arguments submitted in support of the plea at first instance alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment, it must be recalled that the obligation to state reasons provided for in Article 296 TFEU constitutes an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well founded, which goes to the substantive legality of the measure at issue (judgment of 29 September 2011, Elf Aquitaine v Commission, C‑521/09 P, EU:C:2011:620, paragraph 146 and the case-law cited).
41


According to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the obligation incumbent upon the General Court under Article 36 and the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union to state reasons for its judgments does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to understand the grounds of the General Court’s judgment and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient information to exercise its powers of review on appeal (judgment of 8 March 2016, Greece v Commission, C‑431/14 P, EU:C:2016:145, paragraph 38).
49


Relying, in particular, on the case-law arising from the judgments of 16 November 2000, Weig v Commission (C‑280/98 P, EU:C:2000:627, paragraphs 52 to 68), and of 16 November 2000, Sarrió v Commission (C‑291/98 P, EU:C:2000:631, paragraphs 91 to 100), the appellant submits that there are numerous precedents in which the Court of Justice considered that it had to set aside the judgment of the General Court in so far as it had used a different calculation method, when reviewing fines, from that used by the Commission or by the General Court itself with regard to other undertakings implicated in the infringement at issue. Although it is true that the Court of Justice has already held, in particular in paragraph 181 of its judgment of 10 July 2014, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission (C‑295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062), that the Commission is not required to indicate the figures relating to the method of calculating the fines, it nevertheless pointed out that it is, at the very least, ‘preferable’ that the mechanism used to set the amount of the fine be given.
52


It is appropriate to note that, having regard to the case-law referred to in paragraphs 40 and 41 of this judgment, the judgment under appeal meets the standard as regards reasoning required of the General Court since, in paragraphs 401 to 407 of that judgment, the General Court set out in detail the factors which it took into account in its decision on the setting of the amount of the fine (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 November 2012, E.ON Energie v Commission, C‑89/11 P, EU:C:2012:738, paragraph 133).
56


It is appropriate to bear in mind that it is only inasmuch as the Court of Justice considers that the level of the penalty is not merely inappropriate, but also excessive to the point of being disproportionate, that it would have to find that the General Court erred in law, on account of the inappropriateness of the amount of a fine (see judgment of 10 July 2014, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, C‑295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062, paragraph 205 and the case-law cited).
65


In so far as the appellant claims that the Court should hear its claim for compensation for the harm suffered as a result of the alleged infringement by the General Court of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, it should be recalled that the sanction for a breach, by a court of the European Union, of its obligation under that provision to adjudicate on the cases before it within a reasonable time must be an action for damages brought before the General Court, since such an action constitutes an effective remedy. It follows that a claim for compensation in respect of the damage caused by the General Court’s failure to adjudicate within a reasonable period may not be made directly to the Court of Justice in the context of an appeal, but must be brought before the General Court itself (see judgments of 26 November 2013, Gascogne Sack Deutschland v Commission, C‑40/12 P, EU:C:2013:768, paragraphs 89 and 90; of 26 November 2013, Groupe Gascogne v Commission, C‑58/12 P, EU:C:2013:770, paragraphs 83 and 84, and of 10 July 2014, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, C‑295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062, paragraph 66).
66


Where a claim for damages is brought before the General Court, which has jurisdiction under Article 256(1) TFEU, it must determine such a claim sitting in a different composition from that which heard the dispute giving rise to the procedure whose duration is criticised (judgments of 26 November 2013, Groupe Gascogne v Commission, C‑58/12 P, EU:C:2013:770, paragraph 90, and of 10 July 2014, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, C‑295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062, paragraph 67).
67


That said, where it is clear, without any need for the parties to adduce additional evidence in that regard, that the General Court infringed, in a sufficiently serious manner, its obligation to adjudicate on the case within a reasonable time, the Court of Justice may note that fact (judgment of 9 June 2016, Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades and Others v Commission, C‑617/13 P, EU:C:2016:416, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited).