ISD Polska sp. z o.o. and Others v European Commission.
Date: 2011-03-24
7. Protocol No 8 on the restructuring of the Polish steel industry, annexed to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded (OJ 2003 L 236, p. 948; ‘Protocol No 8’), authorised the Republic of Poland, in derogation from the general rules on State aid, to grant aid for the restructuring of its steel sector in accordance with the detailed rules laid down in the restructuring plan and the conditions stipulated in that protocol. It provides among other things:
‘1. Notwithstanding Articles 87 [EC] and 88 [EC], State aid granted by [the Republic of] Poland for restructuring purposes to specified parts of the Polish steel industry shall be deemed to be compatible with the common market provided that:
– the period provided for in Article 8(4) of Protocol [No] 2 ... has been extended until the date of accession,
– the terms set out in the restructuring plan on the basis of which the abovementioned Protocol was extended are adhered to throughout the period 2002-06,
– the conditions set out in this Protocol are met, and
– no State aid for restructuring is to be paid to the Polish steel industry after the date of accession.
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3. Only companies listed in Annex 1 (hereinafter referred to as “benefiting companies”) shall be eligible for State aid in the framework of the Polish steel restructuring programme.
4. A benefiting company may not:
(a) in the case of a merger with a company not included in Annex 1, pass on the benefit of the aid granted to the benefiting company;
(b) take over the assets of any company not included in Annex 1 which is declared bankrupt in the period up to 31 December 2006.
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6. The restructuring aid granted to the benefiting companies shall be determined by the justifications set out in the approved Polish steel restructuring plan and individual business plans as approved by the Council. But in any case the aid paid out in the period of 1997-2003 and in its total amount shall not exceed PLN 3 387 070 000.
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No further State aid shall be granted by [the Republic of] Poland for restructuring purposes to the Polish steel industry.
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10. Any subsequent changes in the overall restructuring plan and the individual plans must be agreed by the Commission and, where appropriate, by the Council.
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18. Should the monitoring show that:
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(c) [the Republic of] Poland in the course of the restructuring period has granted additional incompatible State aid to the steel industry and to the benefiting companies in particular,
the transitional arrangements contained in this Protocol shall not have effect.
The Commission shall take appropriate steps requiring any company concerned to reimburse any aid granted in breach of the conditions laid down in this Protocol.’
66. According to settled case-law, it follows from Article 225 EC, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see, in particular, Case C‑352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil  v Commission  [2000] ECR I‑5291, paragraph 34; Case C‑248/99 P France  v Monsanto and Commission  [2002] ECR I‑1, paragraph 68; and Case C‑67/09 P Nuova Agricast and Cofra  v Commission  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 48).
67. In that regard, the Court observes that, although admittedly certain portions of the line of argument put forward by the appellants in their pleas may lack rigour, that line of argument does, however, appear overall to be sufficiently clear for the purposes of identifying with the necessary precision the elements of the judgment under appeal which are being challenged, and the legal arguments relied on in support of that challenge, and thus enables the Court to carry out its review of the lawfulness thereof.
83. As regards the Commission’s objection of inadmissibility, on the basis of the novel character of the plea put forward, it is settled case-law that to allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea in law which it has not raised before the General Court would be to allow it to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the General Court. In an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is confined to review of the findings of law on the pleas argued before the General Court (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑186/02 P and C‑188/02 P Ramondín and Others  v Commission  [2004] ECR I‑10653, paragraph 60; Case C‑68/05 P Koninklijke Coöperatie Cosun  v Commission  [2006] ECR I‑10367, paragraph 96).
85. As regards the Commission’s objection of inadmissibility on the basis that the argument regarding a difference in the treatment of two essentially similar situations, invoked by the applicant in Case T‑297/06, was new in the sense that it was not invoked by the latter at first instance but only by the applicants in Case T‑273/06, it is sufficient to note that, since a party must be able to challenge all the grounds for a judgment adversely affecting it, where the General Court has joined two cases and given a single judgment which answers all the pleas submitted by the parties to the proceedings before the Court, each of those parties may criticise the reasoning concerning pleas which, before the General Court, were raised only by the applicant in the other joined case (judgment of 29 November 2007 in Case C‑176/06 P Stadtwerke Schwäbisch Hall and Others  v Commission , paragraph 17; see also, by analogy, Case C‑348/06 P Commission  v Girardot  [2008] ECR I‑833, paragraph 50).
98. It is true that, according to settled case-law, in order to ensure observance of the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, the substantive rules of Community law must be interpreted as applying to situations existing before their entry into force only in so far as it follows clearly from their terms, objectives or general scheme that such effect must be given to them (see, inter alia, Case 21/81 Bout  [1982] ECR 381, paragraph 13; Case C‑34/92 GruSa Fleisch  [1993] ECR I‑4147, paragraph 22; Case C‑162/00 Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer  [2002] ECR I‑1049, paragraph 49; Case C‑441/08 Elektrownia Pątnów II  [2009] ECR I‑10799, paragraph 33).
122. Secondly, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is among the fundamental principles of the European Union (see, in particular, Case 112/80 Dürbeck  [1981] ECR 1095, paragraph 48).
123. It is also apparent from the case-law that the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations extends to any person in a situation where the Community authority has, by giving him precise assurances, caused him to entertain expectations which are justified (Case 111/86 Delauche  v Commission  [1987] ECR 5345, paragraph 24; Case C‑82/98 P Kögler  v Court of Justice  [2000] ECR I‑3855, paragraph 33; Joined Cases C‑182/03 and C‑217/03 Belgium and Forum 187  v Commission  [2006] ECR I‑5479, paragraph 147). The assurances given must, in addition, be in accordance with the applicable rules (see, to that effect, Case 228/84 Pauvert  v Court of Auditors  [1985] ECR 1969, paragraphs 14 and 15; Case 162/84 Vlachou  v Court of Auditors  [1986] ECR 481, paragraph 6).