larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Alpenchalets Resorts GmbH v Finanzamt München Abteilung Körperschaften.
Date: 2018-12-19
20


It must, first, be observed that, pursuant to Article 306 of the VAT Directive, that special scheme applies only where the travel agent uses for the organisation of the journey supplies of goods and services bought in from other taxable persons (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2012, Kozak, C‑557/11, EU:C:2012:672, paragraphs 18 and 21).
23


As is apparent from the wording of Article 306 of the VAT Directive and the case-law of the Court, the special scheme for travel agents applies only where a travel agent uses goods or services supplied by third parties, in the provision of travel, which means that its own services, namely services which have not been bought in from third parties but supplied by the travel agent itself, are not covered by that scheme (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2012, Kozak, C‑557/11, EU:C:2012:672, paragraphs 18, 21, 23 and 27).
24


In that context, the single service rule to which the referring court refers and referred to in paragraph 18 of the judgment of 21 June 2007, Ludwig (C‑453/05, EU:C:2007:369), which applies under the normal VAT regime, cannot affect the assessment of that concept in the context of the special VAT scheme applicable to transactions carried out by travel agents (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2012, Kozak, C‑557/11, EU:C:2012:672, paragraph 24).
29


In its judgment of 9 December 2010, Minerva Kulturreisen (C‑31/10, EU:C:2010:762, paragraph 21), the Court held that, although any service whatsoever supplied by a travel agent which is unrelated to a journey does not fall under the special scheme provided for in Article 26 of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1, as amended), the provisions of Article 26 having been included in Article 306 of the VAT Directive, the supply by a travel agent of holiday accommodation comes within the scope of Article 26, even if that service covers accommodation only and not transport.
Francesca Cadeddu v Agenzia delle Entrate - Direzione provinciale di Cagliari and Others.
Date: 2018-12-19
15


First of all, it should be noted that, according to consistent case-law, direct taxes fall within the competence of the Member States, but they must exercise that competence consistently with Union law (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 September 2004, Manninen, C‑319/02, EU:C:2004:484, paragraph 19, and of 25 October 2007, Porto Antico di Genova, C‑427/05, EU:C:2007:630, paragraph 10)
16


In particular, national legislation must not impede the working of the mechanisms established in the context of the European structural funds as provided for by Regulation No 1083/2006 (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2007, Porto Antico di Genova, C‑427/05, EU:C:2007:630, paragraph 10).
19


As regards that article, which provided that ‘payments are to be made to the final beneficiaries without any deduction or retention which could reduce the amount of financial assistance to which they are entitled’, the Court pointed out that that prohibition on deductions cannot be interpreted in a purely formal manner and that it must of necessity extend to all charges which are directly and inseparably linked to the amounts disbursed (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 October 2006, Commission v Portugal, C‑84/04, EU:C:2006:640, paragraph 35, and of 25 October 2007, Porto Antico di Genova, C‑427/05, EU:C:2007:630, paragraph 13).
20


By contrast, a levy which is separate from the amount of the Union grants and which is not specifically connected with the amounts awarded, but which applies without distinction to all of the income of the final beneficiary, does not impede the working of the mechanisms established by EU law, even if it has the effect of reducing the amount of the Union grants (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2007, Porto Antico di Genova, C‑427/05, EU:C:2007:630, paragraphs 16 and 18).
21


Given that the support measures are all financed from the EU budget and that the rules of payment applicable to those measures must be subject to the same interpretation (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 October 2006, Commission v Portugal, C‑84/04, EU:C:2006:640, paragraph 32), the Court’s case-law relating to the payment in full of financial assistance in the light of the second subparagraph of Article 21(3) of Regulation No 4253/88, as amended by Regulation No 2082/93, remains applicable with respect to Article 80 of Regulation No 1083/2006.
Proceedings brought by A Oy.
Date: 2019-01-10
31


In that connection, Article 14(1) of Directive 2006/112 defines the supply of goods as being ‘the transfer of the right to dispose of tangible property as owner’, while Article 24(1) thereof defines a supply of services as ‘any transaction which does not constitute a supply of goods’.
35


The questions of the referring court concern, in substance, whether that supply of services is also made in exchange for a supply of goods, namely the supply of recyclable scrap metal contained in the waste and used materials, so that the taxable base of that supply of services is composed both of the price paid by the client and of that supply of goods.
36


In that connection, it is clear from settled case-law that the consideration for a supply of services may consist of a supply of goods, and so constitute the taxable amount within the meaning of Article 73 of Directive 2006/112, provided, however, that there is a direct link between the supply of services and the supply of goods and that the value of the latter can be expressed in monetary terms (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2012, Orfey, C‑549/11, EU:C:2012:832, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited). The same is true if a supply of goods is performed in exchange for a supply of services, as long as the same conditions are satisfied (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 September 2013, Serebryannay vek, C‑283/12, EU:C:2013:599, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
38


In the present case, it is clear from the description of the facts in the main proceedings, set out in paragraph 32 of the present judgment, that the service supplier, namely a demolition company, in addition to receiving monetary payment from its client for carrying out demolition works, acquires, pursuant to the demolition contract, recyclable scrap metal that it may then sell on. Therefore, in that situation, there is a supply of goods, within the meaning of Article 14(1) of Directive 2006/112.
41


The fact that the quantity and value of the scrap metal contained in demolition waste has not been agreed in the demolition contract does not preclude that finding.
43


In any event, it must be observed that, in the situation mentioned in paragraph 39 of the present judgment, it is possible to determine the value of the supply of recyclable scrap metal. Having regard to the case-law cited in paragraph 38 of the present judgment, that value must be considered as equal to the amount of the reduction by the service provider in the price of the demolition works.
47


In such as case, the taxable base of the supply of services which is the subject matter of a demolition contract, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, is constituted by the price actually paid by the client and by the value attributed by the service provider to the recyclable scrap metal, as reflected in the amount of the reduction of the price charged for the supply of services.
Criminal proceedings against ET.
Date: 2019-01-10
17


In that regard, the Court of Justice has acknowledged that both the principle of mutual trust between the Member States and the principle of mutual recognition, which is itself based on the mutual trust between the latter are, in EU law, of fundamental importance given that they allow an area without internal borders to be created and maintained (judgment of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the System of Justice), C‑216/18 PPU, EU:2018:586, paragraph 36).
24


As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, as regards the interpretation of provisions of national law, the Court is in principle required to base its consideration on the description given in the order for reference. According to settled case-law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to interpret the internal law of a Member State (judgment of 16 February 2017, Agro Foreign Trade & Agency, C‑507/15, EU:C:2017:129, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
33


That provision is based on the principle of mutual recognition, which implies that there is mutual trust as to the fact that each Member State accepts the application of the criminal law in force in the other Member States, even though the implementation of its own national law might produce a different outcome (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 January 2018, Piotrowski, C‑367/16, EU:C:2018:27, paragraph 52).
Deutsche Post AG v Hauptzollamt Köln.
Date: 2019-01-16
38


That said, having regard to the declaratory nature of the action (Feststellungsklage) brought before the national court, it is conceivable that that regulation is applicable ratione temporis to the resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings, that point not being clarified by oral argument at the hearing.
54


In that regard, that legislation entails that respect for the right to private life with regard to processing of such data concerns any information relating to a natural person who is identified or identifiable (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 November 2010, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, C‑92/09 and C‑93/09, EU:C:2010:662, paragraph 52, and of 17 October 2013, Schwarz, C‑291/12, EU:C:2013:670, paragraph 26).
55


It is apparent, also, from the Court’s case-law that tax data constitutes ‘personal data’ within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46 (see, to that effect, judgments of 1 October 2015, Bara and Others, C‑201/14, EU:C:2015:638, paragraph 29, and of 27 September 2017, Puškár, C‑73/16, EU:C:2017:725, paragraph 41).
57


All processing of personal data must comply, first, with the principles relating to data quality set out in in Article 6 of Directive 95/46 or in Article 5 of Regulation 2016/679 and, second, with one of the criteria governing the legitimacy of data processing listed in Article 7 of that directive or in Article 6 of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 May 2003, Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, C‑465/00, C‑138/01 and C‑139/01, EU:C:2003:294, paragraph 65, and of 13 May 2014, Google Spain and Google, C‑131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 71).
59


Further, it must be borne in mind that the requirement that processing of personal data be fair, laid down in Article 6 of Directive 95/46 or in Article 5 of Regulation 2016/679, entails an obligation to inform the data subjects of the transfer of that data by customs authorities for the purposes of its subsequent processing (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 October 2015, Bara and Others, C‑201/14, EU:C:2015:638, paragraph 34).
SH v TG.
Date: 2019-01-17
51


It should be noted that the prohibition laid down in that provision on making funds or economic resources available to any person on the list of persons targeted by the restrictive measures is framed in particularly broad terms, as evidenced by the use of the words ‘directly or indirectly’, and therefore encompasses all the acts necessary under the applicable national law if that person is in fact to obtain full power of disposal in relation to the funds or economic resources concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 October 2007, Möllendorf and Möllendorf-Niehuus, C‑117/06, EU:C:2007:596, paragraphs 50 and 51; of 29 June 2010, E and F, C‑550/09, EU:C:2010:382, paragraphs 66 and 74, and of 21 December 2011, Afrasiabi and Others, C‑72/11, EU:C:2011:874, paragraphs 39 and 40).
52


The broad and unambiguous terms of that provision apply to any mode of making available an economic resource and therefore also to any act which flows from the execution of a contract imposing mutual obligations and which has been agreed in exchange for payment of pecuniary consideration (judgment of 11 October 2007, Möllendorf and Möllendorf-Niehuus, C‑117/06, EU:C:2007:596, paragraph 56).
53


Moreover, according to the Court’s case-law, the notion of ‘funds and economic resources’ is wide in scope, covering assets of every kind, however acquired (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 June 2010, E and F, C‑550/09, EU:C:2010:382, paragraphs 69).
58


Furthermore, as the Advocate General observed in point 34 of his Opinion, the fact that those payments are part of a transaction characterised by an economic balance between the consideration given and the consideration received and constitute acts implementing an agreement concluded before the entry into force of Regulation No 204/2011 does not, in itself, mean that they fall outside the scope of that regulation or of the prohibitions laid down therein (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 October 2007, Möllendorf and Möllendorf-Niehuus, C‑117/06, EU:C:2007:596, paragraphs 49 and 62).
SIA „KPMG Baltics” v SIA „Ķipars AI”.
Date: 2019-01-17
11


In that regard, first, it must be noted that, by its first question, the referring court seeks to ascertain specifically whether the payment order at issue in the main proceedings is covered by the concept of ‘transfer order’, within the meaning of Directive 98/26, and, therefore, the scope of that directive. Thus, the argument put forward by KPMG Baltics and the Latvian Government that the payment order does not come within the scope of that directive is inextricably linked to the answer to be given to the first question and consequently has no bearing on the Court’s jurisdiction to answer that question (see, by analogy, judgments of 10 September 2015, Wojciechowski, C‑408/14, EU:C:2015:591, paragraph 29, and of 26 September 2018, Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en justitie (Suspensory effect of the appeal), C‑180/17, EU:C:2018:775, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
Proceedings brought by A Ltd.
Date: 2019-01-17
29


In that regard, the Court has explained, first, that it is clear fromArticle 2(d), first to fourth indents, of Directive 88/357 that the EU legislature intended to propose, for all types of risk insured, a solution enabling the State where the risk is situated to be determined on the basis of concrete and physical, rather than legal criteria. The purpose was that there should be a concrete factor corresponding to each risk which would allow it to be localised in a specific Member State (judgment of 14 June 2001, Kvaerner, C‑191/99, EU:C:2001:332, paragraph 44).
30


Second, the Court has stated that the objective of Article 2(d), final indent, of that directive, was in particular to lay down a residual rule for the determination of the place in which a business risk is situated when that risk is not specifically linked to a building, a vehicle or travel. To that end, emphasis is placed on the place where the activity whose risk is covered by the contract is exercised (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 June 2001, Kvaerner, C‑191/99, EU:C:2001:332, paragraph 46).
Proceedings brought by Klaus Manuel Maria Brisch.
Date: 2019-01-17
22


According to the Court’s settled case-law, it follows from the need for a uniform application of EU law, and the principle of equality, that a provision of EU law, which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope, must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, which must take into account its wording, the scheme underlying the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 June 2018, Oberle, C‑20/17, EU:C:2018:485, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
George Haswani v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2019-01-24
28


The Council, based on the Opinion of the Advocate General in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 9 November 2017, HX v Council (C‑423/16 P, EU:C:2017:848, paragraph 33), considers that the rule deriving from the phrase ‘where appropriate’, in Article 86(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court must be applied on a case-by-case basis and requires an assessment of the merits by the General Court of the need to submit modified pleas in law and arguments. That interpretation is based on the fact that formal requirements, such as those in Article 86(3)(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, are intended to ensure the adversarial nature of proceedings and to enable the General Court to make an informed ruling and not for the sake of it. The General Court has a degree of discretion in that regard.
31


It must be recalled that Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court govern the conditions under which the applicant may, by exception to the principle that forms of order are unalterable, modify the application if a measure whose annulment is sought by the General Court is replaced or amended by another measure with the same subject matter (see, in particular, judgment of 9 November 2017, HX v Council, C‑423/16 P, EU:C:2017:848, paragraph 18).
35


In that regard, the Court of Justice has found, while it is perfectly in order for modification of the application to be subject to certain formal requirements, such formal requirements do not apply for their own sake but are, on the contrary, intended to ensure the adversarial nature of proceedings and the sound administration of justice (judgment of 9 November 2017, HX v Council, C‑423/16 P, EU:C:2017:848, paragraph 23).
40


In that examination, the General Court is not required to invite the applicant beforehand to regularise the failure to submit modified pleas in law and arguments. As the Advocate General observed in points 48 to 57 of his Opinion, the responsibility for assessing the need to modify the pleas in law and arguments in the application is the applicant’s, who takes the initiative in pursuing the case and delimiting its subject matter, in particular by the forms of order and pleas in law that he submits, whether that is in the context of a request for modification or in the context of the originating application (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 November 2017, British Airways v Commission, C‑122/16 P, EU:C:2017:861, paragraphs 86 and 87).
41


In that connection, it should be recalled that, although, by the judgment of 9 November 2017, HX v Council (C‑432/16 P, EU:C:2017:848, paragraphs 22 to 27), the Court criticised the General Court for failing to put the applicant in a position beforehand to regularise the request for modification due to the failure to produce the separate document required by Article 86(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, that was because of circumstances specific to the case — an ambiguity in the language version of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court corresponding to the language of the proceedings chosen by the applicant.
Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank v D. Balandin and Others.
Date: 2019-01-24
29


It follows both from the requirements of the uniform application of EU law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of EU law which, like Article 1 of Regulation No 1231/2010, contains no express reference to the law of the Member States in order to determine its meaning and scope must normally be interpreted autonomously and uniformly throughout the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2013, Brey, C‑140/12, EU:C:2013:565, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
31


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that it is settled case-law of the Court that the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all EU languages. Where there is a divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and purpose of the rules of which it forms part (see judgment of 20 December 2017, Gusa, C‑442/16, EU:C:2017:1004, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
33


According to Article 1(j) of Regulation No 883/2004, the term ‘residence’ means the place where a person habitually resides. It is distinct from the concept of ‘stay’ which Article 1(k) of that regulation defines as temporary residence. The residence of the person concerned, within the meaning of Article 1(j) of the regulation, is therefore subject to a factual assessment and its determination is made on the basis of the place where the person’s habitual centre of interest is located (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 June 2014, I, C‑255/13, EU:C:2014:1291, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
35


As is apparent from recital 15 thereof, the objective of Regulation No 883/2004 is to prevent the persons concerned from being left without social security cover because there is no legislation which is applicable to them, and to ensure that the persons concerned are subject to the social security scheme of only one Member State, so that the complications arising from more than one system of national legislation being applicable are avoided (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 June 2014, I, C‑255/13, EU:C:2014:1291, paragraphs 40 and 42 and the case-law cited).