Deutsche Post AG and Klaus Leymann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen.
Date: 2019-11-21
36


In order to answer that question, it should be noted that the Court has repeatedly declared that it has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on questions concerning provisions of EU law in situations in which, even if the facts of the case in the main proceedings do not fall within the field of application of EU law directly, provisions of EU law have been rendered applicable by domestic law due to a reference made by that law to the content of those provisions. In such a situation, it is clearly in the interest of the European Union that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, provisions taken from EU law should be interpreted uniformly (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 October 1990, Dzodzi, C‑297/88 and C‑197/89, EU:C:1990:360, paragraph 37, and of 13 March 2019, E., C‑635/17, EU:C:2019:192, paragraphs 35 and 36 and the case-law cited).
37


Thus, an interpretation by the Court of provisions of EU law in situations not falling within the scope of EU law is warranted where such provisions have been made applicable to such situations by national law directly and unconditionally, in order to ensure that those situations and situations falling within the scope of EU law are treated in the same way (judgment of 13 March 2019, E., C‑635/17, EU:C:2019:192, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
40


In addition, the referring court, with exclusive jurisdiction to interpret national law under the framework of the system of judicial cooperation enshrined in Article 267 TFEU (see, by analogy, judgment of 7 November 2018, K and B, C‑380/17, EU:C:2018:877, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited), made clear in its order for reference that the FPersV reproduces the provisions of that regulation in order to extend them to vehicles with a maximum permissible mass of between 2.8 and 3.5 tonnes, referring expressly to the requirements of EU law. Moreover, as is apparent from the order for reference in Case C‑203/18, it is clear from the documents relating to the origin of Paragraph 18(1)(4) of the FPersV that the German legislature ‘wanted to make full use of the exception in Article 13(1)(d) of Regulation No 561/2006’, and thus harmonised the treatment of domestic situations with that of situations covered by Regulation No 561/2006.
46


In order to answer those questions, it must be recalled that, in accordance with recital 17 and Article 1 of Regulation No 561/2006, the aims of that regulation are to harmonise the conditions of competition with regard to the road sector and to improve working conditions and road safety (judgment of 7 February 2019, NK, C‑231/18, EU:C:2019:103, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
50


It must be pointed out in that regard that, as an exception from Articles 5 to 9 of Regulation No 561/2006, the conditions for applying the first subparagraph of Article 13(1)(d) of that regulation are to be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, in relation to the second subparagraph of Article 13(1)(d) of that regulation, judgment of 28 July 2011, Seeger, C‑554/09, EU:C:2011:523, paragraph 33, and, in relation to Article 13(1)(p) of Regulation No 561/2006, judgment of 7 February 2019, NK, C‑231/18, EU:C:2019:103, paragraph 21). Furthermore, the scope of that exception must be determined taking into account the wording, context and aims of the legislation at issue in the main proceedings.
54


As the Commission in essence submits, in its written observations, the absence of the term ‘exclusively’ in the wording of one of the exceptions listed in Article 13(1) of Regulation No 561/2006 does not necessarily have to lead to the contrary inference that it should be interpreted broadly. It is sufficient, in that regard, to recall that the Court has already held, in the case of the use, albeit only partial, of vehicles for purposes other than those expressly referred to in Article 13(1) of Regulation No 561/2006, that the exceptions laid down by that provision are not applicable (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2014, A. Karuse, C‑222/12, EU:C:2014:142, paragraphs 31 and 35).
55


In addition, the interpretation of the exception set out in Article 13(1)(d) of Regulation No 561/2006 upheld by the Court in paragraph 52 of the present judgment is borne out by the aims of that regulation, which must be taken into account for the purposes of determining the scope of that exception (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2014, A. Karuse, C‑222/12, EU:C:2014:142, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
57


A broad interpretation of the exception set out in Article 13(1)(d) of Regulation No 561/2006 could result in Deutsche Post drivers — that is to say, a large number of drivers — no longer benefiting from the protection of their working conditions as laid down by Regulation No 561/2006, which would run counter to the objective of improving social conditions for those employees. Moreover, the effect of such an extension of the exception provided for in Article 13(1)(d) of Regulation No 561/2006 is likely to be that all Deutsche Post vehicles — that is to say, a large number of vehicles — might legally be driven by such drivers for long hours without a rest, which would be likely seriously to undermine the objective of road safety (see, by analogy, judgment of 28 July 2011, Seeger, C‑554/09, EU:C:2011:523, paragraphs 35 and 36).
58


In addition, such a broad interpretation of the exception at issue in the main proceedings would be likely also to undermine the objective of eliminating disparities capable of distorting competition in the road transport sector. An undertaking such as Deutsche Post carrying out its activities in the field of the universal postal service, but which also supplies ordinary postal services, while exempted from the requirements laid down in Articles 5 to 9 of Regulation No 561/2006, would thus enjoy a competitive advantage over competing undertakings, such as UPS Deutschland and others, which only supply ordinary postal services (see, to that effect, in particular, judgment of 13 March 2014, A. Karuse, C‑222/12, EU:C:2014:142, paragraph 32).
65


In that regard, the Court has recently ruled that delivery of an item with added value, that is an item with an add-on service, must be distinguished from the universal service as a basic service. What distinguishes express mail services from the universal postal service is the added value which they bring to customers, for which the customers agree to pay more. These are specific services, dissociable from the service of general interest, which meet the special needs of economic operators and call for certain additional services not offered by the traditional postal service (judgment of 31 May 2018, Confetra and Others, C‑259/16 and C‑260/16, EU:C:2018:370, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).