larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2004-03-04
57. In this respect, it should be recalled that Article 8(1) of Regulation No 729/70 imposes on the Member States the obligation to take the measures necessary to satisfy themselves that the transactions financed by the EAGGF are actually carried out and are executed correctly, to prevent and deal with irregularities and to recover sums lost as a result of irregularities or negligence, even if the specific Community act does not expressly provide for the adoption of particular supervisory measures (Case C-373/99 Greece  v Commission [2001] ECR I-9619, paragraph 9).
58. The Court has consistently held that the Commission, in order to prove an infringement of the rules on the common organisation of the agricultural markets, is required not to demonstrate exhaustively that the checks carried out by the national authorities are inadequate, or that the data submitted by them are incorrect, but to adduce evidence of serious and reasonable doubt on its part regarding the checks or data.  The reason for this mitigation of the burden of proof on the Commission is that it is the Member State which is best placed to collect and verify the data required for the clearance of EAGGF accounts and, consequently, it is for that State to adduce the most detailed and comprehensive evidence that its checks or data are accurate and, if appropriate, that the Commission’s statements are incorrect (see in particular Case C-278/98  Netherlands  v Commission  [2001] ECR I-1501, paragraphs 39 to 41, and Case C-329/00 Spain  v Commission  [2003] ECR I-6103, paragraph 68).
60. Therefore, just as it is not for the Commission to rule on the allocation of powers by the institutional rules proper to each Member State, or on the obligations which may be imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany and Länder authorities respectively (see Case C-8/88 Germany  v Commission  [1990] ECR I-2321, paragraph 13), that allocation cannot constitute a sufficient reason to restructure the Member States’ obligations towards the Community in connection with the apportionment of the burden of proof of an infringement of the rules on the common organisation of the agricultural markets (also see, on this point, Case C-52/91 Commission v Netherlands  [1993] ECR I-3069, paragraph 36, Case C-140/00 Commission  v United Kingdom  [2002] ECR I-10379, paragraph 60, and Case C-89/03 Commission  v Luxembourg  [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 5).
61. Extrapolation of the data of certain Länder to others is not therefore prohibited in principle. It must, however, always be justified by the evidence.
79. It should be noted that the duty to cooperate in good faith which follows from Article 10 EC governs relations between the Member States and the institutions. It entails an obligation on the Member States to take all the measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law and imposes on Member States and the Community institutions mutual duties to cooperate in good faith (Case C-339/00 Ireland v Commission [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 71, and the case-law cited therein).
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt v Kazimieras Viluckas (C-238/02) and Ricardas Jonusas (C-246/02).
Date: 2004-03-04
22. It is clear from the wording and the broad logic of Articles 4(19), 38(1) and 40 of the Customs Code that all goods introduced into the customs territory of the Community must be presented to customs.  The fact that certain goods were concealed in secret compartments in the vehicle in which they were transported does not have the effect of releasing them from that obligation.
28. As discussed in the reply to the first two questions, an introduction is considered unlawful when goods, including those concealed in a vehicle without its driver’s knowledge, were not declared by that driver upon presentation to customs.
29. Consequently, even if other persons can be declared debtors in respect of the same goods on the basis of the other provisions of Article 202(3) of the Customs Code, the person who in practical terms introduced the goods without declaring them remains the debtor by virtue of the provisions of the first indent of Article 202(3).
Cofinoga Mérignac SA v Sylvain Sachithanathan.
Date: 2004-03-04
25. It should be noted in that regard that it is clear from the recitals in the preamble thereto that the Directive was adopted with the dual aim of ensuring both the creation of a common market in consumer credit (third to fifth recitals) and the protection of consumers who avail themselves of such credit (sixth, seventh and ninth recitals) (Case C-208/98 Berliner Kindl Brauerei [2000] ECR I-1741, paragraph 20).
26. Informing the consumer of the total cost of credit, in the form of an interest rate calculated according to a single mathematical formula, is of critical importance in this regard. First, this information, which, under Article 3 of the Directive, must be stated in any advertising, contributes to the transparency of the market, as it enables the consumer to compare offers of credit. Secondly, it enables the consumer to assess the extent of his liability.
Peter Haackert v Pensionsversicherungsanstalt der Angestellten.
Date: 2004-03-04
30. Where, pursuant to Article 7(1)(a) of the directive, a Member State prescribes different pensionable ages for men and women for the purposes of granting old-age and retirement pensions, the scope of the permitted derogation, defined by the words ‘possible consequences thereof for other benefits’, contained in Article 7(1)(a), is limited to the forms of discrimination existing under other benefit schemes which are necessarily and objectively linked to that age difference. That will be the case if those forms of discrimination are objectively necessary to avoid endangering the financial equilibrium of the social security system or in order to ensure coherence between the system of retirement pensions and that of other benefits (see Buchner , paragraphs 23 to 26, and case-law cited therein).
34. In the present case, however, the retirement age fixed for the benefit at issue in the main proceedings and the normal retirement age are objectively linked, not only because the old-age pension is substituted for the early old-age pension on account of unemployment where the persons concerned attain the normal retirement age, but also because the age at which that benefit may be claimed is the same for men as for women, namely three and a half years before the normal retirement age (see, to that effect, Case C-139/95 Balestra  [1997] ECR I-549, paragraph 40).
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 2004-03-09
5. As regards the Luxembourg Government’s arguments relating to the difficulties it had in implementing the provisions of Directive 2000/52, it has consistently been held that difficulties which emerge when it comes to implementing a Community measure cannot constitute a ground for a Member State to exonerate itself from fulfilling its obligations (see, inter alia, Case 128/78  Commission  v United Kingdom  [1979] ECR 419, paragraph 10,  Case C-374/89 Commission  v Belgium  [1991] ECR I-367, paragraph 10, and Case C-327/98 Commission  v France  [2000] ECR I-1851, paragraph 21).
Saatgut-Treuhandverwaltungsgesellschaft mbH v Werner Jäger.
Date: 2004-03-11
50. Nevertheless, it follows both from the requirements of the uniform application of Community law and the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of Community law which includes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community; that interpretation must take into account the context of the provision and the purpose of the legislation in question (Case C-287/98 Linster  [2000] ECR I-6917, paragraph 43, and Case C-40/01 Ansul  [2003] ECR I-2439, paragraph 26).
61. Therefore, for the purposes of this judgment, the Court must, first, refer to paragraphs 46 to 69 and paragraph 71 of the judgment in Schulin.  Second, as to Article 4(3) of Regulation No 1768/95, which STV relies on in support of its interpretation of Article 8(2) of that regulation, it is sufficient to note that Article 4(3) does not impose any additional obligations on farmers but quite simply lays down rules for the purpose of determining who is required to comply with the farmer’s obligations deriving from Article 14 of Regulation No 2100/94.
Commission of the European Communities v Ireland.
Date: 2004-03-11
25. In the present case, it is clear from the wording of Article 3(1) and (2) and Article 5 of the Directive, read in conjunction with paragraphs A(1) and A(2) of Annex I, that the Member States are obliged to identify as waters affected by pollution, or as waters which could be affected by pollution, not only waters intended for human consumption but also all surface freshwaters and groundwaters which have or could have a nitrate concentration in excess of 50 mg/l (Case C-69/99 Commission  v United Kingdom  [2000] ECR I-10979, paragraph 23).
43. In that regard, it must be observed that, under Article 3(1) of the Directive, in conjunction with paragraph A(1) of Annex I thereto, Member States are required to identify eutrophic freshwaters or freshwaters at risk of eutrophication in the near future if action pursuant to Article 5 of the Directive is not taken.
57. A Member State may establish an action programme in respect of all the vulnerable zones on its territory or different programmes for different vulnerable zones or parts of zones in that territory.
Asociación Profesional de Empresas de Reparto y Manipulado de Correspondencia (Asempre) and Asociación Nacional de Empresas de Externalización y Gestión de Envíos y Pequeña Paquetería v Entidad Pública Empresarial Correos y Telégrafos and Administración General del Estado.
Date: 2004-03-11
24. If it is accepted that the Member States are free to impose additional conditions on the definition of self-provision, and thereby limit the situations which are covered by it, they would have the option of extending the services reserved for the universal service provider. However such extension would go against the purpose of the Directive, which, according to recital 8, aims to establish gradual and controlled liberalisation in the postal sector.
30. It must be observed that, under Article 1, the Directive lays down the common rules on the provision of a universal postal service. As is clear from recital 10, the Directive at present constitutes a framework of general principles adopted at Community level, the determination of the exact procedures being a matter for the Member States.
31. The postal services are defined in Article 2(1) of the Directive. That provision provides an exhaustive list of the services consisting in clearance, sorting, transport and delivery of postal items. Article 2(6) of the Directive gives a more detailed description of the definition of postal item. Neither Article 2 nor any other provision of the Directive mentions financial services which may also be provided by the postal services providers.
32. Those financial services are, therefore, not covered by the wording of the Directive and, in the light of its precise and exhaustive character, there is nothing to support an interpretation that the Directive extends to situations which do not in fact fall within its scope.
34. Therefore, the answer to the second question referred by the national court must be that the money order services, which consist in making payments through the public postal network to natural or legal persons on behalf of and on the order of others, are not within the scope of the Directive.
French Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2004-03-23
26. In that regard, the Court takes the view that given the circumstances in the present case, it is not necessary to rule on the objections as to admissibility raised by the Commission, since the form of order sought by the French Republic must in any event be dismissed on the substance.
Substance
40. Nevertheless, this judgment cannot be construed as upholding the Commission’s argument that the fact that a measure such as the Guidelines is not binding is sufficient to confer on that institution the competence to adopt it. Determining the conditions under which such a measure may be adopted requires that the division of powers and the institutional balance established by the Treaty in the field of the common commercial policy be duly taken into account, since in this case the measure seeks to reduce the risk of conflict related to the existence of technical barriers to trade in goods.
Azienda Agricola Giorgio, Giovanni e Luciano Visentin and Others v Azienda di Stato per gli interventi nel mercato agricolo (AIMA), and Caseificio Silvio Belladelli e Figli and Others.
Date: 2004-03-25
39. According to the general principles on which the Community is based and which govern relations between it and the Member States, it is for the latter, under Article 5 of the EC Treaty (now Article 10 EC), to ensure that Community rules are implemented within their territories.  In so far as Community law, including its general principles, does not include common rules to that effect then, when the national authorities implement Community rules, they are to act in accordance with the procedural and substantive rules of their own national law (see, in particular, Case C-285/93 Dominikanerinnen-Kloster Altenhohenau  [1995] ECR I-4069, paragraph 26, and Case C-292/97 Karlsson and Others  [2000] ECR I-2737, paragraph 27).
40. Nevertheless, when adopting measures to implement Community legislation, national authorities must exercise their discretion in compliance with the general rules of Community law, which include the principles of proportionality, legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations (see, to that effect, Case C-313/99 Mulligan and Others  [2002] ECR I-5719, paragraphs 35 and 36).
49. Although the time-limits prescribed by those articles are mandatory (see, to that effect, Case C-356/97 Molkereigenossenschaft Wiedergeltingen  [2000] ECR I-5461, paragraphs 38 to 40), the fact remains that they do not preclude the competent authorities of a Member State from making after-the-event checks and corrections for the purpose of ensuring that that Member State’s production does not exceed the guaranteed global quantity allocated to it.
59. In accordance with settled case-law, the spirit of cooperation which must prevail in preliminary ruling proceedings requires the national court for its part to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to contribute to the administration of justice in the Member States and not to give opinions on general or hypothetical questions (see, inter alia, the judgment in Case C-343/90 Lourenço Dias  [1992] ECR I-4673, paragraph 17, and the order in Case C-485/93 Saddik  [1995] ECR I-511, paragraph 17).
Industrias de Deshidratación Agrícola SA v Administración del Estado.
Date: 2004-03-25
19. It should be pointed out that the Court has held that where there is common organisation of the market in a given sector, the Member States can in principle no longer take action through national provisions adopted unilaterally (Case 154/77 Dechmann  [1978] ECR 1573, paragraph 16). Their legislative competence can only be residual and is limited to situations which are not governed by the Community rules and to cases where those rules expressly give them power to act (Case 48/85 Commission v Germany [1986] ECR 2549, paragraph 12).
20. It should also be noted that where there is a regulation on the common organisation of the market in a given sector, Member States are under an obligation to refrain from taking any measures which might undermine or create exceptions to it. Rules which interfere with the proper functioning of a common organisation of the market are also incompatible with such common organisation, even if the matter in question has not been exhaustively regulated by it (Case C-507/99 Denkavit [2002] ECR I-169, paragraph 32, and Case C-332/00 Belgium v Commission [2002] ECR I-3609, paragraph 29).
Willi Rothley and Others v European Parliament.
Date: 2004-03-30
25. In that regard, it is sufficient to observe that, as is apparent from the actual wording of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC and from settled case-law, a natural or legal person is entitled to bring an action for annulment of a measure which is not a decision addressed to it only if the person is not only directly concerned by the measure but also individually concerned by it (see, inter alia, Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v Commission, paragraph 5), with the result that the provision cannot be interpreted so as to have the effect of setting aside that condition, which is expressly laid down in the Treaty, without going beyond the jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on the Community Courts (see, in particular, Case C‑50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I‑6677, paragraph 44).
27. In that regard, it must nevertheless be observed that, by virtue of settled case-law, the general applicability, and thus the legislative nature, of a measure is not called in question by the fact that it is possible to determine more or less exactly the number or even the identity of the persons to whom it applies at any given time, as long as it is established that it applies to them by virtue of an objective legal or factual situation defined by the measure in question in relation to its purpose (see, inter alia , Case 26/86 Deutz and Geldermann v Council [1987] ECR 941, paragraph 8, and Codorniu  v Council , paragraph 18).
35. Likewise, having found that Community legislation required the Commission, when adopting the contested measure, to take account of the special position of products in transit to the Community, the Court pointed out, in paragraph 11 of the judgment in Sofrimport v Commission , that only certain importers of Chilean apples were in that position, with the result that they constituted a restricted group which was sufficiently well defined in relation to any other importer of such apples and could not be extended after the suspensory measures in issue took effect.
36. Finally, in paragraph 28 of the judgment in Antillean Rice Mills and Others  v Commission , the Court drew particular attention to the fact that the judicial protection which an individual enjoys under the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the EC Treaty (now the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC) must be established on the basis of the specific situation of that individual compared to all other persons concerned.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Sweden.
Date: 2004-03-30
5. The Court has consistently held that a Member State cannot rely on provisions, practices or circumstances in its own legal order to justify failure to implement a directive within the prescribed period (see, inter alia, Case C-276/98 Commission v Portugal [2001] ECR I-1699, paragraph 20, and Case C-352/01 Commission v Spain [2002] ECR I‑10263, paragraph 8).
Privat-Molkerei Borgmann GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Dortmund.
Date: 2004-04-01
23. As the Advocate General stated in point 44 of his Opinion, in the majority of the language versions, the purchaser is to ‘transmit’ or ‘communicate’ to the competent national authority, before 15 May each year, a summary of the statements drawn up for each milk producer.  Such wording implies, rather, that the information must be sent before the deadline.
25. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of a Community text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see Case C-437/97 EKW and Wein & Co  [2000] ECR I-1157, paragraph 42).
30. Furthermore, where it is necessary to interpret a provision of secondary Community law, preference should as far as possible be given to the interpretation which renders the provision consistent with the EC Treaty and the general principles of Community law (Case C-98/91 Herbrink [1994] ECR I-223, paragraph 9) and, more specifically, with the principle of legal certainty.
31. That principle requires in particular that rules such as those before the Court, which may lead to the imposition of charges on the economic operators concerned, must be clear and precise, so that they can know unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and take steps accordingly (Case C‑236/02 Slob [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 37).
Commune de Braine-le-Château (C-53/02) and Michel Tillieut and Others (C-217/02) v Région wallonne, and BIFFA Waste Services SA and Others.
Date: 2004-04-01
33. Chief among those objectives is the protection of public health and the environment, which is the essence of Community legislation relating to waste              (Case C-292/99 Commission  v France  [2002] ECR I-4097, paragraph 44). Those objectives also include the establishment of an integrated and adequate network of disposal installations, taking account of the best available technology not involving excessive costs, a network which must also enable waste to be disposed of in one of the nearest appropriate installations (Article 5(1) and (2) of the Directive).
34. As pointed out before the Court, the location criteria for disposal sites should therefore, where relevant, relate to geological and hydrogeological conditions, the distance of such sites from inhabited areas, the prohibition on establishing installations in the vicinity of sensitive areas or the existence of adequate infrastructure, such as connections to transport networks.
37. In that regard, the Court observed in paragraph 41 of Commission  v France , cited above, that the words ‘as soon as possible’ in Article 7(1) of the Directive are an indication that the time-limit laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 2(1) of Directive 91/156 for the transposition of that directive does not relate to the obligation to draw up waste management plans. If that were the case, the words would be meaningless. The Court accordingly inferred that the words ‘as soon as possible’ are to be interpreted as stipulating, in principle, a reasonable period for compliance by the competent authorities of each Member State with that particular obligation, that period being unconnected with the period laid down for transposition of Directive 91/156.
42. It is true that failure to draw up management plans may lead to an infringement procedure under Article 226 EC against the Member State concerned, seeking to have the Court declare that the Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations  under Article 7 of the Directive. The Court has indeed held that a failure to fulfil the obligation to draw up waste management plans must be regarded as serious ( Commission  v France , cited above, paragraph 44).
45. It is true that Article 8(b) of Directive 1999/31 provides that a landfill permit may not be issued unless the landfill project is in line with the relevant waste management plan or plans referred to in Article 7 of the Directive. None the less, Directive 1999/31 is not applicable to the main proceedings, inasmuch as both the permit issued on 21 May 1999 and the Ministerial Order of 16 December 1998 were formalised before the time-limit for transposing that directive expired.