larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Krohn & Schröder GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen.
Date: 2019-05-22
37


In that regard, the Court has held that any pecuniary charge, whatever its designation and mode of application, which is imposed unilaterally on goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, and which is not a customs duty in the strict sense, constitutes a charge having equivalent effect (judgments of 8 June 2006, Koornstra, C‑517/04, EU:C:2006:375, paragraph 15, and of 26 October 2006, Koninklijke Coöperatie Cosun, C‑248/04, EU:C:2006:666, paragraph 30).
44


In the first place, it should be noted that the Court has held that the concept of ‘person concerned’, within the meaning of Article 212a of the Customs Code, must be understood, in the light of the wording of that provision, as referring to any natural or legal person who is considered to be a customs debtor under any of Articles 202 to 205 of that code, in particular on the ground that that person, by his actions, was the cause of the unlawful introduction of goods into the customs territory of the European Union (judgment of 25 January 2017, Ultra-Brag, C‑679/15, EU:C:2017:40, paragraph 38).
46


In the second place, exemptions from anti-dumping and countervailing duties may be made only under certain conditions, in cases specifically provided for, and thus constitute exceptions to the normal regime for anti-dumping and countervailing duties. The provisions which provide for such exemptions are, therefore, to be interpreted strictly (judgment of 17 September 2014, Baltic Agro, C‑3/13, EU:C:2014:2227, paragraph 24).
55


It should be noted that such a reference is of particular importance in the context of the rules laid down in the implementing regulations, inasmuch as it permits the customs authorities to verify, at the material time, that all the requirements regarding the exemption from anti-dumping and countervailing duties at issue have been satisfied (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2010, Isaac International, C‑371/09, EU:C:2010:458, paragraph 43).
56


Thus, the application of Article 212a of the Customs Code cannot, in those circumstances, lead to the result that such an exemption, which is subject, by virtue of Article 3(1) of Implementing Regulation No 1238/2013 and Article 2(1) of Implementing Regulation No 1239/2013, to conditions, could be granted even where those conditions have not been satisfied (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 July 2010, Isaac International, C‑371/09, EU:C:2010:458, paragraph 44).
ReFood GmbH & Co. KG v Landwirtschaftskammer Niedersachsen.
Date: 2019-05-23
43


In the latter regard, Article 48(2) of that regulation makes reference, in its German language version, to applications for ‘approval’ referred to in paragraph 1 of that article (Anträgen auf Zulassung). However, other language versions of Article 48(2), in particular the Greek, English, French, Italian and Dutch versions, refer only to ‘formats for applications’ referred to in paragraph 1 of that article. According to settled case-law of the Court of Justice, in the case of disparities between the various language versions of a provision of EU law, the wording used in one of those versions cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision or be made to override the other language versions (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 January 2019, Balandin and Others, C‑477/17, EU:C:2019:60, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
44


In the second place, it should be emphasised that recital 11 of Regulation No 1013/2006 shows that the exclusion from the scope of that regulation laid down in Article 1(3)(d) thereof is intended to avoid duplication with Regulation No 1774/2002, which already contained provisions concerning the overall consignment, channelling and movement, including transport, of animal by-products within, into and out of the Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 March 2007, KVZ retec, C‑176/05, EU:C:2007:123, paragraph 47).
V v Institut national d'assurances sociales pour travailleurs indépendants (Inasti) and Securex Integrity ASBL.
Date: 2019-06-06
27


In any event, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, where questions submitted by national courts concern the interpretation of a provision of EU law, the Court of Justice is bound, in principle, to give a ruling unless it is obvious that the request for a preliminary ruling is in reality designed to induce the Court to give a ruling by means of a fictitious dispute, or to deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions, or that the interpretation of EU law requested bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, or that the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 7 December 2010, VEBIC, C‑439/08, EU:C:2010:739, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
32


Thus, that provision applies, first, on condition that the applicable legislation is covered by Title II of Regulation No 1408/71 and, second, on condition that the relevant situation remained unchanged (judgment of 11 April 2013, Jeltes and Others, C‑443/11, EU:C:2013:224, paragraph 50).
35


According to settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only the wording of that provision, but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 21 March 2018, Klein Schiphorst, C‑551/16, EU:C:2018:200, paragraph 34).
41


As the Court has previously stated, according to recitals 4 and 45 of Regulation No 883/2004, the purpose of that regulation is to coordinate Member States’ social security systems in order to guarantee that the right to free movement of persons can be exercised effectively. That regulation modernised and simplified the rules contained in Regulation No 1408/71, while retaining the same objective as the latter (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 March 2018, Klein Schiphorst, C‑551/16, EU:C:2018:200, paragraph 31).
42


Article 11(1) of Regulation No 883/2004 reaffirms the principle of a single applicable law, under which the persons to whom that regulation applies are subject to the legislation of a single Member State. Therefore, that principle aims to avoid the complications which may arise from the simultaneous application of several national forms of legislation and to eliminate unequal treatment, which, for persons moving within the Union, would be the consequence of partial or total overlapping of the applicable legislation (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 March 2006, Piatkowski, C‑493/04, EU:C:2006:167, paragraph 21).
Deichmann SE v European Union Intellectual Property Office.
Date: 2019-06-06
43


Such a classification is also irrelevant in assessing, as in the present case, the genuine use of such a mark. The Court has previously held that the requirements that apply to verification of the genuine use of a mark are analogous to those concerning the acquisition by a sign of distinctive character through use for the purpose of its registration (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 July 2018, Société des produits Nestlé v Mondelez UK Holdings & Services, C‑84/17 P, C‑85/17 P and C‑95/17 P, EU:C:2018:596, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).
44


Additionally, as regards the determination of the subject matter of the mark at issue, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that the graphic representation of a mark must be clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable and objective (judgment of 12 December 2002, Sieckmann, C‑273/00, EU:C:2002:748, paragraph 55).
47


Contrary to the appellant’s reasoning, the fact that the mark at issue has been registered as a figurative mark is not relevant here for the purpose of determining the scope of the application for protection. When assessing the characteristics of a sign, in addition to the graphic representation and any descriptions filed at the time of the application for registration, other material relevant to identifying appropriately the essential characteristics of a sign may be taken into consideration (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 March 2014, Pi-Design and Others v Yoshida Metal Industry, C‑337/12, not published, EU:C:2014:129, paragraph 54).
49


While it is true that, as the appellant states, often a description or a disclaimer for the purposes of delimiting the scope of the protection sought is added to the use of the broken lines in the registration of a trade mark, the fact remains that neither the legislation applicable ratione temporis nor the case-law requires the filing of such declarations. In so far as the appellant submits, in addition, that the EUIPO Guidelines require that a position mark is expressly described as such, it is to be noted that they are not binding legal acts for the purpose of interpreting provisions of EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2012, Leno Merken, C‑149/11, EU:C:2012:816, paragraph 48).
Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów v Orange Polska S.A.
Date: 2019-06-12
30


It should be added that, according to recital 7 of Directive 2005/29, full account should be taken of the context of the individual case concerned in applying that directive, which entails, in Article 8 thereof, an obligation to take account of all the features of the conduct of the trader in the factual context concerned. It should also be borne in mind that the meaning of consumer is of the utmost importance for the purposes of interpreting the provisions of Directive 2005/29. According to recital 18, that directive takes as a benchmark the average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, taking into account social, cultural and linguistic factors (judgment of 13 September 2018, Wind Tre and Vodafone Italia, C‑54/17 and C‑55/17, EU:C:2018:710, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
34


It should also be borne in mind that Article 8 of Directive 2005/29 defines the concept of an ‘aggressive commercial practice’ in particular by the fact that it impairs or is likely to significantly impair the average consumer’s freedom of choice or conduct with regard to a product. It follows that for a service or product to be solicited, the consumer must have made a free choice. That supposes, in particular, that the information provided by the trader to the consumer is clear and adequate (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2018, Wind Tre and Vodafone Italia, C‑54/17 and C‑55/17, EU:C:2018:710, paragraph 45).
35


The information provided, before the conclusion of a contract, on the terms of the contract and the consequences of concluding it is of fundamental importance for a consumer (judgment of 13 September 2018, Wind Tre and Vodafone Italia, C‑54/17 and C‑55/17, EU:C:2018:710, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
36


Account should also be taken of the fact that the objective pursued by Directive 2005/29 is, inter alia, to achieve a high level of consumer protection against unfair commercial practices and that that objective is based on the assumption that, in relation to a trader, the consumer is in a weaker position, particularly with regard to the level of information, especially in a sector as technical as the telecommunications services sector, in which it cannot be denied that there is a major imbalance of information and expertise between the parties (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2018, Wind Tre and Vodafone Italia, C‑54/17 and C‑55/17, EU:C:2018:710, paragraph 54).
Terre wallonne ASBL v Région wallonne.
Date: 2019-06-12
24


Lastly, given the objective of the SEA Directive, which is to provide for such a high level of protection of the environment, the provisions which delimit the scope of the directive, in particular those setting out the definitions of the measures envisaged by the directive, must be interpreted broadly (judgment of 27 October 2016, D’Oultremont and Others, C‑290/15, EU:C:2016:816, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
28


It must, however, be borne in mind that, as regards Directive 85/337, the Court has already ruled that the fact that projects should have beneficial effects is not relevant in determining whether it is necessary to make those projects subject to an assessment of their environmental impact (judgment of 25 July 2008, Ecologistas en Acción-CODA, C‑142/07, EU:C:2008:445, paragraph 41).
34


The Court has interpreted that provision as meaning that plans and programmes whose adoption is regulated by national legislative or regulatory provisions, which determine the competent authorities for adopting them and the procedure for preparing them, must be regarded as ‘required’ within the meaning, and for the application, of the SEA Directive and, accordingly, be subject to an assessment of their environmental effects in the circumstances which it lays down (judgments of 22 March 2012, Inter-Environnement Bruxelles and Others, C‑567/10, EU:C:2012:159, paragraph 31 and of 7 June 2018, Thybaut and Others, C‑160/17, EU:C:2018:401, paragraph 43).
41


In that connection, the Court has ruled that the notion of ‘plans and programmes’ relates to any measure which establishes, by defining rules and procedures, a significant body of criteria and detailed rules for the grant and implementation of one or more projects likely to have significant effects on the environment (judgments of 27 October 2016, D’Oultremont and Others, C‑290/15, EU:C:2016:816, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited, and of 8 May 2019, Verdi Ambiente e Società (VAS) — Aps Onlus and Others, C‑305/18, EU:C:2019:384, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
44


In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the questions referred is that Article 3(2) and (4) of the SEA Directive must be interpreted as meaning that a decree, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, by which a body of a Member State establishes, at regional level for its Natura 2000 network, conservation objectives which have an indicative value, whereas the conservation objectives at site level have a statutory value, is not one of the ‘plans and programmes’, within the meaning of that directive, for which an environmental impact assessment is mandatory.
Google LLC v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Date: 2019-06-13
27


It must first be recalled that the concept of ‘electronic communications service’ is defined, in positive and negative terms, in Article 2(c) of the Framework Directive and that that definition is reproduced in equivalent terms in Article 1(3) of Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and services (OJ 2002 L 249, p. 21) (judgment of 7 November 2013, UPC Nederland, C‑518/11, EU:C:2013:709, paragraphs 36 and 37).
31


As the Court has already pointed out, the various directives making up the new regulatory framework applicable to electronic communications services, in particular the Framework Directive and Directive 2002/77, thus make a clear distinction between the production of content, which involves editorial responsibility, and the transmission of content, which does not entail any editorial responsibility, content and transmission being covered by different measures which pursue their own specific objectives (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 November 2013, UPC Nederland, C‑518/11, EU:C:2013:709, paragraph 41, and of 30 April 2014, UPC DTH, C‑475/12, EU:C:2014:285, paragraph 36).
32


The Court has also held that, to fall within the scope of the concept of ‘electronic communications service’, a service must include the conveyance of signals, and the fact that the conveyance of signals is by means of an infrastructure that does not belong to the service provider is of no relevance to the classification of the nature of the service, since all that matters in that regard is that such a service provider is responsible vis-à-vis the end-users for conveyance of the signal which ensures that they are supplied with the service to which they have subscribed (judgment of 30 April 2014, UPC DTH, C‑475/12, EU:C:2014:285, paragraph 43).
36


As the European Commission pointed out, inter alia, in its written observations, it is (a) the IAPs of the senders and recipients of the emails and, as the case may be, the web-based email service providers and (b) the operators of the various networks of which the open internet is constituted which, essentially, convey the signals necessary for the functioning of any web-based email service, and it is they who bear responsibility in accordance with the judgment of 30 April 2014, UPC DTH (C‑475/12, EU:C:2014:285, paragraph 43).
Cátia Correia Moreira v Município de Portimão.
Date: 2019-06-13
36


It should, first of all, be stated that the national court, in its order for reference, expressly refers to the judgment of 20 July 2017, Piscarreta Ricardo (C‑416/16, EU:C:2017:574, paragraph 46), in which the Court of Justice held, in essence, that Article 1(1) of Directive 2001/23 must be interpreted as meaning that a situation in which the activities of a municipal undertaking are transferred to a municipality falls within the scope of that directive, provided that the identity of that undertaking is preserved after the transfer, which is a matter for the national court to determine.
49


The purpose of that directive is to ensure, as far as possible, that the contract of employment or employment relationship continues unchanged with the transferee, in order to prevent the workers concerned from being placed in a less favourable position solely as a result of the transfer (see judgment of 6 April 2017, Unionen, C‑336/15, EU:C:2017:276, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
53


First of all, it must be observed that, according to settled case-law, the fact that the transferee is a legal person governed by public law is not such as to exclude the existence of a transfer coming within the scope of Directive 2001/23, whether that legal person is a public undertaking responsible for a public service or a municipal authority. Thus, the Court has acknowledged that the fact that the transferee is a municipality does not, as such, preclude that directive from applying to a transfer of the activities of an undertaking to a municipality (see, to that effect, judgement of 20 July 2017, Piscarreta Ricardo, C‑416/16, EU:C:2017:574, paragraphs 30 to 32 and the case-law cited).
54


However, the Court has pointed out, in that respect, that it is clear from the wording of Article 1(1)(c) of Directive 2001/23 that, in order for the directive to apply, the transfer must concern an entity engaged in economic activities, whether or not for gain, and that, in principle, activities which fall within the exercise of public powers are excluded in that respect (judgment of 20 July 2017, Piscarreta Ricardo, C‑416/16, EU:C:2017:574, paragraphs 33 and 34 and the case-law cited).
Skatteverket v Memira Holding AB.
Date: 2019-06-19
26


In fact, as the Advocate General stated in points 65 to 70 of her Opinion, it cannot be excluded from the outset that a third party may take into account for tax purposes the losses of the subsidiary in that subsidiary’s State of establishment, for example following a sale of that subsidiary for a price including the tax advantage represented by the deductibility of losses for the future (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 February 2013, A, C 123/11, EU:C:2013:84, paragraph 52 et seq., and judgment delivered today, Holmen, C‑608/17, paragraph 38).
Skatteverket v Holmen AB.
Date: 2019-06-19
38


In fact, as the Advocate General stated in points 57 to 63 of her Opinion, it cannot be excluded from the outset that a third party may take into account for tax purposes the losses of the subsidiary in that subsidiary’s State of establishment, for example following a sale of that subsidiary for a price including the tax advantage represented by the deductibility of losses for the future (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 February 2013, A, C‑123/11, EU:C:2013:84, paragraph 52 et seq., and judgment delivered today, Memira Holding, C‑607/17, paragraph 26).
Meca Srl v Comune di Napoli.
Date: 2019-06-19
Nevertheless, in a situation where opinions appear to differ as regards the applicable national legislation, it is settled case-law that, in preliminary ruling proceedings brought under Article 267 TFEU, it is not for the Court to specify the relevant provisions of national law applicable to the main proceedings. That is the prerogative of the referring court which, while setting out the internal legal framework, leaves it open to the Court to provide all the criteria for interpreting EU law so as to permit the court making the reference to assess the compatibility of national legislation with EU rules (judgment of 26 June 2008, Burda, C‑284/06, EU:C:2008:365, paragraph 39).
Thus, when the Court interpreted the optional grounds for exclusion, such as those provided for in points (d) and (g) of the first subparagraph  of Article 45(2) of Directive  2004/18, the only provisions which did not refer to national law, the Court relied on the second subparagraph  of Article 45(2) of that directive, under which the Member States were to specify, having regard for EU law, the implementing conditions of paragraph 2, in order to circumscribe more strictly the discretion of the Member States and itself determine the scope of the optional ground for exclusion at issue (see, inter alia, judgment of 13 December 2012, Forposta and ABC Direct Contact, C‑465/11, EU:C:2012:801, paragraphs 25 to 31).
That directive innovates, in particular by laying down, in Article 57(6), the mechanism for adopting corrective measures (‘self-cleaning’). That arrangement, which applies to economic operators which have not been excluded by a final judgment, is designed to encourage an economic operator who is in one of the situations referred to in Article 57(4) of that directive to provide evidence showing that the measures which it has taken are sufficient to demonstrate its reliability despite the existence of a relevant optional ground for exclusion. If such evidence is considered as sufficient, the economic operator concerned must not be excluded from the procurement procedure. For this purpose, the economic operator must prove that it has paid or undertaken to pay compensation in respect of any damage caused by the criminal offence or misconduct, clarified the facts and circumstances in a comprehensive manner by actively collaborating with the investigating authorities and taken concrete technical, organisational and personnel measures that are appropriate to prevent further criminal offences or misconduct.
In that regard, the corrective measures emphasise, as the Advocate General observed in point 44 of his Opinion, the importance attached to the reliability of the economic operator, as that factor profoundly influences the grounds for exclusion that relate to the tenderer’s subjective characteristics.