Ackermann Saatzucht GmbH & Co.KG and Others v European Parliament and Council of the European Union.
Date: 2016-11-24
According to settled case-law, it follows inter alia from Article 168(1)(d) and Article 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (judgment of 24 March 2011, ISD Polska and Others v Commission, C‑369/09 P, EU:C:2011:175, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).
In this regard, the Court has consistently held that a measure of general application such as a legislative act can be of individual concern to natural and legal persons only if it affects them by reason of certain attributes peculiar to them, or by reason of a factual situation which differentiates them from all other persons and distinguishes them individually in the same way as the addressee (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 July 1963, Plaumann v Commission, 25/62, EU:C:1963:17; order of 12 December 2003, Bactria v Commission, C‑258/02 P, EU:C:2003:675, paragraph 34, and the judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraphs 70 and 71).
It is also clear from the Court’s case-law that where a measure affects a group of persons who were identified or identifiable when that measure was adopted by reason of criteria specific to the members of the group, those persons might be individually concerned by that measure inasmuch as they form part of a limited class of traders, particularly when that measure alters rights acquired by the individuals before it was adopted (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2008, Commission v Infront WM, C‑125/06 P, EU:C:2008:159, paragraphs 71 and 72 and the case-law cited).
First, it is clear from that case-law that if a legislative act can individually concern natural or legal persons where it affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them, it is only on condition that those attributes differentiate them from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguish them individually just as in the case of the person addressed (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 April 2003, Commission v Nederlandse Antillen, C‑142/00 P, EU:C:2003:217, paragraphs 68 and 70).
Secondly, according to the case-law referred to in paragraph 31 of the present judgment, persons belonging to a group can be individually concerned by a legislative measure only where those persons were identified or identifiable when the measure was adopted. Thus, a limited group whose members could be individually concerned by an EU measure cannot be extended after the entry into force of that measure (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 June 1990, Sofrimport v Commission, C‑152/88, EU:C:1990:259, paragraph 11), as is the case in respect of a measure capable of applying to an indeterminate number of addressees (see, by analogy, order of 12 December 2003, Bactria v Commission, C‑258/02 P, EU:C:2003:675, paragraphs 34 to 37).
Secondly, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, the General Court was not required to provide an account which follows exhaustively all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case. According to that case-law, the reasoning of the General Court may be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the measures in question were taken and provides the competent court with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 82 and the case-law cited).
In any event, it must be held that none of the provisions of higher-ranking law relied on by the appellants is capable of laying down an obligation on the part of the EU legislature to take account of the consequences for the situation of certain individuals of the act they are intending to adopt, within the meaning of the judgment of 10 April 2003, Commission v Nederlandse Antillen (C‑142/00 P, EU:C:2003:217, paragraph 72).
As regards the protection conferred by Article 47 of the Charter, the Court has previously held that that article is not intended to change the system of judicial review laid down by the Treaties, and particularly the rules relating to the admissibility of direct actions brought before the Courts of the European Union (judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited).
Accordingly, the conditions of admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, but such an interpretation cannot have the effect of setting aside the conditions expressly laid down in that Treaty (judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 98 and the case-law cited).
As regards the appellants’ argument that the interpretation adopted by the General Court of the concept of ‘individual concern’, appearing in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, is incompatible with the fundamental right to effective judicial protection in that its effect is that a directly applicable regulation is virtually immune from judicial review, it must be stated that the protection conferred by Article 47 of the Charter does not require an individual to be unconditionally entitled to bring an action for annulment of such an EU legislative act directly before the Courts of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 105).
Furthermore, as the Council observes, the application of Article 4 of the contested regulation presupposes the adoption of legislative or regulatory provisions by the Member States. Consequently, even though the appellants cannot, because of the conditions governing admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, challenge that regulation directly before the European Union judicature, they can in principle contend that it is invalid before the national courts and cause the latter to refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, pursuant to Article 267 TFEU (see, by analogy, judgment of 19 December 2013, Telefónica v Commission, C‑274/12 P, EU:C:2013:852, paragraph 59).