AKZO Chemie BV and AKZO Chemie UK Ltd v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1986-09-23
30 WITH REGARD TO THE FIRST PART OF THE FOURTH SUBMISSION CONCERNING THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE SYSTEM OF DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLEGIATE RESPONSIBILITY , IT MUST FIRST BE POINTED OUT THAT THAT PRINCIPLE IS TO BE TRACED TO ARTICLE 17 OF THE MERGER TREATY ACCORDING TO WHICH ' THE COMMISSION SHALL ACT BY A MAJORITY OF THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 10 . A MEETING OF THE COMMISSION SHALL BE VALID ONLY IF THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS LAID DOWN IN ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE IS PRESENT ' . THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLEGIATE RESPONSIBILITY THUS LAID DOWN IS FOUNDED ON THE EQUAL PARTICIPATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION IN THE ADOPTION OF DECISIONS AND IT FOLLOWS FROM THAT PRINCIPLE , IN PARTICULAR , THAT DECISIONS SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF A COLLECTIVE DELIBERATION AND THAT ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COLLEGE OF COMMISSIONERS BEAR COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL FOR ALL DECISIONS ADOPTED .
35 WITH REGARD TO THE COMPATIBILITY OF THAT SYSTEM WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLEGIATE RESPONSIBILITY , IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 17 JANUARY 1984 ( JOINED CASES 43 AND 63/82 , VBVB AND VBBB V COMMISSION , ( 1984 ) ECR 19 ), THE MOST RECENT DECISION ON THAT POINT , THE COURT DECIDED THAT THE COMMISSION COULD , WITHIN CERTAIN LIMITS AND SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS , AUTHORIZE ITS MEMBERS TO ADOPT CERTAIN DECISIONS IN ITS NAME WITHOUT THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLEGIATE RESPONSIBILITY WHICH GOVERNED ITS FUNCTIONING BEING IMPAIRED BY SUCH AUTHORIZATION . TWO CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLIE THAT SETTLED CASE-LAW .
36 ON THE ONE HAND , SUCH A SYSTEM OF DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY DOES NOT HAVE THE EFFECT OF DIVESTING THE COMMISSION OF POWERS BY CONFERRING ON THE MEMBER TO WHOM AUTHORITY IS DELEGATED POWERS TO ACT HIS OWN RIGHT . DECISIONS ADOPTED UNDER A DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY ARE ADOPTED IN THE NAME OF THE COMMISSION , WHICH IS FULLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM , AND MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF AN APPLICATION FOR ANNULMENT UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS IF THEY HAD BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE FULL COMMISSION . MOREOVER , THE COMMISSION HAS SET UP MACHINERY MAKING IT POSSIBLE TO RESERVE FOR THE FULL COMMISSION CERTAIN MEASURES WHICH COULD BE ADOPTED UNDER A DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY . FINALLY , IT HAS RETAINED THE RIGHT TO RECONSIDER THE DECISIONS GRANTING DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY .
37 ON THE OTHER HAND , LIMITED TO SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF MEASURES OF MANAGEMENT OR ADMINISTRATION , AND THUS EXCLUDING BY DEFINITION DECISIONS OF PRINCIPLE , SUCH A SYSTEM OF DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY APPEARS NECESSARY , HAVING REGARD TO THE CONSIDERABLE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF DECISIONS WHICH THE COMMISSION IS REQUIRED TO ADOPT , TO ENABLE IT TO PERFORM ITS DUTIES . THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT THE DECISION-MAKING BODY IS ABLE TO FUNCTION CORRESPONDS TO A PRINCIPLE INHERENT IN ALL INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS AND WHICH IS SET OUT IN PARTICULAR IN ARTICLE 16 OF THE MERGER TREATY , ACCORDING TO WHICH ' THE COMMISSION SHALL ADOPT ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE SO AS TO ENSURE THAT BOTH IT AND ITS DEPARTMENTS OPERATE . . . ' .
38 CONTRARY TO WHAT THE APPLICANTS MAINTAIN , A DECISION ORDERING AN UNDERTAKING TO SUBMIT TO AN INVESTIGATION IS A FORM OF PREPARATORY INQUIRY AND AS SUCH , MUST BE REGARDED AS A STRAIGHTFORWARD MEASURE OF MANAGEMENT . THAT IS TRUE EVEN IF THE UNDERTAKINGS ARE OPPOSED TO THE INVESTIGATION . THE POWER CONFERRED ON THE COMMISSION BY ARTICLE 14 ( 3 ) OF REGULATION NO 17 IS EXERCISED PRECISELY AND ABOVE ALL WHEN THE COMMISSION EXPECTS THAT THE UNDERTAKINGS WILL NOT SUBMIT VOLUNTARILY TO AN INVESTIGATION .