larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
European Parliament v Pierre Richard.
Date: 2000-07-13
33 As to whether the plea is well founded, it should be observed at the outset that for a person to have an interest in bringing appeal proceedings the appeal must be likely, if successful, to procure an advantage for that party (Case C-19/93 P Rendo and Others v Commission [1995] ECR I-3319, paragraph 13).
37 As regards the Parliament's first ground of complaint, it should be pointed out that the appointing authority has a wide discretion for the purpose of finding the candidates with the highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity (see, in particular, Case 135/87 Vlachou v Court of Auditors [1988] ECR 2901, paragraph 23).
39 Although the subdivision of Article 29(1) requires the appointing authority to consider the possibility of promotion with the utmost care before going on to the following stage, it does not prevent the authority, in the course of such an examination, from also taking account of the possibility of obtaining better candidates by using the other procedures mentioned in that paragraph. Consequently the appointing authority is at liberty to consider the subsequent options (Case 10/82 Mogensen and Others v Commission [1983] ECR 2397, paragraph 10).
40 It follows that the appointing authority may go on to a subsequent stage of the recruitment procedure, even where there are one or more candidates who satisfy all the conditions and requirements set out in the vacancy notice for the post to be filled.
50 As the Court of First Instance held in paragraph 42 of the contested judgment, the appointing authority is required, when it considers that candidatures for promotion or transfer are not satisfactory, to consider the possibilities offered by Article 29(1)(b) and (c) of the Staff Regulations before following the recruitment procedure (see, in particular, Case C-304/97 P Carbajo Ferrero v Parliament [1999] ECR I-1749, paragraph 29).
Criminal proceedings against Yannick Geffroy and Casino France SNC.
Date: 2000-09-12
18 As to the application of such national legislation to a particular case, it should be remembered that, in principle, it is not for the Court of Justice, pursuant to the division of jurisdiction between the Community Courts and national courts, to rule on the question whether the labelling of certain products is likely to mislead the purchaser or consumer or to determine whether a sales description is potentially misleading. That task is for the national court, even if the provisions in question are identical in substance to the provisions of Community law.
19 The Court would act otherwise only if the information at the Court's disposal appeared to it to be sufficient and the solution is clear (see Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide and Tusky v Oberkreisdirektor Steinfurt [1998] ECR I-4657, paragraph 30). In this case, however, as the Advocate General has pointed out in paragraphs 32 to 35 of his Opinion, the Court does not have the necessary information to rule on this point.
20 When giving a preliminary ruling on a reference, however, the Court may, in appropriate cases, give clarifications to guide the national court in its decision (see Case C-424/97 Haim v Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein [2000] ECR I-5123, paragraph 58).
21 In this respect, the mere fact that the composition of alcoholic drinks made of apples, which have been lawfully manufactured and marketed in a Member State under the description of cider, does not comply with the legislation of another Member State regarding the production of cider is not in itself sufficient to prohibit the marketing of those drinks in that latter Member State under the description of cider on the ground that use of that description would be likely to mislead consumers in that State (see, in relation to foie gras, Case C-184/96 Commission v France [1998] ECR I-6197, paragraph 24).
22 The Court has, however, not excluded the possibility that Member States might require producers or vendors to alter the description of a foodstuff where a product offered for sale under a particular name is so different, in terms of its composition or production, from the products generally understood as falling within that description within the Community that it cannot be regarded as falling within the same category (Case 286/86 Ministère Public v Deserbais [1988] ECR 4907, paragraph 13; Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 23).
23 Where the difference is of minor importance, appropriate labelling should be sufficient to provide the purchaser or consumer with the necessary information. It is for the national court to assess whether that is so in the case at issue in the main proceedings.
The second part of the question
The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Trevor Robert Fisher and Penny Fisher.
Date: 2000-09-14
27 In this regard, it is clear from the second and third recitals in the preamble to Regulation No 3508/92 that it is designed to make administrative and control mechanisms more effective. As the Advocate General has noted in point 42 of his Opinion, an efficient procedure presupposes that the information to be provided by an applicant for aid under Article 6 of the regulation is complete and accurate from the outset and that consequently the applicant is in a position to obtain the information necessary to ensure that the applications which he must submit to the competent authority are valid.
28 It must be observed, furthermore, that an applicant for aid has, in the context of the application of Regulation No 3508/92, an essential and legitimate interest in being able to procure the information necessary to make a proper application for the grant of compensatory payments and to avoid the imposition of penalties.
D. v W.
Date: 2000-09-14
15 First of all, it should be borne in mind that the terms used to specify the exemptions provided for by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that turnover tax is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, in particular, Case 348/87 Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1989] ECR 1737, paragraph 13, and Case C-149/97 Institute of the Motor Industry v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1998] ECR I-7053, paragraph 17).
16 In order to determine whether a genetic test carried out by a doctor to establish the paternity of a child constitutes the provision of medical care within the meaning of Article 13A(1)(c) of the Sixth Directive, it is necessary to compare the various language versions of that provision, as the uniform interpretation of Community law requires. Where there is a difference between the language versions, the provision in question must then be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see, inter alia, Case C-372/88 Milk Marketing Board of England and Wales v Cricket St Thomas Estate [1990] ECR I-1345, paragraph 19, and Case C-437/97 EKW and Wein & Co. [2000] ECR I-0000, paragraph 42).
18 Clearly, therefore, the concept of provision of medical care does not lend itself to an interpretation which includes medical interventions carried out for a purpose other than that of diagnosing, treating and, in so far as possible, curing diseases or health disorders.
20 That interpretation cannot be invalidated by the fact that the expert activities in question may be in the general interest. Article 13A of the Sixth Directive does not provide exemption from VAT for every activity performed in the public interest, but only for those listed and described in detail (judgment in Institute of the Motor Industry, cited above, paragraph 18).
Ministre de la Santé v Jeff Erpelding.
Date: 2000-09-14
27 The answer to be given to the first question must therefore be that a doctor who has obtained in another Member State a diploma in specialised medicine which does not appear on the list of specialist training courses in Article 7 of Directive 93/16 may not rely on Article 19 of that directive to use the corresponding professional title of specialist in the host State.
The second question
30 Since any restriction on the use in the host Member State of an academic title obtained in another Member State is liable to render that title less attractive and hence to hamper the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, it must comply with the requirements of the Treaty (see Case C-19/92 Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-1663, paragraph 32). Community legislation, including Article 10 of Directive 93/16 which is the subject of the national court's question, must likewise be interpreted in the light of those requirements.
European Fertilizer Manufacturers Association (EFMA) v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2000-09-21
43 It also follows from settled case-law that the appraisal by the Court of First Instance of the evidence put before it does not constitute (save where the clear sense of that evidence has been distorted) a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-667, paragraph 42).
Hendrik van der Woude v Stichting Beatrixoord.
Date: 2000-09-21
22 It should be noted that, in Albany, Brentjens' and Drijvende Bokken, the Court held that agreements entered into in the framework of collective bargaining between employers and employees and intended to improve employment and working conditions must, by virtue of their nature and purpose, be regarded as not falling within the scope of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
23 It is therefore necessary to consider whether the nature and purpose of the agreement at issue in the main proceedings warrant its exclusion from the scope of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
26 The fact that the insurance business in question was subcontracted cannot prevent the exception from the prohibition in Article 85 of the Treaty, which was established by Albany, Brentjens' and Drijvende Bokken, from applying in the case of a collective labour agreement such as that in point in the main proceedings. To accept such a limitation would constitute an unwarranted restriction on the freedom of both sides of industry who, when they enter into an agreement concerning a particular aspect of working conditions, must also be able to agree to the creation of a separate body for the purpose of implementing the agreement and this body must be able to have recourse to another insurer.
27 It must therefore be concluded that the agreement at issue in the main proceedings does not, by reason of its nature and purpose, fall within the scope of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
Mediocurso - Estabelecimento de Ensino Particular Ld.ª v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2000-09-21
36 In that connection, it must be pointed out that, according to settled case-law of the Court of Justice, respect for the rights of defence is, in all proceedings initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person, a fundamental principle of Community law which must be guaranteed even in the absence of any rules governing the proceedings in question. That principle, as expounded in paragraph 21 of the judgment in Commission v Lisrestal, cited above, requires that the addressees of decisions which significantly affect their interests should be placed in a position in which they may effectively make known their views.
Carl Borawitz v Landesversicherungsanstalt Westfalen.
Date: 2000-09-21
17 In addressing that question, it must be borne in mind that, within the framework of proceedings brought under Article 177 of the Treaty, the Court does not have jurisdiction to give a ruling on the compatibility of a national measure with Community law. However, it does have jurisdiction to supply the national court with a ruling on the interpretation of Community law so as to enable that court to determine whether such compatibility exists in order to decide the case before it (see, for example, Joined Cases C-37/96 and C-38/96 Sodiprem and Others v Direction Générale des Douanes [1998] ECR I-2039, paragraph 22).
23 In this respect, it must be borne in mind that the object of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1408/71 is to ensure, in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty, equal treatment in matters of social security, without distinction based on nationality, for the persons to whom that regulation applies by abolishing all discrimination in that regard deriving from the national legislation of the Member States (Case C-131/96 Mora Romero v Landesversicherungsanstalt Rheinprovinz [1997] ECR I-3659, paragraph 29).
24 It is settled case-law that the principle of equal treatment, as laid down in that article, prohibits not only overt discrimination based on the nationality of the beneficiaries of social security schemes but also all covert forms of discrimination which, through the application of other distinguishing criteria, lead in fact to the same result (Mora Romero, paragraph 32).
25 Accordingly, conditions imposed by national law must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory where, although applicable irrespective of nationality, they affect essentially migrant workers or where the great majority of those affected are migrant workers, as well as conditions which are applicable without distinction but can more easily be satisfied by national workers than by migrant workers or where there is a risk that they may operate to the particular detriment of migrant workers (Case C-237/94 O'Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR I-2617, paragraph 18).
26 It is otherwise only if those provisions are justified by objective considerations independent of the nationality of the workers concerned, and if they are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued by the national law (O'Flynn, paragraph 19).
27 It is clear from that body of case-law that, unless it is objectively justified and proportionate to its aim, a provision of national law must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory if it is intrinsically liable to affect the nationals of other Member States more than the nationals of the State whose legislation is in point and if there is a consequent risk that it will place the former at a particular disadvantage (see, to that effect, Case C-57/96 Meints v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [1997] ECR I-6689, paragraph 45).
Rijksdienst voor Pensioenen v Robert Engelbrecht.
Date: 2000-09-26
21 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, in the order for reference, the national court explicitly stated that it did not consider it necessary to refer any question on the interpretation of Article 46a of Regulation 1408/71, as amended, with regard to pensions awarded on the basis of voluntary or continued optional insurance.
22 The questions referred by the national court relate, therefore, to the taking into account of a benefit such as the old-age pension granted to Mrs Engelbrecht under the AOW on the basis of compulsory insurance.
35 The Court has consistently held that Community law does not detract from the powers of the Member States to organise their social security systems (Case 238/82 Duphar and Others v Netherlands State [1984] ECR 523, paragraph 16, and Case C-70/95 Sodemare and Others v Regione Lombardia [1997] ECR I-3395, paragraph 27).
36 Accordingly, in the absence of Community harmonisation in this field, the conditions governing the right or obligation to become a member of a social security scheme are a matter to be determined by the legislation of each Member State (Case 110/79 Coonan [1980] ECR 1445, paragraph 12, and Case C-349/87 Paraschi [1991] ECR I-4501, paragraph 15), as are the conditions for entitlement to benefits (Joined Cases C-4/95 and C-5/95 Stöber and Piosa Pereira v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1997] ECR I-511, paragraph 36).
37 While it is true that Article 51 of the Treaty leaves in being differences between the Member States' social security systems and hence in the rights of persons working in the Member States, it is not, however, in dispute that the aim of Articles 48 to 51 of the Treaty would not be met if, through exercising their right to freedom of movement, migrant workers were to lose social security advantages guaranteed to them by the laws of a Member State (Van Munster, paragraph 27).
38 The Court has also consistently held that the duty imposed on Member States by Article 5 of the Treaty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of Community law is incumbent on all the authorities in the Member States, including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts.
39 In this regard, when applying domestic law the national court must, as far as is at all possible, interpret it in a way which accords with the requirements of Community law (Van Munster, paragraph 34, and, to the same effect, Case C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135, paragraph 8).
40 Where application in accordance with those requirements is not possible, the national court must fully apply Community law and protect the rights conferred thereunder on individuals, if necessary disapplying any provision in the measure application of which would, in the circumstances of the case, lead to a result contrary to Community law (see, to similar effect, Case 249/85 Albako v BALM [1987] ECR 2345, paragraph 13 et seq.)
Bärbel Kachelmann v Bankhaus Hermann Lampe KG.
Date: 2000-09-26
16 As far as those arguments are concerned, it is settled case-law that it is solely for the national courts before which the case has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which they submit to the Court (see, inter alia, Case C-387/93 Banchero [1995] ECR I-4663, paragraph 15). Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, in particular, Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59).
17 However, the Court has also stated that, in exceptional circumstances, it can examine the conditions in which the case has been referred to it by the national court in order to assess whether it has jurisdiction (see, to that effect, Case 244/80 Foglia [1981] ECR 3045, paragraph 21). The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Bosman, paragraph 61, and Case C-36/99 Idéal Tourisme [2000] ECR I-6049, paragraph 20).
23 It should be remembered at the outset that it is well settled that where national rules, although worded in neutral terms, work to the disadvantage of a much higher percentage of women than men, they discriminate indirectly against women, unless that difference in treatment is justified by objective factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex (see, in particular, Case C-226/98 Jørgensen [2000] ECR I-2447, paragraph 29).
30 As Community law stands at present, social policy is a matter for the Member States, which enjoy a reasonable margin of discretion as regards the nature of social protection measures and the detailed arrangements for their implementation. If such measures meet a legitimate aim of social policy, are suitable and requisite for attaining that end and are therefore justified by reasons unrelated to discrimination on grounds of sex, they cannot be regarded as being contrary to the principle of equal treatment (Jørgensen, cited above, paragraph 41).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 2000-09-26
18 Measures taken by a Member State which are liable to dissuade its residents from obtaining loans or making investments in other Member States constitute restrictions on movements of capital within the meaning of that provision (see, to that effect, Case C-484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson v Ministre du Logement et de l'Urbanisme [1995] ECR I-3955, paragraph 10, Case C-222/97 Trummer and Mayer [1999] ECR I-1661, paragraph 26, and Case C-439/97 Sandoz v Finanzlandesdirektion für Wien, Niederösterreich und Burgenland [1999] ECR I-7041, paragraph 19), as do measures which make a direct foreign investment subject to prior authorisation (Joined Cases C-163/94, C-165/94 and C-250/94 Sanz de Lera and Others [1995] ECR I-4821, paragraphs 24 and 25, and Case C-54/99 Église de Scientologie de Paris v Prime Minister [2000] ECR I-1335, paragraph 14).
35 In the present case, however, as the Advocate General observes in point 57 of his Opinion, there is no direct link between any fiscal advantage and a corresponding disadvantage which ought to be preserved in order to ensure fiscal coherence.
38 As the Court has already held in Joined Cases C-358/93 and C-416/93 Bordessa and Others [1995] ECR I-361, paragraphs 21 and 22, and Sanz de Lera, paragraph 22, the requisite measures to prevent certain infringements in the field of taxation referred to in Article 73d(1)(b) of the Treaty include measures intended to ensure effective fiscal supervision and to combat illegal activities such as tax evasion.
39 It follows that in the present case the fight against tax evasion and the effectiveness of fiscal supervision may be relied on under Article 73d(1)(b) of the Treaty to justify restrictions of the free movement of capital between Member States.
41 For a measure to be covered by Article 73d of the Treaty, it must comply with the principle of proportionality, in that it must be appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective it pursues and must not go beyond what is necessary to attain it.
45 As appears from Case C-28/95 Leur-Bloem v Inspecteur der Belastingsdienst/Ondernemingen Amsterdam 2 [1997] ECR I-4161, paragraph 44, a general presumption of tax evasion or tax fraud cannot justify a fiscal measure which compromises the objectives of a directive. That applies all the more in the present case, where the contested measure consists in an outright prohibition on the exercise of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by Article 73b of the Treaty.
Cristoforo Bertinetto v Biraghi SpA.
Date: 2000-09-26
17 It should be noted in this regard that, at paragraph 12 of its judgment in Case 10/79 Toffoli and Others v Regione Veneto [1979] ECR 3301, the Court held that national legislation designed to promote and encourage, by any method, the establishment of a uniform producer price for milk, by agreement or by authority, at national or regional level falls, by its nature, outside the bounds of the powers reserved to Member States and conflicts with the principle established by Regulation No 804/68, in particular Article 3 thereof, of attainment of a target producer price for the milk sold by Community producers.
Fábrica de Queijo Eru Portuguesa Ldª v Tribunal Técnico Aduaneiro de Segunda Instância.
Date: 2000-09-26
13 It is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and for ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN. There are also explanatory notes drawn up, as regards the CN, by the Commission and, as regards the HS, by the Customs Cooperation Council, which may be an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various tariff headings but which do not have legally binding force (see, in particular, Case C-201/96 LTM v FIRS [1997] ECR I-6147, paragraph 17, and Case C-280/97 Rose Elektrotechnik [1999] ECR I-689, paragraph 16).
20 Since the explanatory notes are not binding, it must be determined whether their content is compatible with the provisions of the CN and does not alter their scope.