The Queen, on the application of ABNA Ltd and Others v Secretary of State for Health and Food Standards Agency (C-453/03), Fratelli Martini & C. SpA and Cargill Srl v Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e Forestali and Others (C-11/04), Ferrari Mangimi Srl and Associazione nazionale tra i produttori di alimenti zootecnici (Assalzoo) v Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e Forestali and Others (C-12/04) and Nederlandse Vereniging Diervoederindustrie (Nevedi) v Productschap Diervoeder (C-194/04).
Date: 2005-12-06
45. On this point, according to settled case-law, the need to provide an interpretation of Community law which will be of use to the national court makes it necessary that the national court should define the factual and legislative context of the questions it is asking or, at the very least, explain the factual circumstances on which those questions are based (see, inter alia, the order in Case C‑190/02 Viacom  [2002] ECR I‑8287, paragraph 15 and the references there cited, and the judgments in Case C‑134/03 Viacom Outdoor [2005] ECR I‑1167, paragraph 22, and Case C‑145/03 Keller [2005] ECR I‑2529, paragraph 29).
46. The Court has also stressed that it is important for the referring court to set out the precise reasons why it was unsure as to the interpretation of Community law and why it considered it necessary to refer questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling. The Court has thus ruled that it is essential that the referring court provide at the very least some explanation of the reasons for the choice of the Community provisions which it requires to be interpreted and of the link it establishes between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the dispute (see, inter alia, the order in Viacom, cited above, paragraph 16, and the judgment in Case C‑318/00 Bacardi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins [2003] ECR I‑905, paragraph 43).
47. One of the reasons for those requirements is that the information provided in orders for reference must not only be such as to enable the Court to reply usefully but must also enable the Governments of the Member States and other interested parties to submit observations pursuant to Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice (orders in Case C‑422/98 Colonia Versicherung and Others [1999] ECR I‑1279, paragraph 5, and in Viacom , paragraph 14; judgment in Keller , cited above, paragraph 30).
53. As the Council has stated in its observations and argued at the hearing, if the contested measure had not directly had the objective of safeguarding public health, it could have come under Article 37 EC, which also confers competence on the Community legislature. Review of the legal basis of Directive 2002/2 does, however, remain relevant for the purpose of verifying whether the procedure for the adoption of that directive was vitiated by any irregularity (see, in this connection, Case C‑491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECR I‑11453, paragraph 111).
54. According to settled case-law, in the context of the organisation of the powers of the European Community the choice of the legal basis for a measure must rest on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review. Those factors include in particular the aim and content of the measure (see, in particular, Case C-269/97 Commission  v Council  [2000] ECR I‑2257, paragraph 43, Case C-36/98 Spain  v Council  [2001] ECR I-779, paragraph 58, and British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco , cited above, paragraph 93).
63. It is settled case-law that the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified ( Arnold André , cited above, paragraph 68; Swedish Match , cited above, paragraph 70; and Joined Cases C‑154/04 and C‑155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and Others [2005] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 115).
68. According to settled case-law, the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of Community law, requires that measures implemented through Community provisions be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it ( Arnold André , paragraph 45, and Swedish Match , paragraph 47).
69. With regard to judicial review of the conditions referred to in the previous paragraph, it should be noted that the Community legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in an area such as that in issue in the present case, which involves political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called on to undertake complex assessments. Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in that area can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institutions are seeking to pursue (see, in this regard, Arnold André , paragraph 46, Swedish Match , paragraph 48, and Alliance for Hatural Health and Others , cited above, paragraph 52).
Observations submitted to the Court
87. It must be noted in this regard that, as is clear from settled case-law, the right to property, in the same way as the freedom to pursue an economic activity, forms part of the general principles of Community law. However, those principles are not absolute but must be viewed in relation to their social function. Consequently, the exercise of the right to property and the freedom to pursue an economic activity may be restricted, provided that any restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and do not constitute in relation to the aim pursued a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the rights guaranteed (see, most recently, Alliance for Natural Health and Others , cited above, paragraph 126).
103. As the Court has held in its judgment in Joined Cases C‑143/88 and C‑92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest [1991] ECR I‑415, paragraph 18 (‘ Zuckerfabrik ’), references for preliminary rulings on the validity of a measure, like actions for annulment, allow the legality of acts of the Community institutions to be reviewed. In the context of actions for annulment, Article 242 EC enables applicants to request enforcement of the contested act to be suspended and empowers the Court to order such suspension. The coherence of the system of interim legal protection therefore requires that national courts should also be able to order suspension of enforcement of a national administrative measure based on a Community regulation, the legality of which is contested (see also Case C‑465/93 Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others (I) [1995] ECR I‑3761, paragraph 22, and Case C‑68/95 T. Port [1996] ECR I‑6065, paragraph 49; on the Court’s lack of jurisdiction to order interim measures in the context of preliminary-ruling proceedings, see the order of the President of the Court in Case C‑186/01 R Dory [2001] ECR I‑7823, paragraph 13).
104. The Court has, however, ruled that the uniform application of Community law, which is a fundamental requirement of the Community legal order, means that the suspension of enforcement of administrative measures based on a Community regulation, whilst it is governed by national procedural law, in particular as regards the making and examination of the application, must in all the Member States be subject, at the very least, to conditions which are uniform so far as the granting of such relief is concerned and which it has defined as being the same conditions as those of the application for interim relief brought before the Court ( Zuckerfabrik , cited above, paragraphs 26 and 27).
105. The Court has pointed out in particular that, in order to determine whether the conditions relating to urgency and the risk of serious and irreparable damage have been satisfied, the national court dealing with the application for interim relief must examine the circumstances particular to the case before it and consider whether immediate enforcement of the measure which is the subject of the application for interim relief would be likely to result in irreversible damage to the applicant which could not be made good if the Community act were to be declared invalid ( Zuckerfabrik , paragraph 29; Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others (I), cited above, paragraph 41).
106. As the court responsible for applying, within the framework of its jurisdiction, the provisions of Community law and consequently under an obligation to ensure that Community law is fully effective, the national court, when dealing with an application for interim relief, must take account of the damage which the interim measure may cause to the legal regime established by a Community measure for the Community as a whole. It must consider, on the one hand, the cumulative effect which would arise if a large number of courts were also to adopt interim measures for similar reasons and, on the other, those special features of the applicant’s situation which distinguish it from the other operators concerned ( Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others (I), paragraph 44).
107. In particular, if the grant of interim relief may represent a financial risk for the Community, the national court must also be in a position to require the applicant to provide adequate guarantees, such as the deposit of money or other security ( Zuckerfabrik , paragraph 32; Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others (I), paragraph 45).