The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Nana Yaa Konadu Yiadom.
Date: 2000-11-09
24 The Court has consistently held that the principle of freedom of movement of persons must be given a broad interpretation (see, to that effect, Case C-292/89 Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745, paragraph 11; and Case C-344/95 Commission v Belgium [1997] ECR I-1035, paragraph 14), whereas derogations from that principle must be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, Case 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337, paragraph 18; Case 67/74 Bonsignore v Stadt Köln [1975] ECR 297, paragraph 6; and Case 139/85 Kempf v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1986] ECR 1741, paragraph 13).
26 It should also be recalled that the need for uniform application of Community law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of Community law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community; that interpretation must take into account the context of the provision and the purpose of the legislation in question (Case 327/82 Ekro v Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees [1984] ECR 107, paragraph 11; and Case C-287/98 State of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg v Linster and Others [2000] ECR I-6917, paragraph 43).
29 The provisions of Article 9 of the Directive complement those of Article 8. Their purpose is to provide minimum procedural safeguards for persons affected by one of the measures referred to in the three cases mentioned in Article 9(1), namely where there is no right of appeal to a court of law, or where such appeal lies only in respect of the legal validity of the decision, or where the appeal cannot have suspensory effect (Joined Cases C-65/95 and C-111/95 Shingara and Radiom [1997] ECR I-3343, paragraph 34).
30 The Court held that those three cases must be taken into account in relation both to measures referred to in Article 9(1) of the Directive and to those mentioned in Article 9(2) thereof (Shingara and Radiom, paragraph 37).
31 Accordingly, Article 9(1) of the Directive provides that, in those cases, a decision refusing renewal of a residence permit or ordering the expulsion of the holder of a residence permit from the territory may not be taken, save in cases of urgency, until an opinion has been obtained from a competent authority of the host Member State before which the person concerned enjoys such rights of defence and of assistance or representation as the domestic law of that country provides for.
35 The Court has, moreover, interpreted Article 8 of the Directive as meaning that there may not be inferred from that provision an obligation for the Member States to permit a foreign national to remain in their territory for the duration of the proceedings, so long as he is able nevertheless to obtain a fair hearing and to present his defence in full (Case 98/79 Pecastaing v Belgium [1980] ECR 691, paragraph 13).
42 All that must be taken into account is the time which elapsed between the physical entry into the territory and the competent authority's decision refusing admission, since the time which elapsed as a result of bringing legal proceedings having a suspensory effect and the grant of permission to take up employment pending the determination of those proceedings are not relevant for the purpose of determining the nature of that decision and its classification under the Directive (see, to that effect, Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1990] ECR I-3461, paragraph 31).