Gianpaolo Paoletti and Others v Procura della Repubblica.
Date: 2016-10-06
13


It is to be recalled in respect of those submissions that the Charter’s field of application so far as concerns action by the Member States is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, according to which the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing European Union law (judgment of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 17).
14


It follows from the Court’s case-law that the concept of ‘implementing Union law’, as referred to in Article 51 of the Charter, assumes a degree of connection between an EU legal measure and the national measure in question, above and beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those matters having an indirect impact on the other (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 March 2014, Siragusa, C‑206/13, EU:C:2014:126, paragraph 24).
15


These considerations correspond to those underlying Article 6(1) TEU, according to which the provisions of the Charter are not to extend in any way the competences of the European Union as defined in the Treaties (judgment of 8 May 2014, Pelckmans Turnhout, C‑483/12, EU:C:2014:304, paragraph 21).
18


Irrespective of whether Legislative Decree No 286/1998 was adopted in order to transpose into Italian law the provisions of Directive 2002/90 and Framework Decision 2002/946, criminal proceedings to curb facilitation of illegal immigration, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, are intended to ensure the implementation of that directive and of that framework decision (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraphs 27 and 28).
21


As provided for in Article 6(3) TEU, fundamental rights recognised by the ECHR constitute general principles of EU law. Article 52(3) of the Charter provides, moreover, that the rights contained in the Charter which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR are to have the same meaning and scope as those laid down by the ECHR. The latter does not, nonetheless, constitute, as long as the European Union has not acceded to it, a legal instrument which has been formally incorporated into EU law (judgments of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 44, and of 15 February 2016, N., C‑601/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:84, paragraph 45).
22


Therefore, reference should be made solely to Article 6 TEU and to Article 49 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 November 2012, Otis and Others, C‑199/11, EU:C:2012:684, paragraph 47, and of 15 February 2016, N., C‑601/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:84, paragraph 46).
25


In that regard, it should be noted that that principle, as enshrined in Article 49(1) of the Charter, is part of primary EU law. Even before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which conferred on the Charter the same legal value as the treaties, the Court held that that principle followed from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and, therefore, had to be regarded as forming part of the general principles of EU law, which national courts must respect when applying national law (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 May 1997, Kremzow, C‑299/95, EU:C:1997:254, paragraph 14).
27


The application of the more lenient criminal law necessarily involves a succession of laws over time and is based on the conclusion that the legislature changed its position either on the criminal classification of the act or the penalty to be applied to an offence.
37


In addition, the Court has repeatedly held that the provisions on EU citizenship are applicable as soon as they enter into force and must therefore be applied to the present effects of situations arising previously (judgments of 11 July 2002, D’Hoop, C‑224/98, EU:C:2002:432, paragraph 25, and of 21 December 2011, Ziolkowski and Szeja, C‑424/10 and C‑425/10, EU:C:2011:866, paragraph 58).
41


It follows that, in the present case, that criminal offence does not constitute a situation arising before the accession of Romania to the European Union which had not produced all its effects before that accession (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2014, X, C‑318/13, EU:C:2014:2133, paragraphs 22 and 23).