Brahim Samba Diouf v Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration.
Date: 2011-07-28
29. For the purpose of analysing this question, it is necessary, as a preliminary matter, to note that the procedures put in place by Directive 2005/85 are minimum standards and that the Member States have, in a number of respects, a margin of assessment with regard to the implementation of those provisions in the light of the particular features of national law.
49. That principle is a general principle of EU law to which expression is now given by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (see Case C‑279/09 DEB  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 30 and 31, and the order in Case C‑457/09 Chartry  [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 25).
54. It is appropriate, in that regard, to recall that, in Case C‑13/01 Safalero  [2003] ECR I‑8679, paragraphs 54 to 56, the Court held that the principle of effective judicial protection of the rights which the EU legal order confers on individuals is to be construed as not precluding national legislation under which an individual cannot bring court proceedings to challenge a decision taken by the public authorities, where there is available to that individual a legal remedy which ensures respect for the rights conferred on him by EU law and which enables him to obtain a judicial decision finding the provision in question to be incompatible with EU law.
57. As regards judicial review within the framework of a substantive action against the decision rejecting the application for international protection, the effectiveness of that action would not be guaranteed if – because of the impossibility of bringing an appeal under Article 20(5) of the Law of 5 May 2006 – the reasons which led the Minister for Labour, Employment and Immigration to examine the merits of the application under an accelerated procedure could not be the subject of judicial review. In a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the reasons relied on by that Minister in order to use the accelerated procedure are in fact the same as those which led to that application being rejected. Such a situation would render review of the legality of the decision impossible, as regards both the facts and the law (see, by analogy, Case C‑506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I‑8613, paragraphs 60 to 62).
59. In that regard, it should be noted that it is not for the Court, in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling, to give a ruling on the interpretation of provisions of national law or to decide whether the interpretation given by the national court of those provisions is correct. Indeed, only the national courts are competent to decide upon the interpretation of domestic law (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑378/07 to 380/07 Angelidaki and Others [2009] ECR I‑3071, paragraph 48).
60. However, in that context, attention should also be drawn to the requirement that national law be interpreted in conformity with EU law, which permits national courts, for the matters within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law when they determine the disputes before them (see, inter alia, Case C‑268/06 Impac t [2008] ECR I‑2483, paragraph 99). The principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law requires national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that the directive in question is fully effective and achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (see Impact , paragraph 101 and the case-law cited).
61. The objective of Directive 2005/85 is to establish a common system of safeguards serving to ensure that the Geneva Convention and the fundamental rights are fully complied with. The right to an effective remedy is a fundamental principle of EU law. In order for that right to be exercised effectively, the national court must be able to review the merits of the reasons which led the competent administrative authority to hold the application for international protection to be unfounded or made in bad faith, there being no irrebuttable presumption as to the legality of those reasons. It is also within the framework of that remedy that the national court hearing the case must establish whether the decision to examine an application for asylum under an accelerated procedure was taken in compliance with the procedures and basic guarantees laid down in Chapter II of Directive 2005/85, as provided for in Article 23(4) of the directive.
66. As regards the fact that the time-limit for bringing an action is 15 days in the case of an accelerated procedure, whilst it is 1 month in the case of a decision adopted under the ordinary procedure, the important point, as the Advocate General has stated in point 63 of his Opinion, is that the period prescribed must be sufficient in practical terms to enable the applicant to prepare and bring an effective action.
69. As regards the fact that the applicant for asylum has the benefit of two levels of jurisdiction only in relation to a decision adopted under the ordinary procedure, Directive 2005/85 does not require there to be two levels of jurisdiction. All that matters is that there should be a remedy before a judicial body, as is guaranteed by Article 39 of Directive 2005/85. The principle of effective judicial protection affords an individual a right of access to a court or tribunal but not to a number of levels of jurisdiction.