GE Healthcare GmbH v Hauptzollamt Düsseldorf.
Date: 2017-03-09
30


At the outset, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law of the Court, the objective of EU law on customs valuation is to introduce a fair, uniform and neutral system excluding the use of arbitrary or fictitious customs values. The customs value must thus reflect the real economic value of imported goods and therefore take into account all of the elements of such goods that have economic value (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 November 2006, Compaq Computer International Corporation, C‑306/04, EU:C:2006:716, paragraph 30, and of 16 June 2016, EURO 2004. Hungary, C‑291/15, EU:C:2016:455, paragraphs 23 and 26).
31


In particular, by virtue of Article 29 of the Customs Code, the customs value of imported goods is, in principle, the transaction value, that is to say, the price actually paid or payable for the goods when they are sold for export to the customs territory of the European Union, adjusted, where necessary, in accordance with Article 32 of that code (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 December 2013, Christodoulou and Others, C‑116/12, EU:C:2013:825, paragraphs 38, 44 and 50, and of 21 January 2016, Stretinskis, C‑430/14, EU:C:2016:43, paragraph 15).
33


Under Article 157(1) of Regulation No 2454/93, ‘royalties and licence fees’ for the purposes of Article 32(1)(c) of the Customs Code are to be taken to mean, in particular, payment for the use of rights relating ‘to the sale for exportation of imported goods (in particular, trade marks, registered designs)’ or ‘to the use or resale of imported goods (in particular, copyright, manufacturing processes inseparably embodied in the imported goods)’.
45


The conclusions of the Customs Code Committee, although they do not have legally binding force, nevertheless constitute an important means of ensuring the uniform application of the Customs Code by the customs authorities of the Member States and as such may be regarded as a valid aid to the interpretation of the Code (judgment of 6 February 2014, Humeau Beaupréau, C‑2/13, EU:C:2014:48, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
60


In those circumstances, the Court considers, as the Advocate General stated in point 51 of his Opinion, that the payment of a royalty or of a licence fee is a ‘condition of sale’ of the goods being valued where, in the course of the contractual relations between the buyer, or the person related to him, and the seller, the payment of the royalty or of the licence fee is so important to the seller that, without such payment, the seller would not have concluded the sales contract, this being a matter to be determined by the referring court.
65


However, according to settled case-law of the Court, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. Such an approach would be incompatible with the requirement that EU law be applied uniformly. Where there is a divergence between the various language versions, the provision in question must thus be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and the purpose of the rules of which it forms part (judgment of 15 November 2011, Kurcums Metal, C‑558/11, EU:C:2012:721, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
75


It should be borne in mind that, where the customs value cannot be determined by the transaction value of the goods being valued in accordance with Article 29 of the Customs Code, the customs valuation is to be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article 30 of that code by applying sequentially the methods laid down in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 2 of that article (judgment of 16 June 2016, EURO 2004. Hungary, C‑291/15, EU:C:2016:455, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
76


If it is no longer possible to determine the customs value of the imported goods on the basis of Article 30 of the Customs Code, the customs valuation is to be carried out in accordance with the provisions under Article 31 of that code (judgment of 16 June 2016, EURO 2004. Hungary, C‑291/15, EU:C:2016:455, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
77


Consequently, it is clear, both from the wording of Articles 29 to 31 of the Customs Code and from the order in which the criteria for determining the customs value must be applied pursuant to those articles, that those provisions are subordinately linked to each other. Thus, when the customs value cannot be determined by applying a given provision, only then is it appropriate to refer to the provision which comes immediately after it in the established order (judgment of 16 June 2016, EURO 2004. Hungary, C‑291/15, EU:C:2016:455, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
80


As stated in paragraph 30 above, the objective of EU law on the valuation of goods for customs purposes is to introduce a fair, uniform and neutral system excluding the use of arbitrary or fictitious customs values. In accordance with point 2 of the interpretative note on customs value concerning Article 31(1) of the Customs Code, set out in Annex 23 to Regulation No 2454/93, the methods of valuation to be used under Article 31(1) should be those laid down in Articles 29 and 30(2) of the Code but a ‘reasonable flexibility’ in the application of those methods would be in conformity with the objectives and provisions of Article 31(1) of the Code (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 February 2008, Carboni e derivati, C‑263/06, EU:C:2008:128, paragraph 60).
81


Having regard to the need to establish a customs value if an undertaking fails to provide full information relating to the relevant tax years and to the ‘reasonable flexibility’ mentioned in point 2 of the interpretative note, it must be accepted that taking into account data relating to other tax years of the undertaking may constitute data available in the European Union which Article 31(1) of the Customs Code allows to be used as a basis for determining customs value. Reference to such data constitutes a means of determining a customs value which is both ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of Article 31(1) and consistent with the principles and general provisions of the international agreements and the provisions referred to in Article 31(1) (see, by analogy, judgment of 28 February 2008, Carboni e derivati, C‑263/06, EU:C:2008:128, paragraph 61).