larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Biogen Inc. v Smithkline Beecham Biologicals SA.
Date: 1997-01-23
26 It must be borne in mind in that regard that the third and fourth recitals in the preamble give as a reason for the adoption of the Regulation the insufficient duration of the effective protection under the patent to cover the investment put into the pharmaceutical research.  The Regulation thus seeks to make up for that insufficiency by creating a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products, which may be obtained by the holder of a national or European patent under the same conditions in each Member State.
27 Article 6 of the Regulation confirms that the certificate is to be granted to the holder of the basic patent or his successor in title.  Article 1(c) mentions the basic patents which may be designated for the purpose of the procedure for the grant of a certificate, namely those which protect a product as such, a process to obtain a product or an application of a product.  The Regulation thus seeks to confer supplementary protection on the holders of such patents, without instituting any preferential ranking amongst them.
28 Consequently, where a product is protected by a number of basic patents in force, which may belong to a number of patent holders, each of those patents may be designated for the purpose of the procedure for the grant of a certificate.  Under Article 3(c) of the Regulation, however, only one certificate may be granted for each basic patent.
30 The answer to the second question must therefore be that, where a medicinal product is covered by several basic patents, the Regulation does not preclude the grant of a supplementary protection certificate to each holder of a basic patent.
The third and fourth questions
45 Where the basic patent and the marketing authorization are held by different persons and the patent holder is unable to provide the competent national authorities with a copy of that authorization, granted by the authorities of a Member State, in accordance with Article 8(1)(b) of the Regulation, the application for a certificate must not be refused on that ground alone.  By simple cooperation, the national authority granting the certificate can obtain a copy of the marketing authorization from the national authority which issued it (see, to that effect, Case C-201/94 The Queen v Medicines Control Agency ex parte Smith and Nephew [1996] ECR I-5819, paragraph 28).  If that were not the case, the entitlement to the certificate conferred by Article 6 of the Regulation on the basic patent holder would be rendered nugatory.
Myrianne Coen v Belgian State.
Date: 1997-01-23
17 Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations do not apply only to persons who have the status of officials or employees other than local staff; they also apply to persons claiming that status, including candidates in a recruitment procedure organized by a Community institution (see to that effect Case 286/83 Alexis and Others v Commission [1989] ECR 2445, paragraph 9).
21 It is settled case-law that the time-limits prescribed in the Staff Regulations for lodging complaints and bringing proceedings and those for bringing actions under Article 173 of the Treaty are a matter of public policy and are not subject to the discretion of the parties or the Court, since they were established in order to ensure that legal positions are clear and certain (see Case 227/83 Moussis v Commission [1984] ECR 3133, paragraph 12, and Case 191/84 Barcella and Others v Commission [1986] ECR 1541, paragraph 12).
Institut National d'Assurances Sociales pour Travailleurs Indépendants (Inasti) v Claude Hervein and Hervillier SA.
Date: 1997-01-30
15 It is settled case-law that in interpreting a provision of Community law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also, where appropriate, the context in which it occurs and the objects of the rules of which it is part (see, in particular, Case 292/82 Merck v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1983] ECR 3781, paragraph 12).
16 Article 51 of the Treaty, which the regulation implements, provides for the coordination, not the harmonization, of the legislations of the Member States. Substantive and procedural differences between the social security systems of individual Member States, and hence in the rights of persons working there, are unaffected by that provision (see, in particular, Case 41/84 Pinna v Caisse d'Allocations Familiales de la Savoie [1986] ECR 1, paragraph 20).
20 In those circumstances, as the Court has held in today's judgment in Case C-340/94 De Jaeck v Staatsecretaris van Financiën [1997] ECR I-0000, although the provisions of Title II refer to `persons who are employed' (or `engaged in paid employment') (`personnes qui exercent une activité salariée') or who are `self-employed' (`personnes qui exercent une activité non-salariée') rather than to `employed' or `self-employed persons' (`travailleurs salariés'/`non-salariés'), a logical and consistent interpretation of the scope ratione personae of the regulation and of the system of rules of conflict of laws which it establishes requires the terms in question of Title II to be interpreted in the light of the definitions in Article 1(a) of the regulation.
21 Accordingly, just as the description `employed person' or `self-employed person' for the purposes of the regulation depends on the national social security scheme under which the person is insured, `a person who is employed' (or `engaged in paid employment') and `a person who is self-employed' for the purposes of Title II of the regulation should be understood to refer to activities deemed such by the legislation applicable in the field of social security in the Member State in whose territory those activities are pursued.
22 The reply to the question put by the national court should therefore be that for the purposes of Articles 14a and 14c of the regulation, `employed' and `self-employed' should be understood to refer to activities which are regarded as such for the purposes of the social security legislation of the Member State in whose territory those activities are pursued.
Kingdom of Belgium v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1997-02-04
29 A plea in law can only be considered new if it has not been mentioned directly or indirectly in the application (see Joined Cases 19/60, 21/60, 2/61 and 3/61 Fives Lille Cail and Others v Haute Autorité [1961] ECR 281 and Case 108/81 Amylum v Council [1982] ECR 3107, paragraph 25).
53 According to settled case-law, the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty must be appropriate to the nature of the measure in question.  It must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the institution which adopted the measure so as to inform the persons concerned of the justification for the measure adopted and to enable the Court to exercise its powers of review.  It is also apparent from the case-law that the statement of the reasons for a measure is not required to specify the matters of fact or of law dealt with, provided that it falls within the general scheme of the body of measures of which it forms part (see Joined Cases C-63/90 and C-67/90 Portugal and Spain v Commission [1992] ECR I-5073, paragraph 16, and Case C-353/92 Greece v Council [1994] ECR I-3411, paragraph 19).
Harnas & Helm CV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 1997-02-06
13 Furthermore, as the Court has repeatedly held (see Case C-186/89 Van Tiem v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1990] ECR I-4363, paragraph 17), Article 4 of the Sixth Directive confers a very wide scope on value added tax, comprising all stages of production, distribution and the provision of services.
14 The Court has further held that, in accordance with the requirements of the principle that the common system of VAT should be neutral, the concept of `exploitation' within the meaning of Article 4(2) refers to all transactions, whatever may be their legal form, by which it is sought to obtain income from the property in question on a continuing basis (Van Tiem, paragraph 18).
15 However, the Court has also specified that the mere acquisition and holding of shares in a company is not to be regarded as an economic activity, within the meaning of the Sixth Directive, conferring on the holder the status of a taxable person (Case C-60/90 Polysar Investments Netherlands v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1991] ECR I-3111, paragraph 13).  The mere acquisition of financial holdings in other undertakings does not amount to the exploitation of property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis because any dividend yielded by that holding is merely the result of ownership of the property (see also, to the same effect, Case C-333/91 Sofitam v Ministre Chargé du Budget [1993] ECR I-3513, paragraph 12).
16 It is true that the transactions referred to in Article 13B(d)(5) of the Sixth Directive may fall within the scope of VAT where they are effected as part of a commercial share-dealing activity, in order to secure a direct or indirect involvement in the management of the companies in which the holding has been acquired or where they constitute the direct, permanent and necessary extension of the taxable activity (see Polysar Investments Netherlands, cited above, paragraph 14; Case C-155/94 Wellcome Trust v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1996] ECR I-3013, paragraph 35; and Case C-306/94 Régie Dauphinoise v Ministre du Budget [1996] ECR I-3695, paragraph 18).
Finanzamt Augsburg-Stadt v Marktgemeinde Welden.
Date: 1997-02-06
17 It should first be noted in this regard that activities pursued as public authorities within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive are those engaged in by bodies governed by public law under the special legal regime applicable to them and do not include activities pursued by them under the same legal conditions as those that apply to private traders (Joined Cases 231/87 and 129/88 Ufficio distrettuale delle imposte dirette di Fiorenzuola d'Arda and Others [1989] ECR 3233 and Case C-4/89 Comune di Carpaneto Piacentino and Others [1990] ECR I-1869, paragraph 8).
19 Reference should, however, be made to the fourth subparagraph of Article 4(5) of the directive, which, apart from activities of bodies governed by public law which are not taxable by virtue of the first subparagraph of Article 4(5), gives Member States the option of regarding activities exempt from VAT under Article 13 of the directive as activities of a public authority and hence of excluding bodies governed by public law from treatment as taxable persons in respect of those activities.
21 In so far as a body governed by public law is regarded, by virtue of the fourth subparagraph of Article 4(5), as having carried out an activity as a public authority, it falls to the national court to determine, where necessary, whether the requirements of the second subparagraph of Article 4(5) are satisfied.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 1997-02-06
10 Secondly, the Court has consistently held that a State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down by a directive (see, for example, Case C-262/95 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-5729, paragraph 17).
Intelligente Systemen, Database toepassingen, Elektronische diensten BV (IDE) v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1997-02-20
82 With regard to the admissibility of counterclaim, it should be borne in mind that the Court has consistently held that where its jurisdiction is based on an arbitration clause, that jurisdiction is conferred in derogation from the ordinary rules of law and must therefore be construed narrowly, so that the Court may hear and determine only claims arising from a contract which was concluded with the Community and which contains the arbitration clause or claims that are directly connected with the obligations arising from that contract (judgment in Case 426/85 Commission v Zoubek [1986] ECR 4057, paragraph 11).
Bernardina Martínez Losada, Manuel Fernández Balado and José Paredes v Instituto Nacional de Empleo (INEM) and Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS).
Date: 1997-02-20
21 According to the Court's case-law, whilst the fact that a national law or regulation has not been mentioned in the declarations referred to in Article 5 of Regulation No 1408/71 is not of itself proof that that law or regulation does not fall within the field of application of the regulation, the fact that a Member State has specified a law in its declaration must be accepted as proof that the benefits granted on the basis of that law are social security benefits within the meaning of Regulation No 1408/71 (see, in particular, Case 35/77 Beerens [1977] ECR 2249).
27 Consequently, Article 48 does not apply to unemployment benefits of the kind at issue in the main proceedings and hence the taking into account by a Member State of periods of employment or insurance completed by the persons concerned under the legislation of another Member State for the purposes of the award of unemployment benefit is governed solely by Article 67 of Regulation No 1408/71, which is the subject of the second question.
35 In Warmerdam-Steggerda, paragraphs 10, 17 and 19, it was held that Regulation No 1408/71 does not determine the conditions under which periods of employment or insurance are constituted.  Those conditions are determined solely by the legislation of the Member State in which benefits are applied for.
36 Consequently, a Member State is entitled to make the award of unemployment allowance conditional on the persons concerned having last completed periods classed as `periods of insurance' or `periods of employment' under its own legislation.
37 It is therefore for the national court to determine whether the periods during which the competent Spanish institution paid contributions to the sickness insurance and family benefits schemes on behalf of the plaintiffs in the main proceedings constitute periods of insurance under its domestic legislation.
43 The Court has consistently held that the Member States remain competent to define the conditions for granting social security benefits, even if they make them more strict, provided that the conditions adopted do not give rise to overt or disguised discrimination between Community workers (Case C-12/93 Drake [1994] ECR I-4337, paragraph 27).
Bundesverband der Bilanzbuchhalter e.V. v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1997-02-20
23 It should be observed that Article 90(3) of the Treaty requires the Commission to ensure that Member States comply with their obligations as regards the undertakings referred to in Article 90(1) and expressly empowers it to take action for that purpose by way of directives and decisions (judgment in Netherlands and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 25).  The Commission is empowered to determine that a given State measure is incompatible with the rules of the Treaty and to indicate what measures the State to which a decision is addressed must adopt in order to comply with its obligations under Community law (judgment in Netherlands and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 28).
24 As is apparent from the judgment in Netherlands and Others v Commission, cited above, individuals may, in some circumstances, be entitled to bring an action for annulment, under the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty, against a decision of the Commission taken on the basis of Article 90(3) of the Treaty.
27 In this regard, it is apparent from the wording of Article 90(3) and from the scheme of Article 90 as a whole that the Commission enjoys a wide discretion in the field covered by paragraphs 1 and 3, both in relation to the action which it considers necessary to be taken and in relation to the means appropriate for that purpose (see, to this effect, the judgment in Netherlands and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 27).
Fontaine SA, Garage Laval SA, Fahy SA, Renault Lyon Ouest FLB Automobiles SA, Diffusion Vallis Auto SA and Horizon Sud SA v Aqueducs Automobiles SARL.
Date: 1997-02-20
12 As regards the first part of that question, it must be recalled that Regulation No 123/85 has previously been interpreted by the Court in its judgment in Nissan France and Others, cited above, with regard to parallel imports of motor vehicles and their resale by an independent trader in a sector covered by an exclusive distribution agreement between the manufacturer of a particular make of motor vehicles and one of its concessionaires.
13 In that judgment, the Court held that Regulation No 123/85, in accordance with the function assigned to it in relation to the application of Article 85 of the Treaty, concerns only contractual relations between suppliers and their approved distributors and specifies the conditions under which certain agreements between them are lawful having regard to the competition rules of the Treaty (paragraph 16).
14 It is thus concerned only with the content of agreements which parties tied to a distribution network for a specified product may lawfully conclude having regard to the rules of the Treaty prohibiting restrictions affecting normal competition within the common market (judgment in Nissan France and Others, paragraph 17).
15 Since, therefore, it confines itself to stating what the parties to such agreements may or may not undertake to do in relations with third parties, that regulation does not, in contrast, serve to regulate the activities of such third parties, who may operate in the market outside the framework of distribution agreements (judgment in Nissan France and Others, paragraph 18).
16 Thus, the provisions of that exempting regulation cannot affect the rights and obligations of third parties in relation to contracts concluded between vehicle manufacturers and their concessionaires, in particular those of independent dealers (judgment in Nissan France and Others, paragraph 19).
17 The Court concluded from this that Regulation No 123/85 could not be interpreted as prohibiting a trader who is outside the official distribution network for a given make of motor vehicle and is not an authorized intermediary within the meaning of that regulation from acquiring new vehicles of that make by way of parallel imports and independently carrying on the business of marketing such vehicles (judgment in Nissan France and Others, paragraph 20).
18 Consequently, the Court ruled in Nissan France and Others that Regulation No 123/85 must be interpreted as not preventing a trader who is neither an approved reseller in the distribution network of a manufacturer of a particular make of motor vehicle nor an authorized intermediary within the meaning of Article 3(11) of that regulation from undertaking parallel imports and operating as an independent reseller of new vehicles of that make.
Commission of the European Communities v Frédéric Daffix.
Date: 1997-02-20
12 At paragraphs 35 to 46, the Court then considered whether a proper statement of reasons was provided by the contested decision, after observing, at paragraph 32, that, according to the case-law, the requirement that a decision adversely affecting a person should state the reasons on which it is based is intended to provide the person concerned with details sufficient to allow him to ascertain whether the decision is well founded and to enable the Court to review its legality (Case 195/80 Michel v Parliament [1981] ECR 2861, paragraph 22; Case 69/83 Lux v Court of Auditors [1984] ECR 2447, paragraph 36; Case T-1/90 Pérez-Mínguez Casariego v Commission [1991] ECR II-143, paragraph 73).
23 In this regard, it should be observed that, according to the case-law, the statement of the reasons on which a decision adversely affecting a person is based must allow the Court to exercise its power of review as to its legality and must provide the person concerned with the information necessary to enable him to decide whether or not the decision is well founded (Michel v Parliament, cited above, paragraph 22).
24 Accordingly, the fact that a statement of reasons is lacking or inadequate, hindering that review of legality, constitutes a matter of public interest which may, and even must, be raised by the Community Court of its own motion (Case 18/57 Nold v High Authority [1959] ECR 41 and Case 185/85 Usinor v Commission [1986] ECR 2079, paragraph 19).
25 Since consideration of such pleas may take place at any stage in the proceedings, the applicant cannot be debarred from relying on them solely on the ground that he did not raise them in his complaint.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 1997-02-20
14 The Court had consistently held that the principle of freedom of movement for workers laid down in Article 48(1) to (3) of the Treaty forms one of the foundations of the Community and that, consequently, the provisions laying down that freedom must be given a broad interpretation (see, in particular, Antonissen, paragraph 11).
15 In paragraph 13 of its judgment in Antonissen, the Court stated further that freedom of movement for workers entails the right for nationals of Member States to move freely within the territory of other Member States and to stay there for the purposes of seeking employment.
16 The effectiveness of Article 48 is secured in so far as Community legislation or, in its absence, the legislation of a Member State gives persons concerned a reasonable time in which to apprise themselves, in the territory of the Member State concerned, of offers of employment corresponding to their occupational qualifications and to take, where appropriate, the necessary steps in order to be engaged (Antonissen, paragraph 16).
17 In the absence of Community provisions prescribing a period during which Community nationals who are seeking employment may stay in their territory, the Member States are entitled to lay down a reasonable period for this purpose.  However, if after expiry of that period, the person concerned provides evidence that he is continuing to seek employment and that he has genuine chances of being engaged, he cannot be required to leave the territory of the host Member State (Antonissen, paragraph 21).
22 According to the case-law of the Court, Article 4 of the Directive entails an obligation for Member States to issue a residence permit to any person who provides proof, by means of the appropriate documents, namely the document with which he entered their territory, or a declaration of engagement by the employer or a work certificate, that he belongs to one of the categories set out in Article 1 of the Directive (Case 48/75 Royer [1976] ECR 497, paragraph 37).