Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di Lecce v Salvatore Manni.
Date: 2017-03-09
34


It must be held that the particulars concerning the identity of the persons referred to in Article 2(1)(d) and (j) of Directive 68/151 constitute, as information relating to identified or identifiable natural persons, ‘personal data’ within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46. It is apparent from the Court’s case-law that the fact that that information was provided as part of a professional activity does not mean that it cannot be characterised as personal data (see judgment of 16 July 2015, ClientEarth and PAN Europe v EFSA, C‑615/13 P, EU:C:2015:489, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
37


With regard to Directive 95/46, it should be remembered that, as is apparent from Article 1 and recital 10, that directive seeks to ensure a high level of protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, in particular their right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data (see judgment of 13 May 2014, Google Spain and Google, C‑131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).
39


The Court has already held that the provisions of Directive 95/46, in so far as they govern the processing of personal data liable to infringe fundamental freedoms and, in particular, the right to respect for private life, must necessarily be interpreted in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) (see judgment of 6 October 2015, Schrems, C‑362/14, EU:C:2015:650, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
41


With regard, in particular, to the general conditions of lawfulness imposed by Directive 95/46, it should be noted that, subject to the exceptions permitted under Article 13 of that directive, all processing of personal data must comply, first, with the principles relating to data quality set out in Article 6 of the directive and, secondly, with one of the criteria for making data processing legitimate listed in Article 7 of the directive (see, inter alia, judgment of 13 May 2014, Google Spain and Google, C‑131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).
43


With regard, inter alia, to the ground for legitimation provided for in Article 7(e) of Directive 95/46, it should be noted that the Court of Justice has already held that the activity of a public authority consisting in the storing, in a database, of data which undertakings are obliged to report on the basis of statutory obligations, permitting interested persons to search for that data and providing them with print-outs thereof, falls within the exercise of public powers (see judgment of 12 July 2012, Compass-Datenbank, C‑138/11, EU:C:2012:449, paragraphs 40 and 41). Moreover, such an activity also constitutes a task carried out in the public interest within the meaning of that provision.
46


In the event of failure to comply with the condition laid down in Article 6(1)(e) of Directive 95/46, Member States guarantee the person concerned, pursuant to Article 12(b) thereof, the right to obtain from the controller, as appropriate, the erasure or blocking of the data concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 May 2014, Google Spain and Google, C‑131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 70).
47


Moreover, under subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46, Member States are to grant the data subject the right, inter alia in the cases referred to in Article 7(e) and (f) of that directive, to object at any time on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation to the processing of data relating to him, save where otherwise provided by national legislation. The balancing to be carried out under subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 thus enables account to be taken in a more specific manner of all the circumstances surrounding the data subject’s particular situation. Where there is a justified objection, the processing instigated by the controller may no longer involve those data (see judgment of 13 May 2014, Google Spain and Google, C‑131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 76).
50


The Court has already noted, moreover, that the purpose of Directive 68/151 is to guarantee legal certainty in relation to dealings between companies and third parties in view of the intensification of trade between Member States following the creation of the internal market and that, with that in mind, it is important that any person wishing to establish and develop trading relations with companies situated in other Member States should be able easily to obtain essential information relating to the constitution of trading companies and to the powers of persons authorised to represent them, which requires that all the relevant information should be expressly stated in the register (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 November 1974, Haaga, 32/74, EU:C:1974:116, paragraph 6).
51


Moreover, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that the disclosure provided for in Article 3 of Directive 68/151 is intended to enable any interested third parties to inform themselves of these matters, without having to establish a right or an interest requiring to be protected. The Court noted, in that regard, that the very wording of Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty, on which that directive was based, refers to the need to protect the interests of third parties generally, without distinguishing or excluding any categories falling within the ambit of that term, and consequently the third parties referred to in that article cannot be limited in particular merely to creditors of the company concerned (see judgment of 4 December 1997, Daihatsu Deutschland, C‑97/96, EU:C:1997:581, paragraphs 19, 20 and 22, and the order of 23 September 2004, Springer, C‑435/02 and C‑103/03, EU:C:2004:552, paragraphs 29 and 33).