Jean-Charles Marchiani v European Parliament.
Date: 2016-06-14
34


That said, the conclusion reached in the previous paragraph does not prejudice a consideration of the admissibility of certain grounds of appeal taken individually (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2013 in France v Commission, C‑601/11 P, EU:C:2013:465, paragraphs 70, 71 and 73).
37


As regards the inadmissibility of the first, fifth and sixth parts of the first ground of appeal, as claimed by the Parliament, it should be recalled that, where a party challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the General Court, the points of law examined at first instance may be argued again in the course of an appeal. If a party could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the General Court, the appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (see, inter alia, judgment of 21 September 2010 in Sweden and Others v API and Commission, C‑514/07 P, C‑528/07 P and C‑532/07 P, EU:C:2010:541, paragraph 116).
49


In addition, since the General Court correctly held, as is apparent from paragraphs 40 to 44 above, that the Implementing Measures were not applicable in the present case, the Court must also find that, in so far as the third and fourth parts of the appellant’s first ground of appeal allege misinterpretation of the relationship between Articles 68 and 72 of the Implementing Measures, as well as distortion of the sense of the letter of 27 June 2013, which, according to the appellant, should have been considered to be a complaint within the meaning of Article 72, those parts of the first ground of appeal are directed against reasons included in the judgment under appeal purely for the sake of completeness and cannot, according to the settled case-law of the Court, lead to that judgment being set aside (see judgments of 21 December 2011 in France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 79, and 13 February 2014 in Hungary v Commission, C‑31/13 P, EU:C:2014:70, paragraph 82).
51


Last, as regards the sixth part of this ground of appeal, relating to an error of law committed by the General Court in its assessment of the alleged disregard by the Parliament of the appellant’s rights of defence, it should be recalled that the principle of respect for the rights of the defence is, in all proceedings initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person, a general principle of EU law which is applicable even in the absence of any specific rules in that regard. That principle requires that the addressees of decisions which significantly affect the interests of those addressees should be placed in a position in which they may effectively make known their views with regard to the evidence on which those decisions are based (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 February 1992 in Netherlands and Others v Commission, C‑48/90 and C‑66/90, EU:C:1992:63, paragraphs 44 and 45; 24 October 1996 in Commission v Lisrestal and Others, C‑32/95 P, EU:C:1996:402, paragraph 30; and 9 June 2005 in Spain v Commission, C‑287/02, EU:C:2005:368, paragraph 37).
61


Moreover, in so far as the appellant also submits that the General Court erred in finding that the allocation of the burden of proof was to the advantage of the Parliament as regards use of the parliamentary assistance allowance in accordance with the PEAM Rules, despite the length of time that had elapsed between the end of the Member’s term in office and the date on which the decision at issue was adopted, the Court notes that it is apparent from the case file at first instance that an argument to that effect was not put forward before the General Court. The argument is therefore new and must, in accordance with settled case-law of the Court, be rejected as being inadmissible (judgment of 8 March 2016 in Greece v Commission, C‑431/14 P, EU:C:2016:145, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
69


The Court has consistently held that the requirement that the General Court give reasons for its decisions does not mean that it is obliged to respond in detail to every single argument put forward (see judgment of 9 September 2008 in FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission, C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 P, EU:C:2008:476, paragraph 91, and order of 29 October 2009 in Portela v Commission, C‑85/09 P, not published, EU:C:2009:685, paragraph 31). The reasoning adopted by the General Court may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to understand the grounds for the General Court’s judgment and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient information to exercise its powers of review (see, inter alia, judgments of 22 May 2008 in Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑266/06 P, EU:C:2008:295, paragraph 103, and 8 March 2016 in Greece v Commission, C‑431/14 P, EU:C:2016:145, paragraph 38).
72


That line of argument must therefore be rejected as being inadmissible, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (judgments of 11 April 2013 in Mindo v Commission, C‑652/11 P, EU:C:2013:229, paragraph 21, and 3 October 2013 in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 46).
77


It should be recalled that the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations presupposes that precise, unconditional and consistent assurances originating from authorised, reliable sources have been given to the person concerned by the competent authorities of the European Union (see, inter alia, judgments of 22 June 2006 in Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission, C‑182/03 and C‑217/03, EU:C:2006:416, paragraph 147, and 7 April 2011 in Greece v Commission, C‑321/09 P, EU:C:2011:218, paragraph 45).
86


It must be observed in that regard that the Court has previously made clear that Article 73a of Regulation No 1605/2002, which fixed a limitation period for claims by the European Union of five years, could not be relied on alone, without its implementing rules, to establish that recovery of a debt owed to the European Union was time-barred (see judgment of 13 November 2014 in Nencini v Parliament, C‑447/13 P, EU:C:2014:2372, paragraphs 43 and 44).
87


It follows that Article 73a, which must be read in conjunction with its detailed implementing rules laid down in Article 85b of Regulation No 2342/2002, provides for a limitation period of five years to allow the EU institutions to recover European Union entitlements in respect of third parties, the date from which that period begins to run being the expiry of the deadline communicated to the debtor in the debit note (see judgment of 13 November 2014 in Nencini v Parliament, C‑447/13 P, EU:C:2014:2372, paragraphs 45 and 46).
89


Contrary to the view which appears to be held by the appellant, those provisions did not fix any period within which a debit note had to be sent to the debtor following the date when the debt in question arose (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 November 2014 in Nencini v Parliament, C‑447/13 P, EU:C:2014:2372, paragraph 47). It follows that the General Court was entitled to hold that the amounts receivable that were the subject matter of the decision at issue were not time-barred and that the adoption of the decision at issue was not a breach of the principle of non-retroactivity.
90


That being the case, the Court must reject the first and second parts of the fourth ground of appeal as being unfounded.
91


By the fourth part of his fourth ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for having disregarded the scope of the reasonable time principle by failing to take into account all the relevant circumstances of the case. The appellant submits that the General Court should have recognised, having regard to the significant sums at issue, the limited complexity of the case and the appellant’s exemplary conduct, that the period of almost ten years which elapsed between the end of the appellant’s term in office and the Parliament’s adoption of the decision at issue was unreasonable.
92


The Parliament submits, principally, that the General Court should not, in the present case, have examined the issue of failure to act within a reasonable time since such a failure had not been raised by the appellant before that court. If the Court should nevertheless hold that the General Court raised of its own motion the issue of failure to act within a reasonable time as a plea in law, the General Court erred in law, since that plea does not fall within the category of pleas in law that may or must be raised by the General Court of its own motion. In any event, the General Court should have requested the parties to submit their observations in that regard. In those circumstances, the Parliament requests the Court to substitute the grounds of the judgment under appeal.
93


In the alternative, the Parliament submits that the reasonable time principle was not disregarded by the General Court.
94


It should be noted that the Court has previously held that compliance with a limitation period may not be raised by a Court of the European Union of its own motion but must be raised by the party affected (judgment of 8 November 2012 in Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, C‑469/11 P, EU:C:2012:705, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited). In the present case, it is common ground that the appellant explicitly submitted before the General Court that the Parliament acted out of time as regards the establishment of the amounts receivable by it, in that that action was contrary to the provisions of Regulations No 1605/2002 and No 2342/2002 providing for rules on limitation applicable to entitlements of the European Union in respect of third parties.
95


Against that background, the General Court was, as is apparent from paragraph 89 above, correct to hold that no provision of EU law laid down the time within which a debit note, namely the act in which the establishment of amounts receivable by an EU institution is brought to the attention of the debtor, had to be communicated to that debtor.
96


It is clear from the Court’s case-law that, in such circumstances, the requirement of legal certainty means that the EU institutions must exercise their powers within a reasonable time (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 September 2002 in Falck and Acciaierie di Bolzano v Commission, C‑74/00 P and C‑75/00 P, EU:C:2002:524, paragraphs 139 to 141 and the case-law cited; 28 February 2013 in Review of Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, C‑334/12 RX-II, EU:C:2013:134, paragraph 28; and 13 November 2014 in Nencini v Parliament, C‑447/13 P, EU:C:2014:2372, paragraphs 47 and 48), as the General Court also stated in paragraph 81 of the judgment under appeal.
97


It follows that the General Court was also correct to give a ruling, in paragraphs 81 to 87 of the judgment under appeal, where the applicable texts are silent and having regard to the circumstances of the case, on the appellant’s arguments alleging that the Parliament acted out of time as regards the establishment of the amounts receivable by the Parliament in respect of the appellant, from the perspective of the reasonable time principle.
99


In that regard, it must be observed that the reasonableness of a period of time is to be appraised in the light of all of the circumstances specific to each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity, the various procedural stages which the EU institution followed and the conduct of the parties in the course of the procedure (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 July 2004 in Spain v Commission, C‑501/00, EU:C:2004:438, paragraph 53; 7 April 2011 in Greece v Commission, C‑321/09 P, EU:C:2011:218, paragraph 34; and 28 February 2013 in Review of Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, C‑334/12 RX-II, EU:C:2013:134, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
100


The reasonableness of a period cannot be determined by reference to a precise maximum limit determined in an abstract manner (judgments of 7 April 2011 in Greece v Commission, C‑321/09 P, EU:C:2011:218, paragraph 33, and 28 February 2013 in Review of Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, C‑334/12 RX-II, EU:C:2013:134, paragraphs 29 and 30).
101


As regards the specific background of the particular case, the Court has previously stated that Article 73a of Regulation No 1605/2002, which corresponds, in essence, to Article 81 of Regulation No 966/2012, is intended to limit in time the possibility of recovering European Union entitlements in respect of third parties, in order to satisfy the principle of sound financial management and fixes, from that perspective, a period of five years, and that Article 85b of Regulation No 2342/2002, which corresponds to Article 93(1) of Delegated Regulation No 1268/2012, provides that the limitation period begins to run on the expiry of the deadline communicated to the debtor in the debit note (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 November 2014 in Nencini v Parliament, C‑447/13 P, EU:C:2014:2372, paragraph 45).
102


Taking into consideration Article 73a, it has been held that, where the applicable texts are silent as regards the deadline for an EU institution to communicate a debit note to a debtor, that period must, in principle, be presumed to be unreasonable where that communication takes place outside a period of five years from the point at which the institution was, in normal circumstances, in a position to claim its debt (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 November 2014 in Nencini v Parliament, C‑447/13 P, EU:C:2014:2372, paragraphs 48 and 49).