Sniace SA v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2007-11-22
34. First, it must be held that, although Sniace argues there was an error of law, the appellant is, by its first ground of appeal, in reality seeking to challenge the assessment of the facts by the Court of First Instance, the substance of that challenge being that the Court did not take adequate account of certain facts and certain documents relied on by the applicant at first instance to support its case that the lyocell and viscose fibres were in direct competition.
35. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in an appeal, the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to establish the facts or, in principle, to examine the evidence which the Court of First Instance accepted in support of those facts. Provided that the evidence has been properly obtained and the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced to it (Case C‑7/95 P Deere  v Commission  [1998] ECR I‑3111, paragraph 22, and Joined Cases C‑403/04 P and C‑405/04 P Sumitomo Metal Industries  and Nippon Steel  v Commission  [2007] ECR I‑729, paragraph 38). Save where the evidence adduced before the Court of First Instance has been distorted, the appraisal therefore does not constitute a point of law which is subject to review by the Court of Justice (Case C‑53/92 P Hilti  v Commission  [1994] ECR I‑667, paragraph 42, and Joined Cases C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P Aalborg Portland and Others  v Commission  [2004] ECR I‑123, paragraph 49).
37. It is clear from the case-law of the Court that there is such distortion where, without recourse to new evidence, the assessment of the existing evidence is manifestly incorrect (Case C‑551/03 P General Motors  v Commission  [2006] ECR I‑3173, paragraph 54; Case C‑167/04, JCB Service  v Commission , [2006] ECR I‑8935, paragraph 108, and Case C‑229/05 P, PKK and KNK  v Council , [2007] ECR I‑439, paragraph 37).
49. As regards the admissibility of this ground of appeal, as has been previously stated, it is clear from Article 225(1) EC and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice that an appeal is limited to points of law and must be based on grounds of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, breach of procedure before it which adversely affects the interests of the applicant, or infringement of Community law by the Court of First Instance (see, among others, Case C‑284/98 P Parliament  v Bieber  [2000] ECR I‑1527, paragraph 30; the order in Case C‑420/04 P Gouvras  v Commission  [2005] ECR I‑7251, paragraph 48; and the order of 20 March 2007 in Case C‑323/06 P Kallianos  v Commission , not published in ECR, paragraph 10).
53. According to settled case-law, persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may claim to be individually concerned only if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and, by virtue of those factors, distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed (see, among others, Case 25/62 Plaumann  v Commission , [1963] ECR 95, p. 107; Case C‑198/91 Cook  v Commission  [1993] ECR I‑2487, paragraph 20, and Case C‑78/03 P Commission  v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum  [2005] ECR I‑10737, paragraph 33).
54. As regards the field of State aid, applicants who challenge the merits of a decision appraising aid taken on the basis of Article 88(3) EC or at the end of the formal examination procedure are considered to be individually concerned by that decision if their market position is substantially affected by the aid to which the contested decision relates (see, to that effect, Cofaz and Others  v Commission  paragraphs 22 to 25, and Commission  v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum , paragraphs 37 and 70).
55. In that regard, in addition to the undertaking in receipt of aid, competing undertakings have been recognised as individually concerned by a Commission decision terminating the formal examination procedure where they have played an active role in that procedure, provided that their position on the market is substantially affected by the aid which is the subject of the contested decision (see, inter alia, Cofaz and Others  v Commission , paragraph 25, and Comité d’entreprise de la Société française de production and Others  v Commission , paragraph 40).
56. The Court has thus held that the fact that an undertaking was at the origin of the complaint which led to the opening of the formal examination procedure, the fact that its views were heard and the fact that the conduct of that procedure was largely determined by its observations are factors which are relevant to assessment of the locus standi  of that undertaking (see Cofaz and Others  v Commission , paragraphs 24 and 25).
64. It must be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law of the Court, the conditions for admissibility of an action for annulment cannot be set aside on the basis of the appellant’s interpretation of the right to effective judicial protection (Order of 8 March 2007 in Case C‑237/06 P, Strack  v Commission , not published in ECR, paragraph 108; see also, to that effect, Case C‑50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores  v Council  [2002] ECR I‑6677, paragraph 44; Case C‑263/02 P Commission  v Jégo-Quéré  [2004] ECR I‑3425, paragraph 36; and order of 13 March 2007 in Case C‑150/06 P Arizona Chemical and Others  v Commission  [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 40).
77. As regards the assessment by the Court of First Instance of applications made by a party for measures of organisation of the procedure or enquiry, it must be pointed out that the Court of First Instance is the sole judge of any need to supplement the information available to it concerning the cases before it (see, inter alia, Case C‑315/99 P Ismeri Europa  v Court of Auditors  [2001] ECR I‑5281, paragraph 19; Case C‑136/02 P Mag Instrument  v OHIM  [2004] ECR I‑9165, paragraph 76, and Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others  v Commission  [2005] ECR I‑5425, paragraph 67).
78. In particular, the Court of Justice has held that even where a request for the examination of witnesses, made in the application, refers precisely to the facts on which and the reasons why a witness or witnesses should be examined, it falls to the Court of First Instance to assess the relevance of the application to the subject-matter of the dispute and the need to examine the witnesses named (Case C‑185/95 P Baustahlgewebe  v Commission  [1998] ECR I‑8417, paragraph 70; Dansk Rørindustri and Others  v Commission , paragraph 68, and order of 15 September 2005 in Case C-112/04 P Marlines  v Commission , not published in ECR, paragraph 38).