Dieter Krombach v André Bamberski.
Date: 2000-03-28
19 The Convention is intended to facilitate, to the greatest possible extent, the free movement of judgments by providing for a simple and rapid enforcement procedure (see, inter alia, Case C-414/92 Solo Kleinmotoren v Boch [1994] ECR I-2237, paragraph 20, and Case C-267/97 Coursier v Fortis Bank [1999] ECR I-2543, paragraph 25).
20 It follows from the Court's case-law that this procedure constitutes an autonomous and complete system independent of the legal systems of the Contracting States and that the principle of legal certainty in the Community legal system and the objectives of the Convention in accordance with Article 220 of the EC Treaty (now Article 293 EC), on which it is founded, require a uniform application in all Contracting States of the Convention rules and the relevant case-law of the Court (see, in particular, Case C-432/93 SISRO v Ampersand [1995] ECR I-2269, paragraph 39).
21 So far as Article 27 of the Convention is concerned, the Court has held that this provision must be interpreted strictly inasmuch as it constitutes an obstacle to the attainment of one of the fundamental objectives of the Convention (Solo Kleinmotoren, cited above, paragraph 20). With regard, more specifically, to recourse to the public-policy clause in Article 27, point 1, of the Convention, the Court has made it clear that such recourse is to be had only in exceptional cases (Case 145/86 Hoffmann v Krieg [1988] ECR 645, paragraph 21, and Case C-78/95 Hendrikman and Feyen v Magenta Druck & Verlag [1996] ECR I-4943, paragraph 23).
22 It follows that, while the Contracting States in principle remain free, by virtue of the proviso in Article 27, point 1, of the Convention, to determine, according to their own conceptions, what public policy requires, the limits of that concept are a matter for interpretation of the Convention.
23 Consequently, while it is not for the Court to define the content of the public policy of a Contracting State, it is none the less required to review the limits within which the courts of a Contracting State may have recourse to that concept for the purpose of refusing recognition to a judgment emanating from a court in another Contracting State.
24 It should be noted in this regard that, since the Convention was concluded on the basis of Article 220 of the Treaty and within the framework which it defines, its provisions are linked to the Treaty (Case C-398/92 Mund & Fester v Hatrex Internationaal Transport [1994] ECR I-467, paragraph 12).
25 The Court has consistently held that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures (see, in particular, Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759, paragraph 33). For that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories. In that regard, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter the ECHR) has particular significance (see, inter alia, Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, paragraph 18).
26 The Court has thus expressly recognised the general principle of Community law that everyone is entitled to fair legal process, which is inspired by those fundamental rights (Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, paragraphs 20 and 21, and judgment of 11 January 2000 in Joined Cases C-174/98 P and C-189/98 P Netherlands and Van der Wal v Commission [2000] ECR I-0000, paragraph 17).
27 Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union (now, after amendment, Article 6(2) EU) embodies that case-law. It provides: The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.
28 It is in the light of those considerations that the questions submitted for a preliminary ruling fall to be answered.
The first question
30 It should be noted at the outset that it follows from the specific terms of the first paragraph of Article 1 of the Convention that the Convention applies to decisions given in civil matters by a criminal court (Case C-172/91 Sonntag v Waidmann and Others [1993] ECR I-1963, paragraph 16).
36 By disallowing any review of a foreign judgment as to its substance, Article 29 and the third paragraph of Article 34 of the Convention prohibit the court of the State in which enforcement is sought from refusing to recognise or enforce that judgment solely on the ground that there is a discrepancy between the legal rule applied by the court of the State of origin and that which would have been applied by the court of the State in which enforcement is sought had it been seised of the dispute. Similarly, the court of the State in which enforcement is sought cannot review the accuracy of the findings of law or fact made by the court of the State of origin.
37 Recourse to the public-policy clause in Article 27, point 1, of the Convention can be envisaged only where recognition or enforcement of the judgment delivered in another Contracting State would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought inasmuch as it infringes a fundamental principle. In order for the prohibition of any review of the foreign judgment as to its substance to be observed, the infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal order.
38 With regard to the right to be defended, to which the question submitted to the Court refers, this occupies a prominent position in the organisation and conduct of a fair trial and is one of the fundamental rights deriving from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.
39 More specifically still, the European Court of Human Rights has on several occasions ruled in cases relating to criminal proceedings that, although not absolute, the right of every person charged with an offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer, if need be one appointed by the court, is one of the fundamental elements in a fair trial and an accused person does not forfeit entitlement to such a right simply because he is not present at the hearing (see the following judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: judgment of 23 November 1993 in Poitrimol v France, Series A No 277-A; judgment of 22 September 1994 in Pelladoah v Netherlands, Series A No 297-B; judgment of 21 January 1999 in Van Geyseghem v Belgium, not yet reported).
41 The national court is, however, unsure as to whether the court of the State in which enforcement is sought can take account, in relation to Article 27, point 1, of the Convention, of a breach of this nature having regard to the wording of Article II of the Protocol. That provision, which involves extending the scope of the Convention to the criminal field because of the consequences which a judgment of a criminal court may entail in civil and commercial matters (Case 157/80 Rinkau [1981] ECR 1391, paragraph 6), recognises the right to be defended without appearing in person before the criminal courts of a Contracting State for persons who are not nationals of that State and who are domiciled in another Contracting State only in so far as they are being prosecuted for an offence committed unintentionally. This restriction has been construed as meaning that the Convention clearly seeks to deny the right to be defended without appearing in person to persons who are being prosecuted for offences which are sufficiently serious to justify this (Rinkau, cited above, paragraph 12).
42 However, it follows from a line of case-law developed by the Court on the basis of the principles referred to in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the present judgment that observance of the right to a fair hearing is, in all proceedings initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person, a fundamental principle of Community law which must be guaranteed even in the absence of any rules governing the proceedings in question (see, inter alia, Case C-135/92 Fiskano v Commission [1994] ECR I-2885, paragraph 39, and Case C-32/95 P Commission v Lisrestal and Others [1996] ECR I-5373, paragraph 21).
43 The Court has also held that, even though the Convention is intended to secure the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals, it is not permissible to achieve that aim by undermining the right to a fair hearing (Case 49/84 Debaecker and Plouvier v Bouwman [1985] ECR 1779, paragraph 10).