Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v National Exhibition Centre Limited.
Date: 2016-05-26
The Court, however, has already held that the additional charges invoiced by a service provider to its customers, where the
         latter pay for those services by credit card, debit card, cheque or cash over the counter at a bank or authorised payment
         agent acting on behalf of that service provider, do not constitute consideration for a supply of services distinct and independent
         from the principal supply of services in respect of which that payment was made (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 December
         2010 in Everything Everywhere, C‑276/09, EU:C:2010:730, paragraph 32).
In that regard, the Court held, first, that the making available to customers, by the principal service provider, of an infrastructure
         enabling them to pay the price of that service, inter alia, by bank card does not constitute for those customers an end in
         itself and that the supposed supply of services, which those customers are unable to access separately from the purchase of
         the main service, can have no interest for such consumers that is independent of that service (see, to that effect, judgment
         of 2 December 2010 in Everything Everywhere, C‑276/09, EU:C:2010:730, paragraph 27).
The Court then added that the receipt of a payment and the handling of that payment are intrinsically linked to any supply
         of services provided for consideration and that it is inherent in such a supply that the provider should seek payment and
         make appropriate efforts to ensure that the customer can make effective payment in consideration for the service supplied,
         the Court holding that, in principle, any method of payment for a supply of services involves the provider taking certain
         steps in the handling of the payment, even if the extent of those steps may vary from one method of payment to another (see,
         to that effect, judgment of 2 December 2010 in Everything Everywhere, C‑276/09, EU:C:2010:730, paragraph 28).
Lastly, the Court stated that the fact that a separate price for the supposed financial service is identified in the contract
         document and itemised separately in the invoices issued to customers is not decisive in that regard, the Court holding that
         the fact that a single price is invoiced, or that separate prices were contractually stipulated, has no decisive significance
         for the purposes of determining whether it is necessary to find that there are two or more distinct and independent transactions
         or only a single economic transaction (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 December 2010, Everything Everywhere, C‑276/09, EU:C:2010:730, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
In accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, it is for the national court to assess if, having regard to the economic
         and commercial reality of the transactions at issue, the contractual structure of the transaction notwithstanding, the material
         put before the court discloses the characteristics of a single transaction (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 February
         2008 in Part Service, C‑425/06, EU:C:2008:108, paragraph 54, and of 20 June 2013 in Newey, C‑653/11, EU:C:2013:409, paragraphs 42 to 45) and having regard to all the circumstances in which the transaction takes
         place (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 December 2010 in Everything Everywhere, C‑276/09, EU:C:2010:730, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
In the light of those factors, it is for the referring court to ascertain whether, in the main proceedings, the NEC’s card
         processing service must be considered for VAT purposes to be a service which is ancillary to the sale of the tickets concerned
         or as a service ancillary to another principal service which is provided by the NEC to the purchasers of those tickets, which
         could be the reservation or the delivery of tickets for shows or other events and, therefore, forming with that principal
         service a single service with the result that that service must share the tax treatment of that principal service (see, to
         that effect, judgments of 25 February 1999 in CPP, C‑349/96, EU:C:1999:93, paragraph 32, and of 16 April 2015 in Wojskowa Agencja Mieszkaniowa w Warszawie, C‑42/14, EU:C:2015:229, paragraph 31).
In accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, the exemptions laid down in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive constitute
         independent concepts of EU law whose purpose is to avoid divergences in the application of the VAT system as between one Member
         State and another (see judgments of 10 March 2011 in Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken, C‑540/09, EU:C:2011:137, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited and of 22 October 2015 in Hedqvist, C‑264/14, EU:C:2015:718, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
It is also established case-law that the terms used to specify those exemptions are to be interpreted strictly, since they
         constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable
         person (see, inter alia, judgments of 28 July 2011 in Nordea Pankki Suomi, C‑350/10, EU:C:2011:532, paragraph 23 and of 22 October 2015 in Hedqvist, C‑264/14, EU:C:2015:718, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
The transactions exempted under that provision are thus defined according to the nature of the services provided and in terms
         of the person supplying or receiving the service. Accordingly, the exemption is not subject to the condition that the transactions
         be effected by a certain type of institution or legal person where the transactions in question relate to the sphere of financial
         transactions (see judgment of 28 October 2010 in Axa UK, C‑175/09, EU:C:2010:646, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
The Court has already held that a transfer is a transaction consisting of the execution of an order for the transfer of a
         sum of money from one bank account to another. It is characterised in particular by the fact that it involves a change in
         the legal and financial situation existing, on the one hand, between the person giving the order and the recipient and, on
         the other, between those parties and their respective banks and, in some cases, between the banks. Moreover, the transaction
         which produces this change is simply the transfer of funds between accounts, irrespective of its cause. Thus, a transfer being
         only a means of transmitting funds, the functional aspects are decisive for the purpose of determining whether a transaction
         constitutes a transfer for the purposes of Article 13B(d)(3) of the Sixth Directive (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 June
         1997 in SDC, C‑2/95, EU:C:1997:278, paragraph 53 and of 28 July 2011 in Nordea Pankki Suomi, C‑350/10, EU:C:2011:532, paragraph 25).
Furthermore, the wording of point 3 of Article 13B(d) of the Sixth Directive does not in principle preclude a transfer from
         being broken down into separate services which then constitute ‘transactions concerning transfers’ within the meaning of that
         provision (judgment of 5 June 1997 in SDC, C‑2/95, EU:C:1997:278, paragraph 64). While it cannot be ruled out that the exemption at issue may include services which
         are not intrinsically transfers, it remains the case that that exemption can relate only to transactions which, viewed broadly,
         form a distinct whole and which fulfil in effect the specific, essential functions of such transfers (see, to that effect,
         judgment of 5 June 1997 in SDC, C‑2/95, EU:C:1997:278, paragraphs 66 to 68).
It follows from the above that in order to be characterised as transactions concerning transfers for the purposes of Article 13B(d)(3)
         of the Sixth Directive, the services at issue must, viewed broadly, form a distinct whole, fulfilling in effect the specific,
         essential functions of a transfer and, therefore, have the effect of transferring funds and entail changes in the legal and
         financial situation. In this regard, a service which is exempt under the Sixth Directive must be distinguished from a mere
         physical or technical supply. Accordingly, the national court must examine in particular the extent of the responsibility
         of the supplier of services vis-à-vis the banks, in particular the question whether that responsibility is restricted to technical
         aspects or whether it extends to the specific, essential aspects of the transactions (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 June
         1997 in SDC, C‑2/95, EU:C:1997:278, paragraph 66, and of 28 July 2011 in Nordea Pankki Suomi, C‑350/10, EU:C:2011:532, paragraph 24).
It should also be stated that, as the functional aspects are decisive in determining whether a transaction concerns a transfer
         within the meaning of Article 13B(d)(3) of the Sixth Directive, the criterion by which a transaction having the effect of
         transferring funds and entailing changes in the legal and financial situation, within the meaning of the case-law referred
         to in paragraphs 33 to 35 of the present judgment, coming within the exemption at issue, can be distinguished from a transaction
         not having such effects and, therefore, not coming within that exemption, is whether the transaction in question transfers,
         actually or potentially, the ownership of the funds in question or has the effect of fulfilling the specific, essential aspects
         of such a transfer (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 July 2011 in Nordea Pankki Suomi, C‑350/10, EU:C:2011:532, paragraph 33).
In that regard, although the fact that the service provider in question itself debits directly and/or credits an account or
         intervenes by way of accounting entries on the accounts of the same account holder, permits, in principle, a finding that
         that condition is met and that the service in question qualifies as exempt (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2014
         in ATP PensionService, C‑464/12, EU:C:2014:139, paragraphs 80, 81 and 85), the mere fact that that service does not directly include such a task
         cannot, however, exclude from the outset that it falls within the exemption concerned, considering that the interpretation
         referred to in paragraph 33 of the present judgment does not presuppose any particular method for effecting transfers (see,
         to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2014 in ATP PensionService, C‑464/12, EU:C:2014:139, paragraph 80).
Furthermore, according to the Court’s settled case-law, considerations relating to transactions concerning transfers are also
         applicable to transactions concerning payments (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 June 1997 in SDC, C‑2/95, EU:C:1997:278, paragraph 50, and of 28 July 2011 in Nordea Pankki Suomi, C‑350/10, EU:C:2011:532, paragraph 26).
However, first, as Article 13B(d)(3) of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted strictly, the mere fact that a service is
         essential for completing an exempt transaction does not warrant the conclusion that that service is exempt (see, to that effect,
         judgments of 5 June 1997 in SDC, C‑2/95, EU:C:1997:278, paragraph 65, and of 28 July 2011 in Nordea Pankki Suomi, C‑350/10, EU:C:2011:532, paragraph 31).
In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the automated nature of such a service and, in particular, the fact that the
         sending of the settlement file automatically triggers the payments or transfers under consideration, cannot alter the nature
         of the service supplied and, consequently, has no bearing on the application of the exemption in question (see, to that effect,
         judgment of 5 June 1997 in SDC, C‑2/95, EU:C:1997:278, paragraph 37).
Secondly, to grant the exemption provided for in Article 13B(d)(3) of the Sixth Directive to a card processing service, such
         as that at issue in the main proceedings, would run counter to the objectives pursued by the exemption of financial transactions
         which seeks to alleviate the difficulties connected with determining the tax base and the amount of VAT deductible and to
         avoid an increase in the cost of consumer credit (judgment of 19 April 2007 in Velvet & Steel Immobilien, C‑455/05, EU:C:2007:232, paragraph 24 and the order of 14 May 2008 in Tiercé Ladbroke and Derby, C‑231/07 and C‑232/07, not published, EU:C:2007:332, paragraph 24).