Maria Eugenia Van der Weegen and Others v Belgische Staat.
Date: 2017-06-08
25


In order to answer that question, it is appropriate, first, to state that, although such national legislation was capable of coming within the scope of the two fundamental freedoms alluded to by the referring court, the fact remains that any restrictive effects which that legislation might have on the free movement of capital would be no more than the inevitable consequence of any restrictions on the freedom to provide services. Where a national measure relates to several fundamental freedoms at the same time, the Court will in principle examine the measure in relation to only one of those freedoms if it appears, in the circumstances of the case, that the other freedoms are entirely secondary in relation to the first and may be considered together with it (see, by analogy, judgments of 8 September 2009, Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International, C‑42/07, EU:C:2009:519, paragraph 47, and of 11 March 2010, Attanasio Group, C‑384/08, EU:C:2010:133, paragraph 40; and order of 28 September 2016, Durante, C‑438/15, not published, EU:C:2016:728, paragraph 14).
27


Moreover, it should be stated that banking services constitute services within the meaning of Article 57 TFEU. Article 56 TFEU precludes the application of any national legislation which, without objective justification, impedes a provider of services from actually exercising the freedom to provide those services (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 January 2016, Commission v Greece, C‑66/15, not published, EU:C:2016:5, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
29


However, even national legislation which applies without distinction to all services, irrespective of the place of establishment of the provider, is liable to constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services in so far as it reserves an advantage solely to users of services which comply with certain conditions which are de facto specific to the national market and thus deny that advantage to users of other services which are essentially similar but do not comply with the specific conditions provided for in that legislation. Such legislation affects the situation of users of services as such and is thus liable to discourage them from using the services of certain providers, since the services offered by them do not comply with the conditions laid down in that legislation, thus directly affecting access to the market (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 May 1995, Alpine Investments, C‑384/93, EU:C:1995:126, paragraphs 26 to 28 and 35 to 38, and of 10 November 2011, Commission v Portugal, C‑212/09, EU:C:2011:717, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).
37


It should be recalled that national measures which are liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty may nevertheless be allowed provided that they pursue an objective in the public interest, that they are appropriate for attaining that objective and that they do not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objective pursued (see, inter alia, judgment of 6 June 2013, Commission v Belgium, C‑383/10, EU:C:2013:364, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
39


In that regard, the Court has held that consumer protection features among the overriding reasons in the public interest capable of justifying a restriction on the freedom to provide services (see, inter alia, judgment of 23 January 2014, Commission v Belgium, C‑296/12, EU:C:2014:24, paragraph 47).