Criminal proceedings against JI.
Date: 2020-06-11
18


However, while it is not for the Court, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, to rule on the conformity or compatibility of national provisions with EU law or to interpret national legislative or regulatory provisions, the Court nonetheless has jurisdiction to give the national court full guidance on the interpretation of EU law in order to enable it to determine the issue of conformity or compatibility for the purposes of the case before it (judgment of 18 September 2019, VIPA, C‑222/18, EU:C:2019:751, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
19


It is therefore appropriate for the Court, in the present case, to restrict its analysis to the provisions of EU law and provide an interpretation of the national provisions which will be of use to the national court, which has the task of determining the compatibility and conformity of the instruments of national law with EU law, for the purposes of deciding the dispute before it (judgment of 26 July 2017, Europa Way and Persidera, C‑560/15, EU:C:2017:593, paragraph 36).
24


Nonetheless, it must be recalled that the Court has repeatedly considered itself to have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on questions concerning provisions of EU law in situations where the facts at issue in the main proceedings were outside the scope of EU law and therefore fell within the competence of the Member States alone, but where those provisions of EU law had been rendered applicable by domestic law due to a reference made by that law to the content of those provisions (judgment of 12 July 2012, SC Volksbank România, C‑602/10, EU:C:2012:443, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited).
25


The Court has stated in particular in that regard that where, in regulating purely internal situations, domestic legislation seeks to adopt the same solutions as those adopted in EU law in order, for example, to avoid discrimination against a Member State’s own nationals or any distortion of competition or to provide for one single procedure in comparable situations, there is clearly an interest that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, provisions or concepts taken from EU law should be interpreted uniformly, irrespective of the circumstances in which they are to apply (judgment of 12 July 2012, SC Volksbank România, C‑602/10, EU:C:2012:443, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited).
26


Thus, an interpretation by the Court of provisions of EU law in situations outside its scope is justified where those provisions have been made applicable to such situations by national law in a direct and unconditional way in order to ensure that internal situations and situations governed by EU law are treated in the same way (judgment of 18 October 2012Nolan, C‑583/10, EU:C:2012:638, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
39


In that regard, it should be recalled that framework decisions are binding on the Member States as to the result to be achieved, while leaving to the national authorities the choice of form and methods (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 June 2019, Popławski, C‑573/17, EU:C:2019:530, paragraph 69).
42


That being so, when implementing EU law, Member States are required, under Article 51(1) of the Charter, to respect the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter, including in particular those enshrined in Articles 20, 21 and 49 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraphs 17 and 18).
43


In that context, it is important, in the first place, to recall that the principles of equality before the law and non-discrimination enshrined in Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter require that comparable situations should not be treated differently and that different situations should not be treated equally unless such treatment is objectively justified (judgment of 3 May 2007, Advocaten voor de Wereld, C‑303/05, EU:C:2007:261, paragraph 56).
46


Finally, thirdly, as is clear from paragraphs 32 and 33 of the present judgment, Framework Decision 2004/757 lays down only minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit trafficking in drugs and precursors. It follows that the existence of differences between the measures implementing that framework decision in the various national legal orders cannot be regarded as an infringement of the principle of non-discrimination (see, by analogy, judgment of 3 May 2007, Advocaten voor de Wereld, C‑303/05, EU:C:2007:261, paragraphs 59 and 60).
47


As regards, in the second place, the principle of the legality of criminal offences and penalties, enshrined in Article 49(1) of the Charter, it should be recalled that that principle has been enshrined, inter alia, in Article 7(1) of the ECHR (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 December 2017, M.A.S. and M.B., C‑42/17, EU:C:2017:936, paragraph 53). In accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, the right guaranteed in Article 49 thereof has the same meaning and scope as the right guaranteed by the ECHR.
48


Under that principle, criminal law provisions must comply with certain requirements of accessibility and predictability as regards both the definition of the offence and the sentencing (judgment of 5 December 2017, M.A.S. and M.B., C‑42/17, EU:C:2017:936, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
49


It follows that the law must define clearly offences and the penalties which they attract. This requirement is satisfied where the individual can know from the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the assistance of the courts’ interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make him or her criminally liable (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 June 2008, Intertanko and Others, C‑308/06, EU:C:2008:312, paragraph 71, and of 5 December 2017, M.A.S. and M.B., C‑42/17, EU:C:2017:936, paragraph 56).
50


Further, the principle that the applicable law must be precise cannot be interpreted as prohibiting the gradual clarification of rules of criminal liability by means of interpretations in the case-law, provided that those interpretations are reasonably foreseeable (judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 167 and the case-law cited).