Commission of the European Communities v European Parliament and Council of the European Union.
Date: 2009-09-08
27. Under Article 38(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure, an application must state the subject-matter of the proceedings and a summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based. That statement must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare his defence and the Court to rule on the application. It is therefore necessary for the essential points of law and of fact on which a case is based to be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself (Case C‑195/04 Commission  v Finland  [2007] ECR I‑3351, paragraph 22, Case C‑412/04 Commission  v Italy  [2008] ECR I‑619, paragraph 103).
45. It should be remembered, as a preliminary point, that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the choice of legal basis for a Community measure must rest on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review, including in particular the aim and the content of the measure (see Case C‑178/03 Commission  v Parliament and Council , paragraph 41, and Case C‑155/07 Parliament  v Council  [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 34).
46. If examination of a Community measure reveals that it pursues a twofold purpose or that it has a twofold component and if one of those is identifiable as the main or predominant purpose or component, whereas the other is merely incidental, the act must be based on a single legal basis, namely that required by the main or predominant purpose or component (see Case C‑178/03 Commission  v Parliament and Council , paragraph 42, and Case C‑155/07 Parliament  v Council , paragraph 35).
47. Exceptionally, if on the other hand it is established that the act simultaneously pursues a number of objectives or has several components that are indissociably linked, without one being secondary and indirect in relation to the other, such an act will have to be founded on the various corresponding legal bases (see Case C‑211/01 Commission  v Council  [2003] ECR I‑8913, paragraph 40, and Case C‑178/03 Commission  v Parliament and Council , paragraph 43).
65. First, that regulation replaces Regulation No 259/93, which, whilst providing inter alia in Titles IV to VI for a scheme similar to that provided for in Titles IV to VI of the contested regulation for imports and exports of waste between the Community and third countries, and also for transit through the Community of waste originating from third countries, was adopted on the basis of Article 130s of the EEC Treaty. The choice of that legal basis was endorsed by the Court in Case C‑187/93 Parliament  v Council  [1994] ECR I‑2857, as opposed to Article 100a of the EEC Treaty (subsequently 100a of the EC Treaty, now, after amendment, Article 95 EC). The Court has also found that the supervision and control established by Regulation No 259/93 are intended to protect the environment, not only within the Community but also in third countries to which waste is exported from the Community (see Case C‑259/05 Omni Metal Service  [2007] ECR I‑4945, paragraph 30).
67. As regards the Commission’s argument that the contested regulation is broader in scope than the Basel Convention, since it applies to all waste destined for disposal and recovery, whereas the Convention covers only hazardous waste for disposal, and that that difference denotes a commercial policy dimension to the Regulation, it must be pointed out that it is clear from Article 2(4) of that convention, read in conjunction with Section B of Annex IV thereto, that the term ‘disposal’ used in that convention covers ‘[o]perations which may lead to resource recovery, recycling, reclamation, direct reuse or alternative uses’. As observed by the Advocate General in point 33 of his Opinion, the fact that the contested regulation also applies to non-hazardous waste and to waste intended for recovery does not make it commercial or weaken its environmental dimension since waste, of whatever type it may be, is inherently harmful to the environment (see, to that effect, Case C-9/00 Palin Granit and Vehmassalon kansanterveystyön kuntayhtymän hallitus  [2002] ECR I-3533, paragraphs 36 and 45 to 51).
71. A Community act falls within the exclusive competence in the field of the common commercial policy provided for in Article 133 EC only if it relates specifically to international trade in that it is essentially intended to promote, facilitate or govern trade and has direct and immediate effects on trade in the products concerned (see Case C-347/03 Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia and ERSA  [2005] ECR I-3785, paragraph 75 and case-law cited).
72. That is clearly not the situation in the present case. As with its predecessor, the aim of the contested regulation is not to define those characteristics of waste which will enable it to circulate freely within the internal market or as part of commercial trade with third countries, but to provide a harmonised set of procedures whereby movements of waste can be limited in order to secure protection of the environment (see, to that effect, Case C‑187/93 Parliament  v Council , paragraph 26).
74. The principal objective of Regulation No 304/2003 is to implement the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, approved, on behalf of the European Community, by Council Decision 2003/106/EC of 19 December 2002 (OJ 2003 L 63, p. 27) (‘the Rotterdam Convention’). Given the clear convergence between the provisions of that convention and those of the Regulation, which implements the latter at Community level, the Court found that use of the same legal bases both for the decision approving that convention and for that regulation was necessary (see Case C-178/03 Commission  v Parliament and Council , paragraphs 45 and 47).
75. In that regard, in Case C‑94/03 Commission  v Council  [2006] ECR I‑1, paragraph 43, the Court inferred from a detailed analysis of the Rotterdam Convention that it also aimed to promote shared responsibility and cooperative efforts in the international trade of certain hazardous chemicals and that it was through the adoption of measures of a commercial nature, relating to trade in certain hazardous chemicals or pesticides, that the parties to that convention sought to attain the objective of protecting human health and the environment. The Court concluded that the commercial components of that convention could not be regarded as merely incidental to the objective of environmental protection pursued thereby (see, to that effect, Case C‑94/03 Commission  v Council , paragraphs 37 and 42), and that the two components falling within the scope of the common commercial policy and protection of human health and the environment are indissociably linked and neither of them can be regarded as secondary or indirect as compared with the other. The decision approving that convention on behalf of the Community thus ought to have been based on Articles 133 EC and 175(1) EC, in conjunction with the relevant provisions of Article 300 EC (see Case C‑94/03 Commission  v Council , paragraph 51). Similarly, the Court has held that Regulation No 304/2003 implementing the Rotterdam Convention ought to have been founded on Articles 133 EC and 175(1) EC (Case C‑178/03 Commission  v Parliament and Council ).
77. Moreover, the Commission’s line of argument intended to demonstrate, by reference to the Community acts referred to in paragraph 35 of this judgment, the existence of a practice of adopting acts using a dual legal basis consisting of Articles 133 EC and 175(1) EC cannot be accepted. The legal basis for an act must be determined having regard to its own aim and content and not to the legal basis used for the adoption of other Community acts which might, in certain cases, display similar characteristics (see Case C-178/03 Commission  v Parliament and Council , paragraph 55 and case-law cited).