larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Manuel de Castro Freitas (C-193/97) and Raymond Escallier (C-194/97) v Ministre des Classes moyennes et du Tourisme.
Date: 1998-10-29
19 First, it must be borne in mind that the Directive is intended to make it easier to attain freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services in a broad range of industrial and small craft activities in the manufacturing and processing industries, pending harmonisation of conditions for taking up those activities in the different Member States, which is an essential prerequisite for complete liberalisation in that field.
23 It must however be stressed that whilst, as Community law now stands, there is no specific legislation governing the conditions for taking up and pursuing the activities in question, the Member States must none the less, when exercising their powers in this area, respect both the basic freedoms guaranteed by Articles 52 and 59 of the EC Treaty and the effectiveness of a directive laying down transitional measures.
28 The Court has already held that the competent authority of the Member State of origin must certify whether the applicant's pursuit of the activity in question was genuine and real and took place over a given number of consecutive years, that is to say, without any interruption other than those occurring in the ordinary course of life (Case 130/88 Van de Bijl v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken [1989] ECR 3039, paragraph 18).
29 The Court has also held that a host Member State which imposes certain conditions as to qualifications is in principle bound by the declarations contained in the certificate issued by the Member State of origin, in particular those concerning the activities in which the applicant was engaged there or their duration, as that certificate would otherwise be deprived of its effectiveness (Van de Bijl, cited above, paragraphs 22 and 23).
30 However, where there are objective factors which lead the host State to consider that the certificate produced contains manifest inaccuracies, it may, if it so wishes, approach the Member State of origin with a view to requesting additional information (Van de Bijl, paragraph 24).
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1998-11-12
20 It acknowledges that the German practice in issue here might be regarded as a restriction on intra-Community trade. However, it considers that such a restriction is justified both on grounds of the protection of the health of humans within the meaning of Article 36 of the EC Treaty and by mandatory requirements within the meaning of Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral (the `Cassis de Dijon' case) [1979] ECR 649, paragraph 8, in particular the need to protect the consumer.
21 Here, it must be pointed out that Article 36 of the Treaty, whilst it allows the maintenance of restrictions on the free movement of goods justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or the protection of the health and life of animals, which are fundamental requirements recognised by Community law, cannot be applied where Community directives provide for harmonisation of the measures necessary to achieve the specific objective which would be furthered by reliance upon it (see, in particular, Case C-5/94 The Queen v MAFF ex parte Hedley Lomas [1996] ECR I-2553, paragraph 18).  Its application is also excluded when the need to protect consumers arises.
22 Therefore, the appropriate checks must be carried out and protective measures adopted within the framework outlined by the harmonising directives (see Case C-323/93 Centre d'Insémination de la Crespelle v Coopérative de la Mayenne [1994] ECR I-5077, paragraph 31). In that regard, the Member States must display mutual trust with regard to checks carried out on their respective territories (see, most recently, Case C-1/96 R v MAFF, ex parte Compassion in World Farming [1998] ECR I-1251, paragraph 47).
24 As the Court has held in previous cases, in interpreting provisions of Community law it is necessary to consider not only their wording but also the context in which they occur and the objectives of the rules of which they are part (see, in particular, Compassion in World Farming, cited above, paragraph 49).
26 Directive 64/433 established, furthermore, a harmonised system of health inspections, based on the principle that the public health guarantees required by all the Member States are equivalent, which ensures the protection of health and at the same time the equal treatment of products. The purpose of that system is to transfer supervision to the exporting Member State (see Joined Cases 2/82 to 4/82 Delhaize Frères `Le Lion' v Belgian State [1983] ECR 2973, paragraph 11, and Joined Cases C-277/91, C-318/91 and C-319/91 Ligur Carni and Others [1993] ECR I-6621, paragraph 25).
29 Thus, under the combined provisions of Directive 64/433, as reenacted by Directive 91/497, and Directive 89/662, the measures for the detection of a pronounced sexual odour in uncastrated male pigs have been harmonised at Community level.
Italian Republic v Council of the European Union.
Date: 1998-11-12
19 As a preliminary point, it should be remembered that it is only if the Community intended to implement a particular obligation entered into within the framework of GATT, or if the Community act expressly refers to specific provisions of GATT, that the Court must review the lawfulness of the Community act in question from the point of view of the GATT rules (see, in particular, Case C-280/93 Germany v Council, cited above, paragraph 111).
25 On the question of the alleged infringement of the general principle of proportionality by Articles 3 and 4 of the Regulation, it is settled case-law that in order to establish whether a provision of Community law complies with the principle of proportionality, it must be ascertained whether the means which it employs are suitable for the purpose of achieving the desired objective and whether they do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it (see inter alia Case C-426/93 Germany v Council [1995] ECR I-3723, paragraph 42).
40 Concerning the lack of a statement of grounds, the Court has consistently held that the statement of grounds required by Article 190 of the Treaty must be adapted to the nature of the act in question. It must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the Community institution which adopted the measure in such a way as to make the persons concerned aware of the reasons for the measure and to enable the Court to exercise its power of review. It also follows from that case-law that it is not necessary for details of all relevant factual and legal aspects to be given. The question whether the statement of the grounds for an act meets the requirements of Article 190 must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, to that effect, Case C-350/88 Delacre and Others v Commission [1990] ECR I-395, paragraphs 15 and 16, and Case C-180/96 United Kingdom v Commission [1998] ECR I-2265, paragraph 70).
50 Lastly, on the issue of alleged misuse of powers, it should be recalled that the Court's case-law defines misuse of powers as the adoption by a Community institution of a measure with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that stated or evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case (see inter alia Case C-156/93 Parliament v Commission [1995] ECR I-2019, paragraph 31).
Kingdom of Spain v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1998-11-12
31 According to Article 176 of the Treaty, the institution whose act has been declared void is required to take the measures necessary to comply with the judgment of the Court.  As the Court held in its judgment in Joined Case 97/86, 193/86, 99/86 and 215/86 Asteris and Others v Commission [1988] ECR 2181, paragraph 27, in order to comply with the judgment and to implement it fully, the institution is required to have regard not only to the operative part of the judgment but also to the grounds which led to the judgment and constitute its essential basis, in so far as they are necessary to determine the exact meaning of what is stated in the operative part.  It is those grounds which, on the one hand, identify the precise provision held to be illegal and, on the other, indicate the specific reasons which underlie the finding of illegality contained in the operative part and which the institution concerned must take into account when replacing the annulled measure.  The procedure for replacing such a measure may thus be resumed at the very point at which the illegality occurred (see the judgment in Case 34/86 Council v Parliament [1986] ECR 2155, paragraph 47).
32 According to established case-law, annulment of a Community measure does not necessarily affect the preparatory acts (Case C-331/88 Fedesa and Others [1990] ECR I-4023, paragraph 34).
Victoria Film A/S.
Date: 1998-11-12
14 In this connection, it should be observed that it has been consistently held that a national court may refer a question to the Court only if there is a case pending before it and if it is called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature (see Case 318/85 Greis Unterweger [1986] ECR 955, paragraph 4, and Case C-111/94 Job Centre [1995] ECR I-3361, paragraph 9).
18 Skatterättsnämnden therefore acts in an administrative capacity when giving a preliminary binding decision, which serves the taxpayer's interest inasmuch as he is better able to plan his activities, but it is not called upon to decide a dispute.  It is only where the taxpayer or Riksskatteverket brings an action challenging a preliminary decision that the court or tribunal, before which the matter is thus brought, could, for the purposes of Article 177 of the Treaty, be regarded as performing a judicial function with the object of reviewing the legality of an act determining a taxpayer's assessment to tax.
The Institute of the Motor Industry v Commissioners of Customs and Excise.
Date: 1998-11-12
16 It is settled case-law that the wording used in one language version of a Community provision cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. Such an approach would be incompatible with the requirement of the uniform application of Community law. In the event of divergence between the language versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part (see Case C-372/88 Milk Marketing Board v Cricket St Thomas [1990] ECR I-1345, paragraphs 18 and 19).
17 It should be borne in mind here that the terms used to specify the exemptions envisaged by Article 13 of the Directive are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that turnover tax is levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (Case 348/87 Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1989] ECR 1737, paragraph 13).
18 It must also be remembered that the aim of Article 13A of the Directive is to exempt from VAT certain activities which are in the public interest. As the Court has stressed on several occasions (Case 107/84 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 2655, paragraph 17, and Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties, paragraph 12), that provision does not provide exemption for every activity performed in the public interest, but only for those which are listed and described in great detail.
Kruidvat BVBA v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1998-11-17
48 In that regard, it should be recalled that in Articles 173 and 184, on the one hand, and in Article 177, on the other, the Treaty established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court of Justice to review the legality of measures adopted by the institutions (see Case 294/83 `Les Verts' v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, paragraph 23).
49 In this case, whilst Kruidvat could not bring an application for the annulment of the Decision, it remained able - in accordance with the ruling in Case 216/82 Universität Hamburg v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Kehrwieder [1983] ECR 2771, at paragraph 10, as the Commission points out - to plead before national courts, adjudicating in accordance with Article 177 of the Treaty, that the Decision was unlawful.
Kingdom of Spain v Council of the European Union.
Date: 1998-11-19
28 In that connection, the Court, as the Council was right to point out, has consistently held (since its judgment in Case 5/67 Beus v Hauptzollamt München [1968] ECR 83, at p. 95) that the extent of the requirement to state reasons depends on the nature of the measure in question, and that in the case of measures intended to have general application the preamble may be limited to indicating the general situation which led to its adoption, on the one hand, and the general objectives which it is intended to achieve, on the other.
30 Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly held that if the contested measure clearly discloses the essential objective pursued by the institution, it would be excessive to require a specific statement of reasons for the various technical choices made (see, inter alia, Case 250/84 Eridania and Others v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero [1986] ECR 117, paragraph 38).
33 First of all, and without there being any need to ascertain whether the change made by the contested regulation is one of substance, it must be recalled that the Community institutions enjoy a margin of discretion in their choice of the means needed to achieve the common commercial policy (see, to this effect, Case 245/81 Edeka Zentrale v Germany [1982] ECR 2745, paragraph 27; Case 52/81 Faust v Commission [1982] ECR 3745, paragraph 27; Case 256/84 Koyo Seiko v Council [1987] ECR 1899, paragraph 20; Case 258/84 Nippon Seiko v Council [1987] ECR 1923, paragraph 34, and Case 260/84 Minebea v Council [1987] ECR 1975, paragraph 28).
42 It must be stated at the outset that, although the Spanish Government alleges that the contested regulation adversely affects the legitimate expectations of the Member States as well, in all essential respects its arguments refer to breach of the legitimate expectations of the traders concerned.  Nevertheless, despite the doubts expressed by the Council, there is nothing to prevent a Member State from claiming in an action for annulment that an act of the institutions frustrates the legitimate expectations of particular individuals (see, in this respect, Case 278/84 Germany v Commission [1987] ECR 1, paragraphs 34 to 36; Case 203/86 Spain v Council [1988] ECR 4563, paragraphs 17 to 20, and Case C-169/95 Spain v Council [1997] ECR I-135, paragraphs 49 to 54).
43 As regards the question whether this plea in law is well founded, it should be recalled, first, that since, according to settled case-law, the Community institutions enjoy a margin of discretion in the choice of the means needed to achieve the common commercial policy, traders cannot claim to have a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by decisions taken by those institutions within the limits of their discretionary power will be maintained (Edeka Zentrale v Germany, cited above, paragraph 27; Faust v Commission, cited above, paragraph 27; Koyo Seiko v Council, cited above, paragraph 20; Nippon Seiko v Council, cited above, paragraph 34; and Minebea v Council, cited above, paragraph 28).
Portuguese Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1998-11-19
40 Where Article 145 of the Treaty provides that `the Council shall ... confer on the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, powers for the implementation of the rules which the Council lays down', it follows from the Treaty context in which Article 145 must be placed and also from practical requirements that the concept of implementation must be given a wide interpretation (Case 23/75 Rey Soda v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero [1975] ECR 1279, paragraph 10).
41 Since only the Commission is in a position to watch closely and constantly international market trends and to act quickly when necessary, the Council may confer on it wide powers in this sphere. Consequently, the limits of those powers must be determined by reference amongst other things to the essential general aims of the legislation in question. Thus, the Commission is authorised to adopt all the measures which are necessary or appropriate for the implementation of the basic legislation, provided that they are not contrary to such legislation or to the implementing legislation adopted by the Council (see, in relation to agricultural matters, Case C-478/93 Netherlands v Commission [1995] ECR I-3081, paragraphs 30 and 31).
European Parliament v Enrique Gutiérrez de Quijano y Lloréns.
Date: 1998-11-19
34 It follows that the disparities in the notices were not a separate issue but an extension of the Court's argument establishing that the plea alleging breach of Article 29(1) of the Staff Regulations was well founded.
39 As regards the Parliament's reference to the arguments raised before the Court of First Instance to the effect that the differences in the wording of the notices played no role, suffice it to note that, according to consistent case-law, an appeal which amounts to no more than a request for a re-examination of the pleas put before the Court of First Instance falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (Case C-354/92 P Eppe v Commission [1993] ECR I-7027, paragraph 8, and the order in X v Commission, cited above, paragraph 13).
Criminal proceedings against Gunnar Nilsson, Per Olov Hagelgren and Solweig Arrborn.
Date: 1998-11-19
27 It should be borne in mind here that, according to settled case-law (see, in particular, Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5), all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.
28 However, as the Court has held, an obligation on all traders to have their products distributed by a method authorised under national rules which apply without distinction as to the origin of the products in question, and so do not affect the marketing of products from other Member States differently from that of domestic products, does not fall within the scope of Article 30 of the Treaty (Case C-387/93 Banchero [1995] ECR I-4663, paragraphs 37 and 44).
29 With respect in particular to the conditions of acceptance for breeding of pure-bred breeding animals of the bovine species and their semen, they have been harmonised, with a view to eliminating zootechnical barriers to the free movement of bovine semen, by Directives 77/504 and 87/328 (see Case C-17/94 Gervais and Others [1995] ECR I-4353, paragraph 32). It follows that a requirement whose purpose or effect is to control or verify imports of bovine semen by reference to zootechnical or pedigree considerations could be laid down only in conformity with those directives.
41 As the Court has already held, the zootechnical and pedigree conditions relating to intra-Community trade in bovine semen have been fully harmonised under Directives 87/328 and 91/174 (Case C-323/93 Centre d'Insémination de la Crespelle v Coopérative de la Mayenne [1994] ECR I-5077, paragraph 33). It follows from that harmonisation that a Member State may not obstruct the use in its territory of the semen of pure-bred bulls where they have been accepted for artificial insemination in another Member State on the basis of tests carried out in accordance with Decision 86/130.
49 As to the Protocol of amendment to the European Convention for the Protection of Animals kept for Farming Purposes, that protocol has not yet entered into force and thus has no binding effect. As to the Recommendation concerning Cattle of 1988, while the Court has already held that it does not contain legally binding obligations for the Community (Case C-1/96 R v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Compassion in World Farming [1998] ECR I-1251, paragraph 36), it is an act adopted on the basis of a convention approved by the Community, and as such may be of use in interpreting the provisions of the convention (see Case C-188/91 Deutsche Shell v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg [1993] ECR I-363, paragraph 18).
54 On this point, it must be stated that the preamble to a Community act has no binding legal force and cannot be relied on as a ground for derogating from the actual provisions of the act in question.
French Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1998-11-19
38 First of all it must be observed that it is settled case-law that the Commission is only permitted to charge to the EAGGF sums paid in accordance with the rules laid down in the various sectors of agricultural production, leaving the Member States to bear the burden of any other sum paid, and in particular any amounts which the national authorities wrongly believed themselves authorised to pay in the context of the common organisation of the markets (Case 11/76 Netherlands v Commission [1979] ECR 245, paragraph 8; Case 18/76 Germany v Commission [1979] ECR 343, paragraph 7, and Case C-48/91 Netherlands v Commission [1993] ECR I-5611, paragraph 14).
39 Whilst it is for the Commission to prove that there has been a breach of Community rules, it is for the Member State to demonstrate, if appropriate, that the Commission erred as to the financial consequences to be put into effect as a result (see to that effect Case 49/83 Luxembourg v Commission [1984] ECR 2931, paragraph 30).
45 Article 8(1) of Regulation No 729/70, which defines the principles according to which the Community and the Member States are to ensure the implementation of Community decisions on agricultural intervention financed by the EAGGF and combat fraud and irregularities in relation to those operations (see Joined Cases 146/81, 192/81 and 193/81 BayWa [1982] ECR 1503, paragraph 13), imposes on the Member States the obligation to take the measures necessary to satisfy themselves that the transactions financed by the EAGGF are actually carried out and are executed correctly, to prevent and deal with irregularities and to recover sums lost as a result of irregularities or negligence, even if the specific Community act does not expressly provide for the adoption of particular supervisory measures (see Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission [1990] ECR I-2321, paragraphs 16 and 17).
76 So far as the sound and fair marketable quality of the products in question is concerned, in the absence of Community rules providing a definition thereof it is for the Member States themselves to adopt more precise provisions (see, to that effect, Case C-371/92 Ellinika Dimitriaka [1994] ECR I-2391, paragraph 23).
77 However, such national provisions may conflict with the general scheme of the applicable Community rules.  In that connection, the ninth recital in the preamble to Regulation No 3665/87 provides that products in respect of which an export refund is applied for must be `of a quality such that they can be marketed on normal terms'.
80 Taking the opposite view would result in the general public having to bear the consequences of the manufacturer's failure to fulfil its contractual obligations to deliver the product as specified.  That is not the purpose of the refund scheme, which is intended solely to enable Community products to be exported where this course would not otherwise be financially viable for the exporter (see Case C-299/94 Anglo Irish Beef Processors International and Others [1996] ECR I-1925, paragraphs 21 and 22).