larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Criminal proceedings against Anders Sjöberg.
Date: 1998-03-17
12 It should be recalled first of all that, according to consistent case-law, in proceedings brought under Article 177 of the Treaty the Court has no jurisdiction to apply the rules of Community law to a specific case (see, in particular, Case 20/67 Kunstmühle Tivoli v Hauptzollamt Würzburg [1968] ECR 199, and Case 204/87 Bekaert [1988] ECR 2029, paragraph 5).
14 Article 13 of Regulation No 3820/85 lists certain categories of transport in respect of which the Member States may grant exceptions on their own territories from any provision of that regulation. Being thus a derogation from the general scheme, Article 13 may not be interpreted broadly. Furthermore, the scope of the exceptions which it lays down must be determined in the light of the aims pursued by the regulation (see Case C-335/94 Mrozek and Jäger [1996] ECR I-1573, paragraph 9, and Case C-39/95 Goupil [1996] ECR I-1601, paragraph 8).
27 Article 15(7) of Regulation No 3821/85 provides that, whenever requested by an authorised inspecting officer to do so, the driver must be able to produce record sheets for the current week, and in any case for the last day of the previous week on which he drove. The purpose of that provision, as the Court held in Case C-158/90 Nijs and Transport Vanschoonbeek-Matterne [1991] ECR I-6035, at paragraph 13, is to ensure that compliance with the compulsory weekly rest period can be checked.
Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) and Others v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1998-04-02
7 On 18 December 1993, Greenpeace Spain, an environmental protection association responsible at the national level for the achievement at local level of the objectives of Stichting Greenpeace Council ("Greenpeace"), the first applicant, a nature conservancy foundation having its head office in the Netherlands, brought legal proceedings challenging the validity of the administrative authorisations issued to Unelco by the Canary Island Regional Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Consumption.
28 As far as natural persons are concerned, it follows from the case-law, cited at both paragraph 48 of the contested order and at paragraph 7 of this judgment, that where, as in the present case, the specific situation of the applicant was not taken into consideration in the adoption of the act, which concerns him in a general and abstract fashion and, in fact, like any other person in the same situation, the applicant is not individually concerned by the act.
Sodiprem SARL and Others (C-37/96) and Roger Albert SA (C-38/96) v Direction générale des douanes.
Date: 1998-04-30
22 When addressing that question, it must be borne in mind that, within the framework of proceedings brought under Article 177 of the Treaty, the Court does not have jurisdiction to give a ruling on the compatibility of a national measure with Community law.  However, it does have jurisdiction to supply the national court with a ruling on the interpretation of Community law so as to enable that court to determine whether such compatibility exists in order to decide the case before it (see, inter alia, Case C-134/95 USSL No 47 di Biella v INAIL [1997] ECR I-195, paragraph 17).
26 In its judgment of 19 February 1998 in Case C-212/96 Chevassus-Marche v Conseil Régional de la Réunion [1998] ECR I-0000, the Court examined Decision 89/688 and held that consideration thereof, in so far as it authorises a system of exemptions from the charge termed octroi de mer subject to strict conditions which it lays down, disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect its validity.  The national court must therefore classify and interpret its domestic law in the light of the criteria set out in that judgment.
27 As regards the distinction between a charge equivalent to a customs duty, falling under Articles 9 and 12 of the Treaty, and internal taxation, falling under Article 95, the Court referred, at paragraph 24 of the judgment in Chevassus-Marche, to its previous case-law to the effect that a charge liable to be borne by imported products or certain categories thereof, to the exclusion of local products in the same category, would, in any event, be incompatible with the Treaty.
28 At paragraph 37, it pointed out that the Council cannot, on any view, authorise a system of general or systematic exemptions which would amount to the reintroduction of a charge equivalent to a customs duty.  Such a system would be contrary to Articles 9, 12 and 13 of the Treaty.
29 At paragraph 46, it noted that the system of exemptions, as a support measure for local production, which encounters difficulties as a result of its isolation and distance from metropolitan France, is subject to strict conditions.
30 At paragraph 49, the Court stressed that Decision 89/688 authorises only exemptions which are necessary, proportionate and precisely determined.
31 In addition, at paragraph 52, the Court noted that the imposition of the strict conditions laid down in Article 2(3) of Decision 89/688, interpreted in the light of the limits laid down in Article 226 of the EC Treaty, is such as to ensure that the system of precisely determined exemptions is compatible with the Treaty.
32 Those conditions are described in detail in paragraphs 44 to 51 of the same judgment.  First of all, under the general rule, stated in Articles 1 and 2 of Decision 89/688, octroi de mer is to apply in principle to all products whether imported into or produced in the French overseas departments.
August De Vriendt v Rijksdienst voor Pensioenen (C-377/96), Rijksdienst voor Pensioenen v René van Looveren (C-378/96), Julien Grare (C-379/96), Karel Boeykens (C-380/96) and Frans Serneels (C-381/96) and Office national des pensions (ONP) v Fredy Parotte (C-382/96), Camille Delbrouck (C-383/96) and Henri Props (C-384/96).
Date: 1998-04-30
25 It should first be noted that it is settled case-law that the possibility of derogation provided for in Article 7(1)(a) of the Directive must be construed strictly (see, in particular, Case C-328/91 Secretary of State for Social Security v Thomas and Others [1993] ECR I-1247, paragraph 8). Thus where, pursuant to that article, a Member State prescribes different retirement ages for men and women for the purposes of granting old-age and retirement pensions, the scope of the permitted derogation is limited to forms of discrimination which are necessarily and objectively linked to the difference in retirement age (Thomas and Others, and Case C-137/94 R v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte Richardson [1995] ECR I-3407, paragraph 18). If, on the other hand, national legislation has abolished the difference in pensionable age, the Member State is not authorised to maintain a difference according to sex in the method of calculating the pension (Van Cant, paragraph 13).
26 It follows from the nature of the exceptions contained in Article 7(1) of the Directive that the Community legislature intended to allow Member States to maintain temporarily the advantages accorded to women with respect to retirement in order to enable them progressively to adapt their pension systems in this respect without disrupting the complex financial equilibrium of those systems, the importance of which could not be ignored (Case C-9/91 R v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1992] ECR I-4297, paragraph 15).
27 It is therefore necessary to determine whether in a case such as that in point in the main proceedings the discrimination relating to the method of calculating retirement pensions is necessarily and objectively linked to the maintenance of national provisions which prescribe different pensionable ages for men and women and therefore come under the derogation provided for in Article 7(1)(a) of the Directive.
28 As may be seen from paragraph 13 of the judgment in Van Cant, the question whether national legislation has maintained different pensionable ages for male and female workers is a question of fact which it is for the national court to determine.
29 It should be observed that, if it is the case that such a difference has been maintained, the specification of the age for award of a retirement pension effectively determines the length of the period during which persons can contribute to the pension scheme.
30 It is thus apparent that, in such a case, a form of discrimination in the method of calculating pensions such as that which follows from the national legislation in issue would be necessarily and objectively linked to the difference that had been maintained as regards the specification of the pensionable age.
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1998-04-30
11 First, it should be recalled that Article 48 of the Treaty, which was implemented by Directive 68/360, and Articles 52 and 59 of the Treaty, implemented by Directive 73/148, are based on the same principles both as regards the entry into and residence in the territory of Member States of persons covered by Community law and as regards the prohibition of all discrimination between them on grounds of nationality (Case 48/75 Royer [1976] ECR 497, paragraphs 11 and 12).
12 Article 4(1) of Directive 68/360 and Article 4(1) of Directive 73/148 both provide that Member States are to grant the right of residence in their territory to nationals of other Member States and members of their families who are able to produce an identity card or a valid passport.
13 Community law does not prevent a Member State from carrying out checks on compliance with the obligation to be able to produce a residence permit at all times, provided that it imposes the same obligation on its own nationals as regards their identity card (Case 321/87 Commission v Belgium [1989] ECR 997, paragraph 12).
14 In the event of failure to comply with that obligation, the national authorities are entitled to impose penalties comparable to those attaching to minor offences committed by their own nationals, such as those laid down in respect of failure to carry an identity card, provided that they do not impose a penalty so disproportionate that it becomes an obstacle to the free movement of workers (Case C-265/88 Messner [1989] ECR 4209, paragraph 14).
Criminal proceedings against E. Clarke & Sons (Coaches) Ltd and D.J. Ferne.
Date: 1998-04-30
16 That provision distinguishes between regular services and special regular services. The former are open to all and provide for the carriage of passengers at specified intervals along specified routes, passengers being taken up and set down at predetermined stopping points.  Special regular services are provided under the same conditions, but only for specified categories of passengers. It must therefore be considered whether a transport service such as that at issue in the main proceedings satisfies those conditions.
Barbara Bellone v Yokohama SpA.
Date: 1998-04-30
10 It should be noted, first, that the Directive is intended to coordinate the laws of the Member States as regards the legal relationship between the parties to a commercial agency contract.  According to Article 22, Member States were to comply with the Directive before 1 January 1990.  As regards the obligations deriving from Article 17, the Italian Republic was authorised to adopt implementing measures until 1 January 1993.
13 In that respect it should be borne in mind, first, that the Directive is designed to protect commercial agents, within the meaning of the Directive.  According to Article 1(2), a commercial agent is `a self-employed intermediary who has continuing authority to negotiate the sale or the purchase of goods on behalf of another person ... or to negotiate and conclude such transactions on behalf of and in the name of that principal'.  Since entry in a register is not referred to as a condition for protection under the Directive, it follows that protection under the Directive is not conditional upon entry in a register.
14 As regards, next, the form of the agency contract, Article 13(2) of the Directive, in Chapter IV, `Conclusion and Termination of the Agency Contract', permits Member States to `provide that an agency contract shall not be valid unless evidenced in writing'.  It follows, on the one hand, that the Directive starts from the principle that the contract is not subject to any formal requirement, whilst leaving it open to the Member States to require it to be in writing.  On the other hand, as the Commission pointed out and the Advocate General noted at point 37 of his Opinion, by referring only to the requirement that the contract be in writing in order to be valid, the Community legislature dealt exhaustively with the matter in that provision. Member States may therefore not impose any condition other than requiring that a written document be drawn up.
17 Furthermore, it is apparent from the first and second recitals in the preamble to the Directive that it is intended, inter alia, to eliminate restrictions on the freedom of establishment.  Although Italian practice appears not to apply the condition of entry in the register to foreign agents, the national provisions at issue in the main proceedings, which are drafted in general terms, nevertheless also encompass agency relationships between parties established in different Member States.  They are still capable of significantly hindering the conclusion and operation of agency contracts between parties in different Member States and therefore from that point of view also are contrary to the aims of the Directive.
Compagnie Continentale (France) SA v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1998-05-05
41 The Court's case-law shows that, for a person to be directly concerned by a Community measure, the latter must directly affect the legal situation of the individual and leave no discretion to the addressees of that measure who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from Community rules without the application of other intermediate rules (see to that effect, in particular, International Fruit Company, cited above, paragraphs 23 to 29, Case 92/78 Simmenthal v Commission [1979] ECR 777, paragraphs 25 and 26, Case 113/77 NTN Toyo Bearing Company and Others v Council [1979] ECR 1185, paragraphs 11 and 12, Case 118/77 ISO v Council [1979] ECR 1277, paragraph 26, Case 119/77 Nippon Seiko and Others v Council and Commission [1979] ECR 1303, paragraph 14, Case 120/77 Koyo Seiko and Others v Council and Commission [1979] ECR 1337, paragraph 25, Case 121/77 Nachi Fujikoshi and Others v Council [1979] ECR 1363, paragraph 11, Joined Cases 87/77, 130/77, 22/83, 9/84 and 10/84 Salerno and Others v Commission and Council [1985] ECR 2523, paragraph 31, Case 333/85 Mannesmann-Röhrenwerke and Benteler v Council [1987] ECR 1381, paragraph 14, Case 55/86 Arposol v Council [1988] ECR 13, paragraphs 11 to 13, Case 207/86 Apesco v Commission [1988] ECR 2151, paragraph 12, and Case C-152/88 Sofrimport v Commission [1990] ECR I-2477, paragraph 9).
42 The same applies where the possibility for addressees not to give effect to the Community measure is purely theoretical and their intention to act in conformity with it is not in doubt (see to that effect Case 62/70 Bock v Commission [1971] ECR 897, paragraphs 6 to 8, Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 207, paragraphs 8 to 10, and Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France and Others v Commission [1998] ECR I-0000, paragraph 51).
Glencore Grain Ltd, formerly Richco Commodities Ltd v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1998-05-05
43 The Court's case-law shows that, for a person to be directly concerned by a Community measure, the latter must directly affect the legal situation of the individual and leave no discretion to the addressees of that measure who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from Community rules without the application of other intermediate rules (see to that effect, in particular, International Fruit Company, cited above, paragraphs 23 to 29, Case 92/78 Simmenthal v Commission [1979] ECR 777, paragraphs 25 and 26, Case 113/77 NTN Toyo Bearing Company and Others v Council [1979] ECR 1185, paragraphs 11 and 12, Case 118/77 ISO v Council [1979] ECR 1277, paragraph 26, Case 119/77 Nippon Seiko and Others v Council and Commission [1979] ECR 1303, paragraph 14, Case 120/77 Koyo Seiko and Others v Council and Commission [1979] ECR 1337, paragraph 25, Case 121/77 Nachi Fujikoshi and Others v Council [1979] ECR 1363, paragraph 11, Joined Cases 87/77, 130/77, 22/83, 9/84 and 10/84 Salerno and Others v Commission and Council [1985] ECR 2523, paragraph 31, Case 333/85 Mannesmann-Röhrenwerke and Benteler v Council [1987] ECR 1381, paragraph 14, Case 55/86 Arposol v Council [1988] ECR 13, paragraphs 11 to 13, Case 207/86 Apesco v Commission [1988] ECR 2151, paragraph 12, and Case C-152/88 Sofrimport v Commission [1990] ECR I-2477, paragraph 9).
44 The same applies where the possibility for addressees not to give effect to the Community measure is purely theoretical and their intention to act in conformity with it is not in doubt (see to that effect Case 62/70 Bock v Commission [1971] ECR 897, paragraphs 6 to 8, Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 207, paragraphs 8 to 10, and Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France and Others v Commission [1998] ECR I-0000, paragraph 51).
Glencore Grain Ltd, formerly Richco Commodities Ltd v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1998-05-05
41 First of all, the Commission has not denied that the applicant is individually concerned.  Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that only the question whether the contested decision is of direct concern to the applicant need be examined.
42 The Community rules and the agreements concluded between the Community, Ukraine and the SEIB provide for a division of powers between the Commission and the agent appointed by Ukraine to arrange the purchase of wheat.  It is for that agent - in the present case, Ukrimpex - to select the other contracting party by means of an invitation to tender and to negotiate and conclude the contract.  The Commission's role is merely to verify that the conditions for Community financing are fulfilled and, where necessary, to acknowledge, for the purposes of disbursement of the loan, that such contracts are in conformity with the provisions of Decision 91/658 and with the agreements concluded with Ukraine and the SEIB.  It is not for the Commission, therefore, to assess the commercial contract with reference to any other criteria.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 1998-05-07
11 It should be observed in that regard that the conditions which may be laid down pursuant to Article 13(A)(1) of the Sixth Directive to do not in any way affect the definition of the subject-matter of the exemptions envisaged by that provision (Case 8/81 Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53, paragraph 32).
12 Those conditions are intended to ensure the correct and straightforward application of the exemptions and refer to measures intended to prevent any possible evasion, avoidance or abuse (Becker, cited above, paragraphs 33 and 34).
15 On that point, it is clear from Article 13(A)(1)(m) of the Sixth Directive that the exemption in question concerns supplies of services closely linked to sport or physical education provided by non-profit-making bodies.
18 Moreover, there is nothing in that provision to the effect that a Member State, when granting an exemption for a certain supply of services closely linked to sport or physical education provided by non-profit-making bodies, may make that exemption subject to any conditions other than those laid down in Article 13(A)(2).
21 On that point, it is sufficient to note that that provision does not imply that a Member State, by making the exemption envisaged in Article 13(A)(1)(m) subject to one or more conditions laid down in paragraph 2(a) of that provision, may alter the scope of the latter.
22 Moreover, as the Commission has rightly pointed out, Article 13(A)(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive provides that Member States may make the grant of the exemptions envisaged subject to compliance with one or more of the conditions mentioned by that provision.  The latter therefore excludes a restriction of the exemption of supplies of services closely linked to sport or physical education to private sports bodies or establishments of a social nature which charge membership fees not exceeding a certain amount without taking into account the nature and particular circumstances of each sporting activity.
Somaco SARL v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1998-05-07
49 According to consistent case-law, it follows from those provisions that an appeal must specify the alleged flaws in the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and the legal arguments which specifically support that application. That requirement is not satisfied by an appeal which confines itself to repeating or reproducing word for word the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the Court of First Instance, including those based on facts expressly rejected by that court (see inter alia Case C-244/92 P Kupka-Floridi v Economic and Social Committee [1993] ECR I-2041, paragraphs 9 and 10; Case C-73/95 P Viho v Commission [1996] ECR I-5457, paragraphs 25 and 26, and Case C-59/96 P Koelman v Commission [1997] ECR I-4809, paragraph 52).
53 As regards the question whether the two grounds of appeal put forward by Somaco call into question findings of fact made by the Court of First Instance, it should be noted to begin with that the question whether the grounds of a judgment of the Court of First Instance are contradictory or inadequate is a question of law which is amenable, as such, to judicial review on appeal (see inter alia Case C-283/90 P Vidrányi v Commission [1991] ECR I-4339, paragraph 29, and Case C-188/96 P Commission v V [1997] ECR I-6561, paragraph 24).
54 Finally, as regards the ground concerning distortion of evidence, it should be noted that, whilst it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value which should be attached to the items of evidence produced to it (see, in particular, Case C-136/92 P Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraph 66), the Court of Justice has none the less held that such a ground is admissible (see Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-667, paragraph 42, Case C-362/95 P Blackspur DIY and Others v Council and Commission [1997] ECR I-4775, paragraph 29, Case C-55/97 P AIUFFASS and AKT v Commission [1997] ECR I-5383, paragraph 25, and Case C-140/96 P Dimitriadis v Court of Auditors [1997] ECR I-5635, paragraph 35).
71 On that point, it should be noted that, according to consistent case-law, it is first and foremost for the party seeking to establish the Community's liability to adduce conclusive proof as to the existence or extent of the damage he alleges and to establish the causal link between that damage and the conduct complained of on the part of the Community institutions (see, in particular, Case 26/74 Roquette Frères v Commission [1976] ECR 677, paragraphs 22 and 23, and Blackspur DIY and Others v Council and Commission, cited above, paragraph 31).