larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Jaouad El Majdoub v CarsOnTheWeb.Deutschland GmbH.
Date: 2015-05-21
25. It should be observed that the requirements laid down by Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation must be strictly interpreted in so far as they exclude both jurisdiction as determined by the general principle of the courts of the State in which the defendant is domiciled laid down in Article 2 thereof, and the special jurisdiction provided for in Articles 5 to 7 of that regulation (see, by analogy, judgment in MSG , C‑106/95, EU:C:1997:70, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited).
26. In the first place, it must be observed that the provisions of Article 23(1) of the Brussels I Regulation clearly indicate that its scope is limited to cases in which the parties have ‘agreed’ on a court. As appears from recital 11 in the preamble to that regulation, it is that consensus between the parties which justifies the primacy granted, in the name of the principle of the freedom of choice, to the choice of a court other than that which may have had jurisdiction under that regulation (judgment in Refcomp , C‑543/10, EU:C:2013:62, paragraph 26).
40. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred is that Article 23(2) of the Brussels I Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that the method of accepting the general terms and conditions of a contract for sale by ‘click-wrapping’, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, concluded by electronic means, which contains an agreement conferring jurisdiction, constitutes a communication by electronic means which provides a durable record of the agreement, within the meaning of that provision, where that method makes it possible to print and save the text of those terms and conditions before the conclusion of the contract.
Costs
Stichting Corporate Europe Observatory v European Commission.
Date: 2015-06-04
26. According to the case-law, an appeal lies on points of law only. The General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence. The appraisal of those facts and the assessment of that evidence thus do not, save where the facts or evidence are distorted, constitute points of law open, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (see judgment in Viega  v Commission , C‑276/11 P, EU:C:2013:163, paragraphs 28 and 29).
34. As a preliminary point, it must be observed that the appellant criticises the conclusion in paragraph 60 of the judgment under appeal that an implicit waiver of any restrictions on the dissemination of the documents covered by the request for access cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the Commission did not mark those documents as being confidential, a conclusion which was a decisive factor for the rejection of the line of argument put forward by the appellant regarding Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1049/2001. The appellant therefore identifies the elements of the judgment under appeal which are being challenged with sufficient precision to enable the Court to carry out its review of the lawfulness thereof (see, to that effect, judgment in Nuova Agricast and Cofra  v Commission , C‑67/09 P, EU:C:2010:607, paragraphs 48 and 49).
36. As to the substance, it does not follow from either Article 4 or Article 9 of Regulation No 1049/2001 that the fact that a document has not previously been classified pursuant to Article 9(1) prevents an institution from refusing access to that document on the basis of Article 4. Accordingly, the mere fact that a document is not marked with one of the designations referred to in Article 9 of Regulation No 1049/2001 cannot prevent the exceptions provided for in Article 4(1)(a) thereof from applying, unless the latter provision is to be deprived of all practical effect (see, to that effect, judgment in Jurašinović  v Council , C‑576/12 P, EU:C:2013:777, paragraphs 41, 42 and 47).
P and S v Commissie Sociale Zekerheid Breda and College van Burgemeester en Wethouders van de gemeente Amstelveen.
Date: 2015-06-04
41. It must be noted, in that regard, that according to settled case-law, the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (judgment in S.P.C.M. and Others , C‑558/07, EU:C:2009:430, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited).
45. In any event, it must be added that the Member States may not apply national rules which are liable to jeopardise the achievement of the objectives pursued by that directive and, therefore, deprive it of its effectiveness (see judgment in Commission  v Netherlands , C‑508/10, EU:C:2012:243, paragraph 65).
46. In that regard, as is apparent from recitals 4, 6 and 12 in the preamble to Directive 2003/109, the principal purpose of that directive is the integration of third-country nationals who are settled on a long-term basis in the Member States (see judgment in Commission  v Netherlands , C‑508/10, EU:C:2012:243, point 66).
47. That being said, as regards, first of all, the obligation to pass the civic integration examination at issue in the main proceedings, it cannot be disputed that the acquisition of knowledge of the language and society of the host Member State greatly facilitates communication between third-country nationals and nationals of the Member State concerned and, moreover, encourages interaction and the development of social relations between them. Nor can it be contested that the acquisition of knowledge of the language of the host Member State makes it less difficult for third-country nationals to access the labour market and vocational training.
48. With that in mind, since the obligation to pass an examination, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, ensures that the third-country nationals concerned acquire knowledge which is undeniably useful for establishing connections with the host Member State, it must be held that such an obligation does not, by itself, jeopardise the achievement of the objectives pursued by Directive 2003/109, but may on the contrary contribute to their achievement.
Directeur général des douanes et droits indirects and Directeur régional des douanes et droits indirects d'Auvergne v Brasserie Bouquet SA.
Date: 2015-06-04
15. It should be noted that, in the context of the procedure established by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (see, inter alia, judgment in Le Rayon d’Or , C‑151/13, EU:C:2014:185, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
18. As regards the concept of ‘operate under licence’ as laid down in Article 4(2) of Directive 92/83, it is clear both from the third recital in the preamble to and from the title of Directive 92/83 that, in order to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, that directive seeks to establish common definitions for all the products concerned, and was adopted as part of a policy designed to harmonise the structures of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages. In order to ensure that Directive 92/83 is applied in a uniform fashion, the terms in it must be interpreted independently on the basis of the wording of the provisions in question and the purpose of that directive (see judgment in Glückauf Brauerei , C‑83/08, EU:C:2009:228, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
20. As regards those conditions, Article 4(1) contains a quantitative condition relating to the maximum annual production of a brewery of 200 000 hectolitres of beer. Article 4(2), which provides that an independent brewery is a brewery which is legally and economically independent of any other brewery, which uses premises situated physically apart from those of any other brewery, and does not operate under licence, thereby lays down a qualitative condition concerning that brewery’s independence from any other brewery (see, to that effect, judgment in Glückauf Brauerei , C‑83/08, EU:C:2009:228, paragraphs 22 to 24).
21. As far as concerns the objective of Directive 92/83 with respect to beer produced in small independent breweries, it follows from the 7th and 17th recitals in the preamble to that directive, that it seeks common solutions to permit Member States to apply reduced rates of duty to those products, while not allowing those reduced rates to lead to distortions of competition in the internal market. Therefore, that directive seeks to prevent the benefits of such a reduction from being granted to breweries, the size and capacity of which could cause such distortions (see, to that effect, judgment in Glückauf Brauerei , C‑83/08, EU:C:2009:228, paragraphs 25 and 26).
22. Article 4(2) of Directive 92/83 requires, as a consequence that small breweries — the annual beer production of which is less than 200 000 hectolitres — should be genuinely autonomous from any other brewery both as regards their legal and economic structure, and as regards their production structure, where they use physically separate premises and do not operate under licence (judgment in Glückauf Brauerei , C‑83/08, EU:C:2009:228, paragraph 27).
Base Company NV and Mobistar NV v Ministerraad.
Date: 2015-06-11
41. However, under Article 32, when Member States decide to make additional mandatory services publicly available in their own territory, a financing mechanism for those services involving specific undertakings cannot be imposed. Consequently, the financing mechanism provided for in Article 13(1)(b) of the Universal Service Directive cannot be extended to such services.
Pfeifer & Langen GmbH & Co. KG v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung.
Date: 2015-06-11
34. In that respect, it suffices to recall that the need for a uniform interpretation of the provisions of EU law makes it impossible, where there are doubts, for the text of a provision to be considered in isolation in one of its language versions, but requires, on the contrary, that it be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages (see, inter alia, judgments in Stauder , 29/69, EU:C:1969:57, paragraph 3; Moksel Import und Export , 55/87, EU:C:1988:377, paragraph 15; EMU Tabac and Others , C‑296/95, EU:C:1998:152, paragraph 36; and Profisa , C‑63/06, EU:C:2007:233, paragraph 13).
37. Indeed, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, the prohibition of quantitative restrictions and of all measures having equivalent effect, laid down in Articles 34 TFEU and 35 TFEU, applies not only to national measures but also to measures adopted by the EU institutions (see, to that effect, judgments in Denkavit Nederland , 15/83, EU:C:1984:183, paragraph 15; Meyhui , C‑51/93, EU:C:1994:312, paragraph 11; Kieffer and Thill , C‑114/96, EU:C:1997:316, paragraph 27; and Alliance for Natural Health and Others , C‑154/04 and C‑155/04, EU:C:2005:449, paragraph 47).
39. As is apparent from the 3rd, 10th and 14th recitals in the preamble to the basic regulation, the quota system is one of the measures of the COM in sugar with the ultimate aim of stabilising the EU market in sugar and, consequently, ensuring, inter alia, that the necessary guarantees in respect of the employment and standard of living of EU producers are maintained. In that context, national quotas constitute a means of guaranteeing producers Community prices and an outlet for their production (see, to that effect, judgment in Koninklijke Coöperatie Cosun v Commission , C‑68/05 P, EU:C:2006:674, paragraphs 59 and 62, and order in Isera & Scaldis Sugar and Others , C‑154/12, EU:C:2013:101, paragraph 46).
Hauptzollamt Hannover v Amazon EU Sàrl.
Date: 2015-06-11
17. As a preliminary point, it should be made clear that, when the Court is requested to give a preliminary ruling on a matter of classification for customs purposes, its task is to provide the national court with guidance on the criteria which will enable that court to classify the products at issue in the main proceedings correctly in the CN, rather than to effect that classification itself (judgment in Rohm Semiconductor , C‑666/13, EU:C:2014:2388, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
20. It should be noted in that regard that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, inter alia, judgment in Digitalnet and Others , C‑320/11, C‑330/11, C‑382/11 and C‑383/11, EU:C:2012:745, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
24. Similarly, the Court has previously pointed out that, for the purposes of classifying a product, it is necessary to take into account what consumers would consider to be ancillary or principal (see, to that effect, judgment in British Sky Broadcasting Group , C‑288/09 and C‑289/09, EU:C:2011:248, paragraph 77).
Lisboagás GDL - Sociedade Distribuidora de Gás Natural de Lisboa SA v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira.
Date: 2015-06-11
25. However, since questions concerning EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance, the Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, judgments in Cipolla and Others , C‑94/04 and C‑202/04, EU:C:2006:758, paragraph 25, and also Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys , C‑307/10, EU:C:2012:361, paragraph 32).
29. Under point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 78 of the VAT Directive, taxes, excluding the VAT itself, are to be included in the taxable amount. The Court has held previously that, in order for taxes to be included in the taxable amount for VAT, even though they do not represent any added value and do not constitute the financial consideration for the supply of goods or services, they must have a direct link with that supply and the question whether the chargeable event for the tax coincides with that for VAT is a decisive factor for the purposes of establishing the existence of such a direct link (see, to that effect, judgments in De Danske Bilimportører , C‑98/05, EU:C:2006:363, paragraph 17; Commission  v Poland , C‑228/09, EU:C:2010:295, paragraph 30; Commission  v Austria , C‑433/09, EU:C:2010:817, paragraph 34; and TVI , C‑618/11, C‑637/11 and C‑659/11, EU:C:2013:789, paragraphs 37 and 39).
36. Contrary to Lisboagás’s assertions, the inclusion of the amount of land use taxes in the taxable amount for VAT applicable to its supply of services to the company responsible for marketing the gas is not contrary to the the principle of fiscal neutrality, which precludes treating similar supplies of goods and of services, which are in competition with each other, differently for VAT purposes (see, to that effect, judgment in BGŻ Leasing , C‑224/11, EU:C:2013:15, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).
Federal Republic of Germany v European Commission.
Date: 2015-06-24
81. However, it is apparent from the grounds set out in paragraphs 56 to 89 and 93 of the judgments in Spain v Commission (C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156) and Spain  v Commission (C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157) that the adoption by the Commission of a decision on financial corrections is subject, as from 2000, to the observance of a certain time-limit.
84. It is apparent from the second paragraph of Article 108 of Regulation No 1083/2006 that Article 100 is to apply as from 1 January 2007, including to programmes prior to the period 2007 to 2013.
89. The Court points out that concerning, in this instance, decisions with important budgetary implications, it is in the interests both of the Member State concerned and of the Commission that the length of the procedure for financial corrections be predictable, which implies the setting of a predetermined time-limit for adopting the final decision. It should also be stated that failing to comply with the time-limit laid down for adopting a decision on financial corrections is not compatible with the general principle of sound administration (judgments in Spain  v Commission , C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 88, and Spain v Commission , C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 88).
92. It is apparent from the Court’s case-law that failure to comply with the procedural rules relating to the adoption of an act adversely affecting an individual, such as a failure on the part of the Commission to have adopted a decision within the time-limit prescribed by the EU legislature, constitutes an infringement of essential procedural requirements, which it is a matter for the EU judicature to raise of its own motion (see judgments in Spain  v Commission , C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 103; Spain  v Commission , C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited; and Spain  v Commission , C‑429/13 P, EU:C:2014:2310, paragraph 34).
93. The Court points out in that regard that it is settled case-law that, except in particular cases such as, inter alia, those provided for by the rules of procedure of the Courts of the European Union, those Courts cannot base their decisions on a plea raised of their own motion, even one involving a matter of public policy, without first having invited the parties to submit their observations on that plea (see judgments in Commission  v Ireland and Others , C‑89/08 P, EU:C:2009:742, paragraph 57, and OHIM  v National Lottery Commission , C‑530/12 P, EU:C:2014:186, paragraph 54).
96. It follows, first, that the Commission had sufficient opportunity to submit, in the context of an exchange of views, its pleas in law and arguments in relation to the scope of the time-limit laid down in Article 100(5) of Regulation No 1083/2006 and, second, that the Court’s case-law on the interpretation to be given to that provision must be regarded as established.
Kingdom of Spain v European Commission.
Date: 2015-06-24
50. However, it follows in this respect from the reasoning in paragraphs 56 to 89 and 93 and 94 of the judgments in Spain  v Commission  (C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156) and Spain  v Commission  (C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157) that the adoption of a financial correction decision by the Commission has since 2000 been subject to compliance with a time-limit laid down by law, and that the time-limit varies according to the applicable legislation.
53. It follows from the second paragraph of Article 108 of Regulation No 1083/2006 that Article 100 of that regulation was applicable from 1 January 2007, including for programmes earlier than the period 2007 to 2013.
56. Moreover, it follows from the Court’s case-law, first, that failure to comply with the procedural rules relating to the adoption of an act adversely affecting an individual, such as a failure by the Commission to take the contested decision within the time-limit defined by the EU legislature, constitutes an infringement of essential procedural requirements (see judgments in United Kingdom  v Council , 68/86, EU:C:1988:85, paragraphs 48 and 49; Spain  v Commission , C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 103; and Spain  v Commission , C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 103), and, secondly, that if the Court of the European Union finds, on examining the act at issue, that it was not regularly adopted, it must draw the necessary conclusions from the infringement of an essential procedural requirement and, consequently, annul the act vitiated by that defect (see judgments in Commission  v ICI , C‑286/95 P, EU:C:2000:188, paragraph 51; Commission  v Solvay , C‑287/95 P and C‑288/95 P, EU:C:2000:189, paragraph 55; Spain  v Commission , C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 103; and Spain  v Commission , C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 103).
57. It should be recalled here that, according to settled case-law, apart from special cases such as those provided for by the rules of procedure of the Courts of the European Union, those courts may not base a decision on a plea raised by the court of its own motion, even if it involves a matter of public policy, without first inviting the parties to submit their observations on that plea (see judgments in Commission  v Ireland and Others , C‑89/08 P, EU:C:2009:742, paragraph 57, and OHIM  v National Lottery Commission , C‑530/12 P, EU:C:2014:186, paragraph 54).
60. It follows, first, that the Commission had an adequate opportunity to submit, as part of an adversarial procedure, its pleas in law and arguments on the scope of the time-limit laid down in Article 100(5) of Regulation No 1083/2006 and, secondly, that the Court’s case-law on the interpretation of that provision must be regarded as settled.
Hotel Sava Rogaška, Gostinstvo, turizem in storitve, d.o.o. v Republika Slovenija.
Date: 2015-06-24
25. According to the settled case-law of the Court, the meaning and scope of terms for which EU law provides no definition must be determined by reference to their usual meaning in everyday language, while account is also taken of the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they form part (judgments in EasyCar , C‑336/03, EU:C:2005:150, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited, and Partena , C‑137/11, EU:C:2012:593, paragraph 56).
26. Additionally, interpreting a provision of Union law involves a comparison of the language versions (judgments in Cilfit and Others , 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 18, and Spain v Council , C‑36/98, EU:C:2001:64, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited). Where there is divergence between the various language versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgments in Bouchereau , 30/77, EU:C:1977:172, paragraph 14, and Brey , C‑140/12, EU:C:2013:565, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited).
40. In that regard, recital 5 of Directive 2009/54 specifies that the primary purposes of any rules on natural mineral waters should be to protect the health of consumers, to prevent consumers from being misled and to ensure fair trading. In support of this, recital 7 of that directive provides that care should be taken to ensure that natural mineral waters retain at the marketing stage those characteristics which enabled them to be recognised as such, and recital 9 states that the inclusion of the statement of the analytical composition of a natural mineral water should be compulsory in order to ensure that consumers are informed.
43. In that context, there is no need, for the purposes of assessing those characteristics and, accordingly, for the purposes of interpreting Article 8(2) of Directive 2009/54, to refer to the notions of ‘aquifer’ and ‘body of groundwater’ used in Directive 2000/60. It is apparent from Article 1 of that directive and the case-law of the Court (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission v Luxembourg , C‑32/05, EU:C:2006:749, paragraph 41, and Commission v Germany , C‑525/12, EU:C:2014:2202, paragraph 50) that the objectives pursued by Directive 2000/60 differ from those pursued by Directive 2009/54. Whereas the objectives pursued by Directive 2000/60 are essentially environmental, Directive 2009/54 is intended to protect the health of consumers, to prevent consumers from being misled and to ensure fair trading. Accordingly, the provisions of Directive 2000/60 cannot be regarded as relevant for the interpretation requested in the present case (see, by analogy, judgment in Møller , C‑585/10, EU:C:2011:847, paragraph 37).