Adriano Guaitoli and Others v easyJet Airline Co. Ltd.
Date: 2019-11-07
30


Moreover, as follows from settled case-law, the fact that that court has worded its request for a preliminary ruling with reference to certain provisions of Regulation No 44/2001 does not preclude the Court of Justice from providing to the national court all the elements of interpretation which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to them in its questions (see, by analogy, judgment of 6 June 2019, Weil, C‑361/18, EU:C:2019:473, paragraph 26).
31


In addition, it should be recalled that, in so far as Regulation No 1215/2012 repeals and replaces Regulation No 44/2001, which has itself replaced the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 1972 L 299, p. 32), the Court’s interpretation of provisions of the latter legal instrument also applies to Regulation No 1215/2012 whenever those provisions may be regarded as ‘equivalent’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2019, Tibor-Trans, C‑451/18, EU:C:2019:635, paragraph 23).
32


Finally, as is apparent from the reference for a preliminary ruling, the applicants in the main proceedings claim both lump-sum compensation and reimbursement of the costs provided for in Articles 7 and 9 of Regulation No 261/2004 and the further compensation covered in Article 12 of that regulation, namely the compensation for further material damage and for non-material damage allegedly suffered. In so far as further compensation is governed by the Montreal Convention (judgment of 13 October 2011, Sousa Rodríguez and Others, C‑83/10, EU:C:2011:652, paragraph 38), it follows that, in a dispute such as that at issue in the main proceedings, there are two schemes of liability of the air carrier in respect of passengers, one based on Regulation No 261/2004, the other on the Montreal Convention.
34


As regards jurisdiction to hear the claims such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the Court has already specified that, since the rights based respectively on the provisions of Regulation No 261/2004 and of the Montreal Convention fall within distinct regulatory frameworks, the rules on international jurisdiction provided for in that convention do not apply to applications made on the basis of Regulation No 261/2004 alone, which must be examined in the light of Regulation No 44/2001 (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 March 2016, Flight Refund, C‑94/14, EU:C:2016:148, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
38


In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, with a view to strengthening the legal protection of persons established in the Union, by enabling the plaintiff to identify easily the court in which he may sue, and the defendant reasonably to foresee before which court he may be sued, the rules of jurisdiction set out in Regulation No 1215/2012 are founded on the principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s domicile, as provided for in Article 4 thereof, complemented by the rules of special jurisdiction (see, by analogy, judgment of 3 May 2007, Color Drack, C‑386/05, EU:C:2007:262, paragraphs 20 and 21).
39


Thus, the rule that jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s domicile is complemented, in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, by a rule of special jurisdiction in matters relating to a contract which reflects an objective of proximity, is the existence of a close link between the contract and the court called upon to hear and determine the case (see, by analogy, judgment of 3 May 2007, Color Drack, C‑386/05, EU:C:2007:262, paragraph 22).
40


Under that rule of special jurisdiction, the defendant may also be sued in the court for the place of performance of the obligation in question, since that court is presumed to have a close link to the contract (see, by analogy, judgment of 3 May 2007, Color Drack, C‑386/05, EU:C:2007:262, paragraph 23).
41


Moreover, while the provisions under Section 4 of Chapter II of Regulation No 1215/2012, on ‘Jurisdiction over consumer contracts’, also establish a rule of special jurisdiction for consumers, it should be noted that Article 17(3) of that regulation states that Section 4 ‘shall not apply to a contract of transport other than a contract which, for an inclusive price, provides for a combination of travel and accommodation’ (judgment of 11 April 2019, Ryanair, C‑464/18, EU:C:2019:311, paragraph 28).
42


In the area of air transport, it follows from the case-law of the Court that the rule of special jurisdiction for the supply of services laid down in the second indent of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 1215/2012 designates as the court having jurisdiction to deal with a claim for compensation based on air transport contract of persons, at the applicant’s choice, that court which has territorial jurisdiction over the place of departure or place of arrival of the aircraft, as those places are agreed in that transport contract (see, by analogy, judgments of 9 July 2009, Rehder, C‑204/08, EU:C:2009:439, paragraphs 43 and 47, and of 11 July 2018, Zurich Insurance and Metso Minerals, C‑88/17, EU:C:2018:558, paragraph 18).
46


At the outset, it should be borne in mind that the provisions of the Montreal Convention are an integral part of the Union legal order, although the Court has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling concerning its interpretation, in observance of the rules of international law which apply to the Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 May 2010, Walz, C‑63/09, EU:C:2010:251, paragraph 20).
47


The Court has already stated that the concepts contained in the Montreal Convention must be interpreted in a uniform and autonomous manner, so that, when interpreting these concepts for a preliminary ruling, it must take into account not the various meaning that may have been given to them in the internal laws of the Member States of the Union, but rules of interpretation of general international law, which are binding on it (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 May 2010, Walz, C‑63/09, EU:C:2010:251, paragraphs 21 and 22).
48


In that connection, Article 31 of the Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed in Vienna on 23 May 1969, which codifies rules of general international law, states that a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose (judgment of 6 May 2010, Walz, C‑63/09, EU:C:2010:251, paragraph 23).