larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Slovenské elektrárne a.s. v Úrad pre vybrané hospodárske subjekty, formerly Daňový úrad pre vybrané daňové subjekty.
Date: 2019-12-12
32


In that regard, it must be stated that it is apparent from recitals 3 to 5 and 7 of Directive 2009/72 that that directive seeks, in essence, to establish an open and competitive internal market in electricity which enables consumers freely to choose their suppliers and suppliers freely to deliver to their customers, to create a level playing field in that market, to ensure security of supply and to combat climate change.
Otis Gesellschaft m.b.H. and Others v Land Oberösterreich and Others.
Date: 2019-12-12
21


In that regard, it should be noted that Article 101(1) TFEU produces direct legal effects in relations between individuals and directly creates rights for individuals which national courts must protect (judgments of 20 September 2001, Courage and Crehan, C‑453/99, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 23, and of 14 March 2019, Skanska Industrial Solutions and Others, C‑724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
22


The full effectiveness of Article 101 TFEU and, in particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in paragraph 1 of that provision would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to him or her by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition (judgments of 20 September 2001, Courage and Crehan, C‑453/99, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 26, and of 14 March 2019, Skanska Industrial Solutions and Others, C‑724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
23


Therefore, any person is thus entitled to claim compensation for the harm suffered where there is a causal relationship between that harm and an agreement or practice prohibited under Article 101 TFEU (judgments of 13 July 2006, Manfredi and Others, C‑295/04 to C‑298/04, EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 61, and of 14 March 2019, Skanska Industrial Solutions and Others, C‑724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
24


The right of any individual to claim compensation for such a loss actually strengthens the working of the European Union competition rules, since it discourages agreements or practices, frequently covert, which are liable to restrict or distort competition, thereby making a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the European Union (judgment of 5 June 2014, Kone and Others, C‑557/12, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
25


In that regard, and specifically in the context of competition law, national rules governing the exercise of the right to claim compensation for the harm resulting from an agreement or practice prohibited under Article 101 TFEU must not jeopardise the effective application of that provision (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 June 2014, Kone and Others, C‑557/12, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
26


Therefore, the law of Member States must, in particular, take into account the objective pursued by Article 101 TFEU, which strives to guarantee effective and undistorted competition in the internal market, and, accordingly, prices set on the basis of free competition. It is for the purposes of guaranteeing that effectiveness of EU law that the Court has held, as was noted in paragraph 23 of the present judgment, that national legislation must recognise the right of any individual to claim compensation for loss sustained (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 June 2014, Kone and Others, C‑557/12, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
Der Grüne Punkt - Duales System Deutschland GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office.
Date: 2019-12-12
51


Although the findings of the General Court relating to the use of a mark are factual and may therefore not be challenged in an appeal, unless there has been a distortion of the facts, a ground of appeal alleging infringement of Article 15(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 is however admissible where it concerns criteria in respect of which the General Court must assess the existence of genuine use within the meaning of that provision (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 October 2017, EUIPO v Cactus, C‑501/15 P, EU:C:2017:750, paragraph 64). That is the case here, since the single ground of appeal concerns criteria in respect of which it is necessary to assess the existence of genuine use, within the meaning of that provision, of an EU collective mark, taking into account the characteristics of that type of mark.
52


As to the substance, it should be recalled that, as the General Court has noted in paragraph 26 of the judgment under appeal, the essential function of an EU collective mark is to distinguish the goods or services of the members of the association which is the proprietor of the mark from those of other undertakings (judgment of 20 September 2017, The Tea Board v EUIPO, C‑673/15 P to C‑676/15 P, EU:C:2017:702, paragraph 63).
IT Development SAS v Free Mobile SAS.
Date: 2019-12-18
26


As a preliminary point, it should be observed that, according to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (judgments of 28 June 2018, Crespo Rey, C‑2/17, EU:C:2018:511, paragraph 40, and of 26 September 2019, UTEP 2006., C‑600/18, EU:C:2019:784, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
Club de Variedades Vegetales Protegidas v Adolfo Juan Martínez Sanchís.
Date: 2019-12-19
24


Accordingly, Regulation No 2100/94 provides for ‘primary’ protection covering the production or reproduction of variety constituents, in accordance with Article 13(2)(a) of that regulation. Harvested material is subject to ‘secondary’ protection, which, although also mentioned in that provision, is severely limited by the additional conditions laid down in paragraph 3 of that article (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 October 2011, Greenstar-Kanzi Europe, C‑140/10, EU:C:2011:677, paragraph 26).
Arriva Italia Srl and Others v Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti.
Date: 2019-12-19
31


According to settled case-law, classification of a measure as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU requires all the conditions mentioned in that provision to be fulfilled. Thus, first, there must be intervention by the State or through State resources. Second, the intervention must be liable to affect trade between Member States. Third, it must confer a selective advantage on the recipient. Fourth, it must distort or threaten to distort competition (judgment of 27 June 2017, Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania, C‑74/16, EU:C:2017:496, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
85


In that regard, it must be noted that restoring the situation prior to the payment of aid which was unlawful or incompatible with the internal market is a necessary requirement for preserving the effectiveness of the provisions of the Treaties concerning State aid (judgment of 7 March 2018, SNCF Mobilités v Commission, C‑127/16 P, EU:C:2018:165, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited).
Criminal proceedings against X.
Date: 2019-12-19
36


In that regard, it should be pointed out that, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to rule on the case before it. In that context, the Court may extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the order for reference, the legislation and the principles of EU law that require interpretation in view of the subject matter of the dispute in the main proceedings in order to reformulate the questions referred to it and to interpret all provisions of EU law which national courts require in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in those questions (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, Abcur, C‑544/13 and C‑545/13, EU:C:2015:481, paragraphs 33 and 34 and the case-law cited).
83


Under Article 3(4) of Directive 2000/31, Member States may, in respect of a given information society service falling within the coordinated field, take measures that derogate from the principle of the freedom to provide information society services, subject to two cumulative conditions.
84


First, under Article 3(4)(a) of Directive 2000/31, the restrictive measure concerned must be necessary in the interests of public policy, the protection of public health, public security or the protection of consumers; it must be taken against an information society service which actually undermines those objectives or constitutes a serious and grave risk to those objectives and, finally, it must be proportionate to those objectives.
85


Secondly, under the second indent of Article 3(4)(b) of that directive, before taking the measures in question and without prejudice to court proceedings, including preliminary proceedings and acts carried out in the framework of a criminal investigation, the Member State concerned must notify the Commission and the Member State on whose territory the service provider in question is established of its intention to adopt the restrictive measures concerned.
94


In view of the matters raised in paragraphs 89 to 92 above, the prior notification obligation established by the second indent of Article 3(4)(b) of Directive 2000/31 is not simply a requirement to provide information, comparable to the one at issue in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 13 July 1989, Enichem Base and Others (380/87, EU:C:1989:318, paragraphs 19 to 24), but rather an essential procedural requirement which justifies the unenforceability of non-notified measures restricting the freedom to provide an information society service against individuals (see, by analogy, judgment of 30 April 1996, CIA Security International, C‑194/94, EU:C:1996:172, paragraphs 49 and 50).
European Central Bank v Espírito Santo Financial (Portugal), SGPS, SA.
Date: 2019-12-19
40


However, it is settled case-law of the Court that the wording of secondary EU legislation must be interpreted, in so far as possible, in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Treaties (judgment of 16 April 2015, Parliament v Council, C‑540/13, EU:C:2015:224, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
43


Accordingly, in order to safeguard that competence, the view must be taken that Article 4(1)(a) of Decision 2004/258, read in conjunction with the second sentence of Article 10.4 of the Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB, must be interpreted as safeguarding the confidentiality of the outcome of deliberations of the Governing Council, without it being necessary that the refusal to grant access to documents containing that outcome be subject to the condition that the disclosure thereof undermines the protection of the public interest.
44


Consequently, pursuant to the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) and to Article 7(1) of that decision, the Director-General Secretariat of the ECB is required to refuse to grant access to the outcome of deliberations of the Governing Council, unless the latter has decided to make that outcome public in whole or in part.
45


Furthermore, it should be noted that such an interpretation is corroborated by the wording of recital 3 of Decision 2004/258, which states that the proceedings of the meetings of the ECB’s decision-making bodies are confidential, unless the relevant body decides to make the outcome of its deliberations public.
46


The statement of reasons for refusing to disclose the outcome of the deliberations of the Governing Council can thus be confined to reliance on the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Decision 2004/258 in respect of documents reflecting the outcome of those deliberations.
54


In this connection, it is settled case-law that, although the statement of reasons for an EU measure, which is required by the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU, must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the author of the measure in question, so as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the Court to exercise its power of review, that statement of reasons is not required to go into every relevant point of fact and law. The question whether the duty to state reasons has been satisfied must, moreover, be assessed by reference not only to the wording of the measure but also to its context and the whole body of legal rules governing the matter in question (judgment of 11 December 2018, Weiss and Others, C‑493/17, EU:C:2018:1000, paragraphs 31 and 33 and the case-law cited).
Bondora AS v Carlos V. C. and XY.
Date: 2019-12-19
40


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the system of protection implemented by the directive is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as regards both his or her bargaining power and his or her level of knowledge, which leads to the consumer agreeing to terms drawn up in advance by the seller or supplier without being able to influence the content of those terms (judgment of 27 February 2014, Pohotovosť, C‑470/12, EU:C:2014:101, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited). In addition, Article 38 of the Charter provides that European Union policies must ensure a high level of consumer protection. That requirement applies to the implementation of Directive 93/13 (judgment of 27 February 2014, Pohotovosť, C‑470/12, EU:C:2014:101, paragraph 52).
Darie BV v Staatssecretaris van Infrastructuur en Milieu.
Date: 2019-12-19
24


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts established in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need of a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (judgment of 25 July 2018, AY (Arrest warrant — witness), C‑268/17, EU:C:2018:602, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
25


It follows that questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a request for a preliminary ruling referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its object, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 25 July 2018, AY (Arrest warrant — witness), C‑268/17, EU:C:2018:602, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
29


In that regard, it should be noted that since Regulation No 528/2012 repealed and replaced Directive 98/8, the Court’s interpretation of the provisions of that directive also applies to that regulation whenever the provisions of the two instruments of EU law may be regarded as equivalent (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 November 2016, Schmidt, C‑417/15, EU:C:2016:881, paragraph 26; of 9 March 2017, Pula Parking, C‑551/15, EU:C:2017:193, paragraph 31; and of 15 November 2018, Kuhn, C‑308/17, EU:C:2018:911, paragraph 31).
Segler-Vereinigung Cuxhaven e.V. v Finanzamt Cuxhaven.
Date: 2019-12-19
22


By way of derogation, Article 98 of the VAT Directive provides for the possibility of applying reduced rates of VAT. To that end, Annex III to the directive sets out an exhaustive list of the supplies of goods and services to which the reduced rates may be applied (judgment of 9 March 2017, Oxycure Belgium, C‑573/15, EU:C:2017:189, paragraph 21).
25


In that regard, it should, first of all, be pointed out that provisions which are in the nature of exceptions to a principle must be interpreted strictly. Also, the concepts used in Annex III to the VAT Directive must be interpreted in accordance with the usual meaning of the terms at issue (judgment of 10 November 2016, Baštová, C‑432/15, EU:C:2016:855, paragraphs 59 and 60 and the case-law cited).
31


In that regard, it is to be pointed out that the EU legislature should be accorded a broad discretion, given that, when it adopts a tax measure, it is called upon to make political, economic and social choices, and to rank divergent interests or to undertake complex assessments (judgment of 7 March 2017, RPO, C‑390/15, EU:C:2017:174, paragraph 54).
32


In that general context, it must be stated that, in establishing Annex III to the VAT Directive, the EU legislature intended that essential commodities, and goods and services serving social or cultural objectives, may be subject to a reduced rate of VAT, provided that they pose little or no risk of distortion to competition (judgment of 4 June 2015, Commission v United Kingdom, C‑161/14, not published, EU:C:2015:355, paragraph 25).
36


That principle precludes similar goods or services which are in competition with each other being treated differently for VAT purposes (judgment of 27 June 2019, Belgisch Syndicaat van Chiropraxie and Others, C‑597/17, EU:C:2019:544, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
RN v Home Credit Slovakia a.s.
Date: 2019-12-19
28


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that Directive 2008/48 was adopted in order both to ensure that all consumers in the European Union enjoy a high and equivalent level of protection of their interests and to facilitate the emergence of a well-functioning internal market in consumer credit (judgment of 5 September 2019, Pohotovosť, C‑331/18, EU:C:2019:665, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). It is clear from recital 19 of that directive that it seeks, inter alia, to ensure that consumers receive adequate information, prior to the conclusion of the credit agreement, in particular on the APRC throughout the European Union, to enable them to compare those rates.
Criminal proceedings against Oriol Junqueras Vies.
Date: 2019-12-19
55


According to the Court’s settled case-law, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (judgment of 10 December 2018, Wightman and Others, C‑621/18, EU:C:2018:999, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
Ursa Major Services BV v Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit.
Date: 2020-01-22
33


In order to answer that question, it should be recalled that, under the second paragraph of Article 288 TFEU, a regulation is of general application and directly applicable in all Member States. Accordingly, by virtue of the very nature of regulations and of their function in the system of sources of EU law, the provisions of regulations generally have immediate effect in the national legal systems without its being necessary for the national authorities to adopt implementing measures (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 April 2018, Commission v Denmark, C‑541/16, EU:C:2018:251, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
34


In so far as the implementation of certain provisions of a regulation so require, Member States may adopt implementing measures for a regulation provided that (i) they do not thereby obstruct its direct applicability or conceal its nature as an act of EU law, (ii) they specify that they are acting in exercise of a discretion conferred on them under that regulation, and (iii) they adhere to the parameters laid down thereunder (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 April 2018, Commission v Denmark, C‑541/16, EU:C:2018:251, paragraphs 27 and 28 and the case-law cited).
35


In that regard, it is by referring to the relevant provisions of the regulation concerned, interpreted in the light of its objectives, that it may be determined whether they prohibit, require or allow Member States to adopt certain implementing measures and, particularly in the latter case, whether the measure concerned comes within the scope of the discretion that each Member State is recognised as having (judgment of 12 April 2018, Commission v Denmark, C‑541/16, EU:C:2018:251, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
36


It must also be recalled that any provision of EU law that satisfies the conditions required to have direct effect is binding on all the authorities of the Member States, that is to say, not merely the national courts but also all administrative bodies, including decentralised authorities, and those authorities are required to apply it (judgment of 5 March 2019, Eesti Pagar, C‑349/11, EU:C:2019:172, paragraph 90 and the case-law cited).
37


In accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, both the administrative authorities and the national courts that are called upon, within the exercise of their respective powers, to apply provisions of EU law are under a duty to give full effect to those provisions (judgment of 5 March 2019, Eesti Pagar, C‑349/11, EU:C:2019:172, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited).
49


However, the Court has consistently held that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments of 7 June 2005, VEMW and Others, C‑17/03, EU:C:2005:362, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited; of 24 June 2014, Parliament v Council, C‑658/11, EU:C:2014:2025, paragraph 51; and of 19 September 2019, Gesamtverband Autoteile-Handel, C‑527/18, EU:C:2019:762, point 30).