Antonio Crispoltoni v Fattoria Autonoma Tabacchi and Giuseppe Natale and Antonio Pontillo v Donatab Srl.
Date: 1994-10-05
27 According to the first recital in the preamble to the Regulation, the aim of the MGQ system is to curb any increase in the Community' s tobacco production and at the same time to discourage the growing of varieties which are difficult to dispose of. The second recital adds that the Regulation seeks to continue to implement a policy aimed at encouraging the most sought-after varieties and to take account of specific socio-economic and regional features of tobacco production.
30 The Community institutions have a wide discretionary power in regard to the common agricultural policy which reflects the responsibilities which the Treaty imposes on them (see, for example, the judgment in Case C-350/88 Delacre and Others v Commission [1990] ECR I-395, paragraph 32).
31 In pursuing the objectives of the common agricultural policy set out in Article 39 of the Treaty, the Community institutions must secure the permanent harmonization made necessary by any conflicts between those aims taken individually and, where necessary, allow any one of them temporary priority in order to satisfy the demands of the economic factors or conditions in view of which their decisions are made (see, for example, the judgment in Case 5/73 Balkan-Import-Export v Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof [1973] ECR 1091, paragraph 24). That harmonization must preclude the isolation of any one of those objectives in such a way as to render impossible the realization of other objectives (see, in particular, the judgment in Joined Cases 197 to 200, 243, 245 and 247/80 Ludwigshafener Walzmuehle v Council and Commission [1981] ECR 3211, paragraph 41).
32 As is clear from the first recital of the Regulation, the aim of establishing the MGQ system was, in accordance with one of the objectives of the common agricultural policy set out in Article 39 of the Treaty, to stabilize the raw tobacco market which is characterized by over-production.
34 As for Mr Crispoltoni' s argument, it is based on the assumption that a misuse of powers may consist in the manifest unsuitability of a measure to the objective pursued, which will be considered below.
41 With regard to judicial review of compliance with the abovementioned conditions, in matters concerning the common agricultural policy the Community legislature has a discretionary power which corresponds to the political responsibilities given to it by Articles 40 to 43 of the Treaty. Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (paragraph 14 of the same judgment).
42 The legality of a Community act cannot depend on retrospective considerations of its efficacy (judgment in Case 40/72 Schroeder v Germany [1973] ECR 125, point 14). Where the Community legislature is obliged to assess the future effects of rules to be adopted and those effects cannot be accurately foreseen, its assessment is open to criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of the information available to it at the time of the adoption of the rules in question (judgment in Joined Cases C-267 to 285/88 Wuidart and Others v Laiterie Coopérative Eupenoise, a cooperative society, and Others [1990] ECR I-435, paragraph 14).
43 In this case, a comparison of the MGQs fixed for each variety of tobacco for the 1989, 1990 and 1991 harvests with the quantities of those varieties actually produced shows that the MGQs were not exceeded for the majority of the varieties at issue, so that it cannot in any event be argued that the system at issue was manifestly inappropriate for the objective pursued.
46 It must accordingly be concluded, in concurrence with the Commission, that the Council in this case acted not only in compliance with the principle of proportionality, in that it did not choose a measure which was manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective pursued, but also in accordance with the need to effect the appropriate adjustments by degrees prescribed by Article 39(2)(b) of the Treaty.
47 The alleged breach of the principle of proportionality has accordingly not been established.
C ° The alleged discrimination
50 There is discrimination not only when comparable situations are treated differently but also when different situations are treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified (judgment in Case 106/83 Sermide v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero [1984] ECR 4209, paragraph 28).
51 The Court of Justice has already held that the principle of non-discrimination does not preclude a Community regulation which introduced a system of guarantee thresholds for the entire Community involving a reduction in the production aid of the relevant producers of all the Member States, even if exceeding those thresholds was not due to an increase in production in all those States. It ruled that in a common organization of markets with no system of national quotas all Community producers, regardless of the Member State in which they are based, must together, in an egalitarian manner, bear the consequences of the decisions which the Community institutions are led to adopt, in the exercise of their powers, in order to respond to the risk of an imbalance which may arise in the market between production and market outlets (judgment in Case C-27/90 SITPA v Oniflhor [1991] ECR I-133, paragraph 20).
52 The same consideration applies to a system such as that in point in this case.
57 It follows that traders cannot claim a vested right to the maintenance of an advantage which they derive from the establishment of the common organization of the markets and which they enjoyed at a given time (paragraph 34 of that judgment).
58 A possible reduction in their earnings cannot therefore be contrary to the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.