Asociación Nacional de Grandes Empresas de Distribución (ANGED) v Diputación General de Aragón.
Date: 2018-04-26
16


According to settled case-law, freedom of establishment aims to guarantee the benefit of national treatment in the host Member State to nationals of other Member States and to companies referred to in Article 54 TFEU by prohibiting any discrimination based on the place in which companies have their seat (see, inter alia, judgments of 12 December 2006, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation, C‑374/04, EU:C:2006:773, paragraph 43, and of 14 December 2006, Denkavit Internationaal and Denkavit France, C‑170/05, EU:C:2006:783, paragraph 22).
17


The rules regarding equal treatment forbid not only overt discrimination based on the location of the seat of companies, but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result (judgment of 5 February 2014, Hervis Sport-és Divatkereskedelmi, C‑385/12, EU:C:2014:47, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
18


Moreover, a tax based on an apparently objective criterion of differentiation but that disadvantages in most cases, given its features, companies whose seat is in other Member States and that are in a comparable situation to companies whose seat is situated in the Member State where that tax is charged, constitutes indirect discrimination based on the location of the seat of the companies, which is prohibited under Articles 49 and 54 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 February 2014, Hervis Sport-és Divatkereskedelmi, C‑385/12, EU:C:2014:47, paragraphs 37 to 41).
25


Classification of a national measure as ‘State aid’, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, requires all the following conditions to be fulfilled. First, there must be an intervention by the State or through State resources. Second, the intervention must be liable to affect trade between Member States. Third, it must confer a selective advantage on the recipient. Fourth, it must distort or threaten to distort competition (see, inter alia, judgment of 21 December 2016, Commission v World Duty Free Group and Others, C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P, EU:C:2016:981, paragraph 53).
26


So far as concerns the condition relating to the selectivity of the advantage, also mentioned before the Court, it is clear from settled case-law that in order to assess that condition it is necessary to determine whether, under a particular legal regime, the national measure in question is such as to favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ over others which, in the light of the objective pursued by that regime, are in a comparable factual and legal situation and which accordingly suffer different treatment that can, in essence, be classified as ‘discriminatory’ (see, inter alia, judgment of 21 December 2016, Commission v World Duty Free Group and Others, C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P, EU:C:2016:981, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
27


As regards, in particular, national measures that confer a tax advantage, it must be recalled that a measure of that nature which, although not involving the transfer of State resources, places the recipients in a more favourable position than other taxpayers is capable of procuring a selective advantage for the recipients and, consequently, constitutes State aid, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. By contrast, a tax advantage resulting from a general measure applicable without distinction to all economic operators does not constitute such aid within the meaning of that provision (judgment of 21 December 2016, Commission v World Duty Free Group and Others, C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P, EU:C:2016:981, paragraph 56).
28


In that regard, in order to classify a national tax as ‘selective’, the ordinary or ‘normal’ tax system applicable in the Member State concerned must first be identified and it must then be demonstrated that the tax being examined is a derogation from that system, in so far as it differentiates between operators who, in the light of the objective pursued by that ordinary tax system, are in a comparable factual and legal situation (see, inter alia, judgment of 21 December 2016, Commission v World Duty Free Group and Others, C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P, EU:C:2016:981, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
29


It should also be recalled that the legal reference framework for the purpose of assessing the selectivity of a measure must not necessarily be determined within the territory of the Member State concerned, but may be that of the territory within which a regional or local authority exercises the powers conferred on it by the constitution or by law. Such is the case when that entity enjoys a legal and factual status which makes it sufficiently autonomous in relation to the central government of a Member State, with the result that, by the measures it adopts, it is that body and not the central government which plays a fundamental role in the definition of the political and economic environment in which undertakings operate (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2008, UGT-Rioja and Others, C‑428/06 to C‑434/06, EU:C:2008:488, paragraphs 47 to 50 and the case-law cited).
30


A measure that differentiates between undertakings which, in the light of the objective pursued by the legal regime concerned, are in a comparable factual and legal situation and is, therefore, a priori selective, does not, however, constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU where the Member State concerned is able to demonstrate that the differentiation is justified since it flows from the nature or overall structure of the system of which it forms part (judgment of 21 December 2016, Commission v World Duty Free Group and Others, C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P, EU:C:2016:981, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).
31


A measure which creates an exception to the application of the general tax system may be justified by the nature and overall structure of the tax system if the Member State concerned can show that the measure results directly from the basic or guiding principles of its tax system. In that connection, a distinction must be made between, on the one hand, the objectives attributed to a particular tax scheme and which are extrinsic to it and, on the other, the mechanisms inherent in the tax system itself, which are necessary for the achievement of those objectives (judgment of 6 September 2006, Portugal v Commission, C‑88/03, EU:C:2006:511, paragraph 81).
32


It should also be borne in mind that although, in order for a tax to be established as being selective, it is not always necessary that it should derogate from a tax system considered to be an ordinary tax system, the fact that it can be so characterised is highly relevant in that regard where its effect is that two categories of operators are distinguished and are subject, a priori, to different treatment, namely those who fall within the scope of the derogating measure and those who continue to fall within the scope of the ordinary tax system, although those two categories are in a comparable situation in the light of the objective pursued by that system (judgment of 21 December 2016, Commission v World Duty Free Group and Others, C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P, EU:C:2016:981, paragraph 77).
35


Article 107(1) TFEU defines State interventions on the basis of their effects, independently of the techniques used (judgment of 22 December 2008, British Aggregates Association, C‑487/06 P, EU:C:2008:757, paragraph 89).
38


In the context of that analysis, account must be taken of the fact that, in the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it falls within the competence of the Member States, or of infra-State bodies having fiscal autonomy, to designate bases of assessment and to spread the tax burden across the various factors of production and economic sectors (judgment of 15 November 2011, Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, C‑106/09 P and C‑107/09 P, EU:C:2011:732, paragraph 97).
42


It is also clear that the setting-up of such establishments is of particular significance for town and country planning policies, wherever those establishments may be situated (see, by analogy, judgment of 24 March 2011, Commission v Spain, C‑400/08, EU:C:2011:172, paragraph 80).