Coop de France bétail et viande (C-101/07 P) and Fédération nationale des syndicats d’exploitants agricoles (FNSEA) and Others (C-110/07 P) v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2008-12-18
47. As the Court of First Instance observed, it emerges from the settled case-law of the Court of Justice that, at the stage of the statement of objections, to give indications as regards the level of the fines envisaged, before the undertakings have been invited to submit their observations on the allegations against them, would be to anticipate inappropriately the Commission’s decision (Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80 Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission  [1983] ECR 1825, paragraph 21).
49. It is clear, however, from the Court of Justice’s settled case-law, referred to by the Court of First Instance in paragraph 218 of the judgment under appeal, that, provided that the Commission indicates expressly in the statement of objections that it will consider whether it is appropriate to impose fines on the undertakings concerned and that it sets out the principal elements of fact and of law that may give rise to a fine, such as the gravity and the duration of the alleged infringement and the fact that it has been committed ‘intentionally or negligently’, it fulfils its obligation to respect the undertakings’ right to be heard. In doing so, it provides them with the necessary elements to defend themselves not only against a finding of infringement but also against the fact of be ing fined (see to that effect, particularly, Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others  v Commission  [2005] ECR I‑5425, paragraph 428).
50. As regards taking into account the appellant federations’ members’ turnover in the calculation of the fines, it is sufficient to state that such a practice, on the part of the Commission, is not new and has been upheld by the Community Courts (see, particularly, Case C‑298/98 P Finnboard  v Commission  [2000] ECR I‑10157, paragraph 66, and Joined Cases T‑39/92 and T‑40/92 CB and Europay  v Commission  [1994] ECR II‑49, paragraph 139). Contrary to the appellant federations’ assertions, there was, therefore, on the part of the Commission, no change in method requiring a particular statement in that regard in the statement of objections.
58. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, it is clear from Article 225 EC and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice that the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to find the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it and, second, to assess those facts. When the Court of First Instance has found or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 225 EC to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the Court of First Instance and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (see, in particular, Case C‑551/03 P General Motors  v Commission  [2006] ECR I‑3173, paragraph 51, and Case C‑266/06 P Evonik Degussa  v Commission and Council  [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 72).
59. Thus, the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to establish the facts or, in principle, to examine the evidence which the Court of First Instance accepted in support of those facts. Provided that the evidence has been properly obtained and the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced to it. Save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, that appraisal does not therefore constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice (see, in particular, General Motors  v Commission , paragraph 52, and Evonik Degussa  v Commission and Council , paragraph 73).
60. It is important, also, to point out that an alleged distortion of the facts must be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (see, in particular, General Motors  v Commission , paragraph 54, and Evonik Degussa  v Commission and Council , paragraph 74).
75. However, it is settled case-law that the obligation to state reasons does not require the Court of First Instance to provide an account that follows exhaustively and point by point all the reasoning articulated by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the measures in question were taken and provides the competent Court with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (see, to that effect, Case C‑120/99 Italy v Council [2001] ECR I-7997, paragraph 28, and Joined Cases C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P Aalborg Portland and Others  v Commission  [2001] ECR I‑123, paragraph 372).
87. Furthermore, it is well-established case-law that, for the purposes of applying Article 81(1) EC, there is no need to take account of the actual effects of an agreement once it appears that its object is to restrict, prevent or distort competition (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig  v Commission  [1966] ECR 299, 342, and Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C‑244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C‑247/99 P, C‑250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C‑254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others  v Commission  [2002] ECR I-8375, paragraph 491).
104. It must be pointed out, first, that FNSEA, FNB, FNPL and JA do not challenge the Court of First Instance’s findings of fact in their regard in paragraphs 320 to 322 of the judgment under appeal and, second, that, as is pointed out in paragraph 59 of the present judgment, the appraisal of the facts and the assessment of the evidence do not, save where the facts and evidence are distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (see Case C-104/00 P DKV v OHIM [2002] ECR I-7561, paragraph 22, and Case C-125/06 P Commission v Infront WM [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 57). Distortion of the facts is not relied upon before the Court of Justice in this case.
127. The Court of First Instance noted, first, the case-law whereby the application of the principle of non bis in idem  is subject to the threefold condition of identity of the facts, unity of offender and unity of the legal interest protected, a principle which prohibits the sanctioning of the same person more than once for a single unlawful course of conduct designed to protect the same legal asset and held that, in this case, the Commission had fined the appellant federations by reason of the participation and the degree of responsibility of each of them in the infringement.