Syndicat CFTC du personnel de la Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie de la Moselle v Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie de Moselle.
Date: 2020-11-18
29


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the system of cooperation established by Article 267 TFEU is based on a clear division of responsibilities between the national courts and the Court of Justice. In proceedings brought on the basis of that article, the interpretation of provisions of national law is a matter for the courts of the Member States, not for the Court of Justice, and the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the compatibility of rules of national law with EU law. However, the Court does have jurisdiction to provide the national court with all the guidance as to the interpretation of EU law necessary to enable that court to determine whether those national rules are compatible with EU law (judgment of 30 April 2020, CTT – Correios de Portugal, C‑661/18, EU:C:2020:335, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
30


Although it is true that a combined reading of the question referred and the grounds set out by the referring court requests the Court of Justice to rule on the compatibility of a provision of national law with EU law, there is nothing to prevent the Court from giving an answer that will be of use to the referring court, by providing the latter with guidance as to the interpretation of EU law that will enable that court itself to rule on the compatibility of the national rules with EU law. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 April 2020, CTT – Correios de Portugal, C‑661/18, EU:C:2020:335, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
37


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that questions concerning the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance (judgment of 2 April 2020, Reliantco Investments and Reliantco Investments Limassol Sucursala Bucureşti, C‑500/18, EU:C:2020:264, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
38


However, where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it, it may reject the request for a preliminary ruling as inadmissible (judgment of 2 April 2020, Reliantco Investments and Reliantco Investments Limassol Sucursala Bucureşti, C‑500/18, EU:C:2020:264, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
39


Furthermore, in view of the spirit of judicial cooperation which governs relations between national courts and the Court of Justice in the context of preliminary-ruling proceedings, the fact that the referring court did not make certain initial findings does not necessarily mean that the request for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible if, in spite of those deficiencies, the Court, in the light of the information contained in the case file, considers that it is in a position to provide a useful answer to the referring court (judgment of 2 April 2020, Reliantco Investments and Reliantco Investments Limassol Sucursala Bucureşti, C‑500/18, EU:C:2020:264, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
48


In the context of that directive, the prohibition of discrimination between male and female workers extends to all agreements which are intended to regulate paid labour collectively (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 November 2004, Sass, C‑284/02, EU:C:2004:722, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
50


With regard to the protection of the mother of a child, it follows from the settled case-law of the Court that the right to maternity leave granted to pregnant workers must be regarded as a particularly important mechanism of protection under employment law. The EU legislature thus took the view that the fundamental changes to the living conditions of the persons concerned during the period of at least 14 weeks preceding and after childbirth constituted a legitimate ground on which they could suspend their employment, without the public authorities or employers being allowed in any way to call the legitimacy of that ground into question (judgments of 20 September 2007, Kiiski, C‑116/06, EU:C:2007:536, paragraph 49, and of 21 May 2015, Rosselle, C‑65/14, EU:C:2015:339, paragraph 30).
51


As the EU legislature acknowledged in the 14th recital of Directive 92/85, pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or who are breastfeeding are in an especially vulnerable situation which makes it necessary for the right to maternity leave to be granted to them but which, particularly during that leave, cannot be compared to that of a man or a woman on sick leave (judgments of 27 October 1998, Boyle and Others, C‑411/96, EU:C:1998:506, paragraph 40, and of 18 March 2014, D., C‑167/12, EU:C:2014:169, paragraph 33).
52


That maternity leave is intended, first, to protect a woman’s biological condition during and after pregnancy and, second, to protect the special relationship between a woman and her child over the period which follows pregnancy and childbirth, by preventing that relationship from being disturbed by the multiple burdens which would result from the simultaneous pursuit of employment (judgments of 12 July 1984, Hofmann, 184/83, EU:C:1984:273, paragraph 25, and of 4 October 2018, Dicu, C‑12/17, EU:C:2018:799, paragraph 34).
53


Moreover, Directive 92/85, which lays down minimum requirements, in no way prevents Member States from providing for a higher level of protection for pregnant workers or workers who have recently given birth or who are breastfeeding by maintaining or introducing more favourable measures for those workers, provided that those measures are compatible with the provisions of EU law (judgments of 13 February 2014, TSN and YTN, C‑512/11 and C‑513/11, EU:C:2014:73, paragraph 37, and of 14 July 2016, Ornano, C‑335/15, EU:C:2016:564, paragraph 35).
54


The Court added that a measure such as maternity leave, granted to the woman after expiry of the legal period of protection, falls within the scope of Article 28(1) of Directive 2006/54, inasmuch as it seeks to protect a woman in connection with the effects of pregnancy and motherhood. On that basis, such leave may legitimately be reserved to the mother, to the exclusion of any other person, in view of the fact that it is only the mother who may find herself subject to undesirable pressures to return to work prematurely (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 July 1984, Hofmann, 184/83, EU:C:1984:273, paragraph 26).
55


As regards the status of parent, the Court has stated that the situation of a male worker and that of a female worker both having that status are comparable so far as concerns the bringing up of children (judgments of 25 October 1988, Commission v France, 312/86, EU:C:1988:485, paragraph 14, and of 12 December 2019, Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (Mothers’ Pension Supplement), C‑450/18, EU:C:2019:1075, paragraph 51). Consequently, measures designed to protect women in their capacity as parents cannot be justified on the basis of Article 28(1) of Directive 2006/54 (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 November 2001, Griesmar, C‑366/99, EU:C:2001:648, paragraph 44).