larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
A. Verholen and others v Sociale Verzekeringsbank Amsterdam.
Date: 1991-07-11
12 In that respect, it should be noted that the Court has recognized that Article 177 of the Treaty gives national courts the power and, where appropriate, imposes on them the obligation to refer a case for a preliminary ruling, as soon as the court perceives either of its own motion or at the request of the parties that the litigation depends on a point referred in the first paragraph thereof (judgment in Case 166/73 Rheinmuhlen v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle Getreide [1974] ECR 33, paragraph 3).
13 That power to raise of its own motion a question of Community law presupposes that the national court considers either that Community law must be applied and, if necessary, national law disapplied, or that national law must be interpreted in a way that conforms with Community law.
19 In that respect, it must be recalled that, in its judgment in Joined Cases 48/88, 106/88 and 107/88 Achterberg-te Riele v Sociale Verzekeringsbank [1989] ECR 1963, at paragraph 9, the Court ruled that the scope ratione personae of the directive was determined by Article 2, pursuant to which the directive applies to the working population, including persons seeking employment and persons whose activity has been interrupted by one of the risks listed in Article 3(1)(a).
24 While it is, in principle, for national law to determine an individual' s standing and legal interest in bringing proceedings, Community law nevertheless requires that the national legislation does not undermine the right to effective judicial protection (see the judgments in Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651 and in Case 222/86 UNECTEF v Heylens [1987] ECR 4097) and the application of national legislation cannot render virtually impossible the exercise of the rights conferred by Community law (judgment in Case 199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595).
Marc Rich & Co. AG v Società Italiana Impianti PA.
Date: 1991-07-25
18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
26 Those interpretations cannot be accepted. In order to determine whether a dispute falls within the scope of the Convention, reference must be made solely to the subject-matter of the dispute. If, by virtue of its subject-matter, such as the appointment of an arbitrator, a dispute falls outside the scope of the Convention, the existence of a preliminary issue which the court must resolve in order to determine the dispute cannot, whatever that issue may be, justify application of the Convention.
27 It would also be contrary to the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the objectives pursued by the Convention (see judgment in Case 38/81 Effer v Kantner [1982] ECR 825, paragraph 6) for the applicability of the exclusion laid down in Article 1(4) of the Convention to vary according to the existence or otherwise of a preliminary issue, which might be raised at any time by the parties.
Criminal proceedings against Alfred Stoeckel.
Date: 1991-07-25
12 As the Court stated in its judgment in Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Health Authority [1986] ECR 723, at paragraph 55, Article 5 of Directive 76/207 does not confer on the Member States the right to limit the application of the principle of equal treatment in its field of operation or subject it to conditions and that provision is sufficiently precise and unconditional to be capable of being relied upon by an individual before a national court in order to avoid the application of any national provision not conforming to Article 5(1), which lays down the principle of equal treatment with regard to working conditions.
13 Moreover, pursuant to Article 2(3), the Directive is to be without prejudice to provisions concerning the protection of women, particularly as regards pregnancy and maternity. In its judgment in Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, at paragraph 44, the Court held that it was clear from the express reference to pregnancy and maternity that the Directive was intended to protect a woman' s biological condition and the special relationship which exists between a woman and her child.
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 1991-07-25
11 Moreover, the equivalence of a diploma obtained in another Member State must be assessed with sole regard to the degree of knowledge and qualifications which that diploma, taking into account the nature and duration of the studies and practical training certified to have been completed, allows to be presumed on the part of the holder (judgment in Case 168/85, at paragraph 13).
12 Finally, the Italian Republic cannot escape its obligation to adapt its national legislation to the requirements of the Treaty by relying on a certain administrative or judicial practice, or by claiming that the nationals of the other Member States will in future receive the same treatment as Italian nationals. The discriminatory provisions contained in the Law of 8 November 1984 maintain a state of uncertainty as to the possibility of relying on Community law and, as a result, an ambiguous state of affairs for the persons concerned.
13 It must therefore be declared that by maintaining in force provisions restricting to Italian nationals the possibility of obtaining recognition in Italy of foreign formal qualifications which entitle holders to pursue occupations as health-care auxiliaries, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 48, 52 and 59 of the EEC Treaty.
Ayuntamiento de Sevilla v Recaudadores de Tributos de las Zonas primera y segunda.
Date: 1991-07-25
10 The documents before the Court show that tax collectors do not receive a salary and are not bound to the Commune by a contract of employment. It must therefore be considered whether their legal relationship with the Commune nevertheless creates the relationship of employer and employee referred to in Article 4(4) of the directive.
12 That being so, the fact that in the performance of their functions tax collectors are tied to the local authority, which can give them instructions, and the fact that they are subject to disciplinary control by that authority are not decisive for the purpose of defining their legal relationship with the Commune for the purposes of Article 4(4) of the directive (see, with regard to disciplinary control, the judgment of the Court in Case 235/85 Commission v Netherlands [1987] ECR 1471, paragraph 14).
13 With regard, secondly, to remuneration, there is no relationship of employer and employee since tax collectors bear the economic risk entailed in their activity in so far as their profit depends not only on the amount of taxes collected but also on the expenses incurred on staff and equipment in connection with their activity.
14 With regard, finally, to employer' s liability, the fact that the Commune can be held liable for the conduct of tax collectors when they act as representatives of the public authority is not sufficient to establish the existence of a relationship of employer and employee.
15 The decisive criterion for this purpose is the liability arising from the contractual relationships entered into by tax collectors in the course of their activity and their liability for any damage caused to third parties when they are not acting as representatives of the public authority.
18 As the Court has held on numerous occasions, it is clear from that provision, when examined in the light of the aims of the directive, that two conditions must be fulfilled in order for the exemption to apply: the activities must be carried out by a body governed by public law and they must be carried out by that body acting as a public authority (judgments in Case 107/84 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 2655, paragraph 11; Case 235/85 Commission v Netherlands, cited above, paragraph 21; Joined Cases 231/87 and 129/88 Comune de Carpaneto Piacentino and Others [1989] ECR 3233, paragraph 12).
19 With regard to the first of those two conditions, the Court has already held in its judgment in Commission v Netherlands (at paragraph 21) that an activity carried on by a private individual is not excluded from the scope of VAT merely because it consists in the performance of acts falling within the prerogatives of the public authority.
20 It follows that, if a commune entrusts the activity of collecting taxes to an independent third party, the exclusion from VAT provided for by the abovementioned provision is not applicable.
Hauptzollamt Karlsruhe v Gebrüder Hepp GmbH & Co. KG.
Date: 1991-07-25
13 That objective, which meets the requirements of commercial practice, would not be attained if no account were taken of a buying agent' s actual function. Since such an agent acts on behalf of the importer, his function in relation to the purchase of goods is only one of representation and he bears no financial risks in the purchase. Consequently, even if he acts in his own name, his function is limited to participation as indirect representative in a contract of sale concluded in fact between his principal and the supplier.
20 As regards the second problem raised by the preliminary questions, the reply must therefore be that the price in the transaction between the manufacturer or supplier, on the one hand, and the importer, on the other, constitutes the customs value for the purposes of Article 3(1) of the basic regulation. The buying commission is not to be included in that value even when the importer has described the buying agent as the seller and has declared the price of the goods as invoiced by that agent.
Raimund Vidrányi v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1991-10-01
11 It should be pointed out in the second place that according to Article 168a of the EEC Treaty and the corresponding provisions of the ECSC and EAEC Treaties, appeals are limited to points of law. That restriction is confirmed in the first paragraph of Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EEC and the corresponding provisions of the Statutes of the Court of Justice of the ECSC and the EAEC which go on to set out the grounds on which an appeal may lie, namely lack of competence of the Court of First Instance, a breach of the procedure before it which adversely affects the interests of the appellant and the infringement of Community law by the Court of First Instance.
12 It follows that the appeal may rely only on grounds relating to the infringement of rules of law by the Court of First Instance, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts (see Order in Case C-115/90 P Turner v Commission [1991] ECR I-1423).
13 The appeal is therefore admissible only in so far as it is claimed that the decision of the Court of First Instance is incompatible with the rules of law the application of which it had to ensure.
29 With regard, finally, to the complaint in the third plea that the Court of First Instance failed to rule on the plea regarding the infringement of the first and second paragraphs of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations, it must be said that although he does not claim the infringement of any precise rule of law, it may be understood as alleging an irregularity amounting to a failure to state reasons, and hence failure to observe a general principle which places on every court the obligation to state the reasons on which its decisions are based, by indicating in particular the reasons which led it not to uphold a complaint expressly raised before it.
Criminal proceedings against Paul Vandevenne, Marc Wilms, Jozef Mesotten and Wilms Transport NV.
Date: 1991-10-02
6 In the first place it should be stated that the definition of "undertaking" within the meaning of Article 15 of Regulation No 3820/85 must be considered in the light of the system established by the regulation and its aims. In that respect, it may be seen from the 27th recital to the regulation that the Council wished to emphasize "the importance of and the need for compliance with this regulation by employers and drivers".
11 As may be seen from the Court' s consistent case-law (see, most recently, the judgment in Case C-326/88 Hansen [1990] ECR I-2911, at paragraph 17), when a Community regulation does not provide any specific penalty in case of breach but refers on this matter to national provisions, the Member States retain a discretion as to the choice of penalties. However, under Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, which requires the Member States to take all measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law, they must ensure that infringements of a Community regulation are penalized under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
16 However, the purpose of Article 15 of Regulation No 3820/85 is not to restrict the liability of the undertaking for a failure by its employees to observe driving and rest periods. It therefore remains permissible for Member States to provide for criminal liability on the part of the employer for the fact that one of his employees has infringed the rules laid down in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the regulation. Such liability does indeed represent one way of ensuring that the limits laid down by those provisions are observed.
17 However, the introduction of such strict criminal liability on the part of the employer is not compulsory. As has been pointed out above, Article 17(1) of Regulation No 3820/85 allows the Member States a discretion as to the choice of penalties to be imposed in the event of breach of the regulation, which is subject only to the obligations resulting from Article 5 of the EEC Treaty. It is therefore possible for a Member State to comply with those obligations whilst choosing not to provide for strict criminal liability on the part of the undertaking.
Criminal proceedings against Willy Kennes and Verkooyen PVBA.
Date: 1991-10-02
3 Regulation No 3820/85 introduced greater flexibility into the provisions of Regulation (EEC) No 543/69 of the Council of 25 March 1969 on the harmonization of certain social legislation relating to road transport (Official Journal, English Special Edition 1969 (I), p. 170), laying down daily and weekly limits on driving periods and requiring certain rest periods. Article 18(1) of Regulation No 543/69, like Article 17(1) of Regulation No 3820/85, requires the Member States to adopt the provisions necessary for the implementation of the respective regulations, in particular as regards the penalties to be imposed in case of breach.
Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1991-10-03
8 In view of these arguments it should be pointed out first, that, according to the Court' s established case-law, a contribution by the public authorities to the capital of an undertaking, in whatever form, may constitute State aid when the conditions referred to in Article 92 of the Treaty are fulfilled, and that, in order to determine whether such contributions amount to State aids, it must be considered whether, in similar circumstances, a private investor of a stature comparable to that of the bodies administering the public sector might have been induced to provide contributions of capital to a like extent (Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR 1603, paragraphs 18 and 19 of the judgment).
15 As regards the argument relating to the principle of equality between private and public undertakings, it should be recalled that, as the Court pointed out in the judgment in Case C-303/88 (Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1433, at paragraph 20), it follows from that principle of equal treatment that capital placed by the State, directly or indirectly, at the disposal of an undertaking, in circumstances which correspond to normal market conditions cannot be regarded as State aid. However, regard being had to the facts recorded above, it is impossible to maintain that the undertakings in question received the capital placed at their disposal in circumstances which corresponded to normal market conditions.
20 As regards the argument that in order to make a finding that the previous decision had been infringed the Commission should have referred the matter to the Court, it must be pointed out first of all that when the Commission considers the compatibility of a State aid with the common market it must take all the relevant factors into account, including, where relevant, the circumstances already considered in a prior decision and the obligations which that decision may have imposed on a Member State. In this case the Commission cannot be criticized for considering the new aid in the framework of the whole of the aids to the aluminium industry as, moreover, the Italian Government itself did in its comments at the pre-litigation stage.
21 Moreover, the procedure for assessing aid under Article 93(2) makes it possible to appraise any new fact capable of altering the Commission' s assessment, regard being had to the purpose of any new aid and all relevant economic circumstances at the time when the aid is granted.
23 It follows that, since the Commission had not been informed, when it took the contested decision, of any new fact allowing it to assess whether the aid in question might have the benefit of the derogation laid down in Article 92(3)(c) of the Treaty, it was justified in basing its decision on the assessments it had already made in its previous decision and the failure to comply with the condition it had imposed thereby.
European Parliament v Council of the European Communities.
Date: 1991-10-04
9 The Court has consistently held that in the context of the organization of the powers of the Community the choice of the legal basis for a measure may not depend simply on an institution' s conviction as to the objective pursued but must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review. Those factors include in particular the aim and content of the measure (see, most recently, paragraph 10 of the judgment in Case C-300/89 Commission v Council [1991] ECR I-2867).
14 There is no support in the relevant legislation for that restrictive interpretation, which cannot therefore be accepted. The indications are rather that the purpose of the articles referred to is to ensure the consistent and effective protection of the health of the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiations, whatever their source and whatever the categories of persons exposed to such radiations.
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 1991-10-04
11 It must be pointed out, in the first place, as the Court held in its judgment in Case C-221/89 Factortame II ([1991] ECR I-3905, paragraph 13), that, as Community law stands at present, competence to determine the conditions for the registration of vessels is vested in the Member States. As far as fishing vessels in particular are concerned, the provisions of Council Regulation (EEC) No 101/76 of 19 January 1976 laying down a common structural policy for the fishing industry (Official Journal 1976 L 20, p. 19) refer to fishing vessels "flying the flag" of a Member State or "registered" there but leaves those terms to be defined in the legislation of the Member States (judgments in Factortame II, above, paragraph 13, and in Case 223/86 Pesca Valentia [1988] ECR 83, paragraph 13).
12 Nevertheless, powers retained by the Member States must be exercised consistently with Community law (see most recently the judgments in Case 57/86 Hellenic Republic v Commission [1988] ECR 2855, at paragraph 9, and in Case 127/87 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1988] ECR 3333, at paragraph 7).
17 It must be borne in mind that the Court has consistently held (see, for example, judgment in Case 305/87 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1989] ECR 1461, paragraph 13) that Article 7 applies independently only to situations governed by Community law in regard to which the Treaty lays down no specific prohibition of discrimination.
18 In the same judgment (paragraph 12) the Court made it clear that the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in Article 7 of the Treaty has been implemented by Article 52 of the Treaty in the specific domain governed by that article and that, consequently, any rules incompatible with the latter provision are also incompatible with Article 7 of the Treaty.
Article 52 of the Treaty
21 It must be observed in that regard that the concept of establishment, within the meaning of Article 52 et seq. of the Treaty, involves the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an indefinite period.
Criminal proceedings against Aimé Richardt and Les Accessoires Scientifiques SNC.
Date: 1991-10-04
14 Having regard to those opposing points of view, it should first be recalled that, as the Court held in its judgment in Case 266/81 SIOT v Ministero delle Finanze [1983] ECR 731, paragraph 16, it is necessary, as a consequence of the Customs Union and in the mutual interest of the Member States, to acknowledge the existence of a general principle of freedom of transit of goods within the Community. That principle is, moreover, confirmed by the reference to "transit" in Article 36 of the Treaty.
15 As the Court stated in its judgment in Case C-117/88 Trend-Moden Textilhandels GmbH v Hauptzollamt Emmerich [1990] ECR I-631, paragraph 16, the purpose of Regulation No 222/77 is to facilitate the transport of goods within the Community by simplifying and standardizing the formalities to be carried out when internal frontiers are crossed.
19 In that connection the Court has consistently held that the purpose of Article 36 of the Treaty is not to reserve certain matters to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member States, but merely to allow national legislation to derogate from the principle of the free movement of goods to the extent to which this is and remains justified in order to achieve the objectives set out in the article (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 72/83 Campus Oil Limited v Minister for Industry and Energy [1984] ECR 2727, paragraph 32).
22 In that respect, it is necessary to state, along with the Commission and the Member States which submitted written observations to the Court, that the concept of public security within the meaning of Article 36 of the Treaty covers both a Member State' s internal security and its external security. It is common ground that the importation, exportation and transit of goods capable of being used for strategic purposes may affect the public security of a Member State, which it is therefore entitled to protect pursuant to Article 36 of the Treaty.
25 However, it is for the national court to determine whether the system established complies with the principle of proportionality, taking account of all the elements of each case, such as the nature of the goods capable of endangering the security of the State, the circumstances in which the breach was committed and whether or not the trader seeking to effect the transit and holding documents for that purpose issued by another Member State was acting in good faith.