European Commission v Czech Republic.
Date: 2013-07-11
34. Thus Article 4(1) establishes a division of powers between Member States and the infrastructure manager with regard to charging schemes. It is for the Member States to establish a charging framework, while the determination and collection of the charge are tasks to be performed by the infrastructure manager.
35. In order to ensure that the objective of management independence of the infrastructure manager is attained, the latter must, within the charging framework established by the Member States, be given a certain latitude in determining the amount of the charges so as to enable it to use that flexibility as a management tool (C-483/10 Commission  v Spain [2013] ECR I-0000, paragraph 49).
70. In that respect, it is to be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, in proceedings under Article 258 TFEU for failure to fulfil obligations, it is for the Commission to prove the allegation that the obligation has not been fulfilled. It is therefore the Commission’s responsibility to place before the Court the information needed to enable the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled, and in so doing the Commission may not rely on any presumptions (see, inter alia, Case C-555/10 Commission  v Austria  [2013] ECR I-0000, paragraph 62, and Case C-556/10 Commission  v Germany  [2013] ECR I-0000, paragraph 66, and the case-law cited).
80. It follows from this, first, that the Member States must include in infrastructure charging schemes a performance scheme the purpose of which is to encourage both railway undertakings and the infrastructure manager to improve network performance. Second, as regards the types of incentive which may be introduced by the Member States, the latter remain free to choose the specific measures that are to form part of the scheme, provided such measures constitute a coherent and transparent whole which may be described as a ‘performance scheme’ ( Commission  v Spain , paragraph 64).
85. Furthermore, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-528/10 Commission  v Greece  [2012] ECR I-0000, paragraph 26, and, to that effect, Case C-473/10 Commission  v Hungary [2013] ECR I-0000, paragraph 96).
108. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that it follows from Article 120(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and from the case-law relating to that provision that the application initiating proceedings must state the subject matter of the dispute and a summary of the pleas in law, and that that statement must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the application. It is therefore necessary for the essential points of fact and of law on which a case is based to be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself and for the form of order sought to be set out unambiguously so that the Court does not rule ultra petita  or indeed fail to rule on a complaint (see, inter alia, Case C-165/08 Commission  v Poland  [2009] ECR I‑6843, paragraph 42, and Case C-343/08 Commission  v Czech Republic  [2010] ECR I-275, paragraph 26).
109. The Court has also held that, in an action brought under Article 258 TFEU, the application must set out the complaints coherently and with precision, so that the Member State and the Court can know exactly the full extent of the alleged infringement of Community law, a condition which must be satisfied if the Member State is to be able to present an effective defence and the Court to determine whether there has been a breach of obligations, as alleged (see, in particular, Commission  v Poland , paragraph 43).
116. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the Court has consistently held that, in proceedings under Article 258 TFEU for failure to fulfil obligations, it is for the Commission to prove the allegation that the obligation has not been fulfilled. It is therefore the Commission’s responsibility to place before the Court the information needed to enable the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled, and in so doing the Commission may not rely on any presumptions (see, inter alia, Commission  v Austria , paragraph 62, and Commission  v Germany , paragraph 66).
125. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the Commission’s allegation relating to the time limit of 15 days, as provided for under Article 34g of the Law on railways, for lodging a complaint was raised for the first time in its reply. Since the subject matter of the proceedings under Article 258 TFEU is delimited by the pre-litigation procedure provided for in that provision, those proceedings must be based on the same grounds and pleas as the reasoned opinion, so that if a complaint was not included in the reasoned opinion, it is inadmissible at the stage of proceedings before the Court (see, to that effect, inter alia Case C‑305/03 Commission  v United  Kingdom [2006] ECR I‑1213, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited). The complaint must therefore be rejected as inadmissible.
132. It should be borne in mind at the outset that the subject matter of an action brought under Article 258 TFEU is circumscribed by the pre-litigation procedure laid down in that provision. Consequently, the Commission’s reasoned opinion and its application must be based on the same complaints (see Case C-211/08 Commission  v Spain  [2010] ECR I-5267, paragraph 33).