Génesis Seguros Generales Sociedad Anónima de Seguros y Reaseguros (Génesis) v Boys Toys SA and Administración del Estado.
Date: 2012-03-22
26. Indeed, according to settled case-law, there is a presumption of relevance in favour of questions on the interpretation of European Union law referred by a national court, and it is a matter for the national court to define, and not for the Court to verify, in which factual and legislative context they operate (Case C‑300/01 Salzmann  [2003] ECR I‑4899, paragraphs 29 and 31; Joined Cases C‑222/05 to C‑225/05 van der Weerd and Others  [2007] ECR I‑4233, paragraph 22; and Case C‑210/06 Cartesio [2008] ECR I‑9641, paragraph 67). The Court declines to rule on a reference for a preliminary ruling from a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or to its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( Cartesio , paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).
30. As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that the protection of trade marks is characterised, within the European Union, by the coexistence of several systems of protection.
31. First, according to the first recital in the preamble thereto, the purpose of Directive 89/104 is to approximate national trade mark laws in order to remove any existing disparities which may impede the free movement of goods and the freedom to provide services and which may distort competition within the common market.
32. Although the third recital in the preamble to Directive 89/104 states that ‘it does not appear to be necessary at present to undertake full-scale approximation of the trade mark laws of the Member States’, the directive none the less provides for harmonisation in relation to substantive rules of central importance in this sphere, that is to say, according to the same recital, the rules concerning the provisions of national law which most directly affect the functioning of the internal market, and that recital does not preclude the harmonisation relating to those rules from being complete (Case C‑355/96 Silhouette International Schmied  [1998] ECR I‑4799, paragraph 23; Case C‑40/01 Ansul  [2003] ECR I‑2439, paragraph 27; and Case C‑482/09 Budějovický Budvar  [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 30).
35. Second, it follows from the second recital in the preamble to Regulation No 40/94 as amended that the objective of that regulation is the creation of a Community regime for trade marks to which uniform protection is given and which produce their effects throughout the entire area of the European Union (see, to that effect, Case C‑235/09 DHL Express France  [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 41).
36. That Community trade mark system is an autonomous system with its own set of objectives and rules peculiar to it; it applies independently of any national system (see, inter alia, Case C‑238/06 P Develey  v OHIM  [2007] ECR I‑9375, paragraph 65; Joined Cases C‑202/08 P and C‑208/08 P American Clothing Associates  v OHIM  and OHIM  v American Clothing Associates  [2009] ECR I‑6933, paragraph 58; and Case C‑479/09 P Evets  v OHIM  [2010], ECR I-0000, paragraph 49).
40. First of all, it should be observed that the need for a uniform application of European Union law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of European Union law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union; that interpretation must take into account the context of the provision and the objective of the relevant legislation (see, inter alia, Case 327/82 Ekro  [1984] ECR 107, paragraph 11; Case C‑287/98 Linster  [2000] ECR I‑6917, paragraph 43; Case C‑467/08 Padawan  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 32; and Budějovický Budvar , paragraph 29).
41. Next, it follows from case-law that the meaning and scope of terms for which European Union law provides no definition must be determined by considering their usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they form part (see, inter alia, Case C‑336/03 easyCar  [2005] ECR I‑1947, paragraph 21; Case C‑549/07 Wallentin‑Hermann  [2008] ECR I‑11061, paragraph 17; Case C‑151/09 UGT‑FSP  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 39; and Budějovický Budvar , paragraph 39).
42. Lastly, the need for a uniform interpretation of the various language versions of a provision of European Union law also requires, in the case of divergence between those language versions, that the provision in question be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (Case C‑72/95 Kraaijeveld and Others  [1996] ECR I‑5403, paragraph 28; Case C‑63/06 Profisa  [2007] ECR I‑3239, paragraph 14; and Case C‑585/10 Møller  [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 26).