Jutta Leth v Republik Österreich, Land Niederösterreich.
Date: 2013-03-14
24. As regards the term ‘material assets’ within the meaning of Article 3 of Directive 85/337, it must be recalled that, according to settled case‑law, it follows from the need for a uniform application of European Union law that the terms of a provision of European Union law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, having regard to the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see Case C-287/98 Linster [2000] ECR I‑6917, paragraph 43, and Case C-497/10 PPU Mercredi [2010] ECR I‑14309, paragraph 45).
32. It must be recalled, from the outset, that the Court has already ruled that an individual may, where appropriate, rely on the duty to carry out an environmental impact assessment under Article 2(1) of Directive 85/337, read in conjunction with Articles 1(2) and 4 thereof (see Case C‑201/02 Wells [2004] ECR I-723, paragraph 61). That directive thus confers on the individuals concerned a right to have the environmental effects of the project under examination assessed by the competent services and to be consulted in that respect.
37. As regards a right to compensation for such pecuniary damage, it follows from the Court’s settled case‑law that, under the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, Member States are required to nullify the unlawful consequences of a breach of European Union law. In that regard, the Court has already held that, in order to remedy the failure to carry out an environmental impact assessment of a project within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 85/337, it is for the national court to determine whether it is possible under national law for a consent already granted to be revoked or suspended in order to subject the project in question to an assessment of its environmental impacts, in accordance with the requirements of Directive 85/337, or alternatively, if the individual so agrees, whether it is possible for the latter to claim compensation for the harm suffered (see Wells , paragraphs 66 to 69).
38. The detailed procedural rules that are applicable are a matter for the domestic legal order of each Member State, under the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States, provided that they are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the European Union legal order (principle of effectiveness) (see Wells , paragraph 67).
39. Thus, it is on the basis of the rules of national law on liability that the Member State must make reparation for the consequences of the loss or damage caused, provided that the conditions for reparation of that loss or damage laid down by national law ensure compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness recalled in the previous paragraph (see Joined Cases C-46/93 and C‑48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I‑1029, paragraph 67).
40. It must, however, be pointed out that European Union law confers on individuals, under certain conditions, a right to compensation for damage caused by breaches of European Union law. According to the Court’s settled case-law, the principle of State liability for loss or damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of European Union law for which the State can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the treaties on which the European Union is based (see Case C‑429/09 Fuß [2010] ECR I-12167, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
41. In that respect, the Court has repeatedly held that individuals who have been harmed have a right to reparation if three conditions are met: the rule of European Union law infringed must be intended to confer rights on them; the breach of that rule must be sufficiently serious; and there must be a direct causal link between that breach and the loss or damage sustained by the individuals (see, Fuß , paragraph 47, and Case C‑568/08 Combinatie Spijker Infrabouw-De Jonge Konstruktie and Others [2010] ECR I-12655, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited).
42. Those three conditions are necessary and sufficient to found a right in individuals to obtain redress on the basis of European Union law directly, although this does not mean that the Member State concerned cannot incur liability under less strict conditions on the basis of national law (see Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame , paragraph 66).
43. It is, in principle, for the national courts to apply the criteria, directly on the basis of European Union law, for establishing the liability of Member States for damage caused to individuals by breaches of European Union law, in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Court for the application of those criteria (see Case C‑446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation  [2006] ECR I‑11753, paragraph 210 and the case-law cited).