Minister for Justice and Equality v Francis Lanigan.
Date: 2015-07-16
24. Secondly, it should be noted that Mr Lanigan is currently deprived of his liberty and that the question as to whether he may continue to be held in custody depends on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings.
27. It should be recalled, as a preliminary point, that the purpose of the Framework Decision, as is apparent in particular from Article 1(1) and (2) thereof and recitals 5 and 7 in the preamble thereto, is to replace the multilateral system of extradition between Member States with a system of surrender between judicial authorities of convicted or suspected persons for the purpose of enforcing judgments or of conducting prosecutions, that system of surrender being based on the principle of mutual recognition (judgments in Melloni , C‑399/11, EU:C:2013:107, paragraph 36, and F. , C‑168/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:358, paragraph 34).
28. The Framework Decision thus seeks, by the establishment of a new simplified and more effective system for the surrender of persons convicted or suspected of having infringed criminal law, to facilitate and accelerate judicial cooperation with a view to contributing to the objective set for the European Union to become an area of freedom, security and justice, founded on the high level of confidence which should exist between the Member States (judgments in Melloni , C‑399/11, EU:C:2013:107, paragraph 37, and F. , C‑168/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:358, paragraph 35).
29. That objective of accelerating judicial cooperation is present in various aspects of the Framework Decision, inter alia in the treatment of the time-limits for adopting decisions relating to a European arrest warrant (judgment in F. , C‑168/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:358, paragraph 58).
32. It follows from the Court’s case-law that Articles 15 and 17 of the Framework Decision must be interpreted as requiring the final decision on the execution of the European arrest warrant to be taken, in principle, within those time-limits, the importance of which is, moreover, expressed in a number of provisions of the Framework Decision (see, to that effect, judgment in F. , C‑168/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:358, paragraphs 62 and 64).
35. It should be noted, in that regard, that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments in Maatschap L.A. en D.A.B. Langestraat en P. Langestraat-Troost , C‑11/12, EU:C:2012:808, paragraph 27, and Koushkaki , C‑84/12, EU:C:2013:862, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
36. As regards the context of which Article 15(1) of the Framework Decision forms part, it follows from settled case-law of the Court that the principle of mutual recognition, which is the ‘cornerstone’ of judicial cooperation, means that, pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Framework Decision, Member States are in principle obliged to give effect to a European arrest warrant. They may refuse to execute such a warrant only in the cases of non-execution provided for in Articles 3, 4 and 4a of the Framework Decision and they may make its execution subject only to the conditions defined in Article 5 thereof (see, to that effect, judgments in West , C‑192/12 PPU, EU:C:2012:404, paragraph 55; Melloni , C‑399/11, EU:C:2013:107, paragraph 38; and F. , C‑168/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:358, paragraph 36).
38. That interpretation is corroborated by the fact that the EU legislature expressly envisaged, in Article 17(7) of the Framework Decision, the situation in which a Member State finds itself unable to observe the time-limits stipulated in Article 17, without providing that the executing judicial authority would thus no longer be able to adopt the decision on the execution of the European arrest warrant or that the obligation to carry out the execution procedure of the European arrest warrant would, in that case, be removed. Article 17(7) of the Framework Decision refers, moreover, to the occurrence of repeated ‘delays … in the execution’, which shows, therefore, that the EU legislature considered that, in a situation in which those time-limits have not been observed, the execution of the European arrest warrant is postponed, not abandoned.
40. Furthermore, an interpretation of Article 15(1) of the Framework Decision to the effect that the executing judicial authority should no longer adopt the decision on the execution of the European arrest warrant after those time-limits have expired would run counter to the objective pursued by the Framework Decision of accelerating and simplifying judicial cooperation, since such an interpretation could, in particular, force the issuing Member State to issue a second European arrest warrant in order to enable a new surrender procedure to take place within the time-limits stipulated in the Framework Decision.
41. Thus, by preventing the effect of European arrest warrants from being weakened and delays in the execution of those warrants from leading to more complex procedures, the interpretation of Articles 15 and 17 of the Framework Decision to the effect that the decision on the execution of the European arrest warrant may still be adopted once the time-limits stipulated in Article 17 have expired only facilitates the surrender of requested persons, in accordance with the principle of mutual recognition set out in Article 1(2) of the Framework Decision, which constitutes the essential rule introduced by that decision (see, by analogy, judgments in Wolzenburg , C‑123/08, EU:C:2009:616, paragraph 59, and West , C‑192/12 PPU, EU:C:2012:404, paragraph 62). Moreover, an interpretation contrary to Articles 15 and 17 of the Framework Decision would be liable to encourage delaying tactics aimed at obstructing the execution of European arrest warrants.
44. It should be noted that that article does not provide, in a general manner, that the holding of the requested person in custody is envisageable only within the temporal limits specified nor, in particular, that such a possibility is to be ruled out after expiry of the time-limits stipulated in Article 17 of the Framework Decision.
45. Similarly, although Article 12 of the Framework Decision allows for the possibility, under certain conditions, to release provisionally the person arrested on the basis of a European arrest warrant, it does not provide that, following the expiry of the time-limits stipulated in Article 17 of the Framework Decision, the executing judicial authority is required to release that person provisionally or, a fortiori , to release him purely and simply.
46. It should be pointed out, in that regard, that no other provision of the Framework Decision lays down any such obligation.
48. In that regard, Article 17(2) and (3) of the Framework Decision provides that the decision on the execution of the European arrest warrant ‘should be taken’ within the time-limits stipulated, and Article 17(4) provides that those time-limits ‘may be extended’, whereas Article 23(5) of the Framework Decision states, in a more affirmative manner, that the requested person ‘shall be released’ if he is still being held in custody upon expiry of the time-limits referred to in that article.
50. Moreover, in so far as it results from the considerations set out in paragraphs 34 to 42 above that the execution procedure for the European arrest warrant must continue also after expiry of the time-limits stipulated in Article 17 of the Framework Decision, a general and unconditional obligation to release the requested person provisionally or, a fortiori , to release that person purely and simply upon expiry of those time-limits or where the total duration of the period that person has spent in custody exceeds those time-limits could limit the effectiveness of the surrender system put in place by the Framework Decision and, consequently, obstruct the attainment of the objectives pursued by it.
53. However, Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision expressly states that the decision is not to have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 EU and reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), an obligation which moreover concerns all the Member States, in particular both the issuing and the executing Member States (see, to that effect, judgment in F. , C‑168/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:358, paragraphs 40 and 41).
54. Article 12 of the Framework Decision must, therefore, be interpreted in conformity with Article 6 of the Charter, which provides that everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
55. Article 52(1) of the Charter accepts that limitations may be imposed on the exercise of rights such as those set forth in Article 6 of the Charter, as long as the limitations are provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and, subject to the principle of proportionality, are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recogni sed by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others (see, to that effect, judgment in Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert , C‑92/09 and C‑93/09, EU:C:2010:662, paragraph 50).
56. Moreover, according to Article 52(3) of the Charter, in so far as it contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights are to be the same as those laid down by the Convention. Article 53 of the Charter further states that nothing in the Charter is to be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting the rights recognised inter alia by the ECHR (judgment in Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert , C‑92/09 and C‑93/09, EU:C:2010:662, paragraph 51).
57. According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR on extradition procedures, only the conduct of such a procedure justifies the deprivation of a freedom based on that article and, consequently, if the procedure is not carried out with due diligence, the detention ceases to be justified (see, inter alia, Quinn v. France , 22 March 1995, § 48, Series A no. 311, and Gallardo Sanchez v. Italy , no. 11620/07, § 40, ECHR 2015).
58. Therefore, given that the issuing of a European arrest warrant cannot, as such, justify the holding of the requested person for a period the total duration of which exceeds the time necessary to execute that warrant, the executing judicial authority may decide to hold that person in custody, in accordance with Article 6 of the Charter, only in so far as the procedure for the execution of the European arrest warrant has been carried out in a sufficiently diligent manner and in so far as, consequently, the duration of the custody is not excessive.
59. In order to ensure that that is indeed the case, the executing judicial authority will be required to carry out a concrete review of the situation at issue, taking account of all of the relevant factors with a view to evaluating the justification for the duration of the procedure, including the possible failure to act on the part of the authorities of the Member States concerned and any contribution of the requested person to that duration. The sentence potentially faced by the requested person or delivered in his regard in relation to the acts which justified the issuing of the European arrest warrant in his respect, together with the potential risk of that person absconding, must also be taken into consideration.
60. Against that background, the fact that the requested person has been held in custody for a period the total of which greatly exceeds the time-limits stipulated in Article 17 of the Framework Decision is also relevant, in so far as those time-limits are, in principle, sufficient, in the light, inter alia, of the essential role of the principle of mutual recognition in the system put in place by the Framework Decision, for the executing judicial authority to carry out checks prior to the execution of the European arrest warrant and to adopt the decision on the execution of such a warrant.
61. In any event, if the executing judicial authority concludes, following the review referred to in paragraphs 58 to 60 above, that it is required to bring the requested person’s custody to an end, it is then required, pursuant to Articles 12 and 17(5) of the Framework Decision, to attach to the provisional release of that person any measures it deems necessary so as to prevent him from absconding and to ensure that the material conditions necessary for his effective surrender remain fulfilled for as long as no final decision on the execution of the European arrest warrant has been taken.