Galileo Zaninotto v Ispettorato Centrale Repressione Frodi - Ufficio di Conegliano - Ministero delle risorse agricole, alimentari e forestali.
Date: 1998-10-29
25 In that regard, the Commission set out its method of calculation in response to a written question put by the Court.  Its reply shows that, according to the forward estimate for the 1993/94 wine year (OJ 1994 C 49, p. 12), overall Community production of table wine amounted to 98 610 000 hl, of which 91 365 000 hl were intended for winemaking.  Table wine production, net of wine deliveries and losses, was assessed at 87 385 000 hl, while normal utilisation which, under Article 1 of Regulation No 441/88, is defined as the sum of the quantities intended for human consumption, industrial uses and export, minus the quantity of imported wine, was assessed at 79 807 000 hl.  It follows that the total surplus for the wine year at issue amounted to 7 578 000 hl (87 385 000 hl - 79 807 000 hl = 7 578 000 hl).  Taking into account the stocks at the start of the wine year of 46 886 000 hl and those at the end of the year assessed at 33 253 000 hl, surplus stocks amounted to 13 633 000 hl.  The total surplus to be eliminated thus corresponded to the difference between the total quantities available (87 385 000 hl + 46 886 000 hl = 134 271 000 hl) and the total needs for the wine year (79 807 000 hl + 33 253 000 hl = 113 060 000 hl), that is to say 21 211 000 hl.
31 The Court finds, on the basis of those calculations, that the Italian Republic did not suffer from different treatment in relation to the other Member States.  On the contrary, the Management Committee for Wine even decided to reduce Italy's quantity for distillation (from 14 070 420 hl to 12 150 000 hl).  It therefore does not appear that the fourth indent of Article 1(3) of Regulation No 343/94 led to any discrimination, within the meaning of Article 40(3) of the Treaty, against the Italian Republic in relation to the other Member States.  Nor has that latter provision been shown to have been infringed by Article 1(1)(c) and the second subparagraph of Article 1(2) of Regulation No 465/94, as amended by Regulation No 610/94, which establish different yield classes per hectare for the region corresponding to Italy.
46 In that regard, it should be recalled that the Community institutions have a wide discretionary power in regard to the common agricultural policy which reflects the responsibilities which the Treaty imposes on them (see, in particular, Joined Cases C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93 Crispoltoni and Others v Fattoria Autonoma Tabacchi and Donatab [1994] ECR I-4863, paragraph 31).  Thus, by virtue of the enabling provision contained in Article 39(2) of Regulation No 822/87, the Commission has a wide discretion when, in pursuit of the objective of improving conditions in the wine market, it sets the quantities for distillation.
47 In the context of that objective, all Community producers, regardless of the Member State in which they are based, must together, in an egalitarian manner, bear the consequences of the decisions which the Community institutions are led to adopt in the exercise of their powers in order to respond to the risk of an imbalance which may arise in the market between production and market outlets (Crispoltoni and Others, paragraph 52).
50 It is settled case-law that in the sphere of the common organisation of the markets, whose purpose involves constant adjustments to meet changes in the economic situation, economic agents cannot legitimately expect that they will not be subject to restrictions arising out of future rules of market or structural policy (see Case C-63/93 Duff and Others v Minister of Agriculture and Food, Ireland, and the Attorney General [1996] ECR I-569, paragraph 20).  Moreover, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations may be invoked as against Community rules only to the extent that the Community itself has previously created a situation which can give rise to a legitimate expectation (Case C-177/90 Kühn v Landwirtschaftskammer Weser-Ems [1992] ECR I-35, paragraph 14).  The arguments relied on by the referring court, and adopted by the applicant in the main proceedings, in support of the contention that the legitimate expectations of Italian wine-growers were thwarted are not such as to establish that the Community created such a specific situation.
Question 3
63 In that regard, it is to be remembered that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of Community law, requires that measures adopted by Community institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, Crispoltoni and Others, cited above, paragraph 41, and Case C-157/96 The Queen v MAFF and Another, ex parte National Farmers' Union and Others [1998] ECR I-2211, paragraph 60).
64 So far as concerns judicial review of compliance with the abovementioned conditions, in matters concerning the common agricultural policy the Community legislature has a discretionary power which corresponds to the political responsibilities given to it by Articles 40 to 43 of the Treaty. Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see Crispoltoni and Others, paragraph 42, and National Farmers' Union and Others, paragraph 61).
66 As regards the argument put forward by the applicant in the main proceedings that the Commission has acknowledged, in its new legislative policy for the common organisation of the market in table wine, that the criterion of end-of-year stocks was more appropriate than that of yield per hectare, it should be recalled that the legality of a Community act cannot depend on retrospective considerations of its efficacy (Crispoltoni and Others, paragraph 43).  It is clear from settled case-law that, where the Community legislature is obliged to assess the future effects of rules to be adopted and those effects cannot be accurately foreseen, its assessment is open to criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of the information available to it at the time of the adoption of the rules in question (see Crispoltoni and Others, paragraph 43).
72 In that regard, it must be held that in an entity composed of Member States, such as the European Community, it is clearly reasonable to take the territory of those Member States as a point of reference for administrative purposes.  Even though geographical and economic conditions may not be identical in the various parts of national territory, the Commission was therefore entitled, in the exercise of its discretion, to regard the whole of the territory of a Member State as a single region, provided that such a decision was not manifestly unsuited to the structures of the Member State in question (for the comparable case of a decision of a Member State to regard the whole of its territory as a single region for the purposes of implementing the additional levy on milk within a regional framework, see Joined Cases C-267/88 to C-285/88 Wuidart and Others v Laiterie Coopérative Eupenoise and Others [1990] ECR I-435, paragraph 35).
79 In accordance with settled case-law, it must be held that the questions referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling do not involve an interpretation of Community law objectively required for the decision to be taken by the national court (see, in particular, Case C-361/97 Nour v Burgenländische Gebietskrankenkasse [1998] ECR I-3101, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited).