larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Meiland Azewijn BV v Hauptzollamt Duisburg.
Date: 2004-09-09
35. It should be borne in mind that Article 7(1) and (2) of Directive 92/12 lays down a general rule that where a product subject to excise duty and released for consumption in one Member State is held for commercial purposes in another Member State, the excise duty is to be levied in that other Member State. The excise duty is therefore chargeable in the Member State where the product is to be used rather than the State where it is released for consumption.
40. The Court finds that while Article 8a does not contain a definition of ‘commercial motor vehicle’, it does not follow that the definitions contained in other texts of secondary legislation are relevant. As the Advocate General stated in paragraph 44 of his Opinion, the two definitions invoked by the Hauptzollamt Duisburg are not co-terminous and the texts in which they are found pursue objectives which are different from that of Directive 92/81. In those circumstances, it is not necessary to refer to those texts to determine the meaning of the term ‘commercial motor vehicle’, but rather it is appropriate to refer to the scheme and purpose of the provision in which it is found.
41. It is apparent from the wording of Article 8a of Directive 92/81, in the light of the objectives thereof as set out in the 19th recital in the preamble to Directive 94/74, namely to protect freedom of movement for individuals and goods and to prevent double taxation, that that provision must be interpreted broadly.
51. Directive 95/60, relating to fiscal marking, was adopted pursuant to Article 9 of Directive 92/81. Far from being inconsistent with the objective of Directive 92/81, the objective of Directive 95/60, as evidenced by the first and third recitals in the preamble thereto, is to complement the former by contributing to the achievement and proper functioning of the internal market.
57. It is clear from the case-law of the Court that wherever the provisions of a directive appear, as far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, those provisions may, in the absence of implementing measures adopted within the prescribed period, be relied upon as against any national provision which is incompatible with the directive or in so far as the provisions define rights which individuals are able to assert against the State (Case C‑346/97 Braathens  [1999] ECR I-3419, paragraph 29).
Clinique La Ramée ASBL and Winterthur Europe Assurance SA v Jean-Pierre Riehl and Council of the European Union.
Date: 2004-09-09
15. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the subrogation provided for by Article 85a of the Staff Regulations is subrogation by operation of law. It takes place, within the limits of the obligations devolving upon the Communities under the provisions of the Staff Regulations, upon the occurrence of the harmful event for which a third party is liable (Case C-333/90 Royale belge  [1992] ECR I-1135, paragraph 8).
17. In that context, it must be noted that the purpose of Article 85a of the Staff Regulations is not to alter the national rules applicable for determining whether and to what extent there is liability on the part of the third party who caused the injury. That third party’s liability remains subject to the substantive rules which are normally to be applied by the national court before which the victim’s proceedings are brought, that is to say, in principle, the legislation of the Member State in whose territory the injury has occurred (see, in respect of the subrogation of social security bodies under Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community, in its version amended and updated by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2001/83 of 2 June 1983 (OJ 1983 L 230, p. 6), Case C-428/92 DAK  [1994] ECR I‑2259, paragraph 21).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 2004-09-09
15. According to settled case-law, whilst legislative action on the part of each Member State is not necessarily required in order to implement a directive, it is none the less essential for the national law at issue effectively to guarantee that the directive will be applied in full, that the legal position under national law is sufficiently precise and clear and that individuals are made fully aware of their rights and, where appropriate, may rely on them before the national courts (see, inter alia, Case C-144/99 Commission v Netherlands  [2001] ECR I-3541, paragraph 17, and Case C-478/99 Commission v Sweden [2002] ECR I-4147, paragraph 18).
30. As is clear from the sixth recital in its preamble, the directive is intended ‘to safeguard the citizen in his role as consumer when acquiring goods and services under contracts which are governed by the laws of Member States other than his own’ (see, in that regard, Commission v Netherlands , cited above, paragraph 18, and Commission v Sweden , cited above, paragraph 18). Article 6(2) of the directive gives effect thereto. As is clear from the 22nd recital of the preamble to Directive 93/13, that provision seeks to avert the risk that, in certain cases, the consumer may be deprived of Community protection by the designation of the law of a non-Member country as the law applicable to the contract. For that purpose, it provides that the protection granted by the directive to consumers in contractual relationships within the Community is to be maintained for contractual relationships involving non-Member countries, as long as the contract has close ties with the territory of the Member States.
31. Under Article 1(1) and Article 3(1) of the directive, the substantive scope of the protection granted by it covers terms not individually negotiated in all contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer. It is true that, as the Commission rightly maintains, Article 10a of amended Law 26/1984 is more restricted in its scope since it applies only to the types of contracts referred to in Article 5(1)(4) and (5) of the Rome Convention. However, as the Spanish Government contends, that lacuna is supplied by Article 3(2) of Law 7/1998, which applies to all contracts concluded, without individual negotiation, on the basis of general conditions.
Administration de l'enregistrement et des domaines and État du grand-duché de Luxembourg v Vermietungsgesellschaft Objekt Kirchberg Sàrl.
Date: 2004-09-09
20. It is clear from those provisions that the taxation of leasing and letting transactions is a power which the legislature has conferred on the Member States in derogation from the general rule established in Article 13(B)(b) of the Sixth Directive, according to which leasing and letting transactions are, as a rule, exempt. The right to deduct does not therefore operate automatically in that context but only if the Member States have made use of the power under Article 13(C) of the Sixth Directive and subject to the taxpayers exercising the right of option allowed to them.
21. As the Court has previously held, Member States may, by virtue of this power, allow persons benefiting from the exemptions provided for by the Sixth Directive to waive the exemption in all cases or within certain limits or subject to certain detailed rules. It follows that the Member States have a wide discretion under Article 13(B) and (C) of the Sixth Directive (see Case C-381/97 Belgocodex [1998] ECR I-8153, paragraphs 16 and 17).
23. It must be held that that approval process is, as is clear from the Advocate General’s Opinion, a detail of the use of the right of option within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 13(C) of the Sixth Directive.
29. The lack of retroactivity of the approval process does not make it disproportionate. On the contrary, it may be regarded as useful in order to encourage lessors to submit their declaration of option in advance. It cannot be excluded, indeed, that a retroactive approval process is likely to produce the opposite effect by leading lessors to submit their declaration of option late and that it would therefore be less appropriate for the purpose of ensuring the proper implementation of the exercise of the right of option and attaining the objective of legal certainty mentioned in paragraph 25 of this judgment.
Kingdom of Spain v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2004-09-14
24. Article 87(1) EC defines State aid which is governed by the EC Treaty as aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, in so far as it affects trade between Member States. The concept of aid within the meaning of that provision is wider than that of a subsidy because it embraces not only positive benefits, such as the subsidies themselves, but also measures which, in various forms, mitigate the normal burdens on the budget of an undertaking (see, inter alia, Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg  v High Authority  [1961] ECR 1, 19; Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España  [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 13; Case C-256/97 DM Transport  [1999] ECR I-3913, paragraph 19, and Case C-5/01 Belgium  v Commission [2002] ECR I-11991, paragraph 32).
31. The legality of a decision concerning State aid is to be assessed in the light of the information available to the Commission when the decision was adopted (see, inter alia, Case 234/84 Belgium v Commission  [1986] ECR 2263, paragraph 16, and Case C-241/94 France  v Commission  [1996] ECR I-4551, paragraph 33).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2004-09-14
18. That first defence plea must be understood as being based on Article 7(3)(b) of the Directive, inasmuch as that provision authorises the use of the negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice for works which, for technical reasons, may only be carried out by a particular contractor.
19. The provisions of Article 7(3) of the Directive, which authorise derogations from the rules intended to ensure the effectiveness of the rights conferred by the EC Treaty in relation to public works contracts, must be interpreted strictly and the burden of proving the existence of exceptional circumstances justifying a derogation lies on the person seeking to rely on those circumstances (see, to that effect, Case C‑57/94 Commission v Italy [1995] ECR I-1249, paragraph 23, and Case C‑318/94 Commission  v Germany  [1996] ECR I-1949, paragraph 13).
20. Accordingly, the Italian authorities must prove that technical reasons made it necessary to award the relevant contracts to the contractor who was entrusted with the original contract (see, to that effect, Commission v Italy , paragraph 24).
21. It is true that the aim of ensuring the continuity of works under complex projects which relate to the flood safety of an area is a technical reason which must be recognised as being important. However, merely to state that a package of works is complex and difficult is not sufficient to establish that it can only be entrusted to one contractor, particularly where the works are subdivided into lots which will be carried out over many years.
40. With respect to the Italian Government’s request that it be given the benefit of having made an excusable error, it must be pointed out that proceedings against a Member State for failure to fulfil obligations afford a means of determining the exact nature of the obligations of the Member States, particularly where there are differences of interpretation, and are based on the objective finding that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty or secondary legislation (see, to that effect, Case C-83/99 Commission v Spain [2001] ECR I-445, paragraph 23). Accordingly, the concept of excusable error cannot be relied on by a Member State to justify a failure to comply with the obligations imposed on it under a directive.
Verbraucher-Zentrale Hamburg eV v O2 (Germany) GmbH & Co. OHG.
Date: 2004-09-14
30. Since the wording of Regulation No 1103/97 offers no further guidance, it is appropriate to refer to the objectives of the regulation.
31. It is clear from its preamble and provisions as a whole that the regulation was intended to ensure that the transition to the euro took place without affecting obligations already entered into by citizens and firms. To that end, the fourth recital states that ‘… legal certainty at an early stage will allow preparations by citizens and firms to proceed under good conditions’. The seventh recital states that ‘… it is a generally accepted principle of law that the continuity of contracts and other legal instruments is not affected by the introduction of a new currency’. The same recital specifies that the objective of the provisions of Regulation No 1103/97 on continuity of contracts is ‘to provide legal certainty and transparency to economic agents, in particular for consumers …’. The first sentence of Article 3 of Regulation No 1103/97 provides that ‘[t]he introduction of the euro shall not have the effect of altering any term of a legal instrument or of discharging or excusing performance under any legal instrument, nor give a party the right unilaterally to alter or terminate such an instrument’.
32. The setting of rules relating to conversion operations shares the objective that the transition to the euro should be neutral. The attempt to ensure that those operations are as neutral as possible both for citizens and firms requires, as the 12th recital in the preamble to the regulation suggests, that ‘a high degree of accuracy in conversion operations’ be achieved. Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1103/97 thus provides that conversion rates ‘are to be adopted with six significant figures’. Article 4(2) provides that ‘[t]he conversion rates shall not be rounded or truncated when making conversions’ and Article 4(3) states that ‘inverse rates derived from the conversion rates shall not be used’, the latter proscription seeking, according to the 10th recital of Regulation No 1103/97, to avoid ‘significant inaccuracies, notably if large amounts are involved’.
33. It is by virtue of the same objective of ensuring a neutral changeover to the euro that the 11th recital to Regulation No 1103/97 states that the rules for rounding ‘do not affect any rounding practice, convention or national provisions providing a higher degree of accuracy for intermediate computations’.
34. It is clear from this examination of the aims of Regulation No 1103/97 and, in particular, from the reference made by the 11th recital to national rounding rules for monetary amounts that the regulation sets only minimum rules in relation to the rounding of certain amounts and leaves it to national authorities to maintain or adopt rules which are more conducive to achieving a neutral changeover to the single currency. The actual wording of the 11th recital shows that the detailed rules on the rounding of monetary amounts found in Regulation No 1103/97 are not intended to provide an exhaustive set of rules for intermediate computations in relation to such amounts.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 2004-09-14
24. In accordance with settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-103/00 Commission v Greece [2002] ECR I-1147, paragraph 23, and Case C-209/02 Commission  v Austria  [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 16). Even when the default has been remedied after the time-limit prescribed by that opinion, pursuit of the action still has an object. That object may consist in particular in establishing the basis of the liability that a Member State could incur towards those who acquire rights as a result of its default (see, inter alia, Case 154/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2717, paragraph 6, and Case C-299/01 Commission  v Luxembourg  [2002] ECR I-5899, paragraph 11).
36. It should be borne in mind in that regard that, according to settled case-law, in relation to the transposition of a directive into the legal order of a Member State, it is essential for national law to guarantee that the national authorities will effectively apply the directive in full, that the legal position under national law is sufficiently precise and clear and that individuals are made fully aware of their rights and, where appropriate, may rely on them before the national courts (see, inter alia, Case C-365/93 Commission v Greece [1995] ECR I-499, paragraph 9, and Case C-65/01 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I-3655, paragraph 20).
Cimber Air A/S v Skatteministeriet.
Date: 2004-09-16
23. Exemptions constitute independent concepts of Community law which must be placed in the general context of the common system of VAT introduced by the Sixth Directive (see in particular Case 235/85 Commission  v Netherlands  [1987] ECR 1471, paragraph 18; Case C-2/95 SDC  [1997] ECR I-3017, paragraph 21; and Case C-141/00 Küg ler  [2002] ECR I-6833, paragraph 25).
24. That system is based in particular on two principles. First, each supply of goods and services effected for consideration by a taxable person is subject to VAT. Second, in accordance with the principle of fiscal neutrality, economic operators carrying out the same transactions may not be treated differently in relation to the levying of VAT.
25. For those reasons, whilst it is common ground that the Sixth Directive may provide for exemptions which depart from the principles referred to in the foregoing paragraph, the Court considers that such exemptions must be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, SDC , paragraph 20, Case C-216/97 Gregg  [1999] ECR I-4947, paragraph 12, and Kügler , paragraph 28).
27. Article 15(6) is concerned with ‘aircraft used by airlines operating for reward chiefly on international routes’.
28. Thus, contrary to the contentions of the Commission and the Danish Government, the exemption provided for in Article 15 of the Sixth Directive relates formally, both in paragraphs 7 and 9 and in paragraph 6 of that article, to domestic flights carried out by aircraft used by companies whose business is mainly international.
38. That interpretation must take account of the divergence between certain language versions of the provision in question. The French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese versions of Article 15(6) of the Sixth Directive use the word ‘essentially’ or the equivalent thereof, whereas the Danish, German, English and Dutch versions use, respectively, the words ‘hovedsageligt’, ‘hauptsächlich’, ‘chiefly’ and ‘hoofdzakelijk’. According to the second group of expressions, the provision in question refers to airlines whose operations on international routes merely exceed their non-international operations, whereas, according to the first group of expressions, the international operations should account for almost all the business of those companies.
Josef Baldinger v Pensionsversicherungsanstalt der Arbeiter.
Date: 2004-09-16
14. It is to be remembered in this regard that it is not for the Court of Justice to rule on the interpretation of provisions of national law but that it must take account, under the division of jurisdiction between the Community Courts and the national courts, of the factual and legislative context, as described in the order for reference, in which the question put to it is set (see, inter alia, Case C-224/02 Pusa  [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 37).
18. Having regard to that aim and those conditions for its grant, such an allowance is covered by Article 4(4) of Regulation No 1408/71, such that it is excluded from the material scope of that regulation (see, in that regard, Case 9/78 Gillard and Caisse régionale d’assurance maladie du Nord-Est  [1978] ECR 1661, paragraph 13, and Case 207/78 Even and ONPTS  [1979] ECR 2019, paragraphs 12 to 14).
19. Furthermore, for the same reasons, such an allowance does not fall within the category of advantages granted to national workers principally because of their status as workers or national residents and, as a result, does not fulfil the essential characteristics of the ‘social advantages’ referred to in Article 7(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 ( Even and ONPTS , cited above, paragraphs 20 to 24).
DFDS BV v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst - Douanedistrict Rotterdam.
Date: 2004-09-16
27. It is appropriate to recall at the outset that, according to the Court’s settled case‑law, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be found in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and of the notes to the sections or chapters (see, for example, Case C-276/00 Turbon International  [2002] ECR I-1389, paragraph 21, and Joined Cases C-260/00 to C-263/00 Lohmann and Medi Bayreuth  [2002] ECR I‑10045, paragraph 30).
28. The explanatory notes drawn up, as regards the CN, by the Commission and, as regards the HS, by the Customs Cooperation Council may be an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various headings but do not have legally binding force (see Case C-405/97 Mövenpick Deutschland  [1999] ECR I-2397, paragraph 18).
29. In addition, the intended use of a product may constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (see Case C-459/93 Thyssen Haniel Logistic  [1995] ECR I-1381, paragraph 13).
31. The wording of that subheading requires that a vehicle meets two conditions to be classifiable thereunder, namely that it is a ‘dumper’ and is designed for use off-highway. While the second condition poses no problem in this case, the CN contains no additional specification relating to the definition of a ‘dumper’.
32. It is clear from the descriptions of such vehicles in the explanatory notes on the CN and the HS that an essential characteristic of dumpers is to have a tipping hopper or an opening bottom for the transport of rubble and various materials. There is, by contrast, no indication in those notes that the form or functioning of the tipping hoppers can constitute, by themselves, decisive criteria for the classification of a vehicle as a dumper.