Czech Republic v European Commission.
Date: 2017-07-26
33


As regards the Czech Republic’s argument that the General Court erred in law in that, in paragraph 40 of the judgment under appeal, it interpreted the contested regulations in the light of Directive 2010/40, it should be observed that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, secondary acts of EU law must be interpreted as far as possible in conformity with the basic act (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 July 2012, Pie Optiek, C‑376/11, EU:C:2012:502, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited). As follows from paragraphs 27 to 29 above, the General Court’s interpretation of the contested regulations is compatible both with their wording and with Directive 2010/40.
49


As regards that requirement, the Court has repeatedly held that it implies that the purpose of granting a delegated power is to achieve the adoption of rules coming within the regulatory framework as defined by the basic legislative act (judgments of 18 March 2014, Commission v Parliament and Council, C‑427/12, EU:C:2014:170, paragraph 38; of 16 July 2015, Commission v Parliament and Council, C‑88/14, EU:C:2015:499, paragraph 29; and of 17 March 2016, Parliament v Commission, C‑286/14, EU:C:2016:183, paragraph 30). The Court’s case-law requires in particular that the definition of the power conferred is sufficiently precise, in that it must indicate clearly the limits of the power and must enable the Commission’s use of the power to be reviewed by reference to objective criteria fixed by the EU legislature (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 July 1988, Central-Import Münster, 291/86, EU:C:1988:361, paragraph 13, and of 12 July 2005, Alliance for Natural Health and Others, C‑154/04 and C‑155/04, EU:C:2005:449, paragraph 90).
51


That interpretation is not compatible with the wording and the spirit of that provision. A delegation of power under that provision confers power on the Commission to exercise the functions of the EU legislature, in that it enables it to supplement or amend non-essential elements of the legislative act. The requirement in the first sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 290(1) TFEU is intended precisely to ensure that such a power emanates from an express decision of the legislature and that its use by the Commission respects the bounds the legislature has itself fixed in the basic act. For that purpose, the basic act must, in accordance with that provision, lay down the limits of its conferral of power on the Commission, namely the objectives, content, scope and duration of the conferral.
52


It is true that, as the Commission submits, the first sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 290(1) TFEU allows the EU legislature to confer on the Commission a discretion for exercising the power it delegates, a discretion which may be more or less extensive, depending on the nature of the matter in question. However, a delegation of power within the meaning of Article 290 TFEU (and any discretion it may involve) must be delimited by bounds fixed in the basic act (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 May 2017, Dyson v Commission, C‑44/16 P, EU:C:2017:357, paragraph 53).
53


This interpretation of Article 290 TFEU is, moreover, borne out by point 52 of the Commission’s guidelines of 24 June 2011 on delegated acts (SEC(2011) 855), which, although they cannot bind the Court, may be a useful source of guidance (judgment of 17 March 2016, Parliament v Commission, C‑286/14, EU:C:2016:183, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). The Commission states in those guidelines that the legislature ‘must explicitly and precisely describe the powers it intends to delegate to the Commission’, that ‘vague formulations … are not possible’, and that ‘powers should not be conferred on the Commission simply by setting up a non-exhaustive list of measures to be taken’.
56


However, it should be recalled that, if the grounds of a judgment of the General Court disclose an infringement of EU law but its operative part is shown to be well founded on other legal grounds, such an infringement cannot lead to the setting aside of that judgment, and a substitution of grounds must be made (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 150, and of 5 March 2015, Commission and Others v Versalis and Others, C‑93/13 P and C‑123/13 P, EU:C:2015:150, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited).
72


As regards the second part of the third ground of appeal, by which the Czech Republic essentially submits that the General Court did not explicitly address its argument concerning the explanatory memoranda for the contested regulations, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law of the Court, the General Court’s duty, under Article 36 and the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, to state reasons for its judgments does not require it to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the measures in question were taken and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its powers of review (judgments of 29 March 2011, ArcelorMittal Luxembourg v Commission and Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg and Others, C‑201/09 P and C‑216/09 P, EU:C:2011:190, paragraph 78, and of 8 March 2016, Greece v Commission, C‑431/14 P, EU:C:2016:145, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
76


That prohibition of granting a delegation of power relating to the essential elements of the matter concerned corresponds, moreover, to the settled case-law of the Court (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 December 1970, Köster, Berodt & Co., 25/70, EU:C:1970:115, paragraph 6, and of 5 September 2012, Parliament v Council, C‑355/10, EU:C:2012:516, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).
77


In accordance with that case-law, ascertaining which elements of a matter must be categorised as ‘essential’ is not for the assessment of the EU legislature alone, but must be based on objective factors amenable to judicial review. Account must be taken of the characteristics and particular features of the field concerned (judgments of 5 September 2012, Parliament v Council, C‑355/10, EU:C:2012:516, paragraphs 67 and 68, and of 22 June 2016, DK Recycling und Roheisen v Commission, C‑540/14 P, EU:C:2016:469, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
78


An element is essential within the meaning of the second sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 290(1) TFEU in particular if, in order to be adopted, it requires political choices falling within the responsibilities of the EU legislature, in that it requires the conflicting interests at issue to be weighed up on the basis of a number of assessments, or if it means that the fundamental rights of the persons concerned may be interfered with to such an extent that the involvement of the EU legislature is required (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 September 2012, Parliament v Council, C‑355/10, EU:C:2012:516, paragraphs 65, 76 and 77).