Comité des industries du coton et des fibres connexes de l'Union européenne (Eurocoton) and Others v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2003-09-30
46. First of all, as regards the objection of inadmissibility raised against the first ground of appeal by the Council, it follows from Article 168a of the EC Treaty (now Article 225 EC), the first paragraph of Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1), first subparagraph, (c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (Case C-352/98 P  Bergaderm and Goupil  v  Commission  [2000] ECR I-5291, paragraph 34).
47. That requirement is not satisfied by an appeal which, without even including an argument specifically identifying the error of law allegedly vitiating the contested judgment, confines itself to reproducing the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the Court of First Instance. Such an appeal amounts in reality to no more than a request for re-examination of the application submitted to the Court of First Instance, which the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to undertake ( Bergaderm and Goupil  v  Commission , cited above, paragraph 35).
52. Finally, as regards the objection of inadmissibility raised against the second ground of appeal, it must be pointed out that the Council is in fact maintaining that that ground of appeal is invalid. However, the validity of a ground of appeal concerns its ability to found the appeal and does not affect its admissibility.
54. As regards the question whether the Council ' s failure to adopt a proposal for a regulation imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty constitutes a reviewable act within the meaning of Article 173 of the Treaty, according to settled case-law, only a measure whose legal effects are binding on the applicant and are capable of affecting his interests is an act or decision which may be the subject of an action for annulment under that article (see, in particular, Case C-147/96  Netherlands  v  Commission  [2000] ECR I-4723, paragraph 25).
55. Moreover, it follows from the same case-law that in the case of acts adopted by a procedure involving several stages, and particularly where they are the culmination of an internal procedure, it is in principle only those measures which definitively determine the position of the Commission or the Council upon the conclusion of that procedure which are open to challenge and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the final decision ( Netherlands  v  Commission , cited above, paragraph 26).
56. Furthermore, an act which is neither capable of producing nor intended to produce any legal effects cannot form the basis of an action for annulment. In order to ascertain whether or not a measure which has been challenged produces such effects it is necessary to look to its substance (see, in particular,  Netherlands  v  Commission , cited above, paragraphs 26 and 27).
73. Although regulations imposing anti-dumping duties are legislative in nature and scope, in that they apply to all economic operators, they may nevertheless be of individual concern not only to Community producers, as complainants ( Fediol  v  Commission , paragraphs 27 to 30), but also, in certain circumstances, to the producers and exporters of the product in question who are alleged to be dumping, and, in certain circumstances, to importers of that product (Joined Cases C-133/87 and C-150/87  Nashua Corporation and Others  v  Commission and Council  [1990] ECR I-719, paragraphs 14 to 20).
88. According to settled case-law, the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community Court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 190 must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, in particular, Case C-76/00 P  Petrotub and Republica  v  Council  [2003] ECR I-79, paragraph 81, and the case-law cited).
97. According to settled case-law, Community law confers a right to reparation where three conditions are met: the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals; the breach must be sufficiently serious; and there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the author of the act and the damage sustained by the injured parties (see, in particular, Case C-312/00 P  Commission  v  Camar and Tico  [2002] ECR I-11355, paragraph 53, and Case C-472/00 P  Commission  v  Fresh Marine  [2003] ECR I-7541, paragraph 25).
98. The Court has consistently held that any inadequacy in the statement of reasons for a legislative measure is not sufficient to cause the Community to incur liability (Case 106/81  Kind  v  EEC  [1982] ECR 2885, paragraph 14; Case C-119/88  AERPO and Others  v  Commission  [1990] ECR I-2189, paragraph 20).