larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Daňové riaditeľstvo Slovenskej republiky v Profitube spol. s r.o.
Date: 2012-11-08
41. It needs to be verified, first, whether goods such as those at issue in the main proceedings have been subject to importation within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Sixth Directive.
46. Since the goods at issue had not yet left those arrangements at the date of the sale at issue, even though they had been physically introduced into the territory of the Union, they cannot have been the subject-matter of an ‘importation’ within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Sixth Directive (see, to that effect, Case C‑305/03 Commission  v United Kingdom  [2006] ECR I‑1213, paragraph 41).
48. Consequently, in the absence of importation at the date of the facts of the dispute in the main proceedings, the goods at issue were not subject to VAT under Article 2(2) of the Sixth Directive.
50. In that respect, first, it should be noted that, according to Article 5(1) of the Sixth Directive, ‘supply of goods’ means the transfer of the right to dispose of tangible property as owner. The case‑law of the Court of Justice states that that term covers any transfer of tangible property by one party who empowers the other party actually to dispose of it as if he were the owner of the property (see, in particular, Case C‑320/88 Shipping and Forwarding Enterprise Safe  [1990] ECR I‑285, paragraph 7; Joined Cases C‑497/09, C‑499/09, C‑501/09 and C‑502/09 Bog and Others  [2011] ECR I‑1457, paragraph 59).
51. Second, a supply of goods or services ‘for consideration’, within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive, presupposes the existence of a direct link between the goods or service provided and the consideration received (Case 102/86 Apple and Pear Development Council  [1988] ECR 1443, paragraph 12; Case C‑53/09 and C‑55/09 Loyalty Management UK and Baxi Group  [2010] ECR I‑9187, paragraph 51).
52. Third, the supply of goods must be effected by a ‘taxable person acting as such’. A taxable person acts in that capacity where he carries out transactions in the course of his taxable activity (Case C‑587/10 VSTR  [2012] ECR, paragraph 49). In this case, it is apparent from the order for reference that Profitube is a taxable person registered for VAT.
63. Member States may therefore exempt certain transactions carried out within the country in respect of goods placed under the arrangements or situations referred to in Article 16(1), (B) and (D), including the customs warehousing procedure, inward processing arrangements and transactions carried out in a customs warehouse (see, to that effect, Commission  v United Kingdom , paragraph 40).
Techniko Epimelitirio Elladas (TEE) and Others v Ypourgos Esoterikon, Dimosias Dioikisis kai Apokentrosis and Others.
Date: 2012-11-08
29. In that regard, it must be recalled that, under Article 267 TFEU, the Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the Treaties and acts of the European Union institutions. In the context of cooperation between the Court and the national courts, established by Article 267 TFEU, it is for the national courts alone to assess, in view of the special features of each case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to give their judgment and the relevance of the questions which they put to the Court (see, inter alia, Case C‑482/10 Cicala [2011] ECR I‑14139, paragraph 15 and the case‑law cited).
30. Consequently, where questions referred concern the interpretation of a provision of European Union law, the Court is, in principle, obliged to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Cicala , paragraph 16 and the case‑law cited).
31. The Court can decline to rule on a request for a preliminary ruling from a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or to its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Case C‑160/09 Ioannis Katsivardas – Nikolaos Tsitsikas [2010] ECR I‑4591, paragraph 27 and the case‑law cited).
34. The Court has repeatedly held that it has jurisdiction to rule on requests for a preliminary ruling concerning provisions of European Union law in situations where the facts of the cases being considered by the national courts were outside the scope of European Union law but where such European Union law provisions had been rendered applicable by domestic law due to a reference made by that law to the content of those provisions. The Court has stated in that regard that where, in regulating purely internal situations, domestic legislation seeks to adopt the same solutions as those adopted in European Union law, it is clearly in the interest of the European Union that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, provisions or concepts taken from European Union law should be interpreted uniformly, irrespective of the circumstances in which they are to apply (see, to that effect, Cicala , paragraphs 17 and 18 and the case‑law cited).
Raiffeisen-Waren-Zentrale Rhein-Main eG v Saatgut-Treuhandverwaltungs GmbH.
Date: 2012-11-15
36. So far as concerns planting under contract, the Court has already held that the acquisition by a farmer of propagating material of a protected plant variety of the holder must be considered to be an indication capable of giving rise to the farmer’s obligation to provide information to the holder (see Case C‑305/00 Schulin  [2003] ECR I‑3525, paragraph 65).
39. Whilst it follows from Article 14(3) of Regulation No 2100/94 that such a right is established where a farmer benefits or intends to benefit from the privilege provided for in that article, the Court has held that that right may be relied on, against the supplier of processing services, only where the holder has some indication that the supplier has processed or intends to process the product of the harvest obtained by planting propagating material of that variety for planting (see, to that effect, Case C‑336/02 Brangewitz  [2004] ECR I‑9801, paragraph 53).
Pfeifer & Langen KG v Hauptzollamt Aachen.
Date: 2012-11-15
43. As the Court observed at paragraph 3 of Hannoversche Zucker , the question referred was whether that surplus was to be attributed, for the purpose of the calculation of the production levy, to the period before the COM in sugar came into force, to the first sugar marketing year under the system established by that organisation, or to the marketing year during which it was discovered.
Usha Martin Ltd v Council of the European Union and European Commission.
Date: 2012-11-22
27. It should be noted in that regard that a distortion must be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (Case C‑535/06 P Moser Baer India  v Council  [2009] ECR I‑7051, paragraph 33 and case‑law cited).
Westbahn Management GmbH v ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG.
Date: 2012-11-22
27. It is settled case‑law that, in order to determine whether a body making a reference is a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, which is a question governed by European Union law alone, the Court takes account of a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes , whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent (see, inter alia, Case C‑246/05 Häupl  [2007] ECR I‑4673, paragraph 16; Case C‑195/06 Österreichischer Rundfunk  [2007] ECR I‑8817, paragraph 19; and Case C‑205/08 Umweltanwalt von Kärnten  [2009] ECR I‑11525, paragraph 35).
33. To answer the question, it must be recalled that, according to settled case‑law, in interpreting provisions of European Union law such as those at issue here, it is necessary to consider not only their wording but also their context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which they form part (see, inter alia, Case C‑185/89 Velker International Oil Company  [1990] ECR I‑2561, paragraph 17, and Case C‑33/11 A  [2012] ECR, paragraph 27).
Joan Cuadrench Moré v Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV.
Date: 2012-11-22
25. It is settled case‑law that, in the absence of provisions of EU law on the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law, provided that those rules observe the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (see, to that effect, Case C-429/09 Fuß  [2010] ECR I‑12167, paragraph 72).
28. The compensation measure laid down in Articles 5 and 7 of Regulation No 261/2004 falls outside the scope of the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑581/10 and C‑629/10 Nelson and Others  [2012] ECR, paragraph 55).
Brain Products GmbH v BioSemi VOF and Others.
Date: 2012-11-22
13. Nevertheless, according to the Court’s settled case‑law, in interpreting a provision of European Union law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (Case C‑433/08 Yaesu Europe  [2009] ECR I‑11487, paragraph 24, and Case C‑112/11 ebookers.com Deutschland  [2012] ECR, paragraph 12).
16. Next, it must be stated that the wording of Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 93/42 was amended by Article 2 of Directive 2007/47, recital 6 of which states that a software in its own right is a medical device when specifically intended by the manufacturer to be used for one or more of the medical purposes set out in the definition of a medical device. That recital adds that software for general purposes when used in a healthcare setting is not a medical device.
17. As regards software, the legislature thus made unequivocally clear that in order for it to fall within the scope of Directive 93/42 it is not sufficient that it be used in a medical context, but that it is also necessary that the intended purpose, defined by the manufacturer, is specifically medical.
28. In such circumstances Directive 93/42 must reconcile the free movement of medical devices with the protection of patients’ health (see, to that effect, Case C‑6/05 Medipac-Kazantzidis  [2007] ECR I‑4557, paragraph 52).
Josef Probst v mr.nexnet GmbH.
Date: 2012-11-22
20. It must be stated that neither Directive 2002/58 nor the documents relevant for its interpretation, such as the travaux préparatoires , provide clarification as to the exact scope of the concept of ‘under the authority’. The meaning and scope of terms for which European Union law provides no definition must be determined by considering their usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they are part (see, to that effect, judgments in Case C‑336/03 easyCar  [2005] ECR I‑1947, paragraphs 20 and 21, and of 5 July 2012 in Case C‑49/11 Content Services , paragraph 32).
23. Article 6(2) and (5) of Directive 2002/58 contains an exception to the confidentiality of communications laid down in Article 5(1) by authorising traffic data processing in accordance with the requirements of billing services (see, to that effect, Case C‑275/06 Promusicae  [2008] ECR I‑271, paragraph 48). As it constitutes an exception, that provision of that directive, and therefore also the words ‘under the authority’, are to be interpreted strictly (see Case C‑16/10 The Number (UK) and Conduit Enterprises  [2011] ECR I‑691, paragraph 31). Such an interpretation requires that the service provider has an actual power of supervision which enables him to determine whether the assignee of the claims for payment is acting in compliance with the conditions imposed on it with respect to the processing of traffic data.
Italian Republic v European Commission.
Date: 2012-11-27
86. It should be added that no specific language rules apply to the institutions concerned by the contested competition notices (with regard to the language rules applicable to OHIM, see Case C‑361/01 P Kik v OHIM [2003] ECR I‑8283, paragraphs 81 to 97).
88. In that regard, it is apparent from all the abovementioned provisions that the interest of the service may be a legitimate objective that can be taken into consideration. In particular, as stated in paragraph 82 above, Article 1(d) of the Staff Regulations authorises limitations on the principles of non-discrimination and proportionality. Those interests of the service must however be objectively justified and the required level of knowledge of languages must be proportionate to the genuine needs of the service (see, to that effect, Case 79/74 Küster  v Parliament  [1975] ECR 725, paragraphs 16 and 20, and Case 22/75 Küster  v Parliament [1975] ECR 1267, paragraphs 13 and 17).
90. It should be noted in that regard that the rules limiting the choice of the second language must provide for clear, objective and foreseeable criteria so that the candidates may know, sufficiently in advance, what the language requirements are and can prepare to take part in the competitions in the best possible circumstances.
92. Contrary to what was claimed by the Commission, the judgment in Hendrickx v Council  does not support the argument that the interest of the service may justify the requirement of knowledge of English, French or German contained in the contested competition notices. While those notices of open competition are addressed to citizens of the European Union, the vast majority of whom are unfamiliar with the institutions, Hendrickx v Council  concerned an internal notice of competition open to officials and other servants working for the Secretariat-General of the Council of the European Union and requiring at least five years’ service with the Communities. In addition, the functions to be carried out were clearly described, making it possible for officials and other servants of the Secretariat-General to understand the reasons for the languages to be used for the tests and allowing the General Court to review the choice of those languages.
93. In so far as a legitimate objective of general interest may be relied upon and be shown to be genuine, it should be noted that a difference in treatment on the grounds of language must also observe the principle of proportionality, that is to say, it must be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑453/03, C‑11/04, C‑12/04 and C‑194/04 ABNA and Others [2005] ECR I‑10423, paragraph 68).
103. As proposed by the Advocate General in points 115 and 116 of her Opinion and in order to respect the legitimate expectations of the selected candidates, the results of the contested competitions are not to be called into question.
Costs
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Commission.
Date: 2012-11-29
38. Such an appraisal of the facts does not, save where the clear sense of the evidence submitted to it has been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal.  Under Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal lies on points of law only. The General Court therefore has exclusive jurisdiction to find the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and to appraise those facts (see, inter alia, Case C-53/92 P Hilti  v Commission  [1994] ECR I-667, paragraph 42; Case C-238/06 P Develey  v OHIM  [2007] ECR I-9375, paragraph 97, and Case C‑431/07 P Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom  v Commission  [2009] ECR I-2665, paragraph 137).
45. It must be pointed out that, in accordance with settled case-law, where one of the grounds adopted by the General Court is sufficient to sustain the operative part of its judgment, any defects that might vitiate other grounds given in the judgment concerned in any event have no bearing on that operative part and, accordingly, a plea relying on such defects is ineffective and must be dismissed (see, inter alia, Case C-326/91 P de Compte v Parliament  [1994] ECR I-2091, paragraph 94, and Case C‑496/99 P Commission  v CAS Succhi di Frutta  [2004] ECR I-3801, paragraph 68).
Iwona Szyrocka v SiGer Technologie GmbH.
Date: 2012-12-13
30. Lastly, it should be noted that the objective of Regulation No 1896/2006, as is apparent from Article 1(1)(a) thereof, is, inter alia, to simplify, speed up and reduce the costs of litigation in cross-border cases concerning uncontested pecuniary claims. As observed in recitals 8, 10 and 29, although the regulation neither replaces nor harmonises existing domestic mechanisms for the recovery of uncontested claims, it establishes, for the attainment of that objective, a uniform instrument for the recovery of such claims, guaranteeing a level playing field for creditors and debtors throughout the European Union.
34. In the absence of harmonistion of domestic mechanisms for the recovery of uncontested claims, and subject to the conditions laid down in Article 25 of Regulation No 1896/2006, the procedural rules for determining the amount of the court fees is a matter for the domestic legal order of each Member State, in accordance with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States. However, those rules must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) or such as to make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by European Union law (see, to that effect, Case C-618/10 Banco Español de Crédit o [2012] ECR, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
Maatschap L. A. en D. A. B. Langestraat en P. Langestraat-Troost v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie.
Date: 2012-12-13
27. According to the case-law of the Court, in interpreting a provision of European Union law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (Case C-150/10 Beneo-Orafti [2011] ECR I-6843, paragraph 41 and case-law cited).
36. In that regard, the Court has repeatedly stressed that the rules breached are aimed solely at economic operators who have freely chosen to take advantage of an agricultural aid scheme (Case 137/85 Maizena and Others  [1987] ECR 4587, paragraph 13; Case C-240/90 Germany  v Commission [1992] ECR I-5383, paragraph 26; Case C-210/00 Käserei Champignon Hofmeister  [2002] ECR I-6453, paragraph 41 and Case C-489/10 Bonda  [2012] ECR, paragraph 30).
39. In that regard, it should be noted that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of European Union law, requires measures implemented through provisions of European Union law to be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and not to go beyond what is necessary to achieve it (Case C-59/11 Association Kokopelli [2012] ECR, paragraph 38 and case-law cited).
Brookfield New Zealand Ltd and Elaris SNC v Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) and Schniga GmbH.
Date: 2012-12-19
39. The Court has repeatedly held, as regards Article 63 of Regulation No 40/94, which was framed in terms identical to those of Article 73 of Regulation No 2100/94, that the General Court is called upon to assess the legality of the decisions of the Boards of Appeal of OHIM by reviewing the way in which they have applied European Union law, specifically in the light of the factual evidence placed before those Boards. Accordingly, within the limits laid down in Article 63 of Regulation No 40/94, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, the General Court may carry out a full review of the legality of decisions of the Boards of Appeal of OHIM, if necessary examining whether the Board of Appeal concerned made a correct legal characterisation of the facts of the dispute or whether its appraisal of the facts placed before it was flawed (see, to that effect, Case C-16/06 P Les Éditions Albert René  v OHIM  [2008] ECR I-10053, paragraphs 38 and 39).
40. In that regard, the Court of Justice has acknowledged that the General Court has a similar jurisdiction as regards the review of the legality of decisions of the CPVO or of its Boards of Appeal (see, to that effect, Case C-38/09 P Schräder  v CPVO  [2010] ECR I-3209, paragraph 69).
50. It should be stated at the outset that the CPVO’s task is characterised by the scientific and technical complexity of the conditions governing the examination of applications for Community plant variety rights and, accordingly, the CPVO must be accorded a broad discretion in carrying out its functions (see, to that effect, Schräder  v CPVO , paragraph 77). Furthermore, given that broad discretion, the CPVO may, if it considers it necessary, take account of facts and evidence which are submitted or produced out of time (see, by analogy as regards OHIM, Case C-29/05 P OHIM  v Kaul  [2007] ECR I-2213, paragraph 42).
51. Moreover, the CPVO – as a body of the European Union – is subject to the principle of sound administration, in accordance with which it must examine all the relevant particulars of a case with care and impartiality and gather all the factual and legal information necessary to exercise its discretion. Moreover, it must, as the General Court pointed out in paragraph 64 of the judgment under appeal, ensure the proper conduct and effectiveness of proceedings which it sets in motion.
3D I Srl v Agenzia delle Entrate — Ufficio di Cremona.
Date: 2012-12-19
26. By imposing that fiscal neutrality requirement with regard to the receiving company and the acquired company, Directive 90/434 seeks – as stated in the first and fourth recitals in its preamble – to ensure that a transfer of assets concerning companies from different Member States is not hampered by restrictions, disadvantages or distortions arising in particular from the tax provisions of the Member States, in order to allow undertakings to adapt themselves to the requirements of the common market, to increase their productivity and to improve their competitive strength at the international level (see, to that effect, Case C-28/95 Leur-Bloem  [1997] ECR I-4161, paragraph 45; Case C-285/07 A.T.  [2008] ECR I-9329, paragraph 21; and Case C-352/08 Modehuis A. Zwijnenburg [2010] ECR I-4303, paragraph 38).
28. As noted by the European Commission, that obligation for the receiving company, if it wishes to benefit from fiscal neutrality, to maintain the continuity of the valuation of the assets and liabilities transferred in order to calculate any new depreciation and any gains or losses in respect of those assets and liabilities, is intended to prevent that neutrality from leading to a permanent exemption which is, however, not provided for in Directive 90/434. It follows from the fourth and sixth recitals in the preamble thereto that that directive establishes only a system of deferral of the taxation of the capital gains relating to the assets transferred, which, while avoiding taxation arising from the business transfer itself, safeguards the financial interests of the State of the transferring company while ensuring taxation of those capital gains at the date of their actual disposal (see, to that effect, Case C-321/05 Kofoed  [2007] ECR I-5795, paragraph 32; A.T. , paragraph 28; and Modehuis A. Zwijnenburg , paragraph 39).
Grattan plc v The Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs.
Date: 2012-12-19
28. As regards, next, the principle of fiscal neutrality, it is to be noted that this principle, which constitutes a fundamental principle of the common system of VAT, is the reflection in the field of VAT of the principle of equal treatment (see, to this effect, Case C-309/06 Marks & Spencer  [2008] ECR I-2283, paragraph 47). One of the consequences of this principle is that taxable persons must not be treated differently in respect of similar supplies which are in competition with each other (see, to this effect, Joined Cases C-443/04 and C-444/04 Solleveld and van den Hout-van Eijnsbergen  [2006] ECR I-3617, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).