larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Montte SL v Musikene.
Date: 2018-09-20
In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, in order to assess whether a body making a reference is a ‘court or tribunal’, which is a question governed by EU law alone, the Court will take account of a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent (judgment of 24 May 2016, MT Højgaard and Züblin, C‑396/14, EU:C:2016:347, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
Nevertheless, it is apparent from the order for reference that the decisions of the referring body, whose jurisdiction does not depend on the parties’ agreement, are binding on the parties. In those circumstances, that body also fulfils the criterion of compulsory jurisdiction (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, Consorci Sanitari del Maresme, C‑203/14, EU:C:2015:664, paragraphs 23 to 25).
It should be added that those criteria must, as can be seen from recital 90 of that directive and Article 67(4) thereof, ensure compliance with the principles of transparency, non-discrimination and equal treatment, so as to guarantee an objective comparison of the relative merits of the tenders and, accordingly, effective competition. That would not be the case for criteria having the effect of conferring on the contracting authority an unrestricted freedom of choice (see, by analogy, as regards Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114), judgment of 10 May 2012, Commission v Netherlands, C‑368/10, EU:C:2012:284, paragraph 87).
In any event, it should be borne in mind that the contracting authorities must, throughout the procedure, observe the principles of procurement set out in Article 18 of Directive 2014/24, which include the principles of equal treatment, transparency and proportionality.
In that regard, provided that, in the case at hand, the conditions laid down by Directive 2014/24, in particular in Articles 18 and 67 thereof, have been applied correctly, it must be held that the contracting authority has ensured that there is effective competition. In addition, it must be stated from the outset that even if, following the technical evaluation, there is only one tender left for the contracting authority to consider, that authority is in no way required to accept that tender (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 September 1999, Fracasso and Leitschutz, C‑27/98, EU:C:1999:420, paragraphs 32 to 34). In such circumstances, if the contracting authority considers that the procurement procedure is, in view of the specificities and the subject matter of the contract concerned, characterised by a lack of effective competition, it is open to that authority to terminate that procedure and, if necessary, to launch a new procedure with different award criteria.
Alexander Mölk v Valentina Mölk.
Date: 2018-09-20
23


As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the Hague Protocol (judgment of 7 June 2018, KP, C‑83/17, EU:C:2018:408, paragraph 25).
28


Regarding the context of Article 4(3) of the Hague Protocol, it should be noted that that provision forms part of a system of connecting rules introduced by that protocol, which primarily provides for the application of the law of the State of the creditor’s habitual residence under Article 3 thereof. The authors of the Hague Protocol considered that that law was the most closely connected with the creditor’s situation and appeared therefore to be the best adapted to govern the specific problems which the maintenance creditor may encounter (judgment of 7 June 2018, KP, C‑83/17, EU:C:2018:408, paragraph 42).
30


Article 4(3) of the Hague Protocol derogates from the rule laid down by that protocol and recalled in paragraph 28 above pursuant to which the competent authority is primarily to apply the law of the State of the creditor’s habitual residence. That provision reverses the connecting criteria laid down in Article 3 and Article 4(2) of that protocol by designating first of all the law of the forum in cases where the creditor has seized the competent authority of the State in which the debtor has his habitual residence (judgment of 7 June 2018, KP, C‑83/17, EU:C:2018:408, paragraph 44) and, in the alternative, the law of the State of the habitual residence of the creditor if that creditor is unable, by virtue of the law of the forum, to obtain maintenance from the debtor.
31


By providing that the law of the forum, rather than the law of the State of the habitual residence of the creditor, may be applied first of all, the Hague Protocol provides that creditor with the possibility to choose the former law indirectly, a choice resulting from the creditor lodging his application with the competent authority of the State where the debtor has his habitual residence.
32


That possibility pursues the objective of protecting the creditor, regarded as the weaker party in his dealings with the debtor, by enabling that creditor, de facto, to choose the law applicable to his application. In those circumstances, where the proceedings in which that application was submitted have been closed by a decision which has acquired the force of res judicata, it does not follow from Article 4(3) of the Hague Protocol that the effects of that choice should be extended to new proceedings brought not by the creditor but by the debtor.
44


In that regard, it should be emphasised that the determination of the applicable law cannot be dependent on the date when a second set of proceedings may be initiated. Indeed, such an interpretation would undermine the objective of predictability pursued by the Hague Protocol (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 June 2018, KP, C‑83/17, EU:C:2018:408, paragraph 41).
Proceedings brought by Josef Baumgartner.
Date: 2018-09-26
23


According to settled case-law of the Court, in interpreting a provision of EU law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objects of the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 December 2017, Vaditrans, C‑102/16, EU:C:2017:1012, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
26


The Court has held that the first subparagraph of Article 19(2) of Regulation No 561/2006 expressly provides for the competent authorities of a Member State to be able to impose a penalty on an undertaking and/or a driver for an infringement of the regulation even where the infringement has been committed in the territory of another Member State or a third country (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 2016, Eurospeed, C‑287/14, EU:C:2016:420, paragraph 33).
27


The Court has further held that, besides the improvement of the working conditions of employees in the road transport sector, Regulation No 561/2006 also pursues the objective of improving general road safety (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 2016, Eurospeed, C‑287/14, EU:C:2016:420, paragraph 39).
32


The Court has previously held that a Member State in whose territory an infringement of Regulation No 561/2006 has been committed is in any event entitled to penalise it (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 2016, Eurospeed, C‑287/14, EU:C:2016:420, paragraph 33), so that there is no need for an authorisation to be given by a competent authority of another Member State.
Bundeskammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte v ING-DiBa Direktbank Austria Niederlassung der ING-DiBa AG.
Date: 2018-10-04
19


It should be noted at the outset that, when interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments of 2 September 2015, Surmačs, C‑127/14, EU:C:2015:522, paragraph 28, and of 16 November 2016, DHL Express (Austria), C‑2/15, EU:C:2016:880, paragraph 19).
IQ v JP.
Date: 2018-10-04
31


Article 15, which is in Section 2 of Chapter II of Regulation No 2201/2003 establishing a body of rules governing jurisdiction in cases concerning parental responsibility, lays down a specific rule of jurisdiction that derogates from the general rule of jurisdiction, laid down in Article 8 of that regulation, that designates the courts of the place where the child is habitually resident as having jurisdiction as to the substance of those cases (judgment of 27 October 2016, D., C‑428/15, EU:C:2016:819, paragraph 29).
32


Accordingly, Article 15(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 permits the transfer of a given case to a court of a Member State other than that of the court that normally has jurisdiction, provided, as is stated in recital 13 of that regulation, that such a transfer meets specific conditions and that it occurs only in exceptional cases (judgment of 27 October 2016, D., C‑428/15, EU:C:2016:819, paragraph 47).
34


For the purpose of identifying the court best placed to hear a given case, it is necessary, in particular, to designate a court of another Member State with which the child concerned has a ‘particular connection’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 October 2016, D., C‑428/15, EU:C:2016:819, paragraph 50).
35


In accordance with the Court’s case-law, in order to establish whether there is such a connection in a particular case, reference must be made to the factors that are listed, exhaustively, in Article 15(3)(a) to (e) of Regulation No 2201/2003. It follows that cases where those factors are not present are immediately excluded from the transfer mechanism (judgment of 27 October 2016, D., C‑428/15, EU:C:2016:819, paragraph 51).
38


In addition, the factors listed in Article 15(3) of that regulation all — if not expressly, at least in essence — concern evidence of a close connection between the child concerned in the case and a Member State other than that of the court having jurisdiction to hear the case on the basis of Article 8(1) or Article 12 of that regulation (see, by analogy, judgment of 27 October 2016, D., C‑428/15, EU:C:2016:819, paragraph 52).
42


Next, it must be noted that Chapters II and III of Regulation No 2201/2003 lay down, inter alia, rules on jurisdiction and on recognition and enforcement of judgments concerning parental responsibility, with the objective of ensuring legal certainty (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 October 2016, Mikołajczyk, C‑294/15, EU:C:2016:772, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
Günter Hartmann Tabakvertrieb GmbH & Co. KG v Stadt Kempten.
Date: 2018-10-17
18


In accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, it is necessary, in interpreting a provision of EU law, to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 June 2016, Thomas Philipps, C‑419/15, EU:C:2016:468, paragraph 18, and of 26 July 2017, Jafari, C‑646/16, EU:C:2017:586, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).
23


As regards, next, the objective of the provisions at issue, it should be recalled, in the first place, that the objective of Directive 2014/40 is, according to Article 1 thereof, twofold in that it seeks to facilitate the smooth functioning of the internal market for tobacco and related products, taking as a base a high level of protection of human health, especially for young people (judgments of 4 May 2016, Philip Morris Brands and Others, C‑547/14, EU:C:2016:325, paragraph 171, and of 4 May 2016, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑358/14, EU:C:2016:323, paragraph 80).
26


At the same time, the EU legislature has taken the view that it was appropriate to reserve different treatment for other smokeless tobacco products which may be classified as ‘traditional’ tobacco products, such as chewing tobacco, having regard, in particular, to the lack of novelty and attraction for young people (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2004, Swedish Match, C‑210/03, EU:C:2004:802, paragraph 66).
29


Finally, it should be noted that it is common ground that the prohibition on placing tobacco for oral use on the market, laid down in Article 17 of Directive 2014/40, concerns, in particular, sucking tobacco of the ‘snus’ type (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, Commission v Denmark, C‑468/14, not published, EU:C:2015:504, paragraphs 24 and 25), since that product may be described as ‘finely ground or cut tobacco sold loose or in small sachet portions and intended to be consumed by placing between the gum and the lip’ (judgment of 14 December 2004, Arnold André, C‑434/02, EU:C:2004:800, paragraph 19).
34


As for the products at issue in the main proceedings, it should be observed that, under Article 267 TFEU, the Court has no power to apply rules of EU law to a particular case, but only to rule on the interpretation of the Treaties and of acts adopted by Union institutions (judgments of 10 May 2001, Veedfald, C‑203/99, EU:C:2001:258, paragraph 31, and of 6 October 2005, MyTravel, C‑291/03, EU:C:2005:591, paragraph 43).
European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2018-10-17
In that regard, according to the Court’s case-law, although an action for failure to fulfil obligations must be based on the same grounds and pleas in law as the reasoned opinion, that requirement cannot go so far as to mean that in every case the statement of complaints set out in the operative part of the reasoned opinion and the form of order sought in the application must be exactly the same, provided that the subject matter of the proceedings as defined in the reasoned opinion has not been extended or altered (judgment of 8 July 2010, Commission v Portugal, C‑171/08, EU:C:2010:412, paragraph 26).
The objective pursued by Directive 95/60, which is to complement Directive 2003/96 and to promote the completion and functioning of the internal market (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 September 2004, Meiland Azewijn, C‑292/02, EU:C:2004:499, paragraph 51), by allowing easy and quick identification of gas oil not subject to taxation at the full rate, could not be achieved if Member States were permitted to authorise the use of fiscal marking also for gas oil intended for use subject to taxation at the full rate.
European Commission v Ireland.
Date: 2018-10-17
29


In that regard, it should be recalled that an administrative practice of a Member State can be made the object of an action for failure to fulfil obligations when it is, to some degree, of a consistent and general nature (judgment of 22 September 2016, Commission v Czech Republic, C‑525/14, EU:C:2016:714, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited).
53


As correctly noted by the Commission, the objective pursued by Directive 95/60, which is to complement Directive 2003/96 and to promote the completion and functioning of the internal market (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 September 2004, Meiland Azewijn, C‑292/02, EU:C:2004:499, paragraph 51), by allowing easy and quick identification of gas oil not subject to taxation at the full rate, could not be achieved if Member States were permitted to authorise the use of fiscal marking also for gas oil intended for uses subject to taxation at the full rate.
IBA Molecular Italy Srl v Azienda ULSS n. 3 and Others.
Date: 2018-10-18
29


Thus, a contract providing for the exchange of services is covered by the concept of public contract, even if the remuneration provided for is limited to the partial reimbursement of costs incurred in order to supply the services agreed (see to that effect, judgments of 19 December 2012, Ordine degli Ingegneri della Provincia di Lecce and Others, C‑159/11, EU:C:2012:817, paragraph 29, and of 13 June 2013, Piepenbrock, C‑386/11, EU:C:2013:385, paragraph 31).
35


As is clear from settled case-law, two types of contracts entered into by a public entity do not fall within the scope of European Union public procurement law (judgment of 19 December 2012, Ordine degli Ingegneri della Provincia di Lecce and Others, C‑159/11, EU:C:2012:817, paragraph 31).
36


First, contracts concluded between a public body fulfilling the conditions laid down in Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18 to be classified as a ‘contracting authority’ within the meaning of that directive and a person legally separate from it, where, that body simultaneously exercises over that person a control which is similar to that which it exercises over its own departments and that person carries out the essential part of its activities with the controlling authority or authorities (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 November 1999, Teckal, C‑107/98, EU:C:1999:562, paragraph 50, and of 11 January 2005, Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau, C‑26/03, EU:C:2005:5, paragraph 49).
39


Second, public contracts for pecuniary interest which establish cooperation between public entities with the aim of ensuring that a public task that all of them have to perform is carried out fall outside the scope of EU law on public tendering, as long as such contracts are concluded exclusively by public bodies, without the participation of a private party, so no private provider of services is placed in a position of advantage vis-à-vis competitors and implementation of that cooperation is governed solely by considerations and requirements relating to the pursuit of objectives in the public interest (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 June 2009, Commission v Germany, C‑480/06, EU:C:2009:357, paragraphs 44 and 47, and of 13 June 2013, Piepenbrock, C‑386/11, EU:C:2013:385, paragraphs 36 and 37).
40


Since all of the criteria mentioned in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment are cumulative, a contract concluded between public entities can fall outside the scope of European Union public procurement rules by virtue of that exception only if that contract fulfils all of those criteria (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 June 2013, Piepenbrock, C‑386/11, EU:C:2013:385, paragraph 38).
E. G. v Republic of Slovenia.
Date: 2018-10-18
40


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that it is clear from recitals 8, 9 and 39 of Directive 2011/95 that the EU legislature intended to establish a uniform status for all beneficiaries of international protection and that it accordingly chose to afford beneficiaries of subsidiary protection the same rights and benefits as those enjoyed by refugees, with the exception of derogations which are necessary and objectively justified (judgment of 1 March 2016, Alo and Osso, C‑443/14 and C‑444/14, EU:C:2016:127, paragraph 32).
44


That provision provides for a derogation from the obligation imposed on the Member States by Article 46 of Directive 2013/32 to provide for a right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 July 2017, Sacko, C‑348/16, EU:C:2017:591, paragraph 28).
46


Furthermore, the requirement thus imposed on the Member States to provide for such a right to a remedy corresponds to the right enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), entitled ‘Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial’, which provides that everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal (judgment of 26 July 2017, Sacko, C‑348/16, EU:C:2017:591, paragraph 30).
47


It follows that the characteristics of the remedy provided for in Article 46 of Directive 2013/32 must be determined in a manner that is consistent with Article 47 of the Charter, which constitutes a reaffirmation of the principle of effective judicial protection (judgment of 26 July 2017, Sacko, C‑348/16, EU:C:2017:591, paragraph 31).
48


The principle of effective judicial protection of the rights which individuals derive from EU law comprises various elements; in particular, the rights of the defence, the principle of equality of arms, the right of access to a court or tribunal and the right to be advised, defended and represented (judgment of 26 July 2017, Sacko, C‑348/16, EU:C:2017:591, paragraph 32).
Tänzer & Trasper GmbH v Altenweddinger Geflügelhof KG.
Date: 2018-10-25
20


In this context, it must be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision or be made to override the other language versions. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all languages of the European Union. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and the purpose of the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 March 2016, Alo and Osso, C‑443/14 and C‑444/14, EU:C:2016:127, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
Proceedings brought by Boston Scientific Ltd.
Date: 2018-10-25
31


Thus, the terms ‘medicinal product’ and ‘medical device’ are mutually exclusive in such a way that a product that falls within the definition of a ‘medicinal product’ within the meaning of Directive 2001/83 may not be classified as a medical device within the meaning of Directive 93/42 (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2013, Laboratoires Lyocentre, C‑109/12, EU:C:2013:626, paragraph 41).
33


A product which does not achieve its principal mode of action by pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means therefore falls under the definition of a ‘medical device’. Conversely, a product which achieves its principal intended action in the human body by such means may be classified as a medicinal product within the meaning of Directive 2001/83 (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2013, Laboratoires Lyocentre, C‑109/12, EU:C:2013:626, paragraph 44).
Dermod Patrick O'Brien v Ministry of Justice.
Date: 2018-11-07
26


It should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, procedural rules are generally taken to apply from the date on which they enter into force (judgment of 11 December 2012, Commission v Spain, C‑610/10, EU:C:2012:781, paragraph 45), unlike substantive rules, which are usually interpreted as applying to situations existing before their entry into force only in so far as it follows clearly from their terms, their objectives or their general scheme that such an effect must be given to them (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 November 1981, Meridionale Industria Salumi and Others, 212/80 to 217/80, EU:C:1981:270, paragraph 9, and of 23 February 2006, Molenbergnatie, C‑201/04, EU:C:2006:136, paragraph 31).
27


It must be added that a new legal rule applies from the entry into force of the act introducing it, and that, while it does not apply to legal situations that arose and became definitive prior to that entry into force, it does apply immediately to the future effects of a situation which arose under the old law, and to new legal situations. The position is otherwise, subject to the principle of the non-retroactivity of legal acts, only if the new rule is accompanied by special provisions which specifically lay down its conditions of temporal application (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 March 2015, Commission v Moravia Gas Storage, C‑596/13 P, EU:C:2015:203, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
28


It should be noted from the outset that neither Directive 97/81 nor the Framework Agreement derogates from the principle mentioned in the previous paragraph (judgment of 10 June 2010, Bruno and Others, C‑395/08 and C‑396/08, EU:C:2010:329, paragraph 54).
34


In the present case, it must be stated that the United Kingdom Government at no time requested that the Court limit the temporal effects of its judgment of 1 March 2012, O’Brien (C‑393/10, EU:C:2012:110). A restriction of that kind may be permitted only in the actual judgment which gives the ruling on the interpretation requested (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 May 1990, Barber, C‑262/88, EU:C:1990:209, paragraph 41).