The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte Cyril Richardson.
Date: 1995-10-19
8 As the Court has already held, in order to fall within the scope of Directive 79/7, a benefit must constitute the whole or part of a statutory scheme providing protection against one of the specified risks, or a form of social assistance having the same objective (see the judgments in Case 150/85 Drake [1986] ECR 1995, at paragraph 21, Case C-243/90 Smithson [1992] ECR I-467, at paragraph 12 and Joined Cases C-63/91 and C-64/91 Jackson and Cresswell [1992] ECR I-4737, at paragraph 15).
9 The Court has also stated that, although the way in which a benefit is granted is not decisive for the purposes of Directive 79/7, the benefit must, in order to fall within its scope, be directly and effectively linked to the protection provided against one of the risks specified in Article 3(1) of the directive (Smithson, cited above, at paragraph 14, and Jackson and Cresswell, cited above, at paragraph 16).
13 Lastly, in view of the fundamental importance of the principle of equal treatment and the aim of Directive 79/7, which is the progressive implementation of that principle in matters of social security, a system of benefits cannot be excluded from the scope of the directive simply because it does not strictly form part of national social security rules. The fact, relied on by the United Kingdom, that the exemption from prescription charges is provided for in the National Health Service Act 1977 does not therefore affect the foregoing conclusion.
16 Further, Article 7(1)(a) of Directive 79/7 allows Member States to exclude from its scope not only the setting of pensionable age for the purposes of granting old-age and retirement pensions, but also the possible consequences thereof for other benefits.
18 In its judgment in Case C-328/91 Thomas and Others [1993] ECR I-1247, the Court held that where, pursuant to Article 7(1)(a) of Directive 79/7, a Member State prescribes different retirement ages for men and women for the purposes of granting old-age and retirement pensions, the scope of the permitted derogation, defined by the words "possible consequences thereof for other benefits" contained in Article 7(1)(a), is limited to forms of discrimination existing under the other benefit schemes which are necessarily and objectively linked to the difference in retirement age.
19 That is so where the discrimination in question is objectively necessary in order to avoid disturbing the financial equilibrium of the social security system or to ensure coherence between the retirement pension scheme and other benefit schemes (judgment in Thomas and Others, cited above, at paragraph 12; see also the judgment in Case C-92/94 Graham and Others, not yet published in the ECR, at paragraph 12).
20 As regards the requirement of maintaining financial equilibrium between the old-age pension scheme and other benefit schemes, it should be noted that in paragraph 14 of its judgment in Thomas the Court has already held that the grant of benefits under non-contributory schemes to persons in respect of whom certain risks have materialized where this occurs without reference to their entitlement to an old-age pension by virtue of contribution periods completed by them, has no direct influence on the financial equilibrium of contributory pension schemes.
24 That conclusion cannot in any way be affected by the mere fact that extending entitlement to exemption from prescription charges to men who have reached the age of 60 would increase the financial burden borne by the State in the funding of its national health system. It is settled law that, in exercising their powers under Articles 117 and 118 of the EC Treaty to define their social policy in the framework of the close cooperation to be promoted by the Commission, the Member States are at liberty to define the nature and extent of measures of social protection, including those relating to social security, and the way in which they are implemented; they may also take measures, in order to control their social expenditure, which have the effect of withdrawing social security benefits from certain categories of persons, provided that those measures are compatible with the principle of equal treatment between men and women (judgment in Case C-343/92 De Weerd and Others [1994] ECR I-571, at paragraphs 28, 29 and 37).
31 The Court has consistently held that the interpretation which the Court of Justice gives to a rule of Community law in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 177 of the Treaty clarifies and defines where necessary the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be, or ought to have been, understood and applied from the time of its entry into force. It follows that the rule as so interpreted may, and must, be applied by the courts even to legal relationships arising and established before the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation, provided that in other respects the conditions enabling an action relating to the application of that rule to be brought before the courts having jurisdiction, are satisfied (see the judgment in Case 61/79 Denkavit Italiana [1980] ECR 1205, at paragraph 16).
32 In view of those principles, it is only exceptionally that the Court may, in application of a general principle of legal certainty inherent in the Community legal order, be moved to restrict the possibility for any person concerned of relying upon the provisions thus interpreted with a view to calling in question legal relationships established in good faith (judgment in Case C-163/90 Legros and Others [1992] ECR I-4625, at paragraph 30).
33 In this case there is no factor to justify a derogation from the principle that a ruling on the interpretation of Community law takes effect from the date on which the rule interpreted entered into force.
37 The financial consequences which might ensue for a Member State from a preliminary ruling have never in themselves justified limiting the temporal effect of such a ruling (see, in particular, the judgment of 11 August 1995 in Joined Cases C-367/93 to C-377/93 Roders and Others, not yet published in the ECR, at paragraph 48). Furthermore, the burden of proof normally lies on the person relying on the facts alleged, so that any difficulties which a claimant might have in this regard would in any event be prejudicial to his case.