flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines AS v Starptautiskā lidosta Rīga VAS and Air Baltic Corporation AS.
Date: 2014-10-23
24. First of all, it must be remembered that, according to settled case-law, in order to ensure, as far as possible, that the rights and obligations which derive from Regulation No 44/2001 for the Member States and the persons to whom it applies are equal and uniform, ‘civil and commercial matters’ should not be interpreted as a mere reference to the internal law of one or other of the States concerned. That concept must be regarded as an independent concept to be interpreted by referring, first, to the objectives and scheme of that regulation and, second, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems (see, to that effect, judgments in Apostolides , C‑420/07, EU:C:2009:271, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited; Cartier parfums-lunettes and Axa Corporate Solutions Assurance , C‑1/13, EU:C:2014:109, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited; and Hi Hotel HCF , C‑387/12, EU:C:2014:215, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
25. Next, in so far as Regulation No 44/2001 now replaces the Brussels Convention in relations between Member States, the interpretation given by the Court concerning the provisions of that convention is also valid for those of that regulation in so far as the provisions of those instruments may be regarded as equivalent (see, to that effect, judgments in Sunico and Others , C‑49/12, EU:C:2013:545, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited, and Brogsitter , C‑548/12, EU:C:2014:148, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
26. The scope of Regulation No 44/2001 is, like that of the Brussels Convention, limited to ‘civil and commercial matters’. In order to determine whether a matter falls within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001, the elements which characterise the nature of the legal relationships between the parties to the dispute or the subject-matter thereof must be examined (see, to that effect, judgments in Sapir and Others , C‑645/11, EU:C:2013:228, paragraphs 32 and 34 and the case-law cited, and in Sunico and Others , EU:C:2013:545, paragraphs 33 and 35 and the case-law cited).
27. It follows from Article 5(3) and (4) of Regulation No 44/2001 that, in principle, actions seeking legal redress for damage are civil and commercial matters and therefore come within the scope of that regulation. As stated in recital 7 in the preamble to that regulation, its scope must cover all the main civil and commercial matters apart from certain well-defined matters. Exclusions from the scope of Regulation No 44/2001 are exceptions which, like all exceptions, and in the light of the objective of that regulation, which is to maintain and develop an area of freedom, security and justice by facilitating the free movement of judgments, must be strictly interpreted.
28. The action brought by flyLAL seeks legal redress for damage relating to an alleged infringement of competition law. Thus, it comes within the law relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict (see, by analogy, judgment in Sunico and Others , EU:C:2013:545, paragraph 37).
30. It is true that the Court has held that, although certain actions between a public authority and a person governed by private law may come within the scope of civil and commercial matters, the position is otherwise where the public authority is acting in the exercise of its public powers (judgments in Sapir and Others , EU:C:2013:228, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited, and in Sunico and Others , EU:C:2013:545, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
31. The exercise of public powers by one of the parties to the case, because it exercises powers falling outside the scope of the ordinary legal rules applicable to relationships between private individuals, excludes such a case from civil and commercial matters within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 (see, to that effect, judgment in Apostolides , EU:C:2009:271, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
32. Thus, so far as air navigation charges are concerned, the Court has held that the control and surveillance of air space are activities which in essence fall within the remit of the State and which, in order to be carried out, require the exercise of public powers (see, to that effect, judgment in SAT Fluggesellschaft , C‑364/92, EU:C:1994:7, paragraph 28).
33. However, the Court has already held that the provision of airport facilities in return for payment of a fee constitutes an economic activity (see, to that effect, judgments in Aéroports de Paris  v Commission , C‑82/01 P, EU:C:2002:617, paragraph 78, and in Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle  v Commission , C‑288/11 P, EU:C:2012:821, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited). Such legal relations therefore do indeed come within the scope of civil and commercial matters.
37. Second, the Latvian State is not a party to the main proceedings and the mere fact that it is a shareholder in those entities does not in itself constitute a situation equivalent to that in which that Member State exercises public powers. This is even more true where those entities, the majority or sole shareholder in which is, admittedly, that State, behave like any economic operator, whether a natural or legal person, operating on a given market. The action is brought, not against conduct or procedures which involve an exercise of public powers by one of the parties to the case, but against acts carried out by individuals (see, to that effect, judgment in Apostolides , EU:C:2009:271, paragraph 45).
38. It follows from all of the foregoing that the answer to the first question is that Article 1(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that an action such as that in the main proceedings, seeking legal redress for damage resulting from alleged infringements of European Union competition law, comes within the definition of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of that provision and, therefore, falls within the scope of that regulation.
The second and third questions
40. So far as Article 22(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 is concerned, the Court has already had the opportunity to rule that that provision must be interpreted as meaning that its scope covers only disputes in which a party is challenging the validity of a decision of an organ of a company under the company law applicable or under the provisions governing the functioning of its organs (judgment in Hassett and Doherty , C‑372/07, EU:C:2008:534, paragraph 26).
45. First of all, it must be noted, as is stated in recitals 16 and 17 in the preamble to Regulation No 44/2001, that the rules on recognition and enforcement laid down by that regulation are based on mutual trust in the administration of justice in the European Union. Such trust requires that judicial decisions delivered in one Member State are not only recognised automatically in another Member State, but also that the procedure for making those decisions enforceable in that Member State is efficient and rapid. Such a procedure, according to the terms of recital 17 in the preamble to that regulation, must involve only a purely formal check of the documents required for enforceability in the Member State in which enforcement is sought (see, to that effect, judgment in Prism Investments , C‑139/10, EU:C:2011:653, paragraphs 27 and 28).
46. Next, according to Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, a judgment is not to be recognised if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member State in which recognition is sought. The grounds of challenge that may be relied upon are expressly set out in Articles 34 and 35 of Regulation No 44/2001, to which Article 45 thereof refers. That list, the items of which must, in accordance with settled case-law, be interpreted restrictively, is exhaustive in nature (see, to that effect, judgments in Apostolides , EU:C:2009:271, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited, and in Prism Investments , EU:C:2011:653, paragraph 33).
47. Finally, according to settled case-law, while the Member States in principle remain free, by virtue of the proviso in Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, to determine, according to their own national conceptions, what the requirements of their public policy are, the limits of that concept are a matter of interpretation of that regulation. Consequently, while it is not for the Court to define the content of the public policy of a Member State, it is none the less required to review the limits within which the courts of a Member State may have recourse to that concept for the purpose of refusing recognition of a judgment emanating from a court in another Member State (see to that effect, judgments in Krombach , C‑7/98, EU:C:2000:164, paragraphs 22 and 23, and in Renault , C‑38/98, EU:C:2000:225, paragraphs 27 and 28).
48. In that connection, by disallowing any review of a judgment delivered in another Member State as to its substance, Articles 36 and 45(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 prohibit the court of the State in which enforcement is sought from refusing to recognise or enforce that judgment solely on the ground that there is a discrepancy between the legal rule applied by the court of the State of origin and that which would have been applied by the court of the State in which enforcement is sought had it been seised of the dispute. Similarly, the court of the State in which enforcement is sought cannot review the accuracy of the findings of law or fact made by the court of the State of origin (see judgment in Apostolides , EU:C:2009:271, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).
49. Recourse to the public-policy clause in Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 can therefore be envisaged only where recognition or enforcement of the judgment given in another Member State would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought inasmuch as it would infringe a fundamental principle. In order for the prohibition of any review of the substance of a judgment of another Member State to be observed, the infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal order (see judgment in Apostolides , EU:C:2009:271, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
51. In the first place, as far as concerns the failure to state reasons, the Court has held that the observance of the right to a fair trial requires that all judgments be reasoned in order to enable the defendant to understand why judgment has been pronounced against him and to bring an appropriate and effective appeal against such a judgment (judgment in Trade Agency , C‑619/10, EU:C:2012:531, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).
52. It must be held that the extent of the obligation to give reasons may vary according to the nature of the judgment and must be examined, in the light of the proceedings taken as a whole and all the relevant circumstances, taking account of the procedural guarantees surrounding that judgment, in order to ascertain whether those guarantees ensure that the persons concerned have the possibility to bring an appropriate and effective appeal against that decision (see, to that effect, judgment in Trade Agency , EU:C:2012:531, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).