IPK-München GmbH v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2004-04-29
48. Second, it follows from Article 225 EC, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see, in particular, Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil  v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291, paragraph 34; Case C-248/99 P France  v Monsanto and Commission  [2002] ECR I-1, paragraph 68; and Case C-41/00 P Interporc  v Commission  [2003] ECR I-2125, paragraph 15).
49. Thus, where an appeal merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the Court of First Instance, including those based on facts expressly rejected by that Court, it fails to satisfy the requirements regarding the statement of grounds under those provisions (see, in particular, the order in Case C-174/97 P FFSA and Others  v Commission  [1998] ECR I-1303, paragraph 24, and the judgment in Interporc  v Commission , paragraph 16).
50. However, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of Community law by the Court of First Instance, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal (Case C-210/98 P Salzgitter  v Commission  [2000] ECR I-5843, paragraph 43). Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the Court of First Instance, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (see, in particular, the judgment in Interporc  v Commission , paragraph 17, and the order in Case C-488/01 P Martinez  v Parliament  [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 39).
52. Nevertheless, under Article 118 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Article 42(2) of those rules, which prohibits generally the introduction of new pleas in law in the course of the procedure, applies to the procedure before the Court of Justice on appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance. In an appeal the Court’s jurisdiction is thus confined to review of the assessment by the Court of First Instance of the pleas argued before it (see Case C-136/92 P Commission  v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others  [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraph 59; Case C-7/95 P Deere  v Commission  [1998] ECR I-3111, paragraph 62; and the order of 28 June 2001 in Case C-352/99 P Eridania and Others  v Council  [2001] ECR I-5037, paragraphs 52 and 53).
66. According to settled case-law, the obligation to state reasons for a decision adversely affecting a person is intended to enable the Court to review the legality of the decision and to provide the person concerned with details sufficient to enable him to ascertain whether the decision is well founded or whether it is vitiated by an error which will allow its legality to be contested. It follows that the statement of reasons must in principle be notified to the person concerned at the same time as the decision adversely affecting him and that a failure to state the reasons cannot be remedied by the fact that the person concerned learns the reasons for the decision during the proceedings before the Court ( Michel v Parliament , paragraph 22).
78. In paragraphs 76 to 85 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance also held that the Commission had failed to put forward any evidence that in spite of its interference, in particular that intended to involve Studienkreis in the project, IPK continued to be able to manage the project in a satisfactory manner. Consequently, the Court of First Instance rightly held, in paragraph 86 of that judgment, that the Commission was in breach of the principle of good faith when it refused to pay the second instalment of the aid on the ground that the project was not completed by 31 October 1993.
83. According to the first paragraph of Article 233 EC, the institution whose act has been declared void is required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice. That article requires the institution concerned to ensure that any act intended to replace the annulled act is not affected by the same irregularities as those identified in the judgment annulling the original act (Case C-310/97 P Commission  v AssiDomän Kraft Products and Others  [1999] ECR I-5363, paragraph 56).