Tanoarch s.r.o. v Daňové riaditeľstvo Slovenskej republiky.
Date: 2011-10-27
31. In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, it is for the national courts alone which are seised of the case and are responsible for the judgment to be delivered to determine, in view of the special features of each case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to give their judgment and the relevance of the questions which they put to the Court. Consequently, where questions submitted by national courts concern the interpretation of a provision of European Union law, the Court is, in principle, obliged to give a ruling (see Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 38; Case C‑390/99 Canal Satélite Digital  [2002] ECR I‑607, paragraph 18; and Case C‑373/00 Adolf Truley  [2003] ECR I‑1931, paragraph 21).
32. It also follows from that case-law that the Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite clear that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( PreussenElektra , paragraph 39; Canal Satélite Digital , paragraph 19; and Adolf Truley , paragraph 22).
40. In order to reply to those questions, it is necessary to recall that the deduction system established by the directive is meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities. Thus, the common system of VAT seeks to ensure complete neutrality of taxation of all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that they are themselves subject, in principle, to VAT (see Case C‑408/98 Abbey National [2001] ECR I-1361, paragraph 24; Case C-435/05 Investrand [2007] ECR I‑1315, paragraph 22; and Case C-174/08 NCC Construction Danmark  [2009] ECR I‑10567, paragraph 27).
41. The right of deduction is, therefore, as an integral part of the VAT scheme, a fundamental principle underlying the VAT system and in principle may not be limited (see Case C-409/99 Metropol and Stadler  [2002] ECR I-­81, paragraph 42; Case C-465/03 Kretztechnik  [2005] ECR I-4357, paragraph 33; and Joined Cases C-538/08 and C-33/09 X Holding and Oracle Nederland [2010] ECR I-3129, paragraph 37).
42. It follows that a taxable person may deduct all the VAT levied on goods and services acquired for the exercise of his taxable activities (see NCC Construction Danmark , paragraph 39).
43. With regard to the case in the main proceedings, it is apparent from the case-file that Tanoarch acquired a share in the co-ownership of an invention. With regard to the legal consequences of that acquisition, it should be noted that, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU, the functions of the Court of Justice and those of the referring court are clearly separate, and it falls exclusively to the latter to interpret national legislation (see Case C‑500/06 Corporación Dermoestética  [2008] ECR I‑5785, paragraph 21). It is thus for the referring court, in the present case, to rule whether the applicable national legislation permits a co-inventor to assign his share in the co-ownership of the invention.
45. With regard to the economic reality of that acquisition, it should be recalled that, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 9(1) of the directive, the concept of economic activity encompasses, inter alia, any activity of producers, traders or persons supplying services. The terms ‘supply of goods’ and ‘supply of services’ are objective in nature and apply without regard to the purpose or results of the transactions concerned (see, to that effect, Case C‑223/03 University of Huddersfield  [2006] ECR I‑1751, paragraph 48).
47. With regard to the intentions of the traders concerned, it should be added that the question whether the assignment at issue in the main proceedings is carried out for the sole purpose of obtaining a tax advantage is entirely irrelevant in determining whether it constitutes a supply of a service and an economic activity within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the directive (see University of Huddersfield , paragraph 51).
50. In order to answer that question, it must be recalled that preventing possible tax evasion, avoidance and abuse is an objective recognised and encouraged by the directive (see Halifax and Others , paragraph 71, and Joined Cases C-487/01 and C-7/02 Gemeente Leusden and Holin Groep  [2004] ECR I-5337, paragraph 76).
51. The effect of the principle prohibiting abuse of rights is therefore to prohibit wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic reality and are set up with the sole aim of obtaining a tax advantage (see, to that effect, Case C‑162/07 Ampliscientifica and Amplifin  [2008] ECR I‑4019, paragraph 28).
52. In that regard, the Court, at paragraphs 74 and 75 of Halifax and Others , held that, in the sphere of VAT, an abusive practice can be found to exist only if, first, the transactions concerned, notwithstanding formal application of the conditions laid down by the relevant provisions of the directive and the national legislation transposing it, result in the accrual of a tax advantage the grant of which would be contrary to the purpose of those provisions and, second, it is apparent from a number of objective factors that the essential aim of the transactions concerned is solely to obtain that tax advantage.