larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Timmermans Transport & Logistics BV v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst - Douanedistrict Roosendaal and Hoogenboom Production Ltd v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst - Douanedistrict Rotterdam.
Date: 2004-01-22
21. Article 12(5)(a) of the Customs Code sets out three situations in which a BTI ceases to be valid. Under point (iii) this is the case when a BTI   " is revoked or amended in accordance with Article 9"  of the Customs Code and provided that the revocation or amendment decision is notified to the holder.
22. Under Article 9(1) of the Customs Code, a decision favourable to the person concerned may be revoked if one or more of the conditions laid down for its issue were not or are no longer fulfilled.
23. Thus, the Community legislature has unequivocally provided that a BTI ceases to be valid where one of the conditions set for its issue was not or is no longer fulfilled.
24. The issue of a BTI is made on the basis of an interpretation by the customs authorities of the legal provisions applicable to the tariff classification of the goods concerned and is subject to proper justification for that interpretation.
25. Where, on more detailed examination, it appears to the customs authorities that that interpretation is wrong, following an error of assessment or evolution in the thinking in relation to tariff classification, they are entitled to consider that one of the conditions laid down for the issue of a BTI is no longer fulfilled and to revoke that BTI with a view to amending the tariff classification of the goods concerned.
Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Austria.
Date: 2004-01-29
16. The Court has consistently held that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-166/97  Commission  v  France  [1999] ECR I-1719, paragraph 18, and Case C-103/00  Commission  v  Greece  [2002] ECR I-1147, paragraph 23).
17. It is common ground in the present case that, on expiry of the time-limit fixed by the Commission for the Republic of Austria to comply with the reasoned opinion, the decision of 14 May 1999, considered by the Commission as being the source of the Member State ' s failure to fulfil its obligations, was still in force. Moreover, on the admission of the Austrian Government itself, the two new holes provided for by that decision had in the meantime been created.
18. Accordingly, the present action for failure to fulfil obligations cannot in any case be regarded as being devoid of purpose (see, to this effect, Case 240/86  Commission  v  Greece  [1988] ECR 1835, paragraphs 12 to 15).
26. Having regard to the content of those expert ' s reports and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the inevitable conclusion is that at the time of the adoption of the decision of 14 May 1999, the Austrian authorities were not justified in considering that the planned extension of the golf course in question in the present case, coupled with the measures prescribed by that decision, was not such as significantly to disturb the corncrake population in the   " Wörschacher Moos"  SPA and would not adversely affect the integrity of that SPA.
27. The fact that the note dated 15 July 2002 produced by Mr Gepp at the request of the Government of the Province of Styria regarding the interpretation of the assessments and conclusions contained in his own report seems to soften somewhat their implications cannot affect the finding made in the previous paragraph of this judgment. The same is true of the surveys of the corncrake population in the   " Wörschacher Moos"  SPA carried out in 2000 and 2002 and recording the presence, respectively, of three and two parading males, to which the Austrian Government refers to show that the creation of the extension of the golf course has not caused a significant reduction in that population.
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2004-01-29
14. Since it is settled case-law that that time-limit is decisive when establishing whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations (see, in particular, Case C-173/01  Commission  v  Greece  [2002] ECR I-6129, paragraph 7, and Case C-483/01  Commission  v  France  [2003] ECR I-4961, paragraph 22) the action brought by the Commission must be considered well founded.
Gustav Schneider v Bundesminister für Justiz.
Date: 2004-02-05
20. As regards the question referred for a preliminary ruling, it must be observed that the procedure provided for by Article 234 EC is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, by means of which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of Community law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them (see  Case C-83/91  Meilicke [1992] ECR I-4871, paragraph 22; Case C-378/93  La Pyramide  [1994] ECR I-3999, paragraph 10; and Case C-361/97  Nour  [1998] ECR I-3101, paragraph 10).
21. In the context of that cooperation, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see  Case C-415/93  Bosman  [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59; Case C-379/98  PreussenElektra  [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 38; and Case C-390/99  Canal Satélite Digital  [2002] ECR I-607, paragraph 18).
22. However, the Court has also held that in exceptional circumstances it can examine the conditions in which the case was referred to it by the national court, in order to assess whether it has jurisdiction. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see  PreussenElektra , cited above, paragraph 39, and  Canal Satélite Digital , cited above, paragraph 19).
23. The spirit of cooperation which must prevail in the preliminary ruling procedure requires the national court to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to assist in the administration of justice in the Member States and not to deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions ( Meilicke , cited above, paragraph 25, and the case-law cited therein).
Hortiplant SAT v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2004-02-12
36. However, it follows from Article 225 EC and the first paragraph of Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice that the latter is not competent to find the facts or, as a rule, to examine the evidence which the Court of First Instance accepted in support of those facts. Provided that the evidence has been properly obtained and the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced to it (Case C-185/95 P  Baustahlgewebe  v  Commission  [1998] ECR I-8417, paragraph 24). That appraisal does not therefore constitute, save where the clear sense of that evidence has been distorted, a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court (Cases C-24/01 P and C-25/01 P  Glencore and Compagnie Continentale  v  Commission  [2002] ECR I-10119, paragraph 65).
37. However since the Court of First Instance, in analysing the Commission ' s letter of 3 April 1998 to the Kingdom of Spainas a request for observations within the meaning of Article 24(1) of Regulation No 4253/88, not only assessed the facts but also assigned to them a classification, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to examine this part of the plea (Cases C-39/93  SFEI and Others  v  Commission  [1994] ECR I-2681, paragraph 26, and Case C-325/94 P  An Taisce and WWF  v  Commission  [1996] ECR I-3727, paragraph 30).
Hamann International GmbH Spedition + Logistik v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt.
Date: 2004-02-12
28. In order to answer the question as thus reformulated, it is appropriate to note, as a preliminary point, that Articles 203 and 204 of the Customs Code have different spheres of application. Whilst the first provision covers conduct leading to the goods ' being removed from customs supervision, the second covers failure to fulfil obligations and non-compliance with the conditions of the various customs schemes which have no effect on customs supervision.
29. It is clear from the wording of Article 204 of the Customs Code that it applies only to situations which do not fall within the scope of Article 203 of the same code.
30. Accordingly, in order to determine which of the two articles causes a customs debt to be incurred, it is necessary first to consider whether in the factual situation in question there was removal from customs supervision for the purposes of Article 203(1) of the Customs Code. Only if that question has been answered in the negative is it possible that Article 204 of the Customs Code may apply.
31. Regarding more specifically the concept of removal from customs supervision in Article 203(1) of the Customs Code, it should be borne in mind that, according to the Court ' s case-law, that concept must be understood as encompassing any act or omission the result of which is to prevent the competent customs authority, if only for a short time, from gaining access to goods under customs supervision and from monitoring them as provided for in Article 37(1) of the Customs Code (Case C-66/99  D. Wandel  [2001] ECR I-873, paragraph 47, and Case C-371/99  Liberexim  [2002] ECR I-6227, paragraph 55).
34. Moreover, the financial nature of the import duties does not preclude a customs debt from being incurred on the basis of Article 203(1) of the Customs Code in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings. As pointed out by the Commission, Article 239 of that code provides for the repayment or remission of duties legally owed, subject to certain conditions.
35. In the main proceedings, it is for the national court to ascertain whether the conditions for repayment of the duties at issue, as laid down in Article 239 of the Customs Code, are met.
36. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the question referred must be answered as follows: Article 203(1) of the Customs Code is to be interpreted as meaning that there is removal from customs supervision for the purposes of that provision when, before the entry into force of Regulation No 993/2001, non-Community goods which were subject to the customs warehousing procedure and intended for re-export from the customs territory of the Community have been removed and transported from the customs warehouse to the customs office at the point of exit without having been placed under the external transit procedure and the customs authorities have been unable, if only for a short time, to ensure customs supervision of those goods.
J. Slob v Productschap Zuivel.
Date: 2004-02-12
29. It should be stated at the outset that it is for the national court alone to determine the subject-matter of the questions which it wishes to refer to the Court. The Court cannot, at the request of one party to the main proceedings, examine questions which have not been submitted to it by the national court. If, in view of developments in the proceedings, the national court were to consider it necessary to obtain further interpretations of Community law, it would be for that court to make a fresh reference to the Court (see in particular Case 311/84  CBEM  [1985] ECR 3261, paragraph 10, and Case C-189/95  Franzén  [1997] ECR I-5909, paragraph 79).
30. The issue of whether the Member States are competent to enact legislation imposing reporting obligations on milk producers within their territory that go beyond those in the provision to be interpreted, which was examined at the hearing, is not the subject-matter of the question referred.
37. Such an interpretation would run counter to the principle of legal certainty. That principle, which is a fundamental principle of Community law, requires in particular that a rule such as the one before the Court, which may lead to the imposition of charges on the economic operators concerned, must be clear and precise, so that they know unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and can take steps accordingly (see, to that effect,  Case C-143/93  Van Es Douane Ag enten  [1996] ECR I-431, paragraph 27, and Case C-354/95  National Farmers ' Union and Others  [1997] ECR I-4559, paragraph 57).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 2004-02-12
22. The question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, among others,  Case C-83/02  Commission  v  Greece  [2003] ECR I-5639, paragraph 10).
The Queen, on the application of British Sugar plc v Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce.
Date: 2004-02-19
46. In paragraph 43 of its judgment in Case C-161/96  Südzucker  [1998] ECR I-281, the Court held that, despite the fact that the quantity of sugar at issue had left the customs territory of the Community, the Commission could legitimately consider that production of the export licence bearing the required attributions and endorsements was necessary in order to ensure compliance with the requirements relating to the export of C sugar.  In paragraph 34 of that judgment, it noted that the obligation to prove that the requirements relating to the export of C sugar had been complied with by means of such a licence was essential to the proper functioning of the quota system.
58. According to the Court ' s case-law, in order to establish whether a provision of Community law complies with the principle of proportionality, it must be ascertained whether the means which it employs are suitable for the purpose of achieving the desired objective and whether they do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it (see, inter alia, Case C-426/95  Germany  v  Council  [1995] ECR I-3723, paragraph 42, and Case C-491/01  British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco  [2002] ECR I-11453, paragraph 122).
64. Nothing in the wording of Article 3 of Regulation No 2670/81 indicates that the competent authorities have any power to alter the charge in question.
65. British Sugar observes, however, that if a clearly wrongful act or omission can be attributed to IBAP, Community law not only authorises the latter to vary a penalty but even requires it.
66. It is not necessary to decide whether that interpretation must be upheld.  In the case in the main proceedings no argument has been put forward which would  make it possible to conclude that there was any wrongful conduct on IBAP ' s part.  The one and only argument alleging fault supposedly committed by IBAP is the argument concerning its refusal to correct the licence extracts in question, conduct which, as paragraphs 53 to 56 above make clear, does not lay it open to any complaint.
67. In consequence, the answer to be given to the first part of the sixth question must be that, in circumstances such as those in the case in the main proceedings, neither the national court nor the competent authorities enjoy any discretion to vary downwards the charge to be paid pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation No 2670/81.
71. The Court has no jurisdiction to give a ruling on the facts in an individual case or to apply the rules of Community law which it has interpreted to national measures or situations, since those questions are matters for the exclusive jurisdiction of the national court (Joined Cases C-175/98 and C-177/98  Lirussi and Bizzaro  [1999] ECR I-688 1, paragraphs 37 and 38).
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 2004-02-19
7. However, it is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-63/02  Commission  v  United Kingdom  [2003] ECR I-821, paragraph 11).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 2004-02-19
7. However, it is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case  C-63/0 2  Commission  v  United Kingdom  [2003] ECR I-821, paragraph 11).
Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) v Alberto Barsotti and Others (C-19/01), Milena Castellani v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) (C-50/01) and Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) v Anna Maria Venturi (C-84/01).
Date: 2004-03-04
30. As a preliminary point, it is appropriate to note that, in the context of Article 234 EC, the Court has no jurisdiction to rule either on the interpretation of provisions of national laws or regulations or on their conformity with Community law.  It may, however, supply the national court with an interpretation of Community law that will enable that court to resolve the legal problem before it (see, particularly, Case C-107/98 Teckal  [1999] ECR I-8121, paragraph 33, and Case C-57/01 Makedoniko Metro and Michaniki  [2003] ECR I-1091, paragraph 55).
34. The first subparagraph of Article 4(3) of the directive provides the Member States with an option to set a ceiling to the liability for employees’ outstanding claims in order to avoid the payment of sums going beyond the directive’s social objective.
35. That social objective is to guarantee employees a minimum level of Community protection in the event of the employer’s insolvency through payment of outstanding claims resulting from contracts of employment or employment relationships and relating to pay for a specific period ( Maso and Others , cited above, paragraph 56; Case C-125/97 Regeling [1998] ECR I-4493, paragraph 20; Case C-441/99 Gharehveran [2001] ECR I-7687, paragraph 26, and Case C‑201/01 Walcher  [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 38).
36. While the Member States are entitled to set a ceiling to the liability for outstanding claims, they are bound to ensure, within the limit of that ceiling, the payment of all the outstanding claims in question.
Receveur principal des douanes de Villepinte v Derudder & Cie SA, and Tang Frères.
Date: 2004-03-04
42. In such circumstances, the right to challenge the representativeness of a sample of the imported goods taken by the customs authorities cannot a priori be denied to the declarant or his representative, even if he made no objection in this regard at the time the samples were taken.  In addition to the fact that such an interpretation is in no way precluded by the wording of the abovementioned provisions, it also coincides fully with the actual aim of the Community customs rules, as stated in particular in the ninth recital in the preamble to Directive 79/695 and the fifth recital in the preamble to the Community Customs Code, that is to say to ensure the correct application of duties, charges and levies laid down by that legislation.  Whilst to that end the customs authorities must be regarded as having wide powers of inspection, traders must also have the right to contest decisions taken by those authorities, in particular where, as in the main proceedings, they consider that the samples taken for analysis by those authorities are not representative of the whole of the goods imported and because of that have led to incorrect assessment of import duties.
43. Although it follows from those considerations that a customs declarant or his representative may be permitted to challenge the representativeness of a sample taken from imported goods, even if he was present when the samples were taken and at that time raised no objection in this regard, both the principle of legal certainty and the need to give practical effect to Directives 79/695 and 82/57 and the Community Customs Code require that  the possibility of raising the objection be restricted in time.  It must lapse when the customs authority releases the goods concerned, except where it can be shown that the condition of those goods was not altered in any way whatsoever after the release, so that the possibility remains of conducting inspections and, if necessary, of taking additional samples.
45. Restricting in time the possibility of challenging the representativeness of a sample taken from those goods also satisfies the actual aim of  Directives 79/695 and 82/57 and of the Community Customs Code, which are intended to guarantee rapid and efficient procedures for the release for free circulation since, if the declarant could challenge that representativeness for an unlimited period, the customs authorities would be forced, in order to guard against such a risk, to make a detailed inspection of all goods declared to customs as a matter of course, which would serve neither the interests of traders, who are in general concerned to obtain the release, as was the case in the main proceedings, in order to be able rapidly to sell the goods declared by them, nor the interests of those authorities, for whom a systematic examination of declared goods would mean a considerable amount of extra work.