larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Bestuur van de Nieuwe Algemene Bedrijfsvereniging v V. A. Drake.
Date: 1994-09-20
20 As regards the first part of the question, it should be emphasized that there is no hierarchy between the provisions of Regulation No 1408/71 (as amended) on the one hand, and those of Annex VI on the other. All those provisions were adopted pursuant to Article 51 of the Treaty and must therefore be interpreted together in the light of the purpose of that article, which is to facilitate the establishment of the greatest possible freedom of movement for migrant workers, a principle which is one of the foundations of the Community (see Case 293/88 Winter-Lutzins [1990] ECR I-1623, paragraph 13, and C-282/91 De Wit [1993] ECR I-1221, paragraph 16).
22 It has been established that Articles 48 to 51 of the Treaty are intended to ensure that workers do not lose, as a result of their exercising the right to freedom of movement, social security advantages granted to them by the legislation of a Member State, a result which might dissuade Community workers from exercising their right to freedom of movement and would therefore constitute an obstacle to that freedom (see Cases C-45/92 and C-46/92 Lepore and Scamuffa [1993] ECR I-6497, paragraph 21).
26 As regards the second part of the question raised by the national court, which concerns the lawfulness of the introduction of a supplementary condition, such as income from work of a certain amount during the year prior to the commencement of the incapacity for work, it is sufficient to note that the Court has consistently held that Article 51 of the Treaty and Regulation No 1408/71 provide only for the aggregation of insurance periods completed in different Member States and do not regulate the conditions under which those insurance periods are constituted. The conditions governing the right or obligation to become a member of a social security scheme are therefore a matter to be determined by the legislation of each Member State, provided that there is no discrimination in that regard between the nationals of the host Member State and those of other Member States (see Case C-349/87 Paraschi [1991] I-4501, paragraph 15).
27 It follows that Community law does not preclude the national legislature from altering the conditions for granting benefits for incapacity for work, even if it makes them more strict, provided that the new requirements do not give rise to overt or disguised discrimination between Community workers.
Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1994-10-05
24 Moreover, when the Commission has before it a specific grant of an aid alleged to be made in pursuance of a previously authorized scheme, it cannot at the outset examine it directly in relation to the Treaty. Prior to the initiation of any procedure, it must first examine whether the aid is covered by the general scheme and satisfies the conditions laid down in the decision approving it. If it did not do so, the Commission could, whenever it examined an individual aid, go back on its decision approving the aid scheme which already involved an examination in the light of Article 92 of the Treaty. This would jeopardize the principles of the protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty from the point of view of both the Member States and traders since individual aid in strict conformity with the decision approving the aid scheme could at any time be called in question by the Commission.
25 If following the examination thus circumscribed the Commission finds that the individual aid is in conformity with its decision approving the scheme it must be regarded as authorized aid, and thus as existing aid. Therefore the Commission is not entitled to order the suspension thereof since Article 93(3) of the Treaty empowers it to do so only in regard to new aid.
26 Conversely, where the Commission finds that the individual aid is not covered by its decision approving the scheme, the aid must be regarded as new aid. Where such aid was not notified to it, the Commission "has the power, after giving the Member State in question an opportunity to submit its comments on the matter, to issue an interim decision requiring it to suspend immediately the payment of such aid pending the outcome of the examination of the aid and to provide the Commission, within such period as it may specify, with all such documentation, information and data as are necessary in order that it may examine the compatibility of the aid with the common market" (see judgment in Case 301/87 France v Commission [1990] ECR I-307, paragraph 19).
X v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1994-10-05
17 The Court of Justice has held that the right to respect for private life, embodied in Article 8 of the EHRC and deriving from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, is one of the fundamental rights protected by the legal order of the Community (see the judgment in Case C-62/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-2575, paragraph 23). It includes in particular a person' s right to keep his state of health secret.
18 However, the Court of Justice has held that restrictions may be imposed on fundamental rights provided that they in fact correspond to objectives of general public interest and do not constitute, with regard to the objectives pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference which infringes upon the very substance of the right protected (see Commission v Germany, cited above, paragraph 23).
Criminal proceedings against Johannes Gerrit Cornelis van Schaik.
Date: 1994-10-05
19 Regulations of that kind may be justified, however, by the requirements of road safety, which constitute overriding reasons relating to the public interest, within the meaning of the judgment in Gouda (see Case C-288/89 [1991] ECR I-4007, paragraphs 13 and 14).
Criminal proceedings against M. Voogd Vleesimport en -export BV.
Date: 1994-10-05
9 As the Commission has pointed out, in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling the Court may not deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions (see the judgment in Case C-343/90 Lourenço Dias [1992] ECR I-4673, paragraph 17). The questions referred must therefore be understood as seeking to determine under which subheadings of the Annexes to Regulations Nos 267/87, 1151/87, 2800/87 and 3846/87 the two products referred to in paragraph 3 above are to be placed, and on what conditions.
20 A leg to which a piece of back remains attached must therefore be described as a leg, within the meaning of tariff subheadings 02.02 B II e) 3 of the old nomenclature and 0207 41 51 000 of the new, if that piece of back is not sufficiently large to give the product its essential character.
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 1994-10-05
25 As the Advocate General states in paragraph 19 of his Opinion, while the directive leaves it to the Member States to set concrete objectives for reducing the tonnage and/or volume of containers according to their own priorities and at their own pace, it requires them, in order to attain those objectives, to draw up programmes before 1 January 1987, and then to revise and update them at least every four years. In that respect, it is important that the Member States should notify the Commission in good time, and before the end of 1986, of their undertaking to attain those objectives and of the measures, expressed in quantitative terms, which they intend to adopt or carry out, where appropriate in conjunction with business and industrial circles in the sectors concerned. It is only in the light of those specific figures and time-tables that the Commission can then assess whether the measures envisaged in pursuance of Article 4 actually contribute to the implementation of the programmes designed to attain the objectives of the directive.
Piera Scaramuzza v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1994-10-20
31 The Court of First Instance could indeed have set out its reasoning more fully on this point, especially as it is settled case-law that fundamental rights, such as the right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, are an integral part of the general principles of law, the observance of which the Court ensures (see, in particular, the judgment in Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 41).
Kingdom of the Netherlands v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1994-10-26
22 The scheme of association with overseas countries and territories, provided for by Articles 131 to 136 of the EEC Treaty, confers advantages on those countries and territories in order to further their economic and social development. Those advantages are reflected in both the customs exemptions applicable to products originating in the OCT when they are imported into the Community and in the derogations to the rules on origin introduced by Article 30 of Annex II to the OCT decision which provides inter alia in paragraph (1), third subparagraph, referred to above, that the Community "shall respond positively to all requests which are duly justified ...". The provisions regarding the definition of "originating products" are therefore to be interpreted in the light of that fundamentally favourable approach of the Community towards the OCT and to requests which are not liable to cause serious injury to an economic sector of the Community.
Lucien Ortscheit GmbH v Eurim-Pharm Arzneimittel GmbH.
Date: 1994-11-10
9 It must be observed first that the prohibition of advertising under Paragraph 8(2) of the HWG applies solely to foreign medicinal products. Since it thus does not have the same effect on the marketing of medicinal products from other Member States as on the marketing of national medicinal products, it must fall within the scope of Article 30 of the Treaty (see the judgment in Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097, paragraph 16).
14 It must be observed that Article 36 of the Treaty remains applicable as regards the manufacture and marketing of proprietary medicinal products as long as harmonization of national rules has not been fully achieved in that field (see the judgments in Case 215/87 Schumacher [1989] ECR 617, paragraph 15; Case C-369/88 Delattre [1991] ECR I-1487, paragraph 48; Case C-347/89 Eurim-Pharm [1991] ECR I-1747, paragraph 26; Case C-62/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-2575, paragraph 10; and Case C-317/92 Commission v Germany [1994] ECR I-2039, paragraph 14).
16 That being so, it should be noted that it is also settled law that the health and life of humans rank foremost among the property or interests protected by Article 36 of the Treaty and that it is for the Member States, within the limits imposed by the Treaty, to decide what degree of protection they intend to ensure.
17 However, national rules or practices having, or likely to have, a restrictive effect on the importation of pharmaceutical products are compatible with the Treaty only to the extent that they are necessary for the effective protection of health and life of humans. A national rule or practice cannot benefit from the derogation provided for in Article 36 if the health and life of humans may be protected just as effectively by measures which are less restrictive of intra-Community trade (see the judgments, cited above, in Case C-62/90 Commission v Germany, paragraphs 10 and 11; Schumacher, paragraphs 17 and 18; Delattre, paragraph 53; and Eurim-Pharm, paragraph 27).
19 As the Advocate General has rightly stated in paragraph 23 of his Opinion, the prohibition of advertising in Paragraph 8(2) of the HWG has the purpose of ensuring that the individual importation of medicinal products which have not been authorized remains an exception, in order to prevent the general requirement of national authorization under German law from being systematically circumvented. If medicinal products which were not authorized in Germany could be advertised there, there would be a danger that manufacturers would obtain authorization for their medicinal products in a Member State imposing fewer requirements and then import them into Germany on the basis of individual orders which they would have encouraged by advertising campaigns.
20 The prohibition of advertising imposed by Paragraph 8(2) of the HWG is therefore necessary for the effectiveness of the national authorization scheme. Consequently, it is justified on public health grounds under Article 36 of the Treaty.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 1994-12-06
20 It follows that the requirement to provide remuneration for the periods of training in specialized medicine, laid down in Article 2(1)(c) of the "coordination" directive, applies only to medical specialties which are common to all the Member States or to two or more Member States and which are mentioned in Article 5 or Article 7 of the "recognition" directive.
Rita Grau-Hupka v Stadtgemeinde Bremen.
Date: 1994-12-13
27 In that case it must be pointed out, as the Advocate General has done, that Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security (OJ 1979 L 6, p. 24) in no way obliges the Member States to grant advantages in respect of old-age pension schemes to persons who have brought up children or to provide benefit entitlements where employment has been interrupted in order to bring up children.
SMW Winzersekt GmbH v Land Rheinland-Pfalz.
Date: 1994-12-13
21 It should be pointed out in this respect that in matters concerning the common agricultural policy the Community legislature has a broad discretion which corresponds to the political responsibilities given to it by Articles 40 and 43 of the Treaty and that the Court has, on several occasions, held that the lawfulness of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate, having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see, most recently, the judgment of 5 October 1994 in Case C-280/93 Germany v Council, paragraphs 89 and 90).
22 Account must also be taken of the Court' s case-law to the effect that the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or business are not absolute but must be viewed in relation to their social function. Consequently, the exercise of the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or profession may be restricted, particularly in the context of the common organization of a market, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and do not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the rights guaranteed (see, most recently, the judgment in Case C-280/93 Germany v Council, cited above, paragraph 78).
30 In this regard, the Court has consistently held that the principle of equal treatment requires that similar situations should not be treated differently and that different situations should not be treated identically unless such differentiation is objectively justified (see judgment in Case C-217/91 Spain v Commission [1993] ECR I-3923, paragraph 37).
GoldStar Europe GmbH v Hauptzollamt Ludwigshafen.
Date: 1994-12-13
18 It is important to note that if the Customs Cooperation Council has not given an interpretation of the nomenclature, the Community legislature has the power to interpret, by means of regulations and subject to review by the Court of Justice, the nomenclature as it is to be applied by the Community (see the judgment in Case C-233/88 Van de Kolk [1990] ECR I-265, paragraph 10).
19 To that end, the Council has conferred on the Commission, acting in cooperation with the customs experts of the Member States, a wide discretion in defining the subject-matter of tariff headings falling to be considered for the classification of particular goods, provided only that the provisions adopted by the Commission do not amend the text of the Tariff (see the judgment in Case C-265/89 Vismans Nederland [1990] ECR I-3411, paragraph 13).
26 It must be observed that although the mechanical components which make up a mecadeck are essential as regards the specific manner in which a video recorder functions, the electronic components are also indispensable. The essential character of a video recorder is to be found in the combination of the mechanical and electronic components.
27 The Commission has even accepted that a mecadeck represents only 30% to 40% of the value of a complete video recorder.
28 In view of the distinction drawn in the combined nomenclature between apparatus and parts of apparatus, and in view of the obvious importance of the electronic components, the Commission could not reasonably consider that the mechanical assembly of a mecadeck on its own had the essential character of a video recorder, enabling it to be classified under the same tariff heading as complete video recorders.
Bayer AG v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1994-12-15
26 It should be pointed out in this connection that the Court of First Instance held, at paragraph 29, that the concept of excusable error could concern only exceptional circumstances in which, "in particular", the conduct of the institution concerned had been, either alone or to a decisive extent, such as to give rise to a pardonable confusion in the mind of the party concerned. It follows from the use of the adverbial construction "in particular" that, by not limiting the concept of excusable error, the Court of First Instance correctly applied the case-law cited.
31 It must be pointed out in this regard that the Court of First Instance, in giving its reasons for rejecting the plea based on the second paragraph of Article 42 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EEC, first reviewed the conditions which must be satisfied before it can find that there is a case of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure. As the Court of Justice had consistently held, there must be abnormal difficulties, independent of the will of the person concerned and apparently inevitable, even if all due care is taken (paragraph 44). The Court of First Instance went on to hold that since the circumstances relied on by Bayer did not constitute an excusable error, they could not, a fortiori, be regarded as satisfying those conditions (paragraph 45).
32 It follows from the foregoing that the concepts of force majeure and unforeseeable circumstances contain an objective element relating to abnormal circumstances unconnected with the trader in question and a subjective element involving the obligation, on his part, to guard against the consequences of the abnormal event by taking appropriate steps without making unreasonable sacrifices. In particular, the trader must pay close attention to the course of the procedure set in motion and, in particular, demonstrate diligence in order to comply with the prescribed time-limits.
Società Finanziaria Siderurgica Finsider SpA (in liquidation) v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1994-12-15
11 In that respect, it should be noted, as the Court of First Instance observed, that in the judgment in Hoogovens Groep and Others v Commission, paragraph 26, the Court of Justice held that Article 5 of Decision No 194/88/ECSC took over the wording of Article 5 of Decision No 3485/85/ECSC and that, consequently, it must be annulled for the same reasons as those which led to the annulment of the latter provision in the judgment in Joined Cases 33/86, 44/86, 110/86, 226/86 and 285/86 Peine-Salzgitter v Commission [1988] ECR 4309.
37 However, where the grounds of a judgment of the Court of First Instance disclose an infringement of Community law but the operative part of the judgment is shown to be well founded for other legal reasons, the appeal must be dismissed (judgment in Case C-30/91 Lestelle v Commission [1992] ECR I-3755, paragraph 28).
38 Such is the situation in the present case because, since the Court of Justice has found that the Commission had not adopted a decision on the request for advances and, moreover, could not do so, the pleas directed against the decision of 21 March 1990, cited above, in so far as it constitutes, in Finsider' s view, a rejection of its request for advances, are devoid of purpose.
The sixth plea in law
41 From those findings of fact, which it is for the Court of First Instance to make (see, in particular, the judgment in Case C-283/90 P Vidrányi v Commission [1991] ECR I-4339, paragraph 12), that court could properly infer that the Commission had "given the applicant an opportunity to submit its comments on the alleged exceeding of quotas" (paragraph 108).
46 It is not for the Court of Justice, where it is deciding questions of law in the context of an appeal, to substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own appraisal for that of the Court of First Instance adjudicating, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, on the amount of a fine imposed on an undertaking by reason of its infringement of Community law.
Stadt Lengerich v Angelika Helmig and Waltraud Schmidt v Deutsche Angestellten-Krankenkasse and Elke Herzog v Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Landverband Hamburg eV and Dagmar Lange v Bundesknappschaft Bochum and Angelika Kussfeld v Firma Detlef Bogdol GmbH and Ursula Ludewig v Kreis Segeberg.
Date: 1994-12-15
9 Consequently, provided that the questions raised by the national court or tribunal have to do with the interpretation of a provision of Community law the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to rule (see Case C-231/89 Gmurzynska [1990] ECR I-4003, paragraph 20).
18 As the Court has already had occasion to recall in the context of the issue of admissibility, it has been established that by reason of its mandatory character Article 119 of the Treaty must be applied not only to statutory and administrative provisions but also to collective agreements and individual employment contracts.
20 The principle of equal pay excludes not only the application of provisions leading to direct sex discrimination, but also the application of provisions which maintain different treatment between men and women at work as a result of the application of criteria not based on sex where those differences of treatment are not attributable to objective factors unrelated to sex discrimination.
26 There is unequal treatment wherever the overall pay of full-time employees is higher than that of part-time employees for the same number of hours worked on the basis of an employment relationship.
27 In the circumstances considered in these proceedings, part-time employees do receive the same overall pay as full-time employees for the same number of hours worked.
28 A part-time employee whose contractual working hours are 18 receives, if he works 19 hours, the same overall pay as a full-time employee who works 19 hours.
29 Part-time employees also receive the same overall pay as full-time employees if they work more than the normal working hours fixed by the collective agreements because on doing so they become entitled to overtime supplements.
30 Consequently, the provisions at issue do not give rise to different treatment as between part-time and full-time employees and there is therefore no discrimination incompatible with Article 119 of the Treaty and Article 1 of the directive.
Transáfrica SA v Administración del Estado español.
Date: 1994-12-15
14 The Court has consistently held that the concept of force majeure adopted by the agricultural regulations takes into account the particular nature of the public-law relationships between traders and the national administration, as well as the objectives of those regulations. It follows that the concept of force majeure is not limited to absolute impossibility but must be understood in the sense of abnormal and unforeseeable circumstances, outside the control of the trader concerned, the consequences of which, in spite of the exercise of all due care, could not have been avoided except at the cost of excessive sacrifice (see, most recently, the judgment in Case C-124/92 An Bord Bainne Co-operative and Compagnie Inter-Agra v Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce [1993] ECR I-5061, paragraph 11).