Liivimaa Lihaveis MTÜ v Eesti-Läti programmi 2007-2013 Seirekomitee.
Date: 2014-09-17
46. In accordance with the case-law of the Court, the judicial review mechanisms laid down in Article 263 TFEU apply to the bodies, offices and agencies established by the EU legislature which were given powers to adopt measures that are legally binding on natural or legal persons in specific areas, such as the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the European Medicines Agency (EMA), the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) and the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (see, to that effect, judgment in United Kingdom  v Council and Parliament , C‑270/12, EU:C:2014:18, paragraph 81).
48. In an action brought under Article 263 TFEU, the European Union Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of a measure adopted by a national authority (see, to that effect, judgments in Oleificio Borelli  v Commission , C‑97/91, EU:C:1992:491, paragraph 9, and Sweden  v Commission , C‑64/05 P, EU:C:2007:802, paragraph 91).
62. In accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, the concept of ‘implementing Union law’, as referred to in that provision of the Charter, requires a certain degree of connection above and beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those matters having an indirect impact on the other (see, inter alia, judgment in Kremzow , C‑299/95, EU:C:1997:254, paragraph 16).
75. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the requirement for judicial review of any decision of a national authority constitutes a general principle of EU law. Pursuant to that principle, it is for the national courts to rule on the lawfulness of a disputed national measure and to regard an action brought for that purpose as admissible even if the domestic rules of procedure do not provide for this in such a case (see, to that effect, judgment in Oleificio Borelli  v Commission , EU:C:1992:491, paragraphs 13 and 14).
80. It should be recalled in this regard that, according to settled case-law, the interpretation which, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 267 TFEU, the Court gives to a rule of EU law clarifies and defines the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be, or ought to have been, understood and applied from the time of its coming into force. It follows that the rule as thus interpreted may, and must, be applied by the courts to legal relationships arising and established before the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation, provided that in other respects the conditions for bringing before the courts having jurisdiction an action relating to the application of that rule are satisfied (see, inter alia, judgments in Blaizot and Others , 24/86, EU:C:1988:43, paragraph 27, and Vent De Colère and Others , C‑262/12, EU:C:2013:851, paragraph 39).
81. It is only quite exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the EU legal order, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling into question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed: those concerned must have acted in good faith and there must be a risk of serious difficulties (see, inter alia, judgments in Skov and Bilka , C‑402/03, EU:C:2006:6, paragraph 51, and Vent De Colère and Others , EU:C:2013:851, paragraph 40).
83. In those circumstances, the financial consequences which could follow for the Republic of Latvia cannot be determined on the sole basis of the interpretation of EU law given by the Court in the present case (see, by analogy, judgment in RWE Vertrieb , C‑92/11, EU:C:2013:180, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).