WB v Notariusz Przemysława Bac.
Date: 2019-05-23
40


Indeed, as can be seen from the case-law of the Court, unlike, for example, Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (OJ 2004 L 143, p. 15), or Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1), which do not include any general provision establishing the requirements that must be met in order for an authority to be classified as a court, Regulation No 650/2012 specifies, in Article 3(2) thereof, that the term ‘court’, within the meaning of that regulation, encompasses not only the judicial authorities but also all other authorities and legal professionals with competence in matters of succession which exercise judicial functions and which satisfy the conditions laid down by that provision (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 March 2017, Zulfikarpašić, C‑484/15, EU:C:2017:199, paragraph 35, and of 9 March 2017, Pula Parking, C‑551/15, EU:C:2017:193, paragraph 48).
43


Although, where the Commission is so notified, that creates a presumption that the national authorities declared under Article 79 of Regulation No 650/2012 constitute ‘courts’ within the meaning of Article 3(2) of that regulation, the fact that a national authority has not been mentioned in such a notification cannot, per se, be sufficient for it to be concluded that that authority does not satisfy the conditions set out in Article 3(2) thereof (see, by analogy, judgment of 30 May 2018, Czerwiński, C‑517/16, EU:C:2018:350, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
50


As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, it follows from the requirements of both the uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of EU law which does not contain any explicit reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union; that interpretation must take into account not only the wording of that provision but also its context and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 June 2018, Oberle, C‑20/17, EU:C:2018:485, paragraph 33).
55


In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the Court has ruled that the exercise of judicial functions means that the person concerned has the power to rule of his own motion on possible points of contention between the parties concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 June 1994, Solo Kleinmotoren, C‑414/92, EU:C:1994:221, paragraphs 17 and 18). In order for an authority to be regarded, in the light of the specific nature of its activities, as exercising a judicial function, it must be given the power to decide a legal dispute (see, to that effect, order of 24 March 2011, Bengtsson, C‑344/09, EU:C:2011:174, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited). This is not the case where the powers of the professional concerned are entirely dependent on the will of the parties.
56


Therefore, an authority must be regarded as exercising judicial functions where it may have jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes in matters of succession. That criterion applies irrespective of whether the proceedings for issuing a deed of certification of succession are contentious or non-contentious (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 June 2018, Oberle, C‑20/17, EU:C:2018:845, paragraph 44).
64


In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second and third questions is that:





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the second subparagraph of Article 3(2) of Regulation No 650/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that failure by a Member State to notify the Commission of the exercise of judicial functions by notaries, as required under that provision, is not decisive for their classification as a ‘court’;








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the first subparagraph of Article 3(2) of Regulation No 650/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that a notary who draws up a deed of certificate of succession at the unanimous request of all the parties to the procedure conducted by the notary, such as the deed at issue in the main proceedings, does not constitute a ‘court’ within the meaning of that provision and, consequently, Article 3(1)(g) of that regulation must be interpreted as meaning that such a deed does not constitute a ‘decision’ within the meaning of that provision.