larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
AW and Others v Lietuvos valstybė and Lietuvos valstybė.
Date: 2019-09-05
22


It must also be borne in mind that the Court has previously held that it followed from Article 26(3) of Directive 2002/22, in its original version, which corresponds to Article 26(5) in the current version of that directive, that that provision imposes on the Member States, subject to technical feasibility, an obligation to achieve a result, which is not limited to putting in place an appropriate regulatory framework, but which requires that the information on the location of all callers to ‘112’ be actually transmitted to the emergency services (judgment of 11 September 2008, Commission v Lithuania, C‑274/07, EU:C:2008:497, paragraph 40).
27


In that regard, it is necessary, at the outset, to point out that, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, it is for the national court with jurisdiction to determine whether national legislation is compatible with EU law, as the Court, when giving a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, has jurisdiction only to provide the national court with all the criteria for the interpretation of EU law which may enable it to determine that issue of compatibility (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 July 2014, Ålands Vindkraft, C‑573/12, EU:C:2014:2037, paragraph 126).
37


Suffice it to note, in this regard, that it is not for the Court, in the context of the judicial cooperation established by Article 267 TFEU, to give a ruling on the interpretation of provisions of national law, or to decide whether the referring court’s interpretation of those provisions is correct (judgment of 26 March 2015, Macikowski, C‑499/13, EU:C:2015:201, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
38


As regards the answer to the fourth question, it must, admittedly, be noted that the conditions that must be satisfied in order for a Member State to incur non-contractual liability for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of EU law for which it is responsible include that relating to the existence of a direct causal link between the breach of EU law and the loss or damage sustained by those individuals (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2018, Kantarev, C‑571/16, EU:C:2018:807, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited).
39


However, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that, in the event of a breach of EU law attributable to the State, it is on the basis of the rules of national law on liability that that State must make reparation for the consequences of the loss and damage caused, provided that the conditions for reparation of loss and damage laid down by national law are not less favourable than those relating to similar domestic claims (principle of equivalence) (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2018, Kantarev, C‑571/16, EU:C:2018:807, paragraph 123 and the case-law cited).
R v P.
Date: 2019-09-05
29


It is apparent from the wording of Article 3 of Regulation No 4/2009, entitled ‘General provisions’, that that article lays down general criteria for attributing jurisdiction for the purposes of the courts of the Member States ruling on maintenance obligations. Those criteria are alternative, as is attested to by the use of the coordinating conjunction ‘or’ after each of them (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, A, C‑184/14, EU:C:2015:479, paragraph 34).
30


In this connection, since the objective of Regulation No 4/2009, as is apparent from recital 15 thereof, consists in preserving the interest of the maintenance creditor, who is regarded as the weaker party in an action relating to maintenance obligations, Article 3 of that regulation offers that party, when he acts as the applicant, the possibility of bringing his claim under bases of jurisdiction other than that provided for in Article 3(a) of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 January 2004, Blijdenstein, C‑433/01, EU:C:2004:21, paragraph 29, and of 18 December 2014, Sanders and Huber, C‑400/13 and C‑408/13, EU:C:2014:2461, paragraphs 27 and 28).
46


The importance of that choice given the aim of protecting the maintenance creditor reflects the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the law applicable to maintenance obligations, approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 2009/941/EC of 30 November 2009 (OJ 2009 L 331, p. 17), the Court having observed that that protocol has close links with Regulation No 4/2009 (judgment of 7 June 2018, KP, C‑83/17, EU:C:2018:408, paragraph 49). The Court has thus ruled that that protocol enables the maintenance creditor, de facto, to choose the law applicable to his application concerning maintenance obligations by providing that the law of the forum, rather than the law of the State of the habitual residence of the creditor, may be applied as a matter of priority when the creditor introduces his application before the competent authority of the State where the debtor has his habitual residence (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2018, Mölk, C‑214/17, EU:C:2018:744, paragraphs 31 and 32).
TDK-Lambda Germany GmbH v Hauptzollamt Lörrach.
Date: 2019-09-05
26


In the first place, it should be recalled that the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be found in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant CN heading and of the section or chapter notes (see, in particular, judgment of 26 May 2016, Invamed Group and Others, C‑198/15, EU:C:2016:362, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited). In that regard, the explanatory notes to the CN may be an important aid to interpretation of the various customs headings, but are not legally binding (see, to that effect, 20 September 2018, 2M-Locatel, C‑555/17, EU:C:2018:746, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
27


In the second place, the intended use of a product may also constitute an objective criterion for classification, provided that it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (see, in particular, judgment of 26 May 2016, Invamed Group and Others, C‑198/15, EU:C:2016:362, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited). However, the intended use of the product is a relevant criterion only where the classification cannot be made on the sole basis of the objective characteristics and properties of the product (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 April 2016, Oniors Bio, C‑233/15, EU:C:2016:305, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
28


In the third place, as regards the classification of goods under a heading related to a use, that is to say a heading whose criterion for classification is a particular use of the goods concerned, the product to be classified need not be solely or exclusively intended for that use. It suffices that the use referred to in the heading is the main use for which the product is intended (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 July 2014, Sysmex Europe, C‑480/13, EU:C:2014:2097, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
37


Secondly, secondary legislation, such as the CN, must be interpreted, so far as possible, in a manner that is consistent with the international agreements entered into by the European Union (judgment of 20 September 2018, 2M-Locatel, C‑555/17, EU:C:2018:746, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
Caseificio Sociale San Rocco Soc. coop. arl and Others v Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA) and Regione Veneto.
Date: 2019-09-11
21


In that regard, it should be recalled that the mechanism for collecting the additional levy on milk, introduced by Regulation No 3950/92, is based on a distinction between direct sales of milk for consumption and deliveries of milk to purchasers (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 January 2004, Penycoed, C‑230/01, EU:C:2004:20, paragraph 28).
22


In the case of direct sales, the producer is required to pay the levy due directly to the competent body of the Member State in accordance with Article 2(3) of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 January 2004, Penycoed, C‑230/01, EU:C:2004:20, paragraph 29).
23


By contrast, in the case of deliveries, it is incumbent upon the purchaser, who, as is made clear in the eighth recital of Regulation No 3950/92, is in the best position to ensure that the levy is collected from producers, to pay the levy to that body (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 January 2004, Penycoed, C‑230/01, EU:C:2004:20, paragraph 29).
24


To that end, it is clear from the first and third subparagraphs of Article 2(2) of the same regulation that the purchaser is entitled to deduct from the price of milk paid to a producer the amount owed by that producer by way of additional levy or, failing this, to collect that amount by any appropriate means (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 April 1999, Consorzio Caseifici dell’Altopiano di Asiago, C‑288/97, EU:C:1999:214, paragraph 32).
27


Pursuant to Article 2(1) of Regulation No 3950/92, when read in conjunction with the eighth recital of the same regulation, it is the producer who owes any levy due on any quantity of milk marketed in excess of the reference quantity for direct sales or deliveries (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 April 1999, Consorzio Caseifici dell’Altopiano di Asiago, C‑288/97, EU:C:1999:214, paragraph 19).
28


Moreover, that allocation of the levy to the producer has an intrinsic connection to the purpose of the additional levy, which consists, inter alia, in requiring milk producers to observe the reference quantities allocated to them (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 March 2004, Cooperativa Lattepiù and Others, C‑231/00, C‑303/00 and C‑451/00, EU:C:2004:178, paragraph 75, and of 24 January 2018, Commission v Italy, C‑433/15, EU:C:2018:31, paragraph 62).
29


Therefore, although, with regard to deliveries, the purchaser is liable for payment of the levy, the fact remains that, in both that situation and in the case of direct sales, the levy is payable by producers and may, in certain circumstances, be recovered directly from them (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 January 2004, Penycoed, C‑230/01, EU:C:2004:20, paragraphs 29, 38 and 39).
Antonio Romano and Lidia Romano v DSL Bank – a branch of DB Privat- und Firmenkundenbank AG, formerly DSL Bank – ein Geschäftsbereich der Deutsche Postbank AG.
Date: 2019-09-11
37


It is important to remember in this connection that the principle of interpretation in conformity with EU law requires the national authorities to do everything within their power, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that EU law is fully effective and to achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (judgment of 8 May 2019, Praxair MRC, C‑486/18, EU:C:2019:379, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
38


Although the obligation to interpret national law in a manner consistent with EU law cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem, national courts must alter their established case-law, where necessary, if it is based on an interpretation of national law that is incompatible with the objectives of a directive (judgment of 8 May 2019, Związek Gmin Zagłębia Miedziowego, C‑566/17, EU:C:2019:390, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
40


It should be observed as a preliminary point that, in the context of the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. The Court has a duty to interpret all provisions of EU law which national courts require in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court of Justice by those courts (judgment of 8 May 2019, PI, C‑230/18, EU:C:2019:383, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
54


The perception of the average consumer, that is to say a reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect consumer, is all that is relevant in that regard (see, by analogy, the judgment of 7 August 2018, Verbraucherzentrale Berlin, C‑485/17, EU:C:2018:642, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
Lexitor Sp. z o.o v Spółdzielcza Kasa Oszczędnościowo - Kredytowa im. Franciszka Stefczyka and Others.
Date: 2019-09-11
20


As a preliminary point, it should be specified that the fact that the disputes in the main proceedings are only between sellers or suppliers does not preclude the application of Directive 2008/48. Indeed, as the Advocate General noted in point 24 of his Opinion, the scope of that directive is not dependent on the identity of the parties to the dispute, but on the capacity of the parties to the credit agreement. In the present case, the claims which are the subject of the disputes in the main proceedings are derived from three consumer credit agreements concluded between three consumers and the three defendants in the main proceedings, and were assigned to the applicant in the main proceedings following the early repayment of those agreements.
23


So far as concerns the ‘total cost of the credit’, Article 3(g) of that directive defines it as all the costs, including interest, commissions, taxes and any other kind of fees which the consumer is required to pay in connection with the credit agreement and which are known to the creditor, except for notarial costs. That definition does not therefore contain any restriction relating to the duration of the credit agreement at issue.
31


However, the effectiveness of the right of the consumer to a reduction in the total cost of the credit would be reduced if the reduction of the credit could be limited to the taking into account of only those costs presented by the creditor as dependent on the duration of the contract, given that, as was noted by the Advocate General in point 54 of his Opinion, the costs and the breakdown thereof are determined unilaterally by the bank and the charging of fees may include a certain profit margin.
32


In addition, as is emphasised by the referring court, limiting the possibility of reducing the total cost of the credit solely to costs expressly connected with the duration of the contract would entail the risk that the consumer would be required to make a higher one-off payment when concluding the credit agreement since the creditor could be tempted to reduce the costs depending on the duration of the contract to a minimum.
33


Furthermore, as was emphasised by the Advocate General in points 53 and 55 of his Opinion, the degree of flexibility available to credit institutions in terms of invoicing and internal organisation makes it very difficult in practice for a consumer or a court to determine which costs are objectively linked to the duration of the contract.
TestBioTech eV and Others v European Commission.
Date: 2019-09-12
37


It should be recalled that, under Article 10(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006, any NGO which meets the criteria set out in Article 11 of that regulation is entitled to submit a reasoned request and trigger an internal review of an administrative act by the EU institution or body that has adopted it under environmental law. Where the administrative act at issue relates, as in the present instance, to a marketing authorisation for products — as specified in paragraph 14 of the present judgment — containing genetically modified soybean, a request for review relates, pursuant to that provision, to the reassessment of that authorisation.
38


A request for internal review of an administrative act is thus intended to establish that, as alleged, the act in question is unlawful or that it is not well founded. The party making the request may then, in accordance with Article 12 of Regulation No 1367/2006, read in conjunction with Article 10 thereof, bring the matter before the EU judicature by instituting proceedings — on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers — against the decision rejecting the request for internal review as unfounded.
69


Accordingly, the General Court was correct in holding, in essence, in paragraphs 67, 83 and 88 of the judgment under appeal, that, in order to state in the manner required the grounds for conducting the review, a party requesting the internal review of an administrative act under environmental law is required to put forward the facts or legal arguments of sufficient substance to give rise to serious doubts as to the assessment made in that act by the EU institution or body.
A and Others v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken.
Date: 2019-09-12
38


In that context, it must be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision or be made to override the other language versions. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all languages of the European Union. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and the purpose of the rules of which it forms part (see, inter alia, judgment of 25 October 2018, Tänzer & Trasper, C‑462/17, EU:C:2018:866, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
Bayer Pharma AG v Richter Gedeon Vegyészeti Gyár Nyrt. and Exeltis Magyarország Gyógyszerkereskedelmi Kft.
Date: 2019-09-12
40


As regards, more particularly, that concept of ‘appropriate compensation’, it should be noted that both the need for uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union; that interpretation must take into account the context of the provision and the objective of the relevant legislation (see judgment of 21 October 2010, Padawan, C‑467/08, EU:C:2010:620, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
59


In the absence of an explicit statement in that regard in the wording of Article 9(7) of Direction 2004/48, it must, according to settled case-law, be interpreted in the light of the context and the purpose of the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 June 2018, Koppers Denmark, C‑49/17, EU:C:2018:395, paragraph 22).
European Commission v Kolachi Raj Industrial (Private) Ltd.
Date: 2019-09-12
75


The burden of proving circumvention of anti-dumping measures in a third country lies, in the light of Article 13(3) of that regulation, on the institutions of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 September 2014, Simon, Evers & Co., C‑21/13, EU:C:2014:2154, paragraph 35, and of 26 January 2017, Maxcom v Chin Haur Indonesia, C‑247/15 P, C‑253/15 P and C‑259/15 P, EU:C:2017:61, paragraph 56), whereas it is for each individual producer-exporter to show that its particular situation justifies an exemption pursuant to Article 13(4) of the regulation (judgment of 26 January 2017, Maxcom v Chin Haur Indonesia, C‑247/15 P, C‑253/15 P and C‑259/15 P, EU:C:2017:61, paragraph 59).
82


Pursuant to settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 12 October 2017, Tigers, C‑156/16, EU:C:2017:754, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
88


For the purposes of ensuring a uniform application and interpretation of the same text, the version of which in one EU language diverges from those in other languages, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgment of 26 April 2012, DR and TV2 Danmark, C‑510/10, EU:C:2012:244, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
96


In addition, it is borne out by the purpose and general scheme of the basic regulation. In that light, and in particular having regard to recital 19 and Article 13 of that regulation, the sole purpose of a regulation extending an anti-dumping duty is to ensure that the duty is effective and to prevent its circumvention. Consequently, a measure extending a definitive anti-dumping duty is merely ancillary to the initial act establishing that duty, which protects the effective application of the definitive measures (judgments of 6 June 2013, Paltrade, C‑667/11, EU:C:2013:368, paragraph 28, and of 17 December 2015, APEX, C‑371/14, EU:C:2015:828, paragraphs 50 and 53).
104


Such an interpretation would risk undermining the effectiveness of the EU’s anti-circumvention measures in all cases where the EU’s institutions are faced with a complex assembly procedure consisting of several successive assembly operations in different third countries (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 September 2014, Simon, Evers & Co., C‑21/13, EU: C: 2014: 2154, paragraph 37).
109


That the concept of ‘from’, within the meaning of Article 13(2)(a) of the basic regulation, should be interpreted broadly is also borne out by the fact that, as is apparent from the Court’s case-law, the legislature intended to give the EU institutions a broad margin of discretion in relation to the definition of ‘circumvention’ (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 September 2014, Simon, Evers & Co., C‑21/13, EU:C:2014:2154, paragraph 48).
Pollo del Campo S.c.a. and Others v Regione Emilia-Romagna and Others.
Date: 2019-09-12
Thus, in accordance with the wording of Article 26 of Regulation No 882/2004, Member States must ensure that adequate financial resources are available to provide the necessary staff and other resources for official controls by whatever means considered appropriate, including through general taxation or by establishing fees or charges. In that regard, the Court has interpreted that article, read in the light of recital 32 of that regulation, as meaning that Member States have a broad discretion to make available adequate financial resources to provide the necessary staff and other resources for official controls (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 July 2017, Superfoz — Supermercados, C‑519/16, EU:C:2017:601, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
However, that discretion is circumscribed by the harmonised rules laid down in Article 27 of Regulation No 882/2004 where Member States decide to impose the fees or charges referred to in that article on operators (judgment of 26 July 2017, Superfoz — Supermercados, C‑519/16, EU:C:2017:601, paragraph 34).
In that regard, the Court has held that those minimum rates are basic rates from which the Member States, in principle, may not derogate (judgment of 7 July 2011, Rakvere Piim and Maag Piimatööstus, C‑523/09, EU:C:2011:460, paragraphs 22 and 27).
It follows that Article 27(3) of Regulation No 882/2004 and section  B of Annexes IV and V to that regulation leave no discretion to the Member States allowing them to derogate, in a general and discretionary manner, from the minimum rates set out those provisions (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 July 2011, Rakvere Piim and Maag Piimatööstus, C‑523/09, EU:C:2011:460, paragraph 28).