larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Develop Dr. Eisbein GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Stuttgart-West.
Date: 1994-06-16
15 Finally, Develop Eisbein points out that in its judgment in Brother the Court did not confine its definition of the concept of simple assembly operations to the sphere of the origin of goods, which was at issue in that case, and that, consequently, that definition also applies for the purposes of the tariff classification of a product.
18 The Court has held that whilst the customs tariff does indeed in certain cases contain references to manufacturing processes of goods, the preference is, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, to have recourse to criteria for classification based on the objective characteristics and properties of products, as defined in the wording of the headings of the Common Customs Tariff and of the notes to the sections or chapters, which can be ascertained on the occasion of customs clearance. Consequently, the manufacturing processes of a product, referred to by Develop Eisbein, are decisive only when the tariff heading expressly so provides (see Case 40/88 Weber v Milchwerke Paderborn-Rimbeck [1989] ECR 1395 and Case C-338/90 Hamlin Electronics v Hauptzollamt Darmstadt [1992] ECR I-2333).
21 The Court has stated on many occasions that the Explanatory Notes to the nomenclature of the Customs Cooperation Council constitute an important means of ensuring the uniform application of the Common Customs Tariff by the customs authorities of the Member States and as such may be considered a valid aid to the interpretation of the tariff. However, those notes do not have legally binding force so that, where appropriate, it is necessary to consider whether their content is in accordance with the actual provisions of the Common Customs Tariff and whether they alter the meaning of such provisions (see Joined Cases 69 and 70/76 Dittmeyer v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Waltershof [1977] ECR 231 and Case 798/79 Hauptzollamt Koeln-Rheinau v Chem-Tec [1980] ECR 2639).
22 The meaning of the second sentence of Rule 2(a), as apparent from its wording, would be considerably altered if, in applying it, account had to be taken of the assembly technique or the complexity of the assembly method. Consequently, if paragraph VI of the Explanatory Notes did bear the interpretation attributed to it by Develop Eisbein, it could not be taken into consideration.
23 Accordingly, it should be stated in reply to the first question that an article is to be considered to be imported unassembled or disassembled where the component parts, that is the parts which may be identified as components intended to make up the finished product, are all presented for customs clearance at the same time, and no account is to be taken in that regard of the assembly technique or the complexity of the assembly method.
Questions 2 and 3
Syndicat Français de l'Express international, DHL International SA, Service Crie-LFAL SA and May Courier International SARL v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1994-06-16
26 That line of argument cannot be followed. In analysing the contested letter as a document without legal effects, the Court of First Instance not only assessed the facts but also assigned to them a classification. The Court therefore has jurisdiction to examine this plea.
27 First of all, an institution empowered to find that there has been an infringement and to inflict a sanction in respect of it and to which private persons may make complaint, as is the case with the Commission in the field of competition, necessarily adopts a measure producing legal effects when it terminates an investigation initiated upon a complaint by such a person (see judgments in Demo-Studio Schmidt cited above; and in Joined cases 142/84 and 156/84 BAT and Reynolds v Commission [1987] ECR 4487).
28 A decision to close the file on a complaint cannot be described as preliminary or preparatory. In fact, unlike a communication which is intended to afford to the undertakings concerned the opportunity of making known their point of view on the Commission' s statement of objections and which does not prevent the Commission from altering its position (see judgment in Case 60/81 IBM v Commission [1981] ECR 2639), the decision to close the file on a complaint is the final step in the procedure; it cannot be followed by any other decision amenable to annulment proceedings (see judgment in Case 53/85 AKZO Chemie v Commission [1986] ECR 1965).
31 Finally, contrary to the adjudication of the Court of First Instance (paragraphs 42 and 43 of the order referred to at paragraph 16 above), it matters little whether the contested letter contains an assessment under Article 86 of the Treaty of the conduct complained of. That question does not arise at the admissibility stage of an application and is of relevance only in order to verify in the course of the examination as to substance whether the Commission has performed its duty to provide a statement of reasons.
Fiskano AB v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1994-06-29
39 It must be stressed in this respect that observance of the right to be heard is, in all proceedings initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person, a fundamental principle of Community law which must be guaranteed even in the absence of any rules governing the procedure in question (see inter alia the judgments of the Court in Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461, Case 234/84 Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2263 ("Meura"), Case 40/85 Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2321 ("Boch"), Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst v Commission [1989] ECR 2859, Case 301/87 France v Commission [1990] ECR I-307 ("Boussac Saint Frères"), Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission [1990] ECR I-959 ("Tubemeuse") and Joined Cases C-48/90 and C-66/90 Netherlands and Others v Commission [1992] ECR I-565).
40 It follows from that case-law that observance of the right to be heard requires that any person on whom a penalty may be imposed must be placed in a position in which he can effectively make known his view of the matters on the basis of which the Commission imposes the penalty.
French Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1994-07-05
14 In deciding on the merits of the application it should be borne in mind that the objective of the Community regulations governing the co-responsibility levy is to limit the structural surpluses on the cereals market and that that objective provides justification for imposing the levy only on the processing of cereals placed on the market, since the quantities of cereals remaining in a closed circuit do not contribute to the creation of surpluses (see Case 300/86, cited above, paragraph 11, and Case C-203/89 Van Landschoot v Mera [1990] ECR I-3525, paragraph 22).
15 In Case C-203/89, the Court held (paragraph 24) that, having regard to the objective pursued by the co-responsibility levy, the question whether or not the products are placed on the market is the distinguishing criterion for determining whether or not traders are liable to pay the levy.
Gao Yao (Hong-Kong) Hua Fa Industrial Co. Ltd v Council of the European Union.
Date: 1994-07-07
26 Although it is true that, in the light of the criteria set out in the second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty, regulations imposing anti-dumping duties are in fact, as regards their nature and their scope, of a legislative character, in that they apply to all the economic operators concerned taken as a whole, their provisions may none the less be of individual concern to certain economic operators (see the judgments in Joined Cases 239/82 and 275/82 Allied Corporation and Others v Commission [1984] ECR 1005, paragraph 11, and Case 53/83 Allied Corporation and Others v Council [1985] ECR 1621, paragraph 4).
Hugh McLachlan v Caisse Nationale d'Assurance Vieillesse des Travailleurs Salariés de la Région d'Ile-de-France.
Date: 1994-07-07
20 It is settled case-law that it is solely for the national courts before which actions are brought, and which must bear the responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the special features of each case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which they submit to the Court (see, for instance, the judgments in Case C-127/92 Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority [1993] ECR I-5535, paragraph 10, and Joined Cases C-332/92, C-333/92 and C-335/92 Eurico Italia and Others v Ente Nazionale Risi, 3 March 1994, not yet published in the ECR, paragraph 17).
29 The taking into account by that legislation of periods completed under the legislation of another Member State is excluded by that article as regards the calculation of the amount of the pension, in conformity with the system under Regulation No 1408/71, which allowed different schemes to continue to exist, creating different claims on different institutions against which the claimant possesses direct rights (see the judgment in Case 100/78 Rossi [1979] ECR 831, paragraph 13).
30 Mr McLachlan therefore has rights against the competent institutions of the United Kingdom in respect of the periods of insurance completed in that State and against the French institutions in respect of the periods completed in France.
31 However, Article 49 does not preclude the legislation of a Member State whose conditions are satisfied from taking periods of insurance completed under the legislation of another Member State into account for the purposes of the acquisition of the right to an old-age pension and for determining the rate of that pension. Moreover, that article cannot preclude their being taken into account, since the Court has consistently held that Regulation No 1408/71 may not be interpreted as meaning that it may result in depriving migrant workers of the advantages which they could have claimed under the legislation of a single Member State (judgment in Case C-302/90 Faux [1991] ECR I-4875, paragraph 28).
37 As observed above (paragraph 29), the failure to take those periods into account is inherent in the system under Regulation No 1408/71, which allowed different schemes to continue to exist, creating different claims on different institutions against which the claimant possesses direct rights. On this point, the German Government has rightly observed that each State pays the benefits which correspond to the periods completed under its legislation.
38 As the Court held in its judgment in Case C-199/88 Cabras [1990] ECR I-1023, paragraphs 30 and 31, the disadvantages resulting from the splitting of benefits, which are in any case limited as far as possible by certain provisions of Regulation No 1408/71, are inherent in the fact that Article 51 of the Treaty is not designed to organize a common social security system but merely to lay down rules for the coordination of the social security schemes of the Member States.
Criminal proceedings against François Rouffeteau and Robert Badia.
Date: 1994-07-12
7 It should be borne in mind that Directive 88/301 was adopted by the Commission in the exercise of the legislative power conferred on it by Article 90(3) of the Treaty to lay down general rules specifying the obligations arising from the Treaty, which are binding on the Member States as regards the undertakings referred to in Article 90(1) and (2) (judgment in Case C-202/88 France v Commission ("Terminals") [1991] ECR I-1223, paragraph 14). Article 3 of the directive forms part of the provisions implementing Article 30 of the Treaty (see to that effect the same judgment, paragraphs 37 to 39).
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1994-07-13
8 Although the provisions of that regulation do not expressly lay down a prohibition of quantitative restrictions on imports and of measures having equivalent effect on intra-Community trade, it is clear from the combined provisions of Articles 38 to 46 and Article 8(7) of the Treaty that, once the transition period expired, that prohibition arose automatically from the provisions of the Treaty, as, moreover, the 30th recital of the preamble to Regulation No 3796/81 emphasizes (see, to this effect, the judgment in Case C-228/91 Commission v Italy [1993] ECR I-2701, paragraph 11).
10 Consequently, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, those rules are caught by the prohibition laid down in Article 30 of the Treaty which is applicable without distinction to products originating in the Community and to those which have been put into free circulation in any one of the Member States, irrespective of the actual origin of those products (see the judgment in Case 41/76 Donckerwolcke [1976] ECR 1921, paragraph 18).
12 As the Court has already held (see, for example, the judgment in Case 124/81 Commission v United Kingdom [1983] ECR 203, paragraphs 9 and 10), Article 30 of the Treaty precludes the application to intra-Community trade of national legislation which maintains a requirement, even as a pure formality, for import licences or any other similar procedure, and a measure adopted by a Member State does not escape that prohibition simply because the competent authority enjoys a discretionary power to grant derogations.
16 In those circumstances, it was for the Member States to decide upon the level at which they wished to protect the health and life of animals in this field, whilst taking account of the requirements of the free movement of goods within the Community.
Manfred Graff v Hauptzollamt Köln-Rheinau.
Date: 1994-07-14
7 It appears from the order for reference that Mr Graff delivers the milk he produces on his German holding to the Milchversorgung Rheinland e.G. (hereinafter "Rheinland"), a Germany dairy cooperative.
15 It is settled case-law that the prohibition of discrimination laid down in that provision is merely a specific enunciation of the general principle of equality which is one of the fundamental principles of Community law (see the judgments in Case C-177/90 Kuehn [1992] ECR I-35, paragraph 18, and in Case C-98/91 Herbrink [1994] ECR I-223, paragraph 27); that principle precludes comparable situations from being treated in a different manner unless the difference in treatment is objectively justified (see the judgments in Joined Cases 201/85 and 202/85 Klensch [1986] ECR 3477, paragraph 9, and in Joined Cases C-267/88 to 285/88 Wuidart [1990] ECR I-435, paragraph 13).
17 According to well-established case-law, the requirements flowing from the protection of fundamental rights and principles in the Community legal order are also binding on Member States when they implement Community rules and the Member States must therefore, as far as possible, apply those rules in accordance with those requirements (see the judgments in Case 5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609, paragraph 19, and in Case C-2/92 Bostock [1994] ECR I-0000, paragraph 16).
18 In particular, Article 40(3) of the EEC Treaty covers all measures relating to the common organization of agricultural markets, irrespective of the authority which lays them down. Consequently, it is also binding on the Member States when they are implementing the said common organization (see the judgment in Klensch, cited above, paragraph 8).
Milchwerke Köln/Wuppertal eG v Hauptzollamt Köln-Rheinau.
Date: 1994-07-14
15 As the Federal Republic of Germany has chosen formula A, the producers alone are liable for payment of the additional levy on milk. Accordingly, a milk purchaser such as the plaintiff in the main proceedings is not liable to pay the additional levy.
16 A purchaser cannot be held liable for payment of the additional levy under the provisions referred to in the questions submitted, which require purchasers to pay over to the competent body the amount of the levy collected from each producer.
19 According to the Hauptzollamt, it should be possible to derogate from that system in the event of irregularities on the part of a purchaser in calculating the reference quantities initially allocated.
22 Notwithstanding the need to combat fraudulent transactions, a penalty consisting in the substitution of the purchaser for the producer presupposes the existence of a legal basis laying down the conditions for, and the scope of, that penalty.
23 It is for the Member States to combat fraud effectively. According to the Court, where a Community regulation does not specifically provide any penalty for an infringement or refers for that purpose to national laws, regulations and administrative provisions, Article 5 of the Treaty requires the Member States to take all measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law (see the judgment in Case 68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965, paragraph 23, and in Case C-326/88 Hansen [1990] ECR I-2911, paragraph 17, and the order in Case C-2/88 Imm. Zwartveld and Others [1990] ECR I-3365, paragraph 17 in fine). As the Advocate General pointed out in paragraph 17 of his Opinion, the obligation based on Article 5 of the Treaty also extends to the initiation of any proceedings under administrative, fiscal or civil law for the collection or recovery of duties or levies which have been fraudulently evaded or for damages.
Rustica Semences SA v Finanzamt Kehl.
Date: 1994-07-14
10 In view of the wording of this question, it should be noted that the Court has consistently held that it is not competent to rule on the compatibility of a national measure with Community law (see in particular the judgment in Case C-188/91 Deutsche Shell [1993] ECR I-363, paragraph 27). However, it is competent to provide the national court with all material relating to the interpretation of Community law which may enable it to determine the issue of compatibility for the decision in the case before it (see the judgment in Case C-131/91 "K" Line Air Service Europe [1992] ECR I-4513, paragraph 10).
Criminal proceedings against J.J.J. Van der Veldt.
Date: 1994-07-14
11 The extension to imported products of a requirement that they contain no more than a specific amount of salt, calculated by reference to the dry matter, may prevent bread and other bakery products originating in other Member States from being marketed in the State concerned. It may make it necessary, if identical manufacturing standards are not prescribed in those States, to vary the method of manufacture according to the place where the bread or bakery product in question is to be sold and thus impede the movement of products lawfully produced and marketed in the Member States of origin.
15 Since it concerns an exception to the principle of the free movement of goods, it is for the national authorities to demonstrate that their rules are consistent with the principle of proportionality, that is to say, that they are necessary in order to achieve the declared purpose, which in the present case is the protection of public health.
17 General conjecture of that nature does not prove that increasing salt intake by such an amount poses a risk for public health. It is true that, as the Court has already held (see Case 97/83 Melkunie [1984] ECR 2367), the fact that there is a risk to consumers is sufficient to make legislation of the kind at issue compatible with the requirements of Article 36. However, the risk must be measured, not according to the yardstick of general conjecture, but on the basis of relevant scientific research (see, in particular, Case 178/84 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 1227).
19 Furthermore, instead of prohibiting and penalizing the marketing of bread and other bakery products whose salt content is higher than 2%, the Belgian legislature could have prescribed suitable labelling to give consumers the desired information regarding the composition of the product. The protection of public health would thus have been ensured without such serious restrictions on the free movement of goods.
26 In the present case, Directive 79/112 represents, as follows specifically from its first and eighth recitals, only the initial stage of a harmonization process which is designed progressively to eliminate all obstacles to the free movement of foodstuffs resulting from the differences which exist between the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States with respect to the labelling of those products.
31 Those requirements are satisfied by the obligatory designation of either the specific name or the EEC number of the preservative: to designate only the general category "preservative" would be inadequate, particularly in view of the multiplicity of preserving agents which the products in question may contain. Furthermore, the Court has already observed (see Case C-39/90 Denkavit Futtermittel v Land Baden-Wuerttemberg [1991] ECR I-3069, at paragraph 24) that labelling is one of the means that least restricts the free movement of products within the Community.
Unione Nazionale tra le Associazioni di Produttori di Olive v Azienda di Stato per gli Interventi nel Mercato Agricolo and Ministero dell'Agricoltura e delle Foreste.
Date: 1994-07-14
27 That interpretation is consistent with the scheme for financing the common agricultural policy, according to which the Community grants production aid in the context of a division of powers with the Member States. The sums corresponding to the aid are placed at the disposal of the Member States who must ensure that they are properly managed and, in particular, determine the conditions for payment of the aid to the beneficiaries by their intervention agencies or authorities.
French Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1994-08-09
17 The French Republic' s action must be understood as being directed against the act whereby the Commission sought to conclude the Agreement. Consequently, the action is admissible.
Substance
27 As the Court explained in Opinion 1/75 of 11 November 1975 ([1975] ECR 1355), Article 228 uses the expression "agreement" in a general sense to indicate any undertaking entered into by entities subject to international law which has binding force, whatever its formal designation.
28 Furthermore, as the Advocate General has pointed out in paragraph 37 of his Opinion, Article 228 constitutes, as regards the conclusion of treaties, an autonomous general provision, in that it confers specific powers on the Community institutions. With a view to establishing a balance between those institutions, it provides that agreements between the Community and one or more States are to be negotiated by the Commission and then concluded by the Council, after consulting the European Parliament where required by the Treaty. However, the power to conclude agreements is conferred on the Council "subject to the powers vested in the Commission in this field".