Heikki Antero Pusa v Osuuspankkien Keskinäinen Vakuutusyhtiö.
Date: 2004-04-29
16. As may be seen from the Court’s case-law, Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy within the scope ratione materiae of the Treaty the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for (see, inter alia, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk  [2001] ECR I-6193, paragraph 31; Case C-224/98 D’Hoop  [2002] ECR I-6191, paragraph 28, and Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello  [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 22 and 23).
17. The situations falling within the scope of Community law include those involving the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, in particular those involving the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States, as conferred by Article 18 EC (see, inter alia, as cited above, Grzelczyk , paragraph 33; D’Hoop , paragraph 29, and Garcia Avello , paragraph 24).
18. In that a citizen of the Union must be granted in all Member States the same treatment in law as that accorded to the nationals of those Member States who find themselves in the same situation, it would be incompatible with the right of freedom of movement were a citizen, in the Member State of which he is a national, to receive treatment less favourable than he would enjoy if he had not availed himself of the opportunities offered by the Treaty in relation to freedom of movement ( D’Hoop , paragraph 30).
19. Those opportunities could not be fully effective if a national of a Member State could be deterred from availing himself of them by obstacles raised to his residence in the host Member State by legislation of his State of origin penalising the fact that he has used them (see, by analogy, D’Hoop , paragraph 31).
20. National legislation which places at a disadvantage certain of its nationals simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State would give rise to inequality of treatment, contrary to the principles which underpin the status of citizen of the Union, that is, the guarantee of the same treatment in law in the exercise of the citizen’s freedom to move ( D’Hoop , paragraphs 34 and 35). Such legislation could be justified only if it were based on objective considerations independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national provisions ( D’Hoop , paragraph 36).
22. In order to reply to that question, it is first necessary to state that while, as the Finnish Government points out, enforcement for the recovery of debts falls as a rule within the competence of the Member States, it is none the less the case that that competence must be exercised in compliance with Community law and, in particular, the Treaty provisions on freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States, as conferred by Article 18 EC (see, by analogy, Case C-135/99 Elsen  [2000] ECR I-10409, paragraph 33, and Garcia Avello , paragraph 25).
32. By transferring his residence to Spain, the interested party would automatically, by the very application of the Law on Enforcement to which he remains subject in the event that his Finnish pension is attached and in the light of the double taxation Convention, lose the advantage which for him is represented by the tax which he pays on that pension being taken into account for the purposes of determining what part of his pension may be attached, since the criterion used by the Law for authorising tax to be taken into account is the withholding of tax at source, which for the interested party would require precisely that he not transfer his residence to Spain (see, by analogy, Elsen , cited above, paragraph 34).
37. It should be recalled in this regard that it is not for the Court to rule on the interpretation of provisions of national law and that it must generally take account, under the division of jurisdiction between the Community courts and the national courts, of the factual and legislative context, as described in the order for reference, in which the question put to it is set (Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner  [2001] ECR I-8089, paragraph 10).
44. It must be made clear, however, that this is true only in so far as the national rules on the taking of evidence do not make it impossible in practice or excessively difficult to exercise the right to have proper account taken of the tax in question (see, by analogy, C-276/01 Steffensen  [2003] ECR I-3735, paragraph 80).