larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
The Queen, on the application of S.P.C.M. SA, C.H. Erbslöh KG, Lake Chemicals and Minerals Ltd and Hercules Inc. v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.
Date: 2009-07-07
35. Finally, the conclusion set out in paragraph 27 of this judgment is confirmed by the objectives of the REACH Regulation, as defined by Recital 1 in the preamble and Article 1(1) of the regulation, which consist in ensuring a high level of protection of human health and the environment and the free movement of substances while enhancing competitiveness and innovation.
41. According to settled case-law, the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of Community law, requires that measures implemented through Community provisions should be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it (Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco  [2002] ECR I‑11453, paragraph 122 and the case-law cited).
42. With regard to judicial review of the conditions referred to in the previous paragraph, the Community legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in an area such as that involved in the present case, which entails political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. The legality of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue ( British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco , paragraph 123 and the case-law cited).
45. However, regard being had to Recital 16 in the preamble to the REACH Regulation, it must be stated that the Community legislature established, as the main purpose of the obligation to register laid down in Article 6(3) thereof, the first of those three objectives, namely to ensure a high level of protection of human health and the environment.
46. The means by which to achieve that objective is, as Recital 19 in the preamble to the REACH Regulation states, the registration obligation imposed on manufacturers and importers, which includes the obligation to generate data on the substances which they manufacture or import, to use those data to assess the risks related to those substances and to develop and recommend appropriate risk management measures.
47. Under the terms of Article 6(1) of the REACH Regulation, that registration obligation concerns all types of substances manufactured or imported into the Community in quantities of one tonne or more per year. It also applies to substances whether or not they are classified as dangerous, except where there is an express exemption.
74. According to settled case-law, the principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (Case C-344/04 IATA and ELFAA  [2006] ECR I‑403, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2009-07-09
6. In that connection, it should be borne in mind that the Court has consistently held that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and the Court cannot take any subsequent changes into account by (see, inter alia, Case C‑135/03 Commission  v Spain  [2005] ECR I‑6909, paragraph 31, and judgment of 21 February 2008 in Case C‑328/07 Commission  v Luxembourg , paragraph 9).
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2009-07-09
6. It must be recalled in that connection that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-23/05 Commission  v Luxembourg  [2005] ECR I-9535, paragraph 9, and Case C-152/05 Commission  v Germany  [2008] ECR I-39, paragraph 15).
8. Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held that a Member State cannot plead provisions, practices or situations prevailing in its domestic legal order to justify failure to observe obligations and time-limits laid down by a directive (see, inter alia, Case C-423/00 Commission  v Belgium  [2002] ECR I-593, paragraph 16, and Case C-235/04 Commission  v Spain  [2007] ECR I-5415, paragraph 55).
Pärlitigu OÜ v Maksu- ja Tolliameti Põhja maksu- ja tollikeskus.
Date: 2009-07-16
23. It should be recalled that, when the Court is requested to give a preliminary ruling on a matter of tariff classification, its task is to provide the national court with guidance on the criteria the implementation of which will enable the latter to classify the products at issue correctly in the CN, rather than to effect that classification itself, a fortiori  since the Court does not necessarily have available to it all the information which is essential in that regard. In any event, the national court is in a better position to do so (Joined Cases C‑260/00 to C‑263/00 Lohmann and Medi Bayreuth  [2002] ECR I‑10045, paragraph 26, and Case C‑500/04 Proxxon  [2006] ECR I‑1545, paragraph 23). However, in order to give the national court a useful answer, the Court may, in a spirit of cooperation with national courts, provide it with all the guidance that it deems necessary (see, in particular, Case C‑49/07 MOTOE  [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 30).
24. It should also be recalled that it is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, in particular, Case C‑396/02 DFDS  [2004] ECR I‑8439, paragraph 27; Case C‑495/03 Intermodal Transports  [2005] ECR I‑8151, paragraph 47; and Case C‑183/06 RUMA  [2007] ECR I‑1559, paragraph 27).
26. It is settled case-law that both the notes which head the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff and the Explanatory Notes to the Customs Cooperation Council Nomenclature are important means of ensuring the uniform application of the Tariff and as such may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (Case C‑338/95 Wiener SI  [1997] ECR I‑6495, paragraph 11, and Case C‑276/00 Turbon International  [2002] ECR I‑1389, paragraph 22).
27. In the present case, note 1(c) to Chapter 3 of Part Two, Section I, of the CN states that that chapter does not cover fish unsuitable for human consumption by reason of either their species or their condition. It is therefore clear from the wording of that note that the decisive criterion for determining whether the goods at issue in the main proceedings come under Chapter 3 lies in the fact that they are fit for human consumption. Under those circumstances, the determinant question is whether, at the time that they were cleared through customs, the frozen backbones of farmed Atlantic salmon, obtained after filleting the fish, constituting those goods, were fit for human consumption (see, by analogy, Case C‑395/93 Neckermann Versand  [1994] ECR I‑4027, paragraph 8, and Case C‑14/05 Anagram International  [2006] ECR I‑6763, paragraph 26), which it is for the national court to ascertain.
Distillerie Smeets Hasselt NV v Belgische Staat and Others, Belgische Staat v Bollen, Mathay & Co. BVBA and Louis De Vos v Belgische Staat.
Date: 2009-07-16
16. It must be observed in that regard that, according to settled case-law, the need to provide an interpretation of Community law which will be of use to the national court makes it necessary that the national court should define the factual and legislative context of the questions which it is asking or, at the very least, explain the factual circumstances on which those questions are based (see, inter alia, Case C‑67/96 Albany  [1999] ECR I‑5751, paragraph 39; Joined Cases C‑51/96 and C‑191/97 Deliège  [2000] ECR I‑2549, paragraph 30; and Case C‑506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-8613, paragraph 38).
17. The information provided in orders for reference must not only enable the Court to reply usefully but must also give the governments of the Member States and other interested parties the opportunity to submit observations pursuant to Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. It is the Court’s duty to ensure that that opportunity is safeguarded, bearing in mind that under that provision only the orders for reference are notified to the interested parties (see, inter alia, Albany , paragraph 40; Case C‑145/03 Keller  [2005] ECR I‑2529, paragraph 30; and Wilson , paragraph 39).
22. In order to reply to that question, it should be recalled that it follows from the first subparagraph of Article 217(1) of the Customs Code that entry in the accounts consists of the entry, by the customs authorities, of the amount of import duty or export duty resulting from a customs debt in the accounting records or on any other equivalent medium.
25. Therefore, regard being had to the discretionary power conferred on them by Article 217(2) of the Customs Code, Member States can provide that the entry in the accounts of the amount of duty resulting from a customs debt may be effected by the entry of that amount on the record which is drawn up by the competent customs authorities for the purpose of establishing an infringement of the applicable customs legislation, such as the authorities referred to in Article 267 of the AWDA.
Laszlo Hadadi (Hadady) v Csilla Marta Mesko, épouse Hadadi (Hadady).
Date: 2009-07-16
26. Moreover, Regulation No 1347/2000 was applicable in Hungary only from 1 May 2004, pursuant to Article 2 of the Act concerning the conditions of accession to the European Union of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded (OJ 2003 L 236, p. 33).
38. According to settled case-law, it follows from the need for uniform application of Community law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of Community law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community, having regard to the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, in relation to Regulation No 2201/2003, Case C‑523/07 A  [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 34).
47. In that regard, it should be noted at the outset that, according to recital 1 in the preamble to Regulation No 2201/2003, that regulation is to contribute to creating an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is ensured. To that end, Chapters II and III of the regulation lay down rules on jurisdiction and on recognition and enforcement of judgments concerning the dissolution of matrimonial ties.
48. In that context, Article 3(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 2201/2003 provides for a number of grounds of jurisdiction, without establishing any hierarchy. All the objective grounds set out in Article 3(1) are alternatives. Taking into account that regulation’s purpose of ensuring legal certainty, Article 6 thereof provides, in substance, that the grounds of jurisdiction contained in Articles 3 to 5 of the regulation are exclusive in nature.
49. It follows that the system of jurisdiction established by Regulation No 2201/2003 concerning the dissolution of matrimonial ties is not intended to preclude the courts of several States from having jurisdiction. Rather, the coexistence of several courts having jurisdiction is expressly provided for, without any hierarchy being established between them.
50. In that regard, while the grounds of jurisdiction listed in Article 3(1)(a) of that regulation are based in various respects on the habitual residence of the spouses, that in Article 3(1)(b) is ‘the nationality of both spouses or, in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, the “domicile” of both spouses’. Thus, except in relation to the latter two Member States, the courts of the other Member States of which the spouses hold the nationality have jurisdiction in proceedings relating to the dissolution of matrimonial ties.
Criminal proceedings against Tomasz Rubach.
Date: 2009-07-16
25. It is common ground that Regulation No 338/97 does not contain a general prohibition on importing, and trading in, species other than those which are referred to in Annex A thereto (Case C‑219/07 Nationale Raad van Dierenkwekers en Liefhebberst and Andibel [2008] ECR I‑4475, paragraph 18).
26. As the Court has held, the commercial use of specimens of the species listed in Annex B to Regulation No 338/97 is authorised where the conditions laid down in Article 8(5) of that regulation are complied with (Case C‑510/99 Tridon  [2001] ECR I‑7777, paragraph 44). Indeed, the prohibition on trade contained in Article 8 of that regulation does not apply where the competent authority of the Member State concerned has proof that those specimens were acquired and, if they originated outside the Community, were introduced into it in accordance with the legislation in force for the conservation of wild fauna and flora.
28. In that regard, it should be noted that, given that there is no legislation at Community level governing the concept of proof, any type of evidence admissible under the procedural law of the Member States in similar proceedings is in principle admissible. Consequently, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, it is for the national authorities to determine, according to the principles of their national law on evidence, whether, in the specific case before them, and in the light of all the circumstances, it has been proved that the conditions laid down in Article 8(5) of Regulation No 338/97 have been met (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-310/98 and C-406/98 Met-Trans and Sagpol [2000] ECR I‑1797, paragraphs 29 and 30).
30. Concerning, secondly, the apportionment of the burden of proof with regard to determining whether specimens of species listed in Annex B to Regulation No 338/97 have been acquired lawfully, in the light of the principle of the presumption of innocence, it should be noted that the presumption of innocence resulting in particular from Article 6(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, is one of the fundamental rights which, according to the Court’s settled case-law, reaffirmed in the preamble to the Single European Act and in Article 6(2) of the EU Treaty, are protected in the Community legal order (see, inter alia, Case C‑199/92 P Hüls  v Commission  [1999] ECR I‑4287, paragraph 149, and Case C‑235/92 P Montecatini  v Commission [1999] ECR I‑4539, paragraph 175).
Pia Messner v Firma Stefan Krüger.
Date: 2009-09-03
19. In that regard, it follows from recital 14 in the preamble to Directive 97/7 that that prohibition of imposing on consumers charges other than those resulting directly from the return of the goods serves to ensure that the right of withdrawal guaranteed by that directive ‘is to be more than formal’. Thus, the consumer could be dissuaded from exercising that right if it involved adverse financial consequences.
20. Furthermore, it also follows from recital 14 that the right of withdrawal is designed to protect the consumer in the particular situation of mail-order sales, in which he ‘is not able actually to see the product or ascertain the nature of the service provided before concluding the contract’. The right of withdrawal is therefore intended to offset the disadvantage for the consumer resulting from a distance contract by granting him an appropriate period for reflection during which he can examine and test the goods acquired.
29. Regard being had to all of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that the provisions of the second sentence of Article 6(1) and Article 6(2) of Directive 97/7 must be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law which provides in general that, in the case of withdrawal by a consumer within the withdrawal period, a seller may claim compensation for the value of the use of the consumer goods acquired under a distance contract. However, those provisions do not prevent the consumer from being required to pay compensation for the use of the goods in the case where he has made use of those goods in a manner incompatible with the principles of civil law, such as those of good faith or unjust enrichment, on condition that the purpose of that directive and, in particular, the efficiency and effectiveness of the right of withdrawal are not adversely affected, this being a matter for the national court to determine.
Costs
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2009-09-03
9. In that regard, it is sufficient to recall, first, that a Member State may not rely on provisions, practices or circumstances prevailing in its domestic legal system to justify the failure to observe obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, inter alia, Case C-114/02 Commission v France [2003] ECR I‑3783, paragraph 11, and judgment of 11 December 2008 in Case C-330/08 Commission v France , paragraph 16).
10. Second, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, judgment of 27 September 2007 in Case C-9/07 Commission v France , paragraph 8, and Case C‑152/05 Commission v Germany  [2008] ECR I‑39, paragraph 15).
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2009-09-03
9. It should be pointed out in this regard that it is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation obtaining in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C‑23/05 Commission  v Luxembourg  [2005] ECR I‑9535, paragraph 9, and judgment of 27 September in Case C‑115/07 Commission  v Czech Republic , paragraph 9).
Alberto Severi v Regione Emilia Romagna.
Date: 2009-09-10
37. It is settled case-law that, in proceedings under Article 234 EC, it is, as a general rule, for the national court hearing a dispute to determine both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. The Court may, however, refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court, inter alia, where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose and is therefore not objectively necessary for the resolution of the dispute (see, inter alia, Case C‑421/97 Tarantik  [1999] ECR I‑3633, paragraph 33, and Joined Cases C‑393/04 and C‑41/05 Air Liquide Industries Belgium  [2006] ECR I‑5293, paragraph 24).
50. That conclusion is supported by the actual meaning of the term ‘generic’, as clarified by the case-law of the Court. The way in which the name of a product becomes generic is the result of an objective process, at the end of which that name, although referring to the geographical place where the product in question was originally manufactured or marketed, has become the common name of that product (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑465/02 and C‑466/02 Germany and Denmark  v Commission  [2005] ECR I‑9115, paragraphs 75 to 100, and Case C‑132/05 Commission  v Germany  [2008] ECR I‑957, paragraph 53).
60. In that regard, it must be recalled that, as a general rule, it is not for the Court of Justice to rule on the question whether the labelling of certain products is likely to mislead the purchaser or consumer or to determine whether a sales description is potentially misleading. That task is for the national court (see, inter alia, Case C‑210/96 Gut Springenheide and Tusky  [1998] ECR I‑4657, paragraph 30, and Case C‑366/98 Geffroy [2000] ECR I‑6579, paragraphs 18 and 19). When giving a preliminary ruling on a reference, however, the Court may, in appropriate cases, give clarifications to guide the national court in its decision ( Geffroy , paragraph 20).
61. It is clear from the Court’s case-law that, in order to assess the capacity to mislead of a description to be found on a label, the national court must in essence take account of the presumed expectations, in light of that description, of an average consumer who is reasonably well informed, and reasonably observant and circumspect, as to the origin, provenance, and quality associated with the foodstuff, the critical point being that the consumer must not be misled and must not be induced to believe, incorrectly, that the product has an origin, provenance or quality which are other than genuine (see, to that effect, Case C‑470/93 Mars  [1995] ECR I‑1923, paragraph 24; Gut Springenheide and Tusky , cited above, paragraph 31; and Case C‑220/98 Estée Lauder  [2000] ECR I‑117, paragraph 30).