Consorzio Tutela Aceto Balsamico di Modena v Balema GmbH.
Date: 2019-12-04
20


Furthermore, as regards the criticisms made of the Advocate General’s Opinion, it must be borne in mind, first, that the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Rules of Procedure of the Court make no provision for interested parties to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion (judgments of 25 October 2017, Polbud — Wykonawstwo, C‑106/16, EU:C:2017:804, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited, and of 25 July 2018, Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha and Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift Europe, C‑129/17, EU:C:2018:594, paragraph 25).
21


Second, under the second paragraph of Article 252 TFEU, it is the duty of the Advocate General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, require the Advocate General’s involvement. In this regard, the Court is not bound either by the Opinion delivered by the Advocate General or by the reasoning which led to that Opinion. As a consequence, the fact that a party disagrees with the Advocate General’s Opinion, irrespective of the questions examined in the Opinion, cannot in itself constitute grounds justifying the reopening of the oral procedure (judgments of 25 October 2017, Polbud — Wykonawstwo, C‑106/16, EU:C:2017:804, paragraph 24, and of 25 July 2018, Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha and Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift Europe, C‑129/17, EU:C:2018:594, paragraph 26).
25


In that regard, the Court has already held that, under the system of protection created by Regulation No 2081/92, which was reproduced in Regulation No 510/2006 and is now provided for in Regulation No 1151/2012, questions concerning the protection to be accorded to the various constituent parts of a registered name are matters which fall for determination by the national court on the basis of a detailed analysis of the facts presented before it by the parties concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 June 1998, Chiciak and Fol, C‑129/97 and C‑130/97, EU:C:1998:274, paragraph 38, and of 26 February 2008, Commission v Germany, C‑132/05, EU:C:2008:117, paragraph 30).
26


However, the Court has also held that, as regards a ‘compound’ name registered in accordance with Regulation No 2081/92, the fact that, for that name, there is no footnote, in the regulation registering that name, specifying that registration is not sought for one of the parts of that name does not necessarily mean that each of its parts is protected. The Court pointed out that, even if it may prove to be the case that it follows from Article 13 of Regulation No 2081/92 that, in the absence of specific circumstances pointing to the contrary, the protection afforded by that provision covers not only the compound name as a whole, but also each of its constituent parts, that will be the case only if that constituent part is not a generic or a common term (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 1998, Chiciak and Fol, C‑129/97 and C‑130/97, EU:C:1998:274, paragraphs 37 and 39).
29


In that regard, it must be pointed out that the operative part of an act is indissociably linked to the statement of the reasons for it, so that, when it has to be interpreted, account must be taken of the reasons which led to its adoption (judgments of 27 June 2000, Commission v Portugal, C‑404/97, EU:C:2000:345, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited, and of 29 April 2004, Italy v Commission, C‑91/01, EU:C:2004:244, paragraph 49).
34


Moreover, first, it is established that the term ‘aceto’ is a common term, as previously held by the Court (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 December 1981, Commission v Italy, 193/80, EU:C:1981:298, paragraphs 25 and 26). Second, the term ‘balsamico’ is the Italian translation of the adjective ‘balsamic’ which has no geographical connotation and which, in the case of vinegar, is commonly used to refer to a vinegar with a bitter-sweet flavour. It is therefore also a common term within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 26 of this judgment.