larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
European Commission v Francisco Carreras Sequeros and Others.
Date: 2020-09-08
Since the purpose of Article 277  TFEU is not to allow a party to contest the applicability of any act of general application in support of any action whatsoever, the act the legality of which is called in question must be applicable, directly or indirectly, to the issue with which the action is concerned (see, to that effect,  judgment of  13 July 1966, Italy v Council  and Commission, 32/65, EU:C:1966:42, p. 390, 409).
Thus,  in an action for annulment brought against individual decisions, the Court has accepted that the provisions of an act of general application that constitute the basis of those decisions (see, to that effect,  in particular, judgments of  28 October 1981, Krupp Stahl v Commission, 275/80 and 24/81, EU:C:1981:247, paragraph 32,  and of 11 July 1985, Salerno and Others v Commission and  Council, 87/77, 130/77, 22/83, 9/84 and 10/84, not published, EU:C:1985:318, paragraph 36)  or that have a direct legal connection with such decisions (see, to that effect,  in particular, judgments of  31 March 1965, Macchiorlati Dalmas v High Authority, 21/64, EU:C:1965:30, p. 175, 187;  of  9 September 2003, Kik v OHIM, C‑361/01 P, EU:C:2003:434, paragraph 76;  and of 28 June 2005, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission,  C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P  to  C‑208/02 P  and  C‑213/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, paragraph 237) may legitimately form the subject matter of an objection of illegality.
By contrast, the Court has held that an objection of illegality covering an act of general application in respect of which the individual decision being challenged does not constitute an implementing measure is inadmissible (see, to that effect,  judgment of  5 October 2000, Council v Chvatal and Others, C‑432/98 P  and  C‑433/98 P, EU:C:2000:545, paragraph 33).
Recorded Artists Actors Performers Ltd v Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Ltd and Others.
Date: 2020-09-08
46


It should be noted first of all that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union; that interpretation must take into account the wording of that provision, its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 September 2000, Linster, C‑287/98, EU:C:2000:468, paragraph 43; of 22 September 2011, Budějovický Budvar, C‑482/09, EU:C:2011:605, paragraph 29; and of 1 October 2019, Planet49, C‑673/17, EU:C:2019:801, paragraph 47).
51


It follows that the concepts in Directive 2006/115 must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the equivalent concepts contained in those conventions (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 March 2012, SCF, C‑135/10, EU:C:2012:140, paragraph 55; of 10 November 2016, Vereniging Openbare Bibliotheken, C‑174/15, EU:C:2016:856, paragraph 33; and of 29 July 2019, Pelham and Others, C‑476/17, EU:C:2019:624, paragraph 53).
54


Article 8(2) of Directive 2006/115 confers on those persons a right that is compensatory in nature, triggered by communication to the public of the performance of the work fixed on a phonogram published for commercial purposes (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 May 2016, Reha Training, C‑117/15, EU:C:2016:379, paragraphs 30 and 32).
62


On the contrary, the context of Article 8(2) of Directive 2006/115 and the objectives of that directive, which are noted in paragraph 50 of the present judgment, as well as the primacy, resulting from Article 216(2) TFEU, which international agreements concluded by the European Union have over other categories of secondary legislation (judgment of 21 December 2011, Air Transport Association of America and Others, C‑366/10, EU:C:2011:864, paragraph 50), mean that Article 8(2) of the directive must be interpreted, as far as possible, in a manner consistent with the WPPT (see, by analogy, judgment of 18 March 2014, Z, C‑363/12, EU:C:2014:159, paragraph 72). That international agreement, which forms an integral part of the EU legal order (see, inter alia, judgments of 30 April 1974, Haegeman, 181/73, EU:C:1974:41, paragraph 5, and of 11 April 2013, HK Danmark, C‑335/11 and C‑337/11, EU:C:2013:222, paragraphs 28 to 30), in principle obliges the European Union and its Member States to grant the right to a single equitable remuneration both to performers and phonogram producers who are nationals of Member States of the European Union and to those who are nationals of other contracting parties to the WPPT.
A v B and C.
Date: 2020-09-10
In accordance with Article 4(1) of Directive 93/13, the national court must, in order to determine whether the contractual term on which the claim brought before it is based is unfair, take account of all of the other terms of the contract (see, to that effect, order of 16 November 2010, Pohotovosť, C‑76/10, EU:C:2010:685, paragraph 59; judgments of 21 April 2016, Radlinger and Radlingerová, C‑377/14, EU:C:2016:283, paragraph 94, and of 11 March 2020, Lintner, C‑511/17, EU:C:2020:188, paragraph 46).
As for the damages claimed by A to the amount of the profits made from the subletting by B, which would, if applicable, be imposed cumulatively along with the EUR 5 000 contractual penalty, it should be borne in mind that, according to Articles 1(1) and 3(1) of Directive 93/13, that directive applies to the terms contained in contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer which have not been individually negotiated (judgments of 7 November 2019, Profi Credit Polska, C‑419/18 and C‑483/18, EU:C:2019:930, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited, and of  4 June 2020, Kancelaria Medius, C‑495/19, EU:C:2020:431, paragraph 24).
Edison SpA v European Union Intellectual Property Office.
Date: 2020-09-16
It must be noted, in this regard, that complaints directed against a ground expressed for the sake of completeness in a decision of the General Court cannot lead to the annulment of that decision and are therefore ineffective (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 March 2019, Commission v Italy, C‑621/16 P, EU:C:2019:251, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
SC Romenergo SA and Aris Capital SA v Autoritatea de Supraveghere Financiară.
Date: 2020-09-16
According to settled case-law of the Court, that provision generally prohibits restrictions on movements of capital between Member States (judgment of 6 March 2018, SEGRO and Horváth, C‑52/16 and C‑113/16, EU:C:2018:157, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).
Asociación Estatal de Empresas Operadoras Portuarias (ASOPORT) v Asociación Nacional de Empresas Estibadoras y Consignatarios de Buques (ANESCO and Others.
Date: 2020-09-16
According to settled case-law, in order to determine whether the body making a reference is a ‘court or tribunal’ for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU, which is a question governed by EU law alone, the Court takes account of a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedures are inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent. In addition, a national court may refer a question to the Court of Justice only if there is a case pending before it and if it is called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature (judgment of 31 May 2005, Syfait and Others, C‑53/03, EU:C:2005:333, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
Stichting Schoonzicht v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2020-09-17
By contrast, Article 186 of the VAT Directive expressly makes Member States responsible for defining the conditions for such adjustments, by providing that they are to lay down the detailed rules for applying Articles 184 and 185 of the VAT Directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 April 2018, SEB bankas, C‑532/16, EU:C:2018:228, paragraph 27).
It is only so far as concerns capital goods that Articles 187 to 192 of the VAT Directive provide for certain detailed rules for the adjustment of VAT deductions (judgment of 11 April 2018, SEB bankas, C‑532/16, EU:C:2018:228, paragraph 27).
Those provisions constitute the scheme applicable to any entitlement of the tax authority to require a taxable person to make a VAT adjustment, including adjustment of deductions made in respect of capital goods (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 October 2012, TETS Haskovo, C‑234/11, EU:C:2012:644, paragraph 26).
Groupe Lactalis v Premier ministre and Others.
Date: 2020-10-01
With  regard to the objectives of Regulation No 1169/2011, as follows from Articles 1(1) and 3(1) of that regulation, read in the light of recitals 1, 3 and 4 of that regulation, they include the objective of ensuring a high level of consumer protection in relation to food information, taking into account the differences in perception of consumers (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 November 2019, Organisation juive européenne and Vignoble Psagot, C‑363/18, EU:C:2019:954, paragraphs 52 et 53).
Such an objective requires, as the Court has previously held, that the information relating to food is correct, neutral and objective (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 September 2016, Breitsamer und Ulrich, C‑113/15, EU:C:2016:718, paragraph 69).
Jobcenter Krefeld - Widerspruchsstelle v JD.
Date: 2020-10-06
61


Further, it should be borne in mind that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 18 January 2017, NEW WAVE CZ, C‑427/15, EU:C:2017:18, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
État luxembourgeois v B and Others.
Date: 2020-10-06
That being said, the recognition of that right, in a given case, presupposes, as is apparent from the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, that the person invoking that right is relying on rights or freedoms guaranteed by EU law.
United Biscuits (Pension Trustees) Limited and United Biscuits Pension Investments Limited v Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs.
Date: 2020-10-08
29


In that regard, it must be recalled that the terms used to specify the exemptions covered by Article 135(1) of Directive 2006/112 are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person acting as such (judgment of 17 March 2016, Aspiro, C‑40/15, EU:C:2016:172, paragraph 20).
30


As regards the insurance transactions referred to in that provision, the essentials of such transactions are, as generally understood and according to settled case-law, that the insurer undertakes, in return for prior payment of a premium, to provide the insured, in the event of materialisation of the risk covered, with the service agreed when the contract was concluded (see judgment of 17 March 2016, Aspiro, C‑40/15, EU:C:2016:172, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
46


In accordance with the settled case-law, provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all the languages of the European Union. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgment of 8 December 2005, Jyske Finans, C‑280/04, EU:C:2005:753, paragraph 31).
Crown Van Gelder BV v Autoriteit Consument en Markt.
Date: 2020-10-08
According to the settled case-law of the Court, it follows from the requirement for the uniform application of EU law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of EU law which does not contain any express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope, must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, that interpretation must take into account not only the wording of that provision but also its context and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (judgment of 19 December 2019, GRDF, C‑236/18, EU:C:2019:1120, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
Likewise, Article 3(7) of Directive 2009/72 requires Member States, inter alia, to ensure high levels of consumer protection, particularly with respect to dispute resolution mechanisms, and Article 36(g) of that directive assigns to the regulatory authorities the objective of helping to ensure consumer protection (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 January 2020, Energiavirasto, C‑578/18, EU:C:2020:35, paragraphs 34 and 35).
Thus, while Article 37 of Directive 2009/72 does not require Member States to confer on the regulatory authority the competence to settle disputes between electricity consumers and system operators, but allows them to confer that competence on another authority (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 January 2020, Energiavirasto, C‑578/18, EU:C:2020:35, paragraphs 36 to 40 and 43), that competence, when it is conferred by a Member State on the regulatory authority, cannot be made conditional on the existence of a direct relationship between the complainant and the network operator concerned by the complaint.
Allmänna ombudet hos Tullverket v Combinova AB.
Date: 2020-10-08
In that context, it must be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision or be made to override the other language versions. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all languages of the European Union. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgments of 15 November 2012, Kurcums Metal, C‑558/11, EU:C:2012:721, paragraph 48; of 15 October 2015, Grupo Itevelesa and Others, C‑168/14, EU:C:2015:685, paragraph 42; and of 23 January 2020, Bundesagentur für Arbeit, C‑29/19, EU:C:2020:36, paragraph 48).
In that regard, Article 124(1)(k) of the Customs Code, read in the light of recital 38 and in conjunction with Article 124(6) of the code, seeks, as the Czech Government noted in its written observations, to allow – in the absence of attempted deception – a customs debt incurred under Article 79 of that code to be extinguished in the event that, despite certain conditions or obligations flowing from that code not having been complied with, it is proven that the goods have not been used in such a way that justifies the imposition of duties and that they have left the customs territory of the European Union (see, by analogy, judgments of 5 October 1983, Esercizio Magazzini Generali and Mellina Agosta, 186/82 and 187/82, EU:C:1983:262, paragraph 14, and of 2 April 2009, Elshani, C‑459/07, EU:C:2009:224, paragraph 29).
It is true that the Court has held, as regards the inward processing procedure provided for by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ 1992 L 302, p. 1), which was replaced by the Customs Code, that, since that procedure involves obvious risks to the correct application of the customs legislation of the European Union and the resulting collection of duties, the beneficiaries of that procedure are required to comply strictly with the obligations resulting therefrom and, similarly, the consequences of non-compliance with their obligations must be strictly interpreted. The Court deduced from this that the non-fulfilment of the obligation to submit the bill of discharge within the time period prescribed gives rise to a customs debt in respect of the entire quantity of the imported goods covered by the bill of discharge, including those re-exported outside the territory of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 September 2012, Döhler Neuenkirchen, C‑262/10, EU:C:2012:559, paragraphs 41 and 48).
EU v PE Digital GmbH.
Date: 2020-10-08
The interpretation, set out in paragraphs 28 and 29 of this judgment, corresponds to the objective, stated in recital 4 of Directive 2011/83, of ensuring the right balance between a high level of consumer protection and the competitiveness of undertakings (see, by analogy, judgments of 23 January 2019, Walbusch Walter Busch, C‑430/17, EU:C:2019:47, paragraph 41; of 27 March 2019, slewo, C‑681/17, EU:C:2019:255, paragraph 39; and of 10 July 2019, Amazon EU, C‑649/17, EU:C:2019:576, paragraph 44).
Article 16(m) of Directive 2011/83, which constitutes an exception to the right of withdrawal, is, as a provision of EU law which restricts the rights granted for reasons relating to consumer protection, to be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 May 2020, NK (Planning for the construction of a new single-family house), C‑208/19, EU:C:2020:382, paragraphs 40 and 56 and the case-law cited).
Finanzamt D v E.
Date: 2020-10-08
28


As is clear from settled case‑law, the terms used to specify the exemptions in Article 132 of the VAT Directive are to be interpreted strictly. Nevertheless, the interpretation of those terms must be consistent with the objectives underlying the exemptions and must comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT. Accordingly, the requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 132 must be construed in such a way as to deprive the exemptions of their intended effects (judgment of 15 November 2012, Zimmermann, C‑174/11, EU:C:2012:716, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
Admiral Sportwetten GmbH and Others v Magistrat der Stadt Wien.
Date: 2020-10-08
25


In order to answer that question, it must be borne in mind that the concept of ‘technical regulation’ covers four categories of measures, namely (i) ‘technical specifications’ within the meaning of Article 1(1)(c) of Directive 2015/1535, (ii) ‘other requirements’ as defined in Article 1(1)(d) of that directive, (iii) ‘rules on services’ referred to in Article 1(1)(e) of that directive and (iv) the ‘laws, regulations or administrative provisions of Member States … prohibiting the manufacture, importation, marketing or use of a product or prohibiting the provision or use of a service, or establishment as a service provider’ within the meaning of Article 1(1)(f) of that directive (see, in respect of Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services (OJ 1998 L 204, p. 37), as amended by Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 1998 (OJ 1998 L 217, p. 18), judgment of 12 September 2019, VG Media, C‑299/17, EU:C:2019:716, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
26


It must be stated, in the first place, that in order for a national measure to fall within the first category of technical regulations, referred to in Article 1(1)(c) of Directive 2015/1535, namely within the concept of ‘technical specification’, that measure must necessarily refer to the product or its packaging as such and thus lay down one of the characteristics required of a product (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 September 2019, VG Media, C‑299/17, EU:C:2019:716, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
36


In the fourth place, regarding the ‘technical regulations’ category, covered by Article 1(1)(f) of Directive 2015/1535, it should be borne in mind that it concerns laws, regulations or administrative provisions of Member States prohibiting the manufacture, importation, marketing or use of a product or prohibiting the provision or use of a service, or establishment as a service provider. Regarding, more specifically, prohibitions on use, the Court has previously held that those prohibitions include measures the scope of which goes well beyond a limitation to certain possible uses of the product in question and are thus not confined to a mere restriction of its use (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2005, Lindberg, C‑267/03, EU:C:2005:246, paragraph 76).
38


Furthermore, it must be added that, regarding de facto technical regulations within the meaning of Article 1(1)(f)(iii) of Directive 2015/1535, the Court has previously held that tax legislation, which is not accompanied by any technical specification or any other requirement with which it is purportedly intended to ensure compliance, cannot be described as a ‘de facto technical regulation’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 June 2015, Berlington Hungary and Others, C‑98/14, EU:C:2015:386, paragraph 97).
Association française des usagers de banques v Ministre de l'Économie et des Finances.
Date: 2020-10-15
47


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with the settled case‑law of the Court, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, based on a clear separation of functions between the referring courts and the Court of Justice, the referring court alone has jurisdiction to find and assess the facts in the case before it and to interpret and apply national law. Similarly, it is solely for the referring court, before which the dispute has been brought and which must assume responsibility for the judicial decision to be made, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for and the relevance of the questions that it submits to the Court (judgment of 26 May 2011, Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Others, C‑165/09 to C‑167/09, EU:C:2011:348, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
49


As regards whether, in the first place, Article 12(2)(a) of Directive 2014/17 must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which a lender may require a borrower to deposit all his or her salary or similar income on a payment account opened with that lender, irrespective of the amount, maturities and duration of the loan, it is important, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, to take account not only of the terms of that article but also of its context and the objective pursued by the legislation of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 May 2016, Envirotec Denmark, C‑550/14, EU:C:2016:354, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
53


Since Article 12(2)(a) of Directive 2014/17 constitutes an exception to the general rule laid down in Article 12(1) of that directive, it must, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, judgment of 22 January 2020, Pensionsversicherungsanstalt (severance allowance after retirement age), C‑32/19, EU:C:2020:25, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
59


Moreover, it must be recalled that, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, the referring court is required, by virtue of the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law, to the greatest extent possible, to interpret national law in conformity with the requirements of EU law and thus to ensure, within the limits of its jurisdiction, the full effectiveness of EU law when it determines the dispute before it. That principle requires the referring court to take account of all national law in order to assess the extent to which that law may be applied in such a way that it does not lead to a result contrary to EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 December 2013, Koushkaki, C‑84/12, EU:C:2013:862, paragraphs 75 and 76, and of 24 June 2019, Popławski, C‑573/17, EU:C:2019:530, paragraph 55).