larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Receveur principal des douanes de Roissy Sud and Others v Rohm & Haas Electronic Materials CMP Europe GmbH and Others.
Date: 2012-07-19
31. It must be borne in mind that according to settled case-law, in the interests of legal certainty and for ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and the notes to the sections or chapters (see, in particular, Case C-376/07 Kamino International Logistics  [2009] ECR I-1167, paragraph 31; Joined Cases C-288/09 and C-289/09 British Sky Broadcasting Group and Pace [2011] ECR I-2851, paragraph 60, and Case C-152/10 Unomedical  [2011] ECR I-5433, paragraph 25).
34. However, the CN, in the versions applicable to the main proceedings, does not define the notions of ‘parts’ and ‘accessories’ within the meaning of Chapter 84 thereof. Nonetheless, it is clear from the case-law that the notion of ‘parts’ implies a whole for the operation of which the part is essential and that the notion of ‘accessories’ implies an interchangeable part designed to adapt a machine for a particular operation, or to increase its range of operations, or to perform a particular service relative to the main function of the machine (see, to that effect, Case C-339/98 Peacock  [2000] ECR I-8947, paragraph 21; Case C-267/00 Turbon International  [2002] ECR I-1389, paragraphs 30 and 32; and Unomedical , paragraph 29).
Pie Optiek SPRL v Bureau Gevers SA and European Registry for Internet Domains ASBL.
Date: 2012-07-19
33. The Court has consistently held that the need for a uniform application of European Union law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of European Union law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union; that interpretation must take into account the context of the provision and the objective of the relevant legislation (see, inter alia, Case 327/82 Ekro  [1984] ECR 107, paragraph 11; Case C-287/98 Linster  [2000] ECR I-6917, paragraph 43; and judgment of 22 March 2012 in Case C-190/10 Génesis , paragraph 40).
34. Furthermore, an implementing regulation must, if possible, be given an interpretation consistent with the basic regulation (Case C-90/92 Dr Tretter  [1993] ECR I-3569, paragraph 11, and Case C-32/00 P Commission v Boehringer [2002] ECR I-1917, paragraph 53).
45. In that regard, Article 5(1) and (2) of Directive 89/104 states that that proprietor has exclusive rights by virtue of which he is entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade, that is to say, from putting to some commercial use (see, to that effect, Case C-96/09 P Anheuser-Busch  v Budějovický Budvar [2011] ECR I-2131, paragraph 144), any sign which is identical or similar in relation to certain goods and services and under certain conditions.
46. The Court has already held that that exclusive right was conferred in order to enable the trade mark proprietor to protect his specific interests as proprietor, that is, to ensure that the trade mark can fulfil its function, and that the exercise of that right must therefore be reserved to cases in which a third party’s use of the sign affects, or is liable to affect, the functions of the trade mark. Those functions include not only the essential function of the trade mark, which is to guarantee to consumers the origin of the goods or services, but also its other functions, in particular that of guaranteeing the quality of the goods or services in question and those of communication, investment or advertising (see Case C-487/07 L’Oréal and Others [2009] ECR I-5185, paragraph 58, and Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08 Google France and Google  [2010] ECR I-2417, paragraphs 75 and 77).
48. In the second place, the Court has had occasion, in Case C-533/07 Falco Privatstiftung and Rabitsch [2009] ECR I-3327, to examine the differences between a contract for services and a licence agreement in intellectual property law. It held, in paragraphs 29 and 30 of its judgment in that case, that, whereas the concept of service implies, at the least, that the party who provides the service carries out a particular activity in return for remuneration, it cannot be inferred from a contract under which the owner of an intellectual property right grants its contractual partner the right to use that right in return for remuneration that such an activity is involved.
International Bingo Technology SA v Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Regional de Cataluña (TEARC).
Date: 2012-07-19
25. Next, it must be borne in mind that it is settled case-law that that provision must be interpreted as meaning that the taxable amount for a supply of services is represented by the consideration actually received for that supply (see, inter alia, Case C-126/88 Boots Company  [1990] ECR I-1235, paragraph 19, and Town & County Factors , paragraph 27).
26. The Court has also held that, in the case of gaming machines, which, pursuant to mandatory statutory requirements, pay out as winnings, as in the main proceedings, a fixed percentage of the stakes inserted by players, the consideration actually received by the operator in return for making the machines available consists only of the proportion of the stakes which it can actually take for itself ( Glawe , paragraph 9).
28. Since the portion of the card price which is paid as winnings to players is fixed in advance and is mandatory, it cannot be regarded as forming part of the consideration received by the organiser of the game for the supply of the service provided to players (see, to that effect, Glawe , paragraph 12).
31. In that regard, as is apparent from paragraphs 29 and 30 of the judgment in Town & County Factors , the Court has held that the interpretation which it adopted in its judgment in Glawe  did not apply to a service such as that at issue in the case which gave rise to the judgment in Town & County Factors .  While the gaming machines in question in the case which gave rise to the judgment in Glawe were characterised by the fact that, in accordance with mandatory statutory provisions, they were set in such a way that a certain percentage of the players’ stakes was paid out to them as winnings and those stakes were kept technically and physically separate from the stakes which the operator could actually take for itself, the competition at issue in the case which gave rise to the judgment in Town & County Factors  did not display any of those features, so that the organiser of that type of competition had freely at its disposal the full amount of the entry fees received.
Eurogate Distribution GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt.
Date: 2012-09-06
27. It must be recalled that the customs warehousing procedure allows the storage in a warehouse of non-Community goods with a suspension of import duties on those goods. Those goods, although they are physically on the customs territory of the European Union, are nevertheless regarded as non-Community goods. Entitlement to benefit from such a procedure is linked to compliance with certain obligations which allow the customs authorities to verify the state of the stock at any time, in accordance with Article 529(1) of the Implementing Regulation. Among those obligations, the obligation to keep stock records of goods placed under the customs warehousing procedure, pursuant to Article 105 of the Customs Code, is considered to be an essential obligation connected with that system (Case C-402/10 Groupe Limagrain Holding  [2011] ECR I-10827, paragraphs 33 and 37). Non-fulfilment of the obligation to enter the removal of the goods in the appropriate stock records as soon as possible compromises customs supervision.
28. Moreover, it must be observed that the presence, on the customs territory of the European Union, of non-Community goods carries the risk that those goods will end up forming part of the economic networks of the Member States without having been cleared through customs, a risk which Article 204 of the Customs Code contributes to preventing, as noted by the Commission (see Case C-234/09 DSV Road [2010] ECR I-7333, paragraph 31).
31. In that connection, the Court has held that no provision of the Customs Code or its Implementing Regulation supports the notion that it is necessary, as regards the effect of non-fulfilment of an obligation on the incurrence of a customs debt pursuant to Article 204 of the Customs Code, to distinguish between an obligation which must be carried out before the discharge of the relevant customs procedure and an obligation which must be carried out after such discharge, or between a ‘principal’ and ‘secondary’ obligation (see C-262/10 Döhler Neuenkirchen  [2012] ECR, paragraph 38).
34. In that respect, it must be pointed out that Article 859 of the Implementing Regulation contains a validly constituted and exhaustive set of rules on failures, within the meaning of Article 204(1)(a) of the Customs Code, which ‘have no significant effect on the correct operation of the temporary storage or customs procedure in question’ (C-48/98 Söhl & Söhlke [1999] ECR I-7877, paragraph 43).
Pioneer Hi Bred Italia Srl v Ministero delle Politiche agricole alimentari e forestali.
Date: 2012-09-06
63. Regulation No 1829/2003 states, in recital 1 in the preamble thereto, that the free movement of safe and wholesome food and feed is an essential aspect of the internal market. In accordance with Article 19(5) of that regulation, the authorisation granted in accordance with the procedure referred to therein is valid throughout the European Union.
70. However, a prohibition or restriction on the cultivation of those products may be adopted by a Member State in the situations expressly provided for in European Union law.
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Lucja Czop and Margita Punakova.
Date: 2012-09-06
24. In order to answer those questions, by which the referring court seeks to establish whether such persons are entitled to the income support at issue in the main proceedings, it should be observed that Article 12 of Regulation No 1612/68 confers on the children of a national of a Member State who is or has been employed in the territory of another Member State the right to be admitted to the general educational, apprenticeship and vocational training courses of the latter State under the same conditions as the nationals of that State, if those children are residing in its territory ( Teixeira , paragraph 35).
25. According to case-law, that right of access to education implies that the child of a migrant worker or former migrant worker has a right of residence in order to attend educational courses in the host Member State, and that the parent who is the child’s primary carer has a corresponding right of residence (see Teixeira , paragraph 36).
26. It is also apparent from the case-law that it is sufficient that the child attending educational courses in the host Member State moved there when one of his parents was exercising rights of residence there as a migrant worker. The child’s right of residence in that State in order to attend educational courses there, in accordance with Article 12 of Regulation No 1612/68, and consequently the right of residence of the parent who is the child’s primary carer cannot therefore be subject to the condition that one of the child’s parents was working as a migrant worker in the host Member State on the date on which the child started in education ( Teixeira , paragraph 74).
29. On the other hand, Ms Czop cannot derive a right of residence from the sole fact that she is the primary carer of her son Lukasz Czop, who entered the educational system in the United Kingdom in 2006.
32. Furthermore, it is settled case-law that an interpretation of a provision of European Union law cannot have the result of depriving the clear and precise wording of that provision of all effectiveness (see, to that effect, Case C-220/03 ECB  v Germany  [2005] ECR I-10595, paragraph 31, and Case C-199/05 European Community  [2006] ECR I-10485, paragraph 42).
35. It is settled case-law that periods of residence completed by a national of a non-Member State in the territory of a Member State before the accession of the non-Member State to the European Union must, in the absence of specific provisions in the Act of Accession, be taken into account for the purposes of the acquisition of the right of permanent residence under Article 16(1) of Directive 2004/38, provided that those periods were completed in compliance with the conditions laid down in Article 7(1) of that directive (Joined Cases C-424/10 and C-425/10 Ziolkowski and Szeja  [2011] ECR I-14035, paragraph 63).
Maurice Robert Josse Marie Ghislain Lippens and Others v Hendrikus Cornelis Kortekaas and Others.
Date: 2012-09-06
28. It follows that Regulation No 1206/2001 applies as a general rule only if the court of a Member State decides to take evidence according to one of the two methods provided for by that regulation, in which case it is required to follow the procedures relating to those methods.
29. Next, it must be recalled that, according to recitals 2, 7, 8, 10 and 11 in the preamble to Regulation No 1206/2001, the aim of the regulation is to make the taking of evidence in a cross-border context simple, effective and rapid. The taking, by a court of one Member State, of evidence in another Member State must not lead to the lengthening of national proceedings. That is why Regulation No 1206/2001 established a regime binding on all the Member States, with the exception of the Kingdom of Denmark, to remove obstacles which may arise in that field (see Case C-283/09 Weryński  [2011] ECR I-601, paragraph 62).
33. Finally, the interpretation according to which Regulation No 1206/2001 does not govern exhaustively the taking of cross-border evidence, but simply aims to facilitate it, allowing use of other instruments having the same aim, is supported by Article 21(2) of Regulation No 1206/2001, which expressly authorises agreements or arrangements between Member States to further facilitate the taking of evidence, provided that they are compatible with the regulation.
34. It is true, as the Court held, in paragraph 23 of St. Paul Dairy , that an application to hear a witness in circumstances such as those which gave rise to that case could be used as a means of sidestepping the rules in Regulation No 1206/2001 governing, on the basis of the same guarantees and with the same effects for all individuals, the transmission and handling of applications made by a court of a Member State and seeking to have an inquiry carried out in another Member State.
36. In that connection, it must be observed that the circumstances which gave rise to that judgment were characterised by the fact that the request for a provisional witness hearing, made by one of the parties, was addressed directly to the court of the Member State in which the witness resided, which did not have jurisdiction to hear the substance of the case. Such a request could in fact be used as a means to sidestep the rules of Regulation No 1206/2001, in that it is able to deprive the competent court, to which the request should have been addressed, of the opportunity to hear the witness in accordance with the rules laid down by that regulation. However, the facts of the present case are distinguishable from those in St. Paul Dairy  in so far as the request for a provisional hearing was made to the competent court.
Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej and Republic of Poland v European Commission.
Date: 2012-09-06
23. In that regard, it should be noted, as the General Court correctly held at paragraph 17 of the contested order, that the conception of the lawyer’s role in the legal order of the European Union, which is derived from the legal traditions common to the Member States, and on which Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice is based, is that of collaborating in the administration of justice and of being required to provide, in full independence and in the overriding interests of that cause, such legal assistance as the client needs (see, to that effect, Case 155/79 AM & S Europe v Commission  [1982] ECR 1575, paragraph 24; Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission , paragraph 42; and EREF v Commission , paragraph 52).
24. The requirement of independence of a lawyer implies that there must be no employment relationship between the lawyer and his client (see EREF  v Commission , paragraph 53 and the case-law cited). As the General Court correctly held at paragraph 18 of the contested order, the concept of the independence of lawyers is determined not only positively, that is by reference to professional ethical obligations, but also negatively, that is to say, by the absence of an employment relationship ( Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission , paragraph 45).
48. In that regard, it should be recalled that the obligation to state reasons does not require the General Court to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case and that the reasoning may therefore be implicit on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the General Court has not upheld their arguments and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (Joined Cases C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P FIAMM and Others  v Council and Commission  [2008] ECR I-6513, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited).
Laimonis Treimanis v Valsts ieņēmumu dienests.
Date: 2012-09-06
15. As regards, in the first place, the duty-free importation, Regulation No 918/83 lays down conditions in relation to (i) the importer and (ii) the nature of the property imported.
16. As regards the importer, Article 2 of the regulation provides that, in order to be admitted free of import duties, the property must be imported by a natural person transferring his normal place of residence to the customs territory of the European Union.
22. Article 1 of Regulation No 918/83 does not define what is meant by ‘property intended … for meeting … household needs’. In that connection, it follows from the need for the uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purposes of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (Case 327/82 Ekro  [1984] ECR 107, paragraph 11; Case C-287/98 Linster [2000] ECR I-6917, paragraph 43; and Case C-170/03 Feron  [2005] ECR I-2299, paragraph 26).
24. For the purposes of that interpretation, it is appropriate to recall the objectives pursued by the EU legislature when Regulation No 918/83 was adopted. Those objectives are to make it easier to establish a new residence in the Member State and to facilitate the work of the customs authorities of the Member States.
27. Lastly, the Court has held that, under the relevant provisions of Regulation No 918/83, imports which consist exclusively of goods for the personal use of travellers or their families are to be regarded as imports of a non-commercial nature (Case C-99/00 Lyckeskog  [2002] ECR I-4839, paragraph 25). Similarly, under Article 1(2)(c) of Regulation No 918/83, what is really essential is that the personal property is not such as might indicate, by its nature or quantity, that it is being imported for commercial reasons ( Feron , paragraph 20).
Lowlands Design Holding BV v Minister van Financiën.
Date: 2012-09-06
23. In that regard, it is appropriate to bear in mind settled case-law, according to which, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, inter alia, Case C-339/98 Peacock  [2000] ECR I-8947, paragraph 9, and Case C-196/10 Paderborner Brauerei Haus Cramer  [2011] ECR I-6201, paragraph 31).
33. It must be borne in mind that the content of the Explanatory Notes to the CN, which do not take the place of those of the HS but should be regarded as complementary to them, and consulted jointly with them, must be consistent with the provisions of the CN and may not alter their scope (Joined Cases C-288/09 and C-289/09 British Sky Broadcasting Group and Pace  [2011] ECR I-2851, paragraph 64).
Cimade and Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigrés (GISTI) v Ministre de l’Intérieur, de l’Outre-mer, des Collectivités territoriales et de l’Immigration.
Date: 2012-09-27
39. Regarding the period during which the material reception conditions, that is to say, housing, food and clothing plus a daily expenses allowance, must be granted to the applicants, Article 13(1) of Directive 2003/9 provides that that period is to begin when the asylum seeker applies for asylum.
40. Furthermore, it follows from Articles 2 and 3 of Directive 2003/9 that the directive provides for only one category of asylum seekers, comprising all third-country nationals or stateless persons who make an application for asylum. No provision can be found in the directive such as to suggest that an application for asylum can be regarded as having been lodged only it if is submitted to the authorities of the Member State responsible for the examination of that application.
42. The provisions of Directive 2003/9 must also be interpreted in the light of the general scheme and purpose of the directive and, in accordance with recital 5 in the preamble to that directive, while respecting the fundamental rights and observing the principles recognised in particular by the Charter. According to that recital, the directive aims in particular to ensure full respect for human dignity and to promote the application of Articles 1 and 18 of the Charter.
43. Thus, those requirements apply not only with regard to asylum seekers present in the territory of the Member State responsible pending that State’s decision on their application for asylum but also to asylum seekers awaiting a decision on which Member State will be held responsible for their application.
53. Second, in accordance with Articles 2(c) of Directive 2003/9 and 2(d) of Regulation No 343/2003, an applicant or an asylum seeker is defined as a third-country national or a stateless person who has made an application for asylum in respect of which a final decision has not yet been taken. The applicant thus retains his status as asylum seeker within the meaning of that directive as long as no final decision has been taken.