Siegfried Pohl v ÖBB Infrastruktur AG.
Date: 2014-01-16
23. It is settled case-law that, in the absence of European Union rules in the field, it is for the national legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from European Union law, provided that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar national actions (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by European Union law (principle of effectiveness) (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑89/10 and C‑96/10 Q‑Beef and Bosschaert [2011] ECR I‑7819, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
26. In relation to the principle of equivalence, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, this requires that all the rules applicable to actions apply without distinction to actions alleging infringement of European Union law and to similar actions alleging infringement of national law (Case C‑542/08 Barth  [2010] ECR I‑3189, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
29. As regards the principle of effectiveness, the Court has stated that it is compatible with European Union law to lay down reasonable time-limits for bringing proceedings in the interests of legal certainty to the extent that such time-limits are not liable to make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by European Union law (see, to that effect, Barth , paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
30. With regard to the question whether the respective dates of delivery of the above judgments in Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund  and Hütter  affect the starting point of a limitation period fixed by national law, it should be noted that the interpretation which, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 267 TFEU, the Court gives to a rule of European Union law clarifies and defines, where required, the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be, or ought to have been, understood and applied from the time of its entry into force. In other words, a preliminary ruling does not create or alter the law, but is purely declaratory, with the consequence that in principle it takes effect from the date on which the rule interpreted entered into force (Case C‑2/06 Kempter  [2008] ECR I‑411, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
31. So far as concerns the starting point of the limitation period, the Court has pointed out that this, in principle, is a matter for national law and that the fact that the Court may have ruled that the breach of European Union law has occurred generally does not affect the point at which that period starts to run (see, to that effect, Q‑Beef and Bosschaert , paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
32. Consequently, the respective dates of delivery of the above judgments in Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund  and Hütter do not affect the starting point of the limitation period at issue in the case in the main proceedings and are therefore irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether, in the main proceedings, the principle of effectiveness has been respected.