European Commission v Peter McBride and Others.
Date: 2016-06-14
35


In the first place, as regards the Commission’s argument concerning its obligation under Article 266 TFEU, it should be recalled that, under that article, the institution whose act has been declared void is required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment annulling that act. The Court has held in this regard that, in order to comply with such a judgment and to implement it fully, the institution concerned is required to have regard not only to the operative part of that judgment but also to the grounds which led to the judgment and constitute the essential basis for it, in so far as they are necessary to determine the exact meaning of what is stated in the operative part (judgment of 26 April 1988 in Asteris and Others v Commission, 97/86, 99/86, 193/86 and 215/86, EU:C:1988:199, paragraph 27).
40


In the second place, as regards the Commission’s argument concerning the application of the case-law established in the judgments of 25 October 2007 in SP and Others v Commission (T‑27/03, T‑46/03, T‑58/03, T‑79/03, T‑80/03, T‑97/03 and T‑98/03, EU:T:2007:317) and 29 March 2011 in ArcelorMittal Luxembourg v Commission and Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg and Others (C‑201/09 P and C‑216/09 P, EU:C:2011:190), it follows from that case-law that, although it is necessary — in order to comply with the principles governing the temporal application of the law and because of the requirements relating to the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations — to apply the substantive rules in force at the date of the facts in issue even if those rules are no longer in force when an EU institution adopts an act, the provision which forms the legal basis of an act and empowers the EU institution to adopt the act in question must, by contrast, be in force when the act is adopted. Similarly, the procedure for adopting that act must be carried out in accordance with the rules in force at the time of adoption.
47


The General Court, referring to the judgments of 26 March 1987 in Commission v Council (45/86, EU:C:1987:163) and 1 October 2009 in Commission v Council (C‑370/07, EU:C:2009:590), correctly stated, at paragraph 26 of the judgment under appeal, that the requirement for legal certainty means that the binding nature of any act intended to have legal effects must be derived from a provision of EU law which prescribes the legal form to be taken by that act and which must be expressly indicated therein as its legal basis.
48


Whilst it is true that failure to refer to a specific provision of the Treaty need not necessarily constitute an infringement of essential procedural requirements if the legal basis for an act may be determined from other parts of the act, such explicit reference is, however, indispensable where, in its absence, the parties concerned and the Court are left uncertain as to the specific legal basis (judgments of 26 March 1987 in Commission v Council, 45/86, EU:C:1987:163, paragraph 9, and 1 October 2009 in Commission v Council, C‑370/07, EU:C:2009:590, paragraph 56).
55


In the fifth place, as regards the Commission’s argument that the judgment under appeal undermines the principle of legal certainty, it is settled case-law that a decision which has not been challenged by its addressee within the period prescribed by Article 263 TFEU becomes definitive as against him (see to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 17 November 1965 in Collotti v Court of Justice, 20/65, EU:C:1965:115, and 9 March 1994 in TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf, C‑188/92, EU:C:1994:90, paragraph 13).
61


In the first place, as regards the Commission’s argument that the General Court breached its duty to state reasons, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the General Court’s duty, under Article 36 and the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, to state reasons for its judgments does not require it to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the measures in question were taken and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (judgment of 29 March 2011 in ArcelorMittal Luxembourg v Commission and Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg and Others, C‑201/09 P and C‑216/09 P, EU:C:2011:190, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).