TC.
Date: 2019-02-12
30


In the second place, as regards the criterion relating to urgency, it is necessary, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, to take into account the fact that the person concerned was deprived of his liberty and that the question as to whether he may continue to be held in custody depends on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings. In addition, the situation of the person concerned must be assessed as it stands at the time when consideration is given to the request that the reference be dealt with under the urgent procedure (judgment of 19 September 2018, RO, C‑327/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:733, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
37


According to the settled case-law of the Court, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU, which provides for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may, where necessary, have to reformulate the questions referred to it. The fact that a national court has, formally speaking, worded a question referred for a preliminary ruling with reference to certain provisions of EU law does not prevent the Court from providing the national court with all the points of interpretation which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to them in its questions. In that regard, it is for the Court of Justice to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision referring the questions, the points of EU law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of the dispute (judgment of 27 June 2017, Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania, C‑74/16, EU:C:2017:496, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
40


In that regard, in the first, place, it should be noted that the purpose of Framework Decision 2002/584, as is apparent in particular from Article 1(1) and (2), read in the light of recitals 5 and 7 thereof, is to replace the multilateral system of extradition based on the European Convention on Extradition, signed in Paris on 13 December 1957, with a system of surrender between judicial authorities of convicted or suspected persons for the purpose of enforcing judgments or of conducting prosecutions, the system of surrender being based on the principle of mutual recognition (judgment of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice), C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
41


Framework Decision 2002/584 thus seeks, by the establishment of a new simplified and more effective system for the surrender of persons convicted or suspected of having infringed criminal law, to facilitate and accelerate judicial cooperation with a view to contributing to the attainment of the objective set for the European Union of becoming an area of freedom, security and justice, and has as its basis the high level of trust which must exist between the Member States (judgment of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice), C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
42


That objective of accelerating judicial cooperation is present, inter alia, in the time limits for adopting decisions relating to a European arrest warrant. In that regard, as is apparent from the case-law of the Court, Articles 15 and 17 of Framework Decision 2002/584 must be interpreted as requiring the final decision on the execution of the European arrest warrant to be taken, in principle, within those time limits, the importance of which is, moreover, expressed in a number of provisions of that framework decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraphs 29 and 32 and the case-law cited).
43


However, the assessment, by the executing judicial authority that must decide on the surrender of the person in respect of whom the European arrest warrant has been issued, as to whether there is a real risk that that person will, if surrendered to the issuing judicial authority, suffer inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, or a breach of his fundamental right to an independent tribunal and, therefore, of the essence of his fundamental right to a fair trial, a right guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, in accordance with Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584 (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraphs 83 and 88 and the case-law cited, and of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice), C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, paragraphs 59 and 60 and the case-law cited), may result in the surrender procedure lasting more than 90 days, as the referring court rightly points out. That might also be the case as regards the additional time involved when proceedings are stayed pending a decision of the Court of Justice in response to a request for a preliminary ruling made by an executing judicial authority, on the basis of Article 267 TFEU.
45


However, it should be noted that that article does not provide, in a general manner, that the holding of the requested person in custody is envisageable only within the temporal limits specified nor, in particular, that such a possibility is to be ruled out after expiry of the time limits stipulated in Article 17 of that framework decision (judgment of 16 July 2015, Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 44).
46


Similarly, although Article 12 of Framework Decision 2002/584 allows for the possibility, under certain conditions, of the person arrested on the basis of a European arrest warrant being provisionally released, neither that provision nor any other provision of that framework decision provides that, following the expiry of the time limits stipulated in Article 17 of the framework decision, the executing judicial authority is required to release that person provisionally or, a fortiori, to release him purely and simply (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraphs 45 and 46).
47


Indeed, given that the execution procedure for the European arrest warrant must continue also after expiry of the time limits stipulated in Article 17 of Framework Decision 2002/584, a general and unconditional obligation to release the requested person provisionally or, a fortiori, to release that person purely and simply upon expiry of those time limits or where the total duration of the period that the person has spent in custody exceeds those time limits could limit the effectiveness of the surrender system put in place by that framework decision and, consequently, obstruct the attainment of the objectives pursued by it (judgment of 16 July 2015, Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 50).
48


Consequently, if the executing judicial authority decides to bring the requested person’s detention to an end, it is then required, pursuant to Article 12 and Article 17(5) of Framework Decision 2002/584, to attach to the provisional release of that person any measures it deems necessary so as to prevent him from absconding and to ensure that the material conditions necessary for his effective surrender remain fulfilled for as long as no final decision on the execution of the European arrest warrant has been taken (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 61).
54


In the fourth place, it must be recalled that Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584 expressly provides that the decision is not to have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 EU and reflected in the Charter, an obligation which moreover concerns all the Member States, in particular both the issuing and the executing Member States (judgment of 16 July 2015, Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).
55


Article 12 of that framework decision must, therefore, be interpreted in conformity with Article 6 of the Charter, which provides that everyone has the right to liberty and security of person (judgment of 16 July 2015, Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 54).
56


It should be recalled in that regard that Article 52(1) of the Charter accepts that limitations may be imposed on the exercise of that right, as long as the limitations are provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and, subject to the principle of proportionality, are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others (judgments of 16 July 2015, Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited, and of 15 March 2017, Al Chodor, C‑528/15, EU:C:2017:213, paragraph 37).
57


In so far as the Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, Article 52(3) of the Charter seeks to ensure the necessary consistency between the rights contained in it and the corresponding rights guaranteed by the ECHR, without thereby adversely affecting the autonomy of EU law and that of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Account must therefore be taken of Article 5(1) ECHR for the purpose of interpreting Article 6 of the Charter, as the minimum threshold of protection (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 March 2017, Al Chodor, C‑528/15, EU:C:2017:213, paragraph 37, and of 14 September 2017, K., C‑18/16, EU:C:2017:680, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
58


It is clear from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating to Article 5 ECHR that the fact that any deprivation of liberty must be lawful means not only that it must have a basis in national law, but also that that law must be sufficiently accessible, precise and predictable in its application in order to avoid all risk of arbitrariness (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 March 2017, Al Chodor, C‑528/15, EU:C:2017:213, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
59


Furthermore, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice in that regard, it must be noted that the objective of the safeguards relating to liberty, such as those enshrined in both Article 6 of the Charter and Article 5 ECHR, consists in particular in the protection of the individual against arbitrariness. Thus, if the execution of a measure depriving a person of liberty is to be in keeping with the objective of protecting the individual from arbitrariness, this means, in particular, that there can be no element of bad faith or deception on the part of the authorities (judgment of 15 March 2017, Al Chodor, C‑528/15, EU:C:2017:213, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
60


It follows from the foregoing that, since keeping a requested person in detention for more than 90 days represents a serious interference with that person’s right to liberty, it is subject to compliance with strict safeguards, namely the existence of a legal basis which justifies that continued detention and which must meet the requirements of clarity, predictability and accessibility in order to avoid any risk of arbitrariness, as paragraph 58 of the present judgment makes clear (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 March 2017, Al Chodor, C‑528/15, EU:C:2017:213, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
67


In that regard, it is clear from the Court’s settled case-law that the binding character of a framework decision places on national authorities, including national courts, an obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law. When those courts apply domestic law, they are therefore bound to interpret it, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the framework decision concerned in order to achieve the result sought by it. This obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law is inherent in the system of the FEU Treaty, since it permits national courts, for the matters within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law when they rule on the disputes before them (judgment of 29 June 2017, Popławski, C‑579/15, EU:C:2017:503, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
68


In particular, the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law requires national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by it, with a view to ensuring that the framework decision in question is fully effective and to achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (judgment of 29 June 2017, Popławski, C‑579/15, EU:C:2017:503, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).