larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
M. S. v P. S.
Date: 2017-02-09
33


The Court has stated, in that regard, that the objective of Regulation No 4/2009 is to facilitate as far as possible the recovery of international maintenance claims (judgment of 18 December 2014, Sanders and Huber, C‑400/13 and C‑408/13, EU:C:2014:2461, paragraph 41).
48


The direct application of a regulation means that its entry into force and its application in favour of or against those subject to it are independent of any measure of reception into national law, unless the regulation in question leaves it to the Member States themselves to adopt the necessary legislative, regulatory, administrative and financial measures to ensure the effective application of the provisions of that regulation (judgment of 14 June 2012, C‑606/10, Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers, C‑606/10, EU:C:2012:384, paragraph 72).
50


In any event, it is the Court’s well-established case-law that a national court which is called upon, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of EU law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national law, even if adopted subsequently, and it is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior setting-aside of such provision by legislative or other constitutional means (see inter alia, to that effect, judgments of 9 March 1978, Simmenthal, 106/77, EU:C:1978:49, paragraphs 21 and 24; of 22 June 2010, Melki and Abdeli, C‑188/10 and C‑189/10, EU:C:2010:363, paragraph 43, and of 4 June 2015, Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems, C‑5/14, EU:C:2015:354, paragraph 32).
IOS Finance EFC SA v Servicio Murciano de Salud.
Date: 2017-02-16
21


According to established case-law, it is not for the Court, in the context of a request for a preliminary ruling, to rule on the interpretation of national provisions or to decide whether the referring court’s interpretation of such provisions is correct. The national courts alone are competent to decide on the interpretation of domestic law (judgment of 27 October 2016, Audace and Others, C‑114/15, EU:C:2016:813, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).
24


In order to answer those questions, it must be noted that, in accordance with Article 1(1) of Directive 2011/7, the aim of that directive is to combat late payment in commercial transactions, that delay constituting, according to recital 12 of that directive, a breach of contract which has been made financially attractive to debtors because, inter alia, low or no interest is charged on late payments.
25


In order to achieve that aim, Directive 2011/7 does not, however, harmonise fully all of the rules relating to late payments in commercial transactions (see, by analogy with Directive 2000/35, judgment of 15 December 2016, Nemec, C‑256/15, EU:C:2016:954, paragraph 46 and case-law cited).
Elisabeth Schmitt v TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH.
Date: 2017-02-16
50


It should be observed that the Court has previously held, on the basis of, inter alia, the third and fifth recitals of Directive 93/42, that the aim of the directive is not only the protection of health stricto sensu, but also the safety of persons and that it does not concern only patients and users of medical devices but, more generally, ‘third parties’ or ‘other persons’ (judgment of 19 November 2009, Nordiska Dental, C‑288/08, EU:C:2009:718, paragraph 29). It follows that the actual aim of that directive is to protect the end users of medical devices.
55


It should be noted at the outset that the Court has previously stated that it does not necessarily follow from the fact that a directive imposes surveillance obligations on certain bodies or the fact that one of the objectives of the directive is to protect injured parties that the directive seeks to confer rights on such parties in the event that those bodies fail to fulfil their obligations, and that is the case especially if the directive does not contain any express rule granting such rights (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 October 2004, Paul and Others, C‑222/02, EU:C:2004:606, paragraphs 38 to 40).
58


It is established case-law that the system of rules put in place by Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products (OJ 1985 L 210, p. 29) does not preclude the application of other systems of contractual or non-contractual liability based on other grounds, such as fault (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 January 2006, Skov and Bilka, C‑402/03, EU:C:2006:6, paragraph 47).
ITV Broadcasting Limited and Others v TVCatchup Limited and Others.
Date: 2017-03-01
18


In this connection, it should be noted that, in the absence of any express reference to the laws of the Member States, the concept of ‘access to cable of broadcasting services’, in Article 9 of Directive 2001/29, must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union which takes into account the wording of that provision, its context and the objectives of the legislation of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 October 2010, Padawan, C‑467/08, EU:C:2010:620, paragraph 32, and of 10 November 2016, Private Equity Insurance Group, C‑156/15, EU:C:2016:851, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
22


In the third place, as regards the objective of Directive 2001/29, the principal objective of that directive is to establish a high level of protection of authors, allowing them to obtain an appropriate reward for the use of their works, including on the occasion of communication to the public (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2011, Football Association Premier League and Others, C‑403/08 and C‑429/08, EU:C:2011:631, paragraph 186).
23


Having regard to that high level of protection of authors, the Court — ruling on a question referred in the action at first instance from which the main proceedings have arisen — held that the concept of ‘communication to the public’ in Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted broadly, as recital 23 of that directive expressly states, and that a retransmission by means of an internet stream, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, constitutes such a communication (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 March 2013, ITV Broadcasting and Others, C‑607/11, EU:C:2013:147, paragraphs 20 and 40).
SC Casa Noastră SA v Ministerul Transporturilor - Inspectoratul de Stat pentru Controlul în Transportul Rutier ISCTR.
Date: 2017-03-02
28


In that regard it is necessary to bear in mind that, according to recital 17 and Article 1 of Regulation No 561/2006, that regulation seeks to harmonise the conditions of competition between inland transport modes, especially with regard to the road sector, and to improve the working conditions of employees in that sector and road safety, those objectives meaning in particular that, in principle, road transport vehicles must be equipped with an approved tachograph enabling compliance with driving times and drivers’ rest periods to be monitored (see, inter alia, Lundberg, C‑317/12, EU:C:2013:631, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited, and of 19 October 2016, EL-EM-2001, C‑501/14, EU:C:2016:777, paragraph 21).
31


In that regard, the Court has pointed out that Article 2(1) provides for two categories of such services by distinguishing between regular and special regular services. The former are open to all and provide for the carriage of passengers at specified intervals along specified routes, passengers being taken up and set down at predetermined stopping points. The latter are provided under the same conditions, but only for specified categories of passengers (judgment of 30 April 1998, Clarke & Sons and Ferne, C‑47/97, EU:C:1998:185, paragraph 16), namely for the carriage of ‘workers between home and work’, carriage ‘to and from the educational institution’ for school pupils and students, and the carriage of soldiers and their families ‘between their state of origin and the area of their barracks’.
Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs Frankfurt am Main eV v comtech GmbH.
Date: 2017-03-02
19


In those circumstances, the meaning and scope of that concept must be determined by considering its usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which it occurs and the purposes of the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 October 2016, TMD, C‑412/15, EU:C:2016:738, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
24


In addition, it appears from several articles in Directive 2011/83 that, in principle, it is not for the consumer to bear charges other than ordinary charges if he exercises rights provided for by that directive, and that potential additional costs are therefore to be borne by the trader.
25


Thus, Article 19 of that directive provides, in respect of the use of a given means of payment, that ‘Member States shall prohibit traders from charging consumers … fees that exceed the cost borne by the trader for the use of such means.’
26


Article 13(1) of the directive provides, in turn, that, where the consumer exercises his right of withdrawal, all payments made by the consumer, including the costs of delivery, are to be reimbursed to him by the trader. The Court has previously held, with regard to the right of withdrawal as provided for in Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts (OJ 1997 L 144, p. 19), which preceded Directive 2011/83, that, in principle, in the case of withdrawal by a consumer within the withdrawal period, the seller may not claim compensation from the consumer for the value of the use of the consumer goods acquired under a distance contract (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2009, Messner, C‑489/07, EU:C:2009:502, paragraph 29). In addition, a trader is not permitted to charge the costs of delivering the goods to the consumer where the latter exercises his right of withdrawal (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 April 2010, Heinrich Heine, C‑511/08, EU:C:2010:189, paragraph 59).
28


As the Advocate General stated in paragraph 32 of his Opinion, such an interpretation also mirrors the aim pursued by Directive 2011/83 of achieving a high level of consumer protection, as referred to in recitals 3 to 5 and 7 and in Article 1 of that directive. In addition, consumer protection is enshrined in EU policies by Article 169 TFEU and Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
J. D. v Prezes Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki.
Date: 2017-03-02
23


According to the Court’s settled case-law, the need for a uniform application of European Union law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of European Union law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (judgment of 21 December 2011, Ziolkowski and Szeja, C‑424/10 and C‑425/10, EU:C:2011:866, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
25


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the meaning and scope of terms for which European Union law provides no definition must be determined by considering, inter alia, the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they form part (judgment of 21 December 2011, Ziolkowski and Szeja, C‑424/10 and C‑425/10, EU:C:2011:866, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
José María Pérez Retamero v TNT Express Worldwide Spain SL and Others.
Date: 2017-03-02
20


According to settled case-law, the procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU is a means of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts. It follows that it is for the national courts alone which are seised of the case and are responsible for the judgment to be delivered to determine, in view of the special features of each case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to give their judgment and the relevance of the questions which they put to the Court (see, inter alia, judgments of 17 July 1997, Leur-Bloem, C‑28/95, EU:C:1997:369 paragraph 24, and of 7 July 2011, Agafiţei and Others, C‑310/10, EU:C:2011:467, paragraph 25).
21


Consequently, where questions submitted by national courts concern the interpretation of a provision of European Union law, the Court is, in principle, obliged to give a ruling (see, inter alia, judgments of 17 July 1997, Leur-Bloem, C‑28/95, EU:C:1997:369 paragraph 25, and of 7 July 2011, Agafiţei and Others, C‑310/10, EU:C:2011:467, paragraph 26).
22


Nevertheless, the Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to enable it to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, judgments of 11 July 2006, Chacón Navas, C‑13/05, EU:C:2006:456, paragraph 33, and of 7 July 2011, Agafiţei and Others, C‑310/10, EU:C:2011:467, paragraph 27).
23


It is therefore apparent from settled case-law that a reference by a national court can be rejected if, inter alia, it is obvious that European Union law cannot be applied, either directly or indirectly, to the circumstances of the case (judgment of 7 July 2011, Agafiţei and Others, C‑310/10, EU:C:2011:467, paragraph 28).
X and X v État belge.
Date: 2017-03-07
37


As to whether that code applies to applications, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, that are intended to enable third-country nationals to lodge applications for asylum on the territory of a Member State, that question is inextricably linked to the answers to be given to the present request for a preliminary ruling. In those circumstances, the Court has jurisdiction to answer that request (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2015, Wojciechowski, C‑408/14, EU:C:2015:591, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
39


It should be recalled at the outset that the Court has consistently held that the fact that a question submitted by the referring court refers only to certain provisions of EU law does not mean that the Court may not provide the national court with all the guidance on points of interpretation that may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to those points in its questions. It is, in this regard, for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the referring court, in particular from the grounds of the decision to make the reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject matter of the dispute (see, inter alia, judgment of 12 February 2015, Oil Trading Poland, C‑349/13, EU:C:2015:84, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
41


As set out in Article 1 of the Visa Code, the objective thereof is to establish the procedures and conditions for issuing visas for transit through or intended stays on the territory of the Member States not exceeding 90 days in any 180-day period. In Article 2(2)(a) and (b) of the code the concept of ‘visa’ is defined, for the purpose of the code, as meaning ‘an authorisation issued by a Member State’ with a view, respectively, to ‘transit through or an intended stay on the territory of the Member States for a duration of no more than 90 days in any 180‑day period’ and to ‘transit through the international transit areas of airports of the Member States’.
44


In addition, since, as noted by the Belgian Government and the European Commission in their written observations, no measure has been adopted, to date, by the EU legislature on the basis of Article 79(2)(a) TFEU, with regard to the conditions governing the issue by Member States of long-term visas and residence permits to third-country nationals on humanitarian grounds, the applications at issue in the main proceedings fall solely within the scope of national law.
45


Since the situation at issue in the main proceedings is not, therefore, governed by EU law, the provisions of the Charter, in particular, Articles 4 and 18 thereof, referred to in the questions of the referring court, do not apply to it (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 19, and of 27 March 2014, Torralbo Marcos, C‑265/13, EU:C:2014:187, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
ArcelorMittal Rodange et Schifflange SA v État du Grand-duché de Luxembourg.
Date: 2017-03-08
22


So far as concerns the first part of the question referred, it must be noted at the outset that there is an economic logic underlying the allowance trading scheme established by Directive 2003/87, which encourages a participant in that scheme to emit quantities of greenhouse gases that are less than the allowances originally allocated him, in order to sell the surplus to another participant who has emitted more than his allowance (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 2008, Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others, C‑127/07, EU:C:2008:728, paragraph 32).
24


The Court has held in this connection that the overall scheme of Directive 2003/87 is based on the strict accounting of the issue, holding, transfer and cancellation of allowances, the framework for which is provided for by Article 19 thereof. That accurate accounting is inherent in the very purpose of the directive, consisting in the establishment of a Community scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading, which aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere to a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, with the ultimate objective of protection of the environment (judgment of 17 October 2013, Billerud Karlsborg and Billerud Skärblacka, C‑203/12, EU:C:2013:664, paragraph 27).
27


Lastly, it is important to point out that in setting out their NAPs, the Member States have a certain margin for manoeuvre (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 March 2012, Commission v Estonia, C‑505/09 P, EU:C:2012:179, paragraphs 51 to 53). At the end of the procedure under Article 9 of Directive 2003/87, an NAP enjoys a presumption of legality, since, after the three-month time limit laid down in Article 9(3) has expired, it is regarded as definitive where the Commission makes no observations, so that the Member State concerned may adopt it (judgment of 3 October 2013, Commission v Latvia, C‑267/11 P, EU:C:2013:624, paragraph 46).
Ibrica Zulfikarpašić v Slaven Gajer.
Date: 2017-03-09
32


As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the wording of a provision of EU law which does not expressly refer to the law of Member States in order for its meaning and scope to be determined must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union; that interpretation must take into account the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the relevant legislation (see judgment of 13 October 2016, Mikołajczyk, C‑294/15, EU:C:2016:772, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
35


It should also be noted that, unlike, for example, Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession (OJ 2012 L 201, p. 107), whose Article 3(2) specifies that the term ‘court’, for the purposes of that regulation, encompasses not only the judicial authorities, but also any authority competent in that area which exercises judicial functions and which satisfies certain conditions listed in that provision, Regulation No 805/2004 does not include any general provision having such an effect.
39


According to recital 10 of that regulation, that objective cannot, however, be attained by undermining in any way the rights of the defence (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 December 2006, ASML, C‑283/05, EU:C:2006:787, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
41


The principle of mutual trust between the Member States is, in EU law, of fundamental importance given that it allows an area without internal borders to be created and maintained, founded on the high level of confidence which should exist between the Member States (judgment of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraph 78).
48


Article 16 of that regulation, read in the light of recital 12 thereof, provides for the communication of ‘due’ information to the debtor in order to enable him to arrange for his defence and thus ensure the inter partes nature of the proceedings leading to the issuing of the enforcement order capable of giving rise to a certificate. Those minimum standards reflect the EU legislature’s intention to ensure that proceedings leading to the adoption of judgments on uncontested claims offer adequate guarantees of respect for the rights of the defence (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 June 2016, Pebros Servizi, C‑511/14, EU:C:2016:448, paragraph 44).
Ellinikos Chrysos AE Metalleion kai Viomichanias Chrysou v European Commission.
Date: 2017-03-09
18


In that regard, first, it is settled case-law that the Commission must make complex economic assessments when assessing the value of aid within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 September 2010, Commission v Scott, C‑290/07 P, EU:C:2010:480, paragraph 68).
19


In those circumstances, the review by the EU judicature of such a process is necessarily restricted. It is limited to determining whether the rules governing procedure and the requirement for a statement of reasons have been complied with, whether the facts are accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of assessment or any misuse of powers (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 October 2016, Land Hessen v Pollmeier Massivholz, C‑242/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:765, paragraph 28).
20


In particular, it is not for the EU judicature, in the context of that review, to substitute its own economic assessment for that of the Commission (judgment of 24 October 2013, Land Burgenland and Others v Commission, C‑214/12 P, C‑215/12 P and C-223/12 P, EU:C:2013:682, paragraph 78).
21


Second, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with Article 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal lies on points of law only. The General Court thus has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence. The appraisal of the facts and the assessment of the evidence thus do not, save where the facts and evidence have been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (judgment of 26 January 2017, Masco and Others v Commission, C‑614/13 P, EU:C:2017:63, paragraph 35).