larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Lopex Export GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas.
Date: 1998-01-29
19 According to the third recital in the preamble to that regulation, it appeared necessary, in order to ensure a measure of legal certainty for traders when carrying on their activities, to facilitate the work of the customs services themselves and secure more uniform application of Community customs law, to establish rules which oblige customs authorities to provide information which is binding on the administration under certain well-defined conditions.
28 As the Council and the Commission were right to point out, the aim of binding tariff information is to enable the trader to proceed with certainty where there are doubts as to the classification of goods in the existing customs nomenclature, thereby protecting him against any subsequent change in the position adopted by the customs authorities with regard to the classification of the goods. However, such information is not aimed at, nor can it have the effect of, guaranteeing that the tariff heading to which the trader refers will not subsequently be amended by a measure adopted by the Community legislature. That interpretation is confirmed clearly and precisely by the wording of the first indent of the first paragraph of Article 13 of Regulation No 1715/90.
29 Accordingly, not only is the provision in question in keeping with the requirements inherent in the principle of legal certainty, as set out in the judgment in Case 169/80 Administration des Douanes v Gondrand Frères [1981] ECR 1931, paragraph 17, but it also precludes a trader such as Lopex from being able to entertain, on the sole basis of binding tariff information, a legitimate expectation that the tariff heading in question will not be amended by a measure adopted by the Community legislature.
Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau v Prolacto NV.
Date: 1998-01-29
65 Accordingly, the loss of the security lodged constitutes a penalty where, on the expiry of a period that Regulation No 1354/83 sets at three months, it is clear that, despite the deterrent effect of Article 26(5), the successful tenderer has definitively failed to fulfil his obligation to supply the goods in question and that that failure cannot be explained by force majeure or attributed to the recipient of the food aid.
Commission of the European Communities v NTN Corporation and Koyo Seiko Co. Ltd. and Council of the European Union
Date: 1998-02-10
38 Under Article 7(1)(c) of the basic regulation, the investigation is to cover both dumping and injury resulting therefrom.  The existence of sufficient evidence of dumping and the injury resulting therefrom is always a prerequisite for the opening of an investigation, within the meaning of Article 7, whether at the initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding or in the course of a review of a regulation imposing anti-dumping duties (see Case C-216/91 Rima Eletrometalurgia v Council, cited above, paragraph 16).
40 In that connection, it should be noted that in the contested judgment the Court of First Instance merely applied, without indeed citing it, the Court's case-law where the Court, in similar circumstances, examined the conditions under which the Council, in the course of a review, had substituted price undertakings for anti-dumping duties in order to verify whether that substitution was based on a correct determination of injury in accordance with the criteria set out in Article 4(2) of the basic regulation then applicable (see Joined Cases C-305/86 and C-160/87 Neotype Techmashexport v Commission and Council [1990] ECR I-2945, paragraph 50, and Case C-323/88 Sermes [1990] ECR I-3027, paragraph 27).
43 It follows that the Court of First Instance was also correct in holding, at paragraphs 98 and 99 of the contested judgment, that the Council had committed an error of law in taking account of the recession in the industry when Article 4(1) of the basic regulation does not allow this. That provision states: `Injuries caused by other factors, such as ... contraction in demand, which ... also adversely affect the Community industry must not be attributed to the dumped or subsidised imports'.
Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1998-02-10
32 It must therefore be held that the adoption of the opinion of the Standing Committee on Construction, without regard to the obligation to send the draft document to its two separate addressees within the time-limit laid down and without the vote having been postponed despite the request made by a Member State, is vitiated by infringement of essential procedural requirements, with the result that the contested decision is void.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 1998-02-12
27 The first point to note is that, according to Article 4(1) of the directive, Member States are to take all necessary measures to ensure that the quality of bathing water conforms to the limit values set in accordance with Article 3.
28 Furthermore, the only derogations from the obligation laid down in Article 4(1) of the directive are those provided for in Articles 4(3), 5(2) and 8, whose provisions are summarised above.  It follows that the directive requires the Member States to take steps to ensure that certain results are attained, and that, apart from those derogations, they cannot rely on particular circumstances to justify a failure to fulfil that obligation (see, to that effect, Case C-56/90 Commission v United Kingdom [1993] ECR I-4109, paragraph 43).
31 However, Article 5(2) of the directive constitutes an exception to the obligation to achieve the result set out by the directive and must, therefore, as the Commission was right to point out, be strictly interpreted.  In particular, the weather conditions relied upon must be abnormal and the deviations from the values set must be the result of such conditions.
Criminal proceedings against Silvano Raso and Others.
Date: 1998-02-12
23 The first point to note is that an undertaking with a monopoly in the supply of labour to other undertakings authorised to carry out dock work is an undertaking which has been granted exclusive rights by the State within the meaning of Article 90(1) of the Treaty (see Case C-179/90, cited above, paragraph 9).
25 It is settled law that an undertaking having a statutory monopoly in a substantial part of the common market may be regarded as having a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty (Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v Macrotron [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraph 28; Case C-260/89 ERT v DRP [1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 31, and Case C-179/90, paragraph 14).
26 As regards the definition of the market in question, it appears from the order for reference that it is that of the organisation on behalf of third persons of dock work relating to container freight in the port of La Spezia. Having regard to the volume of traffic in that port, which is regarded as the leading Mediterranean port for container traffic, and its importance in intra-Community trade, that market may be regarded as constituting a substantial part of the common market (Case C-179/90, paragraph 15).
27 Next, it should be recalled that although merely creating a dominant position by granting exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 90(1) of the Treaty is not in itself incompatible with Article 86, a Member State is in breach of the prohibitions contained in those two provisions if the undertaking in question, merely by exercising the exclusive rights granted to it, is led to abuse its dominant position or when such rights are liable to create a situation in which that undertaking is led to commit such abuses (Case C-41/90, paragraph 29; Case C-260/89, paragraph 37, Case C-179/90, paragraph 17, and Case C-323/93 Centre d'Insémination de la Crespelle [1994] ECR I-5077, paragraph 18).
29 That is because merely exercising its monopoly will enable it to distort in its favour the equal conditions of competition between the various operators on the market in dock-work services (Case C-260/89, paragraph 37, and Case C-18/88 GB-Inno-BM [1991] ECR I-5941, paragraph 25).
31 In those circumstances a legal framework such as that which results from the 1994 Law must be regarded as being in itself contrary to Article 90(1) in conjunction with Article 86 of the Treaty.  In that regard, it is therefore immaterial that the national court did not identify any particular case of abuse by the reconstituted former dock-work company (Case C-18/88, paragraphs 23 and 24).
Louisette Cordelle v Office national des pensions (ONP).
Date: 1998-02-12
9 It should be recalled first of all that in proceedings brought under Article 177 of the Treaty the Court has no jurisdiction to apply the rules of Community law to a specific case or, consequently, to classify provisions of national law with respect to such a rule. It may, however, provide the national court with an interpretation of all relevant provisions of Community law which might be useful in assessing the effects of such provisions of national law (see, in particular, Case 37/86 van Gastel v Rijksdienst and Rijkskas [1987] ECR 3589, paragraph 8).
12 Regulation No 1248/92 made a number of amendments to that provision which do not affect its principle but which specify the precise limits for the application of national rules against overlapping in the context of the calculation of pensions.
14 In addition, Article 46a was added to Regulation No 1408/71, paragraph (3)(d) of which provides in particular that where rules against overlapping are applicable under the legislation of only one Member State on account of the fact that the person concerned receives benefits of a different kind payable under the legislation of other Member States, the benefit payable under the legislation of the first Member State may be reduced only within the limit of the amount of the benefits payable under the legislation of other Member States.
15 Pursuant to that rule, the Belgian survivor's pension could only be reduced within the limit of the amount of the French old-age pension.
19 The Court has consistently held that social security benefits must be regarded as being of the same kind within the meaning of Article 12(2) of Regulation No 1408/71 when their purpose and object as well as the basis on which they are calculated and the conditions for granting them are identical (Case C-98/94 Schmidt v Rijksdienst voor Pensioenen [1995] ECR I-2559, paragraph 24).
20 In Case 197/85 ONTPS v Stefanutti [1987] ECR 3855, at paragraph 13, the Court considered that a personal invalidity pension based on the recipient's own employment record in one Member State and a survivor's pension based on the employment record of the recipient's deceased husband in another Member State were not of the same kind.
21 It must thus be held that benefits calculated on the basis of periods of insurance completed by different persons cannot be treated as benefits of the same kind within the meaning of Article 12(2) of Regulation No 1408/71 and, therefore, that Regulation No 1408/71 does not preclude the application of a national rule against overlapping such as that referred to by the national court.
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 1998-02-12
5 By letter of 13 July 1995 the Italian authorities replied that implementing legislation was being prepared with a view to rapidly transposing Directive 94/2.
9 The Italian Government does not deny that Directive 94/2 was not transposed within the period prescribed.  It merely states that the measures to transpose that directive will be taken in the near future.  It also notes that, in so far as Directive 94/2 implements Council Directive 92/75/EEC of 22 September 1992 on the indication by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy and other resources by household appliances (OJ 1992 L 297, p. 16), which has not yet been formally transposed, Directive 94/2 cannot be implemented until the procedure for transposing Directive 92/75 has been completed, the draft legislation being at present under examination by the Italian Council of State.
10 In that connection, it should be noted that Directive 92/75 was to be transposed by 30 June 1993 at the latest, that is to say, before the end of the period prescribed for transposing Directive 94/2.  The Italian Republic cannot, therefore, justify the failure to transpose Directive 94/2 by the delay in implementing Directive 92/75 (see Case C-268/93 Commission v Spain [1994] ECR I-947, paragraph 5).
11 Since Directive 94/2 was thus not transposed within the prescribed period, the Commission's action must be regarded as well founded.
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 1998-02-12
8 It is, however, settled case-law that a Member State cannot rely on provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal order in order to justify its failure to respect the obligations and time-limits laid down by a directive (see, in particular, Case C-208/96 Commission v Belgium [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 9).
Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union.
Date: 1998-02-19
11 Both the Council and the French Government consider that the Commission may not rely on the Court's case-law according to which, failing publication or notification, it is for the party which has knowledge of a decision concerning it to request the whole text thereof within a reasonable period and the period for bringing an action can begin to run only from the moment at which the third party concerned acquires precise knowledge of the content of the decision in question and of the reasons on which it is based (Case C-180/88 Wirtschaftsvereiningung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie v Commission [1990] ECR I-4413).  The Commission's position in this case cannot, in fact, be compared with that of a third party in a procedure falling within the spheres of competition or State aid.
18 According to the case-law of the Court, in the absence of publication or notification, it is for the party which has knowledge of a decision concerning it to request the whole text thereof within a reasonable period and the period for bringing an action can begin to run only from the moment at which the third party concerned acquires precise knowledge of the content of the decision in question and of the reasons on which it is based in such a way as to enable it to exercise its right of action (Case C-180/88 Wirtschaftsvereiningung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie v Commission, cited above, paragraph 22).
SPAR Österreichische Warenhandels AG v Finanzlandesdirektion für Salzburg.
Date: 1998-02-19
20 Article 33 of the Sixth Directive accordingly permits a Member State to maintain or introduce taxes, duties or charges on the supply of goods, the provision of services or imports only if they cannot be characterised as turnover taxes (see Case 252/86 Bergandi [1988] ECR 1343, paragraph 10).
21 However, Community law, as it now stands, does not contain any specific provision excluding or limiting the power of Member States to introduce taxes, duties or charges other than turnover taxes (Joined Cases 93/88 and 94/88 Wisselink and Others [1989] ECR 2671, paragraph 13). It is clear even from the terms of Article 33 of the Sixth Directive that Community law permits systems of taxation to exist concurrently with VAT (see Case 73/85 Kerrutt [1986] ECR 2219, paragraph 22; Wisselink and Others, cited above, paragraph 14; and Case C-109/90 Giant [1991] ECR I-1385, paragraph 9).
22 In order to decide whether a tax, duty or charge can be characterised as a turnover tax within the meaning of Article 33 of the Sixth Directive, it is necessary, in particular, to determine whether it has the effect of compromising the functioning of the common system of VAT by levying a charge on the movement of goods and services and on commercial transactions in a way comparable to VAT (see Case 295/84 Rousseau Wilmot [1985] ECR 3759; Bergandi, cited above, paragraph 14; Giant, cited above, paragraph 11; Case C-347/95 UCAL [1997] ECR I-4911, paragraph 33; Case C-28/96 Fricarnes [1997] ECR I-4939, paragraph 37; and Case C-130/96 Solisnor-Estaleiros Navais [1997] ECR I-5053, paragraph 13).  In that connection, the Court has stated that taxes, duties and charges must in any event be regarded as being imposed on the movement of goods and services in a way comparable to VAT if they exhibit the essential characteristics of VAT (judgments in Case C-200/90 Dansk Denkavit and Poulsen v Skatteministeriet [1992] ECR I-2217, paragraph 11; UCAL, paragraph 33; Fricarnes, paragraph 37, and Solisnor-Estaleiros Navais, paragraph 14, cited above).
23 The Court has consistently held (see, in particular, the abovementioned judgments in Rousseau Wilmot, paragraph 15; Bergandi, paragraph 15; Wisselink and Others, paragraph 18; and Giant, paragraph 12) that the principle of the common system of VAT consists, by virtue of Article 2 of the First Directive, in the application to goods and services up to the retail stage of a general tax on consumption which is exactly proportional to the price of the goods and services, irrespective of the number of transactions which take place in the production and distribution process before the stage at which the tax is charged.  However, VAT is chargeable on each transaction only after deduction of the amount of VAT borne directly by the costs of the various price components.  The procedure for deduction is so arranged by Article 17(2) of the Sixth Directive that taxable persons are authorised to deduct from the VAT for which they are liable the VAT which the goods or services have already borne.
Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 1998-02-19
8 The Court has consistently held that a Member State cannot rely on provisions, practices or situations arising in its own internal legal order to justify its failure to respect the obligations and time-limits laid down by a directive (see, in particular, the judgment of 2 October 1997 in Case C-208/96 Commission v Belgium [1997] ECR I-5375, paragraph 9).
Compañía Internacional de Pesca y Derivados SA (Inpesca) v Commission of the European Communities and Pesquería Vasco-Montañesa SA (Pevasa).
Date: 1998-03-05
15 The first point to note is that, according to the first paragraph of Article 41 of the Statute, an application for revision of a judgment may be made to the Court only on discovery of a fact which is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, and which, when the judgment was given, was unknown to the Court and to the party claiming the revision.
16 The wording of the Statute does not expressly provide that an order may be the subject of an application for revision. In this case, however, the application for revision relates to an order which dismisses the appeals lodged as clearly unfounded, pursuant to Article 119 of the Rules of Procedure, and which therefore produces the same effects as would a judgment dismissing the appeals as unfounded.  Accordingly, in the event of the discovery of a new and decisive fact, an application for revision may be brought against such an order (see, in that regard, Case C-130/91 REV ISAE/VP and Interdata v Commission [1995] ECR I-407 and Case C-130/91 REV II ISAE/VP and Interdata v Commission [1996] ECR I-65).
17 As the Court has repeatedly held, revision is not an appeal procedure but an exceptional review procedure that allows the authority of res judicata attaching to a final judgment to be called in question on the basis of the findings of fact relied upon by the court.  Revision presupposes the discovery of elements of a factual nature which existed prior to the judgment and which were unknown at that time to the court which delivered it as well as to the party applying for revision and which, had the court been able to take them into consideration, could have led it to a different determination of the proceedings (see, in particular, Case C-130/91 REV II ISAE/VP and Interdata v Commission, cited above, paragraph 6).
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 1998-03-05
13 It should next be pointed out that mere apprehension of internal difficulties cannot justify a failure to comply with Community law (see, inter alia, Case C-52/95 Commission v France [1995] ECR I-4443, paragraph 38; Case C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 55).
14 Finally, in so far as the finding of a Member State's failure to fulfil its obligations is not bound up with a finding as to the damage flowing therefrom, a Member State may not rely on the argument that the failure to adopt measures to transpose a directive has had no adverse consequences on other Member States (see, to that effect, Case C-263/96 Commission v Belgium [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 30; as regards Article 141 of the Euratom Treaty, see Case 7/71 Commission v France [1971] ECR 1003, paragraph 50).
Ourdia Djabali v Caisse d'allocations familiales de l'Essonne.
Date: 1998-03-12
16 Second, in reply to a letter from the Court Registry asking the Tribunal des Affaires de Sécurité Sociale, Evry, whether in those circumstances it intended to maintain its request for a preliminary ruling, the President of that court stated that under the national rules of procedure it had no power to withdraw a question duly referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling.
17 According to settled case-law, the procedure provided for in Article 177 of the Treaty is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts by means of which the former provides the latter with interpretation of such Community law as is necessary for them to give judgment in cases upon which they are called to adjudicate (see inter alia Joined Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 Dzodzi v Belgian State [1990] ECR I-3763, paragraph 33, and Case C-231/89 Gmurzynska-Bscher v Oberfinanzdirektion Köln [1990] ECR I-4003, paragraph 18).
18 It is clear from both the wording and the scheme of Article 177 of the Treaty that a national court or tribunal is not empowered to bring a matter before the Court of Justice by way of a reference for a preliminary ruling unless a case is pending before it, in which it is called upon to give a decision which is capable of taking account of the preliminary ruling (see, to that effect, Case 338/85 Pardini v Ministero del Commercio con l'Estero [1988] ECR 2041, paragraph 11, and Joined Cases C-422/93, C-423/93 and C-424/93 Zabala Erasun and Others v Instituto Nacional de Empleo [1995] ECR I-1567, paragraph 28).
19 The justification for a preliminary reference is not that it enables advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions to be delivered but rather that it is necessary for the effective resolution of a dispute (see Case 244/80 Foglia v Novello [1981] ECR 3045, paragraph 18, and Zabala Erasun, cited above, paragraph 29).
21 It must therefore be stated that the claims of the applicant in the main proceedings have been satisfied in full, with the result that the case pending before the national court now has no purpose.
22 In those circumstances, for the Court to reply to the question referred would be of no avail to the Tribunal des Affaires de Sécurité Sociale, Evry.
Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank AG v Edgard Dietzinger.
Date: 1998-03-17
18 In determining whether a contract of guarantee securing performance of a credit agreement by the principal debtor can fall within the scope of Directive 85/577, it should be noted that, apart from the exceptions listed in Article 3(2), the scope of the directive is not limited according to the nature of the goods or services to be supplied under a contract; the only requirement is that the goods or services must be intended for private consumption.  The grant of a credit facility is indeed the provision of a service, the contract of guarantee being merely ancillary to the principal contract, of which in practice it is usually a precondition.