Administration des Douanes et Droits Indirects v Léopold Legros and others.
Date: 1992-07-16
8 According to the case-law of the Court (see the judgment in Case 148/77 Hansen v Hauptzollamt Flensburg [1978] ECR 1787), it follows from that article that the provisions of the Treaty expressly mentioned in the first paragraph of Article 227(2) were applicable in the French overseas departments as soon as the EEC Treaty entered into force, while, with respect to the other provisions, that article reserved a period of two years within which the Council could determine special conditions. The Court then stated that, with regard to the provisions which are not enumerated in the first paragraph of Article 227(2), it always remains possible subsequently to adopt specific measures in order to meet the needs of those territories.
11 The Court has previously held that a charge which is borne by a product imported from another Member State does not constitute a charge having equivalent effect, but internal taxation within the meaning of Article 95 of the Treaty if it relates to a general system of internal dues applied systematically to categories of products in accordance with objective criteria irrespective of the origin of the products (Case 90/79 Commission v France [1981] ECR 283, paragraph 14). The Court has also held that where a pecuniary charge is imposed at the import stage it may be classified as internal taxation only if its purpose is to put every kind of product, whatever its origin, in a comparable fiscal situation in the territory of the State imposing the tax (Case 27/67 Fink-Frucht v Hauptzollamt Muenchen [1968] ECR 223).
13 Consequently, the question to be examined is whether a levy such as the dock dues in question constitutes a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty. In that connection, the Court has already held that any pecuniary charge, however small and whatever its designation and mode of application, which is imposed unilaterally on domestic or foreign goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, and which is not a customs duty in the strict sense, constitutes a charge having equivalent effect within the meaning of Articles 9 and 12 of the Treaty, even if it is not imposed for the benefit of the State, is not discriminatory or protective in effect, or if the product on which the charge is imposed is not in competition with any domestic product (see, in particular, the judgment in Joined Cases 2/69 and 3/69 Diamantarbeiders v Brachfeld [1969] ECR 211).
16 The justification for the prohibition of any customs duty applicable to goods moving between Member States is that any pecuniary charge, however small, imposed on goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier impedes the movement of such goods (see the judgment in Joined Cases 2/69 and 3/69 Diamantarbeiders, cited above). A charge levied at a regional frontier by reason of the introduction of products into a region of a Member State constitutes an obstacle to the free movement of goods which is at least as serious as a charge levied at the national frontier by reason of the introduction of the products into the whole territory of a Member State.
18 The reply to be given to the national court must therefore be that a charge, proportional to the customs value of goods, levied by a Member State on goods imported from another Member State by reason of their entry into a region of the territory of the first Member State constitutes a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty on imports, notwithstanding the fact that the charge is also imposed on goods entering that region from another part of the same State.
Applicability of the free-trade agreement in force between the Community and Sweden (third question of the national court)
26 It follows that, in the context of the objective of eliminating obstacles to trade, elimination of customs duties is of prime importance, as is elimination of charges having equivalent effect, which, according to the case-law of the Court, are closely linked to customs charges stricto sensu (see, in particular, the judgment in Diamantarbeiders, cited above, and the judgment in Case C-260/90 Leplat [1992] ECR I-643). The agreement would therefore be deprived of much of its effectiveness if the term "charge having equivalent effect" contained in Article 6 of the agreement were to be interpreted as having a more limited scope than the same term appearing in the EEC Treaty.
30 It should be observed that it is only exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the Community legal order, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying upon the provisions thus interpreted with a view to calling in question legal relationships established in good faith. As the Court has consistently held, such a restriction may be allowed only in the actual judgment ruling upon the interpretation sought. In determining whether or not to limit the temporal effect of a judgment it is necessary to bear in mind that although the practical consequences of any judicial decision must be weighed carefully, the Court cannot go so far as to diminish the objectivity of the law and compromise its future application on the ground of the possible repercussions which might result, as regards the past, from a judicial decision (judgment in Case 24/86 Blaizot [1988] ECR 379, paragraphs 28 and 30).