larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 1994-03-24
19 As to that, it is sufficient to find that no amendment of the legislation at issue was implemented before the expiry of the period set by the reasoned opinion. In any event, such an amendment would be irrelevant for the purposes of giving judgment on the subject-matter of this action.
20 Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that, as the Court has consistently held, mere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the authorities and are not given the appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the proper fulfilment of a Member State' s obligations under the Treaty (see the judgment in Case C-381/92 Commission v Ireland [1994] ECR I-0000, at paragraph 7).
21 In the circumstances, and without the need to consider whether a certification procedure is appropriate for certain equipment capable of reception only but liable to cause interference, it must be held that by adopting and maintaining in force a certification procedure applied without distinction to all radiocommunications equipment capable of reception only, with the sole exception of equipment intended exclusively for the reception of radio or television broadcasts, provided for by Article 7 of the Law of 30 July 1979 relating to radiocommunications and by the implementing decrees relating to radiocommunications, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 30 of the Treaty.
The complaint concerning transmitters or transceivers intended for export, based on the infringement of Article 34 of the Treaty
24 It should be borne in mind that, as the Court has consistently held, Article 34 of the Treaty concerns national measures which have as their specific object or effect the restriction of patterns of exports and thereby the establishment of a difference in treatment between the domestic trade of a Member State and its export trade, in such a way as to provide a special advantage for national production or for the domestic market of the State in question (see the judgment in Case C-47/90 Delhaize Frères et Le Lion [1993] ECR I-3669, at paragraph 12).
Guido Van Poucke v Rijksinstituut voor de Sociale Verzekeringen der Zelfstandigen and Algemene Sociale Kas voor Zelfstandigen.
Date: 1994-03-24
17 As the Commission rightly points out, in the scheme of the Treaty civil servants are regarded as employed persons. According to the case-law of the Court, the Community meaning of the term "worker" within the meaning of Article 48 of the Treaty must be defined in accordance with objective criteria which distinguish the employment relationship, the essential feature of which is that a person performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration (see the judgment in Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1986] ECR 2121, paragraph 17). The position in the Treaty and wording of Article 48(4), which refers to employment in the public service in order to exclude it from its scope of application, without distinguishing between employment as civil servants and employment as other staff, show that civil servants are counted as employees or salaried workers. It should, moreover, be noted that when the regulation applied only to employed persons and not to self-employed persons, the provisions concerning civil servants alone already appeared in the regulation.
18 It is true that Article 13(2) of the regulation, which lays down general rules for determining the legislation applicable, mentions civil servants in paragraph (d), whereas persons employed are mentioned in paragraph (a). It should, however, be noted that the two initial paragraphs of Article 13(2), (a) and (b), concern respectively persons employed and persons self-employed, whereas the subsequent paragraphs concern certain specific categories of persons who can also be engaged in either form of employment, which is the case, for instance, of seamen referred to in (c). Thus the fact that civil servants are mentioned separately in Article 13(2)(d) does not deprive them of their status as employed persons for the purposes of the regulation' s application.
22 The Court has consistently held that the provisions of Title II of the regulation, of which 14c forms part, constitute a complete and uniform system of conflict rules the aim of which is to ensure that workers moving within the Community shall be subject to the social security scheme of only Member State, in order to prevent more than one legislative system from being applicable and to avoid the complications which may result from that situation (see in particular the judgment in Case 60/85 Luijten [1986] ECR 2365).
24 Furthermore, Article 14d(1) specifies that the person thus referred to is to be treated, for the purposes of the application of the legislation laid down in accordance with the provisions of the regulation, as if he pursued all his professional activity or activities in the territory of the Member State concerned.
3M Medica GmbH v Oberfinanzdirektion Frankfurt am Main.
Date: 1994-03-24
14 Those sandals and shoes may thus be assimilated to mass-produced inner soles or to mass-produced footwear the soles of which support the arch, which are articles not falling within Chapter 90.
15 Nor does the parallel with crutches, expressly mentioned under heading 9021, permit classification under that heading, given that the functions performed are different: whereas crutches are essential for a person with a mobility handicap, the items in question merely facilitate walking with a plaster cast.
Halliburton Services BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 1994-04-12
12 As regards Article 7 of the Treaty, it must first be borne in mind (see the judgment in Case 305/87 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 1461, paragraph 13) that it applies independently only to situations governed by Community law in regard to which the Treaty lays down no specific prohibition of discrimination. It is also common ground (see the judgment in Case 63/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 29, paragraph 12) that Article 52 is essentially intended to give effect, in the field of activities as self-employed persons, to the principle of equal treatment enshrined in Article 7. Accordingly, the latter provision does not apply in the present case.
14 In that regard the first point to bear in mind is that the freedom of establishment which is conferred by Article 52 on the nationals of a Member State and which gives them the right to take up activities as self-employed persons and pursue them on the same conditions as those laid down by the law of the Member State of establishment for its own nationals, comprises, pursuant to Article 58 of the Treaty, for companies constituted in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community, the right to carry on business in the Member State concerned through a branch or agency.
15 Further, the Court has held (see Case C-330/91 The Queen v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Commerzbank [1993] ECR I-4017, paragraph 14) that the rules regarding equality of treatment forbid not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality or, in the case of a company, its seat, but all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result.
16 Finally, it must be borne in mind that, as the Court has repeatedly stated (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 71/76 Thieffry v Conseil de l' Ordre des Avocats à la Cour de Paris [1977] ECR 765), since the end of the transitional period Article 52 of the Treaty has been directly applicable notwithstanding the absence in a particular area of the directives provided for in Articles 54(2) and 57(1) of the Treaty.
Directeur Général des Douanes et Droits Indirects v Société Superior France SA and Danzas SA.
Date: 1994-04-12
10 In accordance with those criteria, it is necessary to determine whether it is the plastic or the textile material which gives the travel goods their essential character (see the judgment in Case 253/87 Sportex [1988] ECR 3351, at paragraph 8).
Federal Republic of Germany and Pleuger Worthington GmbH v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1994-04-13
26 As may be seen from that judgment, once the Commission has established that aids have been granted or altered without notification, it has the power, after giving the Member State in question an opportunity to submit its comments on the matter, to issue an interim decision requiring it to suspend immediately the payment of such aids pending the outcome of the examination of the aids and to provide the Commission, within such period as it may specify, with all such documentation, information and data as are necessary in order that it may examine the compatibility of the aid with the common market. It is only if the Member State, notwithstanding the Commission' s order, fails to provide the information requested, that the Commission is empowered to terminate the procedure and make its decision, on the basis of the information available to it, on the question whether or not the aids are compatible with the common market.
H. J. Banks & Co. Ltd v British Coal Corporation.
Date: 1994-04-13
9 Both the extraction of unworked coal and the undertakings concerned fall within the scope of the ECSC Treaty. Annex I to the Treaty, to which Article 81 refers for the definition of the term "coal", expressly refers to hard coal, which is the type of coal at issue in the main proceedings. Furthermore, Article 80 of the Treaty provides that, for the purposes of the Treaty, "undertaking" means any undertaking engaged in production in the coal industry within the European territories of the Member States. That is true both of Banks and of British Coal, since the extraction of coal by them is the first stage in the processing cycle of a more highly-worked product and is carried on within the territory of a Member State.
11 As to which provisions are applicable to the practices of the undertakings in question, Article 4 applies by itself only in the absence of more specific rules; if they have been adopted or are governed by other provisions of the Treaty, texts relating to the same provision must be considered as a whole and applied together (see, in particular, the judgment in Joined Cases 7 and 9/54 Industries Sidérurgiques Luxembourgeoises v High Authority [1956] ECR 175 and the judgment in Case 13/57 Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie v High Authority [1958] ECR 265).
15 In order to answer Question 3, it is necessary to see whether Articles 4(d), 65 and 66(7) are clear and unconditional provisions which confer directly on individuals rights which the national courts must protect.
16 As Article 4(d) is not applicable by itself (see paragraph 11 above), it cannot have direct effect.
17 As regards Article 65, the second subparagraph of its fourth paragraph confers on the Commission sole jurisdiction, subject to review by the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice, to rule on the compatibility with Article 65 of any agreement prohibited by the first paragraph. Accordingly, as long as such incompatibility has not been established by the Commission itself, individuals may not plead, in proceedings before the national courts, that an agreement is incompatible with Article 65.
18 Likewise, Article 66(7) reserves to the Commission the power to verify whether public or private undertakings which, in law or in fact, hold or acquire in the market for one of the products within its jurisdiction a dominant position shielding them against effective competition in a substantial part of the common market are using that position for purposes contrary to the objectives of the Treaty. The conferral of sole jurisdiction on the Commission precludes individuals from relying directly on that provision in proceedings before the national courts.
19 The answer to Question 3 must therefore be that Articles 4(d), 65 and 66(7) do not confer rights which are directly enforceable by private parties in proceedings before the national courts.
Questions 4 and 5
Albert Hoorn v Landesversicherungsanstalt Westfalen.
Date: 1994-04-28
19 On a proper construction of Articles 6, 7 and 8 of Regulation No 1408/71, and the Court' s case-law (judgment in Case C-23/92 Grana-Novoa [1993] ECR I-4505, paragraph 22), Article 8 concerns only conventions concluded between the Member States after the entry into force of the Regulation and does not therefore apply to the Complementary Agreement.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 1994-05-03
12 It is sufficient to point out that, in paragraph 10 of its judgment in Case C-71/92 Commission v Spain [1993] ECR I-5923, the Court observed that the only permissible exceptions to the application of Directive 77/62 are those which are expressly and exhaustively mentioned in it.
15 In that regard, Article 6 of Directive 77/62, which authorizes derogations from rules intended to ensure the effectiveness of rights conferred by the Treaty in the public supply contracts sector, must be interpreted strictly (see the judgment in Commission v Spain, cited above, paragraph 36).
16 Furthermore, the burden of proving the actual existence of exceptional circumstances justifying a derogation lies on the person seeking to rely on those circumstances (see, with regard to public works contracts, the judgment in Case 199/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 1039, paragraph 14).
18 The position is the same with regard to Article 6(1)(d). Admittedly, having regard to the freedom of doctors to prescribe pharmaceutical products, to which the Spanish Government refers, an urgent need for a particular pharmaceutical speciality may well arise in a hospital pharmacy; however, that freedom to prescribe pharmaceutical products cannot justify a priori systematic recourse to the single-tender procedure for all supplies of pharmaceutical products and specialities to hospitals. Moreover, even if the requirement of urgency were considered to have been satisfied in a particular case, Article 6(1)(d) would not necessarily apply. The Court has consistently held that, in order to rely on the derogation provided by that provision, all the conditions it lays down must be satisfied cumulatively (see, with respect to the corresponding provision applicable to public works contracts, the judgment in Case C-24/91 Commission v Spain [1992] ECR I-1989, paragraph 13).
Marlies and Heinz-Bernd Kamp v Hauptzollamt Wuppertal.
Date: 1994-05-05
7 The Community legislation on the additional levy on milk originally contained no specific provision for the grant of a reference quantity to producers who, pursuant to an undertaking given under Regulation No 1078/77, mentioned above, had not delivered milk during the reference year adopted by the Member State concerned. In its judgments in Case 120/86 Mulder v Minister van Landbouw en Visserij [1988] ECR 2321 - Mulder I, paragraphs 27 and 28, and Case 170/86 Von Deetzen v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1988] ECR 2355, paragraphs 16 and 17, the Court held that that legislation was invalid on the ground that it was in breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.
8 In those judgments, the Court stated that a producer who had voluntarily ceased production for a certain period could not legitimately expect to resume production under the same conditions as those which had previously applied and not to be subject to any rules of market or structural policy adopted in the mean time (Mulder I, paragraph 23, and Von Deetzen, paragraph 12). The Court considered however that where such a producer had been encouraged by a Community measure to suspend marketing his products for a limited period in the general interest and against payment of a premium he could legitimately expect not to be subject, on the expiry of his undertaking, to restrictions which specifically affected him for the very reason that he had availed himself of the possibilities offered by the Community provisions (Mulder I, paragraph 24, and Von Deetzen, paragraph 13).
10 That 60% rule was also held to be invalid by the Court on the ground of breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, since the application to producers covered by Article 3a of Regulation No 857/84 as amended of a reduction of 40% which, far from being representative of the rates applicable to the producers covered by Article 2, was more than double the highest total of such rates was to be regarded as a restriction which specifically affected the first-mentioned category of producers by very reason of their undertaking as to non-marketing or conversion (Case C-189/89 Spagl v Hauptzollamt Rosenheim [1990] ECR I-4539, paragraphs 24 and 29, and Case C-217/89 Pastaetter v Hauptzollamt Bad Reichenhall [1990] ECR I-4585, paragraphs 15 and 20).
George Lawrence Webb v Lawrence Desmond Webb.
Date: 1994-05-17
14 Article 16 confers exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of rights in rem in immovable property on the courts of the Contracting State in which the property is situated. In the light of the Court' s judgment in Case C-115/88 Reichert and Kockler [1990] ECR I-27, where the Court had to rule on the question whether the exclusive jurisdiction prescribed by that article applied in respect of an action by a creditor to have a disposition of immovable property declared ineffective as against him on the ground that it was made in fraud of his rights by his debtor, it follows that it is not sufficient, for Article 16(1) to apply, that a right in rem in immovable property be involved in the action or that the action have a link with immovable property: the action must be based on a right in rem and not on a right in personam, save in the case of the exception concerning tenancies of immovable property.
17 As the Court has held, the conferring of exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of rights in rem in immovable property on the courts of the State in which the property is situated is justified because actions concerning rights in rem in immovable property often involve disputes frequently necessitating checks, inquiries and expert assessments which must be carried out on the spot (see the judgment in Case 73/77 Sanders v Van der Putte [1977] ECR 2383, at paragraph 13).
French Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1994-05-17
22 According to Article 100a(1), those objectives are to be implemented by measures, including directives to be adopted by the Council in accordance with the procedure laid down therein and which have as their object the abolition of barriers to trade arising from differences between the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States.
29 Measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which are such as to hinder intra-Community trade would be rendered ineffective if the Member States retained the right to apply unilaterally national rules derogating from those measures.
30 A Member State is not, therefore, authorized to apply the national provisions notified by it until after it has obtained a decision from the Commission confirming them.
34 The Court has consistently held that the obligation under Article 190 to give reasons requires that the measures concerned should contain a statement of the reasons which led the institution to adopt them, so that the Court can exercise its power of review and so that the Member States and the nationals concerned may learn of the conditions under which the Community institutions have applied the Treaty.
Codorníu SA v Council of the European Union.
Date: 1994-05-18
18 As the Court has already held, the general applicability, and thus the legislative nature, of a measure is not called in question by the fact that it is possible to determine more or less exactly the number or even the identity of the persons to whom it applies at any given time, as long as it is established that it applies to them by virtue of an objective legal or factual situation defined by the measure in question in relation to its purpose (see most recently the judgment in Case C-298/89 Gibraltar v Council [1993] ECR I-3605, paragraph 17).
19 Although it is true that according to the criteria in the second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty the contested provision is, by nature and by virtue of its sphere of application, of a legislative nature in that it applies to the traders concerned in general, that does not prevent it from being of individual concern to some of them.
20 Natural or legal persons may claim that a contested provision is of individual concern to them only if it affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons (see the judgment in Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission [1963] ECR 95).
26 It is appropriate in the first place to point out that under the principle of non-discrimination between Community producers or consumers, which is enshrined in the second subparagraph of Article 40(3) of the EEC Treaty and which includes the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in the first paragraph of Article 7 of the EEC Treaty, comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified. It follows that the conditions of production or consumption may not be differentiated except by reference to objective criteria which ensure a proportionate division of the advantages and disadvantages for those concerned without distinction between the territories of the Member States (see the judgment in Case 106/83 Sermide v Casa Conguaglio Zucchero [1984] ECR 4209, paragraph 28).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 1994-05-18
6 On the other hand, contrary to what the Commission maintained, the Court does not have to take account of the failure to publish and provide information concerning the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary in order to comply with the directive, since the Italian Republic had not adopted those provisions within the period prescribed in the reasoned opinion.
Siemens Nixdorf Informationssysteme AG v Hauptzollamt Augsburg.
Date: 1994-05-19
11 As the Court has repeatedly held, the decisive criterion for the customs classification of goods must be sought generally in their objective characteristics and qualities, as defined in the relevant heading of the Common Customs Tariff and in the notes to the sections or chapters (see in particular the judgment in Case 200/84 Daiber [1985] ECR 3363, paragraph 13).
12 Both the notes which head the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff and the Explanatory Notes to the Nomenclature of the Customs Cooperation Council are important means for ensuring the uniform application of the Tariff and as such may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (see Daiber, cited above, paragraph 14).