Hellenic Republic v European Commission.
Date: 2016-03-08
30


With regard to the first part of the first ground of appeal, it should be recalled, in the first place, as regards the argument that the General Court distorted the facts, that it follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to find the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents in the file submitted to it, and, second, to assess those facts (judgments in General Motors v Commission, C‑551/03 P, EU:C:2006:229, paragraph 51, and ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission, C‑352/09 P, EU:C:2011:191, paragraph 179).
31


Therefore, the appraisal of the facts by the General Court does not constitute, save where the clear sense of the evidence produced before it is distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (judgments in Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission, C‑397/03 P, EU:C:2006:328, paragraph 85, and ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission, C‑352/09 P, EU:C:2011:191, paragraph 180).
32


Where an appellant alleges distortion of the evidence by the General Court, he must, under Article 256 TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and show the errors of appraisal which, in his view, led to such distortion. In addition, it is settled case-law of the Court that distortion must be obvious from the documents in the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (judgments in Lafarge v Commission, C‑413/08 P, EU:C:2010:346, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited, and Austria v Scheucher-Fleisch and Others, C‑47/10 P, EU:C:2011:698, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
38


As regards the second part of the first ground of appeal, it must be recalled that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, the duty incumbent upon the General Court under Article 36 and the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union to state reasons for its judgments does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to understand the grounds of the General Court’s judgment and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient information to exercise its powers of review on appeal (see, inter alia, judgment in A2A v Commission, C‑320/09 P, EU:C:2011:858, paragraph 97).
43


In view of the independence of the contributions paid by the farmers in relation to the compensation aid received by them, those contributions cannot be regarded as specific charges imposed on the advantage consisting, in the present case, of the payment of that aid; nor can those contributions be regarded as connected with the introduction of that advantage. Accordingly, the General Court was fully entitled to conclude that, in the present case, the Commission was justified, under Article 107(1) TFEU, in refusing to offset the advantage and those same contributions (see, to that effect, judgment in France Télécom v Commission, C‑81/10 P, EU:C:2011:811, paragraphs 43 and 48).
45


The Hellenic Republic complains that the General Court rejected its first and second pleas in law in the action by relying on the settled case-law of the Court that measures which, whatever their form, are likely directly or indirectly to favour certain undertakings or which are to be regarded as an economic advantage which the recipient undertaking would not have obtained under normal market conditions are to be regarded as State aid (judgment in Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, C‑280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paragraph 84 and the case-law cited). In so doing, the General Court failed to have regard to the fact that those principles are valid only under normal market and economic conditions and not under the exceptional conditions experienced by the Greek economy in 2009.
55


Consequently, that argument must be rejected as inadmissible. According to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, to allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea in law which it has not raised before the General Court, would in effect allow that party to bring before the Court of Justice a wider case than that heard by the General Court (see, to that effect, judgments in Alliance One International and Standard Commercial Tobacco v Commission and Commission v Alliance One International and Others, C‑628/10 P and C‑14/11 P, EU:C:2012:479, paragraph 111, and Groupe Gascogne v Commission, C‑58/12 P, EU:C:2013:770, paragraph 35).
57


As stated in paragraph 38 of this judgment, the duty incumbent upon the General Court to state reasons for its judgments does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to understand the grounds of the General Court’s judgment and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient information to exercise its powers of review on appeal (judgment in Isdin v Bial-Portela, C‑597/12 P, EU:C:2013:672, paragraph 21).
68


As the General Court stated in paragraphs 159 to 161 of the judgment under appeal, it is settled case-law of the Court that, in the application of Article 107(3) TFEU, the Commission enjoys wide discretion, the exercise of which involves complex economic and social assessments (judgments in Germany and Others v Kronofrance, C‑75/05 P and C‑80/05 P, EU:C:2008:482, paragraph 59, and Banco Privado Português and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português, C‑667/13, EU:C:2015:151, paragraph 67).
69


Furthermore, as the General Court stated in paragraphs 186 and 187 of the judgment under appeal, the Court has also consistently held that, in adopting rules of conduct and announcing by publishing them that they will henceforth apply to the cases to which they relate, the Commission imposes a limit on the exercise of its aforementioned discretion and, in principle, cannot depart from those rules without being found, where appropriate, to be in breach of general principles of law, such as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectations (judgments in Holland Malt v Commission, C‑464/09 P, EU:C:2010:733, paragraph 46, and Banco Privado Português and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português, C‑667/13, EU:C:2015:151, paragraph 69).
70


However, in the specific area of State aid, the Commission is bound by the guidelines that it issues, to the extent that they do not depart from the rules in the TFEU, including, in particular, Article 107(3)(b) TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment in Holland Malt v Commission, C‑464/09 P, EU:C:2010:733, paragraph 47), and to the extent that their application is not in breach of general principles of law, such as equal treatment, in particular where exceptional circumstances, different from those envisaged in those guidelines, distinguish a given sector of the economy of a Member State.
71


Consequently, first, the Commission may not fail to have regard to Article 107(3) TFEU by adopting guidelines vitiated by an error of law or a manifest error of assessment, nor may it waive, by the adoption of guidelines, the exercise of the discretion that that provision confers on it. Further, when, in the exercise of that discretion, it adopts guidelines of that nature, these must be kept under continuous review for the purposes of anticipating any major developments not covered by those measures.
72


Secondly, the adoption of such guidelines does not relieve the Commission of its obligation to examine the specific exceptional circumstances relied on by a Member State, in a particular case, for the purpose of requesting the direct application of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, and to provide reasons for its refusal to grant such a request, should the case arise.