larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Compañía de Tranvías de la Coruña, SA v Ayuntamiento de A Coruña.
Date: 2020-03-19
14


In accordance with settled case-law, it follows from the requirement for the uniform application of EU law and from the principle of equal treatment that the terms of a provision of EU law which does not contain any express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, which interpretation must take into account not only the wording of that provision but also its context and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (judgment of 23 May 2019, WB, C‑658/17, EU:C:2019:444, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
Erik Simpson and HG v Council of the European Union and European Commission.
Date: 2020-03-26
70


As set out in that provision, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law.
71


In that regard, this Court has held that the requirements that courts be independent and impartial form part of the essence of the right to effective judicial protection and the fundamental right to a fair trial, which is of cardinal importance as a guarantee that all the rights which individuals derive from EU law will be protected and that the values common to the Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular the value of the rule of law, will be safeguarded. Those requirements require rules, particularly as regards the composition of the body and the appointment, length of service and grounds for abstention, rejection and dismissal of its members, in order to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it. As regards appointment decisions specifically, it is in particular necessary for the substantive conditions and detailed procedural rules governing the adoption of those decisions to be such that they cannot give rise to such reasonable doubts with respect to the judges appointed (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 November 2019, A. K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18, EU:C:2019:982, paragraphs 120, 123 and 134 and the case-law cited).
Mikrokasa S.A. w Gdyni and Revenue Niestandaryzowany Sekurytyzacyjny Fundusz Inwestycyjny Zamknięty w Warszawie v XO.
Date: 2020-03-26
39


Lastly, as can be seen from the case-law of the Court, in order to guarantee extensive consumer protection, in Article 3(g) of that directive the EU legislature broadly defines the ‘total cost of the credit to the consumer’ as covering all the costs, including interest, taxes and any other kind of fees which the consumer is required to pay in connection with the credit agreement and which are known to the creditor, except for notarial costs (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 February 2015, Matei, C‑143/13, EU:C:2015:127, paragraph 48; of 8 December 2016, Verein für Konsumenteninformation, C‑127/15, EU:C:2016:934, paragraph 35; and of 11 September 2019, Lexitor, C‑383/18, EU:C:2019:702, paragraph 23).
40


However, Directive 2008/48 does not contain either the concept of ‘non-interest credit costs’ or provisions governing the issue of limiting credit costs or the sharing of those costs between the seller or supplier and the consumer. It is apparent from the documents before the Court that the ‘non-interest credit costs’ constitute a subcategory of the ‘total cost of the credit’ referred to in Article 3(g) of Directive 2008/48, as that cost encompasses all costs, including, in particular, interest.
48


In the light of the foregoing considerations, Article 3(g), Article 10(2) and Article 22(1) of Directive 2008/48 must be interpreted as not precluding a provision of national legislation which lays down a calculation method regarding the maximum amount of non-interest credit costs that may be imposed on the consumer, provided that that provision does not introduce additional information obligations regarding those non-interest credit costs which go beyond those laid down in Article 10(2) of that directive.
JC v Kreissparkasse Saarlouis.
Date: 2020-03-26
30


In addition, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its object, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual and legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 3 July 2019, UniCredit Leasing, C‑242/18, EU:C:2019:558, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
Pfizer Consumer Healthcare Ltd v Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs.
Date: 2020-03-26
37


In that regard, the settled case-law of the Court states that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (judgment of 22 February 2018, Kubota (UK) and EP Barrus, C‑545/16, EU:C:2018:101, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
38


Furthermore, the intended use of a product may constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (judgment of 22 February 2018, Kubota (UK) and EP Barrus, C‑545/16, EU:C:2018:101, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
Caisse de retraite du personnel navigant professionnel de l'aéronautique civile (CRPNPAC) v Vueling Airlines SA v Vueling Airlines SA and Jean-Luc Poignant.
Date: 2020-04-02
88


As a preliminary point, attention should be drawn, in that regard, to the importance, both in the legal order of the European Union and in national legal systems, of the principle of the authority of res judicata. In order to ensure both stability of the law and legal relations and the sound administration of justice, it is important that judicial decisions which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the time limits provided for in that connection can no longer be called into question (judgments of 6 October 2015, Târşia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 28; of 24 October 2018, XC and Others, C‑234/17, EU:C:2018:853, paragraph 52; and of 11 September 2019, Călin, C‑676/17, EU:C:2019:700, paragraph 26).
95


That interpretation of the principle of the authority of res judicata therefore has the result that, where the decision of a criminal court that has become final is based on a finding of fraud that has been made by that court with no attention whatsoever given to the procedure of dialogue laid down in Article 84a(3) of Regulation No 1408/71 and on an interpretation of the provisions concerning the binding effect of E 101 certificates that is contrary to EU law, the incorrect application of EU law would be repeated in every decision adopted by the civil courts and tribunals concerning the same facts, and there would be no possibility of correcting a finding and an interpretation that were in breach of EU law (see, by analogy, judgment of 3 September 2009, Fallimento Olimpiclub, C‑2/08, EU:C:2009:506, paragraph 30).
96


In those circumstances, it must be held that such obstacles to the effective application of the rules of EU law in relation to that procedure and on the binding effect of E 101 certificates cannot reasonably be justified by the principle of legal certainty and must therefore be considered to be contrary to the principle of effectiveness (see, by analogy, judgment of 3 September 2009, Fallimento Olimpiclub, C‑2/08, EU:C:2009:506, paragraph 31).
AS „PrivatBank” v Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija.
Date: 2020-04-02
66


It should be noted, third, that under Article 51 of Directive 2007/64, where the payment service user is not a consumer, the parties may agree that, inter alia, Article 75 of that directive is not to apply in whole or in part. Recital 20 of the directive, in the light of which Article 51 must be read, states that, since consumers and enterprises are not in the same position, they do not need the same level of protection. Recital 20 also states that, while it is important to guarantee consumers’ rights by means of provisions which cannot be derogated from by contract, it is reasonable to let enterprises and organisations agree otherwise. That recital adds, however, that, in any event, certain core provisions of Directive 2007/64 should always be applicable, irrespective of the status of the user.
Condominio di Milano, via Meda v Eurothermo SpA.
Date: 2020-04-02
33


According to the 12th recital of Directive 93/13, that directive provides for only partial minimum harmonisation of national laws on unfair terms, leaving Member States the option, with due regard for the Treaty, to afford consumers a higher level of protection through national provisions that are more stringent than those of that directive. In addition, under Article 8 of the directive, Member States may adopt or retain the most stringent provisions compatible with the Treaty in the area covered by that directive, to ensure a maximum degree of protection for the consumer.
Ruska Federacija v I.N.
Date: 2020-04-02
43


It should however be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. The Court has a duty to interpret all provisions of EU law which national courts require in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court of Justice by those courts (judgment of 8 May 2019, PI, C‑230/18, EU:C:2019:383, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
60


As the Court has already held, the objective of preventing the risk of impunity for persons who have committed an offence, put forward in the order for reference for the purpose of justification, must be considered legitimate. However, measures which restrict the freedom laid down in Article 36 of the EEA Agreement, may be justified by objective considerations only if they are necessary for the protection of the interests which they are intended to secure and only in so far as those objectives cannot be attained by less restrictive measures (see, by analogy, judgment of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin, C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraphs 37 and 38 and the case-law cited).
70


More specifically, the Court has held that, in such a case, the exchange of information with the Member State of which the person concerned is a national must be given priority in order to afford the authorities of that Member State, in so far as they have jurisdiction pursuant to their national law to prosecute that person for offences committed outside national territory, the opportunity to issue, in accordance with Framework Decision 2002/584, a European arrest warrant with a view to the surrender of that person for the purposes of prosecution. Thus, the competent authority of the requested Member State must inform the Member State of which the person concerned is a national and, should that Member State so request, surrender the person concerned to it, on the basis of such a European arrest warrant (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin, C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraphs 48 and 50).
Gugler France v European Union Intellectual Property Office.
Date: 2020-04-23
Since the application for registration of the mark in question was made on 25 August 2003, the present dispute must be examined in the light of Regulation No 40/94. In the case of applications for a declaration that trade marks are invalid, the date on which the application for registration of such marks was made is determinative for the purposes of identifying the applicable substantive law (judgment of 29 January 2020, Sky and Others, C‑371/18, EU:C:2020:45, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
It suffices to note, in that regard, that the Court held, in paragraph 46 of the judgment of 20 December 2017, Schweppes (C‑291/16, EU:C:2017:990), that the concept of ‘economic links’, for the purposes of Directive 2008/95, refers to a substantive, rather than formal, criterion, which is in no way confined to situations in which the goods in question have been put into circulation by a licensee, by a parent company, by a subsidiary of the same group, or by an exclusive distributor and which, in particular, is also fulfilled where, following the division of national parallel trade marks resulting from a territorially limited assignment, the proprietors of those marks coordinate their commercial policies or reach an agreement in order to exercise joint control over the use of those marks, so that it is possible for them to determine, directly or indirectly, the goods to which those marks are affixed and to control the quality of those goods.
Furthermore, the methodological approach adopted by the General Court complies with the requirement that the examination of whether an economic link exists must be conducted globally, taking into account all the relevant circumstances, as observed, moreover, in paragraph 51 of the judgment of 20 December 2017, Schweppes (Case C‑291/16, EU:C:2017:990), without there being any need to give priority in that connection to methodological principles such as those advocated by the appellant.
Deutsche Homöopathie-Union (DHU) Arzneimittel GmbH & Co. KG v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Date: 2020-04-23
28


Under Article 14(1) of that directive, which expressly refers to Article 69 thereof, only homeopathic medicinal products which satisfy three cumulative conditions may be subject to a special, simplified registration procedure, namely that they are administered orally or externally, that no specific therapeutic indication appears on the labelling of the medicinal product or in any information relating thereto, and that there is a sufficient degree of dilution to guarantee its safety (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 May 2005, Meta Fackler, C‑444/03, EU:C:2005:288, paragraph 16).
43


The need for uniform application and, therefore, for uniform interpretation of an EU measure precludes one version of the text being considered in isolation, but requires that the measure be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and purpose of the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 March 2016, Kødbranchens Fællesråd, C‑112/15, EU:C:2016:185, paragraph 36, and of 20 December 2017, Polkomtel, C‑277/16, EU:C:2017:989, paragraph 59).
CTT - Correios de Portugal v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira.
Date: 2020-04-30
28


In that connection, it should be borne in mind that the system of cooperation established by Article 267 TFEU is based on a clear division of responsibilities between the national courts and the Court of Justice. In proceedings brought on the basis of that article, the interpretation of provisions of national law is a matter for the courts of the Member States, not for the Court of Justice, and the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the compatibility of rules of national law with EU law. However, the Court does have jurisdiction to provide the national court with all the guidance as to the interpretation of EU law necessary to enable that court to determine whether those national rules are compatible with EU law (judgment of 15 October 2015, Iglesias Gutiérrezand Rion Bea, C‑352/14 and C‑353/14, EU:C:2015:691, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
29


Although it is true that, on a literal reading of the referring court’s questions, the Court is being asked to rule on the compatibility of a provision of national law with EU law, there is nothing to prevent the Court from giving an answer that will be of use to the national court, by providing the latter with guidance as to the interpretation of EU law which will enable that court to rule itself on the compatibility of national rules with EU law (judgment of 15 October 2015, Iglesias Gutiérrez and Rion Bea, C‑352/14 and C‑353/14, EU:C:2015:691, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited). Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see to that effect order of 13 December 2012, Debiasi, C‑560/11, not published, EU:C:2012:802, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
A v B.
Date: 2020-04-30
23


In that regard, the expression ‘use in the course of trade’, to be found in that provision, entails that the exclusive rights conferred by a trade mark may, as a rule, be relied on by the proprietor of that trade mark only as against economic operators and, consequently, only in the context of a trading business (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 July 2011, L’Oréal and Others, C‑324/09, EU:C:2011:474, paragraph 54). Further, if the transactions carried out, by reason of their volume, their frequency or other characteristics, go beyond the scope of a private activity, whoever carries out those transactions will be acting in the course of trade (judgment of 12 July 2011, L’Oréal and Others, C‑324/09, EU:C:2011:474 paragraph 55).
27


As regards whether the person concerned can be considered to have himself used a sign identical to a trade mark, although that person was acting in the economic interests of a third party, it must be observed that, in order to identify use in the course of trade, ownership of the goods on which the trade mark is affixed is of no relevance. The Court has held that the fact that an economic operator uses a sign corresponding to a trade mark in relation to goods which are not his own goods — in the sense that he does not have title to them — does not in itself prevent that use from falling within the scope of Article 5(1) of Directive 2008/95 (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 July 2011, L’Oréal and Others, C‑324/09, EU:C:2011:474, paragraph 91).
LG v Rina SpA and Ente Registro Italiano Navale.
Date: 2020-05-07
30


It must be recalled, first, that, according to settled case-law, in order to ensure, as far as possible, that the rights and obligations which derive from Regulation No 44/2001 for the Member States and the persons to whom it applies are equal and uniform, ‘civil and commercial matters’ should not be interpreted as a mere reference to the internal law of one or other of the States concerned. That concept must be regarded as being an independent concept to be interpreted by referring, first, to the objectives and scheme of that regulation and, secondly, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems (judgment of 23 October 2014flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines, C‑302/13, EU:C:2014:2319, paragraph 24).
A.m.a. - Azienda Municipale Ambiente SpA v Consorzio Laziale Rifiuti – Co.La.Ri.
Date: 2020-05-14
26


In that regard, it should be observed that, according to settled case-law, Article 267 TFEU establishes a procedure for direct cooperation between the Court and the courts of the Member States. In that procedure, which is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court, any assessment of the facts of the case is a matter for the national court, which must determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court, whilst the Court is empowered to give rulings on the interpretation or the validity of an EU provision only on the basis of the facts which the national court puts before it (judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others, C‑62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited).
Criminal proceedings against Bouygues travaux publics and Others.
Date: 2020-05-14
51


It must be borne in mind that Article 267 TFEU does not empower the Court to apply rules of EU law to a particular case, but only to give a ruling on the interpretation of the Treaties and on acts adopted by the EU institutions.(see, inter alia, judgment of 19 November 2019, A.K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18, EU:C:2019:982, paragraph 132 and the case-law cited).
52


It is therefore not for the Court either to establish the facts which have given rise to the dispute in the main proceedings and to draw any inferences therefrom for the decision which the referring court is required to deliver, or to interpret the relevant national laws or regulations (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 October 2019, Glencore Agriculture Hungary, C‑189/18, EU:C:2019:861, paragraphs 30 and 31).
Asociación de fabricantes de morcilla de Burgos v European Commission.
Date: 2020-05-28
10


It should be recalled, as follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU and from the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, that an appeal lies on points of law only. The General Court thus has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence. The appraisal of those facts and the assessment of that evidence thus do not, save where the facts or evidence are distorted, constitute points of law subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (judgment of 13 November 2019, Outsource Professional Services v EUIPO, C‑528/18 P, not published, EU:C:2019:961, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
Federación de Trabajadores Independientes de Comercio (Fetico) and Others v Grupo de Empresas DIA S.A. and Twins Alimentación S.A.
Date: 2020-06-04
31


The days of special leave granted under Article 46 of the collective agreement of 13 July 2016 in order to enable workers to meet specific needs or obligations fall within the scope not of Directive 2003/88 but rather of the exercise, by a Member State, of its own competences (see, by analogy, judgment of 19 November 2019, TSN and AKT, C‑609/17 and C‑610/17, EU:C:2019:981, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
32


It must, however, be stated that the exercise by a Member State of its own competences cannot, nonetheless, have the effect of undermining the minimum protection guaranteed to workers by that directive and, in particular, the actual benefit of the minimum weekly rest periods and periods of paid annual leave provided for in Articles 5 and 7 of that directive (see, by analogy, judgment of 19 November 2019, TSN and AKT, C‑609/17 and C‑610/17, EU:C:2019:981, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).