EL-EM-2001 Ltd v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Dél-alföldi Regionális Vám- és Pénzügyőri Főigazgatósága.
Date: 2016-10-19
21


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with recital 17 and Article 1 of Regulation No 561/2006, that regulation seeks, inter alia, to improve the working conditions of drivers to whom those regulations apply and to improve road safety in general.
25


It follows from those provisions that the aim pursued by Regulation No 561/2006 is not harmonisation of the penalties, since, on the contrary, that regulation leaves the Member States free to choose the measures to adopt and the penalties necessary to their application (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 February 2012, Urbán, C‑210/10, EU:C:2012:64, paragraph 22).
28


It is clear from that provision that Regulation No 561/2006 makes both transport undertakings and drivers subject to specific obligations and holds them both liable for infringements of their respective obligations (judgment of 9 June 2016, Eurospeed, C‑287/14, EU:C:2016:420, paragraph 32).
29


It is also clear unequivocally from the wording of recital 27 of that regulation that the Member States are entitled to lay down a system of liability of drivers for infringements of the regulation, and that they have a broad discretion as regards the nature of the applicable penalties (judgment of 9 June 2016, Eurospeed, C‑287/14, EU:C:2016:420, paragraph 34).
30


In so far as, first, the Member States are required pursuant to Article 19(1) of Regulation No 561/2006 to lay down rules on penalties for infringements of that regulation in such a way that those penalties are effective, proportionate, dissuasive and non-discriminatory, and, second, the regulation does not exclude the liability of drivers, it follows that the Member States can lay down provisions allowing penalties to be imposed, exclusively or otherwise, on drivers (judgment of 9 June 2016, Eurospeed, C‑287/14, EU:C:2016:420, paragraph 34).
31


Furthermore, the Court has held that a system of strict liability may prompt the employer to organise the work of his employees in such a way as to ensure compliance with Regulation No 561/2006 and that road safety, which is one of the objectives of that regulation, is a matter of public interest which may justify the imposition of a fine on the employer for infringements committed by his employees and a system of strict criminal liability (judgment of 10 July 1990, Hansen, C‑326/88, EU:C:1990:291, point 19).
36


However, that regulation does not contain more precise rules as regards the establishment of those national penalties and in particular does not establish any express criterion for the assessment of the proportionality of such penalties (judgment of 9 February 2012, Urbán, C‑210/10, EU:C:2012:64, paragraph 22).
37


According to settled case-law, in the absence of harmonisation of EU legislation in the field of penalties applicable where conditions laid down by arrangements under that legislation are not complied with, Member States are empowered to choose the penalties which seem to them to be appropriate. They must, however, exercise that power in accordance with EU law and its general principles, and, consequently, in accordance with the principle of proportionality (judgment of 9 February 2012, Urbán, C‑210/10, EU:C:2012:64, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
39


Thus, in the present case, the precautionary measures permitted under national legislation at issue in the main proceedings must not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 February 2012, Urbán, C‑210/10, EU:C:2012:64, paragraphs 24 and 53 and the case-law cited).
40


In that context, the Court has held that the severity of penalties must be commensurate with the seriousness of the infringements for which they are imposed, in particular by ensuring a genuinely deterrent effect, while respecting the general principle of proportionality (judgment of 27 March 2014, LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais, C‑565/12, EU:C:2014:190, paragraph 45).
41


Furthermore, the Court has held that Member States are required to comply with the principle of proportionality not only as regards the determination of factors constituting an infringement and the determination of the rules concerning the severity of fines, but also as regards the assessment of the factors which may be taken into account in the fixing of a fine (judgment of 9 February 2012, Urbán, C‑210/10, EU:C:2012:64, paragraph 54).