Mohamed Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL and Others.
Date: 2016-12-01
40


In that regard, it must be recalled that the European Union approved the UN Convention by way of Decision 2010/48. Consequently, the provisions of that convention are thus, from the time of its entry into force, an integral part of the EU legal order (see judgment of 18 March 2014, Z., C‑363/12, EU:C:2014:159, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited). Moreover, according to the appendix to Annex II to that decision, which concerns independent living and social inclusion, work and employment, Directive 2000/78 is one of the EU acts relating to matters governed by that convention.
41


It follows that that convention may be relied on for the purposes of interpreting that directive, which must, as far as possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with that convention (see judgments of 11 April 2013, HK Danmark, C‑335/11 and C‑337/11, EU:C:2013:222, paragraph 32, and of 18 March 2014, Z., C‑363/12, EU:C:2014:159, paragraph 75).
42


It is for that reason that, following the ratification by the EU of the UN Convention, the Court took the view that the concept of ‘disability’ within the meaning of Directive 2000/78 must be understood as referring to a limitation which results in particular from long-term physical, mental or psychological impairments which, in interaction with various barriers, may hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other workers (see judgments of 11 April 2013, HK Danmark, C‑335/11 and C‑337/11, EU:C:2013:222, paragraph 38; of 18 March 2014, Z., C‑363/12, EU:C:2014:159, paragraph 76; and of 18 December 2014, FOA, C‑354/13, EU:C:2014:2463, paragraph 53).
43


Consequently, the expression ‘persons with disabilities’ used in Article 5 of that directive must be interpreted as encompassing all persons suffering from a disability corresponding to the definition set out in the preceding paragraph (judgment of 4 July 2013, Commission v Italy, C‑312/11, not published, EU:C:2013:446, paragraph 57).
44


It must be added that the directive covers, inter alia, disabilities caused by an accident (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 April 2013, HK Danmark, C‑335/11 and C‑337/11, EU:C:2013:222, paragraph 40).
45


Therefore, if an accident entails a limitation resulting in particular from long-term physical, mental or psychological impairments which, in interaction with various barriers, may hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other workers, and if that limitation is long-term, it may come within the concept of ‘disability’ within the meaning of Directive 2000/78 (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 April 2013, HK Danmark, C‑335/11 and C‑337/11, EU:C:2013:222, paragraph 41).
50


According to settled case-law, the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, which must take into account the context of that provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, inter alia, judgments of 18 January 1984, Ekro, 327/82, EU:C:1984:11, paragraph 11, and of 16 June 2016, Pebros Servizi, C‑511/14, EU:C:2016:448, paragraph 36).
53


Moreover, the ‘long-term’ nature of the limitation must be assessed in relation to the condition of incapacity, as such, of the person concerned at the time of the alleged discriminatory act adopted against him (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2006, Chacón Navas, C‑13/05, EU:C:2006:456, paragraph 29).
54


With regard to the notion of the ‘long-term’ nature of a limitation in the context of Article 1 of Directive 2000/78 and of the objective pursued by that directive, it must be recalled that, according to the case-law of the Court, the importance which the EU legislature attaches to measures for adapting the workplace to the disability demonstrates that it envisaged situations in which participation in professional life is hindered over a long period of time (see judgment of 11 July 2006, Chacón Navas, C‑13/05, EU:C:2006:456, paragraph 45).
56


The evidence which makes it possible to find that a limitation is ‘long-term’ includes the fact that, at the time of the allegedly discriminatory act, the incapacity of the person concerned does not display a clearly defined prognosis as regards short-term progress or, as the Advocate General has, in essence, noted in point 47 of his Opinion, the fact that that incapacity is likely to be significantly prolonged before that person has recovered.
58


In the event that the referring court should conclude that the limitation of Mr Daouidi’s capacity is ‘long-term’, it is necessary to recall that unfavourable treatment on grounds of disability undermines the protection provided for by Directive 2000/78 only in so far as it constitutes discrimination within the meaning of Article 2(1) of that directive (see judgments of 11 July 2006, Chacón Navas, C‑13/05, EU:C:2006:456, paragraph 48, and of 11 April 2013, HK Danmark, C‑335/11 and C‑337/11, EU:C:2013:222, paragraph 71).
61


In this regard, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the Court may interpret EU law only within the limits of the powers conferred on it (judgment of 27 March 2014, Torralbo Marcos, C‑265/13, EU:C:2014:187, paragraph 27, and order of 25 February 2016, Aiudapds, C‑520/15, not published, EU:C:2016:124, paragraph 18).
63


As is apparent from the Court’s settled case-law, where a legal situation does not come within the scope of EU law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and any provisions of the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction (see judgment of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 22, and order of 25 February 2016, Aiudapds, C‑520/15, not published, EU:C:2016:124, paragraph 20).
67


Therefore, as pointed out by the Advocate General in point 52 of his Opinion, since the application of Directive 2000/78 to the case in the main proceedings is linked to the assessment by the referring court to be carried out following the present judgment of the Court, it is not necessary, at the present stage of the proceedings, to find that the situation at issue in the main proceedings comes within the scope of EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 March 2014, Torralbo Marcos, C‑265/13, EU:C:2014:187, paragraph 40).