larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Criminal proceedings against Uber France.
Date: 2018-04-10
19


Thus, the Court first took the view that an intermediation service that enables the transfer, by means of a smartphone application, of information concerning the booking of a transport service between the passenger and the non-professional driver who will carry out the transportation using his own vehicle meets, in principle, the criteria for classification as an ‘information society service’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34 (judgment of 20 December 2017, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi, C‑434/15, EU:C:2017:981, paragraph 35).
20


However, the Court noted that the intermediation service at issue in the case giving rise to that judgment was more than an intermediation service consisting of putting, by means of a smartphone application, non-professional drivers using their own vehicles in contact with persons who wish to make an urban journey (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 December 2017, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi, C‑434/15, EU:C:2017:981, paragraph 37).
21


In that regard, the Court found that the intermediation service provided by the company concerned was inherently linked to the offer by that company of non-public urban transport services, in view of the fact that, in the first place, that company provided an application without which those drivers would not have been led to provide transport services, and the persons who wished to make an urban journey would not have used the services provided by those drivers and, in the second place, that company exercised decisive influence over the conditions under which services were provided by those drivers, inter alia by determining the maximum fare, by collecting that fare from the customer before paying part of it to the non-professional driver of the vehicle, and by exercising a certain control over the quality of the vehicles, the drivers and their conduct, which could, in some circumstances, result in their exclusion (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 December 2017, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi, C‑434/15, EU:C:2017:981, paragraphs 38 and 39).
22


The Court found, on the basis of those factors, that the intermediation service at issue in that case had to be regarded as forming an integral part of an overall service the main component of which was a transport service and, accordingly, had to be classified, not as an ‘information society service’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34, but as a ‘service in the field of transport’ within the meaning of Article 2(2)(d) of Directive 2006/123 (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 December 2017, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi, C‑434/15, EU:C:2017:981, paragraph 40).
23


The Court inferred from that finding, in particular, that that intermediation service did not come under Directive 2006/123, since services in the field of transport are among those expressly excluded from the scope of that directive pursuant to Article 2(2)(d) thereof (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 December 2017, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi, C‑434/15, EU:C:2017:981, paragraph 43).
Finnair Oyj v Keskinäinen Vakuutusyhtiö Fennia.
Date: 2018-04-12
19


It should be noted that the Montreal Convention was signed by the European Community on 9 December 1999 and approved on its behalf by the Council of the European Union on 5 April 2001. That convention entered into force, so far as the European Union is concerned, on 28 June 2004.
20


As from that date, the Montreal Convention has been an integral part of the European Union legal order and, accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling concerning its interpretation (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 January 2006, IATA and ELFAA, C‑344/04, EU:C:2006:10, paragraph 36, and of 6 May 2010, Walz, C‑63/09, EU:C:2010:251, paragraph 20).
21


In that regard, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties, which codifies general international law binding on the European Union, states that a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose (judgment of 17 February 2016, Air Baltic Corporation, C‑429/14, EU:C:2016:88, paragraph 24).
European Commission v Kingdom of Denmark.
Date: 2018-04-12
25


In order to rule on the substance of the present action, it must be recalled, as a preliminary point, that it is established case-law that in proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations it is for the Commission to prove the existence of the alleged infringement and to provide the Court with the information necessary for it to determine whether the infringement is made out, and the Commission may not rely on any presumption for that purpose (judgments of 12 May 2005, Commission v Belgium, C‑287/03, EU:C:2005:282, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited, and of 19 May 2011, Commission v Malta, C‑376/09, EU:C:2011:320, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
27


In that connection, it should also be recalled that, if, by virtue of the very nature of regulations and of their function in the system of sources of European Union law, the provisions of regulations generally have immediate effect in the national legal systems without its being necessary for the national authorities to adopt measures of application, however, some of their provisions may necessitate, for their implementation, the adoption of measures of application by the Member States (judgments of 21 December 2011, Danske Svineproducenter, C‑316/10, EU:C:2011:863, paragraphs 39 and 40, and of 30 March 2017, Lingurár, C‑315/16, EU:C:2017:244, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
28


It is established that Member States may adopt implementing measures for a regulation provided that they do not thereby obstruct its direct applicability or conceal its nature as an act of EU law; that they specify that they are acting in exercise of a discretion conferred on them under that regulation; and that they adhere to the parameters laid down thereunder (judgments of 21 December 2011, Danske Svineproducenter, C‑316/10, EU:C:2011:863, paragraph 41, and of 30 March 2017, Lingurár, C‑315/16, EU:C:2017:244, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
29


It is by referring to the relevant provisions of the regulation concerned, interpreted in the light of its objectives, that it may be determined whether they prohibit, require or allow Member States to adopt certain implementing measures and, particularly in the latter case, whether the measure concerned comes within the scope of the discretion that each Member State is recognised as having (judgment of 30 March 2017, Lingurár, C‑315/16, EU:C:2017:244, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
50


The principle of proportionality, which applies to, inter alia, the legislative and regulatory authorities of the Member States when they apply European Union law, requires that measures implemented by means of a provision must be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it (judgment of 21 December 2011, Danske Svineproducenter, C‑316/10, EU:C:2011:863, paragraph 52).
Fédération des entreprises de la beauté v Ministre des Affaires sociales, de la Santé et des Droits des femmes and Others.
Date: 2018-04-12
23


It should be recalled that, according to recital 4 of Regulation No 1223/2009, that regulation is intended comprehensively to harmonise the rules in the European Union in order to achieve an internal market for cosmetic products while ensuring a high level of protection of human health. To that end, Article 1 of that regulation establishes rules which must be complied with by any cosmetic product placed on the EU market. Consequently, a Member State cannot make the movement of cosmetic products subject to additional conditions (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 May 1993, Commission v France, C‑246/91, EU:C:1993:174, paragraph 7).
24


In order to ensure that high level of protection, any cosmetic product placed on the EU market must be safe for human health, its safety must be assessed on the basis of the relevant information and a safety report must be drafted and included in the cosmetic product information file (judgment of 21 September 2016, European Federation for Cosmetic Ingredients, C‑592/14, EU:C:2016:703, paragraph 33).
38


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications laid down in Article 53 TFEU, in particular by the introduction of a system which, as a result of the harmonisation of the rules and criteria for recognition, obliges the Member States to accept the equivalence of certain diplomas, without them being able to require the persons concerned to comply with additional requirements, seeks to promote the free movement of persons (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 September 2000, Hocsman, C‑238/98, EU:C:2000:440, paragraphs 31 to 34).
PPC Power a.s. v Finančné riaditeľstvo Slovenskej republiky and Daňový úrad pre vybrané daňové subjekty.
Date: 2018-04-12
18


As is clear from Article 1 of Directive 2003/87, that directive establishes a Community scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading in order to promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner.
20


The allocation of emission allowances of greenhouse gas free of charge is a transitional measure intended to prevent undertakings from losing competitiveness as a result of the scheme for emission allowance trading (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 October 2013, Iberdrola and Others, C‑566/11, C‑567/11, C‑580/11, C‑591/11, C‑620/11 and C‑640/11, EU:C:2013:660, paragraph 45).
21


It is true that no provision of Directive 2003/87 expressly restricts the right of Member States to adopt measures which may affect the economic implications of using such allowances (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 October 2013, Iberdrola and Others, C‑566/11, C‑567/11, C‑580/11, C‑591/11, C‑620/11 and C‑640/11, EU:C:2013:660, paragraph 28, and of 26 February 2015, ŠKO-Energo, C‑43/14, EU:C:2015:120, paragraph 19).
22


The Court has thus held that Member States are free, as a rule, to determine the manner in which the value of the emission allowances allocated free of charge to producers is to be passed on to consumers (judgments of 17 October 2013, Iberdrola and Others, C‑566/11, C‑567/11, C‑580/11, C‑591/11, C‑620/11 and C‑640/11, EU:C:2013:660, paragraph 29, and of 26 February 2015, ŠKO-Energo, C‑43/14, EU:C:2015:120, paragraph 20).
23


Nevertheless, the adoption of such measures may not undermine the objectives pursued by Directive 2003/87 (see judgments of 17 October 2013, Iberdrola and Others, C‑566/11, C‑567/11, C‑580/11, C‑591/11, C‑620/11 and C‑640/11, EU:C:2013:660, paragraph 30, and of 26 February 2015, ŠKO-Energo, C‑43/14, EU:C:2015:120, paragraph 21).
24


In that regard, it must be pointed out that, in order to achieve its objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner, Directive 2003/87 relies on the economic value of allowances to encourage companies to reduce their emissions and, to that end, introduces a system of emission allowance trading. Undertakings can thus use the emission allowances allocated to them, or sell them, on the basis of their market value and the profits which they could thus obtain from them (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 October 2013, Iberdrola and Others, C‑566/11, C‑567/11, C‑580/11, C‑591/11, C‑620/11 and C‑640/11, EU:C:2013:660, paragraphs 47, 49 and 55).
25


It is therefore necessary for the proper functioning of that system that a levy taken by a Member State from the economic value of those emission allowances should not diminish the incentive to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to the point of removing it entirely (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 October 2013, Iberdrola and Others, C‑566/11, C‑567/11, C‑580/11, C‑591/11, C‑620/11 and C‑640/11, EU:C:2013:660, paragraph 58).
Conseils et mise en relations (CMR) SARL v Demeures terre et tradition SARL.
Date: 2018-04-19
22


According to the Court’s settled case-law, in determining the scope of a provision of EU law, in this case Article 17 of Directive 86/653, its wording, context and objectives must all be taken into account (judgment of 16 April 2015, Angerer, C‑477/13, EU:C:2015:239, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
31


In the first place, as regards the context of Article 17 of that directive, it should be noted, first, that Article 18 of the directive provides an exhaustive list of the circumstances in which indemnity or compensation for damage is not payable. Termination of the trial period is not mentioned. In addition, since Article 18 represents an exception to the right to indemnity and compensation, it must be interpreted strictly. It follows that that article cannot be interpreted in a way which amounts to adding a ground for exclusion of the indemnity or compensation for which no express provision is made (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 October 2010, Volvo Car Germany, C‑203/09, EU:C:2010:647, paragraph 42). To consider that no indemnity or compensation is payable when the termination of the contractual relationship occurs during the trial period is in fact tantamount to allowing a ground for exclusion not provided for in Article 18 of that directive.
33


In the second place, as regards the objective of Directive 86/653, it is apparent from its second and third recitals that one of the objectives of that directive is to protect the commercial agent in his relations with the principal (judgment of 17 May 2017, ERGO Poist’ovňa, C‑48/16, EU:C:2017:377, paragraph 41).
34


In that regard, the Court has held that Articles 17 and 18 of that directive are of crucial importance, as they define the level of protection which the European Union legislature considered reasonable to grant commercial agents in the course of the creation of the single market (judgment of 17 October 2013, Unamar, C‑184/12, EU:C:2013:663, paragraph 39). In addition, according to the Court’s case-law, the purpose of Articles 17 to 19 of that directive is to protect the commercial agent after termination of the commercial agency contract. The regime established by Directive 86/653 for that purpose is mandatory in nature (judgments of 9 November 2000, Ingmar, C‑381/98, EU:C:2000:605, paragraph 21, and of 23 March 2006, Honyvem Informazioni Commerciali, C‑465/04, EU:C:2006:199, paragraph 22).
35


The Court also has stated that, in the light of the aim of Directive 86/653, any interpretation of Article 17 which may prove to be detrimental to the commercial agent is not permissible (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 March 2009, Semen, C‑348/07, EU:C:2009:195, paragraph 21).
Industrias Químicas del Vallés, SA v Administración General del Estado and Sapec Agro, SA.
Date: 2018-05-17
27


In that regard, it must be recalled that, in accordance with the Court’s established case-law, when interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 June 2016, Thomas Philipps, C‑419/15, EU:C:2016:468, paragraph 18, and of 26 July 2017, Jafari, C‑646/16, EU:C:2017:586, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).
35


As regards, in the third and final place, the aim of Directive 2010/28, it must be noted that it is a directive which implements Directive 91/414. It must therefore, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, be interpreted, as far as possible, consistently with the provisions of the basic directive, namely Directive 91/414 (see, to that effect, the judgments of 22 May 2008, Feinchemie Schwebda and Bayer CropScience, C‑361/06, EU:C:2008:296, paragraph 49, and of 26 July 2017, Czech Republic v Commission, C‑696/15 P, EU:C:2017:595, paragraph 33).
36


According to its fifth, sixth and ninth recitals, Directive 91/414 seeks to remove barriers to intra-Community trade in plant products, while maintaining a high level of protection of the environment and of human and animal health (judgment of 18 July 2007, Industrias Químicas del Vallés v Commission, C‑326/05 P, EU:C:2007:443, paragraph 74).
Dávid Vámos v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága.
Date: 2018-05-17
37


In that regard, the Court has established that it follows from that provision that every Member State is under an obligation to take all legislative and administrative measures appropriate for ensuring collection of all the VAT due on its territory and for preventing evasion (judgment of 9 July 2015, Cabinet Medical Veterinar Dr. Tomoiagă Andrei, C‑144/14, EU:C:2015:452, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
38


The Court has also held that, outside the limits laid down therein, Article 273 of the VAT Directive does not specify either the conditions or the obligations which the Member States may impose and therefore gives the Member States a margin of discretion with regard to the means of ensuring collection of all the VAT due on their territory and for combating fraud (judgment of 26 October 2017, BB construct, C‑534/16, EU:C:2017:820, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
41


However, while the Member States have discretion in the choice of measures to be adopted in order to ensure the correct collection of VAT and to prevent evasion, they must, however, exercise that power in accordance with EU law and its general principles, and, in particular, in accordance with the principle of proportionality (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2015, Salomie and Oltean, C‑183/14, EU:C:2015:454, paragraph 50 and case-law cited), and the principles of fiscal neutrality and legal certainty.
44


The Court made clear, in that connection, that the lack of retroactivity of the approval process does not make that process disproportionate (judgment of 9 September 2004, Vermietungsgesellschaft Objekt Kirchberg, C‑269/03, EU:C:2004:512, paragraph 29).
46


Secondly, as regards the principle of fiscal neutrality, which was intended by the EU legislature to reflect, in matters relating to VAT, the general principle of equal treatment (judgment of 26 October 2017, BB construct, C‑534/16, EU:C:2017:820, paragraph 29), it has been held that the measures that Member States may adopt in order to ensure the correct collection of VAT and to prevent evasion may not be used in such a way that they would have the effect of undermining the neutrality of VAT (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 April 2013, Rusedespred, C‑138/12, EU:C:2013:233, paragraphs 28 and 29 and the case-law cited).
50


Thirdly, it must be found that the principle of legal certainty must be observed not only by the EU institutions, but also by Member States in the exercise of the powers conferred on them under EU directives (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2015, Salomie and Oltean, C‑183/14, EU:C:2015:454, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited)
51


That principle requires the tax position of the taxable person not to be open to challenge indefinitely (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 February 2014, Fatorie, C‑424/12, EU:C:2014:50, paragraph 46).
Junek Europ-Vertrieb GmbH v Lohmann & Rauscher International GmbH & Co. KG.
Date: 2018-05-17
23


In that regard, it is clear from the settled case-law that the specific purpose of a mark is to guarantee the origin of the product bearing that mark and that a repackaging of that product carried out by a third party without the authorisation of the proprietor is likely to create real risks for that guarantee of origin (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 November 2016, Ferring Lægemidler, C‑297/15, EU:C:2016:857, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited).
24


According to the case-law of the Court, it is the repackaging of the trade-marked pharmaceutical products in itself which is prejudicial to the specific subject matter of the mark, and it is not necessary in that context to assess the actual effects of the repackaging by the parallel importer (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 April 2007, Boehringer Ingelheim and Others, C‑348/04, EU:C:2007:249, paragraph 15).
25


In addition, it must be observed that the Court has held, as regards Article 7(2) of the First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1) the wording of which is equivalent to that of Article 13(2) of Regulation No 207/2009, that, under that provision, the trade mark proprietor’s opposition to repackaging, in that it constitutes a derogation from free movement of goods, cannot be accepted if the proprietor’s exercise of that right constitutes a disguised restriction on trade between Member States within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 36 TFEU (judgments of 23 April 2002, Boehringer Ingelheim and Others, C‑143/00, EU:C:2002:246, paragraph 18 and of 26 April 2007, Boehringer Ingelheim and Others, C‑348/04, EU:C:2007:249, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).
26


A disguised restriction within the meaning of that provision will exist where the exercise by a trade mark proprietor of its right to oppose repackaging contributes to artificial partitioning of the markets between Member States and where, in addition, the repackaging is done in such a way that the legitimate interests of the proprietor are respected. This means, in particular, that the repackaging must not adversely affect the original condition of the product and must not be such as to harm the reputation of the mark (judgment of 26 April 2007, Boehringer Ingelheim and Others, C‑348/04, EU:C:2007:249, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
27


The Court thus laid down the principles on the restrictions on the exhaustion of the rights conferred by a trade mark in the context of the parallel importation of pharmaceutical products (judgments of 11 July 1996, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others, C‑427/93, C‑429/93 and C‑436/93, EU:C:1996:282, paragraph 79, and of 26 April 2007, Boehringer Ingelheim and Others, C‑348/04, EU:C:2007:249, paragraph 32).
30


As regards the concept of ‘repackaging’, the Court has clarified that it includes the relabelling of the pharmaceutical products bearing the mark (judgment of 26 April 2007, Boehringer Ingelheim and Others, C‑348/04, EU:C:2007:249, paragraph 28).
Dyrektor Izby Celnej w Poznaniu v Kompania Piwowarska S.A. w Poznaniu.
Date: 2018-05-17
27


As regards the question referred, it must be observed that the concept of ‘degree Plato’ mentioned in Article 3(1) of Directive 92/83 is not defined either in that directive or in other acts of the European Union. In those circumstances, the meaning and scope of that concept must be determined by considering its usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which it occurs and the purposes of the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 March 2017, Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs Frankfurt am Main, C‑568/15, EU:C:2017:154, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).