Samantha Elrick v Bezirksregierung Köln.
Date: 2013-10-24
18.  First of all, it must be recalled that, as a German national, Ms Elrick enjoys the status of a citizen of the Union under Article 20(1) TFEU and may therefore rely on the rights conferred on those having that status, including against their Member State of origin (see Case C‑192/05 Tas-Hagen and Tas  [2006] ECR I‑10451, paragraph 19; Joined Cases C‑11/06 and C‑12/06 Morgan and Bucher  [2007] ECR I‑9161, paragraph 22; and Joined Cases C‑523/11 and C‑585/11 Prinz and Seeberger [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
19. As the Court has held on numerous occasions, the status of citizen of the Union is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those among such nationals who find themselves in the same situation to receive, as regards the material scope of the FEU Treaty, the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for in that regard (Case C‑224/98 D’Hoop [2002] ECR I‑6191, paragraph 28; Case C‑46/12 N. [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 27; and Prinz and Seeberger , paragraph 24).
20. The situations falling within the scope of EU law include those involving the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, in particular those involving the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States, as conferred by Article 21 TFEU ( Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 23, and Prinz and Seeberger , paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
21. In that respect, although the Member States are competent, under Article 165(1) TFEU, as regards the content of teaching and the organisation of their respective education systems, they must exercise that competence in compliance with EU law and, in particular, in compliance with the Treaty provisions on the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States, as conferred by Article 21(1) TFEU (see, Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 24 and the case-law cited, and Prinz and Seeberger , paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
22. Next, it should be recalled that national legislation which places certain nationals of the Member State concerned at a disadvantage simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State constitutes a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 21(1) TFEU on every citizen of the Union (Case C‑406/04 De Cuyper  [2006] ECR I‑6947, paragraph 39; Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 25; and Prinz and Seeberger , paragraph 27). In that respect, a national of a Member State who goes to another Member State and pursues secondary education there exercises the freedom of movement guaranteed by Article 20 TFEU (see, to that effect, D’Hoop , paragraphs 29 to 34, and Case C‑209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I‑2119, paragraph 35).
23. Indeed, the opportunities offered by the Treaty in relation to freedom of movement for citizens of the Union cannot be fully effective if a national of a Member State can be deterred from availing himself of them by obstacles placed in the way of his stay in another Member State by legislation of his State of origin penalising the mere fact that he has used those opportunities (see D’Hoop , paragraph 31; Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 26; and Prinz and Seeberger , paragraph 28).
24. That consideration is particularly important in the field of education in view of the aims pursued by Article 6(e) TFEU and the second indent of Article 165(2) TFEU, namely, inter alia, encouraging mobility of students and teachers (see D’Hoop , paragraph 32; Case C‑147/03 Commission  v Austria [2005] ECR I‑5969, paragraph 44; Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 27; and Prinz and Seeberger , paragraph 29).
25. Moreover, it must be noted that EU law does not impose any obligation on the Member State to provide a system of education or training grants for studies pursued in another Member State. However, where a Member State provides for a system of education or training grants which enables students to receive such grants, it must ensure that the detailed rules for the award of those grants do not create an unjustified restriction of the right to move and reside within the territory of the Member States (see, to that effect, Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 28, and Prinz and Seeberger , paragraph 30).
29. Such a condition is likely to dissuade European Union citizens, such as Ms Elrick, from exercising their right to freedom of movement and residence in another Member State, given the impact that exercising that freedom is likely to have on the right to an education or training grant ( Prinz and Seeberger , paragraph 32). Moreover, the restrictive effects created by that condition cannot be regarded as too uncertain or too insignificant to constitute a restriction on the freedom of movement and residence (see, to that effect, Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 32).
30. In accordance with settled case-law, legislation which is such as to restrict a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty can be justified in the light of EU law only if it is based on objective considerations of public interest independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and if it is proportionate to the legitimate objective pursued by the provisions of national law (see De Cuyper , paragraph 40; Tas-Hagen and Tas , paragraph 33; and Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 33). It follows from the case-law of the Court that a measure is proportionate if, while appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective pursued, it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective ( De Cuyper , paragraph 42; Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 33; and Prinz and Seeberger , paragraph 33).
33. Accordingly, the imposition of a condition concerning duration such as that at issue in the main proceedings appears to be inconsistent and cannot be regarded as proportionate to that objective (see, by analogy, Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 36).