José Luís Núñez Torreiro v AIG Europe Limited, Sucursal en España and Unión Española de Entidades Aseguradoras y Reaseguradoras (Unespa).
Date: 2017-12-20
24


It must be recalled, to that end, that the Court has held that that very concept, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 72/166 (‘the First Directive’), the content of which essentially corresponds to that of the first and second paragraphs of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103, cannot be left to the discretion of each Member State, but constitutes an autonomous concept of EU law, which must, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, be interpreted in the light, in particular, of the context of that provision and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 September 2014, Vnuk, C‑162/13, EU:C:2014:2146, paragraphs 41 and 42, and of 28 November 2017, Rodrigues de Andrade, C‑514/16, EU:C:2017:908, paragraph 31).
25


In that regard, as stated in recital (1) of Directive 2009/103, that directive codified the First Directive, the Second Directive 84/5, the Third Directive 90/232, Directive 2000/26 and Directive 2005/14. Those directives progressively defined the obligations of Member States with respect to compulsory insurance. While the aim of those directives was to ensure the free movement of vehicles normally based on European Union territory and of persons travelling in those vehicles, they also had the objective of guaranteeing that the victims of accidents caused by those vehicles receive comparable treatment irrespective of where in the European Union the accident occurred (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 October 2012, Marques Almeida, C‑300/10, EU:C:2012:656, paragraph 26; of 4 September 2014, Vnuk, C‑162/13, EU:C:2014:2146, paragraph 50; and of 28 November 2017, Rodrigues de Andrade, C‑514/16, EU:C:2017:908, paragraph 32).
27


In addition, it is clear from the development of the EU legislation concerning compulsory insurance that the objective of protecting the victims of accidents caused by those vehicles has continuously been pursued and reinforced by the EU legislature (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 September 2014, Vnuk, C‑162/13, EU:C:2014:2146, paragraphs 52 to 55, and of 28 November 2017, Rodrigues de Andrade, C‑514/16, EU:C:2017:908, paragraph 33).
28


It follows from the foregoing that the first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103 must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘use of vehicles’ in that provision is not limited to road use, that is to say, to travel on public roads, but that that concept covers any use of a vehicle that is consistent with the normal function of that vehicle (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 September 2014, Vnuk, C‑162/13, EU:C:2014:2146, paragraph 59, and of 28 November 2017, Rodrigues de Andrade, C‑514/16, EU:C:2017:908, paragraph 34).
29


In that regard, the Court has stated that, in so far as the motor vehicles defined in Article 1(1) of the First Directive, the wording of which corresponds to that of Article 1(1) of Directive 2009/103, are, irrespective of their characteristics, intended normally to serve as a means of transport, that concept covers any use of a vehicle as a means of transport (judgment of 28 November 2017, Rodrigues de Andrade, C‑514/16, EU:C:2017:908, paragraphs 37 and 38).
30


The Court has held, moreover, that the scope of the concept of ‘use of vehicles’ does not depend on the characteristics of the terrain on which the motor vehicle is used (judgment of 28 November 2017, Rodrigues de Andrade, C‑514/16, EU:C:2017:908, paragraph 35).
31


There is, moreover, no provision in Directive 2009/103 that limits the scope of the insurance obligation, and of the protection which that obligation is intended to give to the victims of accidents caused by motor vehicles, to the use of such vehicles on certain terrain or on certain roads (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 November 2017, Rodrigues de Andrade, C‑514/16, EU:C:2017:908, paragraph 36).
38


In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 20 July 2017, Piscarreta Ricardo, C‑416/16, EU:C:2017:574, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).