larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
TNT Express Worldwide (Poland) sp. z o.o. v Minister Finansów.
Date: 2013-05-16
24. Since it constitutes a derogation from the rule laid down in Article 63 of the VAT Directive, Article 66 of that directive must be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, Case C‑19/12 Efir [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 31).
25. Although the fact that the legislature substantially extended the scope of the permitted derogations suggests that it intended to allow the Member States a wide margin of discretion (see Case C‑144/94 Italittica  [1995] ECR I‑3653, paragraph 15), that does not allow the inference that a Member State has a discretion to establish a time at which the VAT becomes chargeable other than one of those specified in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 66 of the VAT Directive.
28. The Court has held that Article 10(2) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1) (now Article 66(a) of the VAT Directive) is to be interpreted as meaning that where a Member State opts for the derogation allowed under the first indent of the third subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 77/388, (now Article 66(c) of the VAT Directive), that is to say, where it makes the tax chargeable no later than the issue of the invoice or the document serving as invoice, it may, in accordance with the third indent, provide that the tax is to become chargeable ‘where an invoice or document serving as invoice is not issued, or is issued late, within a specified period from the date of the chargeable event’ (see Italittica , paragraph 22).
29. It must also be noted that, in that judgment, the Court added that the fact that ‘there is no such possibility where a Member State opts for the derogation laid down in the second indent [of Article 10(2) of Directive 77/388, now Article 66(b) of the VAT Directive] is probably due to the fact that the [European Union] legislature considered that a trader’s interest in receiving consideration for the service carried out was a sufficient incentive to ensure prompt payment for the service’ (see, to that effect, Italittica , paragraph 23).
31. It should also be recalled that, as is clear from recital 24 in the preamble to the VAT Directive, the concepts of ‘chargeable event’ and ‘chargeability of VAT’ should be harmonised if the introduction of the common system of VAT and of any subsequent amendments thereto are to take effect at the same time in all Member States. The European Union legislature intended maximum harmonisation of the date on which liability to pay VAT arises in all the Member States in order to ensure the uniform collection of that tax.
Scandic Distilleries SA v Direcţia Generală de Administrare a Marilor Contribuabili.
Date: 2013-05-30
22. The purpose of Directive 92/12 is to lay down a number of rules on the holding, movement and monitoring of products subject to excise duty, in particular so as to ensure that chargeability of excise duties is identical in all the Member States (see Case C‑5/05 Joustra  [2006] ECR I‑11075, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
23. That harmonisation makes it possible, in principle, to avoid double taxation in relations between Member States (see, to that effect, Case C‑392/05 Alevizos [2007] ECR I‑3505, paragraph 38).
24. In order to ensure that the levying of the excise duty occurs in one Member State only, namely the one in which the products are consumed, Article 22 of Directive 92/12 provides, under certain conditions, for the reimbursement of the excise duties paid in another Member State.
The Queen, on the application of MA and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department.
Date: 2013-06-06
36. It should be borne in mind in that regard that it has consistently been held that the procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU is an instrument for cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, by means of which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of European Union law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them (see, inter alia, Case C‑314/96 Djabali [1998] ECR I‑1149, paragraph 17; Case C‑225/02 García Blanco [2005] ECR I‑523, paragraph 26; and Case C‑197/10 Unió de Pagesos de Catalunya  [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 16).
37. Questions on the interpretation of European Union law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling from a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (Case C‑45/09 Rosenbladt  [2010] ECR I‑9391, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
50. It must be borne in mind however that, according to settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of European Union law it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, Case C‑19/08 Petrosian  [2009] ECR I‑495, paragraph 34, and Case C‑403/09 PPU Detiček  [2009] ECR I‑12193, paragraph 33).
58. Thus, the second paragraph of Article 6 of Regulation No 343/2003 cannot be interpreted in such a way that it disregards that fundamental right (see, by analogy, Detiček , paragraphs 54 and 55, and Case C‑400/10 PPU McB. [2010] ECR I‑8965, paragraph 60).
Paltrade EOOD v Nachalnik na Mitnicheski punkt - Pristanishte Varna pri Mitnitsa Varna.
Date: 2013-06-06
26. In particular, it follows from Article 13(3) of the basic Regulation that, in the event of circumvention, the extension of the established definitive measures is to take effect from the date on which the registration was imposed pursuant to Article 14(5) of that regulation.
28. Accordingly, it must be pointed out that, according to the purpose and scheme of the basic Regulation, in particular recital 19 and Article 13, the sole purpose of a regulation extending an anti-dumping duty is to ensure the effectiveness of that duty and to prevent its circumvention. Consequently, a measure extending a definitive anti-dumping duty is merely ancillary to the initial act establishing that duty which protects the effective application of the definitive measures.
29. It follows that the obligation to register the imports concerned, in the specific context of a circumvention, is also aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of the extended definitive measures by making possible the retroactive application of duties and thereby avoiding a situation in which the definitive measures to be applied are deprived of their effectiveness. In that respect, since the Commission has directed the competent national authorities to take the appropriate steps to register the imports concerned in order to ensure the retroactive imposition of extended anti‑dumping duties, those authorities are required to comply with that obligation.
Piepenbrock Dienstleistungen GmbH & Co. KG v Kreis Düren.
Date: 2013-06-13
29. In that regard, first, it is immaterial, on the one hand, whether that operator is itself a contracting authority and, on the other hand, whether the body concerned is primarily profit-making, whether it is structured as an undertaking or whether it has a continuous presence on the market (judgment of 19 December 2012 in Case C‑159/11 Ordine degli Ingegneri della Provincia di Lecce and Others [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 26).
31. Thirdly, a contract must be considered as being ‘for pecuniary interest’, within the meaning of Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 2004/18 even if the remuneration provided for remains limited to reimbursement of the expenditure incurred to provide the agreed service (see, to that effect, Ordine degli Ingegneri della Provincia di Lecce and Others , paragraph 29).
33. Moreover, such a contract does not appear to be one of the two types of contracts which, although entered into by public entities, do not come within the scope of European Union public procurement law.
34. The first type of contracts are those concluded by a public entity with a person who is legally distinct from that entity where, at the same time, that entity exercises over the person concerned a control which is similar to that which it exercises over its own departments and where that person carries out the essential part of its activities with the entity or with entities which control it (see, to that effect, Teckal , paragraph 50, and Ordine degli Ingegneri della Provincia di Lecce and Others , paragraph 32).
36. The second type of contracts are those which establish cooperation between public entities with the aim of ensuring that a public task that all of them have to perform is carried out ( Ordine degli Ingegneri della Provincia di Lecce and Others , paragraph 34).
37. In those circumstances, the European Union rules on public procurement are not applicable in so far as such contracts are concluded exclusively by public entities, without the participation of a private party, no private provider of services is placed in a position of advantage vis-à-vis competitors and implementation of that cooperation is governed solely by considerations and requirements relating to the pursuit of objectives in the public interest ( Ordine degli Ingegneri della Provincia di Lecce and Others , paragraph 35).
38. All of the above criteria are cumulative, with the result that a contract between public entities can fall outside the scope of European Union public procurement rules by virtue of that exception only if that contract fulfils all of those criteria (see, to that effect, Ordine degli Ingegneri della Provincia di Lecce and Others , paragraph 36).
Galin Kostov v Direktor na Direktsia ‘Obzhalvane I upravlenie na izpalnenieto’ — Varna pri Tsentralno upravlenie na Natsionalnata agentsia za prihodite.
Date: 2013-06-13
25. The Court must take account, under the division of jurisdiction between the Community Courts and the national courts, of the factual and legislative context, as described in the order for reference, in which the question put to it is set (see Case C‑153/02 Neri  [2003] ECR I‑13555, paragraphs 34 and 35, and Joined Cases C‑482/01 and C‑493/01 Orfanopoulos and Oliveri  [2004] ECR I‑5257, paragraph 42).
31. Having regard to the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that Article 9(1) of the VAT Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that a natural person who is already a taxable person for VAT purposes in respect of his activities as a self-employed bailiff must be regarded as a ‘taxable person’ in respect of any other economic activity carried out occasionally, provided that that activity constitutes an activity within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 9(1) of the VAT Directive.
Costs
European Commission v Republic of Poland.
Date: 2013-06-27
28. Before ruling on the Republic of Poland’s argument that there is an absolute bar to proceeding with an action, it should be borne in mind that, according to the Court of Justice’s settled case-law, the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is to give the Member State concerned an opportunity, on the one hand, to comply with its obligations under European Union law and, on the other, to avail itself of its right to defend itself against the objections formulated by the Commission. The subject‑matter of the action brought under Article 258 TFEU is, therefore, delimited by the pre-litigation procedure provided for by that article. Accordingly, the action cannot be founded on any objections other than those stated in the pre‑litigation procedure (see, inter alia, Case C‑152/98 Commission  v Netherlands  [2001] ECR I‑3463, paragraph 23, and Case C‑340/10 Commission  v Cyprus [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 21). It must accordingly be founded on the same grounds and pleas as those stated in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C‑50/09 Commission  v Ireland  [2011] ECR I‑873, paragraph 93), which must contain a cogent and detailed exposition of the reasons which led the Commission to the conclusion that the Member State concerned has failed to fulfil one of its obligations under Community law (see, inter alia, Case C‑274/07 Commission  v Lithuania [2008] ECR I‑7117, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
29. That requirement cannot, however, go so far as to make it necessary that the national provisions mentioned in the reasoned opinion and in the application should always be completely identical (see Case C‑11/95 Commission  v Belgium [1996] ECR I‑4115, paragraph 74, and judgment of 22 December 2008 in Case C‑283/07 Commission  v Italy , paragraph 22).
30. Nevertheless, where the Commission has not indicated during the pre-litigation procedure that the subject-matter of the action, that is to say, the infringement attributed to the Member State in question, extends beyond the national provisions specified in that procedure, then the action is inadmissible in so far as it covers national provisions other than those specified during the pre-litigation procedure (see, to that effect, Case 166/82 Commission  v Italy [1984] ECR I‑459, paragraphs 19 to 22, and Case C‑243/89 Commission  v Denmark  [1993] ECR I‑3353, paragraphs 15 to 17). That is because, in such a situation, the grounds of the alleged infringement and, therefore, its basis, have been extended without the Member State concerned having been given an opportunity, on the one hand, to comply with its obligations under European Union law and, on the other, to avail itself of its right to defend itself against the objections formulated by the Commission.
Consideration of the first plea in law
– Arguments of the parties
Ciro Di Donna v Società imballaggi metallici Salerno srl (SIMSA).
Date: 2013-06-27
24. According to the Court’s settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of European Union law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C-415/93 Bosman  [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59; Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra  [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 38; and Case C‑241/09 Fluxys  [2010] ECR I‑12773, paragraph 28).
25. However, the Court has also held that, in exceptional circumstances, it can examine the conditions in which the case was referred to it by the national court in order to establish whether it has jurisdiction. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, in particular, PreussenElektra , paragraph 39; Case  C‑544/07 Rüffler  [2009] ECR I‑3389, paragraph 38; Case C‑314/08 Filipiak  [2009] ECR I‑11049, paragraph 42; and Case C‑399/11 Melloni [2013] ECR I-0000, paragraph 29).
26. Thus, on the basis of settled case-law, it is clear from both the wording and the scheme of Article 267 TFEU that a national court or tribunal is not empowered to bring a matter before the Court by way of a reference for a preliminary ruling unless a case is pending before it, in which it is called upon to give a decision which is capable of taking account of the preliminary ruling (see to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑225/02 García Blanco  [2005] ECR I-523, paragraph 27 and case-law cited).
27. In the case in the main proceedings, following the judgment of the Corte costituzionale of 24 October 2012, the national legislation applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings is no longer that under consideration in the context of the request for a preliminary ruling (see, by analogy, Fluxys , paragraph 32). That judgment, declaring some of the provisions of Decree No 28/2010 incompatible with the constitution, has the effect of removing them from the national legal system.
32. It follows that, taking into account the development of the dispute before the referring court from the point of view of the applicable law, the Court is no longer in a position to give a ruling on the questions which have been referred to it (see, to that effect, Fluxys , paragraph 34).
Costs
Staatssecretaris van Financiën v Codirex Expeditie BV.
Date: 2013-06-27
32. It is clear from paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 203 of the Customs Code that the unlawful removal from customs supervision of goods liable to import duties gives rise, from the moment of that removal, to a customs debt on importation. ‘Unlawful removal from customs supervision’ covers any act or any omission the result of which is to prevent, even if only for a short time, the competent customs authority from gaining access to goods under customs supervision and from carrying out the monitoring provided for under Article 37(1) of the Customs Code (see United Antwerp Maritime Agencies and Seaport Terminals , paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
33. If, at the time when goods are removed from customs supervision, they have already been placed under the external Community transit procedure, it is the holder of that procedure who – as the ‘principal’ for the purposes of Article 96(1) of the Customs Code – is required to fulfil the obligations arising from the use of that procedure and who is liable for payment of the customs debt in accordance with the fourth indent of Article 203(3) of that code, if the first three indents of paragraph 3 do not apply.
34. On the other hand, if, at the time of that removal, the goods have not yet been placed under the external Community transit procedure, but are still in temporary storage, the person liable for payment of the customs debt – if the first three indents of Article 203(3) of the Customs Code do not apply – is the person who, being responsible for fulfilling the obligations arising from temporary storage, holds the goods, after they have been unloaded, in order to move or store them (see, to that effect, United Antwerp Maritime Agencies and Seaport Terminals , paragraph 39 and the operative part). On the basis of the information in the documents before the Court, that person is not Codirex.
36. First of all, it is apparent from Case C‑66/99 D. Wandel  [2001] ECR I‑873, paragraphs 35 to 38 and 45 – a judgment given in relation to imported goods intended for release for free circulation – that those goods remain in temporary storage until released and that their customs status does not change until they are released by the customs authorities.
55. In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that Articles 50, 67 and 73 of the Customs Code must be interpreted as meaning that the point at which non-Community goods, covered by a customs declaration accepted by the customs authorities for placing under the external Community transit procedure and having the status of goods in temporary storage, are placed under that customs procedure and thereby assigned a customs-approved treatment or use is the moment at which they are released.
Costs
Xeda International SA and Pace International LLC v European Commission.
Date: 2013-06-27
31. According to the Court’s settled case-law, the subject‑matter of the case must continue to exist, like the interest in bringing proceedings, until the final decision, otherwise there will be no need to adjudicate; this presupposes that the action, or as the case may be, the appeal, must be liable to procure an advantage to the party bringing it (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑373/06 P, C‑379/06 P and C‑382/06 P Flaherty and Others  v Commission  [2008] ECR I‑2649, paragraph 25, and Case C‑550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission and Others  [2010] ECR I‑8301, paragraphs 22 and 23).
32. The repeal of the contested act, after the bringing of an action, does not in itself mean that the Courts of the European Union must declare that there is no need to adjudicate for lack of purpose or for lack of interest in bringing proceedings at the date of the delivery of the judgment (see, to that effect, Case C‑362/05 P Wunenburger  v Commission  [2007] ECR I‑4333, paragraph 47). As the appellants argue, since that repeal does not have retroactive effect, the applicant may in particular retain an interest in obtaining a declaration of illegality of that act for the period during which it was applicable and produced its effects, such a declaration retaining an interest at the very least as the basis for a possible action for damages (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑68/94 and C‑30/95 France and Others  v Commission  [1998] ECR I‑1375, paragraph 74).
Simone Gardella v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS).
Date: 2013-07-04
25. It is settled case-law that any Community national who, irrespective of his place of residence and his nationality, has exercised the right to freedom of movement for workers and who has been employed in a Member State other than that of his origin falls within the scope of Article 45 TFEU. A Union national working in a Member State other than his State of origin and who has accepted a post in an international organisation also comes within the scope of that provision (see, to that effect, Case C‑185/04 Öberg  [2006] ECR I‑1453, paragraphs 11 and 12 and the case-law cited).
26. He does not lose his status as worker for the purposes of Article 45 TFEU because he holds employment with an international organisation (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 389/87 and 390/87 Echternach and Moritz [1989] ECR 723, paragraph 11).
38. According to settled case-law, Article 20 TFEU, which sets out generally the right of every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, finds specific expression in Article 45 TFEU in relation to freedom of movement for workers (see Case C‑3/08 Leyman  [2009] ECR I‑9085, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
39. As regards Article 15(2) of the Charter, it must be borne in mind that Article 52(2) thereof, which provides that rights recognised by the Charter for which provision is made in the treaties are to be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined therein. In that vein, Article 15(2) of the Charter reiterates inter alia the free movement of workers guaranteed by Article 45 TFEU, as confirmed by the explanations relating to that provision.