Stefan Fahnenbrock and Others v Hellenische Republik.
Date: 2015-06-11
25. In that regard, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see judgment in Rohm Semiconductor , Case C‑666/13, EU:C:2014:2388, paragraph 38).
27. Next, as regards the inaccuracies alleged in the description of the content of the exchange offer made by the Hellenische Republik, it is sufficient to note that it is not for the Court of Justice but for the national court to ascertain the facts which have given rise to the dispute and to establish the consequences which they have for the judgment which it is required to deliver (judgment in Traum , C‑492/13, EU:C:2014:2267, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
30. Finally, in so far as the Commission appears to allege that there is no dispute pending before the national court ruling in the performance of its judicial functions, it should be noted that the concept ‘give judgment’, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, must be interpreted broadly in order to prevent many procedural questions from being regarded as inadmissible and from being unable to be the subject of interpretation by the Court. That concept must therefore be understood as encompassing the whole of the procedure leading to the judgment of the referring court so that the Court of Justice is able to interpret all procedural provisions of EU law that the referring court is required to apply in order to give judgment (see, by analogy, judgment in Weryński , C‑283/09, EU:C:2011:85, paragraphs 41 and 42).
34. In order to answer those questions, the Court notes, first of all, that, as regards the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36), as amended by the successive conventions on the accession of new Member States thereto (‘the Brussels Convention’), the Court, after finding that Article 1 of the Brussels Convention limited the scope of that convention to ‘civil and commercial matters’, without, however, defining its content and scope, held that it must be regarded as an independent concept to be interpreted by referring, first, to the objectives and scheme of the Brussels Convention and, second, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems (judgment in Lechouritou and Others , C‑292/05, EU:C:2007:102, paragraphs 28 and 29 and the case-law cited).
35. Next, the Court also held that Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1), which limits the scope of that regulation to ‘civil and commercial matters’, without, however, defining its content and scope, must be regarded as an independent concept to be interpreted by referring, first, to the objectives and scheme of that regulation and, second, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems (judgment in flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines , C‑302/13, EU:C:2014:2319, paragraph 24).
36. Finally, once again, based on the fact that Article 1(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (OJ 2000 L 338, p. 1), as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 2116/2004 of 2 December 2004 (OJ 2004 L 367, p. 1), sets out the principle that the scope of that regulation is confined to ‘civil matters’ without, however, defining its content and scope, the Court held that it must be interpreted autonomously (see judgment in C , C‑435/06, EU:C:2007:714, paragraphs 38 and 46).
40. As far as concerns the objectives pursued by Regulation No 1393/2007, it follows from recital 2 thereto that that regulation aims to improve and expedite the transmission of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters for service between the Member States in order to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. That objective is also set out in recitals 6 and 7 thereto, which refer to efficiency and speed in judicial procedures and speed in transmission of those documents. Furthermore, Article 4(1) of that regulation provides that judicial documents are to be transmitted as soon as possible.
51. In order to answer that question, it must therefore be determined whether the legal relationship between the applicants in the main proceedings and the Hellenische Republik is manifestly characterised by an exercise of public powers on the part of the debtor State, in that it entails the exercise of powers falling outside the scope of the ordinary legal rules applicable to relationships between private individuals (judgments in Préservatrice foncière TIARD SA , C‑266/01, EU:C:2003:282, paragraph 30, and Lechouritou and Others , C‑292/05, EU:C:2007:102, paragraph 34).
52. In that connection, the Court has held that a national or international body governed by public law which pursues the recovery of charges payable by a person governed by private law for the use of its equipment and services acts in the exercise of its public powers, in particular where that use is obligatory and exclusive and the rate of charges, the methods of calculation and the procedures for collection are fixed unilaterally in relation to the users (judgments in LTU , 29/76, EU:C:1976:137, paragraph 4, and Lechouritou and Others , C‑292/05, EU:C:2007:102, paragraph 32).
56. However, it must be observed in that regard, first, that the fact that that possibility was introduced by a law is not, in itself, decisive in order to conclude that the State acted in the exercise of State authority.