larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Fattoria autonoma tabacchi, Lino Bason and others and Associazione Professionale Trasformatori Tabacchi Italiani (APTI) and others v Ministero dell'Agricoltura e delle Foreste, Azienda di Stato per gli interventi sul mercato agricolo (AIMA), Consorzio Nazionale Tabacchicoltori (CNT), Unione Nazionale Tabacchicoltori (Unata) and Ditta Mario Pittari.
Date: 1996-09-12
36 It follows from Article 9 of Regulation No 2075/92 that, in order to ensure observance of the guarantee thresholds dealt with in Article 8 of that regulation, the Community legislature provided for the introduction, for a limited period, of a system of processing quotas which Member States are required to distribute on a transitional basis for the 1993 and 1994 harvests among first processors, unless they dispose of the necessary and accurate data relating to tobacco production, in which case they may distribute quotas directly to producers.
55 The Court has held that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of law, requires that measures adopted by Community institutions should not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, in particular, the judgment of 29 February 1996 in Joined Cases C-296/93 France v Commission and C-307/93 Ireland v Commission [1996] ECR I-0000, paragraph 30).
56 However, as far as judicial review of those conditions is concerned, it must be stated that in matters relating to the common agricultural policy the Community legislature has a discretion which corresponds to the political responsibilities which Articles 40 and 43 of the EC Treaty place upon it (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 179/84 Bozzetti v Invernizzi [1985] ECR 2301, paragraph 30). Thus, in examining whether such a discretionary power has been lawfully exercised, judicial review must be confined to determining whether it is vitiated by a manifest error or misuse of powers or whether the authority in question clearly exceeded the bounds of its discretion.
Cooperativa Agricola Zootecnica S. Antonio and Others v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato.
Date: 1996-09-17
17 The Court has consistently held (see, in particular Case 8/81 Becker v Finanzamt Muenster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53, paragraph 25, and Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839, paragraph 29) that, whenever the provisions of a directive appear, as far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, those provisions may be relied upon before the national courts by an individual against the State where that State has failed to implement the directive in national law by the end of the period prescribed or where it has failed to implement the directive correctly.
18 A Community provision is unconditional where it sets forth an obligation which is not qualified by any condition, or subject, in its implementation or effects, to the taking of any measure either by the Community institutions or by the Member States (see, in particular, Case 28/67 Molkerei-Zentrale Westfalen Lippe v Hauptzollamt Paderborn [1968] ECR 143, at 153).
19 Moreover, a provision is sufficiently precise to be relied on by an individual and applied by a national court where it sets out an obligation in unequivocal terms (Case 152/84 Marshall [1986] ECR 723 and Case 71/85 Netherlands v Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging [1986] ECR 3855).
Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 1996-09-19
11 The suspension procedure provided for by Article 52 of Presidential Decree No 18/89 expressly covers only applications for annulment brought by legal persons governed by public law, whereas, under Article 1 of the directive, the review procedures introduced by the Member States must be "available ... at least to any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular public supply or public works contract and who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement". What is more, Article 52 of the decree in question relates only to procedures for suspension of operation of measures and presupposes the existence of a main action seeking to have the contested administrative measure annulled, whereas, under Article 2 of the directive, the Member States are under a duty more generally to empower their review bodies to take, independently of any prior action, any interim measures "including measures to suspend or to ensure the suspension of the procedure for the award of a public contract".
12 Admittedly, the Council of State interprets Article 52 of the presidential decree in conformity with the directive and holds that any interested party has the capacity to seek suspension of operation of measures of contracting authorities.
13 However, the Court has consistently held that it is particularly important, in order to satisfy the requirement for legal certainty, that individuals should have the benefit of a clear and precise legal situation enabling them to ascertain the full extent of their rights and, where appropriate, to rely on them before the national courts (see to this effect Case 29/84 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 1661, paragraph 23, Case 363/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 1733, paragraph 7, and C-59/89 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-2607, paragraph 18).
18 Lastly, as regards the formal and procedural difficulties referred to by the Hellenic Republic in order to justify the delay in adopting the draft presidential decree, it should be observed that, as the Court has repeatedly held, a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-147/94 Commission v Spain [1995] ECR I-1015, paragraph 5, Case C-259/94 Commission v Greece [1995] ECR I-1947, paragraph 5, and Case C-253/95 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-0000, paragraph 12).
Etienne Debouche v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen.
Date: 1996-09-26
15 As provided by the last sentence of Article 3(b) of the Eighth Directive, a taxable person who benefits from exemption and is consequently not entitled to deduct input tax is not, in accordance with the objective pursued by the VAT directives, entitled to a refund of VAT paid in another Member State either.
16 That interpretation is in keeping with that given by the Court on Article 17 of the Sixth Directive. Except in the cases expressly provided for by the relevant directives, where a taxable person supplies services to another taxable person who uses them for an exempt transaction, the latter person is not entitled to deduct the input VAT paid (see in particular Case C-4/94 BLP Group v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1995] ECR I-983, paragraph 28).
18 Moreover, it is not the purpose of the Eighth Directive to undermine the scheme introduced by the Sixth Directive. According to the third recital in the preamble, the Eighth Directive is intended rather to eliminate discrepancies between the arrangements then in force in the Member States, which gave rise in some cases to deflection of trade and distortion of competition. In accordance with the fifth recital, the Eighth Directive must not "lead to the treatment of taxable persons differing according to the Member State in the territory of which they are established".
19 Mr Debouche nevertheless relies on that fifth recital in the preamble to the directive in order to obtain a refund. However, if that were so, he would be treated more favourably than Netherlands lawyers who are entitled to deduct input tax because they effect taxed transactions whereas Mr Debouche carries out exempted transactions.
French Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1996-09-26
20 According to settled case-law, Article 92(1) does not distinguish between measures of State intervention by reference to their causes or aims but defines them in relation to their effects (Case 173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] ECR 709, paragraph 13).
21 The social character of the FNE assistance is not therefore sufficient to exclude it outright from being categorized as aid for the purposes of Article 92 of the Treaty.
23 However, as the Commission has rightly pointed out, the FNE enjoys a degree of latitude which enables it to adjust its financial assistance having regard to a number of considerations such as, in particular, the choice of beneficiaries, the amount of the financial assistance and the conditions under which it is provided. The French Government itself concedes that the administration may depart from its own guidelines where particular circumstances justify that course of action.
24 In those circumstances, it must be held that, by virtue of its aim and general scheme, the system under which the FNE contributes to measures accompanying social plans is liable to place certain undertakings in a more favourable situation than others and thus to meet the conditions for classification as aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the Treaty.
33 It must be borne in mind, as a preliminary point, that, as the Court has held, the legality of a decision concerning aid is to be assessed in the light of the information available to the Commission when the decision was adopted (Case 234/84 Commission v Belgium [1986] ECR 2263, paragraph 16).
34 It must next be observed that the concept of aid encompasses advantages granted by public authorities which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking (Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] ECR I-877, paragraphs 12 and 13).
36 To enable it to assess the compatibility with the common market of the measures in question, the Commission, by letter of 4 February 1994, asked the French Government, among other things, what the costs of the plan would have been if it had been limited to the minimum prescribed by French legislation. The French Government replied that no minimum social plan existed for which a figure could easily be arrived at. It was only in its reply that the French Government clarified this point, stating in particular that Kimberly Clark initially intended laying off 312 members of its workforce of 465 employees and that it contented itself with laying off 207 after negotiations with the FNE resulting in the latter' s subsequent involvement in the social plan.
37 Since the Commission was thus unable, despite making a specific request, to assess the nature and effects of the measures concerned, it was entitled to conclude that, in drawing up a social plan in collaboration with the State under which Kimberly Clark contributed FF 81.83 million and the State contributed FF 27.25 million, Kimberly Clark had received State aid within the meaning of Article 92 of the Treaty.
A/S Richard Frederiksen & Co. v Skatteministeriet.
Date: 1996-09-26
12 The granting of an interest-free loan allows the company to have capital available without having to bear its cost. The resultant saving in interest leads to an increase in its assets by allowing the company to avoid expenditure which it would otherwise have to bear (Case C-249/89 Trave Schiffahrts-Gesellschaft [1991] ECR I-257, paragraph 12).
13 Furthermore, the granting of an interest-free loan helps to strengthen the company' s economic potential in so far as it enables the company to have capital available without having to bear its cost. It must therefore be regarded as likely to increase the value of the company' s shares (Case C-249/89 Trave Schiffahrts-Gesellschaft, cited above, paragraph 14).
14 Consequently, the answer to the first question referred must be that Article 4(2)(b) of the directive is to be interpreted as applying, where a company benefits from an interest-free loan, to the amount of interest saved.
Question 2
17 According to its title, the directive concerns "indirect taxes on the raising of capital".
21 Accordingly the harmonization provided for by the directive does not extend to direct taxes, such as company income tax, which are a matter for the Member States themselves.
Jürgen Dudda v Finanzgericht Bergisch Gladbach.
Date: 1996-09-26
20 As regards the relationship between Article 9(1) and Article 9(2), the Court has already held that Article 9(2) sets out a number of specific instances of places where certain services are deemed to be supplied, whereas Article 9(1) lays down the general rule on the matter. The object of those provisions is to avoid, first, conflicts of jurisdiction, which may result in double taxation, and, secondly, non-taxation, as Article 9(3) indicates, albeit only as regards specific situations (Case 168/84 Berkholz v Finanzamt Hamburg-Mitte-Altstadt [1985] ECR 2251, paragraph 14).
21 It follows that, when Article 9 is interpreted, Article 9(1) in no way takes precedence over Article 9(2). In every situation, the question which arises is whether it is covered by one of the instances mentioned in Article 9(2); if not, it falls within the scope of Article 9(1).
22 Accordingly, it is necessary to determine the scope of Article 9(2) in the light of its purpose which is set out as follows in the seventh recital in the preamble to the directive:
" ... the determination of the place where taxable transactions are effected has been the subject of conflicts concerning jurisdiction as between Member States, in particular as regards supplies of goods for assembly and the supply of services; ... although the place where a supply of services is effected should in principle be defined as the place where the person supplying the services has his principal place of business, that place should be defined as being in the country of the person to whom the services are supplied, in particular in the case of certain services supplied between taxable persons where the cost of the services is included in the price of the goods".
23 The overall purpose of Article 9(2) of the Sixth Directive is accordingly to establish a special system for services provided between taxable persons where the cost of the services is included in the price of the goods.
24 There is a similar purpose underlying the first indent of Article 9(2)(c) which lays down that the place of the supply of services relating inter alia to artistic and entertainment activities and ancillary services is the place where those services are physically carried out. The Community legislature considered that, in so far as the supplier provides his services in the State in which such services are physically carried out and the organizer of the event charges the final consumer VAT in the same State, the VAT charged on the basis of all those services the cost of which is included in the price of the complete service paid for by the final consumer must be paid to that State and not to the State in which the supplier of the service has established his business.
25 As regards the criteria according to which a specified service is to be regarded as being covered by the first indent of Article 9(2)(c), no particular artistic level is required, and it is not only services relating inter alia to artistic and entertainment activities but also services relating to merely similar activities that fall within its scope.
Criminal proceedings against André Allain and Steel Trading France SARL, as a party liable at civil law.
Date: 1996-09-26
11 It must be borne in mind, at the outset, that the Court of Justice has no power, within the framework of Article 177 of the EC Treaty, to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of rules pertaining to national law (see Case 75/63 Hoekstra v Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel [1964] ECR 177).
13 Consequently, the question submitted should be answered since it is for the national court to determine both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (Joined Cases C-358/93 and C-416/93 Bordessa and Others [1995] ECR I-361, paragraph 10).
The substance
23 The third paragraph of Article 14 of the ECSC Treaty provides that "Recommendations shall be binding as to the aims to be pursued but shall leave the choice of the appropriate methods for achieving these aims to those to whom the recommendations are addressed". Although that provision leaves Member States free to choose the ways and means of implementing a recommendation, that freedom does not affect the obligation imposed on all the Member States to which the recommendation is addressed to adopt, in their national legal systems, all the measures necessary to ensure that the recommendation is fully effective, in accordance with the objective which it pursues (see, to that effect, Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891 (concerning directives), paragraph 15).
24 Where Community legislation does not specifically provide for any penalty for an infringement or refers for that purpose to national legislation, Article 86 of the ECSC Treaty and Article 5 of the EC Treaty require the Member States to take all measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law. For that purpose, while the choice of penalties remains at their discretion, they must ensure in particular that infringements of Community law are penalized under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive (see, in this regard, Case C-36/94 Siesse v Director da Alfândega de Alcântara [1995] ECR I-3573 (which concerned regulations), paragraph 20, and Case C-382/92 Commission v United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2435 (which concerned directives), paragraph 55).
25 The Member States' obligation, under a recommendation, to achieve the result envisaged by the recommendation and their duty under Article 86 of the ECSC Treaty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation, is binding on all the authorities of Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (see, with regard to directives, Von Colson and Kamann, cited above, paragraph 26).
Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1996-10-03
17 It must be observed that administrative controls preceding on-farm inspections must be carried out in such a way as to enable the national authorities to draw all possible conclusions, be they matters of certainty or of doubt, regarding compliance with the conditions for granting premiums. Accordingly, such controls should consist in checking that the claims and the undertakings or declarations accompanying them are in due order, comparing claims with any lodged by the same producer in earlier years, comparing claims with those relating to other holdings, above all the larger ones, and examining the information obtained in combination with the available statistics, and any other relevant data, so as to identify any dubious cases.
23 It must first be noted that the investigation of 12 September 1991, having been mentioned for the first time by the applicant in its reply, cannot be taken into consideration by the Court, since it constitutes evidence adduced out of time. By decision of 6 November 1992, based on Article 1(3) of Regulation No 1723/72, as amended by Regulation No 422/86, the Commission set 15 December 1992 as the final date for transmission of additional information by the Member States. However, the applicant did not produce the results of the investigation concerned by that date and did not ask the Court to take account of any exceptional circumstances such as to justify the delay (see also Case C-54/91 Germany v Commission [1993] ECR I-3399, paragraphs 13 to 15).
24 It must also be observed that, in the absence of any written evidence which could invalidate the findings in the summary report to the effect that the competent authorities did not undertake a control of the kind described in paragraph 16 above, the applicant' s contentions concerning the substance of the administrative controls carried out in the two Laender must be regarded as having no foundation.
43 It must be stated in that connection that administrative controls and on-farm inspections were designed by the Community legislature as two means of verification which, although separate, complement each other within the control procedure under Article 8 of Regulation No 714/89.
Bernardus Hendrikman and Maria Feyen v Magenta Druck & Verlag GmbH.
Date: 1996-10-10
15 According to settled case-law, the purpose of Article 27(2) of the Convention is to ensure that a judgment is not recognized or enforced under the Convention if the defendant has not had an opportunity of defending himself before the court first seised (see Case 166/80 Klomps v Michel [1981] ECR 1593, paragraph 9, and Case C-172/91 Sonntag v Waidmann [1993] ECR I-1963, paragraph 38).
18 Where proceedings are initiated against a person without his knowledge and a lawyer appears before the court first seised on his behalf but without his authority, such a person is quite powerless to defend himself. That person must therefore be regarded as a defendant in default of appearance, within the meaning of Article 27(2), even if the proceedings before the court first seised became, in point of form, proceedings inter partes. It is for the court from whom recognition is sought to ascertain whether those exceptional circumstances exist.
20 The proper time for a defendant to have an opportunity to defend himself is the time at which proceedings are commenced. The possibility of having recourse, at a later stage, to a legal remedy against a judgment given in default of appearance, which has already become enforceable, cannot constitute an equally effective alternative to defending proceedings before judgment is given (see Case C-123/91 Minalmet v Brandeis [1992] ECR I-5661, paragraph 19).
23 As regards the second question, it should be noted that the public-policy clause in Article 27(1) of the Convention "ought to operate only in exceptional cases" (see the Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ 1979 C 59, p. 1, at p. 44). Recourse to it is in any event precluded when the issue must be resolved on the basis of a specific provision such as Article 27(2) (see, in connection with Article 27(3), Case 145/86 Hoffmann v Krieg [1988] ECR 645, paragraph 21).