larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Skandia America Corp. (USA), filial Sverige v Skatteverket.
Date: 2014-09-17
23. Article 9 of the VAT Directive defines ‘taxable person’. This is any person who carries out any economic activity ‘independently’. It is especially important for the uniform application of the VAT Directive that the notion of ‘taxable person’, defined in Title III thereof, is given an autonomous and uniform interpretation.
24. According to the Court’s case-law, a supply of services is taxable only if there exists between the service supplier and the recipient a legal relationship in which there is a reciprocal performance (judgment in FCE Bank , C‑210/04, EU:C:2006:196, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
25. To establish whether such a legal relationship exists between a non-resident company and one of its branches established in a Member State so that the supplies made may be liable to VAT, it is necessary to determine whether that branch carries out an independent economic activity. It is necessary in that regard to determine whether that branch may be regarded as being independent, in particular in that it bears the economic risk arising from its business (judgment in FCE Bank , EU:C:2006:196, paragraph 35).
27. So far as concerns the existence of an agreement on the sharing of costs, which took the form in the case in the main proceedings of the issue of internal invoices, this is also irrelevant when such an agreement has not been negotiated between independent parties ( FCE Bank , EU:C:2006:196, paragraph 40).
29. In this connection, treatment as a single taxable person precludes the members of the VAT group from continuing to submit VAT declarations separately and from continuing to be identified, within and outside their group, as individual taxable persons, since the single taxable person alone is authorised to submit such declarations (judgment in Ampliscientifica and Amplifin , C‑162/07, EU:C:2008:301, paragraph 19). It follows that, in such a situation, the supplies of services made by a third party to a member of a VAT group must be considered, for VAT purposes, to have been made not to that member but to the actual VAT group to which that member belongs.
30. Therefore, for VAT purposes, the services supplied by a company such as SAC to its branch which, such as Skandia Sverige, belongs to a VAT group, are considered not to be supplied to that branch but must be regarded as being supplied to the VAT group.
Commerz Nederland NV v Havenbedrijf Rotterdam NV.
Date: 2014-09-17
26. In that regard, it should be observed that the Court may at any moment, having heard the Advocate General, order the reopening of the oral procedure under Article 83 of its Rules of Procedure if, inter alia, it considers that it lacks sufficient information or that the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties or the parties concerned referred to in Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (judgment in United Kingdom  v Council , C‑431/11, EU:C:2013:589, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
30. As a preliminary point, it is common ground that, in the case in the main proceedings, the provision by Havenbedrijf Rotterdam of guarantees covering the credit provided to RDM Vehicles, RDM Finance I and RDM Finance II involves the commitment of State resources, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, given that those guarantees carry a sufficiently real economic risk capable of resulting in costs for Havenbedrijf Rotterdam and that the latter was wholly owned, at the material time, by the municipality of Rotterdam.
31. As regards imputability to the State, for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU, of the provision of those guarantees, it should be noted that that may not be inferred from the mere fact that they have been provided by a public undertaking controlled by the State. Even if the State is in a position to control a public undertaking and to exercise a decisive influence over its operations, actual exercise of that control in a particular case cannot be automatically presumed. It is also necessary to examine whether the public authorities must be regarded as having been involved, in one way or another, in the adoption of those measures (see, to that effect, judgment in France  v Commission , EU:C:2002:294, paragraphs 50 to 52).
32. On that point, it cannot be demanded that it should be demonstrated, on the basis of a precise inquiry, that in the particular case the public authorities specifically incited the public undertaking to take the aid measures concerned. The imputability to the State of an aid measure taken by a public undertaking may be inferred from a set of indicators arising from the circumstances of the case and the context in which that measure was taken (judgment in France  v Commission , EU:C:2002:294, paragraphs 53 and 55).
33. Specifically, any indication, in the particular case, either, on the one hand, of the involvement by the public authorities in the adoption of a measure or the unlikelihood of their not being involved, having regard also to the compass of the measure, its content or the conditions which it contains, or, on the other hand, the absence of those authorities’ involvement in the adoption of that measure is relevant (judgment in France  v Commission , EU:C:2002:294, paragraphs 56 and 57).
E. v B.
Date: 2014-10-01
37. With respect to the interpretation of Article 12(3) of Regulation No 2201/2003, it should be recalled that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment in Van Buggenhout and Van de Mierop , C‑251/12, EU:C:2013:566, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
38. In that regard, it should be noted that the jurisdiction of a court must be established, according to Articles 8(1) and 12(3) of Regulation No 2201/2003, ‘at the time the court is seised’. In that regard, Article 16 of that regulation states that a court is deemed to be seised of a dispute, in principle, ‘at the time when the document instituting the proceedings … is lodged with the court’.
45. It follows that jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility must be determined, above all, in the best interests of the child.
50. In the light of all of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question referred is that jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility, which has been prorogued, under Article 12(3) of Regulation No 2201/2003, in favour of a court of a Member State before which proceedings have been brought by mutual agreement by the holders of parental responsibility, ceases following a final judgment in those proceedings.
The second question
X v Voorzitter van het managementteam van het onderdeel Belastingdienst/Z van de rijksbelastingdienst.
Date: 2014-10-02
30. With regard to Directive 2003/96, it follows from the very wording of the second indent of Article 2(4)(b) thereof that it ‘shall not apply’ to the dual use of energy products. As the Court has previously held in connection with the first indent of that provision, the exclusion of the products concerned from the scope of that directive means that the Member States are able to tax the energy products in question in compliance with EU law (see, to that effect, judgment in Fendt Italiana , C‑145/06 and C‑146/06, EU:C:2007:411, paragraphs 38 and 41).
Martin Grund v Landesamt für Landwirtschaft, Umwelt und ländliche Räume des Landes Schleswig-Holstein.
Date: 2014-10-02
35. Thus, the EU legislature does not attach any importance to which variety of herbaceous forage was actually grown on the land concerned. In particular, that legislation does not require the land concerned to be reseeded with the same variety of herbaceous forage which was previously grown on it. What is important for the classification as ‘permanent pasture’ within the meaning of Article 2(c) of Regulation No 1120/2009 depends on the actual use of the land in question (see, judgment in Landkreis Bad Dürkheim , C‑61/09, EU:C:2010:606, paragraph 37). Furthermore, neither the change of variety of grass nor the technical procedure used, such as ploughing up or scarification with overseeding has any effect on that classification.
U v Stadt Karlsruhe.
Date: 2014-10-02
48. Such an interpretation is also supported by the requirements linked to the right of a person to protection of his identity and private life, of which respect for his name is a constituent element, as affirmed in Article 7 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment in Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn , C‑391/09, EU:C:2011:291, paragraph 66).
50. It is not disputed that, where the name of a person appears incorrectly or ambiguously in documents issued by a State in order to prove his identity, this is liable to cause serious inconvenience for that person both in his professional and in his private life in so far as it may give rise to doubts as to his real identity, the authenticity of the passport or the veracity of the information contained in it (see, to that effect, judgments in Grunkin and Paul , C‑353/06, EU:C:2008:559, paragraph 23, and Sayn-Wittgenstein , C‑208/09, EU:C:2010:806, paragraph 69).
Orgacom BVBA v Vlaamse Landmaatschappij.
Date: 2014-10-02
20. It must first be borne in mind that FEU Treaty provisions relating to charges having equivalent effect and those relating to discriminatory internal taxation cannot be applied together, so that under the system of the Treaty the same measure cannot belong to both categories at the same time (judgment in Stadtgemeinde Frohnleiten and Gemeindebetriebe Frohnleiten , C‑221/06, EU:C:2007:657, paragraph 26).
22. With regard to the classification of the contested levy as a charge having equivalent effect to a customs duty, as the Court has held on a number of occasions, the justification for the prohibition of customs duties and any charges having an equivalent effect lies in the fact that any pecuniary charge, however small, imposed on goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, constitutes an obstacle to the movement of goods which is aggravated by the resulting administrative formalities (judgment in Commission  v Germany , C‑389/00, EU:C:2003:111, paragraph 22).
23. In that regard, it is settled case-law that any pecuniary charge, however small and whatever its designati on and mode of application, which is imposed unilaterally on goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, and which is not a customs duty in the strict sense, constitutes a charge having equivalent effect within the meaning of Articles 28 TFEU and 30 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment in Stadtgemeinde Frohnleiten and Gemeindebetriebe Frohnleiten , EU:C:2007:657, paragraph 27).
24. Furthermore, it is settled case-law that a charge imposed when goods cross a territorial boundary within a Member State constitutes a charge having effect equivalent to a customs duty (see judgment in Carbonati Apuani , C‑72/03, EU:C:2004:506, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
28. In that regard, it must be noted, firstly, that the essential feature of a charge having equivalent effect to a customs duty which distinguishes it from an internal tax is that the former is borne solely by a product which crosses a frontier, as such, whilst the latter is borne by imported, exported and domestic products (see, to that effect, judgment in Michaïlidis , C‑441/98 and C‑442/98, EU:C:2000:479, paragraph 22).
29. Secondly, it must be borne in mind that, in order to relate to a general system of internal taxation, the tax charge in question must impose the same duty on both domestic products and identical exported products at the same marketing stage and the chargeable event triggering the duty must also be identical in the case of both products (see, to that effect, judgment in Michaïlidis , EU:C:2000:479, paragraph 23).
35. In that regard, the Court has held before that customs duties and charges having equivalent effect thereto are prohibited regardless of the purpose for which they were introduced and the destination of the revenue from them (see, to that effect, judgments in Brachfeld and Chougol Diamond , 2/69 and 3/69, EU:C:1969:30, paragraph 19, and Carbonati Apuani , EU:C:2004:506, paragraph 31).
Fonderie 2A v Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances.
Date: 2014-10-02
24. Even though the question asked refers in general terms to the provisions of the Sixth Directive enabling the place of an intra-Community supply of goods to be defined, it must be considered to relate to the interpretation of Article 8(1)(a) of the directive. It is clear from the case-law that that provision, which enables the place of an intra-Community supply of goods to be determined, makes no distinction between ‘intra-Community’ supplies and ‘internal’ supplies (see judgment in EMAG Handel Eder , C‑245/04, EU:C:2006:232, paragraph 46).
29. In this connection, it is also to be noted that Article 8(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive requires the existence of a sufficient temporal and material link between the supply of the goods in question and the dispatch of those goods, as well as continuity in the course of the transaction (see judgment in X , C‑84/09, EU:C:2010:693, paragraph 33).
31. Finally, such an interpretation is consistent with the objective of the provisions of the Sixth Directive relating to determination of the place of taxable transactions, which seek to avoid both double taxation and non-taxation of those transactions (see to this effect, concerning Article 9 of the Sixth Directive, judgment in ADV Allround , C‑218/10, EU:C:2012:35, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited). As the Advocate General observes in point 42 of her Opinion, that interpretation enables the place of supply of goods to be determined unequivocally, and this place establishes which Member State is entitled to the VAT relating to that transaction.
Vlaams Gewest v Heidi Van Den Broeck.
Date: 2014-10-02
24. It must be borne in mind that that provision does not provide for any penalty; it does no more than lay down, without prejudice to reductions and exclusions in accordance with Articles 32 to 35 of Regulation No 2419/2001, the rules for determining the eligible area under the scheme(s) concerned by the area aid application when it appears that the area declared in that application is greater than the area actually determined following checks by the competent authorities (see, to that effect, judgment in Haug , C‑286/05, EU:C:2006:296, paragraph 24).
31. That finding is confirmed by the objectives pursued by Regulation No 2419/2001. As evidenced by recital 32 in the preamble thereto, it is aimed at adopting the measures necessary to combat irregularities and fraud in the implementation of the different aid schemes coming within the integrated system in order to protect the European Union’s financial interests effectively. In order to attain that objective, that regulation provides, as evidenced by recital 33 in the preamble thereto, for reductions and exclusions according to the gravity of the irregularity committed in the aid application, up to total exclusion from one or more aid schemes for a determined period (see, by analogy, judgment in Agrargenossenschaft Pretzsch , C‑417/00, EU:C:2002:715, paragraphs 35 to 39).
32. In those circumstances, an interpretation of Article 33 of Regulation No 2419/2001 which amounts to penalising irregularities which have been committed intentionally as the most serious irregularities is in keeping with the purpose of a system of penalties which is sufficiently dissuasive and effective to combat irregularities and fraud committed in area aid applications (see, by analogy, judgment in National Farmers’ Union and Others , C‑354/95, EU:C:1997:379, paragraph 51).
33. A penalty which consists in excluding a farmer from an aid scheme is particularly dissuasive and is thus suitable to combat the numerous irregularities which are committed in the context of agricultural aid and, because they weigh heavily on the European Union budget, are of such a nature as to compromise the action undertaken by the institutions in that field (see, to that effect, judgment in Käserei Champignon Hofmeister , C‑210/00, EU:C:2002:440, paragraph 38, and Bonda , C‑489/10, EU:C:2012:319, paragraph 29).
Federal Republic of Germany v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2014-10-07
27. However, a party who, pursuant to Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, is granted leave to intervene in a case submitted to the Court may not alter the subject-matter of the dispute as defined by the forms of order sought by the main parties and the pleas in law raised by those parties. It follows that arguments submitted by an intervener are not admissible unless they fall within the framework provided by those forms of order and pleas in law.
52. Where an area of law falls within a competence of the European Union, such as the one mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the fact that the European Union did not take part in the international agreement in question does not prevent it from exercising that competence by establishing, through its institutions, a position to be adopted on its behalf in the body set up by that agreement, in particular through the Member States which are party to that agreement acting jointly in its interest (see judgment in Commission  v Greece , C‑45/07, EU:C:2009:81, paragraphs 30 and 31; see also, to that effect, Opinion 2/91, EU:C:1993:106, paragraph 5).
TDC A/S v Erhvervsstyrelsen.
Date: 2014-10-09
27. It should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, in order to determine whether the body making a reference is a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU, which is a question governed by EU law alone, the Court takes account of a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes , whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent (see, inter alia, judgment in Belov , C‑394/11, EU:C:2013:48, paragraph 38, and order in Merck Canada , C‑555/13, EU:C:2014:92, paragraph 16).
29. The concept of independence, which is inherent in the task of adjudication, implies above all that the body in question acts as a third party in relation to the authority which adopted the contested decision (judgment in RTL Belgium , C‑517/09, EU:C:2010:821, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
30. There are two aspects to that concept. The first aspect, which is external, entails that the body is protected against external intervention or pressure liable to jeopardise the independent judgment of its members as regards proceedings before them (see, to that effect, judgments in Wilson , C‑506/04, EU:C:2006:587, paragraph 51, and Torresi , C‑58/13 and C‑59/13, EU:C:2014:2088, paragraph 18).
31. The second aspect, which is internal, is linked to impartiality and seeks to ensure a level playing field for the parties to the proceedings and their respective interests with regard to the subject-matter of those proceedings. That aspect requires objectivity and the absence of any interest in the outcome of the proceedings apart from the strict application of the rule of law (judgment in Wilson , EU:C:2006:587, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).
32. Those guarantees of independence and impartiality require rules, particularly as regards the composition of the body and the appointment, length of service and the grounds for abstention, rejection and dismissal of its members, in order to dismiss any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it (judgment in Wilson , EU:C:2006:587, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited). In order to consider the condition regarding the independence of the body making the reference as met, the case-law requires, inter alia, that dismissals of members of that body should be determined by express legislative provisions (judgment in D. and A. , C‑175/11, EU:C:2013:45, paragraph 97, and order in Pilato , C‑109/07, EU:C:2008:274, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
35. It is clear from the order for reference and the observations of the Danish Government that, although Danish legislation makes provision for a specific procedure for the dismissal of judges of the ordinary courts, the members of the Teleklagenævnet may be dismissed, and that the conditions for their dismissal are not subject to any specific rules, other than the general rules of administrative law and employment law which apply in the event of an unlawful dismissal.
Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze and Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli di Stato (AAMS) v Yesmoke Tobacco SpA.
Date: 2014-10-09
28. In the light of the fact that it is mandatory for the overall excise duty to be levied in respect of all cigarettes whatever their characteristics or price, a minimum excise duty, established by Member States on the basis of Article 8(6) of Directive 2011/64, must be applied to all cigarettes, irrespective of their characteristics or price (see, to that effect, as regards Directive 95/59, judgment in Commission  v France , C‑302/00, EU:C:2002:123, paragraph 20).
35. As regards the public health objective relied upon by the Italian, Spanish, French and Portuguese Governments in their respective written observations submitted before the Court, it should be stated that Directive 2011/64 takes into account, in accordance with recitals 2, 14 and 16 thereto, the objective of the protection of public health. In particular, recital 16 to that directive states that the level of taxation is a major factor in the price of tobacco products, which in turn influences consumers’ smoking habits. In this connection, the Court has already held that fiscal legislation is an important and effective instrument for discouraging consumption of tobacco products and, therefore, for the protection of public health (see, to that effect, as regards Directive 95/59, judgment in Commission  v Italy , EU:C:2010:367, paragraph 51).
36. Provided that the national measures come within the framework laid down by Directive 2011/64, that directive does not prevent the Member States from taking measures to combat smoking and to ensure a high level of protection for public health by levying excise duties (see, to that effect, as regards Directive 95/59, judgment in Commission  v Italy , EU:C:2010:367, paragraph 48).