Evelyn Danqua v Minister for Justice and Equality and Others.
Date: 2016-10-20
26


Directive 2005/85 establishes, for its part, minimum standards concerning the procedures for examining applications for international protection and specifies the rights of applicants for asylum. Article 3(1) and (3) of that directive states that it is to apply to applications for asylum which are examined both as applications on the basis of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951, and as applications for other kinds of international protection given under the circumstances defined by Article 15 of Directive 2004/83.
27


Accordingly, the Court has held that Directive 2005/85 applies to applications for subsidiary protection only where a Member State has established a single procedure, under which an application is examined by reference to both forms of international protection, namely asylum and subsidiary protection (judgment of 8 May 2014, N., C‑604/12, EU:C:2014:302, paragraph 39).
29


It follows that, in the absence of EU rules concerning the procedural requirements attaching to the submission and examination of an application for subsidiary protection applicable in Ireland, it is for the domestic legal system of that Member State to determine those requirements, provided, first, that the requirements are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and, second, that they do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the EU legal order (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2014, N., C‑604/12, EU:C:2014:302, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
30


As regards the principle of equivalence, it should be recalled that observance of that principle requires that a national rule be applied without distinction to procedures based on EU law and those based on national law (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 January 2015, ÖBB Personenverkehr, C‑417/13, EU:C:2015:38, paragraph 74).
36


That being said, according to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU, providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. With this in mind, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (judgment of 28 April 2016, Oniors Bio, C‑233/15, EU:C:2016:305, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
37


Furthermore, it is for the Court to provide the national court with all those elements for the interpretation of EU law which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not the referring court has specifically referred to them in its questions (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 February 2006, Ritter-Coulais, C‑152/03, EU:C:2006:123, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
42


In this connection, it must be noted that the Court has held that every case in which the question arises as to whether a national procedural provision renders the application of EU law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its conduct and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national bodies. In that context, it is necessary, inter alia, to take into consideration, where relevant, the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of the procedure (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 November 2015, Klausner Holz Niedersachsen, C‑505/14, EU:C:2015:742, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
43


In this case, it is appropriate to consider, in particular, whether a time limit such as that at issue in the main proceedings may be justified for the purposes of ensuring the proper conduct of the procedure for examining an application for subsidiary protection, in the light of its implications for the application of EU law (see, by analogy, judgment of 3 September 2009, Fallimento Olimpiclub, C‑2/08, EU:C:2009:506, paragraph 28).
44


As regards time limits, the Court has held that, in respect of national rules which come within the scope of EU law, it is for the Member States to establish those time limits in the light of, inter alia, the significance for the parties concerned of the decisions to be taken, the complexities of the procedures and of the legislation to be applied, the number of persons who may be affected and any other public or private interests which must be taken into consideration (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 October 2009, Pontin, C‑63/08, EU:C:2009:666, paragraph 48).