larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 2009-12-15
68. According to the Court’s settled case-law, although it is for Member States to take the appropriate measures to ensure their internal and external security, it does not follow that such measures are entirely outside the scope of Community law (see Case C‑273/97 Sirdar  [1999] ECR I‑7403, paragraph 15, and Case C‑285/98 Kreil  [2000] ECR I‑69, paragraph 15). As the Court has already held, the only articles in which the Treaty expressly provides for derogations applicable in situations which may affect public safety are Articles 30 EC, 39 EC, 46 EC, 58 EC, 64 EC, 296 EC and 297 EC, which deal with exceptional and clearly defined cases. It cannot be inferred that the Treaty contains an inherent general exception excluding all measures taken for reasons of public security from the scope of Community law. The recognition of the existence of such an exception, regardless of the specific requirements laid down by the Treaty, would be liable to impair the binding nature of Community law and its uniform application (see Case C‑186/01 Dory  [2003] ECR I‑2479, paragraph 31, and case-law there cited).
69. Furthermore, the derogations provided for in Articles 296 EC and 297 EC must, in accordance with settled case-law in respect of derogations from fundamental freedoms (see, inter alia, Case C‑503/03 Commission  v Spain  [2006] ECR I‑1097, paragraph 45; Case C‑490/04 Commission  v Germany  [2007] ECR I‑6095, paragraph 86; and Case C‑141/07 Commission  v Germany  [2008] ECR I‑6935, paragraph 50) be interpreted strictly.
European Commission v Kingdom of Denmark.
Date: 2009-12-15
51. According to the Court’s settled case-law, although it is for Member States to take the appropriate measures to ensure their internal and external security, it does not follow that such measures are entirely outside the scope of Community law (see Case C‑273/97 Sirdar  [1999] ECR I‑7403, paragraph 15, and Case C‑285/98 Kreil  [2000] ECR I‑69, paragraph 15). As the Court has already held, the only articles in which the Treaty expressly provides for derogations applicable in situations which may affect public safety are Articles 30 EC, 39 EC, 46 EC, 58 EC, 64 EC, 296 EC and 297 EC, which deal with exceptional and clearly defined cases. It cannot be inferred that the Treaty contains an inherent general exception excluding all measures taken for reasons of public security from the scope of Community law. The recognition of the existence of such an exception, regardless of the specific requirements laid down by the Treaty, would be liable to impair the binding nature of Community law and its uniform application (see Case C‑186/01 Dory [2003] ECR I‑2479, paragraph 31 and case-law there cited).
52. Furthermore, the derogations provided for in Articles 296 EC and 297 EC must, in accordance with settled case-law in respect of derogations from fundamental freedoms (see, inter alia, Case C‑503/03 Commission  v Spain  [2006] ECR I‑1097, paragraph 45; Case C‑490/04 Commission  v Germany  [2007] ECR I‑6095, paragraph 86; and Case C‑141/07 Commission  v Germany  [2008] ECR I‑6935, paragraph 50), be interpreted strictly.
53. As regards, more particularly, Article 296 EC, it must be observed that, although that Article refers to measures which a Member State may consider necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security or of information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to those interests, that Article cannot however be read in such a way as to confer on Member States a power to depart from the provisions of the Treaty based on no more than reliance on those interests.
55. Consequently it is for the Member State which seeks to take advantage of Article 296 EC to prove that it is necessary to have recourse to that derogation in order to protect its essential security interests.
Swiss Caps AG v Hauptzollamt Singen.
Date: 2009-12-17
27. It should be recalled that is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and for ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and the notes to the sections or chapters (see, inter alia, Case C‑173/08 Kloosterboer Services  [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
28. The explanatory notes drawn up by the Commission as regards the CN and by the World Customs Organisation as regards the HS are an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force ( Kloosterboer Services , paragraph 25).
29. In addition, the intended use of an article may constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent to the article, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the article’s objective characteristics and properties (see Case C‑16/08 Schenker  [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 25).
31. In that regard, the wording of heading 2106 of the CN refers to food preparations not elsewhere specified or included. The Explanatory Notes to the HS concerning that heading state that it includes preparations, often referred to as ‘food supplements’, which are put up in packagings with indications that they maintain general health or well-being.
Angelo Rubino v Ministero dell'Università e della Ricerca.
Date: 2009-12-17
23. It should be borne in mind, in that context, that the definition of ‘regulated profession’ for the purposes of Directive 2005/36 is a matter of Community law (see, by analogy, with regard to Directive 89/48, Case C‑234/97 Fernández de Bobadilla  [1999] ECR I‑4773, paragraph 14, and Case C‑285/07 Burbaud  [2003] ECR I‑8219, paragraph 43).
27. It must, however, be noted that it follows from case-law that the general systems for the recognition of diplomas laid down by Directives 89/48 and 92/51 do not concern the choice of selection and recruitment procedures for filling posts and they cannot be relied on as the basis for a right actually to be recruited. Those systems do no more than require the recognition of qualifications obtained in one Member State in order to allow their holder to apply for a job in another Member State, in accordance with the selection and recruitment procedures which govern access to regulated professions in that Member State (see, to that effect, with regard to Directive 89/48, Burbaud , paragraph 91). Those principles remain unchanged following the reorganisation and rationalisation resulting from the adoption of Directive 2005/36.
32. It must be pointed out that the fact of having been successful in a procedure to select a predefined number of persons on the basis of a comparative assessment of the candidates rather than by application of absolute criteria, which confers a qualification the validity of which is strictly limited in time, cannot be regarded as a professional qualification within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of Directive 2005/36.
34. Having regard to the reference in the question referred to the Court to the provisions of the EC Treaty concerning fundamental freedoms, it must nevertheless be recalled that Articles 39 EC and 43 EC guarantee to the nationals of the Member States access to activities, in a self-employed or employed capacity, without discrimination based on nationality. Consequently, it is for the national authorities to ensure, in particular, that, in the context of a selection procedure such as that leading to registration as a holder of the NAQ, qualifications obtained in other Member States are accorded their proper value and are duly taken into account (see, by analogy, Burbaud , paragraphs 99 and 100).
Association générale de l’industrie du médicament (AGIM) ASBL and Others (C-471/07 and C-472/07), Janssen Cilag SA (C-471/07) and Sanofi-Aventis Belgium SA (C-472/07) v Belgian State.
Date: 2010-01-14
15. It must be recalled, first, that according to the fifth recital in its preamble, the main purpose of Directive 89/105 is to ensure transparency of pricing, including the manner in which it operates in individual cases and the criteria on which it is based (Case C-317/05 Pohl-Boskamp  [2006] ECR I-10611, paragraph 29, and A. Menarini Industrie Farmaceutiche Riunite and Others , paragraph 27) and, second, that according to the sixth recital in its preamble, the requirements arising from Directive 89/105 affect neither the Member States’ policies for determining the prices of medicinal products nor national policies on price setting or on the determination of social security schemes, except as far as it is necessary to attain transparency for the purposes of that directive (see A. Menarini Industrie Farmaceutiche Riunite and Others , paragraph 35).
16. It follows that Directive 89/105 has as its underlying principle the idea of minimum interference in the organisation by Member States of their domestic social security policies (Case C-245/03 Merck, Sharp & Dohme  [2005] ECR I-637, paragraph 27, and A. Menarini Industrie Farmaceutiche Riunite and Others , paragraph 36).
26. According to settled case-law, whene ver the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied on before the national courts by individuals against the State where the latter has failed to implement the directive in domestic law by the end of the period prescribed or where it has failed to implement the directive correctly (see Case 152/84 Marshall  [1986] ECR 723, paragraph 46, and Joined Cases C-397/01 to C‑403/01 Pfeiffer and Others  [2004] ECR I-8835, paragraph 103).
Kornelis van Dijk v Gemeente Kampen.
Date: 2010-01-21
33. Thus, what ultimately matters is that, for the grant of the aid, the number of a farmer’s payment entitlements corresponds to an equivalent number of eligible hectares, and not to specific parcels. Article 44(4) of Regulation No 1782/2003 also expressly provides for the possibility for the Member States, in duly justified circumstances, to authorise a farmer to modify his declaration in relation to the parcels corresponding to the eligible area linked to a payment entitlement, on condition that he respects the number of hectares corresponding to his payment entitlements and the conditions for granting the single payment for the area concerned.
35. In particular, Article 46(2) provides that payment entitlements without land may by transferred only by definitive transfer. In such a case, a farmer who benefited from payment entitlements up until that point definitively waives his claims on the sale of his entitlements to another farmer, who then activates them for his benefit. In order to be able to claim payment of those entitlements, in accordance with Article 44(1) of Regulation No 1782/2003, the farmer concerned would have to have a sufficient number of eligible hectares of agricultural land in order to ensure the existence of a sufficient agricultural basis for the payment entitlements.
41. In accordance with the principles common to the laws of the Member States, the right to restitution from the person enriched is conditional upon there being no valid legal basis for the enrichment at issue (Case C‑47/07 P Masdar (UK)  v Commission  [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 44 to 46 and 49).
European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2010-02-04
10. It must be pointed out in this regard that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation obtaining in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, judgments of 8 May 2008 in Case C‑233/07 Commission  v Portugal , paragraph 31, and 3 September 2009 in Case C‑527/08 Commission  v United Kingdom , paragraph 9).
European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2010-02-04
7. In that regard, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation obtaining in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-161/02 Commission  v France [2003] ECR I-6567, paragraph 9, and Case C‑135/05 Commission  v Italy [2007] ECR I‑3475, paragraph 36).
Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening.
Date: 2010-02-11
39. The power thus granted to the Member States by Directive 2002/14 is in accordance with the Court’s case-law that Member States may leave the implementation of the social-policy objectives envisaged by a directive in this area in the first instance to management and labour (see to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑187/98 Commission  v Greece  [1999] ECR I‑7713, paragraph 46, and Case C‑306/07 Andersen  [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 25).
Pontina Ambiente Srl v Regione Lazio.
Date: 2010-02-25
27. It is to be borne in mind, first, that although the Court does not, in a reference for a preliminary ruling, have jurisdiction to give a ruling on the compatibility of a national measure with European Union law, it does have jurisdiction to supply the national court with a ruling on the interpretation of European Union law so as to enable that court to determine whether such compatibility exists with a view to deciding the case before it (Case C‑254/08 Futura Immobiliare and Others  [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
33. As the Advocate General remarked in point 49 of her Opinion, Article 10 of Directive 1999/31 does not impose on the Member States a specific method of financing the cost of a landfill. Consequently, as European Union law currently stands, there is no legislation adopted on the basis of Article 175 EC imposing a specific method upon the Member States for financing that cost, so that the cost may, in accordance with the choice of the Member State concerned, equally well be financed by means of a tax or of a charge or in any other manner (see, by analogy, Futura Immobiliare and Others , paragraph 48).
35. However, as may also be seen from recital 29 to that Directive, Article 10 of Directive 1999/31 requires the Member States to take measures to ensure that the price charged for waste disposal in a landfill covers all the costs involved in the setting up and operation of the facility.
36. That requirement is an expression of the ‘polluter pays’ principle, which implies, as the Court has already held in regard to Directive 75/442 and Directive 2006/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on waste (OJ 2006 L 114, p. 9), that the cost of disposing of the waste must be borne by the waste holders (Case C‑1/03 Van de Walle and Others  [2004] ECR I‑7613, paragraph 57; Case C‑188/07 Commune de Mesquer  [2008] ECR I‑4501, paragraph 71; and Futura Immobiliare and Others , paragraphs 44 and 45 and the case-law cited). It forms part of the objective of Directive 1999/31 which, according to Article 1(1) thereof, is to meet the requirements of Directive 75/442, and in particular Article 3 thereof, which inter alia requires the Member States to take appropriate measures to encourage the prevention or reduction of waste production.
Lahti Energia Oy.
Date: 2010-02-25
24. In such a situation, if the activity of the gas plant alone is considered, the process now being envisaged is not a simple process of waste disposal by thermal treatment which, if the substances obtained from it were subsequently incinerated, would allow such a plant to be regarded as an ‘incineration plant’ within the meaning of Article 3(4) of Directive 2000/76 (see, to that effect, Lahti Energia , paragraph 20).
25. Nor can the plant in question be regarded on its own as a co-incineration plant, that is to say, in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 3(5) of Directive 2000/76, as a plant whose main purpose is the generation of energy or production of material products, which either uses wastes as a regular or additional fuel or in which waste is thermally treated for the purpose of its disposal (see Case C‑251/07 Gävle Kraftvärme  [2008] ECR I‑7047, paragraph 35, and Lahti Energia , paragraph 26).
26. In a situation such as the one now at issue in the main proceedings, contrary to what was stated in paragraph 36 of Lahti Energia , the process of thermal treatment of the waste, commenced in the gas plant, is no longer completed within that plant, since the gas is transported from the gas plant to the power plant where it is used to generate power, although it does not yet possess properties similar to a fossil fuel, particularly with regard to purity.
27. It is true that the activities of two distinct plants must be the subject of a separate examination for the purposes of applying Directive 2000/76 (see, to that effect, Lahti Energia , paragraphs 24 and 25).
Telekommunikacja Polska SA w Warszawie v Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej.
Date: 2010-03-11
27. It is therefore necessary to examine whether national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, affects the powers that the NRA concerned derives from the abovementioned provisions of the Framework Directive and the Universal Service Directive.
28. In that regard, it must be stated, first, that such legislation, which, generally and without discrimination, prohibits linked sales, does not affect the powers of the NRA concerned to define and analyse the different electronic communications markets, in accordance with the respective provisions of Articles 15 and 16 of the Framework Directive. Nor does it affect the power of that NRA to impose, after carrying out an analysis of a market, regulatory obligations ex ante  on undertakings which have been identified as having significant market power on that market in accordance with Article 16 of the Framework Directive and Article 17 of the Universal Service Directive.
29. Second, as the President of the UKE and the Polish Government have emphasised, the prohibition laid down in Article 57(1)(1) of the Law on Telecommunications seeks to guarantee enhanced protection of consumers in their relations with operators of telecommunications services. Although, in carrying out their tasks, the NRAs are, in accordance with Article 8(4)(b) of the Framework Directive, required to promote the interests of citizens of the Union by ensuring a high level of protection for consumers, the fact remains that the Framework Directive and the Universal Service Directive do not provide for full harmonisation of consumer-protection aspects. Article 20 of the Universal Service Directive, which relates to contracts concluded between consumers and providers of electronic communications services, states that it applies without prejudice to European Union rules on consumer protection and national rules in conformity with European Union law.
Centre d'exportation du livre français (CELF) and Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication v Société internationale de diffusion et d'édition (SIDE).
Date: 2010-03-11
27. In that regard, the Court has already in essence ruled, in Case C‑39/94 SFEI and Others  [1996] ECR I‑3547, paragraphs 44 and 50 to 53, that:
– the initiation by the Commission of an examination procedure cannot release national courts from their duty to safeguard the rights of individuals in the event of a breach of the requirement to give prior notification;
– where it is likely that some time will elapse before it gives its final judgment, for example, where it seeks clarification from the Commission for the purposes of interpreting the concept of State aid which it may have cause to grant or where it refers a question to the Court for a preliminary ruling, the national court must decide whether it is necessary to order interim measures in order to safeguard the interests of the parties.
53. In a situation such as that in the main proceedings, the existence of an exceptional circumstance also cannot be upheld in the light of the principle of legal certainty, since the Court has already held, essentially, that, so long as the Commission has not taken a decision approving aid, and so long as the period for bringing an action against such a decision has not expired, the recipient cannot be certain as to the lawfulness of the aid, with the result that neither the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations nor that of legal certainty can be relied upon (see Case C‑91/01 Italy  v Commission  [2004] ECR I‑4355, paragraphs 66 and 67).
54. In a situation such as that in the main proceedings, the existence of an exceptional circumstance cannot, finally, be upheld in the light of the principle of proportionality. Abolishing unlawful aid by means of recovery is the logical consequence of a finding that it is unlawful. Accordingly, the recovery of such aid, for the purpose of restoring the previously existing situation, cannot in principle be regarded as disproportionate to the objectives of the provisions of the EC Treaty relating to State aid (see, inter alia, Case C‑298/00 P Italy  v Commission  [2004] ECR I‑4087, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).
Erotic Center BVBA v Belgische Staat.
Date: 2010-03-18
13. As is apparent from its wording, the first paragraph of Category 7 in Annex H to the Sixth Directive relates to the ‘admissions’ to various cultural events and facilities listed therein (see Case C-109/02 Commission  v Germany  [2003] ECR I‑12691, paragraph 25), including in particular ‘cinemas’.
14. In the absence of a definition in the Sixth Directive of the concept of admissions to a cinema referred to in Category 7 in Annex H, that concept should be interpreted in the light of its context within the Sixth Directive (see, to that effect, Case C-83/99 Commission  v Spain  [2001] ECR I-445, paragraph 17).
15. In that regard, and as has previously been noted by the Court, it follows from Article 12(3)(a) of the Sixth Directive that the application of either one or two reduced rates of VAT is an option accorded to the Member States as an exception to the principle that the standard rate applies. Moreover, according to that provision, the reduced rates of VAT may be applied only to supplies of the goods and services specified in Annex H to that directive. It is settled case-law that provisions which are in the nature of exceptions to a principle must be interpreted strictly (see, inter alia, Commission  v Spain , paragraphs 18 and 19 and the case‑law cited).
16. It follows in particular that the concept of admissions to a cinema must be interpreted in accordance with the usual meaning of those words (see, to that effect, Commission  v Spain , paragraph 20, and Commission  v Germany , paragraph 23).
European Commission v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 2010-03-25
26. As regards the drawing-up of a number of external emergency plans during the year 2008, it should be pointed out that, in accordance with settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-456/05 Commission  v Germany  [2007] ECR I‑10517, paragraph 15).