Firma Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen.
Date: 2010-02-25
39. In this respect, it should be recalled that an agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union with a non-Member State in accordance with Articles 217 TFEU and 218 TFEU, constitutes, as far as the European Union is concerned, an act of one of the institutions of the Union, within the meaning of point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 267 TFEU; that, from the moment it enters into force, the provisions of such an agreement form an integral part of the legal order of the European Union; and that, within the framework of that legal order, the Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of such an agreement (see, to that effect, Case 12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, paragraph 7, and Case C‑162/96 Racke  [1998] ECR I‑3655, paragraph 41). In addition, having been concluded by two subjects of public international law, the EC-Israel Association Agreement is governed by international law and, more specifically, as regards its interpretation, by the international law of treaties.
40. The international law of treaties was consolidated, essentially, in the Vienna Convention. Under Article 1 thereof, the Vienna Convention applies to treaties between States. However, under Article 3(b) of the Vienna Convention, the fact that the Vienna Convention does not apply to international agreements concluded between States and other subjects of international law is not to affect the application to them of any of the rules set forth in that convention to which they would be subject under international law independently of the convention.
41. It follows that the rules laid down in the Vienna Convention apply to an agreement concluded between a State and an international organisation, such as the EC-Israel Association Agreement, in so far as the rules are an expression of general international customary law. Consequently, the EC-Israel Association Agreement must be interpreted in accordance with those rules.
42. In addition, the Court has held that, even though the Vienna Convention does not bind either the Community or all its Member States, a series of provisions in that convention reflect the rules of customary international law which, as such, are binding upon the Community institutions and form part of the Community legal order (see, to that effect, Racke,  paragraphs 24, 45 and 46; see, also, as regards the reference to the Vienna Convention for the purposes of the interpretation of association agreements concluded by the European Communities, Case C‑416/96 El-Yassini  [1999] ECR I‑1209, paragraph 47, and Case C‑268/99 Jany and Others  [2001] ECR I‑8615, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
43. Pursuant to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. In that respect, account is to be taken, together with the context, of any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
44. Among the relevant rules that may be relied on in the context of the relations between the parties to the EC-Israel Association Agreement is the general international law principle of the relative effect of treaties, according to which treaties do not impose any obligations, or confer any rights, on third States (‘ pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt ’) . That principle of general international law finds particular expression in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention, under which a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.
52. Accordingly, to interpret Article 83 of the EC-Israel Association Agreement as meaning that the Israeli customs authorities enjoy competence in respect of products originating in the West Bank would be tantamount to imposing on the Palestinian customs authorities an obligation to refrain from exercising the competence conferred upon them by virtue of the abovementioned provisions of the EC-PLO Protocol. Such an interpretation, the effect of which would be to create an obligation for a third party without its consent, would thus be contrary to the principle of general international law, ‘ pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt ’, as consolidated in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention.
57. It is clear, both from Article 17 of the EC-Israel Protocol and from Article 15 of the EC-PLO Protocol, that proof of origin must be produced in respect of products originating in the territories of the contracting parties if they are to qualify for the preferential treatment. That requirement of valid proof of origin issued by the competent authority cannot be considered to be a mere formality that may be overlooked as long as the place of origin is established by means of other evidence. In this respect, the Court has already held that the validity of certificates issued by authorities other than those designated by name in the relevant association agreement cannot be accepted (see, to that effect, Case C-432/92 Anastasiou and Others  [1994] ECR I‑3087, paragraphs 37 to 41).
61. In a similar legal context, the Court has held that it follows from such provisions that the determination of the origin of goods is b ased on a division of powers between the customs authorities of the parties to the free-trade agreement concerned, inasmuch as origin is established by the authorities of the exporting State. That system is justified by the fact that the authorities of the exporting State are those best placed to verify directly the facts which determine origin (see, to that effect, Case 218/83 Les Rapides Savoyards and Others  [1984] ECR 3105, paragraph 26).
62. However, a mechanism of that kind can function only if the customs authorities of the importing State accept the determinations legally made by the authorities of the exporting State (see, to that effect, Les Rapides Savoyards and Others , paragraph 27, and Joined Cases C‑23/04 to C‑25/04 Sfakianakis [2006] ECR I‑1265, paragraph 23).
63. It follows that, in the context of that system of mutual recognition, the customs authorities of the importing State may not unilaterally declare invalid an invoice declaration made out by an exporter who has been properly approved by the customs authorities of the exporting State. Likewise, in cases of subsequent verification, the customs authorities of the importing State are generally bound by the results of such verification (see, to that effect, Sfakianakis , paragraph 49).
72. In any event, even if it might have been conceivable, had there been a dispute concerning the interpretation of the Association Agreement as such, to bring the matter before the Association Council, it should be recalled that, as the Court has already held, the fact that the dispute was not referred to the Association Committee, an emanation of the Association Council, cannot be used as justification for derogating from the system of cooperation and respect for the areas of competence as allocated under the Association Agreement (see, by analogy, Sfakianakis , paragraph 52).