larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
European Parliament v Council of the European Union.
Date: 1996-06-18
17 Pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty, the Parliament may bring an action before the Court for the annulment of an act of another institution provided that it does so in order to protect its prerogatives. The Court has held that that condition is satisfied where the Parliament indicates in an appropriate manner the substance of the prerogative to be safeguarded and how that prerogative is allegedly infringed (Case C-316/91 Parliament v Council [1994] ECR I-625, paragraph 13).
18 By virtue of those criteria, the action must be declared inadmissible to the extent to which it is founded on infringement of Article 190 of the Treaty. In alleging that the contested provisions are inadequately or incorrectly reasoned for the purposes of that article, the Parliament has failed to provide any relevant indication as to how that infringement, assuming that it has been committed, is such as to impair its own prerogatives (see Case C-156/93 Parliament v Commission [1995] ECR I-2019, paragraph 11).
19 On the other hand, the right to be consulted in accordance with a provision of the Treaty is a prerogative of the Parliament (see Parliament v Council, cited above, paragraph 16) and the Parliament maintains that certain provisions of the contested directive have modified the obligations imposed on the Member States by the basic directive and by Directive 80/778, which are based respectively on Article 43 and Articles 100 and 235 of the Treaty ° which provide that the Parliament must be consulted.
23 As the Court has already held (in particular in Case 46/86 Romkes v Officier van Justitie for the District of Zwolle [1987] ECR 2671, paragraph 16, and in Parliament v Commission, cited above, paragraph 18, the Council cannot be required to draw up all the details of regulations or directives concerning the common agricultural policy according to the procedure laid down in Article 43 of the Treaty. It is sufficient for the purposes of that provision that the essential elements of the matter to be dealt with have been adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down by that provision, and the provisions implementing the basic regulations or directives may be adopted according to a different procedure, as provided for by those regulations or directives. Nevertheless, an implementing directive such as the contested directive, adopted without consultation of the Parliament, must respect the provisions enacted in the basic directive after consultation of the Parliament.
VOBIS Microcomputer AG v Oberfinanzdirektion München.
Date: 1996-06-20
13 The Court has consistently held that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties, as defined in the relevant headings of the Common Customs Tariff and the notes to the sections or chapters. Likewise, for the purpose of interpreting the Common Customs Tariff, both the notes which head the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff and the Explanatory Notes to the Nomenclature of the Customs Cooperation Council are important means for ensuring the uniform application of the Tariff and as such may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (see the judgment in Joined Cases C-59/94 and C-64/94 Ministre des Finances v Pardo & Fils and Camicas [1995] ECR I-3159, paragraph 10).
Waltraud Tomberger v Gebrüder von der Wettern GmbH.
Date: 1996-06-27
17 With regard to Article 31 of the Fourth Directive, it should be borne in mind that the Fourth Directive seeks to coordinate national provisions concerning the presentation and content of annual accounts of certain types of companies (see the first recital of the preamble). In order to coordinate the content of annual accounts, the directive lays down the principle of the "true and fair view", compliance with which is the primary objective of the directive. According to that principle, the annual accounts of the companies to which the Fourth Directive applies must give a true and fair view of their assets and liabilities, financial position and profit or loss (see the fourth recital in the preamble to the Fourth Directive and Article 2(3) and (5) thereof).
22 It is clear from those provisions that taking account of all elements ° profits made, charges, income, liabilities and losses ° which actually relate to the financial year in question ensures observance of the requirement of a true and fair view.
Criminal proceedings against Jacqueline Brandsma.
Date: 1996-06-27
6 In these circumstances, the reply to the first question should be that a legal provision of a Member State prohibiting pesticides for non-agricultural use which have not been previously authorized from being marketed, acquired, offered, put on display or sale, kept, prepared, transported, sold, disposed of for valuable consideration or free of charge, imported or used, constitutes a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction within the meaning of Article 30 of the Treaty.
11 Since biocidal products are used to combat organisms harmful to human or animal health and organisms liable to damage natural or manufactured products, they inevitably contain dangerous substances. As the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the Commission have rightly observed, in the absence of harmonizing rules, the Member States are free to decide on their intended level of protection of human health and life and on whether to require prior authorization for the marketing of such products.
12 As the Court held, however, in Frans-Nederlandse Maatschappij voor Biologische Producten, at paragraph 14, whilst a Member State is free to require a product of the type in question, which has already received approval in another Member State, to undergo a fresh procedure of examination and approval, the authorities of the Member States are nevertheless required to assist in bringing about a relaxation of the controls existing in intra-Community trade and to take account of technical or chemical analyses or laboratory tests which have already been carried out in another Member State.
Criminal proceedings against Rémy Schmit.
Date: 1996-06-27
10 First, it should be emphasized in limine that the place where the vehicles in question are manufactured is irrelevant. Under Article 30, a vehicle manufactured in the national territory which is then exported and reimported through parallel channels constitutes an imported product in the same way as a vehicle manufactured in another Member State which is then directly introduced into the national territory.
14 Since the scope of national laws, regulations or administrative provisions must be assessed in the light of the interpretation given to them by national courts (Joined Cases C-132/81, C-138/91 and C-139/91 Katsikas and Others [1992] ECR I-6577, paragraph 39, and Case C-382/92 Commission v United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2435, paragraph 36), it is argued that the rules in question do not restrict, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 1996-07-02
2 Article 48(1) to (3) of the EEC Treaty, which is now the EC Treaty, lays down the principle of the free movement of workers and the abolition of all discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States. Article 48(4) of the Treaty provides that the provisions of this article are not to apply to employment in the public service. According to the case-law of the Court, Article 48(4) covers posts which involve direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the general interests of the State or of other public authorities and thus presume on the part of those occupying them the existence of a special relationship of allegiance to the State and reciprocity of rights and duties which form the foundation of the bond of nationality. On the other hand, the Article 48(4) exception does not cover posts which, whilst coming under the State or other organizations governed by public law, still do not involve any association with tasks belonging to the public service properly so called (judgment in Case 149/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 3881, paragraphs 10 and 11).
16 As for that argument, it must be observed that it is well established in case-law (see, in particular, the judgment in Case C-433/93 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I-2303, paragraph 15) that amendments made to national legislation are irrelevant for the purpose of giving judgment on the subject-matter of an action for failure to fulfil obligations if they have not been implemented before the expiry of the period set by the reasoned opinion. Consequently, as the Advocate General also points out in paragraph 42 of his Opinion, the Belgian Government cannot rely on legislative amendments made after that date.
Hüpeden & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas.
Date: 1996-07-04
14 According to settled case-law, by virtue of that principle measures imposing financial charges on economic operators are lawful provided that they are appropriate and necessary for meeting the objectives legitimately pursued by the rules in question. However, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, the least onerous measure must be used and the charges imposed must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 265/87 Schraeder v Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989] ECR 2237, paragraph 21).
30 That argument cannot be accepted. The regulation at issue was not designed to exclude imports above certain quantities completely but left open the possibility of issuing import licences against payment of an additional amount (see the judgment in Case 345/82 Wuensche [1984] ECR 1995, paragraph 25). Having opted for that latter solution, the Council was obliged to comply with the principle of proportionality.
Bernhard Pietsch v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Waltershof.
Date: 1996-07-04
15 According to settled case-law, by virtue of that principle measures imposing financial charges on economic operators are lawful provided that they are appropriate and necessary for meeting the objectives legitimately pursued by the rules in question. However, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, the least onerous measure must be used and the charges imposed must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 265/87 Schraeder v Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989] ECR 2237, paragraph 21).
Stanley Charles Atkins v Wrekin District Council and Department of Transport.
Date: 1996-07-11
10 The Court has already held that, in order to fall within the scope of Directive 79/7, a benefit must constitute the whole or part of a statutory scheme providing protection against one of the specified risks, or a form of social assistance having the same objective (see, in particular, Case C-137/94 Richardson [1995] ECR I-3407, paragraph 8).
11 The Court has also stated that, although the way in which a benefit is granted is not decisive for the purposes of Directive 79/7, the benefit must, in order to fall within its scope, be directly and effectively linked to the protection provided against one of the risks specified in Article 3(1) of the Directive (Richardson, cited above, paragraph 9).
15 Similarly, the fact that the scheme in question is not formally part of national social security rules and is not the responsibility of the Department of Social Security ° a point made by Wrekin District Council ° cannot exclude it from the scope of Directive 79/7 (Richardson, paragraph 13).
19 The fact that the recipient of a benefit is, as a matter of fact, in one of the situations envisaged by Article 3(1) of Directive 79/7 does not suffice to bring that benefit as such within the scope of the Directive (see Joined Cases C-63/91 and C-64/91 Jackson and Cresswell [1992] ECR I-4737, paragraphs 18 and 19).
Siegfried Otte v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Date: 1996-07-11
20 The fact that a Member State did not mention a law in that declaration does not have the effect of excluding that law ipso facto from the matters covered by Regulation No 1408/71 (see Case C-35/77 Beerens v Rijkdienst voor Arbeidsvoorziening [1977] ECR 2249, paragraph 9; Case 70/80 Vigier v Bundesversicherungsanstalt fuer Angestellte [1981] ECR 229, paragraph 15; and Case C-327/92 Rheinhold & Malha [1995] ECR I-1223, paragraph 18).
21 Next, as the Court has repeatedly held, the distinction between benefits which are excluded from the scope of Regulation No 1408/71 and benefits which come within it rests entirely on the factors relating to each benefit, in particular its purpose and the conditions for its grant, and not on whether the national legislation describes the benefit as a social security benefit or not (see in particular Case 249/83 Hoeckx v Openbaar Centrum voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn Kalmthout [1985] ECR 973, paragraph 11, and Case 122/84 Scrivner v Centre Public d' Aide Sociale de Chastre [1985] ECR 1027, paragraph 18).
22 In order to fall within the scope of Regulation No 1408/71, legislation must in particular cover one of the risks expressly specified in Article 4(1) of that regulation. That list is exhaustive, so that a branch of social security not mentioned does not fall within that category even if it confers upon individuals a legally defined position entitling them to benefits (see in particular Hoeckx, paragraph 12, and Scrivner, paragraph 19).
31 Benefits such as adaptation allowances differ from old-age benefits in that they pursue an object related to employment policy. In the case of rationalization, they make it possible to release posts held by workers who are near the age of retirement, an aim which emerged only after the implementation of Regulation No 1408/71 in the context of the economic crisis which has for some years affected the Community in general and the mining sector in particular (see, to that effect, Case 171/82 Valentini v Assedic [1983] ECR 2157, paragraph 17). In the case of closures too the grant of the allowance contributes, as indicated in paragraph 27 of this judgment, to reducing the number of laid-off workers who are subject to the unemployment insurance scheme.
36 Suffice it to say, in that respect, that in addition to the fact that the amount of the allowance is determined in accordance with the provisions governing old-age benefits, recipients of adaptation allowances are not required to register as job-seekers, to keep themselves available on the employment market, or to refrain from undertaking an activity as an employed or self-employed person the income from which exceeds a specified ceiling.
Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications and others.
Date: 1996-07-30
11 As the Court has stated in its case-law, in interpreting a provision of Community law it is necessary to consider its wording, its context and its aims (Case 337/82 St. Nikolaus Brennerei v Hauptzollamt Krefeld [1984] ECR 1051, paragraph 10; Case C-83/94 Leifer and Others [1995] ECR I-3231, paragraph 22).
13 As to context and aims, it should be noted that by Regulation No 990/93 the Council gave effect to the decision of the Community and its Member States, meeting within the framework of political cooperation, to have recourse to a Community instrument to implement in the Community certain aspects of the sanctions taken against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the Security Council of the United Nations, which, on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted Resolutions 713 (1991), 752 (1992) and 787 (1992) and strengthened those sanctions by Resolution 820 (1993).
14 To determine the scope of the first paragraph of Article 8 of Regulation No 990/93, account must therefore also be taken of the text and the aim of those resolutions, in particular Paragraph 24 of Resolution 820 (1993), which provides that "all States shall impound all vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in their territories in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)".
21 It is settled case-law that the fundamental rights invoked by Bosphorus Airways are not absolute and their exercise may be subject to restrictions justified by objectives of general interest pursued by the Community (see Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727; Case 5/88 Wachauf v Bundesamt fuer Ernaehrung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 2609; and Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-4973).
22 Any measure imposing sanctions has, by definition, consequences which affect the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or business, thereby causing harm to persons who are in no way responsible for the situation which led to the adoption of the sanctions.
23 Moreover, the importance of the aims pursued by the regulation at issue is such as to justify negative consequences, even of a substantial nature, for some operators.
26 As compared with an objective of general interest so fundamental for the international community, which consists in putting an end to the state of war in the region and to the massive violations of human rights and humanitarian international law in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the impounding of the aircraft in question, which is owned by an undertaking based in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, cannot be regarded as inappropriate or disproportionate.
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1996-09-10
15 Under Article 155 of the EC Treaty, the Commission is responsible for ensuring application of the Treaty and, accordingly, compliance with international agreements concluded by the Community which, pursuant to Article 228 of the Treaty, are binding both on the Community institutions and the Member States. For the Commission to succeed in that task, it must not be hindered in the exercise of its power under Article 169 of the Treaty to bring proceedings before the Court where a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations under such an agreement. The initiation of proceedings before the Court by the Commission cannot therefore depend on the outcome of consultations within the Article 113 Committee; a fortiori, it cannot hinge on whether a consensus between the Member States has first been found to exist within the Committee with regard to the interpretation of the Community' s commitments under an international agreement.
16 Furthermore, it is for the Court, within the framework of its jurisdiction over the interpretation of agreements concluded by the Community, to ensure their uniform application throughout its territory (Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641, paragraph 14).
Substance
The first and third complaints
42 That argument cannot be accepted. An action under Article 169 of the Treaty can be based only on the arguments and submissions already set forth in the reasoned opinion (see inter alia Case C-347/88 Commission v Greece [1990] ECR I-4747, paragraph 16). It follows that, in such proceedings, the existence of an infringement must be assessed in the light of the Community legislation in force at the close of the period prescribed by the Commission for the Member State concerned to comply with its reasoned opinion.
52 When the wording of secondary Community legislation is open to more than one interpretation, preference should be given as far as possible to the interpretation which renders the provision consistent with the Treaty. Likewise, an implementing regulation must, if possible, be given an interpretation consistent with the basic regulation (see Case C-90/92 Dr Tretter v Hauptzollamt Stuttgart-Ost [1993] ECR I-3569, paragraph 11). Similarly, the primacy of international agreements concluded by the Community over provisions of secondary Community legislation means that such provisions must, so far as is possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those agreements.
61 It is settled law that, in proceedings under Article 169 of the Treaty, the Commission is required to establish the existence of the alleged infringement and may not rely on any presumption (see Case 290/87 Commission v Netherlands [1989] ECR 3083, paragraph 11).
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 1996-09-10
26 The Directive contains no express definition of the phrase "broadcasters under its jurisdiction".
40 It thus follows from an analysis of Article 2(1) that the concept of jurisdiction of a Member State, used in its first indent, must be understood as necessarily covering jurisdiction ratione personae over television broadcasters.
42 A Member State' s jurisdiction ratione personae over a broadcaster can be based only on the broadcaster' s connection to that State' s legal system, which in substance overlaps with the concept of establishment as used in the first paragraph of Article 59 of the EC Treaty, the wording of which presupposes that the supplier and the recipient of a service are "established" in two different Member States.
The Council of Europe Convention
58 As to that point, the criterion contended for by the United Kingdom may produce problems in the delimitation of jurisdiction which, in its view, can be resolved only through the conclusion of international agreements between the Member States. Although the criterion of establishment may also give rise to difficulties, the Commission has stated, without being contradicted by the United Kingdom, that Member States may find a solution to the problem of double control, without the necessity of further legislation, by interpreting the criterion of establishment as referring to the place in which a broadcaster has the centre of its activities, in particular the place where decisions concerning programme policy are taken and the programmes to be broadcast are finally put together.