larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Skatteministeriet v Aktieselskabet Forsikrinsselskabet Codan.
Date: 1998-12-17
3 The Directive is aimed in particular at achieving harmonisation of the factors involved in the fixing and levying of duty on the raising of capital to which investments in companies in the Community are subject, by means of the elimination of tax obstacles which interfere with the free movement of capital (see in particular Case C-347/96 Solred [1998] ECR I-937, paragraph 3).
21 In that connection, it must be observed that Article 12(1) of the Directive lays down an exhaustive list of taxes and duties other than capital duty which, in derogation from Articles 10 and 11, may be imposed on capital companies in connection with the transactions referred to in those latter provisions (Case C-188/95 Fantask and Others [1997] ECR I-6783, paragraph 18).
25 To begin with, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law of the Court, the interpretation of a provision of Community law involves a comparison of the different language versions thereof (see Case 283/81 Cilfit and Others [1982] ECR 3415, paragraph 18).
26 It must also be pointed out that the need for a uniform interpretation of the language versions requires, in the case of divergence between them, that the provision in question be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (Case C-449/93 Rockfon [1995] ECR I-4291, paragraph 28, and Case C-72/95 Kraaijeveld and Others [1996] ECR I-5403, paragraph 28).
27 Finally, so far as the purpose of the Directive is concerned, it is intended, as the recitals in its preamble indicate, to encourage the free movement of capital which is regarded as essential for the creation of an economic union whose characteristics are similar to those of a domestic market. As far as concerns taxes on the raising of capital, the pursuit of such an objective presupposes the abolition of indirect taxes in force in the Member States until then and imposing in place of them a duty charged only once in the common market and at the same level in all the Member States  (Case C-2/94 Denkavit Internationaal and Others [1996] ECR I-2827, paragraph 16, and Fantask and Others, cited above, paragraph 13).
28 It thus follows both from a general principle of interpretation of Community law and from the purpose of the Directive that the provisions thereof must be uniformly interpreted.
31 Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred to the Court must be that Article 12(1)(a) of the Directive must be interpreted as allowing a tax to be charged in the event of a transfer of shares irrespective, first, of whether the company issuing the shares is listed on a Stock Exchange and, secondly, of whether the shares are transferred on the Stock Exchange or directly from the transferor to the transferee.
Dansk Metalarbejderforbund, acting on behalf of John Lauge and Others v Lønmodtagernes Garantifond.
Date: 1998-12-17
18 It must be noted that the wording of the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) and Article 4(4) of the Directive indicates clearly that the termination of the activities of the establishment and the collective redundancies must not take place prior to the judicial decision, which consists, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, in a winding-up order. The fact that certain effects of the winding-up are retroactive from the date on which the winding-up petition is filed, as the national legislation provides, does not affect that conclusion.
19 That interpretation is confirmed by the purpose of the Directive. It is clear from the first recital in its preamble that the Directive is aimed at affording protection to workers in the event of collective redundancies. As the Commission observed, that purpose was reinforced by the amendment introduced by Directive 92/56, which extended application of the Directive to the case where the termination of activities is the result of a judicial decision, subject to recourse to the possibility of derogation provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) and Article 4(4). In order not to jeopardise the attainment of the fundamental objective pursued by the Directive, that derogation must be construed narrowly.
Connemara Machine Turf Co. Ltd v Coillte Teoranta.
Date: 1998-12-17
31 In order to give full effect to the principle of free movement, the term `contracting authority' must be interpreted in functional terms (see, to that effect, the judgment of 10 November 1998 in Case C-360/96 Gemeente Arnhem and Gemeente Rheden v BFI Holding [1998] ECR I-6821, paragraph 62).
French Republic v Comafrica SpA and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe Ltd & Co. and Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1999-01-21
13 As regards the request for a measure of inquiry, the Court considers that it must be rejected.  It was made at a time when, in accordance with Article 59(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the oral procedure was closed.  The Court has held (see, in particular, Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 53) that such a request can be accepted only if it relates to facts which may have a decisive influence and which the party concerned could not put forward before the close of the oral procedure.
34 In that regard, it should be recalled that, at paragraph 20 of the judgment in Weddel v Commission, the Court stated that Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2806/87 of 18 September 1987 on the issue of import licences for high-quality fresh, chilled or frozen beef and veal (OJ 1987 L 268, p. 59) was adopted in view of the quantities of beef and veal in respect of which individual applications for import licences had been lodged in the first 10 days of the month of September 1987.
Commission of the European Communities v Portuguese Republic.
Date: 1999-01-21
18 In its judgment in Case C-396/92 Bund Naturschutz in Bayern and Others v Freistaat Bayern [1994] ECR I-3717, the Court has already ruled that Article 12(1) of the directive must be interpreted as not permitting a Member State which has transposed the directive into national law after 3 July 1988, the deadline for transposition, to waive, by a transitional provision, for projects in respect of which the consent procedure was already initiated before the entry into force of the national law transposing the directive, but after 3 July 1988, the obligations concerning the environmental impact assessment required by the directive (see also, to this effect, Case C-431/92 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I-2189, paragraph 28, Case C-81/96 Gedeputeerde Staten van Noord-Holland [1998] ECR I-3923, paragraphs 23 to 28, and Case C-301/95 Commission v Germany [1998] ECR I-6135, paragraph 29).
19 There is nothing in the directive which could be construed as authorising the Member States to exempt projects in respect of which the consent procedures were initiated after the deadline of 3 July 1988 from the obligation to carry out an environmental impact assessment (Bund Naturschutz in Bayern, paragraph 18, and Gedeputeerde Staten van Noord-Holland, paragraph 22).
21 Furthermore, it is settled case-law that a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case 275/83 Commission v Belgium [1985] ECR 1097, paragraph 10, Case C-298/97 Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-3301, paragraph 14, and Case C-326/97 Commission v Belgium [1998] ECR I-6107, paragraph 7).
22 With regard, finally, to the argument that the applications for consent submitted after 3 July 1988 but before the date on which the national legislation entered into force were few in number and had all been the subject of an environmental impact report, it is important to remember that, even assuming that fact to have been established, failure by a Member State to fulfil an obligation imposed by a rule of Community law is sufficient to constitute a breach of Treaty obligations and the fact that the failure had no adverse effects is irrelevant (Case C-209/88 Commission v Italy [1990] ECR I-4313, paragraph 14).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 1999-01-21
15 The Court has consistently held that a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-303/92 Commission v Netherlands [1993] ECR I-4739, paragraph 9, and Case C-298/97 Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-3301, paragraph 14).
17 In that respect, it is important that the Member States under such an obligation notify the Commission of the measures which they intend to adopt or carry out in the sectors concerned.  It is only in the light of such specific figures and timetables that the Commission can then assess whether the measures envisaged in pursuance of the Directive actually contribute to implementing the programmes designed to attain the objectives of the Directive (see Case C-255/93 Commission v France [1994] ECR I-4949, paragraph 25).
18 It follows from the wording of Article 6 and the general scheme of the Directive that the various problems posed by specific waste such as batteries and accumulators are to be resolved according to a precise timetable.  In this respect, it must be pointed out that, even if certain results relating to the objectives of the Directive have been achieved before the expiry of the period prescribed thereby for the implementation of programmes, that does not excuse a Member State from drawing up the programmes required.$
23 In view of the foregoing considerations, it must be stated that, although the Belgian Government has taken positive measures in relation to the objectives set out in the first paragraph of Article 6 of the Directive, they constitute no more than a series of legislative provisions or ad hoc measures which do not possess the characteristics of an organised and coordinated system of objectives such as to make it possible to regard them as programmes within the meaning of Article 6.
Österreichische Unilever GmbH v Smithkline Beecham Markenartikel GmbH.
Date: 1999-01-28
24 It should be borne in mind that Directive 76/768 has brought about the complete harmonisation of national rules on the packaging and labelling of cosmetic products (see Case C-150/88 Parfümerie-Fabrik 4711 v Provide [1989] ECR 3891, paragraph 28, and Case C-315/92 Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb v Clinique Laboratories and Estée Lauder [1994] ECR I-317, paragraph 11).
27 However, the measures which the Member States are required to take for the implementation of that provision must observe the principle of proportionality (see, in particular, Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb v Clinique Laboratories and Estée Lauder, cited above, paragraph 16).
34 It is true that authorisation may be granted.  However, the need to obtain such authorisation, which in any event remains valid only for a limited period, constitutes a wholly unjustified obstacle to the free movement of the product in question.
35 It is possible to ensure the protection of consumers, public health and fair trading by adopting measures which are less restrictive of the free movement of goods than the automatic exclusion of advertising by a system that prohibits the advertising of substances not expressly listed in the Kosmetikverordnung.  Thus, the controls exercised by the national authorities could take the form, inter alia, of an obligation requiring the manufacturer or distributor of the product in question, in the event of any uncertainty, to furnish evidence of the accuracy of the advertisements concerned, in the manner provided for by Article 6 of Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading advertising (OJ 1984 L 250, p. 17).
A.J. van der Kooy v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 1999-01-28
27 It has consistently been held that, in order to reach an interpretation of Community law which will be of use to the national court it is essential for that court to define the factual and legislative context of the questions referred or, at the very least, to explain the factual circumstances on which they are based (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-320/90, C-321/90 and C-322/90 Telemarsicabruzzo and Others v Circostel [1993] ECR I-393, paragraph 6; Case C-157/92 Pretore di Genova v Banchero [1993] ECR I-1085, paragraph 4; Case C-66/97 Banco de Fomento e Exterior v Pechim and Others [1997] ECR I-3757, paragraph 7; and Joined Cases C-128/97 and C-137/97 Italia Testa and Modesti [1998] ECR I-2181, paragraph 5).
36 In accordance with Article 227(3) of the Treaty and Convention 64/533, the special arrangements for association set out in Part Four of the Treaty apply to the OCTs, including the Netherlands Antilles.
37 Under those arrangements, failing express reference, the general provisions of the Treaty do not apply to the OCTs (Case C-260/90 Leplat v Territory of French Polynesia [1992] ECR I-643, paragraph 10).
40 It is true that Article 101 of the Sixth OCT Decision provides that products originating in the OCT and certain products which are in free circulation there are to be imported into the Community free of customs duties and charges having equivalent effect.  However, a tax such as the VAT levied on imports of products into a Member State does not have the ingredients of a charge having an effect equivalent to customs duties (Case 15/81 Schul v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1982] ECR 1409, paragraph 21).
Verbraucherschutzverein eV v Sektkellerei G.C. Kessler GmbH und Co..
Date: 1999-01-28
33 Finally, in its judgment in Case C-456/93 Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs v Langguth [1995] ECR I-1737, concerning Article 40 of Regulation No 2392/89, the wording of which is almost identical with that of Article 13 of Regulation No 2333/92, the Court held in paragraph 28 that the fact that a brand name is presented in a conspicuous manner does not mean that it is likely to cause confusion or mislead the persons to whom it is addressed, even if it contains a word that has been designated by the rules in question as information which may be used in the appellation of a quality wine psr.  The Court added in paragraph 29 that the wording of Article 40 of Regulation No 2392/89 shows that it is aimed primarily at prohibiting the untruthful use of brand names.  It follows from that judgment that, for the use of a brand name to be capable of being regarded as likely to cause confusion or mislead the persons to whom it is addressed, it must be established, having regard to the opinions or habits of the consumers concerned, that there is a real risk of their economic behaviour being affected.
36 As the Court has frequently held in relation to provisions similar to those in Article 13 of Regulation No 2333/92, designed to prevent any deception of consumers and contained in a number of secondary legislative measures either of general application or sectoral in scope, it is for the national court to assess whether an appellation, brand name or advertising statement may be misleading (see, in particular, Case 94/82 De Kikvorsch [1983] ECR 947; C-313/94 Graffione v Fransa [1996] ECR I-6039; Case C-373/90 X [1992] ECR I-131, paragraphs 15 and 16, and Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide and Tusky v Oberkreisdirektor Steinfurt [1998] ECR I-0000). In this case, it is for the national court to assess in the light of the circumstances whether, bearing in mind the consumers to whom it is addressed, a brand name or its component parts are liable to be confused with all or part of the description of certain wines.  In that respect, it is also apparent from the Court's case-law that the national court must take into account the presumed expectations of an average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect (Gut Springenheide and Tusky, cited above, paragraphs 31 and 32).
37 It is only where it has particular difficulty in appraising the misleading nature of the brand name that, in the absence of any Community provision on the matter, the national court must assess whether it is necessary, under the conditions laid down by its national law, to decide upon measures of inquiry such as an expert's report or a consumer research poll as guidance for its judgment (see Gut Springenheide and Tusky, cited above, paragraphs 35 to 37) and, where appropriate, adopt interim measures.
ROSE Elektrotechnic GmbH & Co. KG v Oberfinanzdirektion Köln.
Date: 1999-02-09
16 It is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and for ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN.  There are also explanatory notes drawn up, as regards the CN, by the Commission and, as regards the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System, by the Customs Cooperation Council, which may be an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force (see, in particular, Case C-201/96 LTM v FIRS [1997] ECR I-6147, paragraph 17, and Case C-328/97 Glob-Sped [1998] ECR I-8357, paragraph 26).
18 Moreover, it is apparent from Rule 2(a) of the General Rules for the interpretation of the CN that, for the purposes of customs classification, an incomplete or unfinished article is to be treated in the same way as a complete or finished article, provided that it has the essential character of the complete or finished article. That rule of interpretation is itself clarified by the Customs Cooperation Council's explanatory notes, according to which the heading relating to the finished product covers blanks, that is to say, articles which, although not ready for direct use, have the approximate shape or outline of the finished article and can only be used for completion into the finished article.
23 It is settled case-law that, whilst those explanatory notes may be regarded as a valuable aid to the interpretation of the CN, they do not have legally binding force, so that it is necessary, where appropriate, to examine whether their content is in accordance with the actual provisions of the Common Customs Tariff and whether they alter the meaning of those provisions (see, in particular, Case C-35/93 Develop Dr Eisbein [1994] ECR I-2655, paragraph 21, Case C-201/96 LTM, cited above, paragraph 17, and Case C-328/97 Glob-Sped, cited above, paragraph 26).
Criminal proceedings against Arnoldus van der Laan.
Date: 1999-02-09
18 According to settled case-law, all measures capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions (Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5).
19 It should also be borne in mind that, in accordance with the case-law beginning with Cassis de Dijon (Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649), in the absence of harmonisation of legislation, obstacles to free movement of goods which are the consequence of applying, to goods coming from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods (such as those relating to designation, form, size, weight, composition, presentation, labelling, packaging) constitute measures of equivalent effect prohibited by Article 30, even if those rules apply without distinction to all products, unless their application can be justified by a public-interest objective taking precedence over the free movement of goods (Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097, paragraph 15, and Case C-368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs v Heinrich Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR I-3689, paragraph 8).
24 As regards consumer protection, it must be stated that it can be guaranteed by means which do not hinder the importation of products which have been lawfully manufactured and marketed in other Member States, in particular by suitable labelling giving the nature of the product sold (Case C-269/89 Bonfait [1990] ECR I-4169, paragraph 15).
37 It must be added that a Member State cannot claim that a list of ingredients which complies with Article 3 of the directive none the less constitutes fraud within the meaning of Article 15(2) of the directive, justifying the application of non-harmonised national rules.
Criminal proceedings against Massimo Romanelli and Paolo Romanelli.
Date: 1999-02-11
11 As the Court has already observed in Case C-222/95 Parodi v Banque H. Albert de Bary [1997] ECR I-3899, paragraph 22, the banking sector is a particularly sensitive area from the point of view of consumer protection. Consumers must be protected against the harm which they could suffer through banking transactions effected by credit institutions disregarding the requirements relating to their solvency or whose managers do not have the necessary professional qualifications or integrity.
European Parliament v Council of the European Union.
Date: 1999-02-23
36 According to settled case-law, in the context of the organisation of the powers of the Community the choice of the legal basis for a measure must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review.  Those factors include in particular the aim and the content of the measure (see, in particular, Case C-271/94 Parliament v Council [1996] ECR I-1689, paragraph 14, and Case C-22/96 Parliament v Council [1998] ECR I-3231, paragraph 23).
38 In order to determine whether the dual legal basis contended for by the Parliament was necessary, it is appropriate to consider whether, according to its aim and content, as they appear from its actual wording, the contested decision is concerned, indissociably, both with industry and with culture (see, to that effect, Case C-300/89 Commission v Council [1991] ECR I-2867, paragraph 13).
39 In that connection, it is not sufficient for the contested decision to pursue a twofold purpose or for an analysis of its content to disclose the existence of a twofold component.
40 If it were apparent from an examination of the decision that its `industrial' component is identifiable as the main or predominant component, whereas the `cultural' component is merely incidental, it would follow that the only appropriate legal basis for it was Article 130 of the Treaty.
43 It is important therefore to verify in this case whether culture is an essential component of the contested decision, in the same way as industry, and cannot be dissociated from industry, or whether the `centre of gravity' of the decision is to be found in the industrial aspect of the Community action.
63 They are, however, indirect and incidental effects as compared with the direct effects sought, which are of an economic nature and do not justify basing the decision on Article 128 of the Treaty as well.
José Ferreiro Alvite v Instituto Nacional de Empleo (Inem) and Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS).
Date: 1999-02-25
17 In the present case, the Community condition is fulfilled only if the claimant has contributed or is deemed to have contributed to the Spanish social security scheme. As the Court stated in paragraph 37 of the judgment in Martínez Losada, it is for the national court to determine whether the periods for which the competent Spanish institution paid contributions to the sickness insurance and family benefits schemes on behalf of the applicant in the main proceedings constitute periods of insurance under its domestic legislation.
23 It is settled case-law that the Member States retain jurisdiction to determine the conditions for granting social security benefits, even if they make them more strict, provided that the new requirements do not give rise to overt or disguised discrimination between Community workers (see to that effect Case C-12/93 Drake [1994] ECR I-4337, paragraph 27).