Vaditrans BVBA v Belgische Staat.
Date: 2017-12-20
20


In that regard, it should be recalled that, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, judgment of 6 July 2017, Air Berlin, C‑290/16, EU:C:2017:523, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited) and, in the circumstances of this case, the history of that legislation (judgment of 1 July 2015, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, C‑461/13, EU:C:2015:433, paragraph 30).
42


Thus, it is settled case-law that, in accordance with recital 17 and Article 1 of Regulation No 561/2006, that regulation seeks to improve the working conditions of employees in the road transport sector, to improve general road safety and to harmonise the conditions of competition in road transport (see, inter alia, judgments of 9 February 2012, Urbán, C‑210/10, EU:C:2012:64, paragraph 25, of 9 June 2016, Eurospeed, C‑287/14, EU:C:2016:420, paragraphs 38 and 39 and the case-law cited, and of 19 October 2016, EL-EM-2001, C‑501/14, EU:C:2016:777, paragraph 21).
51


That principle requires, according to the Court’s case-law, EU legislation to give a clear definition of offences and the penalties which they attract. That requirement is satisfied where the individual concerned is in a position to ascertain from the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the assistance of the courts’ interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make him criminally liable (see, inter alia, judgments of 3 June 2008, Intertanko and Others, C‑308/06, EU:C:2008:312, paragraph 71, and of 22 October 2015, AC-Treuhand v Commission, C‑194/14 P, EU:C:2015:717, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
52


The principle that offences and penalties must have a proper basis in law cannot therefore be interpreted as precluding the gradual, case-by-case clarification of the rules on criminal liability by judicial interpretation, provided that the result was reasonably foreseeable at the time the offence was committed, especially in the light of the interpretation put on the provision in the case-law at the material time (judgment of 22 October 2015, AC-Treuhand v Commission, C‑194/14 P, EU:C:2015:717, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
55


In that regard, it is apparent from settled case-law that where an EU regulation does not specifically provide for any penalty for its infringement or refers, in that regard, to national laws, regulations and administrative provisions, Article 4(3) TFEU requires the Member States to take all measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of EU law. For that purpose, while the choice of penalties remains within their discretion, they must ensure in particular that infringements of EU law are penalised under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive (see, inter alia, judgments of 10 July 1990, Hansen, C‑326/88, EU:C:1990:291, paragraph 17, and of 27 March 2014, LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais, C‑565/12, EU:C:2014:190, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
56


It should be noted, in that context, that the Court has frequently interpreted secondary legislation which requires Member States to lay down penalties to ensure effective implementation of that legislation in the light of the principle that offences and penalties must have a proper basis in law. Thus, according to that case-law, a directive cannot, of itself and independently of a national law adopted by a Member State for its implementation, have the effect of determining or aggravating the liability in criminal law of persons who act in contravention of the provisions of that directive (see, inter alia, judgment of 7 January 2004, X, C‑60/02, EU:C:2004:10, paragraph 61).
57


It is also clear from that case-law that the Court’s reasoning in respect of directives may be transposed to regulations, that is rules which, by their very nature, do not require any national implementing measures, where those regulations empower Member States to adopt penalties for infringements in respect of the behaviour prohibited by those regulations (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 January 2004, X, C‑60/02, EU:C:2004:10, paragraph 62).
58


Therefore, given that, in accordance with Regulation No 561/2006, it is for the Member States to lay down penalties for infringement of that regulation, those States having a discretion as regards the nature of the applicable penalties (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 2016, Eurospeed, C‑287/14, EU:C:2016:420, paragraph 34).