UPM France v Premier ministre and Ministre de l'Action et des Comptes publics.
Date: 2019-10-16
26


In that regard, it should be recalled that it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of a rule of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (judgment of 10 December 2018, Wightman and Others, C‑621/18, EU:C:2018:999, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
27


It follows that questions relating to EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 10 December 2018, Wightman and Others, C‑621/18, EU:C:2018:999, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
37


In that regard, it is apparent from the objectives pursued by that directive that it provides for a harmonised taxation regime for energy products and electricity designed, inter alia, as is apparent from recitals 2 to 5 and 24 thereof, to promote the smooth functioning of the internal market in the energy sector by avoiding, inter alia, distortions of competition (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 March 2018, Cristal Union, C‑31/17, EU:C:2018:168, paragraph 29, and of 27 June 2018, Turbogás, C‑90/17, EU:C:2018:498, paragraph 34).
38


To that end, in particular with regard to electricity, the EU legislature has made the choice, as can be seen, in particular, from page 5 of the explanatory memorandum to the Proposal for a Council Directive restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products (OJ 1997 C 139, p. 14), to impose on Member States, in accordance with Article 1 of Directive 2003/96, taxation of distributed electricity, with the energy products used for its production being, at the same time, exempted from taxation in order to avoid double taxation of electricity (judgments of 7 March 2018, Cristal Union, C‑31/17, EU:C:2018:168, paragraph 30, and of 27 June 2018, Turbogás, C‑90/17, EU:C:2018:498, paragraph 35).
41


Thus, it is by way of exception to that principle of downstream taxation of electricity that the second sentence of the third subparagraph of Article 21(5) thereof gives Member States the option of exempting electricity produced by small producers and consumed for their own use, provided that they tax the energy products used to produce that electricity (judgment of 27 June 2018, Turbogás, C‑90/17, EU:C:2018:498, paragraph 36).
45


Thus, until that date, compliance with the minimum levels of taxation laid down in Directive 2003/96 constituted, among the electricity taxation rules provided for in EU law, the only obligation resting on the French Republic (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 July 2018, Messer France, C‑103/17, EU:C:2018:587, paragraph 23).
48


As the Court has pointed out in paragraph 42 of this judgment, the second sentence of the third subparagraph of Article 21(5) of Directive 2003/96 was merely a means of applying the harmonised taxation system (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 June 2018, Turbogás, C‑90/17, EU:C:2018:498, paragraph 37). Consequently, as regards the main proceedings, the French Republic cannot rely on a method of applying a scheme which had not been put in place at the time of the events relating to those proceedings.
49


With regard to the argument of the French Government concerning the transitional period provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 18(10) of Directive 2003/96, it must be borne in mind that that transitional period must be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, judgments of 7 December 2006, Eurodental, C‑240/05, EU:C:2006:763, paragraph 54, and of 27 February 2019, Greece v Commission, C‑670/17 P, EU:C:2019:145, paragraph 52). However, it appears from the wording of that provision that the transitional period provided for therein concerns the fact that the French Republic may adapt only its electricity taxation system and not that of taxation of energy products used to produce electricity.
52


However, as the Court has previously held, when the EU legislature intended to allow Member States to derogate from the regime of mandatory exemption introduced by Directive 2003/96, it did so explicitly in, respectively, the second sentence of Article 14(1)(a) of Directive 2003/96, which states that Member States may tax energy products used to produce electricity for reasons relating to the protection of the environment, and in the second sentence of the third subparagraph of Article 21(5) of that directive, under which Member States which exempt electricity generated by small producers of electricity must tax the energy products used for the generation of that electricity (judgment of 7 March 2018, Cristal Union, C‑31/17, EU:C:2018:168, paragraph 27).
53


It is thus apparent from the general scheme of Directive 2003/96 that, apart from those two specific cases, the mandatory exemption of energy products used to generate electricity referred to in the first sentence of Article 14(1)(a) of that directive is unconditionally binding on the Member States (judgment of 7 March 2018, Cristal Union, C‑31/17, EU:C:2018:168, paragraph 28).