larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Youssef Hassan v Breiding Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH.
Date: 2016-02-04
19


However, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments in Brain Products, C‑219/11, EU:C:2012:742, paragraph 13, and Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
20


As regards the context of which the first sentence of Article 23(1) of the Regulation is part, the Court observes, first of all, that the second sentence of that paragraph qualifies the rule set out in that first sentence as regards ‘third parties who have acquired rights’ in the trade mark after the date of the legal act in question but who knew of the act at the date on which the rights were acquired. Article 23(2) establishes an exception to that rule in the case of a ‘person who acquires the Community trade mark or a right concerning the Community trade mark’ by way of transfer of the whole of the undertaking or by any other universal succession. Accordingly, an interpretation of Article 23(1) and (2) of the Regulation which is both literal and schematic gives support to the idea that it, as a whole, is intended to govern the enforceability of the legal acts referred to in Articles 17, 19 and 22 of the Regulation in respect of third parties who have, or are likely to have, rights in the Community trade mark.
21


Next, the Court notes that Section 4 of Title II of the Regulation, which includes Article 23 of the Regulation, is entitled ‘Community trade marks as objects of property’. Accordingly, all of the articles in that section contain rules relating to the Community trade mark as an object of property. This is the case with regard to Articles 17, 19 and 22 of the Regulation, as is also apparent from recital 11 thereof. As noted by the Advocate General in point 21 of his Opinion, those articles relate to acts the purpose or effect of which is to create or transfer a right in respect of a trade mark.
25


With regard to the purpose of the rule laid down in the first sentence of Article 23(1) of the Regulation, the Court takes the view that, having regard to what has been established in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the present judgment, the lack of effects, vis-à-vis third parties, of the legal acts referred to in Articles 17, 19 and 22 of the Regulation which have not been entered in the Register is intended to protect a person who has, or may have, rights in a Community trade mark as an object of property. It follows that the first sentence of Article 23(1) of the Regulation does not apply to a situation, such as that in the main proceedings, in which a third party, by infringing the mark, infringes the rights conferred by the Community trade mark.
Sanoma Media Finland Oy - Nelonen Media v Viestintävirasto.
Date: 2016-02-17
34


Read in the light of recital 83 of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the first sentence of Article 19(1) of the directive must be understood as expressing the legislature’s intention to ensure that the interests of consumers as television viewers are fully and properly protected (see, to this effect, judgments in Österreichischer Rundfunk, C‑195/06, EU:C:2007:613, paragraphs 26 and 27, and Commission v Spain, C‑281/09, EU:C:2011:767, paragraph 46).
59


Since Article 23(1) of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive seeks to place a ceiling on the time for the broadcasting of television advertising spots and teleshopping spots per clock hour, that provision implicitly but necessarily discloses the intention of the EU legislature to ensure proper achievement of the fundamental objective of the directive, consisting in protecting consumers as television viewers from excessive broadcasting of television advertising (see, to this effect, judgment in Sky Italia, C‑234/12, EU:C:2013:496, paragraph 17).
Air Baltic Corporation AS v Lietuvos Respublikos specialiųjų tyrimų tarnyba.
Date: 2016-02-17
23


It follows that the provisions of the Montreal Convention have been an integral part of the European Union legal order from the date on which it entered into force and that, consequently, the Court has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling concerning its interpretation (see, to that effect, judgments in IATA and ELFAA, C‑344/04, EU:C:2006:10, paragraph 36, and Walz, C‑63/09, EU:C:2010:251, paragraph 20), it being understood that that convention was drawn up in French, English, Arabic, Chinese, Spanish and Russian, with all six language versions being authentic.
24


It is to be noted with regard to such an interpretation that, in accordance with settled case-law, an international treaty must be interpreted by reference to the terms in which it is worded and in the light of its objectives. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties, which codifies general international law and is binding on the European Union, states that a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose (see, to that effect, judgments in IATA and ELFAA, C‑344/04, EU:C:2006:10, paragraph 40, and Walz, C‑63/09, EU:C:2010:251, paragraph 23).
Salutas Pharma GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hannover.
Date: 2016-02-17
29


As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, judgments in Sysmex Europe, C‑480/13, EU:C:2014:2097, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited; Vario Tek, C‑178/14, EU:C:2015:152, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited, and Amazon EU, C‑58/14, EU:C:2015:385, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
30


Thus, the chapter notes to the CN constitute important means for ensuring the uniform application of the common customs tariff and provide, as such, useful information for its interpretation The content of those notes must therefore be consistent with the provisions of the CN and cannot modify its scope (see judgment in X and X BV, C‑319/10 and C‑320/10, EU:C:2011:720, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
31


Furthermore, the explanatory notes drawn up by the Commission as regards the CN and by the WCO as regards the HS are an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force (see judgment in Data I/O, C‑297/13, EU:C:2014:331, paragraph 33 and case-law cited).
37


Where the quantity of vitamins, mineral, essential amino-acids and fatty acids contained in the recommended daily dose of a product with the objective characteristics and properties defined by the wording of heading 3004 of the CN is significantly higher than what is necessary or recommended for general dietary purposes, it must be classified under that heading (see, to that effect, Glob-Sped, C‑328/97, EU:C:1998:601, paragraph 28).
Elektriciteits Produktiemaatschappij Zuid-Nederland EPZ NV v Bestuur van de Nederlandse Emissieautoriteit.
Date: 2016-03-03
25


It should be recalled that Article 3(e) of Directive 2003/87 defines an installation for the purposes of that directive as a stationary technical unit where one or more activities listed in Annex I to that directive are carried out and any other directly associated activities which have a technical connection with the activities carried out on that site and which could have an effect on emissions and pollution.
30


In that respect, it is necessary to point out, first, that the fact that the coal is essential to the functioning of the power plant is in itself sufficient for the view to be taken that the storage is directly associated with that plant’s activity. That direct association is, moreover, evidenced by the existence of a technical connection between the two activities. As the Advocate General proposes in point 30 of her Opinion, such a connection should be assumed if the relevant activity is integrated into the same technical process as the power plant’s combustion activity.
Sonos Europe BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2016-03-17
29


As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, when the Court is requested to give a preliminary ruling on a matter of tariff classification, its task is to provide the national court with guidance on the criteria which will enable the latter to classify the products at issue correctly in the CN, rather than to effect that classification itself, a fortiori since the Court does not necessarily have available to it all the information which is essential in that regard. In any event the national court is in a better position to do so (judgment in Lukoyl Neftohim Burgas, C‑330/13, EU:C:2014:1757, paragraph 27).
32


Moreover, it is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the tariff classification of goods is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (judgment in Lukoyl Neftohim Burgas, C‑330/13, EU:C:2014:1757, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
33


As regards the Explanatory Notes to the HS, it should be added that, although they do not have legally binding force, they are an important means of ensuring the uniform application of the Common Customs Tariff and, as such, may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (see, to that effect, judgments in Kloosterboer Services, C‑173/08, EU:C:2009:382, paragraph 25, and Agroferm, C‑568/11,EU:C:2013:407, paragraph 28). The same is true of the Explanatory Notes of the CN (see, to that effect, judgments in Develop Dr. Eisbein, C‑35/93, EU:C:1994:252, paragraph 21, and British Sky Broadcasting Group and Pace, C‑288/09 and C‑289/09, EU:C:2011:248, paragraph 92).
43


In addition, according to the case-law of the Court, the intended use of a product may constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (see judgment in Krings, C‑130/02, EU:C:2004:122, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
Christian Liffers v Producciones Mandarina SL and Mediaset España Comunicación SA, anciennement Gestevisión Telecinco SA.
Date: 2016-03-17
14


In that regard, according to the Court’s settled case-law, for the purpose of interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment in Surmačs, C‑127/14, EU:C:2015:522, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
26


However, as is apparent from paragraph 20 of the present judgment, setting the amount of damages due as a lump sum on the basis of hypothetical royalties alone covers only the material damage suffered by the intellectual property rightholder concerned; consequently, for the purposes of providing compensation in full, that rightholder must be able to seek, in addition to the damages thus calculated, compensation for any moral prejudice which he has suffered.
Kødbranchens Fællesråd v Ministeriet for Fødevarer, Landbrug og Fiskeri and Fødevarestyrelsen.
Date: 2016-03-17
31


It must be held in that respect that, contrary to what is maintained by the Danish Government, Article 27 of Regulation No 882/2004 does not give Member States discretion in relation to the criteria to be taken into consideration in setting the fees.
32


The EU legislature has adopted, with a view to taking action to counteract distortions of competition, harmonised rules on official controls, relating, in particular, to the various elements which may be taken into consideration in setting the fees intended to cover the costs of the official controls (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission v Germany, C‑270/07, EU:C:2009:168, paragraph 42).
36


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that according to the Court’s settled case-law, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision or be given priority over the other language versions in that regard. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all EU languages. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgment in Axa Belgium, C‑494/14, EU:C:2015:692, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
39


In that regard, it should be observed that, whereas Article 26 of Regulation No 882/2004 provides for both the use of general taxation and the establishment of fees or charges to finance the provision of ‘the necessary staff and other resources for official controls’, Article 27 of that regulation refers only to fees and charges and, in paragraph (1) thereof, authorises the Member States to levy such fees and charges only to ‘cover the costs occasioned by official controls’. It follows from the foregoing that the fees may be intended to cover only the costs which the Member States actually incur in performing controls in food establishments and their purpose is not to impose the cost of the initial training of those staff members on undertakings in the relevant sector.
K. Ruijssenaars and Others v Staatssecretaris van Infrastructuur en Milieu.
Date: 2016-03-17
35


Moreover, that interpretation is consistent with the allocation of the roles attributed, respectively, to the bodies referred to in Article 16(1) of Regulation No 261/2004 and to the national courts, as is apparent from the second sentence of recital 22 of the regulation and the Court’s case-law (see, to that effect, judgments in McDonagh, C‑12/11, EU:C:2013:43, paragraph 51, and Sousa Rodríguez and Others, C‑83/10, EU:C:2011:652, paragraph 44).
Abdelhafid Bensada Benallal v État belge.
Date: 2016-03-17
24


In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the absence of EU rules on the matter, it is for the national legal order of each Member State to establish them in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, on condition, however, that those rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not make it excessively difficult or impossible in practice to exercise the rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (judgment in Eturas and Others, C‑74/14, EU:C:2016:42, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
25


It follows that two cumulative conditions, namely respect for the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, must be satisfied in order for a Member State to be able to assert the principle of procedural autonomy in situations which are governed by EU law.
29


It should be noted that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the principle of equivalence requires that the national rule at issue be applied without distinction, whether the action is based on rights which individuals derive from EU law or whether it is based on an infringement of national law, where the purpose and cause of action are similar (judgment in Agrokonsulting-04, C‑93/12, EU:C:2013:432, paragraph 39). Respect for that principle requires equal treatment of claims based on a breach of national law and of similar claims based on a breach of EU law (judgment in Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 34).
30


Applied to a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the condition linked to respect for the principle of equivalence requires, therefore, that where the provisions of national law relating to the procedural rules governing appeals on a point of law confer on a court hearing a case in that capacity the obligation to accept or to raise of its own motion a plea based on the infringement of national law, that same obligation must prevail in the same way for the same type of plea based on the infringement of EU law.
33


In that regard, in order to enable the referring court to determine whether the plea alleging infringement of the right to be heard in EU law is similar to a plea alleging infringement of such a right in Belgian law, it should be noted, as the Court held in its judgment in Spain v Commission (C‑287/02, EU:C:2005:368, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited), that respect for the rights of the defence is, in all proceedings initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person, a fundamental principle of EU law which must be guaranteed even in the absence of any rules governing the proceedings in question. That principle requires that the addressees of decisions which significantly affect their interests should be placed in a position in which they may effectively make known their views.
Shiraz Baig Mirza v Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal.
Date: 2016-03-17
31


As a ground for that request, that court indicated, inter alia, that Mr Mirza was the subject, until 1 January 2016, of a detention order within the context of the application procedure for international protection at issue in the main proceedings, an order which may be renewed by the competent national court.
34


In the second place, as regards the criterion of urgency, according to the case-law of the Court, it is appropriate to take into account the fact that the person concerned in the main proceedings is currently deprived of his liberty and that the question as to whether he may continue to be held in custody depends on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment in Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 24). Moreover, the situation of the person concerned must be assessed as it stood at the time when consideration was given to whether the reference should be dealt with under the urgent procedure (see, to that effect, judgment in N., C‑601/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:84, paragraph 40).
35


In the present case, first, it is common ground that, on that date, Mr Mirza was deprived of his liberty. It should be observed, secondly, that his continued detention depends on the outcome of the case in the main proceedings, which concerns the lawfulness of the rejection of Mr Mirza’s application for international protection. It is clear from the explanations provided by the referring court that the detention measure to which Mr Mirza is subject was ordered in the course of the procedure for examining that application.
52


Such an interpretation would risk encouraging nationals of third countries and stateless persons who submitted an application for international protection in a Member State to travel to other Member States, thereby causing secondary movements which the Dublin III Regulation precisely seeks to prevent by establishing uniform mechanisms and criteria for determining the Member State responsible.
ADM Hamburg AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt.
Date: 2016-04-07
27


It should be noted that, where the wording of a provision of EU law is unclear, account should be taken of the context of that provision and of its objectives (judgment in PPG and SNF v ECHA, C‑625/11 P, EU:C:2013:594, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
Johannes Evert Antonius Massar v DAS Nederlandse Rechtsbijstand Verzekeringsmaatschappij NV.
Date: 2016-04-07
22


In the second place, according to settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgments in St. Nikolaus Brennerei und Likörfabrik, 337/82, EU:C:1984:69, paragraph 10; VEMW and Others, C‑17/03, EU:C:2005:362, paragraph 41; and Eschig, C‑199/08, EU:C:2009:538, paragraph 38).
23


In that regard, it is to be noted that the objective pursued by Directive 87/344, in particular Article 4 thereof, concerning the free choice of lawyer or representative, is to protect, broadly, the interests of insured persons. The general scope and obligatory nature that the right of the insured party to choose his lawyer or representative is recognised to possess militate against a restrictive interpretation of Article 4(1)(a) of the Directive (see, to that effect, judgments in Eschig, C‑199/08, EU:C:2009:538, paragraphs 45 and 47, and Sneller, C‑442/12, EU:C:2013:717, paragraph 24).
27


Furthermore, as regards the possible financial consequences for legal expenses insurance schemes, it must be recalled that, even if such financial consequences could arise, they may not lead to a restrictive interpretation of Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 87/344. Directive 87/344 does not seek the complete harmonisation of the Member States’ legal expenses insurance contracts, and the Member States remain free, as EU law currently stands, to determine the body of rules applicable to those contracts, on condition that the principles laid down by that directive are not rendered meaningless (see, to that effect, judgment in Stark, C‑293/10, EU:C:2011:355, paragraph 31). Thus, the exercise by the insured person of the right to choose his representative does not mean that, in certain cases, limitations may not be set on the costs to be borne by the insurer (see judgment in Sneller, C‑442/12, EU:C:2013:717, paragraph 26).