larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 1993-11-17
14 That article constitutes a rule of conflict which determines the place of taxation of advertising services and, consequently, delimits the powers of the Member States. It follows that "advertising services" is a Community concept which must be interpreted uniformly in order to avoid instances of double taxation or non-taxation which may result from conflicting interpretations.
17 In order to determine, where other means are used exclusively, whether the transaction concerned is an advertising service within the meaning of Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive, it is necessary in each case to take account of all the circumstances surrounding the service in question. One such circumstance, enabling a service to be characterized as "advertising", exists where the means used have been procured by an advertising agency. However, for a service to be so characterized, it is not an essential condition that the supplier be an advertising agency. It is always possible that an advertising service may be supplied by an undertaking which is not exclusively, or even mainly, engaged in advertising, although this is an unlikely eventuality.
18 It is therefore sufficient that a promotional activity, such as the sale of goods at reduced prices, the handing-out to consumers of goods sold to the person distributing them by an advertising agency, the supply of services at reduced prices or free of charge, or the organization of a cocktail party or banquet, involves the dissemination of a message intended to inform the public of the existence and the qualities of the product or service which is the subject-matter of the activity, with a view to increasing the sales of that product or service, for the activity to be characterized as an advertising service within the meaning of Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive.
19 The same applies to any activity which forms an inseparable part of an advertising campaign and which thereby contributes to conveying the advertising message. This is the case with regard to the production of aids used for a particular advertisement.
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
Date: 1993-11-17
13 With regard to admissibility, the Court has consistently held (see the judgment in Case C-210/91 Commission v Greece [1992] ECR I-6735, paragraph 10) that an application brought under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty can be based only on the grounds and submissions already set forth in the reasoned opinion. In the present case, the head of complaint relating to the letting of sites for purposes of advertising was not included in the reasoned opinion and must for that reason be declared inadmissible.
15 That article constitutes a rule of conflict which determines the place of taxation of advertising services and, consequently, delimits the powers of the Member States. It follows that "advertising services" is a Community concept which must be interpreted uniformly in order to avoid instances of double taxation or non-taxation which may result from conflicting interpretations.
18 In order to determine, where other means are used exclusively, whether the transaction concerned is an advertising service within the meaning of Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive, it is necessary in each case to take account of all the circumstances surrounding the service in question. One such circumstance, enabling a service to be characterized as "advertising", exists where the means used have been procured by an advertising agency. However, for a service to be so characterized, it is not an essential condition that the supplier be an advertising agency. It is always possible that an advertising service may be supplied by an undertaking which is not exclusively, or even mainly, engaged in advertising, although this is an unlikely eventuality.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 1993-11-17
19 That argument cannot be upheld. An action for failure to fulfil obligations is objective in nature and in the context of such an action it is for the Court to decide whether or not the Member State in question has failed to fulfil its obligations as alleged (see the judgments in Case 415/85 Commission v Ireland [1988] ECR 3097, paragraph 9, and in Case 416/85 Commission v United Kingdom [1988] ECR 3127, paragraph 9). The fact that a failure to fulfil obligations results from a Member State' s incorrect interpretation of the Community-law provisions in question cannot preclude the Court from declaring that there has been such a failure.
Criminal proceedings against Coöperatieve Zuivelindustrie "Twee Provinciën" WA.
Date: 1993-11-17
10 It should be observed in limine that, whereas it is not for the Court, in the context of Article 177 of the Treaty, to rule on the compatibility of national legislation with Community law, it does have jurisdiction to provide the national court with all the elements of interpretation under Community law to enable it to assess such compatibility for the purpose of deciding the case before it (see in particular the judgment in Case C-369/89 Piageme and Others v BVBA Peeters [1991] ECR I-2971, paragraph 7).
14 As the Court held in its judgment in Case 298/87 (Smanor SA [1988] ECR 4489, paragraph 29), the exact meaning and scope of Article 5 of Directive 79/112 must be determined regard being had to its context and, in particular, to the directive' s general purpose and structure. This is true of all the provisions of the directive.
15 It is clear from both the sixth recital in the preamble to that directive and the terms of Article 2(1) thereof, that its object was to inform and protect the ultimate consumer of foodstuffs, in particular as regards the nature, identity, properties, composition, quantity, durability, origin or provenance, and the method of manufacture or production thereof (Smanor SA, cited above, paragraph 30).
Henrik Schumacher v Bezirksregierung Hannover.
Date: 1993-11-23
25 The fourth question seeks, in essence, to ascertain whether Article 9(1) of Regulation No 714/89 is compatible with the principle of proportionality, in so far as it precludes payment of the premium in the event of failure, even in part, to comply with the time-limit prescribed in Article 11(2).
26 In order to determine whether that provision is consistent with the principle of proportionality, it must be ascertained whether the measures introduced by those provisions exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objective pursued by the rules which have been breached. More particularly, it must be ascertained whether the means which the provision in question applies in order to achieve the aim pursued correspond to the importance of that aim and whether they are necessary in order to achieve it (see, in particular, the judgment in Case C-319/90 Otto Pressler Weingut-Weingrosskellerei v Federal Republic of Germany [1992] ECR I-203, at paragraph 12).
27 The fourth recital in the preamble to Regulation No 714/89 highlights the need to reinforce the measures for preventing and penalizing irregularities and frauds.
28 Article 9 indicates that the refusal to grant the whole of the premium is not the consequence of mere failure to comply with the final date for slaughter: the failure must also bring about a considerable reduction in the number of animals actually eligible, a reduction which cannot be ascribed either to natural circumstances affecting the herd (Article 9(2)) or to reasons of force majeure (Article 9(3)).
29 In respect of less significant infringements, that is, where the difference between the number of animals actually eligible and the number declared is less than 5%, or no more than one animal, if the number of animals declared is equal to or less than 20 head, and provided that that difference is not the result of a false declaration made deliberately or through negligence, the premium is merely reduced.
30 In the light of those considerations, it must be held that although the loss of the whole of the special premium in circumstances other than those referred to in Article 9(2), (3) and (4) is a severe penalty, that penalty is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objective of the regulation in question, which is to prevent irregularities and frauds.
31 The answer to the fourth question is therefore that Article 9(1) of Regulation No 714/89, in so far as it provides that no premium may be paid in the event of failure, even in part, to comply with the time-limit provided for in Article 11(2), is not contrary to the principle of proportionality.
Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard.
Date: 1993-11-24
11 By virtue of Article 30, quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect are prohibited between Member States. The Court has consistently held that any measure which is capable of directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, hindering intra-Community trade constitutes a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction.
12 National legislation imposing a general prohibition on resale at a loss is not designed to regulate trade in goods between Member States.
13 Such legislation may, admittedly, restrict the volume of sales, and hence the volume of sales of products from other Member States, in so far as it deprives traders of a method of sales promotion. But the question remains whether such a possibility is sufficient to characterize the legislation in question as a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports.
14 In view of the increasing tendency of traders to invoke Article 30 of the Treaty as a means of challenging any rules whose effect is to limit their commercial freedom even where such rules are not aimed at products from other Member States, the Court considers it necessary to re-examine and clarify its case-law on this matter.
15 It is established by the case-law beginning with "Cassis de Dijon" (Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fuer Branntwein [1979] ECR 649) that, in the absence of harmonization of legislation, obstacles to free movement of goods which are the consequence of applying, to goods coming from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods (such as those relating to designation, form, size, weight, composition, presentation, labelling, packaging) constitute measures of equivalent effect prohibited by Article 30. This is so even if those rules apply without distinction to all products unless their application can be justified by a public-interest objective taking precedence over the free movement of goods.
16 By contrast, contrary to what has previously been decided, the application to products from other Member States of national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States within the meaning of the Dassonville judgment (Case 8/74 [1974] ECR 837), so long as those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States.
17 Provided that those conditions are fulfilled, the application of such rules to the sale of products from another Member State meeting the requirements laid down by that State is not by nature such as to prevent their access to the market or to impede access any more than it impedes the access of domestic products. Such rules therefore fall outside the scope of Article 30 of the Treaty.
Petra Kirsammer-Hack v Nurhan Sidal.
Date: 1993-11-30
14 On that point, it is sufficient to observe that, according to the case-law of the Court, the Commission' s powers in that regard do not preclude individuals from bringing proceedings before a national court in order to determine whether a State measure which has not been notified should have been notified pursuant to Article 93(3) of the EEC Treaty, since that court may refer to the Court of Justice a question on the interpretation of the concept of aid (see Joined Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91 Sloman Neptun [1993] ECR I-887, paragraph 12).
16 In that respect, it should be noted that only advantages granted directly or indirectly through State resources are to be considered as State aid within the meaning of Article 92(1). The distinction made in that provision between aid granted "by a Member State" and aid granted "through State resources" does not signify that all advantages granted by a State, whether financed through State resources or not, constitute aid but is intended merely to bring within that definition both advantages which are granted directly by the State and those granted by a public or private body designated or established by the State (Sloman Neptun, paragraph 19).
22 The Court has consistently held that national rules discriminate indirectly against women where, although worded in neutral terms, they are more disadvantageous to women than men, unless that difference in treatment is justified by objective factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex (judgment in Case 171/88 Rinner-Kuehn [1989] ECR 2743, paragraph 12).
34 In that respect, it should be noted that, by providing that directives adopted in the fields of health and safety of workers are to avoid imposing administrative, financial and legal constraints in a way which would hold back the creation and development of small and medium-sized undertakings, Article 118a of the EEC Treaty, which was introduced by the Single European Act into the chapter concerning social provisions, indicates that such undertakings may be the subject of special economic measures.
Deutsche Renault AG v AUDI AG.
Date: 1993-11-30
19 In Case 34/79 Henn and Darby [1979] ECR 3795 at paragraph 21, it was held that the purpose of the second sentence of Article 36 is to prevent restrictions of intra-Community trade based on the grounds set out in the first sentence of Article 36 from being abused in such a way as to introduce discrimination against goods originating in other Member States or to provide indirect protection for certain national products.
30 In view of that argument it should be noted, first, that the specific subject-matter of trade-mark rights consists in protecting the proprietor of the mark against a risk of confusion such as to allow third persons to take unlawful advantage of the reputation of the proprietor' s goods (judgments in Case 16/74 Centrafarm v Winthrop [1974] ECR 1183 at paragraph 8 and in Case C-10/89 HAG GF ("HAG II") [1990] ECR I-3711 at paragraph 14).
32 Community law does not therefore lay down any strict interpretative criterion for the concept of risk of confusion.
37 No exception can be taken under Community law to the protection granted by a national law against this last-mentioned risk of confusion since it corresponds to the specific subject-matter of the trade-mark right which, as stated above, consists in protecting the proprietor against the risk of confusion.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Denmark.
Date: 1993-12-01
16 As the Court has consistently held, illustrated in particular by the judgment in Case 166/82 Commission v Italy [1984] ECR 459, paragraph 16, the scope of an action brought under Article 169 of the Treaty is delimited both by the preliminary administrative procedure provided for by that article and by the form of order sought in the application, and that the Commission' s reasoned opinion and its application must be founded on the same grounds and pleas.
Rima Eletrometalurgia SA v Council of the European Communities.
Date: 1993-12-07
16 It follows that the existence of sufficient evidence of dumping and the injury resulting therefrom is always a prerequisite for the opening of an investigation, whether at the initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding or in the course of a review of a regulation imposing anti-dumping duties.
Federazione Sindacale Italiana dell'Industria Estrattiva and others v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1993-12-07
14 The Decision does not affect the interests of the applicant companies alone. It also affects the interests of the railways, whose competitive position compared to other modes of transport is favoured by the reduced tariff. It is also of interest to the carriers to whom the applicants may entrust the consignment of their goods and which can, themselves, make use of the railway services. Finally, it concerns their customers, who, depending on the terms of the sales contracts, may be induced to bear some or all of the transport costs.
15 In these circumstances, the Decision cannot be considered to affect operators whose number or identity was fixed and ascertainable at the time of its adoption.
16 It is therefore appropriate to state, without even having to ascertain whether the Decision is of direct concern to the applicants, that, since it is not of individual concern to them, their action for annulment must be dismissed as inadmissible.
Admissibility of the action brought by the Federation
Pierrel SpA and others v Ministero della Sanità.
Date: 1993-12-07
21 For the purposes of the reply to this question, it should be noted that, in its judgment in Case 301/82 Clin-Midy v Belgian State [1984] ECR 251, paragraph 11), the Court has already interpreted Article 21 of Directive 65/65 as meaning that authorization to market a proprietary medicinal product may not be refused, suspended or revoked save on the ground of the protection of public health as referred to by that directive.
Stephan Max Wirth v Landeshauptstadt Hannover.
Date: 1993-12-07
15 As the Court has already emphasized in Case 263/86 Belgian State v Humbel [1988] ECR 5365, at paragraphs 17, 18 and 19, the essential characteristic of remuneration lies in the fact that it constitutes consideration for the service in question, and is normally agreed upon between the provider and the recipient of the service. In the same judgment the Court considered that such a characteristic is absent in the case of courses provided under the national education system. First of all, the State, in establishing and maintaining such a system, is not seeking to engage in gainful activity, but is fulfilling its duties towards its own population in the social, cultural and educational fields. Secondly, the system in question is, as a general rule, funded from the public purse and not by pupils or their parents. The Court added that the nature of the activity is not affected by the fact that pupils or their parents must sometimes pay teaching or enrolment fees in order to make a certain contribution to the operating expenses of the system.
16 Those considerations are equally applicable to courses given in an institute of higher education which is financed, essentially, out of public funds.
17 However, as the United Kingdom has observed, whilst most establishments of higher education are financed in this way, some are nevertheless financed essentially out of private funds, in particular by students or their parents, and which seek to make an economic profit. When courses are given in such establishments, they become services within the meaning of Article 60 of the Treaty. Their aim is to offer a service for remuneration.
21 It must be noted here that, since the establishment in question is not a provider of services within the meaning of Article 60 of the Treaty, the application of Article 59 does not arise. The same is true of Article 62 of the Treaty, under which Member States are not to introduce any new restrictions on the freedom to provide services which has in fact been attained at the date of the entry into force of the Treaty. The Court has already held, in Case C-159/90 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland v Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685, paragraph 29, that Article 62, which is complementary to Article 59, cannot prohibit restrictions which do not fall within the scope of Article 59.
ADM Ölmühlen GmbH and Ölwerke Spyck v Bundesanstalt für landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung.
Date: 1993-12-07
15 In order to establish whether the provision forming the subject-matter of the question submitted for a preliminary ruling is compatible with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary to ascertain whether the means which it employs are appropriate to achieve the objective pursued and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it (Case 137/85 Maizena [1987] ECR 4587, paragraph 15).
Vito Canio Lepore and Nicolantonio Scamuffa v Office national des pensions.
Date: 1993-12-09
13 In this connection it is sufficient to observe that Article 45(1) provides for periods of insurance to be aggregated solely for the purposes of the acquisition, retention or recovery of the right to old-age benefits, whereas the disputes in the main proceedings are concerned with the determination of the amount of such benefits.
17 On this point it should be observed that, under Article 46 of Regulation No 1408/71, the amount of benefits has to be calculated in several stages, namely the competent institution must first calculate the so-called "independent" benefit in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 46(1) and then, under the second subparagraph, the so-called "pro-rata" benefit in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2(a) and (b) of Article 46. The higher of those two amounts is applied (see, to this effect, Joined Cases C-90/91 and C-91/91 Di Crescenzo and Casagrande [1992] ECR I-3851, paragraph 19).
19 The term "period of insurance" is defined by Article 1(r) of Regulation No 1408/71 as "periods of contribution or periods of employment or self-employment as defined or recognized as periods of insurance by the legislation under which they were completed or considered as completed, and all periods treated as such, where they are regarded by the said legislation as equivalent to insurance periods".
20 It follows that, for in order to calculate the independent benefit, account must be taken of periods of insurance determined under national legislation alone, in particular periods treated as periods of insurance by that legislation, provided however that Articles 48 to 51 of the Treaty are observed (see, to this effect, Case C-302/90 Faux [1991] ECR I-4875, paragraphs 25 to 28).
21 In accordance with the case-law of the Court (see, in particular, Case C-349/87 Paraschi v Landesversicherunganstalt Wuerttemberg [1991] ECR I-4501, paragraph 22), it would be contrary to Articles 48 to 51 of the Treaty if, as a consequence of the exercise of their right to freedom of movement, migrant workers were to lose the advantages in the field of social security guaranteed to them by the laws of a single Member State; such a consequence might discourage Community workers from exercising their right to freedom of movement and would therefore constitute an obstacle to that freedom.