larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Maria Antonella Garofalo (C-69/96), Giovanni Pagano (C-70/96), Rosa Bruna Vitale (C-71/96), Francesca Nuccio (C-72/96), Giacomo Cangialosi (C-73/96), Giacoma D'Amico (C-74/96), Giulia Lombardo (C-75/96), Emanuela Giovenco (C-76/96), Caterina Lo Gaglio (C-77/96), Daniela Guerrera (C-78/96) and Cesare Di Marco (-79/96) v Ministero della Sanità and Unità sanitaria locale (USL) nº 58 di Palermo.
Date: 1997-10-16
19 In order to answer that question, it is necessary to consider the conditions governing the function of the Consiglio di Stato when it acts in the context of that particular procedure, having regard to the criteria which this Court has laid down for interpreting the concept of `court or tribunal' for the purposes of Article 177 of the Treaty, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether procedure before it is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law, and whether it is independent (see, most recently, Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult v Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin [1997] ECR I-4961, paragraph 23).
27 It follows from the foregoing that, when it issues an opinion in the context of an extraordinary petition, the Consiglio di Stato constitutes a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 177 of the Treaty.
Second and third questions
29 Article 36(2) of Directive 93/16 grants each Member State discretion in determining acquired rights.
30 It is clear from the wording of that provision that this discretion is subject to only one condition, namely that each Member State must recognize the acquired rights of those doctors who do not hold a general medical practitioner's diploma but who, before 1 January 1995, were recognized in that Member State as having a diploma, certificate or other evidence of formal qualification issued to them in another Member State and who, also before that date, obtained the right to exercise the activities of general medical practitioner under the national social security scheme.
31 That minimum requirement is intended to avoid situations in which doctors who have enjoyed the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the Community directives and, before 1 January 1995, acquired a right, albeit only theoretical, to practise general medicine under the social security scheme of a Member State, are deprived of that right because they do not hold the new diplomas, certificates or other evidence of qualification provided for by Directive 93/16, which replaces Directive 86/457.
Belgian State v Banque Indosuez and Others and European Community.
Date: 1997-10-16
18 As the Court has emphasized on numerous occasions, in interpreting a provision of Community law it is necessary to consider its wording, its context and its aims (Case C-84/95 Bosphorus v Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications, Ireland and the Attorney General [1996] ECR I-3953, paragraph 11).
27 The principle of legal certainty is a fundamental principle of Community law which requires in particular that rules imposing charges on a taxpayer be clear and precise so that he may be able to ascertain unequivocally what his rights and obligations are and take steps accordingly (Case C-143/93 Van Es Douane Agenten v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1996] ECR I-431, paragraph 27).
Hera SpA v Unità sanitaria locale nº 3 - genovese (USL) and Impresa Romagnoli SpA.
Date: 1997-10-16
11 In that regard the Court has consistently held that it is for the national courts alone, before which the proceedings are pending and which must assume responsibility for the judgment to be given, to determine, having regard to the particular features of each case, both the need for a preliminary ruling to enable them to give judgment and the relevance of the questions which they refer to the Court.  A request for a preliminary ruling from a national court may be rejected only if it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law sought bears no relation to the facts of the main action or to its purpose (see Case C-143/94 Furlanis v ANAS and Itinera [1995] ECR I-3633, paragraph 12).  However, that is not the case here.
13 It should be recalled at the outset that, as the Commission has pointed out, Directive 93/37 consolidates Council Directive 71/305/EEC of 26 July 1971 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts (OJ, English Special Edition 1971(II), p. 682) and subsequent amendments thereto.  Article 30(4) of Directive 93/37 corresponds to Article 29(5) of Directive 71/305 as amended by Council Directive 89/440/EEC of 18 July 1989 (OJ 1989 L 210, p. 1).
15 Furthermore, the Court, when called upon in Furlanis to adjudicate with regard to the provision in question - as it appeared in Directive 71/305, amended by Directive 89/440 - stated in paragraphs 17 and 20 of its judgment that the exception provided for was available only for procedures in which the definitive award was made by 31 December 1992 at the latest, emphasizing that the provision in question, which  introduces temporary, derogating arrangements constituting an exception to the normal procedure, must be interpreted strictly.
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 1997-10-23
10 By letter of 25 January 1993 the French Government maintained its position, in consequence of which the Commission brought this action.
15 In that regard, it must be remembered that the aim of the prelitigation procedure provided for by Article 169 of the Treaty is to give the Member State an opportunity to justify its position or, if appropriate, to enable it to comply of its own accord with the requirements of the Treaty.  The proper conduct of that procedure thus constitutes an essential guarantee which is required not only in order to protect the rights of the Member State concerned but also to ensure that any contentious procedure will have a clearly defined dispute as its subject-matter (see the order of 11 July 1995 in Case C-266/94 Commission v Spain [1995] ECR I-1975, paragraph 17).
Reisebüro Binder GmbH v Finanzamt Stuttgart-Körperschaften.
Date: 1997-11-06
12 As the Court stated in paragraph 14 of its judgment in Case 168/84 Berkholz  v Finanzamt Hamburg-Mitte-Altstadt [1985] ECR 2251, Article 9 of the Sixth Directive, which is designed to secure the rational delimitation of the respective areas covered by national VAT rules by determining in a uniform manner the place where services are deemed to be supplied for tax purposes, both lays down a general rule in this area (Article 9(1)) and sets out a number of specific instances of places where certain services are deemed to be supplied (Article 9(2)).  One of the aims of those provisions is to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction between Member States, which may result in double taxation.
13 Thus it is that, in the case of transport services, the place of performance, hence the place of supply for tax purposes, is deemed, by virtue of Article 9(2)(b), to be the place where transport takes place, having regard to the distances covered.  As the Court pointed out in Case 283/84 Trans Tirreno Express v Ufficio Provinciale IVA [1986] ECR 231, paragraph 17, it was necessary to make that exception to the general rule laid down in Article 9(1) because a transporter's place of business is not an appropriate reference for establishing territorial jurisdiction for tax purposes.  The very nature of the performance of the specific service constituted by transport, which is liable to be effected on the territory of more than one Member State, requires a different criterion, which essentially must make it possible to delimit the jurisdiction of each of the States involved for tax purposes.
14 That specific attachment rule for transport services, which constitutes a derogation from the general rules laid down in Article 9(1) of the Sixth Directive for determining the place where a service is supplied, is thus intended to ensure that each Member State taxes transport services in respect of the parts of the journey completed in its territory (Case C-30/89 Commission v France [1990] ECR I-691, paragraph 16, and C-331/94 Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I-2675, paragraph 10).
Regione Piemonte v Saiagricola SpA.
Date: 1997-11-06
15 First, according to settled case-law, Community legislation does not permit Member States, which are required to define the precise scope of the expression `farmer practising farming as a main occupation', to limit its scope to natural persons alone (see Case 312/85 Villa Banfi [1986] ECR 4039 and Case C-162/91 Tenuta il Bosco [1992] ECR I-5279).
17 It follows from all the foregoing considerations that Member States have no discretion to deny the benefit of the system introduced by Directive 72/159 - and, subsequently, by Regulation No 797/85 - to farmers who satisfy the conditions laid down therein, solely by reason of the legal form they have assumed (see Villa Banfi, paragraph 9, and Tenuta il Bosco, paragraph 14, cited above).
Conserchimica Srl v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato.
Date: 1997-11-06
16 Second, in Joined Cases 212/80 to 217/80 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Salumi and Others [1981] ECR 2735, paragraph 8, the Court held that, for the purpose of determining the effect ratione temporis of Regulation No 1697/79, recourse should be had, in the absence of transitional provisions, to generally recognized principles of interpretation, having regard both to the wording of the regulation and to its objectives and general scheme.
17 Although procedural rules are generally deemed to apply to all proceedings pending at the time when they enter into force, the Court held, inter alia, that, replacing the relevant national provisions, Regulation No 1697/79 contains both procedural and substantive rules which form an indivisible whole and the individual provisions of which may not be considered in isolation, with regard to the time at which they take effect (Salumi and Others, cited above, paragraph 11).
23 Moreover, it is clear from the judgment in Joined Cases C-31/91 to C-44/91 Lageder and Others [1993] ECR I-1761, paragraph 26, that Regulation No 1697/79 was not applicable to events which occurred prior to the date of entry into force of that regulation.
Commission of the European Communities and French Republic v Ladbroke Racing Ltd.
Date: 1997-11-11
33 Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty apply only to anti-competitive conduct engaged in by undertakings on their own initiative (see to that effect, as regards Article 86 of the Treaty, Case 41/83 Italy v Commission [1985] ECR 873, paragraphs 18 to 20; Case C-202/88 France v Commission - the so-called `telecommunications terminals' judgment - [1991] ECR I-1223, paragraph 55; and Case C-18/88 GB-Inno-BM  [1991] ECR I-5941, paragraph 20).  If anti-competitive conduct is required of undertakings by national legislation or if the latter creates a legal framework which itself eliminates any possibility of competitive activity on their part, Articles 85 and 86 do not apply.  In such a situation, the restriction of competition is not attributable, as those provisions implicitly require, to the autonomous conduct of the undertakings (see also Joined Cases 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73 to 56/73, 111/73, 113/73 and 114/73 Suiker Unie and Others v Commission [1975] ECR 1663, paragraphs 36 to 72, and more particularly paragraphs 65, 66, 71 and 72).
34 Articles 85 and 86 may apply, however, if it is found that the national legislation does not preclude undertakings from engaging in autonomous conduct which prevents, restricts or distorts competition (Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78 Van Landewyck and Others v Commission [1980] ECR 3125; Joined Cases 240/82 to 242/82, 261/82, 262/82, 268/82 and 269/82 Stichting Sigarettenindustrie and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 3831; and Case C-219/95 P Ferriere Nord v Commission [1997] ECR I-0000).
Hellmut Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen.
Date: 1997-11-11
15 The Land observes in this regard that the priority accorded to female candidates is intended to counteract traditional promotion criteria without, however, replacing them.  The Austrian Government considers that a national rule such as that in question is designed to correct discriminatory procedures in the selection of staff.
23 In paragraph 16 of its judgment in Kalanke, the Court held that a national rule which provides that, where equally qualified men and women are candidates for the same promotion in fields where there are fewer women than men at the level of the relevant post, women are automatically to be given priority, involves discrimination on grounds of sex.
26 Article 2(4) is specifically and exclusively designed to authorize measures which, although discriminatory in appearance, are in fact intended to eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality which may exist in the reality of social life (Case 312/86 Commission v France [1988] ECR 6315, paragraph 15, and Kalanke, paragraph 18).
27 It thus authorizes national measures relating to access to employment, including promotion, which give a specific advantage to women with a view to improving their ability to compete on the labour market and to pursue a career on an equal footing with men (Kalanke, paragraph 19).
28 As the Council stated in the third recital in the preamble to Recommendation 84/635/EEC of 13 December 1984 on the promotion of positive action for women (OJ 1984 L 331, p. 34), `existing legal provisions on equal treatment, which are designed to afford rights to individuals, are inadequate for the elimination of all existing inequalities unless parallel action is taken by governments, both sides of industry and other bodies concerned, to counteract the prejudicial effects on women in employment which arise from social attitudes, behaviour and structures' (Kalanke, paragraph 20).
29 As the Land and several governments have pointed out, it appears that even where male and female candidates are equally qualified, male candidates tend to be promoted in preference to female candidates particularly because of prejudices and stereotypes concerning the role and capacities of women in working life and the fear, for example, that women will interrupt their careers more frequently, that owing to household and family duties they will be less flexible in their working hours, or that they will be absent from work more frequently because of pregnancy, childbirth and breastfeeding.
30 For these reasons, the mere fact that a male candidate and a female candidate are equally qualified does not mean that they have the same chances.
32 However, since Article 2(4) constitutes a derogation from an individual right laid down by the Directive, such a national measure specifically favouring female candidates cannot guarantee absolute and unconditional priority for women in the event of a promotion without going beyond the limits of the exception laid down in that provision (Kalanke, paragraphs 21 and 22).
R.O.J. Grahame and L.M. Hollanders v Bestuur van de Nieuwe Algemene Bedrijfsvereniging.
Date: 1997-11-13
21 According to settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of Community law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also, where appropriate, the context in which it occurs and the objects of the rules of which it is part (see, in particular, Case C-340/94 De Jaeck v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1997] ECR I-461, paragraph 17).
32 Finally, it must be observed, the derogation in Article 48(4) of the EC Treaty does not apply to the present case since that provision merely enables Member States to exclude nationals of other Member States from access to certain posts in the civil service (Case C-443/93 Vougioukas v IKA [1995] ECR I-4033, paragraph 19).
P. Moskof AE v Ethnikos Organismos Kapnou.
Date: 1997-11-20
54 In the light of those circumstances, and since the removal from supervision as the operative event for the agricultural conversion rate was already a derogation from the agrimonetary system in force since 1985, detailed reasoning would have been required rather if it had been decided to maintain that exception to the general scheme.
57 As regards the obligation to state reasons, it is settled case-law that the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the EC Treaty must be appropriate to the nature of the measure in question.  It must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the institution which enacted the measure so as to inform the persons concerned of the justification for the measure adopted and to enable to the Court to exercise its powers of review. Furthermore, the statement of reasons for a measure is not required to specify the matters of fact or of law dealt with, provided that it falls within the general scheme of the body of measures of which it forms part (Joined Cases C-9/95, C-23/95 and C-156/95 Belgium and Germany v Commission [1997] ECR I-645, paragraph 44).
68 Whilst the protection of legitimate expectations is one of the fundamental principles of the Community, traders cannot have a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by the Community institutions in the exercise of their discretionary power will be maintained; this is particularly true in an area such as the common organization of the markets whose purpose involves constant adjustments to meet changes in the economic situation (see in particular Joined Cases C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93 Crispoltoni and Others [1994] ECR I-4863, paragraph 57).
69 It follows that traders cannot claim a vested right to the maintenance of an advantage which they derive from the establishment of the common organization of the markets and which they enjoyed at a given time (Crispoltoni, paragraph 58).
77 The Court has consistently held that, although in general the principle of legal certainty precludes a Community measure from taking effect from a point in time before its publication, it may exceptionally be otherwise where the purpose to be achieved so demands and where the legitimate expectations of those concerned are duly respected (Case C-368/89 Crispoltoni [1991] ECR I-3695, paragraph 17).
100 It should be recalled that the Court's case-law (see, in particular, Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council [1996] ECR I-5755, paragraph 69) defines misuse of powers as the adoption by a Community institution of a measure with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that stated or evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case.
Wiener S.I. GmbH v Hauptzollamt Emmerich.
Date: 1997-11-20
10 It is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the Common Customs Tariff and of the notes to the sections or chapters (Case 145/81 Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v Wünsche [1982] ECR 2493, paragraph 12; Case 40/88 Weber v Milchwerke Paderborn-Rimbeck [1989] ECR 1395, paragraph 13; and Case C-395/93 Neckermann Versand v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Ost [1994] ECR I-4027, paragraph 5).
11 Likewise, for the purpose of interpreting the Common Customs Tariff, the Court has consistently held that both the notes which head the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff and the Explanatory Notes to the Nomenclature of the Customs Cooperation Council are important means for ensuring the uniform application of the Tariff and as such may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (Case 200/84 Daiber v Hauptzollamt Reutlingen [1985] ECR 3363, paragraph 14, and Neckermann Versand, paragraph 5).
13 In Neckermann Versand, the Court stated in paragraph 7 that in the absence of a definition of `pyjamas' in the Combined Nomenclature in force in 1988 and 1989, in the versions resulting from Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ 1987 L 256, p. 1), and from Regulation No 3174/88, as well as from the Explanatory Notes to the Combined Nomenclature and the Harmonized System, the objective characteristic of pyjamas, which was capable of distinguishing it from all other ensembles, could be sought only in the use for which pyjamas were intended, that is to say to be worn in bed as nightwear.
14 The Court accordingly took the view that not only sets of two knitted garments which, according to their outward appearance, were to be worn exclusively in bed but also sets used mainly for that purpose had to be considered to be `pyjamas' within the meaning of tariff heading 6108 of the Combined Nomenclature applicable at the time (Neckermann Versand, paragraph 14).
19 Next, it must be borne in mind that the Court has consistently held that the principle of legal certainty is a fundamental principle of Community law (Joined Cases 205/82 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor and Others v Germany [1983] ECR 2633, paragraph 30), which requires, inter alia, that rules imposing charges on the taxpayer must be clear and precise so that he may know without ambiguity what are his rights and obligations and may take steps accordingly (Case 169/80 Administration des Douanes v Gondrand Frères and Garancini [1981] ECR 1931, paragraph 17, and Joined Cases 92/87 and 93/87 Commission v France and United Kingdom [1989] ECR 405, paragraph 22).
David Petrie and Others v Università degli studi di Verona and Camilla Bettoni.
Date: 1997-11-20
54 In that connection, it must be recalled that, according to the case-law of the Court, the principle of equal treatment of which Article 48(2) is one embodiment prohibits not only overt discrimination based on nationality but all covert forms of discrimination which, by applying other distinguishing criteria, in fact achieve the same result (see, in particular, Case 33/88 Allué and Another v Università degli Studi di Venezia [1989] ECR 1591 (hereinafter `Allué I'), paragraph 11).
55 Although a rule such as that referred to in paragraph 5 above may apply irrespective of the nationality of the worker concerned, it operates, in practice, to the detriment of nationals of other Member States.  As the Court noted at paragraph 12 of the judgment in Allué I, only 25% of foreign-language assistants are Italian nationals, according to the statistics provided by the Italian Government.
Commission of the European Communities v V.
Date: 1997-11-20
24 In that connection, it should be pointed out that the extent of the obligation to state reasons is a question of law reviewable by the Court on appeal (Case C-166/95 P Commission v Daffix [1997] ECR I-983).  As the Advocate General rightly pointed out at paragraph 12 of his Opinion, review by the Court of Justice, in that context, of the legality of a decision must of necessity take into consideration the facts on which the Court of First Instance based itself in reaching its conclusion as to the adequacy or inadequacy of the statement of reasons.
26 On the question of the obligation to state reasons, it should be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, the statement of the reasons for a decision adversely affecting the person concerned must enable the Community judicature to exercise its review of legality and to provide that person with the information which he needs in order to know whether the decision is well founded (see in particular Case 195/80 Michel v Parliament [1981] ECR 2861, paragraph 22, and Commission v Daffix, cited above, paragraph 23).
Matthias Witt v Amt für Land- und Wasserwirtschaft.
Date: 1997-11-27
39 On that point, it must be noted that, as the Commission stressed at the hearing, the criteria mentioned in Article 3(1) of the Regulation lay down the general legal framework for establishing the production regions and that, within their wide margin of discretion in that connection, the Member States may take account of other criteria, such as the administrative feasibility of a solution or the homogeneity of a region as regards all arable crops.