larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
European Commission v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 2010-05-20
21. Under the Habitats Directive, Member States must take appropriate protective measures to preserve the characteristics of sites which host priority natural habitat types and/or priority species and which have been identified by Member States with a view to their inclusion on the Community list. Member States cannot therefore authorise intervention where there is a risk that the ecological characteristics of those sites will be seriously compromised as a result. That is particularly so where there is a risk that intervention of a particular kind will bring about the extinction of priority species present on the sites concerned (see, to that effect, Bund Naturschutz in Bayern and Others , paragraphs 44 and 46).
23. According to established case-law, it is for the Commission to prove the alleged failure to fulfil obligations. It is the responsibility of the Commission to place before the Court the information needed to enable the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled, and in so doing the Commission may not rely on any presumption (see Case C‑179/06 Commission  v Italy  [2007] ECR I‑8131, paragraph 37, and Case C‑416/07 Commission  v Greece  [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 32).
European Commission v Portuguese Republic.
Date: 2010-06-17
26. From the outset, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, in proceedings brought under Article 226 EC for failure to fulfil obligations, it is incumbent upon the Commission to prove the allegation that an obligation has not been fulfilled. It is the Commission’s responsibility to place before the Court the information required to enable the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled, and in so doing the Commission may not rely on any presumption (see, inter alia, Case 290/87 Commission  v Netherlands  [1989] ECR 3083, paragraphs 11 and 12, and Case C‑241/08 Commission  v France  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22).
British American Tobacco (Germany) GmbH v Hauptzollamt Schweinfurt.
Date: 2010-06-17
35. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of Community law it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, Case C‑19/08 Petrosian and Others  [2009] ECR I‑495, paragraph 34).
Nawras Bolbol v Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal.
Date: 2010-06-17
37. It is apparent from recitals 3, 16 and 17 in the preamble to the Directive that the Geneva Convention constitutes the cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees and that the provisions of the Directive for determining who qualifies for refugee status and the content thereof were adopted to guide the competent authorities of the Member States in the application of that convention on the basis of common concepts and criteria (see Joined Cases C‑175/08, C‑176/08, C‑178/08 and C‑179/08 Salahadin Abdulla and Others  [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 52).
38. The provisions of the Directive must for that reason be interpreted in the light of its general scheme and purpose, while respecting the Geneva Convention and the other relevant treaties referred to in point (1) of the first subparagraph of Article 63 EC. Those provisions must also, as is apparent from recital 10 in the preamble to the Directive, be interpreted in a manner which respects the fundamental rights and the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ( Salahadin Abdulla and Others , paragraphs 53 and 54).
The first question
51. It follows from the clear wording of Article 1D of the Geneva Convention that only those persons who have actually availed themselves of the assistance provided by UNRWA come within the clause excluding refugee status set out therein, which must, as such, be construed narrowly and cannot therefore also cover persons who are or have been eligible to receive protection or assistance from that agency.
52. While registration with UNRWA is sufficient proof of actually receiving assistance from it, it has been explained in paragraph 45 above that such assistance can be provided even in the absence of such registration, in which case the beneficiary must be permitted to adduce evidence of that assistance by other means.
55. As has been pointed out in paragraph 41 above, Ms Bolbol has not availed herself of protection or assistance from UNRWA.
56. In those circumstances, and in the light of the reply to the first question, it is not necessary to reply to the other questions referred.
Costs
Agra Srl v Agenzia Dogane - Ufficio delle Dogane di Alessandria.
Date: 2010-06-17
27. The first point to be noted is that it is not for the Court, in proceedings brought under Article 234 EC, to rule on the compatibility of national legislation with EU law. However, the Court does have jurisdiction to provide the national court with all the criteria for the interpretation of EU law necessary to enable that court to rule on such compatibility (see Case C‑414/02 Spedition Ulustrans  [2004] ECR I‑8633, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
30. It should first be noted that it is settled case-law that the first sentence of Article 221(3) of the Customs Code lays down a limitation rule whereby the communication of the amount of import or export duty due is not to take place after the expiry of a period of three years from the date on which the customs debt was incurred (see, to that effect, Case C‑201/04 Molenbergnatie  [2006] ECR I‑2049, paragraph 39, and Joined Cases C‑124/08 and C‑125/08 Snauwaert and Others  [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 28).
32. As an exception to the rule referred to in paragraph 30 above, Article 221(4) of the Customs Code provides that the customs authorities may, under the conditions set out in the provisions in force, make such communication after the expiry of that period where the fact that those authorities have been unable to determine the exact amount of duty legally due is attributable to an act which could give rise to criminal court proceedings ( Snauwaert and Others , paragraph 29).
35. Accordingly, in so far as EU law does not lay down common rules in this field, it is for each Member State to determine the rules governing the extinction, through the passage of time, of customs debts which it has not been possible to assess because of an act which could give rise to criminal court proceedings (see, by analogy, Case C-91/02 Hannl-Hofstetter  [2003] ECR I‑12077, paragraphs 18 to 20, and Molenbergnatie , paragraph 53).
European Commission v Alrosa Company Ltd.
Date: 2010-06-29
40. Article 9 of that regulation, by contrast, provides merely that in proceedings under that provision, as follows from recital 13 in the preamble to the regulation, the Commission is not required to make a finding of an infringement, its task being confined to examining, and possibly accepting, the commitments offered by the undertakings concerned in the light of the problems identified by it in its preliminary assessment and having regard to the aims pursued.
41. Application of the principle of proportionality by the Commission in the context of Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 is confined to verifying that the commitments in question address the concerns it expressed to the undertakings concerned and that they have not offered less onerous commitments that also address those concerns adequately. When carrying out that assessment, the Commission must, however, take into consideration the interests of third parties.
49. Moreover, the fact that the individual commitments offered by an undertaking have been made binding by the Commission does not mean that other undertakings are dep rived of the possibility of protecting the rights they may have in connection with their relations with that undertaking.
67. By so doing, the General Court put forward its own assessment of complex economic circumstances and thus substituted its own assessment for that of the Commission, thereby encroaching on the discretion enjoyed by the Commission instead of reviewing the lawfulness of its assessment.
Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa sp. z o.o. v Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej.
Date: 2010-07-01
15. Firstly, it must be stated that the concept of number portability covers the facility available to a telephone subscriber to retain the same number when changing operator (Case C‑438/04 Mobistar  [2006] ECR I‑6675, paragraph 23).
16. The implementation of that facility requires the platforms between operators to be compatible, the subscriber’s number to be ported from one operator to another and technical operations to allow the forwarding of telephone calls to the ported number (see Mobistar , paragraph 24).
17. In accordance with recital 40 in the preamble to the Universal Service Directive, number portability is intended to remove the obstacles to consumers’ freedom of choice, particularly between mobile telephone operators, and thus to ensure development of effective competition on the telephone services market (see Mobistar , paragraph 25).
18. With a view to achieving those aims, the European Union legislature provided, in Article 30(2) of the Universal Service Directive, that the NRAs are to ensure that pricing for interconnection related to the provision of number portability is cost oriented and that direct charges to subscribers, if any, do not act as a disincentive for the use of these facilities (see Mobistar , paragraph 26).
19. In addition, it should be noted that Article 30(2) of the Universal Service Directive requires the NRAs to ensure that the operators set the prices on the basis of their costs and that the prices do not dissuade subscribers (see Mobistar , paragraph 33).
20. Once it is established that prices are fixed on the basis of costs, that provision confers a certain discretion on the NRAs to assess the situation and define the method which appears to them to be the most suitable to make portability fully effective, in a manner which ensures that subscribers are not dissuaded from making use of that facility (see Mobistar , paragraph 34).
21. In that regard, it follows from the Court’s case-law that Article 30(2) of the Universal Service Directive does not preclude the NRAs from fixing in advance and on the basis of an abstract model of the costs maximum prices which may be charged by the donor operator to the recipient operator as set-up costs, provided that the prices are fixed on the basis of the costs in such a way that subscribers are not dissuaded from making use of the facility of portability (see, to that effect, Mobistar , paragraph 37).
Monsanto Technology LLC v Cefetra BV and Others.
Date: 2010-07-06
66. In order to answer that question, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, new rules apply, as a matter of principle, immediately to the future effects of a situation which arose under the old rule (see, inter alia, Case C-334/07 P Commission  v Freistaat Sachsen  [2008] ECR I-9465, paragraph 43 and case-law cited).
71. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement are not such as to create rights upon which individuals may rely directly before the courts by virtue of European Union law (Joined Cases C‑300/98 and C‑392/98 Dior and Others  [2000] ECR I‑11307, paragraph 44).
72. If it should be found that there are European Union rules in the sphere in question, European Union law will apply, which will mean that it is necessary, as far as may be possible, to supply an interpretation in keeping with the TRIPS Agreement, although no direct effect may be given to the provision of that agreement at issue (Case C‑431/05 Merck Genéricos – Produtos Farmacêuticos  [2007] ECR I‑7001, paragraph 35).
European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2010-07-15
32. Similarly, it is common ground that the purpose of the Eighth Directive is to lay down detailed arrangements for the refund of VAT paid in a Member State by taxable persons established in another Member State, its objective being therefore to harmonise the right to refund as provided for in Article 17(3) of the Sixth Directive (see, inter alia, Case C‑136/99 Monte dei Paschi Di Siena  [2000] ECR I‑6109, paragraph 20, and Case C-35/05 Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken  [2007] ECR I-2425, paragraph 26); that is also the case with respect to the Thirteenth Directive as far as concerns taxable persons established in non‑member countries.
35. Therefore, the provisions of the Thirteenth Directive and, in particular, Article 2(1) thereof, must be considered as a lex specialis  as compared with Articles 170 and 171 of the VAT Directive, preventing the right to a refund, set out in general terms in Article 170, from overriding the clear and precise wording of Article 2(1) of the Thirteenth Directive.
49. According to settled case-law, the principle of legal certainly requires that Community rules enable those concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations which are imposed on them. Individuals must be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and take steps accordingly (see Case C-345/06 Heinrich  [2009] ECR I‑1659, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
50. It is true that that case-law refers to the relationship between individuals and public authorities. However, as the Advocate General observed in point 64 of his Opinion, that case-law is also relevant in the context of the transposition of a directive in the area of taxation.
51. The Court cannot, in the face of the clear and precise wording of a provision such as Article 2(1) of the Thirteenth Directive, interpret that provision with the intention of correcting it and thereby extending the obligations of the Member States relating to it (see, by analogy, Case C‑48/07 Les Vergers du Vieux Tauves  [2008] ECR I-10627, paragraph 44).
Bâtiments et Ponts Construction SA and WISAG Produktionsservice GmbH v Berlaymont 2000 SA.
Date: 2010-07-15
36. Therefore, the information thus provided is sufficient to meet the requirements of the Court’s settled case-law (see, to that effect, Case C‑42/07 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 40 and the case‑law cited) and to enable the Court to provide helpful replies to the referring court. Accordingly, the reference for a preliminary ruling is admissible.
The first question
43. It is appropriate to point out, secondly, that according to the Court’s settled case‑law, the first paragraph of Article 24 of Directive 93/37 lists, exhaustively, the grounds capable of justifying the exclusion of a contractor from participation in a contract which relate solely to its professional qualities. Moreover, the Court also added that Member States have the right to provide, in addition to the grounds for exclusion expressly referred to in that provision, for grounds for exclusion designed to ensure observance of the principles of equal treatment and transparency (see, to that effect, Case C‑213/07 Michaniki  [2008] ECR I‑9999, paragraphs 43, 44 and 47, and Case C‑538/07 Assitur  [2009] ECR I‑4219, paragraphs 20 and 21).
61. Such authorities, in view of their composition, cannot be regarded as impartial and neutral. Indeed, that majority participation of representatives of private interests could lead those representatives to obstruct the access of other operators to the market concerned and, in any event, because such operators are obliged to submit to the determination of their potential competitors as regards their personal and professional qualities, such an authority involves a situation of unequal conditions of competition and lack of objectivity and impartiality, inconsistent with a system of undistorted competition, such as that laid down by the law of the Union (see, by analogy, Case C‑49/07 MOTOE [2008] ECR I‑4863, paragraphs 51 and 52 and the case‑law cited, and Case C‑169/07 Hartlauer [2009] ECR I‑1721, paragraph 51 and case‑law cited).
Skatteministeriet v DSV Road A/S.
Date: 2010-07-15
25. Although it should first be noted that a situation such as that at issue before the referring court is covered by the rules of the Customs Code, it should be borne in mind, as regards the interpretation of those provisions by the Danish customs authorities, that Article 859 of the Implementing Regulation, read in conjunction with Article 860 thereof, established an exhaustive set of rules governing 10 ‘failures’, within the meaning of Article 204(1)(a) of the Customs Code, which are to be regarded as having ‘no significant effect on the correct operation of the temporary storage or customs procedure in question’ (Case C-48/98 Söhl & Söhlke  [1999] ECR I‑7877, paragraph 43).
30. Secondly, it should be observed that Article 204 of the Customs Code is intended to ensure that the customs rules are correctly applied. Under Articles 96(1) and 204(1) of that code, the principal – in his capacity as holder in relation to the external Community transit procedure – is the debtor vis-à-vis the customs debt arising from the failure to observe the provisions governing that procedure. The liability thus imposed upon the principal is intended to ensure the diligent and uniform application of the provisions relating to that procedure and the proper functioning of transit operations in order to protect the financial interests of the European Union and its Member States (see, to that effect, Case C-230/06 Militzer & Münch  [2008] ECR I‑1895, paragraph 48).
31. Moreover, the presence, on the customs territory of the European Union, of non-Community goods carries the risk that those goods will end up forming part of the economic networks of the Member States without having been cleared through customs (see, by analogy, Case C‑459/07 Elshani  [2009] ECR I‑2759, paragraph 32), a risk which Article 204 of the Customs Code helps to prevent, as was pointed out by the Commission.
Gaston Schul BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2010-07-15
27. It should first be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, the objective of the European Union legislation on customs valuation is to introduce a fair, uniform and neutral system excluding the use of arbitrary or fictitious customs values (see Case C-256/07 Mitsui & Co. Deutschland  [2009] ECR I‑1951, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
29. Furthermore, that customs value must reflect the real economic value of imported goods and take into account all of the elements of those goods that have economic value (see Case C‑306/04 Compaq Computer International Corporation  [2006] ECR I‑10991, paragraph 30, and Mitsui & Co. Deutschland , paragraph 20).
Rijksdienst voor Pensioenen v Elisabeth Brouwer.
Date: 2010-07-29
29. With regard to the period from 1 January 1968 to 22 December 1984, the compatibility of the national legislation at issue could be examined only as regards Article 119 of the EC Treaty (Articles 117 to 120 of the EC Treaty have been replaced by Articles 136 EC to 143 EC), since Directive 79/7 was not adopted until 1978 and the period prescribed for its transposition was fixed at 23 December 1984. However, provisions such as those at issue in the main proceedings, relating to statutory pension schemes were outside the scope of that article and could not therefore be considered to be contrary to it (see, to that effect, Case 80/70 Defrenne [1971] ECR 445, paragraph 7).
33. The Court may, exceptionally, taking account of the serious difficulties which its judgment may create as regards events in the past, be moved to restrict the possibility for all persons concerned of relying on the interpretation which the Court gives to a provision of European Union law in response to a reference for a preliminary ruling (see Case C‑262/88 Barber [1990] ECR I‑1889, paragraph 41).
34. It is, however, settled case-law that the financial consequences which might ensue for a Member State from a preliminary ruling do not in themselves justify limiting the temporal effects of the ruling (Case C‑184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I‑6193, paragraph 52; Case C‑209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I‑2119, paragraph 68; and Case C‑423/04 Richards  [2006] ECR I‑3585, paragraph 41).
36. In addition to the existence of a risk of serious economic repercussions due in particular to the large number of legal relationships entered into in good faith on the basis of rules considered to be validly in force, an additional factor to take into account to justify the limitation of the temporal effects of the judgment is the existence of significant objective uncertainty regarding the implications of Community provisions (see, to that effect, Bidar , paragraph 69, and Richards , paragraph 42).
Anheuser-Busch Inc. v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM).
Date: 2010-07-29
100. It is therefore a new plea which extends the subject-matter of the dispute and which for that reason cannot be put forward for the first time at the appeal stage (see, in particular, Case C‑16/06 P Les Éditions Albert René v OHIM [2008] ECR I-10053, paragraph 125).
107. That argument in fact concerns paragraphs 81 to 86 of Il Ponte Finanziaria  v OHIM , which relate to a plea based on Article 15(2)(a) of Regulation No 40/94, whilst the third plea raised by Anheuser-Busch before the General Court was based on Article 43(2) and (3) of that regulation.
Pakora Pluss SIA v Valsts ieņēmumu dienests.
Date: 2010-07-29
39. It is clear from that provision, read in conjunction with Article 2 of the Act of Accession, that, as from 1 May 2004, the Customs Code and the implementing regulation were applicable in the new Member States, except where on the date of their accession to the European Union the goods were in transport in the enlarged Community. In that case Annex IV, Chapter 5, paragraph 1 of the Act of Accession applies.
40. However, where the export formalities have not been completed for the goods in transport in the enlarged Community, the procedure provided for in Annex IV, Chapter 5, paragraph 1 of the Act cannot be relied on.
41. Therefore, the answer to the second question is that the Customs Code and the implementing regulation are applicable in the new Member States as from 1 May 2004, but the procedure provided for in Annex IV, Chapter 5, paragraph 1 of the Act of Accession cannot be relied on where the export formalities set out therein have not been completed with respect to goods in transport in the enlarged Community at the date of accession of those new Member States of the European Union.
The third question
47. Therefore, the answer to the fourth question is that Article 4(10) of the Customs Code must be interpreted as meaning that import duties do not include the VAT to be levied on the importation of goods.
The fifth question