larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2001-06-14
24 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in the absence of harmonisation of legislation, obstacles to the free movement of goods which are the consequence of applying, to goods coming from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods (such as those relating to designation, form, size, weight, composition, presentation, labelling, packaging) constitute measures having equivalent effect which are prohibited by Article 30 of the Treaty, even if those rules apply without distinction to all products, unless their application can be justified by a public-interest objective taking precedence over the free movement of goods (see, in particular, Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral [1979] ECR 649, Cassis de Dijon, paragraph 14, and Houtwipper, cited above, paragraph 11).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2001-06-14
25 It should be remembered that, under the first paragraph of Article 10 EC, the Member States are to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the EC Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. Such action includes directives which, pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 249 EC, are binding as to the result to be achieved upon each Member State to which they are addressed. That obligation involves, for each Member State to which a directive is addressed, the adoption, within the framework of its national legal system, of all the measures necessary to ensure that the directive is fully effective, in accordance with the objective which it pursues (see Case C-97/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2053, paragraph 9).
27 According to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see Case C-147/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2387, paragraph 26).
28 Even where the default has been remedied after the time-limit given in the reasoned opinion has expired, there is still an interest in pursuing the action in order to establish the basis of liability which a Member State may incur, as a result of its default towards other Member States, the Community or private parties (see, inter alia, Case C-29/90 Commission v Greece [1992] ECR I-1971, paragraph 12).
30 It is clear from the documents before the Court that Draft Law A.S. No 1138, including the Government amendments designed to introduce the provisions of Directive 97/36 that have not yet been implemented, was not adopted before expiry of the period prescribed in the reasoned opinion. As for any subsequent amendments to the Italian legislation, they are irrelevant for the purpose of giving judgment on the subject-matter of this action (see Case C-433/93 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I-2303, paragraph 15).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 2001-06-14
11 The Commission submits that the Court has already held that a system of tacit authorisation is incompatible with the requirements of Directive 80/68 (Case C-360/87 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR I-791, paragraph 31). That case-law should also apply to the authorisation referred to in Directives 75/442, 76/464, 84/360 and 85/337.
14 In this respect it should be noted that the Court has held, in respect of Directive 80/68, that it requires that after each investigation and in the light of the results thereof an express measure, either prohibition or authorisation, must be adopted (Case C-131/88 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-825, paragraph 38).
15 Moreover, as was pointed out at paragraph 52 of the judgment in Case C-287/98 Linster [2000] ECR I-6917, the essential aim of Directive 85/337 is that, before consent is given, projects likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or location should be made subject to an assessment with regard to their effects.
16 It follows from that case-law that tacit authorisation cannot be compatible with the requirements of the directives referred to in this action because they prescribe, in the case of Directives 75/442, 76/464, 80/68 and 84/360, systems of prior authorisation, and, in the case of Directive 85/337, assessment procedures preceding the grant of authorisation. The national authorities are therefore required under each of those directives to examine individually every request for authorisation.
17 As for the additional implementing measures which the Regions of Flanders and Wallonia are in the course of adopting, it is appropriate to point out that under the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty, directives are binding upon each Member State to which they are addressed as to the result to be achieved. It follows from settled case-law that that obligation requires compliance with the time-limits set by directives (see, among others, Case 10/76 Commission v Italy [1976] ECR 1359, paragraphs 11 and 12, and Case C-176/00 Commission v Greece [2001] ECR I-2063, paragraph 7).
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 2001-06-21
12 Under the first paragraph of Article 10 EC, the Member States are to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the EC Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. Such action includes directives which, pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 249 EC, are binding as to the result to be achieved upon each Member State to which they are addressed. That obligation involves, for each Member State to which a directive is addressed, the adoption, within the framework of its national legal system, of all the measures necessary to ensure that the directive is fully effective, in accordance with the objective which it pursues (see Case C-97/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2053, paragraph 9).
14 First, it is settled case-law that whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C-147/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2387, paragraph 26).
16 Secondly, a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal order in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-470/98 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-4657, paragraph 11).
17 Lastly, even if a Member State's breach of obligations is remedied after the expiry of the time-limit prescribed by the reasoned opinion, there is still an interest in pursuing the action in order to establish the basis for liability which a Member State may incur as a result of its breach of obligations with regard to other Member States, the Community and individuals (see, inter alia, Case C-29/90 Commission v Greece [1992] ECR I-1971, paragraph 12).
Bertelsmann AG v Finanzamt Wiedenbrück.
Date: 2001-07-03
15 It is evident from the judgment in Case C-126/88 Boots Company [1990] ECR I-1235, paragraphs 15 and 16, that before the application of Article 11A(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive can be accepted, the application of Article 11A(2)(b) thereof must be excluded.
17 In order to interpret, for that purpose, the term .consideration. in Article 11A(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the consideration for a supply of goods may consist of a supply of services, and so constitute the taxable amount within the meaning of that provision, if there is a direct link between the supply of goods and the supply of services and if the value of those services can be expressed in monetary terms (see, in particular, Naturally Yours Cosmetics, paragraphs 11, 12 and 16, and Empire Stores, paragraph 12).
18 In the present case, a supply of goods was made in consideration for a supply of services consisting in the introduction of new customers. In this regard, it is to be observed, first, that there is a direct link between the supply of the bonuses in kind and the introduction of new customers and, second, that since the services rendered to Bertelsmann were remunerated by supplies of goods, their value can be expressed in monetary terms (see the judgment in Empire Stores, paragraphs 16 and 17).
20 It is clear from the case-law of the Court that, with regard to VAT, a supply must be regarded as incidental to a principal supply when it does not constitute for the customer an end in itself but a means of better enjoying the principal service of the supplier (see, in particular, Case C-349/96 CPP [1999] ECR I-973, paragraph 30, and Case C-76/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-249, paragraph 27).
22 As for determining the value of such transaction for the purposes of the taxable amount, it must be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, it is a subjective value, since the taxable amount is the consideration actually received and not a value estimated according to objective standards (see, in particular, Naturally Yours Cosmetics, paragraph 16, and Empire Stores, paragraph 18).
23 Furthermore, as the Court held at paragraph 19 of the judgment in Empire Stores, that value, in order to be subjective, must be the value which the recipient of the supply of services attributes to the services which he seeks to obtain and correspond to the amount which he is prepared to spend to that end.
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 2001-07-03
15 It must be observed, at the outset, that there are no grounds for the Court to stay the proceedings (see, in particular, Case C-47/99 Commission v Luxembourg [1999] ECR I-8999, paragraph 12).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2001-07-04
11 It must observed at the outset that, as the Court held at paragraph 32 of its judgment in Case C-361/98 Italy v Commission [2001] ECR I-385, the purpose of Regulation No 2408/92 is, amongst other things, to define the conditions for applying in the air transport sector the principle of the freedom to provide services which is enshrined, in particular, in Articles 59 and 61 (now Article 51 EC) of the EC Treaty, so that all matters of market access are dealt with in the same regulation.
12 Next, it must be borne in mind that the freedom enshrined in Article 59 precludes the application of any national legislation which has the effect of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services purely within one Member State (Case C-381/93 Commission v France [1994] ECR I-5145, paragraph 17).
13 Lastly, it must be remembered that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, in particular, Case C-147/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2387, paragraph 26).
Italian Republic v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2001-07-05
36 Since the comparison of those effects calls for the evaluation of a complex economic situation, it should be pointed out that, according to the Court's case-law, the Community legislature enjoys significant freedom of discretion and the Community judicature, in reviewing the lawfulness of the exercise of such freedom, cannot substitute its evaluation of the matter for that of the competent authority, but must confine itself to examining whether there has been a manifest error or misuse of power or whether that authority has clearly exceeded the bounds of its discretion (see Case C-179/95 Spain v Council [1999] ECR I-6475, paragraph 29).
63 As regards the statement of reasons for a measure whereby the Community legislature makes such choices, it should be borne in mind that, while it is true that it must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the Community authority which adopted the contested measure so as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for it and to enable the Court to exercise judicial review, the authority is not required to go into every relevant point of fact and law. More particularly, it is not possible to require that the statement of reasons should set out the various facts, often very numerous and complex, on the basis of which a regulation was adopted, or a fortiori that it should provide a more or less complete evaluation of those facts (see, in particular, Case C-372/96 Pontillo [1998] ECR I-5091, paragraph 36).
64 Furthermore, the question whether a statement of reasons satisfies the requirements must be assessed with reference not only to the wording of the impugned measure but also to its context and to the whole body of legal rules governing the matter in question. Consequently, if the contested measure clearly discloses the essential objective pursued by the institution, it would be excessive to require a specific statement of reasons for each of the technical choices made by the institution (Case C-122/94 Commission v Council [1996] ECR I-881, paragraph 29).
Ismeri Europa Srl v Court of Auditors of the European Communities.
Date: 2001-07-10
19 In that connection the Court of First Instance is the sole judge of any need for the information available to it concerning the cases before it to be supplemented. Whether or not the evidence before it is convincing is a matter to be appraised by it alone and is not subject to review by the Court of Justice on appeal, except where the clear sense of that evidence has been distorted or the substantive inaccuracy of the Court of First Instance's findings is apparent from the documents in the case-file (judgment in Case C-119/97 P Ufex and Others v Commission [1999] ECR I-1341, paragraph 66, and order in Case C-437/98 P Infrisa v Commission [1999] ECR I-7145, paragraph 34).
27 It should be noted that, under the provisions applicable to its proceedings, the Court of Auditors is not bound to submit draft reports to third parties under the same conditions which apply in the case of Community institutions or to publish the replies of those concerned following publication of its reports. The procedure provided for under Articles 188c(4) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 248(4) EC) and Article 206 of the Treaty is intended to contribute to improving the financial management of the Community by providing for reports to be transmitted to the institutions and for the latter to respond to them. Involvement of third parties in that procedure would not contribute to attainment of the objective pursued.
28 None the less, the principle of the right to a hearing is a general principle of law whose observance is ensured by the Court of Justice. It applies to any procedure which may result in a decision by a Community institution perceptibly affecting a person's interests (see, in particular, judgment in Case 17/74 Transocean Marine Paint v Commission [1974] ECR 1063, paragraph 15).
48 Secondly, the Court of First Instance's assessment that the facts before it constituted a situation of a confusion of interests is a matter solely for the court determining the case on its merits. Since no evidence of a substantive inaccuracy in the findings or of distortion of the clear sense of the evidence of the case-file in the contested judgment has been adduced in these appeal proceedings, that assessment by the Court of First Instance is not reviewable by the Court.
Commission of the European Communities and French Republic v Télévision française 1 SA (TF1).
Date: 2001-07-12
25 In the present case, the final decision for the purposes of the provision of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice just mentioned, and the one to which the French Government explicitly refers in its appeal, namely the second paragraph of the operative part of the judgment under appeal, is the Court of First Instance's ruling that there was no need to adjudicate on the allegation that the Commission had failed to act pursuant to Article 90 of the Treaty
26 The grounds on which that ruling is based are set out in paragraphs 99 to 103 of the judgment under appeal, which explain that the claim of failure to act ceased to have any purpose once the Commission expressed its position.
27 Those grounds alone provide a sufficient legal basis for the decision of the Court of First Instance and thus, in any event, any errors in the grounds of the judgment under appeal concerning the admissibility of TF1's claim of failure to act, as alleged by the Commission and the French Republic, have no effect on the operative part of that judgment.
28 Indeed, it is clear from the consistent case-law of the Court of Justice that, where the Court decides that there is no need to give judgment in an action which has ceased to have any purpose, it is not necessary for it to examine the admissibility of that action (see, in particular, the judgment in Joined Cases C-15/91 and C-108/91 Buckl and Others v Commission [1992] ECR I-6061, paragraphs 14 to 17, and the order of 10 June 1993 in Case C-41/92 Liberal Democrats v Parliament [1993] ECR I-3153, paragraph 4).
29 It follows from this that the plea whereby the Commission and the French Republic challenge the second paragraph of the operative part of the judgment under appeal is inoperative, and in this regard their appeals must be dismissed.
The plea raised by the French Republic challenging the sixth paragraph of the operative part of the judgment under appeal
31 In this connection, suffice it to say that, according to settled case-law, where all the other pleas put forward in an appeal have been rejected, any plea challenging the decision of the Court of First Instance on costs must be rejected as inadmissible by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, which provides that no appeal shall lie regarding only the amount of the costs or the party ordered to pay them (see, in particular, the judgment in Case C-396/93 P Henrichs v Commission [1995] ECR I-2611, paragraph 66, and the order of 13 December 2000 in Case C-44/00 P Sodima v Commission [2000] ECR I-11231, paragraph 93).
Portuguese Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2001-07-12
42 Article 7(1) of that decision provides that [t]he Commission shall confirm the results of the checks within 20 working days in a written report and that [t]he Member State shall give its comments within 25 working days of the receipt of the written report from the Commission.
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 2001-09-11
27 It should be noted in this regard that, in order to produce a draft list of sites of Community importance, capable of leading to the creation of a coherent European ecological network of SACs, the Commission must have available an exhaustive list of the sites which, at national level, have an ecological interest which is relevant from the point of view of the directive's objective of conserving natural habitats and wild fauna and flora. To that end, that list is drawn up on the basis of the criteria laid down in Annex III (Stage 1) to the directive (Case C-371/98 First Corporate Shipping [2000] ECR I-9235, paragraph 22).
28 Only in that way, moreover, is it possible to realise the objective, set out in the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of the directive, of maintaining or restoring the natural habitat types and the species' habitats concerned at a favourable conservation status in their natural range, which may lie across one or more frontiers inside the Community. It follows from Article 1(e) and (i) of the directive, read in conjunction with Article 2(1) thereof, that the favourable conservation status of a natural habitat or a species must be assessed in relation to the entire European territory of the Member States to which the Treaty applies (First Corporate Shipping, cited above, paragraph 23).
29 Finally, it must be borne in mind that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in that Member State as it stood at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion. The Court cannot therefore take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-266/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-1981, paragraph 38).
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2001-09-11
19 It must be noted in this regard that the subject-matter of proceedings brought under Article 226 EC is circumscribed by the pre-litigation procedure provided for by that provision and that the Commission's reasoned opinion and application must consequently be based on the same complaints (see, inter alia, Case C-279/94 Commission v Italy [1997] ECR I-4743, paragraph 24).
20 That rule, however, does not prevent the Commission from setting out its initial complaints in greater detail in its application, on condition that it does not alter the subject-matter of the dispute (see, along these lines, Case C-256/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-2487, paragraphs 30 and 31).
31 It should be noted in this regard that, in order to produce a draft list of sites of Community importance, capable of leading to the creation of a coherent European ecological network of SACs, the Commission must have available an exhaustive list of the sites which, at national level, have an ecological interest which is relevant from the point of view of the directive's objective of conserving natural habitats and wild fauna and flora. To that end, that list is drawn up on the basis of the criteria laid down in Annex III (Stage 1) to the directive (Case C-371/98 First Corporate Shipping [2000] ECR I-9235, paragraph 22).
32 Only in that way, moreover, is it possible to realise the objective, set out in the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of the directive, of maintaining or restoring the natural habitat types and the species' habitats concerned at a favourable conservation status in their natural range, which may lie across one or more frontiers inside the Community. It follows from Article 1(e) and (i) of the directive, read in conjunction with Article 2(1) thereof, that the favourable conservation status of a natural habitat or a species must be assessed in relation to the entire European territory of the Member States to which the Treaty applies (First Corporate Shipping, cited above, paragraph 23).
33 It must also be recalled that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in that Member State as it stood at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion. The Court cannot therefore take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-266/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-1981, paragraph 38).