Ahmad Shah Ayubi v Bezirkshauptmannschaft Linz-Land.
Date: 2018-11-21
19


Article 29(1) of Directive 2011/95 lays down a general rule that beneficiaries of international protection, which include in accordance with Article 2(a) of that directive, refugees, are to receive, in the Member State that has granted such protection, the same social assistance as provided to nationals of that Member State (judgment of 1 March 2016, Alo and Osso, C‑443/14 and C‑444/14, EU:C:2016:127, paragraph 48).
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Second, conferring such an option on the Member States with regard to the benefits granted to refugees would be incompatible with the principle that persons entitled to subsidiary protection should be accorded the same treatment with respect to public relief and assistance as provided to nationals of that Member State laid down in Article 23 of the Geneva Convention, in the light of which Article 29 of Directive 2011/95 must be interpreted (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 March 2016, Alo and Osso, C‑443/14 and C‑444/14, EU:C:2016:127, paragraph 51).
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It follows that the level of social security benefits paid to refugees by the Member State which granted that status, whether temporary or permanent, must be the same as that offered to nationals of that Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 March 2016, Alo and Osso, C‑443/14 and C‑444/14, EU:C:2016:127, paragraphs 48 and 50).
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Since the rights conferred by Chapter VII of that directive, in which Article 29 thereof appears, derive from the grant of refugee status, and not from the issue of the residence permit, they may be limited only in accordance with the conditions set by Chapter VII of that directive, since Member States are not entitled to add restrictions not already listed there (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 June 2015, H.T., C‑373/13, EU:C:2015:413, paragraph 97).
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In the first place, since that provision requires refugees to be treated in the same way as nationals of the Member State which granted them its protection, only objective differences in the situations of those two categories of persons may be relevant for the purposes of its application, excluding differences in the situations of two separate groups of refugees (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 March 2016, Alo and Osso, C‑443/14 and C‑444/14, EU:C:2016:127, paragraphs 54 and 59).
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Furthermore, although the Austrian Government also relies on the considerable burden resulting from the payment of social security benefits to refugees, it must be recalled that the grant of social security benefits to a given person will entail costs for the institution that is required to provide those benefits, regardless of whether that person is a beneficiary of subsidiary protection status, a refugee or a national of the Member State concerned. A difference in situation between the two categories of person cannot therefore be established in that regard (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 March 2016, Alo and Osso, C‑443/14 and C‑444/14, EU:C:2016:127, paragraph 55).
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It is clear from the settled case-law of the Court that, whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied upon before the national courts by individuals against the State where the latter has failed to implement the directive in domestic law by the end of the period prescribed or where it has failed to implement the directive correctly (judgment of 24 January 2012, Dominguez, C‑282/10, EU:C:2012:33,paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
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It must be recalled that the Court has already found that provisions comparable to Article 29(1) of Directive 2011/95 which impose the benefit of national treatment or prohibit certain discrimination have direct effect (see, that that effect, judgments of 4 May 1999, Sürül, C‑262/96, EU:C:1999:228, paragraphs 63 and 74; of 22 December 2010, Gavieiro Gavieiro and Igliesias Torres, C‑444/09 and C‑456/09, EU:C:2010:819, paragraph 78; and of 6 March 2014, Napoli, C‑595/12, EU:C:2014:128, paragraph 48 and 50).
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In that context, it follows that, according to the Court’s case-law, where they are unable to interpret and apply national law in compliance with the requirements of EU law, it is for the national courts and administrative bodies to apply EU law in its entirety and to protect rights which the latter confers on individuals, disapplying, if necessary, any contrary provision of domestic law (judgment of 7 September 2017, H., C‑174/16, EU:C:2017:637, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).