larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Bund Naturschutz in Bayern e.V. and Richard Stahnsdorf and others v Freistaat Bayern, Stadt Vilsbiburg and Landkreis Landshut.
Date: 1994-08-09
16 As indicated in paragraph 13 above, it is clear from the order for reference that the procedure which resulted in the two consent decisions at issue in the main proceedings was initiated after 3 July 1988, the deadline for transposition of the directive. The first two questions must therefore be examined in the light of that fact.
18 It must be pointed out in this connection that there is nothing in the directive which could be construed as authorizing the Member States to exempt projects in respect of which the consent procedures were initiated after the deadline of 3 July 1988 from the obligation to carry out an environmental impact assessment. On the contrary, all the provisions in the directive were formulated on the basis that it was to be transposed into the legal systems of the Member States by 3 July 1988 at the latest.
19 Accordingly, regardless whether the directive permits a Member State to introduce transitional rules for consent procedures already initiated and in progress before the deadline of 3 July 1988, the directive in any case precludes the introduction in respect of procedures initiated after that date of rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings by a national law which, in breach of the directive, transposes it belatedly into the domestic legal system. Such an interpretation would result in an extension of the deadline of 3 July 1988 and would be contrary to the obligations under the directive.
20 The reply to the first two questions referred to the Court must therefore be that Article 12(1) of the directive must be interpreted as not permitting a Member State which has transposed the directive into national law after 3 July 1988, the deadline for transposition, to waive, by a transitional provision, for projects in respect of which the consent procedure was already initiated before the entry into force of the national law transposing the directive, but after 3 July 1988, the obligations concerning the environmental impact assessment required by the directive.
Question 3
European Parliament v Mireille Meskens.
Date: 1994-08-09
24 That plea is unfounded. Article 176 of the EC Treaty requires not only that the administration take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court but that it make good further damage which may be caused by the unlawful measure which has been annulled, subject to the conditions laid down in the second paragraph of Article 215 of the EEC Treaty. Thus Article 176 of the Treaty does not make compensation for the damage dependent on the existence of a new fault distinct from the original unlawful measure which has been annulled, but provides for compensation for the damage which results from that measure and which continues after its annulment and compliance by the administration with the judgment whereby it was annulled.
28 The Court went on to state that "where compliance with a judgment annulling a measure presents particular difficulties, the defendant may satisfy the obligation arising from Article 176 of the Treaty by taking 'such decision as will provide due compensation for the damage which [the person concerned] has suffered as a result of the decision which has been annulled' (see the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case 76/79 Koenecke v Commission, cited above, at p. 679; see also the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case 144/82 Detti v Court of Justice, cited above). In that context, the appointing authority could also have established a dialogue with the applicant in order to attempt to reach agreement offering her fair compensation for the unlawfulness of which she had been the victim" (paragraph 80).
Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1994-08-09
13 Admittedly, under the system applying in Germany at the relevant time each batch manufactured was subject to an internal check and overall there was a high rate of agreement between the results of the internal checks and those of the official checks. However, the system practised did not guarantee that there was such agreement in all the cases in which aid was paid. If the official check revealed a negative result, that should necessarily have cast doubt on the reliability of the internal analyses carried out by the undertaking in question. The German authorities should therefore either have carried out further checks in order to ascertain whether the other batches for which an application had been submitted by the undertaking did in fact comply with the requirements of the regulation or have made the appropriate extrapolation in accordance with the law of probability.
Meyhui NV v Schott Zwiesel Glaswerke AG.
Date: 1994-08-09
10 Article 30 prohibits obstacles to the free movement of goods resulting from rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods (such as requirements as to designation, form, size, weight, composition, presentation, labelling or packaging), even if those rules apply without distinction to all national and imported products, unless their application can be justified by a public-interest objective taking precedence over the free movement of goods (see in particular Case C-315/92 Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb v Clinique Laboratories and Estee Lauder [1994] ECR I-317, paragraph 13). Where such justification exists, the measure in question must, in any event, be proportionate to the goal pursued.
11 It is settled law that the prohibition of quantitative restrictions and of all measures having equivalent effect applies not only to national measures but also to measures adopted by the Community institutions (see in particular Case 15/83 Denkavit Nederland v Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten [1984] ECR 2171, paragraph 15).
13 However, the prohibition on affixing to crystal glass products in categories 3 and 4 of Annex I to Directive 69/493 their description in a language other than the language or languages of the Member State in which those goods are marketed constitutes a barrier to intra-Community trade in so far as products coming from other Member States have to be given different labelling causing additional packaging costs.
21 It is apparent from the foregoing that the requirement that "Only the description in the language or languages of the country in which the goods are marketed may be used" is necessary for the protection of consumers and the Council has, therefore, not exceeded the limits of its discretion in the framework of its powers of harmonization by adopting the explanatory notes in question (see in particular Case 37/83 REWE-Zentrale v Landwirtschaftskammer Rheinland [1984] ECR 1229, paragraph 20).
Klaus Thierschmidt GmbH v Hauptzollamt Essen.
Date: 1994-08-09
11 The Finanzgericht notes that the reasons given by the Court in its judgments in Case 7/83 Ospig v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Ost [1984] ECR 609 and Case C-219/88 Malt v Hauptzollamt Duesseldorf [1990] ECR I-1481 in favour of the non-inclusion in the customs value of goods of third-party quota charges could be extended to own quotas and would permit charges relating thereto also to be excluded from the customs value. First, Article 8 of Regulation No 1224/80, which lists the additional charges included in the customs value, mentions neither third-party quotas nor own quotas. Secondly, own-quota charges, as an advantage calculable in monetary terms for the export of goods, should not form part of the customs value, since they result solely from the Community rules for limiting and monitoring imports. Those charges are not directly related to the goods and own quotas may be traded independently of goods.
21 Contrary to Thierschmidt' s argument, the grounds set out by the Court in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Ospig judgment, cited above, based on the difference between the objectives pursued by the Community rules aimed at monitoring the quantities of textile products imported from certain non-member countries and by Regulation No 1224/80 are not applicable to charges in respect of own quotas allocated to the exporter free of charge. In that case, the quota system does not entail any expense for the seller.
24 The Finanzgericht points out that the customs legislation in force does not contain any rule expressly providing that charges which are not to be included in the customs value should be distinguished. Nor do the judgments in Ospig and Malt, cited above, contain any indication in that connection. However, it must be concluded from the judgment in Malt (at paragraph 13) that charges incurred in acquiring export licences are not material to the price to be taken into account under the rules on customs value and accordingly they are not relevant to the declaration of customs value either. The separate indication of quota charges would, however, appear desirable from a practical point of view. Officials may, pursuant to Article 10 of Regulation No 1224/80, require the importer to provide incontrovertible proof of the quota charges claimed.
Walter Stanner GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Bochum.
Date: 1994-08-09
14 The Court has consistently held that the decisive criterion for the customs classification of goods must be sought generally in their objective characteristics and qualities, as defined in the relevant heading of the Common Customs Tariff (see the judgments in Case C-177/91 Bioforce [1993] ECR I-45, paragraph 8, and in Case C-11/93 Siemens Nixdorf [1994] ECR I-0000, paragraph 11).
15 It also follows from the Court' s case-law that both the explanatory notes to the Nomenclature of the Customs Cooperation Council and the classification slips issued by the Committee on Common Customs Tariff Nomenclature are important means for ensuring the uniform application of the Tariff and as such may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (see the judgments in Case 200/84 Daiber v Hauptzollamt Reutlingen [1985] ECR 3363, paragraph 14, and in Case 166/84 Thomasduenger v Oberfinanzdirektion Frankfurt am Main [1985] ECR 3001, paragraph 14). In order to interpret the above tariff headings, therefore, it is necessary to take account not only of the wording and scheme of the Common Customs Tariff but also of the content of those explanatory notes.
Neckermann Versand AG v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt/Main-Ost.
Date: 1994-08-09
5 It is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their characteristics and objective properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the Common Customs Tariff and of the notes to the sections or chapters (judgment in Case 40/88 Weber v Milchwerke Paderborn-Rimbeck [1989] ECR 1395, paragraph 13). Likewise, for the purpose of interpreting the Common Customs Tariff, the Court has consistently held that both the notes which head the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff and the Explanatory Notes to the Nomenclature of the Customs Cooperation Council are important means for ensuring the uniform application of the Tariff and as such may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (judgment in Case 200/84 Daiber v Hauptzollamt Reutlingen [1985] ECR 3363, paragraph 14).
7 In the absence of such a definition, the objective characteristic of pyjamas, which is capable of distinguishing it from other ensembles, can be sought only in the use for which pyjamas are intended, that is to say to be worn in bed as nightwear.
8 If that objective characteristic can be established at the time of customs clearance, the fact that it may also be possible to envisage another use for the garments will not preclude them from being classified for legal purposes as pyjamas.
9 It follows that, for a garment to be classified as pyjamas for customs purposes, it does not have to be solely or exclusively meant to be worn in bed. It suffices if that is the main use for which it is intended.
14 The answer to the first question submitted must therefore be that heading 61.08 of the Combined Nomenclature of the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Regulations No 2658/87 and No 3174/88, must be interpreted as meaning that not only sets of two knitted garments which, according to their outward appearance, are to be worn exclusively in bed but also sets used mainly for that purpose must be considered to be pyjamas.
The second question
Lars Bo Rasmussen v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1994-08-09
11 The Court of Justice has consistently held that the formalities prescribed by Articles 4 and 29 of the Staff Regulations do not apply when an official is re-assigned with his post because such a transfer does not give rise to a vacant post (see Joined Cases 161 and 162/80 Carbognani and Coda Zabetta v Commission [1981] ECR 543, paragraph 19). Contrary to the appellant' s contention, the rotation procedure does not involve a transfer within the meaning of the Staff Regulations, even if the terminology employed by the Commission is occasionally inappropriate (paragraph 20 of Carbognani).
21 In that connection the Court has consistently held that an appeal is admissible only in so far as it is claimed that the decision of the Court of First Instance is incompatible with the rules of law the application of which it had to ensure (see Case C-283/90 P Vidrányi v Commission [1991] ECR I-4339, paragraph 13).
André Reichling v Institut National d'Assurance Maladie-Invalidité.
Date: 1994-08-09
21 It must be observed in this respect that Article 46 of Regulation No 1408/71 must be interpreted in the light of Article 51 of the EC Treaty, as indeed must all the provisions of that regulation.
22 The purpose of Article 51 is to facilitate freedom of movement for workers by securing for migrant workers and their dependants "aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit and of calculating the amount of benefit, of all periods taken into account under the laws of the several countries."
24 That objective entails that migrant workers must not lose their right to social security benefits or have the amount of those benefits reduced because they have exercised the right to freedom of movement conferred on them by the Treaty.
26 At the time when he became incapacitated, Mr Reichling was not in receipt of remuneration in Belgium, but was in receipt of remuneration in another Member State. That remuneration should have been taken into account by the competent Belgian institution as if it had been remuneration received in Belgium, pursuant to Article 46(2)(a) interpreted in the light of the objective referred to in paragraph 24 above, because a migrant worker must not suffer a reduction in the amount of the benefit he would have received had he not been migrant.
29 That interpretation of Article 46(2)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71 is borne out by the provision which was inserted into Annex VI to Regulation No 1408/71, dealing with Belgium, by Regulation No 1248/92 (see paragraph 16 above). Contrary to the arguments of the INAMI, which regards that provision as a change to the existing rules and develops an argument a contrario therefrom, Regulation No 1248/92 in fact merely clarified those rules, as is shown by the fact that the preamble to the regulation does not contain any explanation of the new provision.
Kingdom of Spain v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1994-09-14
12 The Court has consistently held that investment by the public authorities in the capital of an undertaking, in whatever form, may constitute State aid where the conditions set out in Article 92 of the Treaty are fulfilled (see the judgment in Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1603, paragraph 18).
13 In order to determine whether such measures are in the nature of State aid, it is necessary to consider whether in similar circumstances a private investor of a size comparable to that of the bodies administering the public sector might have provided injections of capital of such an amount (see the judgment in Italy v Commission, cited above, paragraph 19).
14 The Court has stated that although the conduct of a private investor, with which the intervention of a public investor pursuing economic policy aims must be compared, need not be the conduct of an ordinary investor laying out capital with a view to realizing a profit in the relatively short term, it must at least be the conduct of a private holding company or a private group of undertakings pursuing a structural policy ° whether general or sectoral ° and guided by prospects of profitability in the longer term (see the judgment in Italy v Commission, cited above, paragraph 20).
21 Furthermore, it is apparent from the statistical table annexed to the contested decision that all the agricultural products marketed by Merco were traded between Member States. Accordingly, the Commission was entitled to consider that trade between Member States would be influenced by the aid at issue.
32 The Kingdom of Spain argues in particular that in the circumstances it is impossible to implement the decision at issue because Merco has ceased to exist in economic terms. It has ceased all its activities and is managed by a single administrator responsible for carrying out the final steps in the liquidation. In that regard the situation is different from that which came before the Court in Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission [1990] ECR I-959, to which the Commission refers. In its view, the decision at issue has therefore become devoid of purpose.
Koinopraxia Enóséon Georgikon Synetairismon Diacheiríséos Enchorion Proïonton Syn. PE (KYDEP) v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1994-09-15
19 It is settled case law that the Community' s non-contractual liability under the second paragraph of Article 215 of the EEC Treaty is dependent on the coincidence of a series of conditions as regards the unlawfulness of the acts alleged against the Community institutions, the fact of damage and the existence of a causal link between the conduct of the institution and the damage complained of (see, in particular, the judgment in Cases C-258/90 and C-259/90 Pesquerias de Bermeo and Naviera Laida v Commission [1992] ECR I-2901, paragraph 42).
24 As the Court has already held in its judgment in Case C-371/92 Elliniko Dimosio v Ellinika Dimitriaka [1994] ECR I-0000, paragraph 17, the telex at issue is not an act binding on the Member States. It simply gives the Commission' s interpretation of the concept of a "sound, fair and merchantable" product "fit for human consumption" as provided for in accordance with the terms of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1569/77 of 11 July 1977 fixing the procedure and conditions for the taking over of cereals by intervention agencies (OJ 1977 L 174, p. 15), and in Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2730/79 of 29 November 1979 laying down common detailed rules for the application of the system of export refunds on agricultural products (OJ 1979 L 317, p. 1).
61 The Court has consistently held that the Council enjoys a wide margin of discretion in the attainment of the various objectives set out in Article 39 (see judgment in Case 106/81 Kind v Council [1982] ECR 2885). In the exercise of that power, the Council cannot, however, disregard requirements relating to the public interest such as the protection of consumers or of the health and life of humans (see judgment in Case 68/86 United Kingdom v Council [1988] ECR 855, paragraph 12).
66 The Court has consistently held that discrimination consists in treating differently situations which are identical, or in treating in the same way situations which are different (see judgments in Case 8/82 Wagner v BALM [1983] ECR 371, paragraph 18, and in Case 58/86 Coopérative Agricole d' Approvisionnement des Avirons v Receveur des Douanes [1987] ECR 1525, paragraph 15).
80 It follows from all the foregoing considerations that in the present case there was no act or omission by the Council or the Commission of an unlawful nature.
81 Since the first condition governing the Community' s non-contractual liability under the second paragraph of Article 215 of the Treaty is not satisfied the application must be dismissed in its entirety without its being necessary to examine the other preconditions for such liability, namely the fact of damage and the existence of a causal link between the conduct of the institutions and the damage complained of.
Pedro Magdalena Fernández v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1994-09-15
11 Mr Magdalena Fernández further observes that, at paragraph 28 of its judgment, the Court of First Instance states that from 1965 until 1 May 1986 and, therefore, during the reference period in question, the applicant habitually resided in Belgium, whereas at paragraph 29, it acknowledges the existence of "a nine months' stay in Spain between those two dates ..." which, however, it classifies as "episodic and brief", erroneously basing itself on the judgment in Case 188/83 (Witte v Parliament [1984] ECR 3465, paragraph 11). Mr Magdalena Fernández notes in that connection that "episodic" implies irregularity and he raises the question whether a stay of eight months may be regarded as episodic.
20 As the Court of Justice has consistently held, the purpose of the expatriation allowance is to compensate officials for the extra expense and inconvenience of taking up employment with the Communities if they have been thereby obliged to change their residence and move to the country of employment and to integrate themselves in a new environment. Furthermore, the concept of expatriation also depends on the personal position of an official, that is to say, on the extent to which he is integrated in his new environment, which is demonstrated for example, by habitual residence or by the main occupation pursued (see the judgment in Case 201/88 Atala-Palmerini v Commission [1989] ECR 3109, paragraph 9).
22 As the Court of First Instance, referring to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, pointed out, the place of habitual residence is that in which the official concerned has established, with the intention that it should be of a lasting character, the permanent or habitual centre of his interests. However, for the purposes of determining habitual residence, all the factual circumstances which constitute such residence must be taken into account.
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 1994-09-20
20 In the first place, the aim of the directive is to remove barriers to trade while reorganizing phytosanitary inspections within the Community. Second, in order to achieve that aim a system has been introduced under which the Member State of origin determines whether the products satisfy the relevant health requirements, the measures permitted in the State of destination being strictly limited. The view must therefore be taken that the directive is designed to harmonize all inspection measures relating to plants and that Member States consequently no longer have the power to lay down such measures unilaterally at national level (see, to the same effect, the judgment in Case 29/87 Dansk Denkavit v Danish Ministry of Agriculture [1988] ECR 2965, paragraph 16).
27 In that regard, suffice it to note, with reference to paragraph 20 above, that, in contrast to the contention of the Italian Government, the directive introduced a consistent and exhaustive set of measures capable of being implemented in order to ensure the protection of plants within the Community. Where, in application of Article 100 of the Treaty, Community directives provide for the harmonization of the measures necessary to ensure the protection of animal and human health and establish Community procedures to check that they are observed, recourse to Article 36 is no longer justified and the appropriate checks must be carried out and the protective measures adopted within the framework outlined by the harmonizing directive (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 5/77 Tedeschi v Denkavit [1977] ECR 1555, at paragraph 35). The same solution applies where a directive harmonizes the measures necessary for the protection of plants.