larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Enso Española SA v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2000-11-16
30 The Court of First Instance first of all referred, in paragraph 109 of the contested judgment, to the settled case-law to the effect that the purpose of the obligation to give reasons for an individual decision is to enable the Community judicature to review the legality of the decision and to provide the party concerned with an adequate indication as to whether the decision is well founded or whether it may be vitiated by some defect enabling its validity to be challenged, the scope of that obligation being dependent on the nature of the act in question and on the context in which it was adopted (see, in particular, besides the case-law cited by the Court of First Instance, Case C-22/94 Irish Farmers Association and Others v Ministry for Agriculture, Food and Forestry, Ireland, and the Attorney General [1997] ECR I-1809, paragraph 39).
59 Lastly, as regards monetary fluctuations, they are an element of chance which may produce advantages and disadvantages which the undertakings have to deal with regularly in the course of their business activities and whose very existence is not such as to render inappropriate the amount of a fine lawfully fixed by reference to the gravity of the infringement and the turnover achieved during the reference year. In any event, the maximum amount of the fine, determined by virtue of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 by reference to turnover in the business year preceding the adoption of the Decision, limits the possible harmful consequences of monetary fluctuations.
62 As the Commission has submitted, this plea is inadmissible on two grounds. First, it does not satisfy the requirements of Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice because it does not refer to the provisions or principles of Community law alleged to have been infringed by the Court of First Instance. Second, it must be regarded as a new application which cannot be presented for the first time in an appeal. Before the Court of First Instance the appellant sought an order that the Commission pay the costs, and included under the heading of costs certain sums which the Court of First Instance rightly held did not fall under that heading (see paragraph 370 of the contested judgment). In its appeal, the appellant seeks an order that the Commission pay those same sums, even though they are not classified as expenses within the meaning of Article 91(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance.
SCA Holding Ltd v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2000-11-16
27 The reasoning of the Court of First Instance, as set out above, cannot be called in question. It falls, in principle, to the legal or natural person managing the undertaking in question when the infringement was committed to answer for that infringement, even if, at the date of the Decision finding the infringement, the operation of the undertaking was no longer its responsibility, for example where, as in the present case, the undertaking in question acquired a separate legal personality.
36 The Court of First Instance correctly held in that regard, in paragraph 156 of the contested judgment, that a reduction in the fine on grounds of cooperation during the administrative procedure is justified only if the conduct of the undertaking in question enabled the Commission to establish the existence of an infringement more easily and, where relevant, to bring it to an end.
46 The Court of First Instance first of all referred, in paragraph 195 of the contested judgment, to the settled case-law to the effect that the purpose of the obligation to give reasons for an individual decision is to enable the Community judicature to review the legality of the decision and to provide the party concerned with an adequate indication as to whether the decision is well founded or whether it may be vitiated by some defect enabling its validity to be challenged, the scope of that obligation being dependent on the nature of the act in question and on the context in which it was adopted (see, in particular, besides the case-law cited by the Court of First Instance, Case C-22/94 Irish Farmers Association and Others v Ministry for Agriculture, Food and Forestry, Ireland, and the Attorney General [1997] ECR I-1809, paragraph 39).
Criminal proceedings against Roelof Donkersteeg.
Date: 2000-11-16
30 As pointed out in paragraph 20 above, in accordance with Article 1(1) of the directive, so far as agricultural products are concerned, a technical specification is one contained in a document which lays down the characteristics required of a product or its production methods and procedures.
Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl, Thyssen Stahl AG, Preussag Stahl AG and Hoogovens Staal BV, formerly Hoogovens Groep BV v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2000-11-23
53 It is true that, on the basis of the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty, the Commission could not in any circumstance authorise the grant of State aid which was not necessary to attain the objectives of the Treaty and would be likely to give rise to distortion of competition in the common market in steel (Case 214/83 Germany v Commission [1985] ECR 3053, paragraph 30).
British Steel plc v Commission of the European Communities and Others.
Date: 2000-11-23
47 Under Articles 113(2) and 116(1) of the Rules of Procedure fresh submissions not contained in the original application may not be raised in an appeal (Case C-18/91 PV v Parliament [1992] ECR I-3997, paragraph 21). It follows that the alternative plea relied on in the first ground of appeal is manifestly inadmissible.
The second ground of appeal
52 The Court of First Instance was also correct, in reliance on the settled case-law of the Court of Justice (see Case C-350/88 Delacre and Others v Commission [1990] ECR I-395, paragraph 33), to hold, in paragraph 77 of the contested judgment, that [t]he proper functioning of the common market in steel clearly involves the obvious need for constant adjustments to fluctuations in the economic situation and economic operators cannot claim a vested right to the maintenance of the legal situation existing at a given time. British Steel could not legitimately expect that a given legal situation would remain unchanged even though the economic conditions in the steel market were subject to changes which, in some cases, called for specific measures of adjustment.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 2000-11-23
37 It follows from Articles 2 and 10 of the directive that, when an activity is usually pursued by architects holding a qualification awarded by the host Member State, a migrant architect holding a diploma, certificate or other evidence of formal qualifications coming within the scope of the directive must also be able to pursue such an activity, even if his diploma, certificate or other evidence of formal qualifications is not necessarily substantively equivalent in terms of the training received.
38 While it is true, as the Spanish Government submits, that it is for the national legislation of the host Member State to define the field of activities covered by the profession of architect, once an activity is considered by a Member State as coming within that field, the requirement of mutual recognition means that migrant architects must also be able to pursue that activity.
41 So far as application of Article 56 of the Treaty to the present situation is concerned, it should be borne in mind that that provision is not designed to reserve certain matters to the exclusive jurisdiction of Member States but permits national laws to derogate from the principle of free movement to the extent to which such derogation is and continues to be justified for the attainment of the objectives referred to in that article (see to this effect, with reference to Article 36 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 30 EC), Case 5/77 Tedeschi v Denkavit [1977] ECR 1555, paragraph 34).
42 Where Community directives provide for harmonisation of the measures necessary to ensure the protection of a specific objective, recourse to Article 56 of the Treaty is no longer justified and the appropriate checks must be carried out and the measures of protection adopted within the framework outlined by the harmonising directive (see to this effect, with reference to Article 36 of the EC Treaty, Case 251/78 Denkavit Futtermittel v Minister für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen [1979] ECR 3369, paragraph 14, Case 190/87 Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Borken and Another v Moormann [1988] ECR 4689, paragraph 10, and Case C-112/97 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I-1821, paragraph 54).
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2000-11-23
10 In that regard, the Court would point out, first, that, according to settled case-law, a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-470/98 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-4657, paragraph 11) and, second, that the governments of the Member States participate in the preparatory work for directives and must therefore be in a position to prepare within the period prescribed the legislative provisions necessary for their implementation (see Case 301/81 Commission v Belgium [1983] ECR 467, paragraph 11).
HMIL Ltd v Minister for Agriculture, Food and Forestry.
Date: 2000-11-30
83 It is settled case-law that the competent authorities may carry out sampling checks and make an appropriate extrapolation of the results of those checks, in accordance with the law of probability (see, to that effect, Italy v Commission, cited above, paragraph 22, and Germany v Commission, cited above, paragraph 13).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 2000-11-30
16 In this respect, it should be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C-316/96 Commission v Italy [1997] ECR I-7231, paragraph 14).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2000-11-30
10 In that regard, it must be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-470/98 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-4657, paragraph 11).
Eurostock Meat Marketing Ltd v Department of Agriculture for Northern Ireland.
Date: 2000-12-05
57 As is apparent from the fourth subparagraph of Article 9(1) of Directive 89/662, the Member State of destination may, on serious public or animal-health grounds, take interim protective measures pending the measures to be taken by the Commission in accordance with Article 9(4).
58 In that connection, the adoption by the Commission of a decision which is not immediately applicable cannot, as such, be regarded as precluding a Member State from itself taking interim protective measures pursuant to the fourth subparagraph of Article 9(1) of Directive 89/662.
79 It follows that the answer to be given to the first two questions referred for a preliminary ruling must be that a Member State may prohibit imports of bovine heads containing material presenting risks as regards bovine spongiform encephalopathy, by way of an interim protective measure within the meaning of the fourth subparagraph of Article 9(1) of Directive 89/662, where the Commission has adopted, pursuant to Article 9(4) of that directive, a decision such as Decision 97/534 requiring the removal of, and prohibiting the use of, such material but where the date on which the measures laid down by that decision are to become applicable has been postponed.
The third and fourth questions
Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v Telekom Austria AG, joined party: Herold Business Data AG.
Date: 2000-12-07
56 On the other hand, Directive 93/38, adopted on the same day as Directive 93/37, provided for no rule on public service concessions. It follows that the Community legislature decided not to include such concessions within the scope of Directive 93/38. If it had wished to, it would have done so expressly, as it did when adopting Directive 93/37.
58 The answers to the first and second questions must therefore be that:
Directive 93/38 covers a contract for pecuniary interest concluded in writing between, on the one hand, an undertaking which is specifically responsible under the legislation of a Member State for operating a telecommunications service and whose capital is wholly held by the public authorities of that State and, on the other, a private undertaking, where under that contract the first undertaking entrusts the second with the production and publication, for the purpose of distribution to the public, of printed and electronically accessible lists of telephone subscribers (telephone directories);
although it is covered by Directive 93/38, such a contract is excluded, under Community law as it stands at present, from the scope of that directive by reason of the fact, in particular, that the consideration provided by the first undertaking to the second consists in the second obtaining the right to exploit for payment its own service.
59 However, the fact that such a contract does not fall within the scope of Directive 93/38 does not preclude the Court from helping the national court which has sent it a series of questions for a preliminary ruling. To that end, the Court may take into consideration other factors in making an interpretation which may assist the determination of the main proceedings.
60 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, notwithstanding the fact that, as Community law stands at present, such contracts are excluded from the scope of Directive 93/38, the contracting entities concluding them are, none the less, bound to comply with the fundamental rules of the Treaty, in general, and the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality, in particular.
61 As the Court held in Case C-275/98 Unitron Scandinavia and 3-S [1999] ECR I-8291, paragraph 31, that principle implies, in particular, an obligation of transparency in order to enable the contracting authority to satisfy itself that the principle has been complied with.
62 That obligation of transparency which is imposed on the contracting authority consists in ensuring, for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of advertising sufficient to enable the services market to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of procurement procedures to be reviewed.
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2000-12-07
21 In accordance with the third paragraph of Article 189 of the EC Treaty (now the third paragraph of Article 249 EC), a directive is binding, as to the results to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed. This obligation entails compliance with the time-limits set by directives (Case 10/76 Commission v Italy [1976] ECR 1359, paragraph 12).
22 Also, the Court has consistently held that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion. The Court therefore cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see Case C-364/97 Commission v Ireland [1998] ECR I-6593, paragraph 8).
23 In the present case, it is clear from the wording of Article 3(1) and (2) and Article 5 of the Directive, read in conjunction with paragraphs A.1 and A.2 of Annex I, that the Member States are obliged to do the following:
identify as waters affected by pollution, or as waters which could be affected by pollution if action pursuant to Article 5 of the Directive is not taken, not only waters intended for human consumption but also all surface freshwaters and groundwaters which have or could have a nitrate concentration in excess of 50 milligrams per litre (Article 3(1));
by 20 December 1993 at the latest, designate as vulnerable zones all known areas of land in their territories which drain into the waters thus identified as affected by pollution in accordance with Article 3(1) (Article 3(2)); and
by 20 December 1995 at the latest, establish action programmes designed to reduce nitrate pollution of waters and improve water quality in the vulnerable zones designated under Article 3(2) of the Directive or to remedy those problems (Article 5).
Julia Schnorbus v Land Hessen.
Date: 2000-12-07
22 It is sufficient to note in this regard that the Court has consistently held that it is solely for the national court, which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to give its judgment (see, in particular, Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59, and Case C-228/96 Aprile v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1998] ECR I-7141, paragraph 11). Furthermore, it is not for the Court to determine whether the decision whereby a matter is brought before it was taken in accordance with the rules of national law governing the organisation of the courts and their procedure (see, in particular, Case C-39/94 SFEI and Others v La Poste and Others [1996] ECR I-3547).
23 Consequently, if the questions submitted concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court is, in principle, obliged to give a ruling. The only circumstances in which that does not apply are where it is quite obvious that the interpretation sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (Bosman, cited above, paragraph 61, and Case C-36/99 Idéal Tourisme v Belgian State [2000] ECR-I-6049, paragraph 20).
28 It is sufficient to note in this regard that the provisions at issue govern the circumstances in which the admission of applicants to practical legal training may or may not be delayed because there are not enough places. Since that practical training constitutes a period of training and a necessary prerequisite of access to employment in the judicial service or the higher civil service, such a delay may affect the development of the career of the persons concerned. Such provisions therefore fall within the scope of the directive, which applies to employment in the public service (see Case 248/83 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 1459, paragraph 16, and Case C-1/95 Gerster [1997] ECR I-5253, paragraph 18).
33 According to the criteria established by the case-law of the Court, only provisions which apply differently according to the sex of the persons concerned can be regarded as constituting discrimination directly based on sex (see, in particular, Case C-249/96 Grant v South-West Trains [1998] ECR I-621, paragraph 28).
ARGE Gewässerschutz v Bundesministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft.
Date: 2000-12-07
24 The Court must observe that, as the Bundesvergabeamt has noted, the contracting authority is bound, under Directive 92/50, to observe the principle of equal treatment of tenderers. Under Article 3(2) of the directive, contracting authorities are to ensure that there is no discrimination between different service providers.
25 Nevertheless, as the Austrian and French Governments and the Commission have argued, the mere fact that contracting authorities allow bodies which receive subsidies enabling them to submit tenders at prices appreciably lower than those of the other, unsubsidised, tenderers, to take part in a procedure for the award of a public procurement contract does not amount to a breach of the principle of equal treatment.
26 If the Community legislature had intended to require contracting authorities to exclude such tenderers, it would have stated this explicitly.
27 Articles 23 and 29 to 37 of Directive 92/50 lay down detailed criteria for the selection of service providers permitted to submit a tender and the criteria for the award of the contract, but none of those provisions provides that tenderers may be excluded or their tenders rejected simply because they receive public subsidies.
28 On the contrary, Article 1(c) of Directive 92/50 expressly authorises the participation, in a procedure for the award of a public procurement contract, of bodies funded in some cases out of the public purse. It provides that a tenderer means a service provider which has submitted a tender and defines that provider as any natural or legal person, including a public body, which offers its services.
29 While it is not, therefore, contrary in itself to the principle of equal treatment of tenderers for public bodies to take part in a procedure for the award of public procurement contracts, even in circumstances such as those described in the first question, it is not excluded that, in certain specific circumstances, Directive 92/50 requires, or at the very least allows, the contracting authorities to take into account the existence of subsidies, and in particular of aid incompatible with the Treaty, in order, where appropriate, to exclude tenderers in receipt of such aid.
40 It is also relevant to point out that the Court considered a similar question in its judgment in Case C-107/98 Teckal v Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121, concerning Council Directive 93/36/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating procedures for the award of public supply contracts (OJ 1993 L 199, p. 1). It ruled that that directive is applicable where a contracting authority, such as a local authority, plans to conclude in writing, with an entity which is formally distinct from it and independent of it in regard to decision-making, a contract for pecuniary interest for the supply of products, whether or not that entity is itself a contracting authority.