larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Caisse de pension des employés privés v Dieter Kordel, Rainer Kordel and Frankfurter Allianz Versicherungs AG.
Date: 1999-09-21
21 In so far as the rule of German law mentioned by the referring court affects only the subrogation of the institution responsible for benefits to the rights of recipients of benefits, it should be recalled that Article 93(1)(a) of the Regulation provides that each Member State is to recognise the subrogation of the institution responsible for benefits to the rights which the recipient of the benefits has against the third party bound to compensate for the injury, where that institution is so subrogated under the legislation of the Member State to which it belongs (DAK v Lærerstanders Brandforsikring, paragraph 17).
22 That provision is thus to be regarded as a conflict-of-laws rule which requires the national court hearing an action for compensation brought against the party liable for the injury to apply the law of the Member State to which the institution responsible belongs, not only to determine whether that institution is subrogated by law to the rights of the injured party or those entitled under him, but also to determine the nature and extent of the claims to which the institution responsible for benefits is subrogated (DAK v Lærerstanders Brandforsikring, paragraph 18).
25 In this connection, suffice it to recall that, according to settled case-law, it is not for the Court, in proceedings under Article 177 of the Treaty, to interpret national law or assess its effects (see, inter alia, Case 52/76 Benedetti v Munari [1977] ECR 163, paragraph 25).
Dutch Antillian Dairy Industry Inc. and Verenigde Douane-Agenten BV v Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees.
Date: 1999-09-21
38 Trade between the OCTs and the Community does not necessarily benefit from a regime identical to that governing trade between Member States since, although association of the OCTs with the Community is governed by a special regime, the relationship remains one of association, which, as the Court held in its judgment in Road Air (C-310/95 [1997] ECR I-2229, paragraph 40), is to be achieved by a dynamic and progressive process. The fact that there is such a process, which is in no way automatic, means that there is a fundamental difference between the regime governing trade between the OCTs and the Community and the regime established by the Treaty in respect of trade between the Member States. The latter is trade transacted within the framework of the internal market, as distinct from trade between OCTs and the Community, which is governed by the imports regime.
41 In that connection, the Court has consistently held that Article 43 of the Treaty is the proper legal basis for any legislation concerning the production and marketing of agricultural products listed in Annex II to the Treaty which contributes to the attainment of one or more of the objectives of the common agricultural policy set out in Article 39 of the Treaty (now Article 33 EC). Consequently, even where that legislation is directed both to objectives of agricultural policy and to other objectives pursued on the basis of other Treaty provisions, the existence of those provisions cannot be relied on as a ground for restricting the field of application of Article 43 of the Treaty (see the judgments in Case 68/86 United Kingdom v Council [1988] ECR 855, paragraphs 14 and 16; Case C-131/87 Commission v Council [1989] ECR 3743, paragraphs 10 and 11; and Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR 1-4973, paragraph 54).
73 The finding that Decision 94/70 is invalid is not affected by the practical difficulties allegedly encountered by the Commission by reason of the length of the inspection procedures and the complexity of the checks to be carried out (see Joined Cases C-38/90 and C-151/90 Lomas and Others [1992] ECR I-1781, paragraph 21). Practical difficulties of that kind cannot exempt the Commission from applying binding provisions of Community law.
Criminal proceedings against Florus Ariël Wijsenbeek.
Date: 1999-09-21
21 Consequently, the judgment making the reference and the written and oral observations give the Court sufficient information to enable it to interpret the rules of Community law in relation to the situation which is the subject of the main proceedings (see, in particular, Case C-316/93 Vaneetveld [1994] ECR I-763, paragraph 14).
22 Secondly, in arriving at an airport of the Member State of which he is a national on a flight from another Member State, Mr Wijsenbeek was using his right to move freely, which is a right conferred by the Treaty on nationals of the Member States.  If those nationals, who have a right to move freely within the other Member States (Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-7637, paragraph 15) were not able to avail themselves of this right in their State of origin, the right could not be fully effective (see, to this effect, Singh, cited above, paragraphs 21 and 23).
40 That article cannot be interpreted as meaning that, in the absence of measures adopted by the Council before 31 December 1992 requiring the Member States to abolish controls of persons at the internal frontiers of the Community, that obligation automatically arises from expiry of that period.  As the Advocate General points out in point 77 of his Opinion, such an obligation presupposes harmonisation of the laws of the Member States governing the crossing of the external borders of the Community, immigration, the grant of visas, asylum and the exchange of information on those questions (see, to this effect, as regards social security, Baglieri, cited above, paragraphs 16 and 17).
44 In the absence of Community rules governing the matter, the Member States remain competent to impose penalties for breach of such an obligation, provided that the penalties applicable are comparable to those which apply to similar national infringements.  However, Member States may not lay down a penalty so disproportionate as to create an obstacle to the free movement of persons, such as a term of imprisonment (see, in particular, Case C-265/88 Messner [1989] ECR 4209, paragraph 14, and Case C-193/94 Skanavi and Chryssanthakopoulos [1996] ECR I-929, paragraph 36). The same considerations apply as regards breach of the obligation to present an identity card or a passport upon entry into the territory of a Member State.
BASF AG v Präsident des Deutschen Patentamts.
Date: 1999-09-21
12 BASF contends in particular that the costs of translating patent specifications are very high, so that many patent holders are forced to be selective in filing translations and therefore to forgo patent protection in some Member States.  The requirement at issue thus prevents those patent holders from benefiting from the effects of patents granted in all the Member States of the Community. According to BASF, this restriction results in the division of the internal market, with a patent being protected in some Member States (the `protected zone') but not in others (the `free zone').  The requirement in question therefore constitutes an obstacle to the free movement of goods contrary to Article 30 of the Treaty, which is not justified under Article 36.
16 It has been held that all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports (see Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5). However, the restrictive effects which a piece of national legislation has on the free movement of goods may be too uncertain and too indirect for the obligation which the legislation enacts to be regarded as being capable of hindering trade between Member States (see, in particular, the judgment in Case C-266/96 Corsica Ferries France [1998] ECR I-3949, paragraph 31).
18 Here, it has to be observed that one of the choices facing an inventor when planning to obtain protection for his invention by the grant of a patent concerns the territorial scope of the desired protection, limited to a single Member State or covering several Member States. That choice is in principle the same, irrespective of whether the inventor applies for a European patent or uses the systems for the grant of national patents at present in force in the Member States.  The choice will be made after an overall assessment of the advantages and drawbacks of each option, which includes complex economic evaluations of the commercial interest of having protection in the various States compared with the sum of the costs entailed in obtaining the grant of a patent in those States, including translation costs.
21 In those circumstances, it must be held that, even supposing that in some circumstances the division of the internal market may have restrictive effects on the free movement of goods, those repercussions are too uncertain and too indirect to be considered to be an obstacle within the meaning of Article 30 of the Treaty.
Kingdom of Spain v Council of the European Union.
Date: 1999-10-05
1 By application lodged at the Court on 9 June 1995, the Kingdom of Spain brought an action under the first paragraph of Article 173 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, the first paragraph of Article 230 EC) for the annulment of the final sentence of point 1.1(i) of Annex IV to Council Regulation (EC) No 685/95 of 27 March 1995 on the management of the fishing effort relating to certain Community fishing areas and resources (OJ 1995 L 71, p. 5) and of the fifth heading, on anchovies, in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 746/95 of 31 March 1995 amending Regulation (EC) No 3362/94 fixing, for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, the total allowable catches for 1995 and certain conditions under which they may be fished (OJ 1995 L 74, p. 1).
28 In that connection, it must be observed that it is settled case-law that, in pursuing the objectives of the common agricultural policy, the Community institutions must secure the permanent harmonisation made necessary by any conflicts between those objectives taken individually and, where necessary, give any one of them temporary priority in order to satisfy the demands of the economic factors or conditions in view of which their decisions are made (Case 29/77 Roquette Frères [1977] ECR 1835, paragraph 30; Case C-311/90 Hierl v Hauptzollamt Regensburg [1992] ECR I-2061, paragraph 13; Mondiet, cited above, paragraph 51; and Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-4973, paragraph 47).
29 It is also settled case-law that when, pursuant to Article 8(4) of Regulation No 3760/92, the Council fixes TACs and distributes fishing opportunities among Member States, it has to evaluate a complex economic situation. In such circumstances, its discretion is not limited solely to the nature and scope of the measures to be taken but also, to some extent, to the finding of basic facts.  In reviewing the exercise of such a power, the Court must confine itself to examining whether there has been a manifest error or misuse of power or whether the authority in question has clearly exceeded the bounds of its discretion (Case C-4/96 NIFPO and Northern Ireland Fishermen's Federation [1998] ECR I-681, paragraphs 41 and 42).
32 Furthermore, although Article 4(1) of Regulation No 3760/92 requires Community measures laying down the conditions of access to waters and resources to be drawn up in the light of available biological, socio-economic and technical analyses, the absence of such analyses or the fact that they are inconclusive cannot prevent the Council from adopting such measures as it deems necessary for achieving the objectives of the common fisheries policy (see, as regards Article 2(1) of Regulation No 170/83, the substance of which is restated in Article 4(1) of Regulation No 3760/92, the judgment in Mondiet, cited above, paragraph 31).  In those circumstances, contrary to the Spanish Government's claim, not only is the Council justified in imposing stricter conservation measures but it may also, provided that it exercises appropriate caution, allow increased access to fishing resources.
Kingdom of the Netherlands v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1999-10-05
26 To begin with, the Court has consistently held that only a measure whose legal effects are binding on the applicant and are capable of affecting his interests is an act or decision which may be the subject of an action for annulment under Article 173 of the Treaty (see, inter alia, the orders in Cases C-66/91 and C-66/91 R Emerald Meats v Commission [1991] ECR I-1143, paragraph 26, and in Case C-50/90 Sunzest v Commission [1991] ECR I-2917, paragraph 12).
27 The Court has also held that a written expression of opinion cannot constitute a decision of such a nature as to form the basis of an action for annulment since it is neither capable of producing nor intended to produce any legal effects (see, inter alia, Case 133/79 Sucrimex v Commission [1980] ECR 1299 and the order in Case 151/88 Italy v Commission [1989] ECR 1255, paragraph 22).
Kingdom of the Netherlands v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1999-10-05
22 To that end, in Article 12 of Regulation No 4254/88 the Community legislature set 31 March 1995 as the deadline for requesting final payment from the Commission of the sums committed. Moreover, it made non-observance of that deadline subject to a penalty, namely the automatic release of portions of the sums committed.
23 It must be stated that, in so doing, it left the Commission with no discretion as to the imposition of that penalty since release of the sums is the automatic and inescapable consequence of failure to observe the 31 March 1995 deadline.
26 The Court has consistently held that the principle of legal certainty requires that a provision laying down a preclusive period, particularly one which may have the effect of depriving a Member State of the payment of financial aid its application for which has been approved and on the basis of which it has already incurred considerable expenditure, should be clearly and precisely drafted so that the Member States may be made fully aware of the importance of their complying with the time-limit (Case 44/81 Germany v Commission [1982] ECR 1855, paragraph 16).
47 Accordingly, by not taking into consideration, in regard to the conclusion of ERDF projects nos 80.07.03.002 (Veendam-Musselkanaal) and 84.07.03.004 (Weg Veendam), the requests for final payment communicated to it on 1 June 1995 by the Netherlands authorities, the Commission was merely applying Article 12 of Regulation No 4254/88. As such, therefore, the action taken by it cannot have infringed either the principle of Community solidarity and its corollary, the principle of regional partnership, or the principle of proportionality.
57 In that connection, it should be noted that Article 12 of Regulation No 4254/88 in conjunction with Article 15 of Regulation No 2052/88 makes it clear that requests for final payment submitted by the Member States must at least contain the information which the Commission needs in order to proceed with the final conclusion of those projects and payment of the sums claimed.
Kingdom of Spain v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1999-10-05
37 Article 8(1) of the same regulation requires the Member States to take, in accordance with national provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action, the measures necessary to satisfy themselves that transactions financed by the EAGGF are actually carried out and to prevent and deal with irregularities. However, whilst the national authorities remain free to choose such measures as they consider appropriate to protect Community financial interests, their choice must not in any way hinder speedy, efficient and thorough performance of the necessary checks and inquiries (see Case C-54/95 Germany v Commission [1999] ECR I-35, paragraph 96).
38 It must also be borne in mind that, whilst it is for the Commission to justify a decision as to the absence or inadequacy of supervision in the Member State concerned, when the Commission refuses to charge certain expenditure to the EAGGF on the ground that it was incurred as a result of breaches of Community rules imputable to a Member State, it is for that State to show that the conditions for obtaining the financing refused by the Commission are fulfilled (see Case 347/85 United Kingdom v Commission [1988] ECR 1749, paragraph 14, and Case C-50/94 Greece v Commission [1996] ECR I-3331, paragraph 27). That also applies where the Commission considers that the Member State has not discharged its obligation to check the various operations properly and to recover the refunds and aid improperly received by the beneficiaries.
67 In view of the division of powers between the Community and the Member States in the domain of the common agricultural policy, where there is evidence such as to give rise to serious suspicions that Community legislation has been circumvented, such matters call for inspection and investigations by the Member States (see, to that effect, Case C-209/96 Commission v United Kingdom [1998] ECR I-5655, paragraph 40).
70 That provision, which in the field of agriculture constitutes an expression of the obligations imposed on the Member States by Article 5 of the EC Treaty (now Article 10 EC), defines the principles according to which the Community and the Member States are to ensure the implementation of Community decisions on the agricultural intervention financed by the EAGGF and combat fraud and irregularities in relation to those operations (see Joined Cases 146/81, 192/81 and 193/81 BayWa and Others [1982] ECR 1503, paragraph 13). It imposes on the Member States the obligation to take the measures necessary to satisfy themselves that the transactions financed by the EAGGF are actually carried out and are executed correctly, even if the specific Community act dos not expressly provide for the adoption of particular supervisory measures (see Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission [1990] ECR I-2321, paragraphs 16 and 17).
99 It must be observed, first of all, that the right of parties to amend contracts concluded by them is based on the principle of contractual freedom and cannot, therefore, be limited in the absence of Community rules imposing specific restrictions in that regard.
French Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1999-10-05
35 According to settled case-law, the concept of aid encompasses advantages granted by public authorities which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking (see, inter alia, the judgments in Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority [1961] ECR 1, 19; Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 13; Case C-241/94 France v Commission [1996] ECR I-4551, paragraph 34 (known as `Kimberly Clark'); and Case C-256/97 DM Transport [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraph 19).
36 The Court has held, in this respect, that a partial reduction of social charges devolving upon undertakings of a particular industrial sector constitutes aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the Treaty if that measure is intended partially to exempt those undertakings from the financial charges arising from the normal application of the general social security system, without there being any justification for this exemption on the basis of the nature or general scheme of this system (judgment in Case 173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] ECR 709, paragraph 15; to the same effect, judgment in Case C-301/87 France v Commission [1990] ECR I-307, paragraph 41).
37 The Court has also held that the social character of State assistance is not sufficient to exclude it outright from being categorised as aid for the purposes of Article 92 of the Treaty (see, inter alia, Italy v Commission, cited above, paragraph 13; Kimberly Clark, paragraph 21; and Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraph 25).
Azienda Agricola "Le Canne" Srl v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1999-10-05
25 Finally, it must be observed that Article 44(1) of Regulation No 4028/86 confers on the Commission the power `to suspend, reduce or discontinue aid', in the event of one of the four conditions laid down in that article being met, in particular `if the project is not carried out as specified'. In conferring such a power on the Commission the regulation clearly aims to cover all decisions by the Commission which reduce, entirely or in part, the amount of the aid initially granted when one of the above conditions is met. Whilst the Commission is not bound to exercise that power, Article 44(1) explicitly requires that, should it do so, it must do so in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 47 of the regulation. It is equally clear from Article 7 of Regulation No 1116/88 that the procedures it mentions must also be followed before aid under Article 44 can be suspended, reduced or discontinued.
27 It must be observed that, once an initial application is approved, a decision to reduce the amount of aid initially granted might have serious consequences for the applicant. Such consequences highlight the importance of applying a procedure such as that laid down in Articles 44 and 47 of Regulation No 4028/86 and Article 7 of Regulation No 1116/88.