Erzeugerorganisation Tiefkühlgemüse eGen v Agrarmarkt Austria.
Date: 2017-12-20
48


The need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (judgment of 21 December 2011, Ziolkowski and Szeja, C‑424/10 and C‑425/10, EU:C:2011:866, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
50


It is the Court’s settled case-law that the meaning and scope of terms, for which EU law gives no definition, must be determined by considering their usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they are part (judgments of 10 March 2005, EasyCar, C‑336/03, EU:C:2005:150, paragraph 21, and of 3 September 2014, Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds, C‑201/13, EU:C:2014:2132, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited) and it being precluded that, where there are doubts, the text of a provision be considered in isolation in one of its language versions (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 July 2009, Horvath, C‑428/07, EU:C:2009:458, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited, and of 11 June 2015, Pfeifer & Langen, C‑51/14, EU:C:2015:380, paragraph 34).
68


In that regard, it should be recalled that the exercise by a Member State of any discretion to decide whether or not it would be expedient to demand repayment of EU funds unduly or irregularly granted would be inconsistent with the duty under the common agricultural policy for national administrations to recover such funds (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgment of 21 September 1983, Deutsche Milchkontor and Others, 205/82 to 215/82, EU:C:1983:233, paragraph 22).
69


Following settled case-law of the Court, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations cannot be relied upon against an unambiguous provision of EU law; nor can the conduct of a national authority responsible for applying EU law, which acts in breach of that law, give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of a trader of beneficial treatment contrary to EU law (judgments of 1 April 1993, Lageder and Others, C‑31/91 to C‑44/91, EU:C:1993:132, paragraph 35, and of 20 June 2013, Agroferm, C‑568/11, EU:C:2013:407, paragraph 52).
71


Moreover, when approving the operational programme concerned, it was already well established that, in the context of financing the common agricultural policy, a strict interpretation of the conditions for the European Union taking over costs was necessary, since the management of the common agricultural policy, on the basis of equality between traders in the Member States, requires that the national authorities of a Member State, by means of a wide interpretation of a specific provision, should not favour traders of that Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 1985, Italy v Commission, 55/83, EU:C:1985:84, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited, and of 6 November 2014, Netherlands v Commission, C‑610/13 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2349, paragraph 41).
80


Following settled case-law of the Court, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgments of 16 December 2008, Cartesio, C‑210/06, EU:C:2008:723, paragraph 67, and of 29 January 2013, Radu, C‑396/11, EU:C:2013:39, paragraph 22). The same is true where the questions raised concern the validity of a provision of EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 December 2002, British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, C‑491/01, EU:C:2002:741, paragraphs 34 and 35 and the case-law cited).
82


To answer Question 2(a) to (c) in such a circumstance would therefore clearly be to provide an advisory opinion on a hypothetical question, in infringement of the tasks assigned to the Court in the context of judicial cooperation established by Article 267 TFEU (judgment of 24 October 2013, Stoilov i Ko, C‑180/12, EU:C:2013:693, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited, and, to that effect, judgment of 7 November 2013, Romeo, C‑313/12, EU:C:2013:718, paragraphs 39 and 40.
88


It is settled case-law that the interpretation which, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 267 TFEU, the Court gives to a provision of EU law clarifies and defines the meaning and scope of that provision as it must be or ought to have been understood and applied from the time of its entry into force. It follows that the provision as thus interpreted may, and must, be applied by the courts even to legal relationships which arose and were established before the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation, provided that in other respects the conditions for bringing a dispute relating to the application of that rule before the courts having jurisdiction are satisfied (judgments of 15 March 2005, Bidar, C‑209/03, EU:C:2005:169, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited, and of 22 September 2016, Microsoft Mobile Sales International and Others, C‑110/15, EU:C:2016:717, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
89


It is only quite exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the EU legal order, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling into question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely, that those concerned must have acted in good faith and there must be a risk of serious difficulties (judgments of 15 March 2005, Bidar, C‑209/03, EU:C:2005:169, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited, and of 22 September 2016, Microsoft Mobile Sales International and Others, C‑110/15, EU:C:2016:717, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).
90


More specifically, the Court has taken that step only in quite specific circumstances, notably where there was a risk of serious economic repercussions owing in particular to the large number of legal relationships entered into in good faith on the basis of rules considered to be validly in force and where it appeared that individuals and national authorities had been led to adopt practices which did not comply with EU law by reason of objective, significant uncertainty regarding the implications of EU provisions, to which the conduct of other Member States or the European Commission may even have contributed (judgments of 15 March 2005, Bidar, C‑209/03, EU:C:2005:169, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited, and of 22 September 2016, Microsoft Mobile Sales International and Others, C‑110/15, EU:C:2016:717, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).
91


In addition, it is for the Member State seeking to limit the temporal effects of a judgment on a preliminary ruling to produce, before the Court, figures showing the risk of serious economic repercussions (judgment of 7 July 2011, Nisipeanu, C‑263/10, not published, EU:C:2011:466, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited, and, by analogy, judgment of 9 April 2014, T-Mobile Austria, C‑616/11, EU:C:2014:242, paragraph 53).
94


As regards the question whether, in circumstances such as those at issue in the case in the main proceedings, the principle of legal certainty may nevertheless be relied on by ETG before the referring court, it should be recalled that it is for the Member States, by virtue of Article 4(3) TEU, to ensure that EU regulations, particularly those concerning the common agricultural policy, are implemented within their territory (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 July 1998, Oelmühle and Schmidt Söhne, C‑298/96, EU:C:1998:372, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
95


Similarly, it follows from Article 9(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 of 21 June 2005 on the financing of the common agricultural policy (OJ 2005 L 209, p. 1), referred to by AMA in the contested decision in the case in the main proceedings and the substance of which has been incorporated in Article 58(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 549, and corrigendum OJ 2016 L 130, p. 13) that Member States are to, within the framework of the common agricultural policy, take all measures necessary to recover sums lost as a result of irregularities or negligence. The exercise of any discretion to decide whether or not it would be expedient to demand repayment of EU funds unduly or irregularly granted would be inconsistent with that duty (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 July 1998, Oelmühle and Schmidt Söhne, C‑298/96, EU:C:1998:372, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited), as has already been noted in paragraph 68 of the present judgment.
96


Nevertheless, as the Commission has stated, in the absence of provisions of EU law, disputes concerning the recovery of amounts wrongly paid under EU law must be decided by national courts in application of their own domestic law, subject to the limits imposed by EU law, on the basis that the rules and procedures laid down by domestic law must not have the effect of making it practically impossible or excessively difficult to recover aid not due and that the national legislation must be applied in a manner which is not discriminatory as compared to procedures for deciding similar national disputes (judgments of 16 July 1998, Oelmühle and Schmidt Söhne, C‑298/96, EU:C:1998:372, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited, and of 15 January 2009, Bayerische Hypotheken- und Vereinsbank, C‑281/07, EU:C:2009:6, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
97


Accordingly, it cannot be regarded as contrary to EU law for national law, as far as the recovery of sums wrongly paid by public authorities are concerned, to take into account, in addition to the principle of legality, the principle of legal certainty, since the latter principle forms part of the legal order of the European Union (judgments of 19 September 2002, Huber, C‑336/00, EU:C:2002:509, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited, and of 21 June 2007, ROM-projecten, C‑158/06, EU:C:2007:370, paragraph 24).
98


In particular, the principle of legal certainly requires that EU rules enable those concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations which are imposed on them. Individuals must be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and take steps accordingly (judgment of 21 June 2007, ROM-projecten, C‑158/06, EU:C:2007:370, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
100


That being so, the EU’s interest in recovering aid which has been received in infringement of the conditions for granting it must be fully taken into account when assessing the interests in question, including — notwithstanding what has been pointed out in paragraph 99 of the present judgment — whether the principle of legal certainty precludes the recipient of the aid from being required to repay it (judgments of 19 September 2002, Huber, C‑336/00, EU:C:2002:509, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited, and of 21 June 2007, ROM-projecten, C‑158/06, EU:C:2007:370, paragraph 32).
101


Moreover, it is settled case-law that the beneficiary of aid may challenge a demand for recovery only if he acted in good faith when applying for it (judgment of 19 September 2002, Huber, C‑336/00, EU:C:2002:509, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).