Criminal proceedings against Alfonso Verlezza and Others.
Date: 2019-03-28
27


In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU is an instrument for cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts. It follows that it is for the national courts alone which are seised of the case and which are responsible for the judgment to be delivered to determine, in view of the special features of each case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to give their judgment and the relevance of the questions which they put to the Court (see, inter alia, judgments of 17 July 1997, Leur-Bloem, C‑28/95, EU:C:1997:369 paragraph 24, and of 7 July 2011, Agafiței and Others, C‑310/10, EU:C:2011:467, paragraph 25).
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Consequently, where questions submitted by national courts concern the interpretation of a provision of EU law, the Court is, in principle, obliged to give a ruling (see, inter alia, judgments of 17 July 1997, Leur-Bloem, C‑28/95, EU:C:1997:369 paragraph 25, and of 7 July 2011, Agafiței and Others, C‑310/10, EU:C:2011:467, paragraph 26).
29


Nevertheless, the Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to enable it to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, judgments of 11 July 2006, Chacón Navas, C‑13/05, EU:C:2006:456, paragraph 33; of 7 July 2011, Agafiței and Others, C‑310/10, EU:C:2011:467, paragraph 27, and of 2 March 2017, Pérez Retamero, C‑97/16, EU:C:2017:158, paragraph 22).
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It must be recalled, first, that, as regards the obligations under Article 4 of Directive 2008/98, it is clear from paragraph 2 of that article that, when applying the waste hierarchy provided for in that directive, Member States must take appropriate measures to encourage the options that deliver the best overall environmental outcome (judgment of 15 October 2014, Commission v Italy, C‑323/13, not published, EU:C:2014:2290, paragraph 36). In doing so, that article provides that Member States must take into consideration technical feasibility and economic viability, such that the provisions of that directive may not be interpreted to the effect that they impose on a waste holder unreasonable obligations, both from a technical and from an economic point of view, in respect of waste management. Secondly, in accordance with point 2, first indent, of the section entitled ‘Assessment and classification’ of the Annex to Decision 2000/532, the classification of waste which may come under mirror codes as ‘hazardous waste’ is appropriate only if that waste contains hazardous substances which confer on it one or more of the hazardous properties listed in Annex III to Directive 2008/98. It follows that the waste holder, whilst not being obliged to establish that there are no hazardous substances in the waste at issue, is nevertheless required to look for hazardous substances which may reasonably be found in that waste, and thus, in that respect, it has no discretion.
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Moreover, that interpretation is also compatible with the precautionary principle, which is one of the foundations of the EU’s policy of protection in environmental matters, since it follows from the case-law of the Court that a protection measure such as the classification of waste as hazardous is required only where, following an assessment of the risks, which is as complete as possible having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, there is objective evidence which demonstrates that such a classification is required (see, by analogy, judgments of 7 September 2004, Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging, C‑127/02, EU:C:2004:482, paragraph 44, and of 13 September 2017, Fidenato and Others, C‑111/16, EU:C:2017:676, paragraph 51).
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Next, it should be pointed out that it is clear from the case-law of the Court that a correct application of the precautionary principle presupposes, first, identification of the potentially negative consequences for the environment of the waste concerned, and, second, a comprehensive assessment of the risk to the environment based on the most reliable scientific data available and the most recent results of international research (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 September 2003, Monsanto Agricoltura Italia and Others, C‑236/01, EU:C:2003:431, paragraph 113; of 28 January 2010, Commission v France, C‑333/08, EU:C:2010:44, paragraph 92, and of 19 January 2017, Queisser Pharma, C‑282/15, EU:C:2017:26, paragraph 56).
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The Court thus inferred that, where it proves to be impossible to determine with certainty the existence or extent of the alleged risk because of the insufficiency, inconclusiveness or imprecision of the results of studies conducted, but the likelihood of real harm to the environment persists should the risk materialise, the precautionary principle justifies the adoption of restrictive measures, provided they are non-discriminatory and objective (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 January 2017, Queisser Pharma, C‑282/15, EU:C:2017:26, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
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It follows that a protection measure such as the classification of waste which may be classified under mirror codes as hazardous waste is required where, following an assessment of the risks which is as complete as possible having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, it is impossible, in practical terms, for that waste holder to determine the presence of hazardous substances or to assess the hazardous property of that waste (see, by analogy, judgments of 7 September 2004, Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging, C‑127/02, EU:C:2004:482, paragraph 44, and of 13 September 2017, Fidenato and Others, C‑111/16, EU:C:2017:676, paragraph 51).