larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Manfred Otten v Landwirtschaftskammer Niedersachsen.
Date: 2007-06-07
26. At the outset it should be pointed out that it is apparent from the general scheme of the Community rules concerning the additional levy on milk that, in principle, a reference quantity can be allocated to a farmer only if he has the status of a producer (see, to that effect, Case C-275/05 Kibler [2006] ECR I-10569, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
27. Thus, in accordance with Article 7(2) of Regulation No 3950/92, on expiry of a rural lease of a milk production holding, the reference quantity attached thereto in principle reverts, in whole or part, to the lessor only where he has the status of a producer within the meaning of Article 9(c) of that regulation ( Thomsen , paragraph 41).
29. That interpretation can be transposed to the dispute in the main proceedings. Firstly, it is apparent from recital 6 in the preamble to Regulation No 1256/1999 that Member States have the right to organise the transfer of reference quantities other than by means of individual transactions between producers. Secondly, it follows from paragraph 43 of the Thomsen judgment that a provisional allocation of reference quantities for a long period to lessors who do not intend to produce milk is contrary, first, to the general scheme of the Community rules concerning the additional levy on milk and, second, to the principle that a reference quantity cannot be allocated to a farmer who does not have the status of a milk producer.
32. It is worth recalling in that regard that Article 8(b) and (e) of Regulation No 3950/92 enable the Member States to adopt singly or in combination any or all of the measures listed, but do not authorise them to provide for new types of actions in that field (Case C-173/02 Spain v Commission [2004] ECR I-9735, paragraph 26).
36. The above interpretation is not called into question by paragraphs 42 and 43 of the Thomsen judgment, concerning a transfer of reference quantities with account being taken of the areas of land used for dairy production, since it does not follow from that judgment that the lessor could not have transferred the reference quantity to another producer, without the holding to which it was attached, through a State sales office, as soon as possible after the expiry of the lease.
39. That interpretation is, moreover, compatible with the principal objective of Article 7(2) of Regulation No 3950/92, pursuant to which reference quantities cannot be allocated to persons wishing to obtain a purely financial advantage therefrom (see, to that effect, Thomsen , paragraph 45).
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2007-06-14
41. That provision makes the employer subject to the duty to ensure that workers have a safe working environment, the meaning of which is specified in Articles 6 to 12 of Directive 89/391 and by various individual directives which lay down the preventive measures to be adopted in certain specific industrial sectors.
56. Against that background, it must be pointed out that, in an action brought on the basis of Article 226 EC, it is for the Commission to prove the existence of the alleged infringement and to provide the Court with the information necessary for it to determine whether the infringement is made out, and the Commission may not rely on any presumption for that purpose (see Case C-287/03 Commission v Belgium  [2005] ECR I‑3761, paragraph 27, and the case-law cited, and Case C-428/04 Commission  v Austria  [2006] ECR I-3325, paragraph 98).
Euro Tex Textilverwertung GmbH v Hauptzollamt Duisburg.
Date: 2007-06-14
27. In any event, it must be recalled that it is settled case-law that the different language versions of a Community text must be given a uniform interpretation and hence, in the case of divergence between the language versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part (see Case C‑236/97 Codan  [1998] ECR I‑8679, paragraph 28; Case C‑420/98 W.N . [2000] ECR I‑2847, paragraph 21; and judgment of 16 March 2006 in Case C‑332/04 Commission  v Spain  of 16 March 2006, not published in the ECR, paragraph 52).
Telefónica O2 Czech Republic a.s. v Czech On Line a.s.
Date: 2007-06-14
14. In that regard, it should be recalled that the Court may of its own motion, on a proposal from the Advocate General or at the request of the parties, order that the oral procedure be reopened, in accordance with Article 61 of the Rules of Procedure, if it considers that it lacks sufficient information, or that the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties (Case C‑299/99 Philips  [2002] ECR I‑5475, paragraph 20).
21. Without there being any need to examine the consequences of annulmen t of a decision under Czech law, it must be observed, first, that the contested decision in the main proceedings was adopted after the Czech Republic acceded to the Union, that it is prospective in its regulatory effect and not retrospective, and secondly, that the national court asks the Court for an interpretation of the Community legislation applicable to the main proceedings.
22. Provided that the questions referred for preliminary ruling concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court gives its ruling without, generally, having to look into the circumstances in which national courts were prompted to submit the questions and envisage applying the provision of Community law which they have asked the Court to interpret (Case C‑85/95 Reisdorf  [1996] ECR I‑6257, paragraph 15).
23. The matter would be different only if the provision of Community law which was submitted for interpretation by the Court was not applicable to the facts of the main proceedings, which had occurred before the accession of a new Member State to the Union (see, to this effect, Case C‑302/04 Ynos  [2006] ECR I‑371, paragraphs 35 and 36) or if such provision was manifestly incapable of applying (see Reisdorf , paragraph 16).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2007-06-21
28. Any pecuniary charge, whatever its designation and mode of application, which is imposed unilaterally on goods by reason of the fact that they cross a border, and which is not a customs duty in the strict sense, constitutes a charge having equivalent effect within the meaning of Articles 23 EC and 25 EC, even though such pecuniary charge is not levied for the benefit of the State (see, to that effect, Case C‑293/02 Jersey Produce Marketing Organisation  [2005] ECR I‑9543, paragraph 55, and Case C‑517/04 Koornstra  [2006] ECR I‑5015, paragraph 15).
29. The Common Customs Tariff is intended to achieve an equalisation of customs charges levied at the borders of the Community on products imported from non-member countries, in order to avoid any distortion of free internal circulation or of competitive conditions ( Indiamex and De Belder , paragraph 9, and Case C-126/94 Cadi Surgelés and Others  [1996] ECR I‑5647, paragraph 14).
30. Both the unicity of the Community customs territory and the uniformity of the common commercial policy would be seriously undermined if the Member States were authorised unilaterally to impose charges having equivalent effect to customs duties on imports from non-member countries (see, to that effect, Aprile , paragraph 34).
31. Moreover, the customs union necessarily implies that the free movement of goods between Member States should be ensured. That freedom could not itself be complete if it were possible for the Member States to impede or interfere in any way with the movement of goods in transit. It is therefore necessary, as a consequence of the customs union and in the mutual interest of the Member States, to acknowledge the existence of a general principle of freedom of transit of goods within the Community ( SIOT , paragraph 16).
32. The Member States would contravene the principle of freedom of transit within the Community if they were to apply to goods in transit through their territory, including those imported directly from non-member countries, transit duties or other charges imposed in respect of transit (see, to that effect, SIOT , paragraphs 18 and 19).
33. There is, moreover, no reason to interpret the prohibition of charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties differently depending on whether the trade concerned is conducted within the Community or with non-member countries under agreements such as the Cooperation Agreement (see Aprile , paragraph 39).
42. Lastly, regarding the Italian Government’s argument to the effect that the Commission’s action is unfounded because the disputed tax was introduced with the sole aim of protecting the environment, in the light of, inter alia, the requirements of the precautionary principle, the Court notes that charges having equivalent effect to customs duties are prohibited irrespective of the purpose for which they were introduced and the destination of the revenue from them (see Case C‑72/03 Carbonati Apuani  [2004] ECR I‑8027, paragraph 31).
Firma Laub GmbH & Co. Vieh & Fleisch Import-Export v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas.
Date: 2007-06-21
16. At the outset, it is appropriate to point out that, in general, non-compliance with procedural rules set out in Regulation No 3665/87 can lead to the reduction, even the loss, of the rights to an export refund. This is the case, in particular, when an exporter does not produce the necessary evidence to obtain the export refund until after the expiry of the time-limits referred to in Articles 47(2) and 48(2) of that regulation.
18. Although the Court decided, at paragraph 26 of Käserei Champignon Hofmeister , that Article 47 of Regulation No 3665/87 is one of the procedural rules that an exporter must observe to obtain a refund payment, the fact remains that the contravention of these rules can lead to a reduction in, or the loss of, the amount of the refund due to the exporter.
23. Moreover, the Court has already held, in the context of a refund paid to an exporter, that the release of a security does not discharge the exporter from obligations imposed on it under Community legislation (C-155/89 Philipp Brothers [1990] ECR I-3265, paragraphs 13 to 16). This principle also applies to the final payment of an export refund to an exporter who has not produced sufficient evidence that the conditions for the right to the refund have been fulfilled.
27. As the time-limits referred to in Articles 47(2) and 48(2)(a) of Regulation No 3665/87 are not applicable to the recovery procedure and as there are no specific Community law rules prescribing the time-limits for the presentation of supplementary evidence in the context of a recovery procedure, it is a matter for the competent national authorities, in accordance with national law, and subject to the limits imposed by Community law, to grant a supplementary period on the basis of the specific circumstances of each case (see, to that effect, Case C-467/01 Eribrand [2003] ECR I-6471, paragraph 49). The period allowed must be reasonable in order to allow the exporter to obtain and produce the required documentation and must take account of, in particular, any effect of the actions of the competent authority on the exporter.
T-Mobile Austria GmbH and Others v Republik Österreich.
Date: 2007-06-26
33. Under Article 4(1) of the Sixth Directive, ‘taxable person’ means any person who independently carries out in any place any economic activity specified in paragraph 2 thereof, whatever the purpose or results of that activity. ‘Economic activity’ is defined in Article 4(2) as including all activities of producers, traders and persons supplying services, inter alia the exploitation of tangible or intangible property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis.
34. In that regard, it must be pointed out that, although Article 4 of the Sixth Directive gives a very wide scope to VAT, only activities of an economic nature are covered by that provision (see, to that effect, Case C-306/94 Régie dauphinoise  [1996] ECR I-3695, paragraph 15; Case C‑77/01 EDM  [2004] ECR I-4295, paragraph 47; and Case C-465/03 Kretztechnik  [2005] ECR I-4357, paragraph 18).
35. It is also apparent from settled case-law that an analysis of the definitions of ‘taxable person’ and ‘economic activities’ shows that the scope of the term ‘economic activities’ is very wide, and that the term is objective in character, in the sense that the activity is considered per se and without regard to its purpose or results (see, inter alia, Case C-223/03 University of Huddersfield  [2006] ECR I-1751, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
38. At the outset, it is important to point out that, in accordance with the requirements of the principle of neutrality of the common system of value added tax, the term ‘exploitation’ refers to all transactions, whatever may be their legal form, by which it is sought to obtain income from the goods in question on a continuing basis (see, to that effect, Case C-186/89 Van Tiem  [1990] ECR I-4363, paragraph 18; EDM , paragraph 48; and Case C-8/03 BBL  [2004] ECR I-10157, paragraph 36).
43. In those circumstances, an activity such as that at issue in the main proceedings cannot, by its very nature, be carried out by economic operators. In that regard, it should be pointed out that it is irrelevant that those operators thereafter have the right to transfer their rights to use radio frequencies. Such a transfer, apart from remaining subject to the control of the national regulatory authority responsible for spectrum assignment, in accordance with Article 9(4) of Directive 2002/21, cannot be compared to the issuing of an authorisation by the State.
45. Furthermore, the fact that the grant of rights such as the frequency use rights at issue in the main proceedings gives rise to a payment cannot affect the legal status of that activity (see, to that effect, Case C-343/95 Diego Calì & Figli  [1997] ECR I-1547, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
48. Even if such a regulatory activity could be classified as an economic activity, the fact still remains that the application of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive implies a prior finding that the activity considered is of an economic nature. It is apparent from the answer given in paragraph 46 of this judgment that that is not the case.
Hutchison 3G UK Ltd and Others v Commissioners of Customs and Excise.
Date: 2007-06-26
27. Under Article 4(1) of the Sixth Directive, ‘taxable person’ means any person who independently carries out in any place any economic activity specified in paragraph 2 thereof, whatever the purpose or results of that activity. ‘Economic activity’ is defined in Article 4(2) as including all activities of producers, traders and persons supplying services, inter alia the exploitation of tangible or intangible property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis.
28. In that regard, it must be pointed out that, although Article 4 of the Sixth Directive gives a very wide scope to VAT, only activities of an economic nature are covered by that provision (see, to that effect, Case C-306/94 Régie dauphinoise  [1996] ECR I-3695, paragraph 15; Case C‑77/01 EDM  [2004] ECR I-4295, paragraph 47; and Case C-465/03 Kretztechnik  [2005] ECR I-4357, paragraph 18).
29. It is also apparent from settled case-law that an analysis of the definitions of ‘taxable person’ and ‘economic activities’ shows that the scope of the term ‘economic activities’ is very wide, and that the term is objective in character, in the sense that the activity is considered per se and without regard to its purpose or results (see, inter alia, Case C-223/03 University of Huddersfield  [2006] ECR I-1751, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
32. At the outset, it is important to point out that, in accordance with the requirements of the principle of neutrality of the common system of value added tax, the term ‘exploitation’ refers to all transactions, whatever may be their legal form, by which it is sought to obtain income from the goods in question on a continuing basis (see, to that effect, Case C-186/89 Van Tiem  [1990] ECR I-4363, paragraph 18; EDM , paragraph 48; and Case C-8/03 BBL  [2004] ECR I-10157, paragraph 36).
39. Furthermore, the fact that the issuing of licences such as those at issue in the main proceedings gives rise to a payment cannot affect the legal status of that activity (see, to that effect, Case C‑343/95 Diego Calì & Figli  [1997] ECR I-1547, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
42. Even if such a regulatory activity could be classified as an economic activity, the fact still remains that the application of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive implies a prior finding that the activity considered is of an economic nature. It is apparent from the answer given in paragraph 40 of this judgment that that is not the case.
Internationaler Hilfsfonds eV v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2007-06-28
17. The Court may, of its own motion, on a proposal from the Advocate General or at the request of the parties, order the reopening of the oral procedure under Article 61 of its Rules of Procedure, if it considers that it lacks sufficient information or that the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties (see the order of 4 February 2000 in Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar  [2000] ECR I‑665, paragraph 18, and Case C-210/03 Swedish Match  [2004] ECR I‑11893, paragraph 25).
22. It is true, as IH rightly submitted, that the fact that costs relating to proceedings before the Ombudsman are not recoverable under Article 91(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance is in principle irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether such costs may give rise to a claim for compensation under the second paragraph of Article 288 EC. As the Court of First Instance itself held in the contested order, that article is applicable only to costs incurred in proceedings before the Court of First Instance, to the exclusion of any prior stage. The right to recover the costs of proceedings and the right to damages are, in principle, subject to different rules and are independent of each other.
23. With regard to the causal link required, it is, moreover, not disputed that both the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and those of the Court of First Instance provide that the costs of proceedings incurred by the parties are recoverable only if they were necessary for the purposes of the proceedings. On the other hand, the causal link required under the second paragraph of Article 288 EC is established where the damage is the direct consequence of the wrongful act in question (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 64/76, 113/76, 167/78, 239/78, 27/79, 28/79 and 45/79 Dumortier Frères and Others v Council [1979] ECR 3091, paragraph 21, and Joined Cases C-363/88 and C-364/88 Finsider and Others  v Commission  [1992] ECR I-359, paragraph 25).
24. With regard a claim for compensation for material damage which an applicant alleges to have suffered on account of the costs incurred in seeking legal advice at the pre-litigation stage of the procedure governed by Article 90 of the Staff Regulations, the Court of Justice held that, since in particular the contents of administrative complaints lodged under that provision must be interpreted and understood by the administration with all the care that a large and well-equipped institution owes to those having dealings with it, including members of its staff, although it is not possible to prohibit those concerned from seeking legal advice even at that stage, it is their own decision and the institution concerned cannot be held liable for the consequences. Thus, there is no causal link between the damage alleged, namely the lawyers’ fees, and the act of the institution concerned (see, to that effect, Herpels v Commission , paragraphs 47 to 49).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2007-07-05
37. According to settled case-law, when exercising its powers under Article 226 EC, the Commission does not have to show that there is a specific interest in bringing an action. The Commission’s function is to ensure, of its own motion and in the general interest, that the Member States give effect to Community law and to obtain a declaration of any failure to fulfil the obligations deriving therefrom with a view to bringing it to an end (see Case C‑333/99 Commission  v France  [2001] ECR I‑1025, paragraph 23; Case C‑394/02 Commission  v Greece  [2005] ECR I‑4713, paragraphs 14 and 15 and the case-law cited; and Case C‑33/04 Commission  v Luxembourg  [2005] ECR I‑10629, paragraph 65).
38. Furthermore, it is for the Commission to determine whether it is expedient to take action against a Member State and what provisions, in its view, the Member State has infringed, and to choose the time at which it will bring an action for failure to fulfil obligations; the considerations which determine its choice of time cannot affect the admissibility of the action (see Case C‑35/96 Commission  v Italy  [1998] ECR I‑3851, paragraph 27, and Commission  v Luxembourg , paragraph 66).
39. The Court must consider whether or not there has been a failure to fulfil obligations as alleged, without its being part of its role to take a view on the Commission’s exercise of its discretion (see Case C‑474/99 Commission  v Spain  [2002] ECR I‑5293, paragraph 25, and Commission  v Luxembourg , paragraph 67).
40. In any event, even if the carrying-out of a subsequent assessment regarding the environmental impact of the third incinerator line were capable of bringing the alleged failure to fulfil obligations to an end, clearly such an assessment had not been initiated at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, the date by reference to which the situation prevailing in the Member State has to be examined with a view to determining whether it has failed to fulfil its obligations (see, inter alia, Case C‑433/03 Commission  v Germany  [2005] ECR I‑6985, paragraph 32).
Ntionik Anonymi Etaireia Emporias H/Y, Logismikou kai Paroxis Ypiresion Michanografisis and Ioannis Michail Pikoulas v Epitropi Kefalaiagoras.
Date: 2007-07-05
53. In those circumstances, it is necessary to point out that, in the absence of harmonisation of the Community legislation in the field of penalties applicable where conditions laid down by arrangements under such legislation are not observed, the Member States are empowered to choose the penalties which seem appropriate to them. They must, however, exercise that power in accordance with Community law and its general principles, and consequently with the principle of proportionality (see, to that effect, Case 68/88 Commission  v Greece  [1989] ECR 2965, paragraph 23, Case C-210/91 Commission  v Greece  [1992] ECR I‑6735, paragraph 19, and Case C-36/94 Siesse  [1995] ECR I-3573, paragraph 21).
54. In particular, the administrative or punitive measures must not go beyond what is necessary for the objectives pursued and a penalty must not be so disproportionate to the gravity of the infringement that it becomes an obstacle to the freedoms enshrined in the EC Treaty (see Case C-210/91 Commission  v Greece , paragraph 20). It is, however, for the national court to determine, in the light of the foregoing considerations, whether the penalties provided for by the applicable national legislation are proportionate.