Panellinios Sindesmos Viomikhanion Metapoiisis Kapnou v Ipourgos Ikonomias kai Ikonomikon and Ipourgos Agrotikis Anaptixis kai Trofimon.
Date: 2013-09-19
17. Regulation No 1782/2003, as set out at recital 24 thereof, sought to facilitate the transition from production aid to producer aid by the gradual reduction of direct payments and the introduction of an income support scheme decoupled from production, namely the scheme for single payments determined on the basis of previous entitlements within a reference period, in order to make farmers in the European Union more competitive.
22. In that regard, it should be noted that the Court has consistently held that Article 34(2) EC, which prohibits all discrimination under the CAP, is merely a specific expression of the general principle of equal treatment, which requires that comparable situations shoul d not be treated differently and different situations not treated alike unless such treatment is objectively justified (Case C‑33/08 Agrana Zucker [2009] ECR I‑5035, paragraph 46).
24. It is appropriate to recall, in the second place, that, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, referred to in the second paragraph of Article 5 EC, the European Union, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, is to take action only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the European Union (see, to that effect, Case C‑58/08 Vodafone and Others  [2010] ECR I‑4999, paragraph 72).
25. Next, it is settled case-law that the Member States may adopt provisions in a situation governed by European Union law where that law expressly confers on them decision-making powers (see, to that effect, Case C‑251/91 Teulie  [1992] ECR I‑5599, paragraph 13, and Case C‑356/95 Witt  [1997] ECR I‑6589, paragraph 39).
26. Lastly, it must be stated that, under the CAP, which, in accordance with Article 4(2)(d) TFEU, is a competence shared between the European Union and the Member States, the Member States have legislative powers which allow them, as is apparent from Article 2(2) TFEU, to exercise their competence to the extent that the European Union has not exercised its competence.
34. In the fifth place, it should be noted that the fact that the adoption of a measure within the framework of the common organisation of the market may affect producers in different ways because of their individual production or local conditions does not constitute discrimination prohibited by the EC Treaty if the measure is determined on the basis of objective criteria which are adapted to meet the needs of the general common organisation of the market (Case 179/84 Bozzetti [1985] ECR 2301, paragraph 34, and Case C‑34/08 Azienda Agricola Disarò Antonio and Others [2009] ECR I‑4023, paragraph 69).
35. Similarly, according to settled case-law, the prohibition on discrimination is not concerned with any disparities in treatment which may result, between the Member States, from divergences existing between the legislation of the various Member States, so long as that legislation affects equally all persons subject to it (Case C‑428/07 Horvath [2009] ECR I‑6355, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
36. While it is true that that principle was developed in the context of the interpretation of provisions of European Union law with a view to assessing the compatibility of national legislation by reference to the principle of non-discrimination, the situation cannot be any different as regards the assessment of the validity of the provision of European Union law granting the Member States a margin of discretion by virtue of which they adopt such different legislation.
37. In the sixth place, the maintenance of effective competition in the markets for agricultural products is one of the objectives of the CAP.
39. Even if the setting of retention rates at different levels by the Member States could lead to distortion of competition between producers of the same product in different Member States (a point not made in the order for reference), it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, even in regard to the competition rules of the Treaty, Article 36 EC gives precedence to the objectives of the CAP over the objectives of competition policy (Case C‑137/00 Milk Marque and National Farmers’ Union  [2003] ECR I‑7975, paragraph 81).
40. In any event, in matters concerning the CAP, the European Union legislature has a broad discretion, which corresponds to the political responsibilities given to it by Articles 34 EC and 37 EC, and the Court has, on several occasions, held that the lawfulness of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate, having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (Case C‑343/07 Bavaria and Bavaria Italia [2009] ECR I‑5491, paragraph 81).
41. Consequently, judicial review must be limited to verifying that the measure in question is not vitiated by any manifest error or misuse of powers and that the authority concerned has not manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion (Case C‑189/01 Jippes and Others  [2001] ECR I‑5689, paragraph 80; C‑304/01 Spain v Commission  [2004] ECR I‑7655, paragraph 23; and Case C‑535/03 Unitymark and North Sea Fishermen’s Organisation [2006] ECR I‑2689, paragraph 55).