larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Wolfram Bechtel and Marie-Laure Bechtel v Finanzamt Offenburg.
Date: 2017-06-22
32


According to settled case-law, any EU national who, irrespective of his place of residence and his nationality, has exercised the right to freedom of movement for workers and who has been employed in a Member State other than that of residence falls within the scope of Article 45 TFEU (judgments of 12 December 2002, de Groot, C‑385/00, EU:C:2002:750, paragraph 76; of 2 October 2003, van Lent, C‑232/01, EU:C:2003:535, paragraph 14; of 13 November 2003, Schilling and Fleck-Schilling, C‑209/01, EU:C:2003:610, paragraph 23, and of 16 February 2006, Öberg, C‑185/04, EU:C:2006:107, paragraph 11).
53


As regards whether the situations at issue are objectively comparable, it must be recalled that the comparability of a cross-border situation with an internal situation must be examined having regard to the aim pursued by the national provisions at issue (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 February 2010, X Holding, C‑337/08, EU:C:2010:89, paragraph 22; of 6 September 2012, Philips Electronics UK, C‑18/11, EU:C:2012:532, paragraph 17, and of 26 May 2016, Kohll and Kohll-Schlesser, C‑300/15, EU:C:2016:361, paragraph 46).
55


In that regard, it should be recalled that it follows from the Court’s case-law that it is a matter for the State of residence, in principle, to grant the taxpayer all the tax advantages relating to his personal and family circumstances, because that State is, without exception, best placed to assess the taxpayer’s personal ability to pay tax, since that is where his personal and financial interests are centred (see, inter alia, judgments of 14 February 1995, Schumacker, C‑279/93, EU:C:1995:31, paragraph 32; of 16 May 2000, Zurstrassen, C‑87/99, EU:C:2000:251, paragraph 21; of 28 February 2013, Beker and Beker, C‑168/11, EU:C:2013:117, paragraph 43, and of 12 December 2013, Imfeld and Garcet, C‑303/12, EU:C:2013:822, paragraph 43).
66


In accordance with settled case-law, although the Member States are free to determine the connecting factors for the allocation of fiscal jurisdiction in bilateral conventions for the avoidance of double taxation, that allocation of fiscal jurisdiction does not allow them to apply measures contrary to the freedoms of movement guaranteed by the Treaty. As far as concerns the exercise of the power of taxation so allocated by bilateral conventions to prevent double taxation, the Member States must comply with EU rules (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 December 2002, de Groot, C‑385/00, EU:C:2002:750, paragraphs 93 and 94; of 19 January 2006, Bouanich, C‑265/04, EU:C:2006:51, paragraphs 49 and 50, and of 12 December 2013, Imfeld and Garcet, C‑303/12, EU:C:2013:822, paragraphs 41 and 42).
Novartis Europharm Ltd v European Commission.
Date: 2017-06-28
86


It must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law of the Court, the duty incumbent upon the General Court under Article 36 and the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union to state reasons for its judgments does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to understand the grounds of the General Court’s judgment and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient information to exercise its powers of review on appeal (judgment of 8 March 2016, Greece v Commission, C‑431/14 P, EU:C:2016:145, paragraph 38).
‘L.Č.’ IK v Valsts ieņēmumu dienests.
Date: 2017-06-29
18


In that respect, it must be recalled that Article 146 of Directive 2006/112 concerns the exemption of exports outside the European Union from VAT. In the context of international business, such an exemption seeks to respect the principle that the relevant goods or services should be taxed at their place of destination. Every export and equivalent transaction should thus be exempt from VAT in order to ensure that the relevant transaction is taxed only in the place where the relevant products are consumed (see, as regards Article 15 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1), judgments of 18 October 2007, Navicon, C‑97/06, EU:C:2007:609, paragraph 29, and of 22 December 2010, Feltgen and Bacino Charter Company, C‑116/10, EU:C:2010:824, paragraph 16).
19


The exemption set out in Article 146(1)(e) of Directive 2006/112 supplements the exemption set out in Article 146(1)(a), and is intended, like the latter exemption, to ensure that the supply of services concerned is taxed at the place of destination of those services, that is to say the place where the exported products are consumed.
20


To that end, Article 146(1)(e) provides, inter alia, that transport services directly connected with the exportation of goods outside the European Union are exempt from VAT.
22


Furthermore, according to settled case-law of the Court, VAT exemptions are to be interpreted strictly since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, inter alia, judgments of 26 June 1990, Velker International Oil Company, C‑185/89, EU:C:1990:262, paragraph 19; 16 September 2004, Cimber Air, C‑382/02, EU:C:2004:534, paragraph 25; 14 September 2006, Elmeka, C‑181/04 to C‑183/04, EU:C:2006:563, paragraphs 15 and 20, and 19 July 2012, A, C‑33/11, EU:C:2012:482, paragraph 49).
23


Accordingly, it follows from the wording and from the objective of Article 146(1)(e) of Directive 2006/112 that that provision must be interpreted as meaning that the existence of a direct connection entails not only that, by their subject matter, the supply of services in question contributes to the actual performance of an importation or exportation transaction, but also that those services are supplied directly to, as the case may be, the exporter, the importer or the consignee of the goods referred to in that provision.
Nerea SpA v Regione Marche.
Date: 2017-07-06
33


Therefore, as the Advocate General noted essentially in point 71 of his Opinion, it is at that time that the undertaking’s eligibility to receive aid must be assessed, with regard to the conditions laid down by Regulation No 800/2008 (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 March 2013, Magdeburger Mühlenwerke, C‑129/12, EU:C:2013:200, paragraph 40).
Marcu Dumitru v Agenţia Naţională de Administrare Fiscală (ANAF) and Direcţia Generală Regională a Finanţelor Publice Bucureşti.
Date: 2017-07-06
29


The Court has jurisdiction to interpret directives only as regards their application in a new Member State with effect from the date of that State’s accession to the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 January 2006, Ynos, C‑302/04, EU:C:2006:9, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
35


In that regard, it is to be remembered that it is not for the Court to rule on the interpretation and applicability of provisions of national law or to establish the facts relevant to a decision in the main proceedings. The Court must, under the division of jurisdiction between the Courts of the European Union and the national courts, take account of the factual and legislative context, as described in the order for reference, in which the question put to it is set (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgment of 13 June 2013, Kostov, C‑62/12, EU:C:2013:391, paragraph 25).
38


In accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, fourthly and finally, the Court may reject as inadmissible a request made by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 March 2017, Pérez Retamero, C‑97/16, EU:C:2017:158, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
42


Article 199 of Directive 2006/112 constitutes an exception to the principle set out in Article 193 of that directive according to which VAT is payable by any taxable person carrying out a taxable supply of goods or services. That Article 199 allows Member States to introduce a reverse charge mechanism, in the situations referred to in paragraphs 1(a) to (g) of that article, whereby the person liable for the payment of VAT is the taxable person who is the recipient of the transaction subject to VAT (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 June 2013, Promociones y Construcciones BJ 200, C‑125/12, EU:C:2013:392, paragraph 23).
London Borough of Ealing v Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs.
Date: 2017-07-13
28


In that regard, it must be recalled that Article 132(1)(m) of Directive 2006/112, which provides that Member States may exempt certain supplies of services closely linked to sport or physical education made by non-profit making organisations, extends, without distinction, to all non-profit making organisations (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 February 2016, Commission v Netherlands, C‑22/15, not published, EU:C:2016:118, paragraph 43).
Verein zur Wahrung von Einsatz und Nutzung von Chromtrioxid und anderen Chrom-VI-verbindungen in der Oberflächentechnik eV (VECCO) and Others v European Commission.
Date: 2017-07-13
27


In that regard, Article 1(1) of the REACH Regulation states that the purpose of the regulation is to ensure a high level of protection of human health and the environment, including the promotion of alternative methods for assessment of hazards of substances, as well as the free circulation of substances on the internal market while enhancing competitiveness and innovation. To that end, that regulation introduces an integrated system for monitoring chemical substances, including registration, evaluation and authorisation, together with possible restrictions on their use (see, inter alia, judgment of 15 March 2017, Polynt v ECHA, C‑323/15 P, EU:C:2017:207, paragraph 20).
28


As made clear, inter alia, in recitals 69 and 70 of the REACH Regulation, that regulation makes substances ‘of very high concern’ subject to careful attention. Those substances are thus subject to the authorisation scheme laid down in Title VII of that regulation. Article 55 of that regulation states that the objective of the authorisation scheme is ‘to ensure the good functioning of the internal market while assuring that the risks from substances of very high concern are properly controlled and that these substances are progressively replaced by suitable alternative substances or technologies where these are economically and technically viable’ (see, inter alia, judgment of 15 March 2017, Polynt v ECHA, C‑323/15 P, EU:C:2017:207, paragraph 21).
29


The first stage under that authorisation scheme is the procedure for identifying substances of very high concern on the basis of the criteria set out in Article 57 of the REACH Regulation. The second stage is the inclusion of those substances on the list of substances subject to authorisation set out in Annex XIV to that regulation, and the third and final stage concerns the procedure that leads, if appropriate, to the authorisation of a substance of very high concern (see, inter alia, judgment of 15 March 2017, Polynt v ECHA, C‑323/15 P, EU:C:2017:207, paragraph 22).
34


In accordance with settled case-law, the meaning and scope of the term ‘specific legislation’, for which the REACH Regulation provides no definition, must be determined by considering its usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which it occurs and the purposes of the rules of which it is part (see, by analogy, judgment of 24 June 2015, Hotel Sava Rogaška, C‑207/14, EU:C:2015:414, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
Radosław Szoja v Sociálna poisťovňa and WEBUNG, s.r.o.
Date: 2017-07-13
31


In that connection, it should be recalled that, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU, providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it and, to that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (judgment of 18 May 2017, Lahorgue, C‑99/16, EU:C:2017:391, paragraph 21).
34


As is clear from recitals 1 and 45 of the Basic Regulation, that regulation aims to coordinate the national social security systems of the Member States in order to guarantee that the right to free movement of persons can be exercised effectively and, thereby, contribute towards improving their standard of living and conditions of employment within the Union.
35


Article 11(1) of the Basic Regulation lays down the principle of a single applicable law, pursuant to which the persons to whom that law applies are subject to the legislation of a single Member State. Therefore, that principle also aims to avoid the complications which may arise from the simultaneous application of several national laws and to eliminate unequal treatment which, for employed and self-employed workers moving within the Union, is the consequence of partial or total overlapping of the applicable legislation (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 March 2006, Piatkowski, C‑493/04, EU:C:2006:167, paragraph 21).
42


In that connection, it must recalled that since the conflict rules laid down by the Basic Regulation are mandatory for the Member States, a fortiori it cannot be accepted that insured persons falling within the scope of those rules can counteract their effects by being able to elect to withdraw from their application (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 October 2010, von Delft and Others, C‑345/09, EU:C:2010:610, paragraph 52).
Christian Ferenschild v JPC Motor SA.
Date: 2017-07-13
39


The wording of the first subparagraph of Article 7(1) of the directive, read in the light of recital 7 thereof, confirms the binding nature of that general minimum duration in so far as, under that provision, the parties cannot, as a rule, derogate from it by means of an agreement and Member States must ensure that it is complied with (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 June 2015, Faber, C‑497/13, EU:C:2015:357, paragraph 55).
46


Secondly, as has already been pointed out in paragraph 39 of the present judgment, it should be recalled that the two-year period of liability of the seller from the time of delivery of the goods, as mentioned in the first sentence of Article 5(1) of Directive 1999/44, is a mandatory time limit from which the parties to the contract, as a rule, cannot derogate. Therefore, as noted by the Advocate General in points 74 and 75 of his Opinion, the second subparagraph of Article 7(1) of the directive, which allows Member States to provide that, in the case of second-hand goods, the parties may stipulate a shorter time period for the liability of the seller, of not less than one year, is an exception, which must be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, judgment of 1 March 2012, González Alonso, C‑166/11, EU:C:2012:119, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
48


In the last place, it must be recalled that Member States must comply with the minimum level of protection provided for by Directive 1999/44. Thus, pursuant to Article 8(2) of the directive, read in conjunction with recital 24 thereof, while they may adopt or maintain in force more stringent provisions in the field covered by this directive in order to ensure an even higher level of consumer protection, they may not undermine the guarantees laid down by the EU legislature (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 April 2008, Quelle, C‑404/06, EU:C:2008:231, paragraph 36).
Ute Kleinsteuber v Mars GmbH.
Date: 2017-07-13
25


Clause 4.1 of the Framework Agreement lays down, in respect of employment conditions, a prohibition on treating part-term workers in a less favourable manner than comparable full-time workers solely because they work part-time, unless a different treatment is justified on objective grounds.
30


In that regard, it must be recalled that the taking into account of the actual years of service of a worker throughout his career is an objective criterion that is unrelated to any discrimination, allowing his pension entitlement to be reduced proportionately (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 October 2003, Schönheit and Becker, C‑4/02 and C‑5/02, EU:C:2003:583, paragraph 91).
61


It should be noted that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the context of the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it (judgment of 11 September 2014, B., C‑394/13, EU:C:2014:2199, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). Furthermore, the spirit of cooperation which must prevail in the preliminary ruling procedure requires the national court to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to assist in the administration of justice in the Member States and not to deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions (judgments of 12 June 2003, Schmidberger, C‑112/00, EU:C:2003:333, paragraph 32 and of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 42).
Assens Havn v Navigators Management (UK) Limited.
Date: 2017-07-13
29


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that Chapter II, Section 3, of Regulation No 44/2001 establishes an autonomous system for the conferral of jurisdiction in matters of insurance (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 May 2005, Société financière et industrielle du Peloux, C‑112/03, EU:C:2005:280, paragraph 29).
30


As in cases involving workers and consumers, actions involving insurance are characterised by an imbalance between the parties (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 May 2005, GIE Réunion européenne and Others, C‑77/04, EU:C:2005:327, paragraph 22), an imbalance which the rules laid down in Article 8 of Chapter II, Section 3, of Regulation No 44/2001 seek to correct by giving the weaker party the benefit of rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests than the general rules provide for (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 September 2009, Vorarlberger Gebietskrankenkasse, C‑347/08, EU:C:2009:561, paragraph 40).
36


In that regard, the Court has previously noted that, in matters of insurance, prorogation of jurisdiction is strictly circumscribed by the aim of protecting the economically weaker party (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 May 2005, Société financière et industrielle du Peloux, C‑112/03, EU:C:2005:280, paragraph 31).
38


Moreover, under Article 23(5) of that regulation, agreements on jurisdiction have no legal force if they are contrary to Article 13. It follows from those provisions that that regulation establishes a system in which derogations from the jurisdictional rules in matters of insurance must be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 May 2005, Société financière et industrielle du Peloux, C‑112/03, EU:C:2005:280, paragraph 31).
40


The view must therefore be taken that an agreement on jurisdiction made between an insurer and an insured party cannot be invoked against a victim of insured damage who wishes to bring an action directly against the insurer before the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred, as recalled in paragraph 31 of this judgment, or before the courts for the place where the victim is domiciled, a possibility accepted by the Court in its judgment of 13 December 2007, FBTO Schadeverzekeringen (C‑463/06, EU:C:2007:792, paragraph 31).
41


The extension to victims of the constraints of agreements on jurisdiction based on the combined provisions of Articles 13 and 14 of Regulation No 44/2001 could compromise the objective pursued by Chapter II, Section 3, thereof, namely to protect the economically and legally weaker party (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 September 2009, Vorarlberger Gebietskrankenkasse, C‑347/08, EU:C:2009:561, paragraph 40).
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG v Acacia Srl.
Date: 2017-07-13
31


In that regard, it should be noted, on the one hand, that the first sentence of Article 24 of Regulation No 44/2001 provides for a rule of jurisdiction based on the entering of an appearance by the defendant in respect of all disputes where the jurisdiction of the court seised is not derived from other provisions of that regulation. That provision applies also in cases where a court has been seised in breach of the provisions of that regulation and implies that the entering of an appearance by the defendant may be considered to be a tacit acceptance of the jurisdiction of the court seised and thus a prorogation of that court’s jurisdiction (judgments of 20 May 2010, ČPP Vienna Insurance Group, C‑111/09, EU:C:2010:290, paragraph 21, and of 27 February 2014, Cartier parfums-lunettes andAxa Corporate Solutions assurances, C‑1/13, EU:C:2014:109, paragraph 34).
32


On the other hand, the second sentence of Article 24 of that regulation sets out exceptions to the rule provided for in the first sentence of that article. That second sentence determines, in particular, that there is no tacit prorogation of jurisdiction of the court seised if the defendant contests jurisdiction, thereby expressing its intention not to accept that court’s jurisdiction (judgments of 20 May 2010,ČPP Vienna Insurance Group, C‑111/09, EU:C:2010:290, paragraph 22, and of 27 February 2014, Cartier parfums-lunettes and Axa CorporateSolutions assurances, C‑1/13, EU:C:2014:109, paragraph 35).
33


Referring to its case-law concerning Article 18 of the Brussels Convention, that provision being identical in essence to Article 24 of Regulation No 44/2001, the Court has already held that the challenge to the jurisdiction of the national court prevents prorogation where the applicant and the court seised are able to ascertain from the first defence that it is intended to contest the jurisdiction of the court. That is also the case where the first defence contains submissions on the substance of the dispute as well as submissions on the jurisdiction of the court (judgment of 27 February 2014, Cartier parfums-lunettes and Axa Corporate Solutions assurances, C‑1/13, EU:C:2014:109, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
39


In the light of that exclusion, the jurisdiction of the Community design courts laid down in Article 80(1) of Regulation No 6/2002 to hear the actions and claims referred to in Article 81 of that regulation follows from rules directly provided for by that regulation, which have the character of lex specialis in relation to the rules provided for by Regulation No 44/2001 (see, by analogy, judgments of 5 June 2014, Coty Germany, C‑360/12, EU:C:2014:1318, paragraph 27, and of 18 May 2017, Hummel Holding, C‑617/15, EU:C:2017:390, paragraph 26).