larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Criminal proceedings against Mohammad Ferooz Qurbani.
Date: 2014-07-17
20. In those circumstances, it should be noted that, in light of the fact that the Geneva Convention does not contain a clause conferring jurisdiction on the Court, the Court can interpret the provisions of that convention, in the present case Article 31 thereof, as requested only if the performance by it of such tasks is covered by Article 267 TFEU ( TNT Express Nederland , C‑533/08, EU:C:2010:243, paragraph 58).
21. It is settled case-law that the power, resulting from Article 267 TFEU, to provide interpretations by way of preliminary rulings extends only to rules which are part of EU law ( TNT Express Nederland , EU:C:2010:243, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
22. In the case of international agreements, it is settled that such agreements concluded by the European Union form an integral part of its legal order and can therefore be the subject of a request for a preliminary ruling. On the other hand, the Court does not, in principle, have jurisdiction to interpret, in preliminary ruling proceedings, international agreements concluded between Member States and non-member countries ( TNT Express Nederland , EU:C:2010:243, paragraphs 60 and 61 and the case-law cited).
23. It is only where and in so far as the European Union has assumed the powers previously exercised by the Member States in the field to which an international convention not concluded by the European Union applies and, therefore, the provisions of the convention have the effect of binding the European Union that the Court has jurisdiction to interpret such a convention ( TNT Express Nederland , EU:C:2010:243, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).
‘Baltlanta’ UAB v Lietuvos valstybė.
Date: 2014-09-03
41. Consequently, since Regulation No 1269/1999 does not define ‘irregularity’, the meaning and scope of that phrase must, as the Court has consistently held, be determined by considering its usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which it occurs and the purposes of the rules of which it is part (see judgment in Diakité , C‑285/12, EU:C:2014:39, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
56. It should, moreover, be noted that the system of subsidies developed in the EU rules is based, inter alia, on compliance by the recipient with a series of conditions of entitlement to financial assistance (see judgment in Vereniging Nationaal Overlegorgaan Sociale Werkvoorziening and Others , C‑383/06 to C‑385/06, EU:C:2008:165, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).
64. In the third place, with regard to Sections 6 and 7 of the Commission guidelines, it should be noted, first, that, even if those guidelines are not intended to produce binding effects, the national courts are bound to take them into consideration in order to decide disputes submitted to them, in particular where they cast light on the interpretation of national measures adopted in order to implement them or where they are designed to supplement binding European Union provisions (see, by analogy, the judgments in Grimaldi , C‑322/88, EU:C:1989:646, paragraph 18, and Altair Chimica , C‑207/01, EU:C:2003:451, paragraph 41).
Schiebel Aircraft GmbH v Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, Familie und Jugend.
Date: 2014-09-04
21. As it is, in respect of freedom of movement for workers and freedom of establishment, the principle of non-discrimination is given specific effect by Articles 45(2) TFEU and 49 TFEU respectively (see, to that effect, the judgments in Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others , C‑222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraph 99; Lyyski , C‑40/05, EU:C:2007:10, paragraph 34; UTECA , C‑222/07, EU:C:2009:124, paragraph 38; and Hervis Sport- és Divatkereskedelmi , EU:C:2014:47, paragraph 25).
33. In that regard, the derogation allowed under Article 346 TFEU must, in accordance with settled case-law concerning derogations from fundamental freedoms, be narrowly construed (see, to that effect, the judgments in Commission  v Finland , C‑284/05, EU:C:2009:778, paragraph 46, and Insinööritoimisto InsTiimi , C‑615/10, EU:C:2012:324, paragraph 35).
34. Moreover, even though Article 346(1)(b) TFEU refers to measures that a Member State may consider necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security, that provision cannot be construed as conferring on Member States a power to depart from the provisions of the Treaty simply in reliance on those interests (see, to that effect, the judgments in Commission  v Finland , EU:C:2009:778, paragraph 47, and Insinööritoimisto InsTiimi , EU:C:2012:324, paragraph 35). The Member State which wishes to avail itself of the derogation allowed under Article 346(1)(b) TFEU must show that such derogation is necessary in order to protect its essential security interests (see, to that effect, the judgments in Commission  v Finland , EU:C:2009:778, paragraph 49, and Insinööritoimisto InsTiimi , EU:C:2012:324, paragraph 45).
Germanwings GmbH v Ronny Henning.
Date: 2014-09-04
16. Regulation No 261/2004 does not define the actual arrival time. That being the case, the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equal treatment require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent interpretation throughout the European Union (see, to that effect, Ekro , 327/82, EU:C:1984:11, paragraph 11).
19. It must also be noted that the Court has held that when their flights are subject to long delay, that is delay equal to or in excess of three hours, passengers of such flights are entitled to compensation on the basis of Article 7 of Regulation No 261/2004, like those passengers whose original flights have been cancelled and whom an air carrier is not able to offer re-routing in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 5(1)(c)(iii) of that regulation, given that they also suffer an irreversible loss of time (see, to that effect, Folkerts , C‑11/11, EU:C:2013:106, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
Gemeente ‘s-Hertogenbosch v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2014-09-10
25. With regard, first, to Article 6(2)(a) of that directive, as noted by the Advocate General in points 17 and 51 of her Opinion, the option, stemming from that provision, of allocating goods to the assets used as a taxable person or to those used as a non-taxable person cannot be transposed to a situation in which a taxable person carries out, as in the case in the main proceedings, both economic activities which are subject to VAT and non-economic activities which fall outside the scope of that scheme (see, to that effect, judgment in Vereniging Noordelijke Land- en Tuinbouw Organisatie , C‑515/07, EU:C:2009:88, paragraphs 37 and 38).
28. In this regard, it should be observed that the wording of that provision, namely ‘goods produced, constructed, extracted, processed, … in the course of [the] business [of a taxable person]’, covers not only goods entirely produced, constructed, extracted or processed by the business concerned itself, but also goods produced, constructed, extracted or processed by a third party with materials provided by that business (see, to that effect, judgment in Gemeente Vlaardingen , EU:C:2012:698, paragraph 27).
35. That subsequent application is itself subject to VAT and the amount of the VAT for which the Gemeente is liable as a result of that application must be calculated, in accordance with Article 11A(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive, on the basis of the overall value of each of those elements, the land and the building, it being understood that VAT must not have been previously charged on those elements (see, to that effect, judgment in Gemeente Vlaardingen , EU:C:2012:698, paragraphs 28 to 33).
Holger Forstmann Transporte GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Münster.
Date: 2014-09-10
26. However, the Court has consistently held that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, judgment in Feltgen and Bacino Charter Company , C‑116/10, EU:C:2010:824, paragraph 12 and the case-law cited). Also, where a provision of EU law is open to several interpretations, preference must be given to the interpretation which ensures that the provision retains its effectiveness (see judgment in Lassal , C‑162/09, EU:C:2010:592, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
32. It follows that, in the same way as the Court held in paragraph 41 of the judgment in Meiland Azewijn (EU:C:2004:499) in respect of Article 8a of Directive 92/81, Article 24 of Directive 2003/96 must be interpreted broadly. The term ‘standard tanks’ in Article 24(2) cannot, in particular, be interpreted as excluding tanks permanently fixed to commercial motor vehicles intended for the direct supply of fuel to the vehicles when those tanks have been fitted by a person other than the manufacturer.
33. Furthermore, contrary to the Hauptzollamt’s submissions, this conclusion is not contrary to the judgment in Schoonbroodt (EU:C:1998:586). In that case, the Court did not interpret a provision of a directive relating to the taxation of energy products within the internal market, such as Article 24 of Directive 2003/96, but, through the Belgian legislation at issue, a provision of Regulation No 918/83 concerning customs matters. Those enactments pursue different objectives (see, to this effect, the judgment in Meiland Azewijn , EU:C:2004:499, paragraph 40).
34. Furthermore, whilst it is true that the Court stated, in paragraph 20 of the judgment in Schoonbroodt (EU:C:1998:586), that ‘there is no significant difference, in the context of the main proceedings, between the definitions of the term “standard tanks” used in the various provisions which may prove to be relevant’, the fact remains that the reasoning adopted by the Court in that judgment is founded on its case-law concerning customs matters, and not on the aim of a provision adopted in the context of the internal market.
‘Vilniaus energija’ UAB v Lietuvos metrologijos inspekcijos Vilniaus apskrities skyrius.
Date: 2014-09-10
39. In the first place, as regards hot-water meters, it must be recalled that, where a sphere has been the subject of exhaustive harmonisation at EU level, any national measure relating thereto must be assessed in the light of the provisions of that harmonising measure and not of those of the Treaty (see Commission  v Germany , C‑463/01, EU:C:2004:797, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
48. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that national legislation and practice, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which subject remote (telemetric) data-transmission devices lawfully manufactured in other Member States to a metrological verification restrict access to the market of the importing Member State and must therefore be regarded as amounting to a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports within the meaning of Article 34 TFEU (see, to that effect, Radiosistemi , C‑388/00 and C‑429/00, EU:C:2002:390, paragraph 43; ATRAL , C‑14/02, EU:C:2003:265, paragraphs 62 and 63; and Commission v Portugal , C‑432/03, EU:C:2005:669, paragraph 41).
49. According to the Court’s settled case-law, such a measure may be justified only on one of the grounds of public interest listed in Article 36 TFEU or by one of the overriding requirements referred to in the case-law of the Court, provided in particular that that measure is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective pursued and that it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective (see Commission v Portugal , EU:C:2005:669, paragraph 42).
50. The national legislation and practice at issue in the main proceedings are intended to protect consumers. To that effect, the Court has already held that the protection of consumers constitutes a legitimate ground of public interest which is in principle capable of justifying restrictions on the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, such as the free movement of goods (see, to that effect, Canal Satélite Digital , C‑390/99, EU:C:2002:34, paragraph 34).
55. Furthermore, even if the competent national authorities, that is to say, in the case in the main proceedings, the metrologijos inspekcija, were subsequently to decide to limit metrological verification to the remote (telemetric) data-transmission devices, it must be borne in mind that those authorities may not, in any event, unnecessarily require technical analyses where those analyses have already been carried out in another Member State and their results are available to those authorities or may, at their request, be placed at their disposal (see, to that effect, Commission  v Portugal , EU:C:2005:669, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
Gem-Year Industrial Co. Ltd and Jinn-Well Auto-Parts (Zhejiang) Co. Ltd v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2014-09-11
36. In that regard, it should be observed that it is clear from Article 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to find the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and, second, to assess those facts. When the General Court has found or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 256 TFEU to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the General Court and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (see, to that effect, judgment in Moser Baer India v Council , C‑535/06 P, EU:C:2009:498, paragraph 31).
37. By contrast, the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to establish the facts or, in principle, to examine the evidence which the General Court accepted in support of those facts. Provided that the evidence has been properly obtained and the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the General Court alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced to it. Save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, that appraisal does not therefore constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice (see, to that effect, judgment in Moser Baer India v Council , EU:C:2009:498, paragraph 32).
38. In that regard, it should, in any event, be noted that a distortion must be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (see, to that effect, judgment in Moser Baer India v Council , EU:C:2009:498, paragraph 33).
Technische Universität Darmstadt v Eugen Ulmer KG.
Date: 2014-09-11
41. Next, it should be recalled that for there to be an ‘act of communication’ for the purposes of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, it is sufficient, in particular, that those works are made available to a public in such a way that the persons forming that public may access them, irrespective of whether they avail themselves of that opportunity (judgment in Svensson and Others , C‑466/12, EU:C:2014:76, paragraph 19).
42. It follows that, in circumstances such as those of the case in the main proceedings, where an establishment, such as a publicly accessible library, which falls within Article 5(3)(n) of Directive 2001/29, gives access to a work contained in its collection to a ‘public’, namely all of the individual members of the public using the dedicated terminals installed on its premises for the purpose of research or private study, that must be considered to be ‘making [that work] available’ and, therefore, an ‘act of communication’ for the purposes of Article 3(1) of that directive (see, to that effect, judgment in Svensson and Others , EU:C:2014:76, paragraph 20).
43. Such a right of communication of works enjoyed by establishments such as publicly accessible libraries covered by Article 5(3)(n) of Directive 2001/29, within the limits of the conditions provided for by that provision, would risk being rendered largely meaningless, or indeed ineffective, if those establishments did not have an ancillary right to digitise the works in question.
47. Furthermore, the scope of that ancillary right of digitisation must be determined by interpreting Article 5(2)(c) of Directive 2001/29 in the light of Article 5(5) of that directive, under which that limitation is applicable only in certain special cases which do not prejudice the normal exploitation of the work or other protected object or cause unjustified harm to the legitimate interests of the rightholder, the latter provision, however, not being intended to extend the scope of the exceptions and limitations provided for in Article 5(2) of the directive (see, to that effect, judgments in Infopaq International , C‑5/08, EU:C:2009:465, paragraph 58, and ACI Adam and Others , C‑435/12, EU:C:2014:254, paragraph 26).
K Oy.
Date: 2014-09-11
21. Article 96 of the VAT Directive provides that the same rate of VAT, the standard rate, is applicable to supplies of goods and supplies of services.
22. As an exception to that principle, Article 98(1) of the VAT Directive gives the Member States the option of applying either one or two reduced rates of VAT. In accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 98(2), the reduced rates of VAT can apply only to supplies of goods and services in the categories set out in Annex III to the VAT Directive.
23. As regards the application of reduced rates of VAT to those categories, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that it is for the Member States, subject to compliance with the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT, to determine more precisely which of the supplies of goods and services included in the categories in Annex III to the VAT Directive the reduced rate is to apply to (see, to that effect, judgments in Zweckverband zur Trinkwasserversorgung und Abwasserbeseitigung Torgau-Westelbien , C‑442/05, EU:C:2008:184, paragraphs 42 and 43, and Pro Med Logistik , C‑454/12 and C‑455/12, EU:C:2014:111, paragraph 44).
24. As regards the principle of fiscal neutrality, it should be recalled that it precludes similar goods or services which are in competition with each other being treated differently for VAT purposes (see judgments in Commission  v France , C‑384/01, EU:C:2003:264, paragraph 25, and The Rank Group , C‑259/10 and C‑260/10, EU:C:2011:719, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
25. To determine whether goods or services are similar, account must be taken primarily of the point of view of a typical consumer. Goods or services are similar where they have similar characteristics and meet the same needs from the point of view of consumers, the test being whether their use is comparable, and where the differences between them do not have a significant influence on the decision of the average consumer to use one or the other of those goods or services (see, to that effect, judgment in The Rank Group , EU:C:2011:719, paragraphs 43 and 44).
33. If, as the Advocate General observes in point 62 of his Opinion, those circumstances are determinative from the point of view of the average consumer of the Member State concerned, it is justifiable for national legislation not to grant the supply of books on supports other than paper the reduced rate of VAT applicable to the supply of printed books. On the other hand, if what matters for that consumer is essentially the similar content of all books, regardless of their physical support or characteristics, the selective application of a reduced rate of VAT is not justified.
Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund v Wirtschaftskammer Österreich — Fachverband Autobus-, Luftfahrt- und Schifffahrtsunternehmungen.
Date: 2014-09-11
17. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that a request for a preliminary ruling made by a national court may be declared inadmissible only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, judgment in Belvedere Costruzioni , C‑500/10, EU:C:2012:186, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).
19. As regards the second argument raised by the Wirtschaftskammer, it must be noted that the fact that the factual questions have not yet been dealt with in an evidential adversarial procedure is the result of the particular features of the procedure before the referring court. The Court has already ruled that, as such, those features do not render a question referred in that procedure inadmissible (see, to that effect, judgment in Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund , C‑195/98, EU:C:2000:655, paragraph 29).
22. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that Directive 2001/23 is intended to achieve only partial harmonisation in this area, essentially by extending the protection guaranteed to workers independently by the laws of the individual Member States to cover the case where an undertaking is transferred. It is not, however, intended to establish a uniform level of protection throughout the Community on the basis of common criteria (see, inter alia, judgments in Collino and Chiappero , C‑343/98, EU:C:2000:441, paragraph 37, and Juuri , C‑396/07, EU:C:2008:656, paragraph 23).
27. That interpretation is confirmed, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, but the objective pursued by Directive 2001/23, which consists in preventing workers subject to a transfer from being placed in a less favourable position solely as a result of the transfer (see, to that effect, judgment in Scattolon , C‑108/10, EU:C:2011:542, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).
29. In addition, that interpretation complies with the objective of Directive 2001/23, which is to ensure a fair balance between the interests of the employees, on the one hand, and those of the transferee, on the other and from which it is clear that the transferee must be in a position to make the adjustments and changes necessary to carry on its operations (see, to that effect, judgment in Alemo-Herron and Others , C‑426/11, EU:C:2013:521, paragraph 25).
Almer Beheer BV and Daedalus Holding BV v Van den Dungen Vastgoed BV and Oosterhout II BVBA.
Date: 2014-09-17
47. It must be noted that the Court has consistently held that the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently, and different situations must not be treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, to that effect, judgment in Glatzel , C‑356/12, EU:C:2014:350, paragraph 43).
Baltic Agro AS v Maksu- ja Tolliameti Ida maksu- ja tollikeskus.
Date: 2014-09-17
24. It must be observed at the outset that the exemption from anti-dumping duties may be made only under certain conditions, in cases specifically provided for, and thus constitutes an exception to the normal regime for anti-dumping duties. The provisions which provide for such an exemption are, therefore, to be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, Söhl & Söhlke , C‑48/98, EU:C:1999:548, paragraph 52, and Isaac International , C‑371/09, EU:C:2010:458, paragraph 42).
43. However, as has been stated at paragraph 38 of this judgment, no error of such a kind as to permit the invalidation of the customs declarations is at issue in the main proceedings. It must be noted, in that respect, that the obligation to provide correct information in a customs declaration falls on the declarant. That obligation is no more than the corollary of the principle of irrevocability of the customs declaration once it has been accepted, a principle the exceptions to which are strictly defined by the relevant EU legislation ( DP grup , C‑138/10, EU:C:2011:587, paragraphs 39 to 41).