Council of the European Union v European Commission.
Date: 2015-10-06
58. However, it is clear from the case law of the Court that Article 335 TFEU, although restricted to Member States on its wording, is the expression of a general principle that the European Union has legal capacity and is to be represented, to that end, by the Commission (see, to that effect, judgment in Reynolds Tobacco and Others  v Commission , C‑131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 94).
59. It follows that Article 335 TFEU provided a basis for the Commission to represent the European Union before ITLOS in Case No 21.
60. Nevertheless, as the Council has emphasised, supported by the intervening Member States, the applicability of Article 335 TFEU in the present case does not exhaustively resolve the issue, raised by the first plea in law, of whether the principle of conferral of powers laid down in Article 13(2) TEU required that the content of the written statement presented to ITLOS in Case No 21 by the Commission, on behalf of the European Union, receive the prior approval of the Council.
61. In that respect, it must be recalled that, under Article 13(2) TEU, each institution is to act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them. That provision reflects the principle of institutional balance, characteristic of the institutional structure of the European Union, a principle which requires that each of the institutions must exercise its powers with due regard for the powers of the other institutions (see judgment in Council  v Commission , C‑409/13, EU:C:2015:217, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).
65. As the Advocate General observed in points 70 to 74 of her opinion, that provision provides, by way of derogation from the ordinary procedure set out in Article 218(1) to (8) TFEU for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements by the European Union, a simplified procedure for deciding on the positions to be adopted on behalf of the European Union in the context of its participation in the adoption, within a decision-making body set up by the international agreement concerned, of acts applying or implementing that agreement.
69. In that respect, it must observed that the request for an advisory opinion concerned the respective obligations and responsibilities of the flag State and the coastal State in relation to IUU fishing, which undermines the conservation and management of fish stocks. As noted in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the present judgment, IUU fishing falls within the scope of a range of provisions of UNCLOS, to which the European Union is a contracting party, of the FAO Compliance Agreement, to which the Community acceded by Decision 96/428, of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, which the Community ratified by Decision 98/414, and of partnership agreements between the European Union and member States of the SRFC, which form an integral part of the legal order of the European Union pursuant to Article 216(2) TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment in Air Transport Association of America and Others , C‑366/10, EU:C:2011:864, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited). It is also the subject of detailed regulation in EU law, which, moreover, was reinforced in 2008 in order to take into account the European Union’s international commitments, as noted in paragraphs 14 to 19 of the present judgment.
84. Under Article 13(2) TEU, the European Union’s institutions are to practise mutual sincere cooperation. That sincere cooperation, however, is exercised within the limits of the powers conferred by the Treaties on each institution. The obligation resulting from Article 13(2) TEU is therefore not such as to change those powers (judgment in Parliament  v Council , C‑48/14, EU:C:2015:91, paragraphs 57 and 58).