Republic of Poland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union.
Date: 2019-03-13
31


It should be noted, in the first place, that, as the Parliament rightly points out, the form in which the basic data taken into account by the EU legislature are recorded is irrelevant. The EU legislature is entitled to take into account not only the impact assessment, but also any other source of information (see, by analogy, judgments of 8 July 2010, Afton Chemical, C‑343/09, EU:C:2010:419, paragraphs 36, 37 and 40, and of 4 May 2016, Pillbox 38, C‑477/14, EU:C:2016:324, paragraphs 64 to 66).
51


The Republic of Poland, supported by Hungary and Romania, maintains that, if the principle of sincere cooperation is to be observed in full during the procedure leading to the adoption of an EU legal act, the Council is required to forward, at the preparatory stage, information enabling the impact of such an act on all Member States to be understood. The judgment of 5 December 2017, Germany v Council (C‑600/14, EU:C:2017:935, paragraph 107), in its view, supports that interpretation.
73


However, in areas in which the EU legislature has a broad discretion, the Court need satisfy itself only that the institution which adopted the contested measure is able to show that, in adopting the act, it actually exercised its discretion and, for that purpose, is able to set out clearly and unequivocally the basic facts which had to be taken into account as the basis of the contested measures of that act and on which the exercise of its discretion depended (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 June 2018, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑5/16, EU:C:2018:483, paragraphs 151 to 153). It is clear from paragraph 45 of the present judgment that the EU legislature indeed fulfilled that duty by taking account of the full range of extensive data available.
76


It is apparent from the case-law of the Court in this regard that the adoption of a legislative measure with due regard for the relevant provisions of the FEU Treaty, despite the opposition of a minority of Member States, cannot constitute a breach of the duty of sincere cooperation devolving on the Parliament and the Council (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 October 1992, Portugal and Spain v Council, C‑63/90 and C‑67/90, EU:C:1992:381, paragraph 53, and of 23 November 1999, Portugal v Council, C‑149/96, EU:C:1999:574, paragraph 66).
79


In this regard, it must be recalled that a party who, pursuant to Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, is granted leave to intervene in a case submitted to the Court may not alter the subject matter of the dispute as defined by the forms of order sought and the pleas in law raised by the main parties. It follows that arguments submitted by an intervener are not admissible unless they come within the framework provided by those forms of order and pleas in law (judgment of 7 October 2014, Germany v Council, C‑399/12, EU:C:2014:2258, paragraph 27).
94


As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law of the Court, the principle of proportionality requires that acts of the EU institutions be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and do not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, inter alia, judgments of 4 May 2016, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑358/14, EU:C:2016:323, paragraph 78, and of 6 September 2017, Slovakia and Hungary v Council, C‑643/15 and C‑647/15, EU:C:2017:631, paragraph 206).
95


With regard to the judicial review of whether that principle has been observed, in an area of evolving and complex technology, the EU legislature has a broad discretion, in particular as to the assessment of highly complex scientific and technical facts in order to determine the nature and scope of the measures that it adopts, whereas review by the EU judicature has to be limited to verifying whether the exercise of such powers has been vitiated by a manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers, or whether the legislature has manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion. In such a context, the EU judicature cannot substitute its assessment of scientific and technical facts for that of the EU legislature on which the Treaty has conferred that task (judgment of 21 June 2018, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑5/16, EU:C:2018:483, paragraph 150).
96


In the light of those considerations, it is necessary to determine whether, by adopting the measures referred to in the contested directive, the EU legislature committed a manifest error and whether the resultant disadvantages for certain economic operators are wholly disproportionate to the advantages otherwise offered by those measures (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 June 2018, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑5/16, EU:C:2018:483, paragraph 170).
106


Furthermore, the EU legislature is not obliged to take into consideration the particular situation of a Member State if the EU measure concerned has an impact in all Member States and requires that a balance between the different interests involved should be ensured, taking account of the objectives of that measure. Therefore, the attempt to strike such a balance, taking into account not the particular situation of a single Member State, but that of all EU Member States, cannot, in itself, be regarded as contrary to the principle of proportionality (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 June 2018, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑5/16, EU:C:2018:483, paragraph 167).
120


In support of that plea, the Republic of Poland relies on the provisions of Article 4(2) TEU and Article 191 TFEU, relating, respectively, to the equality of Member States before the Treaties and to the balanced development of the regions, and refers, in that regard, to the judgment of 14 July 1998, Safety Hi-Tech (C‑284/95, EU:C:1998:352, paragraphs 36 and 37). It claims that, by that judgment, the Court held that all of the objectives, principles and criteria laid down in Article 191 TFEU must be accorded the same importance and be taken into account as far as possible. Articles 37 and 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) also require observance of the principle of balanced development in the preparation of the European Union’s environmental policy.
128


It should be borne in mind in this regard that, under Article 191(2) TFEU, EU policy on the environment is to aim at a ‘high level of protection’ taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the European Union. Similarly, Article 3(3) TEU provides that the European Union is to work in particular for a ‘high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment’ (judgment of 21 December 2016, Associazione Italia Nostra Onlus, C‑444/15, EU:C:2016:978, paragraph 42).
130


Article 52(2) of the Charter provides that rights recognised by the Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties are to be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties. Such is the case with Article 37 of the Charter, which is essentially based on Article 3(3) TEU and Articles 11 and 191 TFEU (judgment of 21 December 2016, Associazione Italia Nostra Onlus, C‑444/15, EU:C:2016:978, paragraph 62).
132


Whilst it is common ground that Article 191(2) TFEU requires EU policy in environmental matters to aim for a high level of protection, such a level of protection, in order to be compatible with that provision, does not necessarily have to be the highest that is technically possible (judgment of 21 December 2016, Associazione Italia Nostra Onlus, C‑444/15, EU:C:2016:978, paragraph 44).
133


Article 191 TFEU lays down a series of objectives, principles and criteria which the EU legislature must respect in implementing environmental policy (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 1998, Safety Hi-Tech, C‑284/95, EU:C:1998:352, paragraph 36).
135


However, in view of the need to strike a balance between certain of those objectives and principles, and in view of the complexity of the implementation of those criteria, review by the Court must necessarily be limited to the question whether the EU legislature committed a manifest error of assessment as regards the conditions for the application of Article 191 TFEU (judgments of 14 July 1998, Safety Hi-Tech, C‑284/95, EU:C:1998:352, paragraph 37, and of 21 December 2016, Associazione Italia Nostra Onlus, C‑444/15, EU:C:2016:978, paragraph 46).