Județul Neamț and Județul Bacău v Ministerul Dezvoltării Regionale și Administrației Publice.
Date: 2016-05-26
32


It must be noted that Regulation No 2988/95 merely lays down general rules for supervision and penalties for the purpose of safeguarding the European Union’s financial interests. Misused funds must be recovered on the basis of other provisions, that is to say, where appropriate, on the basis of sector-specific provisions (see judgment of 18 December 2014 in Somvao, C‑599/13, EU:C:2014:2462, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
34


However, as Regulation Nos 2988/95 and 1083/2006 form part of the same mechanism designed to ensure the proper management of EU funds and the safeguarding of the European Union’s financial interests, the term ‘irregularity’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Regulation No 2988/95 and Article 2(7) of Regulation No 1083/2006 must be interpreted in a uniform manner.
35


That said, it should be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2015 in Sodiaal International, C‑383/14, EU:C:2015:541, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
45


That definition, which is set out in paragraph 11 above, now refers expressly to any breach of EU law or national law relating to its application. Read in the light of the foregoing considerations, that elucidation concerning breaches of national law clarifies the scope of the term ‘irregularity’ in Article 2(7) of Regulation No 1083/2006 (see, to that effect, a contrario, judgment of 7 April 2016 in PARTNER Apelski Dariusz, C‑324/14, EU:C:2016:214, paragraphs 90 and 91).
50


Lastly, as the Advocate General observed in point 105 of his Opinion, the Court has previously held on many occasions that the obligation to give back an advantage improperly received by means of an irregularity is not a penalty, but simply the consequence of a finding that the conditions required to obtain the advantage derived from EU rules have not been observed, so that that advantage becomes an advantage wrongly received (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 June 2009 in Pometon, C‑158/08, EU:C:2009:349, paragraph 28; 17 September 2014 in Cruz & Companhia, C‑341/13, EU:C:2014:2230, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited, and 18 December 2014 in Somvao, C‑599/13, EU:C:2014:2462, paragraph 36). The fact pointed out by the referring court that the full amount to be repaid may, in any individual case, not coincide exactly with the loss actually incurred by the Structural Funds cannot alter that conclusion.
51


It is therefore apparent from the foregoing that the answer to the second question in Case C‑260/14 and the first question in Case C‑261/14 is that the second sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 98(2) of Regulation No 1083/2006 is to be interpreted as meaning that financial corrections by Member States, if applied to co-financed expenditure under Structural Funds for failure to comply with rules concerning the award of public contract, are administrative measures within the meaning of Article 4 of Regulation No 2988/95.
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In that regard, it is established case-law that where Member States adopt measures by which they implement EU law, they are required to respect the general principles of that law, which include, inter alia, the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations (see, inter alia, judgment of 3 September 2015 in A2A, C‑89/14, EU:C:2015:537, paragraphs 35 and 36 and the case-law cited).
55


Moreover, it should also be borne in mind that, according to that same line of case-law, whilst the principle of legal certainty precludes a regulation from being applied retroactively, namely to a situation which arose prior to the entry into force of that regulation, and irrespective of whether such application might produce favourable or unfavourable effects for the person concerned, the same principle requires that any factual situation should normally, in the absence of any express contrary provision, be examined in the light of the legal rules existing at the time when the situation obtained. However, if the new law is thus valid only for the future, it also applies, save for derogation, to the future effects of situations which came about during the period of validity of the old law (see, inter alia, judgment of 3 September 2015 in A2A, C‑89/14, EU:C:2015:537, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
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Likewise, as is apparent from that same line of case-law, the scope of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations cannot be extended to the point of generally preventing new rules from applying to the future effects of situations which arose under the earlier rules (see, inter alia, judgment of 3 September 2015 in A2A, C‑89/14, EU:C:2015:537, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).