European Commission v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 2019-07-11
28


In this context, the Commission further observes that, according to the Court’s case-law, the EU legislature had no intention of allowing the Member States to establish, at their discretion, schemes derogating from those laid down by Directive 92/83 (judgment of 10 April 2014, Commission v Hungary, C‑115/13, not published, EU:C:2014:253, paragraph 35).
44


As a preliminary point, it must be noted that where a particular matter has been exhaustively harmonised at EU level, national measures relating to that matter must be assessed in the light of the provisions of the harmonising measure and not those of the FEU Treaty (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 March 2013, Commission v France, C‑216/11, EU:C:2013:162, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited, and of 10 April 2014, Commission v Hungary, C‑115/13, not published, EU:C:2014:253, paragraph 38).
45


Directive 92/83 exhaustively harmonised the structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages within the European Union. Thus, under Articles 19 and 21 of that directive, Member States are to fix, in accordance with Directive 92/84, in principle, the same rate of excise duty for all products chargeable with the duty on ethyl alcohol, with the exceptions, allowing Member States on certain conditions to fix that rate at a level below the minimum rate, being set out precisely in Articles 22 and 23 of Directive 92/83 (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 April 2014, Commission v Hungary, C‑115/13, not published, EU:C:2014:253, paragraphs 38 and 39).
50


With reference to exemptions from or reductions of the specific rates of excise duty laid down by Directive 92/83 for certain categories of beverages, the Court has previously held that, having regard to the objectives of that directive and the wording of its 17th recital referring to the prohibition of distortion of competition in the internal market, the EU legislature did not intend to allow the Member States to introduce, at their discretion, schemes derogating from those laid down by Directive 92/83 (judgment of 10 April 2014, Commission v Hungary, C‑115/13, not published, EU:C:2014:253, paragraph 35).
52


It must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the aim of Article 110 TFEU is to ensure free movement of goods between the Member States in normal conditions of competition. To that end, Article 110 intends to eliminate all forms of protection which may result from the application of internal taxation that discriminates against products from other Member States (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 April 2011, Tatu, C‑402/09, EU:C:2011:219, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
53


In this context, the Court has held that the first paragraph of Article 110 TFEU seeks to guarantee the complete neutrality of internal taxation as regards competition between products already on the domestic market and imported products (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 April 2011, Tatu, C‑402/09, EU:C:2011:219, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
55


That being so, it must be recalled that, although the Court has acknowledged that the principle of fiscal neutrality may reflect, in a different context, the principle of equal treatment (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 November 2011, The Rank Group, C‑259/10 and C‑260/10, EU:C:2011:719, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited), it explained that the principle of fiscal neutrality does not in itself allow the scope of an exemption to be extended. That principle is not a rule of primary law but a principle of interpretation, to be applied concurrently with the principle that exemptions must be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 July 2012, Deutsche Bank, C‑44/11, EU:C:2012:484, paragraph 45).
72


Thus, according to settled case-law of the Court, as regards the effects on the internal market of exemptions of small quantities of ethyl alcohol, where a matter is harmonised at EU level, national measures relating to that matter must be assessed in the light of the provisions of the harmonising measure (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 April 2014, Commission v Hungary, C‑115/13, not published, EU:C:2014:253, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
74


As regards, finally, the Hellenic Republic’s argument that small ‘occasional’ distillers of tsipouro and tsikoudia operate in a specific national context which takes account of a long-standing traditional practice, it must be stressed that, although the 20th recital of Directive 92/83 states that the Member States are allowed to apply reduced rates of excise duty or exemptions for certain products of a regional and traditional nature, that does not mean that a national tradition can in itself release Member States from their obligations under EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 April 2014, Commission v Hungary, C‑115/13, not published, EU:C:2014:253, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
75


For the sake of completeness, it should also be pointed out that a statement in the minutes of an ‘Ecofin’ Council cannot call into question the analysis in paragraphs 71 to 74 above. According to settled case-law, declarations formulated in the course of preparatory work leading to the adoption of a directive cannot be used for the purpose of interpreting that directive where no reference is made to the content of the declarations in the wording of the provision in question, and they therefore have no legal significance (judgment of 10 April 2014, Commission v Hungary, C‑115/13, not published, EU:C:2014:253, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).