larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
M.G. Tjebbes and Others v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken.
Date: 2019-03-12
30


In that respect, it is important to bear in mind that the Court has already held that, while it is for each Member State, having due regard to international law, to lay down the conditions for acquisition and loss of nationality, the fact that a matter falls within the competence of the Member States does not alter the fact that, in situations covered by EU law, the national rules concerned must have due regard to the latter (judgment of 2 March 2010, Rottmann, C‑135/08, EU:C:2010:104, paragraphs 39 and 41 and the case-law cited).
31


Article 20 TFEU confers on every individual who is a national of a Member State citizenship of the Union, which, according to settled case-law, is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States (judgment of 8 May 2018, K.A. and Others (Family reunification in Belgium), C‑82/16, EU:C:2018:308, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
32


Accordingly, the situation of citizens of the Union who, like the applicants in the main proceedings, are nationals of one Member State only and who, by losing that nationality, are faced with losing the status conferred by Article 20 TFEU and the rights attaching thereto falls, by reason of its nature and its consequences, within the ambit of EU law. Thus, the Member States must, when exercising their powers in the sphere of nationality, have due regard to EU law (judgment of 2 March 2010, Rottmann, C‑135/08, EU:C:2010:104, paragraphs 42 and 45).
33


In that context, the Court has already held that it is legitimate for a Member State to wish to protect the special relationship of solidarity and good faith between it and its nationals and also the reciprocity of rights and duties, which form the bedrock of the bond of nationality (judgment of 2 March 2010, Rottmann, C‑135/08, EU:C:2010:104, paragraph 51).
40


However, it is for the competent national authorities and the national courts to determine whether the loss of the nationality of the Member State concerned, when it entails the loss of citizenship of the Union and the rights attaching thereto, has due regard to the principle of proportionality so far as concerns the consequences of that loss for the situation of the person concerned and, if relevant, for that of the members of his or her family, from the point of view of EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 March 2010, Rottmann, C‑135/08, EU:C:2010:104, paragraphs 55 and 56).
45


As part of that examination of proportionality, it is, in particular, for the competent national authorities and, where appropriate, for the national courts to ensure that the loss of nationality is consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter, the observance of which the Court ensures, and specifically the right to respect for family life as stated in Article 7 of the Charter, that article requiring to be read in conjunction with the obligation to take into consideration the best interests of the child, recognised in Article 24(2) of the Charter (judgment of 10 May 2017, Chavez-Vilchez and Others, C‑133/15, EU:C:2017:354, paragraph 70).
Skatteverket v Srf konsulterna AB.
Date: 2019-03-13
20


In that regard, it must be observed, as a preliminary point, that Articles 44 and 45 of the VAT Directive contain a general rule for determining the place where services are deemed to be supplied for tax purposes, while Articles 46 to 59a of that directive provide a number of specific instances of such places.
21


As follows from the Court’s settled case-law, Articles 44 and 45 of the VAT Directive do not take precedence over Articles 46 to 59a thereof. In every situation, the question which arises is whether that situation is covered by one of the cases mentioned in Articles 46 to 59a of that directive. If not, it falls within the scope of Articles 44 and 45 of that directive (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 May 2005, RAL (Channel Islands) and Others, C‑452/03, EU:C:2005:289, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited, and of 8 December 2016, A and B, C‑453/15, EU:C:2016:933, paragraph 18).
22


It follows that Article 53 of the VAT Directive must not be regarded as an exception to a general rule which must be narrowly construed (see, by analogy, judgment of 8 December 2016, A and B, C‑453/15, EU:C:2016:933, paragraph 19).
26


As regards the question whether the essential characteristics of the courses at issue in the main proceedings consist in granting admission to those courses, it should be noted that, when two or more components or acts supplied by the taxable person are so closely linked that they form, objectively, a single, indivisible economic supply, which it would be artificial to split, the transaction is a single supply (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 November 2016, Baštová, C‑432/15, EU:C:2016:855, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).
28


It should, furthermore, be noted that the purpose of the provisions of the VAT Directive which determine the place where services are deemed to be supplied is to avoid, first, conflicts of jurisdiction which may result in double taxation, and, secondly, non-taxation (judgment of 8 December 2016, A and B, C‑453/15, EU:C:2016:933, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
29


Accordingly, the underlying logic of the provisions of the VAT Directive concerning the place where a service is deemed to be supplied is that goods and services should be taxed as far as possible at the place of consumption (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 December 2016, A and B, C‑453/15, EU:C:2016:933, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
32


However, as the Advocate General observed in paragraph 74 of her Opinion, it is settled case-law that the preamble to an EU-law act has no binding legal force and cannot be relied on either as a ground for derogating from the actual provisions of the act in question or for interpreting those provisions in a manner that is clearly contrary to their wording (judgment of 13 September 2018, Česká pojišťovna, C‑287/17, EU:C:2018:707, paragraph 33).
Criminal proceedings against B.S.
Date: 2019-03-13
30


In accordance with Article 26 of Directive 92/83, the CN applicable to the main proceedings is the version in force on the date of adoption of that directive, namely the version resulting from Regulation No 2587/91 (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 2011, Paderborner Brauerei Haus Cramer, C‑196/10, EU:C:2011:487, paragraph 28).
31


According to settled case-law, in the interests of legal certainty and for ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the tariff classification of goods is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant CN heading and the notes to sections and chapters. The explanatory notes drawn up by the Commission as regards the CN and by the WCO as regards the HS are an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force (judgment of 12 May 2016, Toorank Productions, C‑532/14 and C‑533/14, EU:C:2016:337, paragraphs 34 and 36 and the case-law cited).
39


Nevertheless, such a product can come under that heading only on condition that its objective characteristics and properties correspond to those of beer. In this regard, account must be taken more particularly of the organoleptic characteristics of the product in question (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 May 2009, Siebrand, C‑150/08, EU:C:2009:294, paragraphs 36 and 37, and of 16 December 2010, Skoma-Lux, C‑339/09, EU:C:2010:781, paragraph 46).
A & G Fahrschul-Akademie GmbH v Finanzamt Wolfenbüttel.
Date: 2019-03-14
17


Article 132 of Directive 2006/112 provides for exemptions which, as indicated by the title of the chapter in which that provision features, are intended to encourage certain activities in the public interest. However, those exemptions do not cover every activity performed in the public interest, but only those listed in that provision and described in great detail (judgment of 4 May 2017, Brockenhurst College, C‑699/15, EU:C:2017:344, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
18


According to the case-law of the Court, those exemptions constitute autonomous concepts of EU law which have the purpose of avoiding divergences in the application of the VAT system from one Member State to another (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 October 2017, The English Bridge Union, C‑90/16, EU:C:2017:814, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
19


The terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 132 of Directive 2006/112 are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle, arising from Article 2 of that directive, that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person. However, that requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 132 should be construed in such a way as to deprive them of their intended effect (judgment of 4 May 2017, Brockenhurst College, C‑699/15, EU:C:2017:344, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
21


The Court has, however, first, taken the view that the transfer of knowledge and skills between a teacher and students is a particularly important element of educational activity (judgment of 14 June 2007, Horizon College, C‑434/05, EU:C:2007:343, paragraph 18).
22


Second, the Court has stated that the concept of ‘school or university education’, within the meaning of Directive 2006/112, is not limited solely to education which leads to examinations for the purpose of obtaining qualifications or which provides training for the purpose of carrying out a professional or trade activity, but includes other activities which are taught in schools or universities in order to develop pupils’ or students’ knowledge and skills, provided that those activities are not purely recreational (judgment of 28 January 2010, Eulitz, C‑473/08, EU:C:2010:47, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
24


Thus, the concept of ‘school or university education’ within the meaning of Article 132(1)(i) and (j) of Directive 2006/112 covers activities which are different both because of their specific nature and by reason of the framework in which they are carried out (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 June 2007, Horizon College, C‑434/05, EU:C:2007:343, paragraph 20).
Metirato Oy, in liquidation v Suomen valtio/Verohallinto and Eesti Vabariik/Maksu- ja Tolliamet.
Date: 2019-03-14
34


That division of powers results from the fact that the claim and the instrument permitting enforcement are established on the basis of the law in force in the Member State in which the applicant authority is situated, whilst, for enforcement measures in the Member State in which the requested authority is situated, the latter applies according to its national law (see, as regards Directive 76/308, judgment of 14 January 2010, Kyrian, C‑233/08, EU:C:2010:11, paragraph 40).
35


Thus, pursuant to Article 14(1) of Directive 2010/24, any dispute of that claim, initial instrument permitting enforcement in the applicant Member State, uniform instrument permitting enforcement in the requested Member State or notification made by a competent authority of the applicant Member State must be brought before the competent bodies of that Member State and not before those of the requested Member State, whose power of review is expressly limited by Article 14(2) to acts of the requested Member State (judgment of 26 April 2018, Donnellan, C‑34/17, EU:C:2018:282, paragraphs 43 and 44).
36


On the other hand, where it is the enforcement measures taken in the Member State in which the requested authority is situated or the validity of a notification given by the requesting authority that is being contested, the action is to be brought before the competent body of that Member State in accordance with its laws and regulations, that body being the best placed to interpret its national law and to determine whether an act is lawful on the basis of that law (see, as regards as regards Directive 76/308, judgment of 14 January 2010, Kyrian, C‑233/08, EU:C:2010:11, paragraphs 39, 40 and 49).
42


Furthermore, it must be recalled that Directive 2010/24 is based on the principle of mutual trust (judgment of 26 April 2018, Donnellan, C‑34/17, EU:C:2018:282, paragraph 41).
Textilis Ltd and Ozgur Keskin v Svenskt Tenn Aktiebolag.
Date: 2019-03-14
30


It follows from the settled case-law of the Court that, in order to ensure observance of the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, the substantive rules of EU law must be interpreted as applying to situations existing before their entry into force only in so far as it clearly follows from their terms, objectives or general scheme that such effect must be given to them (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 2011, Bureau national interprofessionnel du Cognac, C‑4/10 and C‑27/10, EU:C:2011:484, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
35


In that regard, and given that Directive 207/2009 provides no definition of the concept of ‘shape’, the meaning and scope of that concept must, as the Court has consistently held, be determined by considering its usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which it occurs and the purposes of the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, with regard to Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 2008 L 299, p. 25), judgment of 12 June 2018, Louboutin and Christian Louboutin, C‑163/16, EU:C:2018:423, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
36


In the context of trade mark law, the concept of ‘shape’ is usually understood as a set of lines or contours that outline the product concerned (judgment of 12 June 2018, Louboutin and Christian Louboutin, C‑163/16, EU:C:2018:423, paragraph 21).
37


In applying those considerations, the Court has held that the application of a particular colour to a specific location of a product does not mean that the sign at issue consists of a ‘shape’, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(e)(iii) of Directive 2008/95, whose wording is similar to that of Article 7(1)(e)(iii) of Regulation No 207/2009, where it is not the form of the product or part of the product that registration of the mark seeks to protect, but only the application of that colour in this specific location (judgment of 12 June 2018, Louboutin and Christian Louboutin, C‑163/16, EU:C:2018:423, paragraph 24).
European Commission v Republic of Poland.
Date: 2019-03-21
51


More specifically, as regards the concept of ‘international traffic’ contained in the first indent of Article 3(1) of Directive 96/53, the interpretation of which is disputed by the parties, since that directive provides no definition of the concept, it must be interpreted in the light of its usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which it occurs and the purposes of the rules of which it is part (see, by analogy, judgment of 20 September 2018, Carrefour Hypermarchés and Others, C‑510/16, EU:C:2018:751, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
103


That interpretation of point 8.3 of Annex XII to the 2003 Act of Accession is supported by the context of that provision. It is apparent from Articles 2 and 10 of the 2003 Act of Accession that the Act is based on the principle that the provisions of EU law apply ab initio and in toto to new Member States and that derogations are allowed only on a transitional basis in so far as they are expressly provided for by transitional provisions (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 December 2010, Commission v Poland, C‑385/08, not published, EU:C:2010:801, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, it cannot be accepted, in the absence of an express provision to that effect, that the derogating provisions laid down in point 8.3 of Annex XII to the 2003 Act of Accession were intended to be ongoing.
119


As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, the subject matter of an action under Article 258 TFEU for failure to fulfil obligations is determined by the Commission’s reasoned opinion; thus that action must be based on the same grounds and pleas as that opinion (judgment of 10 November 2011, Commission v Portugal, C‑212/09, EU:C:2011:717, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited) and, in accordance with Article 127(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or of fact which came to light in the course of the procedure.
Mobit Soc. cons. arl v Regione Toscana and Autolinee Toscane SpA v Mobit Soc. cons. arl.
Date: 2019-03-21
35


In that regard, it should be observed that, according to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU, providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. With that in mind, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. Further, the Court may decide to take into consideration rules of EU law to which the national court has made no reference in the wording of its question (judgment of 1 February 2017, Município de Palmela, C‑144/16, EU:C:2017:76, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
Falck Rettungsdienste GmbH and Falck A/S v Stadt Solingen.
Date: 2019-03-21
28


It must be observed that Directive 2014/24 does not define the concept of ‘danger prevention’ and that, according to established case-law, it follows from the need for the uniform application of EU law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, having regard to the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, inter alia, judgments of 18 January 1984, Ekro, 327/82, EU:C:1984:11, paragraph 11, and of 19 September 2000, Linster, C‑287/98, EU:C:2000:468, paragraph 43).
32


Secondly, to require danger prevention to have a collective dimension would prevent that concept having any independent content, since it would be systematically confused with either civil protection or civil defence. Where a provision of EU law is open to several interpretations, preference must be given to that interpretation which ensures that the provision retains its effectiveness (judgment of 24 February 2000, Commission v France, C‑434/97, EU:C:2000:98, paragraph 21).
European Commission v Italian Republic.
Date: 2019-03-21
26


It follows from the case-law of the Court that Article 14 introduces a transitional derogating system in order to bring those landfills into line with the new environmental requirements (judgment of 25 February 2016, Commission v Spain, C‑454/14, not published, EU:C:2016:117, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
29


In order to establish a failure to fulfil obligations under that directive, its existence must, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, be assessed by reference to the situation in the Member State as it stood at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, so that subsequent changes cannot be taken into account by the Court (judgment of 18 October 2018, Commission v Romania, C‑301/17, not published, EU:C:2018:846, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
35


Finally, as regards the arguments put forward by the Italian Republic to explain its failure to fulfil its obligations under Directive 1999/31, it should be noted that, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, a Member State may not plead situations in its internal legal order in order to justify a failure to comply with obligations and time limits arising under EU law (judgment of 18 October 2018, Commission v Romania, C‑301/17, not published, EU:C:2018:846, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
Tecnoservice Int. Srl, in liquidation v Poste Italiane SpA.
Date: 2019-03-21
24


In accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, when interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments of 2 September 2015, Surmačs, C‑127/14, EU:C:2015:522, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited, and of 16 November 2016, DHL Express (Austria), C‑2/15, EU:C:2016:880, paragraph 19).
Eco-Bat Technologies Ltd and Others v European Commission.
Date: 2019-03-21
With regard to the latter condition, the Court considers that it is fulfilled when the person to whom a decision is addressed was in a position to become acquainted with the content of that decision and the grounds on which it is based (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 May 2017, Portugal v Commission, C‑337/16 P, EU:C:2017:381, paragraph 48).
In that regard, it should be noted that, under the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal lies on points of law only. The General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence. The appraisal of those facts and the assessment of that evidence does not, therefore, save where they have been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (judgment of 26 September 2018, Philips and Philips France v Commission, C‑98/17 P, not published, EU:C:2018:774, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
Pursuant to Article 169(2) of the Court’s  Rules of Procedure, the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on in an  appeal must identify precisely those points in the grounds of the General Court’s decision which are contested. That requirement is not satisfied by an appeal which, without even specifically identifying the error of law allegedly vitiating the judgment which is the subject of that appeal, confines itself to reproducing the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the General Court (judgment of 18 June 2015, Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraphs 56 and 57 and the case-law cited).