Canon Europa NV v European Commission.
Date: 2015-12-10
45. It must be borne in mind that, in order to assess whether a regulatory act entails implementing measures, it should be assessed by reference to the position of the person pleading the right to bring proceedings under the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. It is therefore irrelevant whether the act in question entails implementing measures with regard to other persons (judgments in Telefónica  v Commission , C‑274/12 P, EU:C:2013:852, paragraph 30, and T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares  v Commission , C‑456/13 P, EU:C:2015:284, paragraph 32).
46. In addition, in that assessment, reference should be made exclusively to the subject-matter of the action and, where an applicant seeks only the partial annulment of an act, it is solely any implementing measures which that part of the act may entail that must, as the case may be, be taken into consideration (judgment in Telefónica  v Commission , C‑274/12 P, EU:C:2013:852, paragraph 31, and order in Forgital Italy  v Council , C‑84/14 P, EU:C:2015:517, paragraph 52).
47. The Court has, moreover, held that it is irrelevant to ascertaining whether or not those measures are mechanical in nature (see, to that effect, judgment in T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares  v Commission , C‑456/13 P, EU:C:2015:284, paragraphs 41 and 42).
51. Clearly, therefore, Article 221(1) of the Customs Code provides that ‘[a]s soon as it has been entered in the accounts, the amount of duty shall be communicated to the debtor’. The communication allows persons liable for customs debts to have full knowledge of their rights (see, to that effect, judgment in Molenbergnatie , C‑201/04, EU:C:2006:136, paragraph 53). By communicating the amount of the duty payable, the customs authorities thus communicate their decision concerning the tariff classification stated by the debtor in its customs declaration. In addition, that communication enables the debtor, as necessary, to defend his rights (see, to that effect, judgment in Direct Parcel Distribution Belgium , C‑264/08, EU:C:2010:43, paragraph 29).
54. Contrary to the appellant’s submissions, the acceptance of a customs declaration does not ‘bring into being’ the effects of the contested regulation in so far as, firstly, such an acceptance does not equate to a decision concerning the tariff classification of the goods in question and, secondly, it does not determine the duty to which the import of those goods is subject. When a customs declaration is accepted, the customs authorities do not take a decision on the accuracy of the information provided by the declarant, but merely verifies that the conditions laid down in Articles 62 and 63 of the Customs Code have been satisfied (see, to that effect, judgment in DP grup , C‑138/10, EU:C:2011:587, paragraph 39).
62. It must be borne in mind that where a regulatory act entails implementing measures, judicial review of compliance with the EU legal order was ensured irrespective of whether those measures were adopted by the European Union or the Member States. Natural or legal persons who are unable, because of the conditions governing admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, to challenge a regulatory act of the European Union directly before the EU judicature are protected against the application to them of such an act by the ability to challenge the implementing measures which the act entails (judgments in Telefónica  v Commission , C‑274/12 P, EU:C:2013:852, paragraph 28, and T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares  v Commission , C‑456/13 P, EU:C:2015:284, paragraph 30).
73. With regard to the General Court’s statement, in paragraph 54 of the order under appeal, that the use of simplified procedures does not mean that no measure is adopted by the customs authorities, it is clear from the sixth and eighth recitals in the preamble to the Customs Code that the aim of the simplified customs procedures is that ‘customs formalities and controls should be … kept to a minimum’ whilst ensuring that the simplifications provided for are not liable to affect adversely the customs interests of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment in Göritz Intransco International , C‑292/96, EU:C:1998:8, paragraph 22). The use of data-processing techniques, which is part of the wish to simplify customs procedures, meets the same objective.
79. Concerning the allegation that reasons insufficient in law are given for the considerations in paragraph 54 of the order under appeal, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the duty of the General Court to state reasons for its judgments does not require it to provide a statement of reasons which follows, exhaustively and one by one, all the arguments put forward by the parties to the dispute. The reasoning may therefore be implied, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to understand the grounds of the General Court’s judgment and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient evidence to exercise its powers of review on appeal (see, inter alia, judgments in A2A  v Commission , C‑318/09 P, EU:C:2011:856, paragraph 97, and Greece  v Commission , C‑391/13 P, EU:C:2014:2061, paragraph 58).
89. In accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, complaints directed against the grounds of a decision of the General Court included purely for the sake of completeness cannot lead to the decision being set aside and are therefore nugatory (judgments in Dansk Rørindustri and Others  v Commission , C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, paragraph 148, and Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft International  v Commission , C‑7/14 P, EU:C:2015:205, paragraph 72).
95. Firstly, it should be pointed out that the right to be heard in judicial proceedings doe s not mean that the court has to incorporate in full in its decision all the submissions put forward by each party. The court, after listening to the submissions of the parties and assessing the evidence, has to decide whether or not to grant the relief sought in the application and give reasons for its decision (see judgments in Sc hröder and Others  v Commission , C‑221/97 P, EU:C:1998:597, paragraph 24, and Lito Maieftiko Gynaikologiko kai Cheirourgiko Kentro  v Commission , C‑506/13 P, EU:C:2015:562, paragraph 48).
101. It is clear from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union that an appeal lies on points of law only. The General Court thus has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence. The appraisal of those facts and the assessment of that evidence thus do not, save where the facts or evidence are distorted, constitute points of law which are subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (see, inter alia, judgment in Les Éditions Albert René  v OHIM , C‑16/06 P, EU:C:2008:739, paragraph 68, and order in Repsol YPF  v OHIM , C‑466/13 P, EU:C:2014:2331, paragraph 54).