IK.
Date: 2018-12-06
30


In the second place, as regards the criterion relating to urgency, it is necessary, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, to take into account the fact that the person concerned is currently deprived of his liberty and that the question as to whether he may continue to be held in custody depends on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings. In addition, the situation of that person must be assessed as it stands at the time when consideration is given to the request that the reference be dealt with under the urgent procedure (judgment of 19 September 2018, RO, C‑327/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:733, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
34


As a preliminary matter, it should be recalled that EU law is based on the fundamental premiss that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that they share with it, a set of common values on which the European Union is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU. That premiss implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised, and therefore that the EU law that implements them will be respected (judgment of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice), C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
35


Both the principle of mutual trust between the Member States and the principle of mutual recognition, which is itself based on the mutual trust between the latter, are, in EU law, of fundamental importance given that they allow an area without internal borders to be created and maintained. More specifically, the principle of mutual trust requires, particularly as regards the area of freedom, security and justice, each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law (judgment of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice), C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
37


As is apparent in particular from Article 1(1) and (2) of the framework decision, read in the light of recitals 5 and 7 thereof, the purpose of that decision is to replace the multilateral system of extradition, signed in Paris on 13 December 1957, based on the European Convention on Extradition with a system of surrender between judicial authorities of convicted or suspected persons for the purpose of enforcing judgments or of conducting prosecutions, the system of surrender being based on the principle of mutual recognition (judgment of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice), C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
38


Framework Decision 2002/584 thus seeks, by the establishment of a new simplified and more effective system for the surrender of persons convicted or suspected of having infringed criminal law, to facilitate and accelerate judicial cooperation with a view to contributing to the attainment of the objective set for the European Union of becoming an area of freedom, security and justice, and has as its basis the high level of trust which must exist between the Member States (judgment of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice), C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
39


Thus, in accordance with Article 1(1) of that framework decision, the aim of the mechanism of the European arrest warrant is to enable the arrest and surrender of a requested person, in the light of the objective pursued by the framework decision, so that the crime committed does not go unpunished and that that person is prosecuted or serves the custodial sentence ordered against him.
40


In that regard, the principle of mutual recognition, which, as is apparent in particular from recital 6 of Framework Decision 2002/584, constitutes the ‘cornerstone’ of EU judicial cooperation in criminal matters, is applied in Article 1(2) thereof which lays down the rule that Member States are required to execute any European arrest warrant on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provisions of the framework decision (judgment of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice), C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
41


Executing judicial authorities may therefore, in principle, refuse to execute such a warrant only on the grounds for non-execution exhaustively listed by Framework Decision 2002/584 and execution of the warrant may be made subject only to one of the conditions exhaustively laid down in Article 5 thereof. Accordingly, while execution of the European arrest warrant constitutes the rule, refusal to execute is intended to be an exception which must be interpreted strictly (judgment of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice), C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
43


The Court has also held that those provisions are based on the premiss that the European arrest warrant concerned will satisfy the requirements as to the lawfulness laid down in Article 8(1) of the framework decision and that failure to comply with one of those requirements as to lawfulness, which must be observed if the European arrest warrant is to be valid, must, in principle, result in the executing judicial authority refusing to give effect to that warrant (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 June 2016, Bob-Dogi, C‑241/15, EU:C:2016:385, paragraphs 63 and 64).
49


Furthermore, in order to simplify and accelerate the surrender procedure in accordance within the time limits laid down by Article 17 of Framework Decision 2002/584, the annex to the decision provides a specific form which the issuing judicial authorities are required to complete, furnishing the specific information requested (judgment of 23 January 2018, Piotrowski, C‑367/16, EU:C:2018:27, paragraph 57). Box (c)(2) of that form refers to the ‘length of the custodial sentence or detention order imposed’.
50


The requirement as to lawfulness set out in Article 8(1)(f) of Framework Decision 2002/584 is intended to inform the executing judicial authorities of the length of the custodial sentence for which surrender of the requested person is sought on the basis of indications providing the minimum official information required to enable those authorities to give effect to the European arrest warrant swiftly by adopting their decision on the surrender as a matter of urgency (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 January 2018, Piotrowski, C‑367/16, EU:C:2018:27, paragraphs 58 and 59).
63


It is true that the Court has previously held with a view to effective judicial cooperation in criminal matters that the issuing and executing judicial authorities must make full use of the instruments provided for, in particular in Article 8(1) and Article 15 of the framework decision in order to foster mutual trust on the basis of that cooperation (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 December 2017, Ardic, C‑571/17 PPU, EU:C:2017:1026, paragraphs 90 and 91).
66


Lastly, as the Court has previously held, as regards proceedings relating to a European arrest warrant, observance of the rights of the person whose surrender is requested falls primarily within the responsibility of the issuing Member State, which must be presumed to be compliant with EU law, in particular the fundamental rights conferred by that law (judgment of 23 January 2018, Piotrowski, C‑367/16, EU:C:2018:27, paragraph 50).
67


Thus, the decision of the executing judicial authority is without prejudice to the person in question’s opportunity, after surrender, to have recourse, within the legal system of the issuing Member State, to legal remedies that may enable him to challenge, where appropriate, the lawfulness of his detention in a prison of that Member State, inter alia, as is clear from the case in the main proceedings, on the basis of the European arrest warrant pursuant to which his surrender was granted. That person may, at that time, rely, inter alia, on respect for the rights to an effective remedy, to a fair trial and of the defence which he derives from Article 47 and Article 48(2) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2018, RO, C‑327/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:733, paragraph 50).
69


As the Advocate General observed in point 116 of her Opinion, to subject the enforcement of the additional sentence to such a requirement, despite the fact that the executing judicial authority could not refuse to accede to the European arrest warrant, would be at odds with the objective of facilitating and accelerating the judicial cooperation sought by that framework decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 January 2018, Piotrowski, C‑367/16, EU:C:2018:27, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).