Azienda Agricola Barausse Antonio e Gabriele - Società semplice v Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA).
Date: 2019-06-27
26


In that regard, it should be recalled that it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is in principle required to give a ruling. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court for a preliminary ruling only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see judgment of 4 December 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality and Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, C‑378/17, EU:C:2018:979, paragraphs 26 and 27 and the case-law cited).
32


According to settled case-law of the Court, in interpreting a provision of EU law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objects of the rules of which it forms part (judgment of 26 September 2018, Baumgartner, C‑513/17, EU:C:2018:772, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
34


Consequently, and as confirmed by the seventh recital of that regulation, that provision allowed Member States the option of reallocating the unused part of the overall reference quantity to producers with overruns, before establishing the contribution of each producer to the payment of the levy due. The decision to carry out a reallocation is an optional precursor to establishing the contribution of producers and affects the result of the latter operation (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 May 2011, Kurt und Thomas Etling and Others, C‑230/09 and C‑231/09, EU:C:2011:271, paragraph 53).
39


The Court has already held that it is clear from all the language versions of the second subparagraph of Article 2(1) of Regulation No 3950/92 that it is indeed the allocation of unused reference quantities which is to be carried out ‘in proportion to the reference quantities of each producer’ and that the contribution of producers to the payment of the levy due is, for its part, established by reference to the overrun of the reference quantity of each individual producer (judgment of 5 May 2011, Kurt und Thomas Etling and Others, C‑230/09 and C‑231/09, EU:C:2011:271, paragraph 64).
46


As regards the Italian Government’s arguments concerning Article 10(3) of Regulation No 1788/2003, it must be noted that that provision provides that the reallocation of the unused part of the national reference quantity allocated to deliveries must be carried out in proportion to the individual reference quantity of each producer having overdelivered, or according to objective criteria to be set by the Member States (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 May 2011, Kurt und Thomas Etling and Others, C‑230/09 and C‑231/09, EU:C:2011:271, paragraph 79).
48


It is true that, in so far as Regulation No 1788/2003 seeks, according to recital 2 thereof, to reorganise and clarify the rules laid down in Regulation No 3950/92, it may be taken into account in the interpretation of the latter regulation. Moreover, in that regard, the Court has held that Article 10(3) of Regulation No 1788/2003 pursued the same logic as the second subparagraph of Article 2(1) of Regulation No 3950/92, and that it did not appear that the option for Member States to reallocate unused reference quantities at the end of the period, as provided for in Article 10(3) of Regulation No 1788/2003, was an innovation in relation to the previous system, or that a notable modification of that system had been made by the legislature on that point (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 May 2011, Kurt und Thomas Etling and Others, C‑230/09 and C‑231/09, EU:C:2011:271, paragraphs 61 to 63).
52


As regards the objective of the levy, it must be borne in mind that the purpose of the additional levy system is to re-establish, by limiting milk production, the balance between supply and demand in the milk market, which is characterised by structural surpluses. This measure, therefore, is within the ambit of the objectives of rational development of milk production and, by contributing to a stabilisation of the income of the agricultural community affected, that of ensuring a fair standard of living for the agricultural community (judgments of 17 May 1988, Erpelding, 84/87, EU:C:1988:245, paragraph 26, and of 25 March 2004, Azienda Agricola Ettore Ribaldi and Others, C‑480/00, C‑482/00, C‑484/00, C‑489/00 to C‑491/00 and C‑497/00 to C‑499/00, EU:C:2004:179, paragraph 57). In accordance with Article 2(1) of Regulation No 3950/92, the additional levy established by Article 1 of that regulation is to be allocated among the producers who contributed to the overrun of the reference quantities (judgment of 24 January 2018, Commission v Italy, C‑433/15, EU:C:2018:31, paragraph 40).
53


Furthermore, as Article 10 of Regulation No 3950/92 clearly shows, the additional levy is to be considered to be intervention to stabilise agricultural markets and is to be used to finance expenditure in the milk sector. It follows that, apart from its obvious aim of requiring milk producers to observe the reference quantities allocated to them, the additional levy has an economic objective too, in that it is intended to bring to the Community the funds necessary for disposal of milk produced by producers in excess of their quotas (judgment of 25 March 2004, Azienda Agricola Ettore Ribaldi and Others, C‑480/00, C‑482/00, C‑484/00, C‑489/00 to C‑491/00 and C‑497/00 to C‑499/00, EU:C:2004:179, paragraph 59).
57


In so far as EU law, including its general principles, does not include common rules to that effect then, when the national authorities implement EU rules, they are to act in accordance with the procedural and substantive rules of their own national law but, when adopting measures to implement EU legislation, must exercise their discretion in compliance with the general rules of EU law, which include the principles of proportionality, legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 March 2004, Azienda Agricola Ettore Ribaldi and Others, C‑480/00, C‑482/00, C‑484/00, C‑489/00 to C‑491/00 and C‑497/00 to C‑499/00, EU:C:2004:179, paragraphs 42 and 43 and the case-law cited).