larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
S. v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v G.
Date: 2014-03-12
33. In accordance with settled case‑law, the rights conferred by Directive 2004/38 on third‑country nationals are not autonomous rights of those third‑country nationals, but derived rights, acquired through their status as family members, as defined in Article 2(2) of that directive, of a Union citizen (see McCarthy , paragraph 42; Dereci and Others , paragraph 55; and Case C‑87/12 Ymeraga and Ymeraga-Tafarshiku  [2013] ECR, paragraph 31).
34. However, as is apparent from paragraphs 37 to 43 of the judgment delivered today in Case C‑456/12 O. and B. , Directive 2004/38 grants an autonomous right of residence to a Union citizen and a derived right of residence to his family members only where that citizen exercises his right of freedom of movement by becoming established in a Member State other than the Member State of which he is a national. Directive 2004/38 does not therefore confer a derived right of residence on third‑country nationals who are family members of a Union citizen in the Member State of which that citizen is a national.
37. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in paragraph 46 of the judgment in Carpenter , the Court held that Article 56 TFEU, read in the light of the fundamental right to respect for family life, precludes, in circumstances such as those in the case which gave rise to that judgment, a refusal, by the Member State of origin of a provider of services established in that Member State who provides services to recipients established in other Member States, of the right to reside in its territory to that provider’s spouse, who is a national of a third country.
39. Union citizens in comparable situations to sponsor S and sponsor G fall within the scope of Article 45 TFEU. Any Union citizen who, under an employment contract, works in a Member State other than that of their place of residence falls within the scope of Article 45 TFEU (see, to that effect, Case C‑152/03 Ritter‑Coulais  [2006] ECR I‑1711, paragraph 31; Case C‑212/05 Hartmann  [2007] ECR I‑6303, paragraph 17; and Case C‑202/11 Las  [2013] ECR, paragraph 17).
41. However, the purpose and justification of such a derived right of residence is based on the fact that a refusal to allow it would be such as to interfere with the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the FEU Treaty (see, to that effect, Case C‑40/11 Iida  [2012] ECR, paragraph 68; Ymeraga and Ymeraga‑Tafarshiku , paragraph 35; and Case C‑86/12 Alokpa and Others  [2013] ECR, paragraph 22).
45. In those circumstances, it is no longer necessary to interpret Articles 20 TFEU and 21(1) TFEU. Those provisions, which set out generally the right of every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, find specific expression in Article 45 TFEU in relation to freedom of movement for workers (see Case C‑233/12 Gardella  [2013] ECR, paragraph 38 and the case‑law cited).
Octapharma France SAS v Agence nationale de sécurité du médicament et des produits de santé (ANSM) and Ministère des Affaires sociales et de la Santé.
Date: 2014-03-13
29. It should be noted that Article 2(1) of Directive 2001/83, as amended by Directive 2004/27, provides, in essence, that Directive 2001/83 applies to medicinal products for human use intended to be placed on the market in Member States and which are prepared industrially.
30. The scope of Directive 2001/83, as amended by Directive 2004/27, is thus limited to products which are industrially produced medicinal products, to the exclusion of those which do not correspond to one or other of the definitions of medicinal products listed in Article 1(2)(a) and (b) of that directive.
38. However, although plasma intended for transfusion which is prepared by a method involving an industrial process comes within the material scope of Directive 2001/83, as amended by Directive 2004/27, with respect to its processing, storage and distribution, the product in question, in order to be subject to the provisions of that directive, must none the less also satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 2 of that directive and be able to be regarded as a medicinal product for human use within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 2001/83, as amended by Directive 2004/27.
Jetair NV and BTW-eenheid BTWE Travel4you v FOD Financiën.
Date: 2014-03-13
48. As the Court has previously held, the retention of that derogation reflects the gradual and still partial harmonisation of national VAT legislation (see, to that effect, Case C‑240/05 Eurodental  [2006] ECR I‑11479, paragraph 50). The harmonisation envisaged has not yet been achieved in so far as Article 28(3)(a) of the Sixth Directive and Article 370 of the VAT Directive authorised the Member States to retain certain provisions of their national legislation existing on 1 January 1978 which would, without those authorisations, be incompatible with those directives (see, to that effect, with regard to the Sixth Directive, Eurodental , paragraph 51).
Posteshop SpA — Divisione Franchising Kipoint v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato and Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri.
Date: 2014-03-13
21. However, it is settled case-law that the wording used in one language version of European Union law provisions cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of those provisions. Where there is a divergence between the various language versions of a European Union text, the provisions in question must thus be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and the purpose of the rules of which they form part (see Case C-149/97 Institute of the Motor Industry  [1998] ECR I-7053, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited, and Case C-277/12 Drozdovs  [2013] ECR, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
25. Fourthly, it is evident from Directive 2006/114 that the provisions concerning misleading advertising and those concerning comparative advertising pursue different aims. Article 3 of that directive provides minimum criteria and objectives for determining whether advertising is misleading and therefore unlawful, while Article 4 of that directive lists various cumulative conditions which comparative advertising must meet in order to be permitted (see, by analogy, Case C‑487/07 L’Oréal and Others  [2009] ECR I-5185, paragraph 67, and Case C-159/09 Lidl  [2010] ECR I-11761, paragraph 16), recital 8 in the preamble to Directive 2006/114 also observing that comparative advertising may be a legitimate means of informing consumers of their advantage.
Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV Frankfurt am Main v ILME GmbH.
Date: 2014-03-13
22. As a preliminary point, it must be observed that the CE marking is to be affixed only to products to which its affixing is provided for by the relevant specific harmonisation legislation of the European Union, and is not to be affixed to any other product. Any other position would have the effect of giving rise to a likelihood of confusion as to the meaning of that marking (Case C‑185/08 Latchways and Eurosafe Solutions  [2010] ECR I‑9989, paragraph 63).
Finanzamt Saarlouis v Heinz Malburg.
Date: 2014-03-13
38. The Court has however also accepted that a taxable person has a right to deduct even where there is no direct and immediate link between a particular input transaction and one or more output transactions giving rise to the right to deduct, where the costs of the services in question are part of his general costs and are, as such, components of the price of the goods or services which he supplies. Such costs do have a direct and immediate link with the taxable person’s economic activity as a whole (Case C‑98/98 Midland Bank  [2000] ECR I‑4177, paragraph 31; Case C‑465/03 Kretztechnik  [2005] ECR I‑4357, paragraph 36; and Becker , paragraph 20). That may be the case, inter alia, if it is established that the taxable person himself acquired the client base at issue in the course of his activity as a managing director of a newly formed partnership and the costs resulting from that acquisition had to be considered as forming part of the general costs relating to his activity as managing director.
41. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the Court has repeatedly held that the principle of fiscal neutrality manifests itself through the deduction system which is meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT therefore ensures that all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that they are themselves subject to VAT, are taxed in a wholly neutral way (see, inter alia, Case 268/83 Rompelman  [1985] ECR 655, paragraph 19, and Case C‑32/03 Fini H  [2005] ECR I‑1599, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
43. Moreover, as the Court has already held, the principle of fiscal neutrality is not a rule of primary law but a principle of interpretation, to be applied concurrently with the principle on which it is a limitation (Case C‑44/11 Deutsche Bank  [2012] ECR, paragraph 45). It does not therefore allow the scope of the deduction from output VAT to be extended in the face of an unambiguous provision of the Sixth Directive. As regards the case which gave rise to Polski Trawertyn , it was clear that the application of the national legislation at issue did not allow either the future partners of the partnership to be created or that partnership to rely successfully on the principle of neutrality.
European Commission v European Parliament and Council of the European Union.
Date: 2014-03-18
16. According to settled case-law of the Court, partial annulment of an EU act is possible only if the elements the annulment of which is sought may be severed from the remainder of the act (see, inter alia, Commission  v Council , C‑29/99, EU:C:2002:734, paragraph 45, and Germany  v Council , C‑239/01, EU:C:2003:514, paragraph 33). The Court has repeatedly ruled that that requirement of severability is not satisfied where the partial annulment of an act would have the effect of altering its substance ( Commission  v Poland , C‑504/09 P, EU:C:2012:178, paragraph 98 and the case-law cited).
38. When the EU legislature confers, in a legislative act, a delegated power on the Commission pursuant to Article 290(1) TFEU, the Commission is called on to adopt rules which supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of that act. In accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 290(1) TFEU, the objectives, content, scope and duration of the delegation of power must be explicitly defined in the legislative act granting such a delegation. That requirement implies that the purpose of granting a delegated power is to achieve the adoption of rules coming within the regulatory framework as defined by the basic legislative act.
39. By contrast, when the EU legislature confers an implementing power on the Commission on the basis of Article 291(2) TFEU, the Commission is called on to provide further detail in relation to the content of a legislative act, in order to ensure that it is implemented under uniform conditions in all Member States.
40. It must be noted that the EU legislature has discretion when it decides to confer a delegated power on the Commission pursuant to Article 290(1) TFEU or an implementing power pursuant to Article 291(2) TFEU. Consequently, judicial review is limited to manifest errors of assessment as to whether the EU legislature could reasonably have taken the view, first, that, in order to be implemented, the legal framework which it laid down regarding the system of fees referred to in Article 80(1) of Regulation No 528/2012 needs only the addition of further detail, without its non-essential elements having to be amended or supplemented and, secondly, that the provisions of Regulation No 528/2012 relating to that system require uniform conditions for implementation.
52. It follows from the foregoing that the EU legislature could reasonably take the view that Article 80(1) of Regulation No 528/2012 confers on the Commission the power, not to supplement certain non-essential elements of that legislative act, but to provide further detail in relation to the normative content of that act, in accordance with Article 291(2) TFEU.
European Commission v Republic of Poland.
Date: 2014-03-20
52. In view of the Court’s settled case-law, the contested legislation constitutes a measure having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports within the meaning of Article 34 TFEU, in so far as its effect is to hinder access to the Polish market for vehicles with steering equipment on the right, which are lawfully constructed and registered in Member States other than the Republic of Poland (see, concerning the origins of that case-law, Case 8/74 Dassonville  [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5; Case 120/78 Rewe Zentral, ‘Cassis de Dijon’  [1979] ECR 649, paragraph 14; and, more recently, Case C‑110/05 Commission  v Italy  [2009] ECR I‑519, paragraph 58).
53. In accordance with that case-law, such legislation may be justified in order to meet imperative requirements, on condition that it is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective pursued and that it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective ( Commission  v Italy , paragraph 59 and case-law cited).
54. The Polish Government puts forward, as justification for the legislation at issue, the need to ensure road safety, about which it is not disputed that it constitutes, according to the case-law, an imperative requirement relating to the public interest capable of justifying a hindrance to the free movement of goods ( Commission  v Italy , paragraph 60 and case-law cited).
55. It should be noted that, in accordance with equally settled case-law, in the absence of full harmonisation at European Union level, which is the case of registration in a Member State of vehicles already registered in another Member State, it is for the Member States to decide upon the level at which they wish to ensure road safety in their territory, whilst taking account of the requirements of the free movement of goods within the European Union. In that regard, it is for the competent national authorities to show that their legislation is appropriate for ensuring the attainment of the objective pursued and does not go further than is necessary in order to attain that objective (see, to that effect, Commission  v Italy , paragraphs 61 and 62 and case-law cited).
61. In addition, according to the information at the disposal of the Court, the legislation of 22 Member States, that is to say, the large majority of the Member States, either allows explicitly the registration of vehicles which have their steering equipment on the same side as the direction of the traffic, or tolerates such, even if, in some of those Member States, the state of the roads is similar to that in the Republic of Poland (see, by analogy, Case C‑333/08 Commission  v France  [2010] ECR I‑757, paragraph 105).
European Commission v Republic of Lithuania.
Date: 2014-03-20
57. In view of the Court’s settled case-law, the contested legislation constitutes a measure having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports within the meaning of Article 34 TFEU, in so far as its effect is to hinder access to the Polish market for vehicles with steering equipment on the right, which are lawfully constructed and registered in Member States other than the Republic of Lithuania (see, concerning the origins of that case-law, Case 8/74 Dassonville  [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5; Case 120/78 Rewe Zentral, ‘Cassis de Dijon’  [1979] ECR 649, paragraph 14; and, more recently, Case C‑110/05 Commission  v Italy  [2009] ECR I‑519, paragraph 58).
58. In accordance wi th that case-law, such legislation may be justified in order to meet imperative requirements, on condition that it is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective pursued and that it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective ( Commission  v Italy , paragraph 59 and case-law cited).
59. The Lithuanian Government puts forward, as justification for the legislation at issue, the need to ensure road safety, about which it is not disputed that it constitutes, according to the case-law, an imperative requirement relating to the public interest capable of justifying a hindrance to the free movement of goods ( Commission  v Italy , paragraph 60 and case-law cited).
60. It should be noted that, in accordance with equally settled case-law, in the absence of full harmonisation at European Union level, which is the case of registration in a Member State of vehicles already registered in another Member State, it is for the Member States to decide upon the level at which they wish to ensure road safety in their territory, whilst taking account of the requirements of the free movement of goods within the European Union. In that regard, it is for the competent national authorities to show that their legislation is appropriate for ensuring the attainment of the objective pursued and does not go further than is necessary in order to attain that objective (see, to that effect, Commission  v Italy , paragraphs 61 and 62 and case-law cited).
66. In addition, according to the information at the disposal of the Court, the legislation of 22 Member States, that is to say the large majority of the Member States, either allows explicitly the registration of vehicles which have their steering equipment on the same side as the direction of the traffic, or tolerate such, even if, in some of those Member States, the state of the roads is similar to that in the Republic of Lithuania (see, by analogy, Case C‑333/08 Commission  v France  [2010] ECR I‑757, paragraph 105).
Ballast Nedam NV v European Commission.
Date: 2014-03-27
25. In so doing, the General Court erred in law with regard to the requirement that the statement of objections be sufficiently clear, in accordance with which it is necessary for the statement of objections to indicate in which capacity an undertaking is called upon to answer the allegations ( Papierfabrik August Koehler and Others  v Commission , EU:C:2009:500, paragraph 39).
26. The General Court was wrong in finding, in paragraph 69 of the judgment under appeal, that Ballast Nedam could not have been unaware that it was likely to be the addressee of a final Commission decision in its capacity as BNGW’s parent company, when it is apparent from the General Court’s own findings that, in point 342 of the statement of objections, the Commission had not indicated that the statement of objections was addressed to Ballast Nedam on the ground that it exercised decisive influence over BNGW’s commercial conduct, and the General Court acknowledged that the statement of objections was unclear in that regard.
27. In particular, the General Court cannot hold that the finding made in point 235 of the statement of objections that Ballast Nedam had participated in the cartel through BNGW’s managing director clearly indicated to Ballast Nedam that the Commission intended to hold it, in its capacity as BNGW’s parent company, liable for its subsidiary, when the only reference made to BGNW in the statement of objections is to BGNW in its capacity as BN Infra’s predecessor.
28. Moreover, the ambiguity in the wording of the statement of objections is exacerbated by the fact that no statement of objections was sent to BNGW.
29. With regard to Ballast Nedam’s reply to the statement of objections and concerning BNGW, referred to in paragraph 70 of the judgment under appeal, it cannot be concluded that Ballast Nedam had understood from its reading of the statement of objections that it would be held liable by the Commission for BNGW’s conduct.
30. In the light of those considerations, the Court finds that the General Court erred in law in finding that Ballast Nedam’s rights of the defence had not been infringed.
31. Since the first ground of appeal is well founded, the present appeal must be upheld and, consequently, the judgment under appeal must be set aside to the extent that it rejects Ballast Nedam’s plea in law alleging infringement of Article 27(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 and the rights of the defence during the administrative procedure leading up to the contested decision.
The second ground of appeal: error of law as regards the imputation of the infringement to Ballast Nedam
38. In the present case, as Ballast Nedam was not afforded the opportunity to conduct its defence properly during the administrative procedure as regards its participation in the infringement in question by virtue of being the parent company of BNGW, its wholly-owned subsidiary, Article 1(a) of the contested decision must be annulled as regards the imputation of BNGW’s conduct to Ballast Nedam for the period from 21 June 1996 to 30 September 2000.
Alpina River Cruises GmbH and Nicko Tours GmbH v Ministero delle infrastrutture e dei trasporti - Capitaneria di Porto di Chioggia.
Date: 2014-03-27
19. The term ‘sea’ referred to by Regulation No 3577/92 is not limited to territorial sea within the meaning of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed in Montego Bay (Jamaica) on 10 December 1982, entered into force on 16 November 1994 and approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 98/392/EC of 23 March 1998 (OJ 1998 L 179, p. 1), but also covers internal maritime waters which are on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea (see, to that effect, Case C‑323/03 Commission  v Spain EU:C:2006:159, paragraphs 25 to 27).
28. It is true that the transport services listed in Article 2(1)(a) to (c) of Regulation No 3577/92 are described as having different departure and arrival ports. However, that list, which is introduced by the term ‘in particular’, is not e xhaustive and cannot have the effect of excluding from the scope of that regulation transport services having all the essential characteristics of maritime cabotage contained in the above-mentioned phrase ‘maritime transport services within a Member State’ (see, to that effect, Case C‑251/04 Commission  v Greece EU:C:2007:5, paragraphs 28 and 32).