Fondul Proprietatea SA v Complexul Energetic Oltenia SA.
Date: 2017-05-18
12


As a preliminary point, it must be held that the European Commission’s power to assess whether aid is compatible with the internal market does not preclude a national court from referring to the Court of Justice a question on the interpretation of the definition of ‘aid’. Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction, inter alia, to give the national court guidance on interpretation of EU law to enable it to determine whether a national measure may be classified as ‘State aid’ under that law (judgment of 19 March 2015, OTP Bank, C‑672/13, EU:C:2015:185, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
13


According to the settled case-law of the Court, classification of a national measure as ‘State aid’ for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU requires that all the conditions set out in that provision are fulfilled. First, there must be intervention by the State or through State resources. Second, the intervention must be liable to affect trade between the Member States. Third, it must confer a selective advantage on the recipient. Fourth, it must distort or threaten to distort competition (see, in particular, judgments of 19 December 2013, Association Vent De Colère! and Others, C‑262/12, EU:C:2013:851, paragraph 15; of 22 October 2015, EasyPay and Finance Engineering, C‑185/14, EU:C:2015:716, paragraph 35; and of 21 December 2016, Commission v World Duty Free Group and Others, C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P, EU:C:2016:981, paragraph 53).
14


It must be stated from the outset that for it to be possible to classify advantages as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, first, they must be granted directly or indirectly through State resources and, secondly, that grant must be attributable to the State (judgments of 16 May 2002, France v Commission, C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited, and of 19 December 2013, Association Vent De Colère! and Others, C‑262/12, EU:C:2013:851, paragraph 16).
15


First, as regards the condition relating to the condition which requires that the advantage must be granted directly or indirectly through State resources, according to settled case-law, the definition of ‘aid’ is more general than that of a ‘subsidy’ because it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (see, in particular, judgments of 10 January 2006, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others, C‑222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraph 131, and of 19 March 2015, OTP Bank, C‑672/13, EU:C:2015:185, paragraph 40).
16


In that connection, the Court has already held that Article 107(1) TFEU covers all the financial means by which the public authorities may actually support undertakings, irrespective of whether or not those means are permanent assets of the public sector. Therefore, even if the sums corresponding to the measure in question are not permanently held by the Treasury, the fact that they constantly remain under public control, and therefore available to the competent national authorities, is sufficient for them to be categorised as State resources (judgment of 19 December 2013, Association Vent De Colère! and Others, C‑262/12, EU:C:2013:851, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
17


More specifically, as far as concerns public undertakings, such as CE Oltenia, the Court has also held that the State is able, by exercising its dominant influence over such undertakings, to direct the use of their resources in order, as occasion arises, to finance specific advantages in favour of other undertakings (judgment of 16 May 2002, France v Commission, C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraph 38).
18


Second, as regards the condition that an aid measure taken by a public undertaking must be attributable to the State, it is clear from settled case-law that that may be inferred from a set of indicators arising from the circumstances of the case and the context in which that measure was taken (judgment of 16 May 2002, France v Commission, C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraph 55).
20


However, the mere fact that a public undertaking has been constituted in the form of a capital company under ordinary law cannot, having regard to the autonomy which that legal form is capable of conferring upon it, be regarded as sufficient to exclude the possibility of an aid measure taken by such a company being imputable to the State. The existence of a situation of control and the real possibilities of exercising a dominant influence which that situation involves in practice makes it impossible to exclude from the outset any imputability to the State of a measure taken by such a company, and hence the risk of an infringement of the Treaty rules on State aid, notwithstanding the relevance, as such, of the legal form of the public undertaking as one indicator, amongst others, enabling it to be determined in a given case whether or not the State is involved (judgment of 16 May 2002, France v Commission, C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraph 57).
25


According to the settled case-law of the Court, the conditions that a measure must meet in order to be regarded as ‘aid’, within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU are not fulfilled if the recipient undertaking, in circumstances corresponding to normal market conditions, could have obtained the same advantage as that made available to it through State resources. When a public creditor grants payment facilities in respect of a debt payable to it by an undertaking that assessment is made, by applying, in principle, the private creditor test (see, in particular, judgments of 24 January 2013, Frucona Košice v Commission, C‑73/11 P, EU:C:2013:32, paragraphs 70 and 71, and of 21 March 2013, Commission v Buczek Automotive, C‑405/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:186, paragraphs 31 and 32).
26


Such payment facilities constitute State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU where, taking account of the significance of the economic advantage thereby granted, the recipient undertaking would manifestly not have obtained comparable facilities from a private creditor in a situation as close as possible to that of the public creditor and seeking to recover sums due to it by a debtor in financial difficulty (judgment of 24 January 2013, Frucona Košice v Commission, C‑73/11 P, EU:C:2013:32, paragraph 72).
27


It is therefore for the referring court to carry out an overall assessment, taking into account all relevant evidence in the case at issue in the main proceedings, that is, in particular, the value of the asset which was the subject of the transfer in lieu of payment and the amount of the outstanding balance paid by CE Oltenia, in order to determine whether the Electrocentrale would manifestly not have obtained comparable facilities from such a private creditor (see, by analogy, judgment of 24 January 2013, Frucona Košice v Commission, C‑73/11 P, EU:C:2013:32, paragraph 73).
29


For the purpose of categorising a national measure as State aid, it is necessary, not to establish that the aid has a real effect on trade between the Member States and that competition is actually being distorted, but only to examine whether that aid is liable to affect such trade and distort competition (judgments of 30 April 2009, Commission v Italy and Wam, C‑494/06 P, EU:C:2009:272, paragraph 50, and of 26 October 2016, Orange v Commission, C‑211/15 P, EU:C:2016:798, paragraph 64).
30


However, the effect on trade between the Member States cannot be purely hypothetical or presumed. Thus, it is necessary to determine the reason why the measure concerned distorts or threatens to distort competition and is liable by its foreseeable effects to have an impact on trade between the Member States (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 April 2009, Commission v Italy and Wam, C‑494/06 P, EU:C:2009:272, paragraph 64).
31


In particular, when aid granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-Community trade, those undertakings must be regarded as affected by that aid (judgment of 10 January 2006, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others, C‑222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraph 141).
32


In that connection, it not necessary that the beneficiary undertaking itself be involved in intra-Community trade. Where a Member State grants aid to an undertaking, internal activity may be maintained or increased as a result, so that the opportunities for undertakings established in other Member States to penetrate the market in that Member State are reduced as a result (judgment of 14 January 2015, Eventech, C‑518/13, EU:C:2015:9, paragraph 67).
33


With regard to the requirement that competition should be distorted, it must be borne in mind in that regard that, in principle, aid intended to release an undertaking from costs which it would normally have to bear in its day-to-day management or normal activities distorts the conditions of competition (judgment of 30 April 2009, Commission v Italy and Wam, C‑494/06 P, EU:C:2009:272, paragraph 54).
34


Furthermore, the fact that an economic sector, such as the energy sector, has been the subject of liberalisation at EU level may serve to determine that the aid in question has a real or potential effect on competition and affects trade between the Member States (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 January 2006, Cassadi Risparmio di Firenze and Others, C‑222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraph 142, and of 5 March 2015, Banco Privado Português and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português, C‑667/13, EU:C:2015:151, paragraph 51).
35


As the Commission observed in its written submissions, in so far as electricity is the subject of cross-border trade, the grant of aid by the decision at issue in the main proceedings is liable to affect trade. Such aid may also distort competition on the electricity market.
40


Article 108(3) TFEU establishes a prior control of plans to grant new aid. The aim of that system of prior control is therefore that only compatible aid may be implemented. In order to achieve that aim, the implementation of planned aid is to be deferred until the doubt as to its compatibility is resolved by the Commission’s final decision (judgment of 21 November 2013, Deutsche Lufthansa, C‑284/12, EU:C:2013:755, paragraphs 25 and 26).
41


The implementation of that system of control is a matter for both the Commission and the national courts, their respective roles being complementary but separate (judgment of 13 February 2014, Mediaset, C‑69/13, EU:C:2014:71, paragraph 19).
42


Whilst an assessment of the compatibility of aid measures with the common market falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the Courts of the European Union, it is for the national courts to ensure the safeguarding, until the final decision of the Commission, of the rights of individuals faced with a possible breach by State authorities of the prohibition laid down by Article 108(3) TFEU (judgment 21 November 2013, Deutsche Lufthansa, C‑284/12, EU:C:2013:755, paragraph 28).