T.KUP SAS v Belgische Staat.
Date: 2017-06-15
16


It should be noted that it follows from the spirit of cooperation which must prevail in the operation of the preliminary reference procedure that it is essential that the national court sets out in its order for reference the precise reasons why it considers a reply to its questions concerning the interpretation or validity of certain provisions of EU law to be necessary to enable it to give judgment (see judgments of 4 May 2016, Pillbox 38, C‑477/14, EU:C:2016:324, paragraph 24, and Philip Morris Brands and Others, C‑547/14, EU:C:2016:325, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
17


It is therefore important that the national court should set out, in particular, the precise reasons which led it to question the validity of certain provisions of EU law and set out the grounds of invalidity which, consequently, appear to it capable of being upheld. Such a requirement also arises under Article 94(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court (see judgments of 4 May 2016, Pillbox 38, C‑477/14, EU:C:2016:324, paragraph 25, and Philip Morris Brands and Others, C‑547/14, EU:C:2016:325, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited) and the recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (OJ 2012 C 338, p. 1, paragraph 22) (see, to that effect, order of 11 January 2017, Boudjellal, C‑508/16, not published, EU:C:2017:6, paragraph 22).
18


Furthermore, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the information provided in orders for reference not only enables the Court to give useful answers but also serves to ensure that the governments of the Member States and other interested persons are given an opportunity to submit observations in accordance with Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It is for the Court to ensure that that opportunity is safeguarded, given that, under Article 23, only the orders for reference are notified to the interested parties, accompanied by a translation in the official language of each Member State, but excluding any case file that may be sent to the Court by the national court (see judgments of 4 May 2016, Pillbox 38, C‑477/14, EU:C:2016:324, paragraph 26, and Philip Morris Brands and Others, C‑547/14, EU:C:2016:325, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
24


It should be noted, in the second place, that Article 17(1) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation provides for two sampling methods. The investigation may be limited either to a reasonable number of parties, products or transactions, which are statistically valid on the basis of information available at the time of the selection, or to the largest representative volume of production, sales or exports which can reasonably be investigated within the time available (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2015, Fliesen-Zentrum Deutschland, C‑687/13, EU:C:2015:573, paragraph 86).
27


It should be noted, moreover, that the Court has already held that the institutions enjoyed a broad discretion in the choice of sampling (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2015, Fliesen-Zentrum Deutschland, C‑687/13, EU:C:2015:573, paragraph 93), so that the EU Courts must, in the context of their review, restrict themselves to verifying that that choice is not based on incorrectly established facts or vitiated by a manifest error of appraisal.