larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 2002-01-30
23 It should be observed in this regard that the Court has consistently held that the question whether there has been a failure to fulfil obligations must be examined on the basis of the position in which the Member State found itself at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-166/97 Commission v France [1999] ECR I-1719, paragraph 18, and Case C-220/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-5831, paragraph 33).
34 It is undisputed that the use of mopeds on a beach used for breeding by the Caretta caretta turtle is, particularly owing to the noise pollution, liable to disturb that species during the laying period, the incubation period and the hatching of the eggs, as well as during the baby turtles' migration to the sea. It is also established that the presence of small boats near the breeding beaches constitutes a source of danger to the life and physical well-being of the turtles.
35 It is apparent from the documents before the Court that at the time the facts were ascertained by the Commission's officials, the use of mopeds on the breeding beaches was prohibited and notices indicating the presence of turtle nests on the beaches had been erected. As regards the sea area around Gerakas and Dafni, it had been classified as an absolute protection area and special notices had been erected there.
36 It follows that the use of mopeds on the sand beach to the east of Laganas and the presence of pedalos and small boats in the sea area around Gerakas and Dafni constitute the deliberate disturbance of the species in question during its breeding period for the purposes of Article 12(1)(b) of the Directive.
37 Moreover, the acts were not isolated occurrences. As regards the use of mopeds on the breeding beaches, this is clear from the Greek Government's assertion that nocturnal supervision of the eastern part of beach at Laganas was, at the material time, particularly difficult to ensure owing to the length of the beach, the high number of access points and the low number of supervisors. As far as the presence of small boats in the relevant sea area is concerned, it should be noted that these were observed on two visits to Zakinthos by Commission officials, as stated at paragraphs 8 and 13 of this judgment.
38 Finally, there is no doubt that the presence of buildings on a breeding beach such as the one at Dafni is liable to lead to the deterioration or destruction of the breeding site within the meaning of Article 12(1)(d) of the Directive.
39 It must, therefore, be held that the Hellenic Republic did not take, within the prescribed time-limit, all the requisite specific measures to prevent the deliberate disturbance of the sea turtle Caretta caretta during its breeding period and the deterioration or destruction of its breeding sites. Consequently, the Commission's application must also be granted on this point.
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 2002-02-07
24 At the outset, it should be observed that Article 9(1)(a) of the Directive imposes a duty on the employer to be in possession of documents containing an assessment of the risks to safety and health at work, documents to which workers and/or their representatives with specific responsibility for the safety and health of workers must have access under Article 10(3)(a) of the Directive.
Turbon International GmbH v Oberfinanzdirektion Koblenz.
Date: 2002-02-07
21 For the purposes of the answer to be given to the national court's question, it should first be observed that it is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the Common Customs Tariff and of the notes to the sections or chapters (Case C-338/95 Wiener SI [1997] ECR I-6495, paragraph 10; Case C-339/98 Peacock [2000] ECR I-8947, paragraph 9, and Case C-479/99 CBA Computer [2001] ECR I-4391, paragraph 21).
22 In addition, for the purpose of interpreting the Common Customs Tariff, the Court has consistently held that both the notes which head the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff and the Explanatory Notes to the Nomenclature of the Customs Cooperation Council are important means for ensuring the uniform application of the Tariff and as such may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (see judgments in Wiener SI, cited above, paragraph 11 and Peacock, cited above, paragraph 10).
26 In that connection, it is settled case-law that in order to identify from among the materials of which a product is composed which is the one that gives it its essential character, it is necessary to determine whether the product would retain its characteristic properties if one or other of its constituents were removed from it (see, to that effect, Case C 288/99 VauDe Sport [2001] ECR I-3683, paragraph 25).
30 In that connection, it should be observed that the word part, within the meaning of CN heading 8473, implies a whole for the operation of which the part is essential (see Peacock, cited above, paragraph 21) and this is not so in the case of the cartridge at issue in the main proceedings. While it is true that, without an ink-cartridge, a printer is not able to carry out its intended functions, the fact remains that the mechanical and electronic functioning of the printer in itself is not in any way dependent on such a cartridge. The inability of the printer, in the absence of an ink-cartridge, to transcribe on to paper the work produced with the aid of a computer is caused by lack of ink rather than a malfunctioning of the printer.
32 Equally, such a cartridge cannot be classified under heading 8473 as an accessory of the printers in question. While the cartridges are interchangeable, they are not designed to adapt the printers for a particular operation, or to perform a particular service relative to their main function, or to increase their range of operations, within the meaning of the HS explanatory note relating to heading 8473. Such cartridges merely enable ESC printers to fulfil their usual function, namely, the transcription on to paper of work produced with the aid of a computer.
Maria Weber and Martin Weber v Freistaat Bayern.
Date: 2002-02-07
32 Second, Community institutions enjoy wide discretion in the area of the common agricultural policy corresponding to the responsibilities given to them by the EC Treaty (see, in particular, Case C-375/96 Zaninotto [1998] ECR I-6629, paragraph 64, and Case C-189/01 Jippes and Others [2001] ECR I-5689 paragraph 80).
33 Given the existence of such discretion, the Court must confine itself to examining whether the exercise of the discretion is not vitiated by a manifest error or misuse of power or whether the institution in question has not manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion (see, in particular, Case C-354/95 National Farmers' Union [1997] ECR I-4559, paragraph 50, Jippes and Others, cited above, paragraph 80, and Case C-301/97 Netherlands v Council [2001] ECR I-8853, paragraph 74).
42 With regard the fourth and fifth questions, namely whether Regulation No 525/93 is invalid, in whole or in part, for infringement of the obligation to state reasons under Article 190 of the Treaty, it must be observed that the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty must be appropriate to the nature of the measure in question. It must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the institution which enacted the measure, so as to inform the persons concerned of the justification for the measure adopted and to enable the Court to exercise its powers of review. It is not necessary, however, for details of all relevant factual and legal aspects to be given, in so far as the question whether the statement of grounds for a measure meets the requirements of Article 190 of the Treaty must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, in particular, Joined Cases C-15/98 and C -105/99 Italy and Sardinia Lines v Commission [2000] ECR I-8855, paragraph 65, and Netherlands v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 187 and 188).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2002-02-19
9 It should be recalled that Regulation No 4055/86, which was adopted on the basis of Article 84(2) EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 80(2) EC), lays down measures for the application in the maritime transport sector of the principle of freedom to provide services laid down in Article 59 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 49 EC). Moreover, the Court has decided to that effect by ruling that Article 1(1) of the regulation defines the beneficiaries of the freedom to provide maritime transport services between Member States and between Member States and third countries in terms which are substantially the same as those in Article 59 of the Treaty (Case C-381/93 Commission v France [1994] ECR I-5145, paragraph 10).
10 The freedom laid down by Article 59 of the Treaty precludes the application of any national legislation which has the effect of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services purely within one Member State (Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 17).
11 Consequently, the provision of maritime transport services between Member States cannot be subject to stricter conditions than those to which analogous provisions of services at domestic level are subject (Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 18).
12 Furthermore, it must be recalled that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, in particular, Case C-147/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2387, paragraph 26).
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 2002-02-19
7 In those circumstances, the Commission brought the present action.
10 It must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, first, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period prescribed in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C-147/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2387, paragraph 26) and, second, a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, inter alia, Case C-374/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-10799, paragraph 13).
12 Furthermore, the finding of a failure to fulfil obligations of itself precludes granting the Luxembourg authorities' application to suspend the proceedings pending a hypothetical withdrawal of the action by the Commission (Case C-47/99 Commission v Luxembourg [1999] ECR I-8999, paragraph 12).
Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen v Petra Rydergård.
Date: 2002-02-21
17 Article 69 of Regulation No 1408/71 enables an unemployed worker to be exempt for a specific period, for the purpose of seeking employment in another Member State, from the obligation imposed by the various national laws to make himself available to the employment services of the competent State without thereby losing his entitlement to unemployment benefits as against that State (Joined Cases 41/79, 121/79 and 796/79 Testa [1980] ECR 1979, paragraph 4).
25 Uniform application of that provision in all the Member States, making it possible for it to achieve its aim of helping to ensure the free movement of workers in accordance with Article 42 EC, does not require that the detailed arrangements for registration of a worker as a person seeking employment and the question of the conditions under which he may be regarded as having remained available to the employment services of the competent State be regulated in a uniform manner in all Member States.
Council of the European Union v Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica GmbH and C. H. Boehringer Sohn.
Date: 2002-02-26
46 The Court must examine of its own motion whether the claim thus formulated by the Council is directed against a decision of the Court of First Instance that is open to appeal under the first paragraph of Article 49 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice.
50 However, decisions which dispose of a procedural issue concerning a plea of inadmissibility, within the meaning of that provision, are decisions which adversely affect one of the parties by upholding or rejecting that objection of inadmissibility. Thus, for example, the Court of Justice allowed an appeal against a judgment of the Court of First Instance in so far as the latter had dismissed an objection of inadmissibility raised by one party against an action, whereas the Court of First Instance had, in the remainder of the same judgment, dismissed that action as unfounded (Case C-73/97 P France v Comafrica and Others [1999] ECR I-185).
51 However, it does not appear from the contested judgment that the Court of First Instance intended to rule by way of decision on the admissibility of the action brought by BI Vetmedica and Boehringer in Case T-125/96 before dismissing it on the merits. Paragraphs 143 and 146 of the contested judgment show, on the contrary, that the Court of First Instance considered that it was not necessary to rule on the objection of inadmissibility raised by the Council since the claims by BI Vetmedica and Boehringer in Case T-125/96 had in any event to be dismissed on the merits.
52 It was for the Court of First Instance to assess, as it did, whether in the circumstances of the case the proper administration of justice justified the dismissal of the action on the merits in this case without ruling on the objection of inadmissibility raised by the Council, a course of action which cannot be regarded as adversely affecting that institution.
Commission of the European Communities v Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica GmbH and C. H. Boehringer Sohn.
Date: 2002-02-26
47 In the first part of this plea, the Commission argues that the error of law by the Court of First Instance lies in the fact that, in paragraphs 188 to 190, the contested judgment took as the starting point for its analysis the reasoning, which the Commission maintains is erroneous, used in paragraphs 88 to 90 of the Lilly judgment, which led the Court of First Instance to draw equally erroneous inferences in the remainder of the contested judgment. In the second part of the same plea, the Commission maintains that the Court of First Instance also erred in law in paragraph 187 of the contested judgment, by holding that Article 6(1) of Regulation No 2377/90 did not make the inclusion of a substance in one of the Annexes I to III to that regulation subject to the condition that the product containing that substance must be directly used and marketed.
53 Furthermore, an implementing regulation must, if possible, be given an interpretation consistent with the basic regulation (Case C-90/92 Dr Tretter v Hauptzollamt Stuttgart-Ost [1993] ECR I-3569, paragraph 11; Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-3989, paragraph 52). In this case, an analysis of Regulation No 1312/96 in the light of the provisions of Regulation No 2377/90, which constitutes its legal basis, confirms that those references must be regarded as merely declaratory, and not having, in themselves, the character of legislation.
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2002-02-27
15 The setting of a minimum retail selling price by public authorities inevitably has the effect of limiting the freedom of producers and importers to determine their maximum retail selling prices since, in any event, those prices cannot be lower than the compulsory minimum price (Case C-216/98 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-8921, paragraph 21).
20 Further, it must be held that the application of different minimum tax rates for dark- and light-tobacco cigarettes under Article 575A of the amended GTC infringes Article 8(2) and Article 16(5) of Directive 95/59 and Article 2 of Directive 92/79, which require the application of a single minimum global excise duty, identical for all cigarettes.
21 Concerning the question of whether a different rate of taxation for dark- and light-tobacco cigarettes also infringes Article 95 of the Treaty, it should be observed that, according to the settled case-law, a system of taxation may be considered compatible with Article 95 of the Treaty only if it is such as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than similar domestic products (see, in particular, Case C-265/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2305, paragraph 40).
23 According to the settled case-law of the Court, which has interpreted the concept of similarity widely, in order to determine whether products are similar it is necessary to consider whether they have similar characteristics and meet the same needs from the point of view of consumers, the test being not whether they are strictly identical but whether their use is similar and comparable (Joined Cases C-367/93 to C-377/93 Roders and Others [1995] ECR I-2229, paragraph 27).
30 Although Article 575A of the amended GTC does not establish any formal distinction according to the origin of the products, it adjusts the system of taxation in such a way that the cigarettes falling within the most favourable tax category come almost exclusively from domestic production whereas almost all imported products come within the least advantageous category. Those features of the system are not nullified by the fact that a very small fraction of imported cigarettes come within the most favourable category whereas, conversely, a certain proportion of domestic production comes within the same tax category as imported cigarettes. It appears, therefore, that the system of taxation is designed in such a way as to benefit a typical domestic product and handicaps imported cigarettes to the same extent (see Case 171/78 Commission v Denmark [1980] ECR 447, paragraph 36).
33 In this regard, it is sufficient to point out that Article 36 of the Treaty must be interpreted strictly and thus cannot be understood as authorising measures of a different nature from the quantitative restrictions on imports and exports and measures having equivalent effect laid down by Articles 30 and 34 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Articles 28 EC and 29 EC) (see Case 29/72 Marimex [1972] ECR 1309, paragraphs 4 and 5, and Case 46/76 Bauhuis [1977] ECR 5, at paragraphs 12 to 14).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 2002-02-27
15 In that regard, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, in particular, Case C-384/99 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I-10633, paragraph 16). At the end of the period of two months laid down by the reasoned opinion of 7 September 2000, the Royal Decree which the Belgian Government announced, and whose utility for the purpose of completely transposing Directive 98/18 it acknowledged, had in any event still not been adopted.
16 It is also settled case-law of the Court of Justice that a Member State cannot rely on provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal order to justify its failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down by Community directives, nor therefore the late or incomplete transposition of a directive (see, in particular, Case C-303/92 Commission v Netherlands [1993] ECR I-4739, paragraph 9, and Case C-139/97 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-605, paragraphs 9 to 11).
Axa Royale Belge SA v Georges Ochoa and Stratégie Finance SPRL.
Date: 2002-03-05
18 It should be recalled, as a preliminary point that even if, in the absence of proper transposition into national law, a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on individuals, the national court that has to interpret that law must do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive so as to achieve the result it has in view and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 189 of the EC Treaty (now the third paragraph of Article 249 EC) (see, in particular, Case C-456/98 Centrosteel [2000] ECR I-6007, paragraphs 15 and 16).
24 It is thus apparent from the express wording of Article 31(3), Annex II and the 23rd recital in the preamble to the directive that the additional information Member States may require in accordance with that article must be clear, accurate and necessary for a proper understanding of the essential characteristics of assurance products proposed to the policy-holder.
28 The warning in question thus also risks jeopardising the objective sought by Article 31 of the directive, which, as the preamble states, is to provide the policy-holder with the information necessary to enable him to select the contract best suited to his requirements so that he can profit fully from the greater choice of contracts and the increased competition in the single assurance market.
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2002-03-07
22 As the Court has previously held, the fact that a provision of services is temporary does not mean that the provider of services within the meaning of the Treaty may not equip himself with some form of infrastructure in the host Member State (including an office, chambers or consulting rooms) in so far as such infrastructure is necessary for the purposes of performing the services in question (Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165, paragraph 27).
23 It follows that the general prohibition laid down in the second paragraph of Article 2 of Law No 31/82, whereby a lawyer established in a Member State other than the Italian Republic and exercising in Italy his freedom to provide services may not establish chambers or a principal or branch office in Italy, is incompatible with Article 59 of the Treaty.
27 The Court has repeatedly held that the right of establishment enshrined in Article 52 of the Treaty entails the right to set up and maintain, subject to observance of the rules of professional practice, more than one place of work within the Community (see, to that effect, Case 107/83 Klopp [1984] ECR 2971, paragraph 19, Case C-106/91 Ramrath [1992] ECR I-3351, paragraphs 20 to 22 and 28, and Case C-162/99 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-541, paragraph 20).
30 The Court has consistently held that the incompatibility of national legislation with Community provisions, even provisions which are directly applicable, can be finally remedied only by means of national provisions of a binding nature which have the same legal force as those which must be amended. Mere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the authorities and are not given the appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the proper fulfilment of obligations under the Treaty (see, in particular, Case C-197/96 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-1489, paragraph 14, and Case C-358/98 Commission v Italy [2000] ECR I-1255, paragraph 17).
37 Those amending provisions satisfy the two conditions which the Court requires to be fulfilled in order for national law to be compatible with primary Community law. These are that the incompatibility of national legislation with Community provisions, even directly applicable provisions, can be definitively remedied only by means of national provisions that are binding and have the same legal force as those that have to be modified (see, in particular, Case C-358/98 Commission v Italy, cited above, paragraph 17).