Fernand Ullens de Schooten v État belge.
Date: 2016-11-15
40


It must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the Court may interpret EU law only within the limits of the powers conferred on it (see judgment of 27 March 2014, Torralbo Marcos, C‑265/13, EU:C:2014:187, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
41


The principle of the non-contractual liability of a State for damage caused to individuals by breaches of EU law for which the State can be held responsible is inherent in the EU legal order. The Court has held that individuals harmed have a right to compensation on the basis of that liability where three conditions are met, namely that the rule of EU law infringed is intended to confer rights on them, that the breach of that rule is sufficiently serious, and that there is a direct causal link between the breach and the damage sustained by the individuals (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 November 1991, Francovich and Others, C‑6/90 and C‑9/90, EU:C:1991:428, paragraph 35, and of 5 March 1996, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, C‑46/93 and C‑48/93, EU:C:1996:79, paragraphs 31 and 51).
42


The non-contractual liability of a Member State for damage caused by a decision of a national court adjudicating at last instance which infringes a rule of EU law is governed by the same conditions (see judgments of 30 September 2003, Köbler, C‑224/01, EU:C:2003:513, paragraph 52, and of 28 July 2016, Tomášová, C‑168/15, EU:C:2016:602, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
47


It should be recalled here that the provisions of the FEU Treaty on the freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital do not apply to a situation which is confined in all respects within a single Member State (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 March 2014, Caixa d’Estalvis i Pensions de Barcelona, C‑139/12, EU:C:2014:174, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited, and of 30 June 2016, Admiral Casinos & Entertainment, C‑464/15, EU:C:2016:500, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
49


The fact that in its judgment of 12 February 1987, Commission v Belgium (221/85, EU:C:1987:81), on the action brought by the Commission for failure to fulfil obligations, the Court assessed the observance by the Kingdom of Belgium of one of the fundamental freedoms laid down by the EEC Treaty cannot in itself allow the conclusion that that freedom may be relied on by an individual in a case such as that in the main proceedings, confined in all respects within a single Member State. While the bringing of an action for failure to fulfil obligations means that the Court ascertains whether the national measure challenged by the Commission is, in general, capable of deterring operators from other Member States from making use of the freedom in question, the Court’s function in proceedings for a preliminary ruling is, by contrast, to help the referring court to resolve the specific dispute pending before that court, which presupposes that that freedom is shown to be applicable to that dispute.
50


The Court has indeed regarded requests for preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of provisions of the Treaties relating to the fundamental freedoms as admissible even though the disputes in the main proceedings were confined in all respect within a single Member State, on the ground that it was not inconceivable that nationals established in other Member States had been or were interested in making use of those freedoms for carrying on activities in the territory of the Member State that had enacted the national legislation in question, and, consequently, that the legislation, applicable without distinction to nationals of that State and those of other Member States, was capable of producing effects which were not confined to that Member State (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 1 June 2010, Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez, C‑570/07 and C‑571/07, EU:C:2010:300, paragraph 40; of 18 July 2013, Citroën Belux, C‑265/12, EU:C:2013:498, paragraph 33; and of 5 December 2013, Venturini and Others, C‑159/12 to C‑161/12, EU:C:2013:791, paragraphs 25 and 26).
51


Similarly, the Court has found that, where the referring court makes a request for a preliminary ruling in proceedings for the annulment of provisions which apply not only to its own nationals but also to those of other Member States, the decision of the referring court that will be adopted following the Court’s preliminary ruling will also have effects on the nationals of other Member States, which justifies the Court giving an answer to the questions put to it in relation to the provisions of the Treaty on the fundamental freedoms, even though the dispute in the main proceedings is confined in all respects within a single Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2013, Libert and Others, C‑197/11 and C‑203/11, EU:C:2013:288, paragraph 35).
52


It should, moreover, be recalled that the interpretation of the fundamental freedoms provided for in Article 49, 56 or 63 TFEU may prove to be relevant in a case confined in all respects within a single Member State where national law requires the referring court to grant the same rights to a national of its own Member State as those which a national of another Member State in the same situation would derive from EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 December 2000, Guimont, C‑448/98,EU:C:2000:663, paragraph 23; of 21 June 2012, Susisalo and Others, C‑84/11, EU:C:2012:374, paragraph 20; and of 21 February 2013, Ordine degli Ingegneri di Verona e Provincia and Others, C‑111/12, EU:C:2013:100, paragraph 35).
53


The same applies in cases in which, although the facts of the main proceedings are outside the direct scope of EU law, the provisions of EU law have been made applicable by national legislation, which, in dealing with situations confined in all respects within a single Member State, follows the same approach as that provided for by EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 October 1990, Dzodzi, C‑297/88 and C‑197/89, EU:C:1990:360, paragraphs 36, 37 and 41; of 17 July 1997, Leur-Bloem, C‑28/95, EU:C:1997:369, paragraphs 27 and 32; and of 14 March 2013, Allianz Hungária Biztositó and Others, C‑32/11, EU:C:2013:160, paragraph 20).
54


While that is so, in the cases referred to in paragraphs 50 to 53 above, the Court, on a question being referred by a national court in connection with a situation confined in all respects within a single Member State, cannot, where the referring court does not indicate something other than that the national legislation in question applies without distinction to nationals of the Member State concerned and those of other Member States, consider that the request for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the provisions of the FEU Treaty on the fundamental freedoms is necessary to enable that court to give judgment in the case pending before it. The specific factors that allow a link to be established between the subject or circumstances of a dispute, confined in all respects within a single Member State, and Article 49, 56 or 63 TFEU must be apparent from the order for reference.
55


Consequently, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings which is confined in all respects within a single Member State, it is for the referring court to indicate to the Court, in accordance with the requirements of Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, in what way the dispute pending before it, despite its purely domestic character, has a connecting factor with the provisions of EU law on the fundamental freedoms that makes the preliminary ruling on interpretation necessary for it to give judgment in that dispute.