Elmeka NE v Ypourgos Oikonomikon.
Date: 2006-09-14
15. Furthermore, interpreting Article 15(4)(a) of the Sixth Directive as referring only to vessels used on the high seas is consistent with the case-law of the Court of Justice, which calls for VAT exemptions to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that turnover tax is to be levied on each service supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see in particular Case C-185/89 Velker International Oil Company  [1990] ECR I-2561, paragraph 19, and Case C-382/02 Cimber Air  [2004] ECR I-8379, paragraph 25).
20. It is appropriate to recall that exemptions are independent concepts of Community law which must be placed in the general context of the common system of VAT introduced by the Sixth Directive (see in particular Case C-2/95 SDC [1997] ECR I-3017, paragraph 21; Case C-141/00 Kügler [2002] ECR I-6833, paragraph 25; and Cimber Air , paragraph 23). Furthermore, exemptions from VAT must, as was stated in paragraph 15 of this judgment, be interpreted strictly.
21. The operations of fuelling and provisioning of vessels mentioned in Article 15(4) of the Sixth Directive are exempted because they are treated as exports (see, to that effect, Velker International Oil Company , paragraph 21).
22. In the case of export transactions, just as the automatic exemption laid down in Article 15(1) of the Sixth Directive applies exclusively to the final supply of goods dispatched or transp orted outside the Community by the seller, or on his behalf, the exemption laid down in Article 15(4) can only apply to the supply of goods to a vessel operator who will use those goods for provisioning and it cannot therefore be extended to the supply of goods effected at an earlier stage in the commercial chain (see, to that effect, Velker International Oil Company , paragraph 22).
23. Extending the exemption to stages prior to the final supply of the goods to the vessel operator would require Member States to set up means of supervision and monitoring in order to be sure of the ultimate use of the goods supplied free of tax. Such means would give rise to constraints for the Member States and the economic agents concerned which would be irreconcilable with the ‘correct and straightforward application of such exemptions’ prescribed by the first sentence of Article 15 of the Sixth Directive (see, to that effect, Velker International Oil Company , paragraph 24).
24. As Advocate General Stix-Hackl states at point 28 of her Opinion, the same considerations apply to the exemption for the supply of services under Article 15(8). It follows that, in order to guarantee a coherent application of the Sixth Directive as a whole, the exemption provided for under this provision applies only to services supplied directly to the shipowner, and cannot therefore be extended to services supplied at an earlier stage in the commercial chain.
25. The answer to the second question must therefore be that Article 15(8) of the Sixth Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that the exemption provided for therein applies to the supply of services directly to the shipowner for the direct needs of sea-going vessels.
The third question
31. Under the settled case-law of the Court, the principles of protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty form part of the Community legal order. On that basis, these principles must be respected by the institutions of the Community, but also by Member States in the exercise of the powers conferred on them by Community directives (see in particular Case C-381/97 Belgocodex  [1998] ECR I‑8153, paragraph 26, and Case C-376/02 ‘Goed Wonen’  [2005] ECR I-3445, paragraph 32). It follows that national authorities are obliged to respect the principle of protection of the legitimate expectations of economic agents.
32. As regards the principle of protection of the legitimate expectations of the beneficiary of the favourable conduct, it is appropriate, first, to determine whether the conduct of the administrative authorities gave rise to a reasonable expectation in the mind of a reasonably prudent economic agent (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 95/74 to 98/74, 15/75 and 100/75 Union nationale des coopératives agricoles de céréales and Others v Commission and Council [1975] ECR 1615, paragraphs 43 to 45, and Case 78/77 Lührs  [1978] ECR 169, paragraph 6). If it did, the legitimate nature of this expectation must then be established.
35. In that respect, it falls to the national court to decide whether Elmeka, which operates a tanker to carry petroleum products within Greece on behalf of various charterers, could reasonably have believed that the tax authority of Piraeus was competent to rule on the application of the exemption to its activities.
36. In the light of those observations the answer to the third question must be that in the framework of the common system of VAT, national tax authorities are obliged to respect the principle of protection of legitimate expectations. It falls to the referring court to decide whether, in the circumstances of the main proceedings, the taxable person could reasonably have believed that the decision in question had been taken by a competent authority.
Costs