Agrana Zucker GmbH v Bundesministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Unwelt und Wasserwirtschaft.
Date: 2009-06-11
22. As the Advocate General pointed out in points 40 to 43 of her Opinion, an undertaking’s renunciation of a quota together with the dismantling or non-use of its production facilities is definitive. As is apparent from, inter alia, recitals 1 and 5 in the preamble to Regulation No 320/2006, the renunciation mechanism is one of the means of restructuring the sugar sector with a view to reducing unprofitable production capacity in the Community and is the subject of an economic incentive in the form of restructuring aid intended for those undertakings with the lowest productivity, so that they give up their quota production.
31. In that regard, it should be recalled that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of Community law, requires that acts adopted by Community institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation in question; where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (Case C‑310/04 Spain v Council [2006] ECR I­‑7285, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited).
32. As regards judicial review of the implementation of that principle, bearing in mind the wide discretion enjoyed by the Community legislature where the common agricultural policy is concerned, the lawfulness of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate in terms of the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue ( Spain v Council , paragraph 98 and the case-law cited).
33. What must be ascertained is therefore not whether the measure adopted by the legislature was the only measure possible or the best measure possible but whether it was manifestly inappropriate ( Spain v Council , paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).
40. In that regard, the measure in question can be distinguished from that at issue in Zuckerfabrik Jülich and Others , in which the Court held that the method of calculating contributions evaluated in paragraphs 57 to 60 of that judgment went beyond what was necessary to attain the objective of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector (OJ 2001 L 178, p. 1), which sought to make producers meet in full, in a fair yet efficient way, the cost of disposing of surpluses of Community production in accordance with the principle of self‑financing.
42. Furthermore, as regards the burdens which the system imposes on the undertakings which are subject to it, it must be emphasised that the scheme is temporary, that arrangements for preventive withdrawal are unique in their application, and that those undertakings can expect to benefit, first, from the renouncing of quotas which the Community legislature sought to encourage and, second, from the support for the price of quota sugar permitted by a withdrawal from the market, in particular, by preventive withdrawal. That benefit is capable of offsetting the disadvantages which that scheme gives rise to, including the fact that the quantity of sugar withdrawn from the market in the course of a marketing year is still subject to the temporary amount applicable to a quota allocated for the following marketing year if that quantity is carried forward and not sold as industrial sugar or out of quota on the world market.
46. In that regard, it should be noted that the Court has consistently held that the second subparagraph of Article 34(2) EC, which prohibits all discrimination in the context of the common agricultural policy, is merely a specific expression of the general principle of equal treatment, which requires that comparable situations not be treated differently and different situations not be treated alike unless such treatment is objectively justified (Case C‑313/04 Franz Egenberger [2006] ECR I‑6331, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
51. Nevertheless, such treatment of undertakings appears to be objectively justified. As the division of the quotas between undertakings and the management of those quotas are ensured by the Member States, the renouncing of quotas is also organised by each Member State and will vary from one Member State to another. In that context, as is apparent from recital 6 in the preamble to Regulation No 493/2006, the object of applying a coefficient which varies depending on the Member State concerned, as provided for in Article 3(2) of that regulation, is to take into account the special efforts which Member States have made to renounce quotas definitively and, in so doing, to contribute to reducing production at an equal rate in all the Member States in order to achieve balanced production throughout the Community.