Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz.
Date: 1979-12-13
14 AS THE COURT DECLARED IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 17 DECEMBER 1970 , INTERNATIONALE HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT ( 1970 ) ECR 1125 , THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE INFRINGEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS BY A MEASURE OF THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS CAN ONLY BE JUDGED IN THE LIGHT OF COMMUNITY LAW ITSELF . THE INTRODUCTION OF SPECIAL CRITERIA FOR ASSESSMENT STEMMING FROM THE LEGISLATION OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF A PARTICULAR MEMBER STATE WOULD , BY DAMAGING THE SUBSTANTIVE UNITY AND EFFICACY OF COMMUNITY LAW , LEAD INEVITABLY TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE UNITY OF THE COMMON MARKET AND THE JEOPARDIZING OF THE COHESION OF THE COMMUNITY .
15 THE COURT ALSO EMPHASIZED IN THE JUDGMENT CITED , AND LATER IN THE JUDGMENT OF 14 MAY 1974 , NOLD ( 1974 ) ECR 491 , THAT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FORM AN     INTEGRAL PART OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW , THE OBSERVANCE OF WHICH IT ENSURES ; THAT IN SAFEGUARDING THOSE RIGHTS , THE COURT IS BOUND TO DRAW INSPIRATION FROM CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS COMMON TO THE MEMBER STATES , SO THAT MEASURES WHICH ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS RECOGNIZED BY THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THOSE STATES ARE UNACCEPTABLE IN THE COMMUNITY ; AND THAT , SIMILARLY , INTERNATIONAL TREATIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON WHICH THE MEMBER STATES HAVE COLLABORATED OR OF WHICH THEY ARE SIGNATORIES , CAN SUPPLY GUIDELINES WHICH SHOULD BE FOLLOWED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF COMMUNITY LAW . THAT CONCEPTION WAS LATER RECOGNIZED BY THE JOINT DECLARATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT , THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION OF 5 APRIL 1977 , WHICH , AFTER RECALLING THE CASE-LAW OF THE COURT , REFERS ON THE ONE HAND TO THE RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE MEMBER STATES AND ON THE OTHER HAND TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF 4 NOVEMBER 1950 ( OFFICIAL JOURNAL C 103 , 1977 , P . 1 ).
17 THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY IS GUARANTEED IN THE COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE IDEAS COMMON TO THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE MEMBER STATES , WHICH ARE ALSO REFLECTED IN THE FIRST PROTOCOL TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS .
23 HOWEVER , THAT FINDING DOES NOT DEAL COMPLETELY WITH THE PROBLEM RAISED BY THE VERWALTUNGSGERICHT . EVEN IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DISPUTE IN PRINCIPLE THE COMMUNITY ' S ABILITY TO RESTRICT THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMMON ORGANIZATION OF THE MARKET AND FOR THE PURPOSES OF A STRUCTURAL POLICY , IT IS STILL NECESSARY TO EXAMINE WHETHER THE RESTRICTIONS INTRODUCED BY THE PROVISIONS IN DISPUTE IN FACT CORRESPOND TO OBJECTIVES OF GENERAL INTEREST PURSUED BY THE COMMUNITY OR WHETHER , WITH REGARD TO THE AIM PURSUED , THEY CONSTITUTE A DISPROPORTIONATE AND INTOLERABLE INTERFERENCE WITH THE RIGHTS OF THE OWNER , IMPINGING UPON THE VERY SUBSTANCE OF THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY . SUCH IN FACT IS THE PLEA SUBMITTED BY THE PLAINTIFF IN THE MAIN ACTION , WHO CONSIDERS THAT ONLY THE PURSUIT OF A QUALITATIVE POLICY WOULD PERMIT THE LEGISLATURE TO RESTRICT THE USE OF WINE-GROWING PROPERTY , WITH THE RESULT THAT SHE POSSESSES AN UNASSAILABLE RIGHT FROM THE MOMENT THAT IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT HER LAND IS SUITABLE FOR WINE GROWING . IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO IDENTIFY THE AIM PURSUED BY THE DISPUTED REGULATION AND TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE EXISTS A REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MEASURES PROVIDED FOR BY THE REGULATION AND THE AIM PURSUED BY THE COMMUNITY IN THIS CASE .
31 THE APPLICANT IN THE MAIN ACTION ALSO SUBMITS THAT THE PROHIBITION ON NEW PLANTINGS IMPOSED BY REGULATION NO 1162/76 INFRINGES HER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN SO FAR AS ITS EFFECT IS TO RESTRICT HER FREEDOM TO PURSUE HER OCCUPATION AS A WINE-GROWER .
32 AS THE COURT HAS ALREADY STATED IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 14 MAY 1974 , NOLD , REFERRED TO ABOVE , ALTHOUGH IT IS TRUE THAT GUARANTEES ARE GIVEN BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SEVERAL MEMBER STATES IN RESPECT OF THE FREEDOM TO PURSUE TRADE OR PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES , THE RIGHT THEREBY GUARANTEED , FAR FROM CONSTITUTING AN UNFETTERED PREROGATIVE , MUST LIKEWISE BE VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF THE ACTIVITIES PROTECTED THEREUNDER . IN THIS CASE , IT MUST BE OBSERVED THAT THE DISPUTED COMMUNITY MEASURE DOES NOT IN ANY WAY AFFECT ACCESS TO THE OCCUPATION OF WINE-GROWING , OR THE FREEDOM TO PURSUE THAT OCCUPATION ON LAND AT PRESENT DEVOTED TO WINE-GROWING . TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE PROHIBITION ON NEW PLANTINGS AFFECTS THE FREE PURSUIT OF THE OCCUPATION OF WINE-GROWING , THAT LIMITATION IS NO MORE THAN THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE RESTRICTION UPON THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY , SO THAT THE TWO RESTRICTIONS MERGE . THUS THE RESTRICTION UPON THE FREE PURSUIT OF THE OCCUPATION OF WINE-GROWING , ASSUMING THAT IT EXISTS , IS JUSTIFIED BY THE SAME REASONS WHICH JUSTIFY THE RESTRICTION PLACED UPON THE USE OF PROPERTY .
33 THUS IT IS APPARENT FROM THE FOREGOING THAT CONSIDERATION OF REGULATION NO 1162/76 , IN THE LIGHT OF THE DOUBTS EXPRESSED BY THE VERWALTUNGSGERICHT , HAS DISCLOSED NO FACTOR OF SUCH A KIND AS TO AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THAT REGULATION ON ACCOUNT OF ITS BEING CONTRARY TO THE REQUIREMENTS FLOWING FROM THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE COMMUNITY .