larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Commission of the European Communities v Portuguese Republic.
Date: 2004-07-15
29. According to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C-147/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2387, paragraph 26).
34. As regards the measures and difficulties relied on by the Portuguese Government, it must be pointed out that Article 4(1) of the Directive requires Member States to ensure that certain results are achieved, inasmuch as the quality of bathing water must conform to the mandatory values laid down in the Directive. Apart from the derogations provided for, the Directive does not allow Member States to rely on particular circumstances to justify a failure to fulfil that obligation (see, inter alia, Case C-92/96 Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-505, paragraph 28, and Case C‑307/98 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I-3933, paragraph 49).
47. However, during the pre-litigation procedure, the Commission did not accuse the Portuguese Republic of failing to transpose Article 1(2)(b) of the Directive correctly into national law in so far as that provision refers to a large number of bathers. The Commission’s reasoned opinion and the application must be founded on the same grounds and pleas (see Case C-237/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-5973, paragraph 20).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2004-07-15
29. For that to be the case, the subsidy must first be paid specifically to the subsidised operator to enable it to supply particular goods or services. Only in that case can the subsidy be regarded as consideration for the supply of goods or services and therefore be taxable. It must be noted, in particular, that the beneficiary is recognised as having a right to receive the subsidy, since a taxable supply has been made by it (Case C‑184/00 Office des produits wallons  [2001] ECR I-9115, paragraphs 12 and 13).
30. It is also necessary to verify that the purchasers of the goods or services benefit from the subsidy granted to the beneficiary. The price payable by the purchaser must be fixed in such a way that it diminishes in proportion to the subsidy granted to the seller or supplier of the goods or services, which therefore constitutes an element in determining the price demanded by the latter. It must also be ascertained whether, objectively, the fact that a subsidy is paid to the seller or supplier allows the latter to sell the goods or supply the services at a price lower than he would have to demand in the absence of subsidy ( Office des produits wallons , paragraph 14).
31. The consideration represented by the subsidy must, at the very least, be identifiable. It is not necessary for the subsidy to correspond exactly to the diminution in the price of the goods or services supplied. It is sufficient if the relationship between the diminution in price and the subsidy, which may be at a flat rate, is significant ( Office des produits wallons , paragraph 17).
32. In conclusion, ‘subsidies directly linked to the price’ for the purposes of Article 11(A)(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive include only subsidies which constitute the whole or part of the consideration for a supply of goods or services and which are paid by a third party to the seller or supplier ( Office des produits wallons,  paragraph 18).
Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Finland.
Date: 2004-07-15
29. For that to be the case, the subsidy must first be paid specifically to the subsidised operator to enable it to supply particular goods or services. Only in that case can the subsidy be regarded as consideration for the supply of goods or services and therefore be taxable. It must be noted, in particular, that the beneficiary is recognised as having a right to receive the subsidy, since a taxable supply has been made by it (Case C‑184/00 Office des produits wallons  [2001] ECR I-9115, paragraphs 12 and 13).
30. It is also necessary to verify that the purchasers of the goods or services benefit from the subsidy granted to the beneficiary. The price payable by the purchaser must be fixed in such a way that it diminishes in proportion to the subsidy granted to the seller or supplier of the goods or services, which therefore constitutes an element in determining the price demanded by the latter. It must also be ascertained whether, objectively, the fact that a subsidy is paid to the seller or supplier allows the latter to sell the goods or supply the services at a price lower than he would have to demand in the absence of subsidy ( Office des produits wallons , paragraph 14).
31. The consideration represented by the subsidy must, at the very least, be identifiable. It is not necessary for the subsidy to correspond exactly to the diminution in the price of the goods or services supplied. It is sufficient if the relationship between the diminution in price and the subsidy, which may be at a flat rate, is significant ( Office des produits wallons , paragraph 17).
32. In conclusion, ‘subsidies directly linked to the price’ for the purposes of Article 11(A)(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive include only subsidies which constitute the whole or part of the consideration for a supply of goods or services and which are paid by a third party to the seller or supplier ( Office des produits wallons,  paragraph 18).
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 2004-07-15
26. By providing that the taxable amount for VAT encompasses, in the cases specified by it, subsidies paid to taxable persons, Article 11(A)(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive is intended to subject the full value of goods or services to VAT and hence to prevent payment of a subsidy entailing a lower return from the tax.
27. In accordance with its terms, that provision applies where the subsidy is directly linked to the price of the transaction in question.
28. For that to be the case, the subsidy must first be paid specifically to the subsidised operator to enable it to supply particular goods or services. Only in that case can the subsidy be regarded as consideration for the supply of goods or services and therefore be taxable. It must be noted, in particular, that the beneficiary is recognised as having a right to receive the subsidy, since a taxable supply has been made by it (Case C‑184/00 Office des produits wallons  [2001] ECR I-9115, paragraphs 12 and 13).
29. It is also necessary to verify that the purchasers of the goods or services benefit from the subsidy granted to the beneficiary. The price payable by the purchaser must be fixed in such a way that it diminishes in proportion to the subsidy granted to the seller or supplier of the goods or services, which therefore constitutes an element in determining the price demanded by the latter. It must also be ascertained whether, objectively, the fact that a subsidy is paid to the seller or supplier allows the latter to sell the goods or supply the services at a price lower than he would have to demand in the absence of subsidy ( Office des produits wallons , paragraph 14).
30. The consideration represented by the subsidy must, at the very least, be identifiable. It is not necessary for the subsidy to correspond exactly to the diminution in the price of the goods or services supplied. It is sufficient if the relationship between the diminution in price and the subsidy, which may be at a flat rate, is significant ( Office des produits wallons , paragraph 17).
31. In conclusion, ‘subsidies directly linked to the price’ for the purposes of Article 11(A)(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive include only subsidies which constitute the whole or part of the consideration for a supply of goods or services and which are paid by a third party to the seller or supplier ( Office des produits wallons , paragraph 18).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 2004-07-15
32. While it is true, as the Belgian Government submits, that that provision does not expressly mention the first acquisition of stocks, shares, or other securities of the same type, the fact remains, as the Advocate General pointed out in paragraph 14 of his Opinion, that to permit the levying of tax or duty on the initial acquisition of a newly issued security amounts in reality to taxing the very issue of that security as it forms an integral part of an overall transaction with regard to the raising of capital. The issue of securities is not an end in itself, and has no point until those securities find investors.
33. For Article 11(a) of Directive 69/335 to have practical effect, therefore, ‘issue’, for the purposes of that provision, must include the first acquisition of securities immediately consequent upon their issue.
Nicolas Schreiber.
Date: 2004-07-15
20. It should be noted that, at the time of the facts alleged in the main proceedings, the harmonisation provided for by Directive 98/8 had not been completed in that Annexes I, IA and IB to the directive, listing the active substances whose use is authorised in biocidal products, low-risk biocidal products and products containing only basic substances, were still being compiled at Community level. Indeed, the evaluation of the active substances notified for possible inclusion in those annexes will only be completed between 2006 and 2010.
41. According to settled case-law, all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions within the meaning of Article 28 EC and are therefore in principle prohibited (Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5, and Case C-322/01 Deutscher Apothekerverband  [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 66).
42. However, in the absence of Community harmonising measures, the free movement of a good may be restricted by national rules justified either on one of the grounds laid down by Article 30 EC or by mandatory requirements (Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral (‘ Cassis de Dijon ’) [1979] ECR 649, paragraph 8).
43. In adopting national measures to protect public health within the meaning of Article 30 EC, it is for the Member States to decide what degree of protection they intend to assure thereto (see, to that effect, Case 272/80 Frans-Nederlandse Maatschappij voor Belgische Producten  [1981] ECR 3277, paragraph 12, Case C-293/94 Brandsma  [1996] ECR I-3159, paragraph 11, and Case C-400/96 Harpegnies  [1998] ECR I-5121, paragraph 33). However, those national rules must be proportionate to the objectives pursued (Case 174/82 Sandoz  [1983] ECR 2445, paragraph 18, and Harpegnies , paragraph 34).
45. First, it should be noted that a scheme prohibiting the placing on the market of biocidal products without prior authorisation constitutes a restriction on the free movement of goods within the meaning of Article 28 EC (see, to that effect, Brandsma , paragraph 6, and Harpegnies , paragraph 30).
48. Fourth, the system of prior authorisation at issue in the main proceedings is proportionate to the legitimate objective pursued. Whilst it is true that blocks of cedar wood such as those at issue in the main proceedings may be placed on the market in Germany without prior authorisation or registration, the fact that one Member State imposes less strict rules than another Member State does not mean that the latter’s rules are disproportionate (see, to that effect, Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments  [1995] ECR I-1141, paragraph 51).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Sweden.
Date: 2004-07-15
33. For that to be the case, the subsidy must first be paid specifically to the subsidised operator to enable it to supply particular goods or services. Only in that case can the subsidy be regarded as consideration for the supply of goods or services and therefore be taxable. It must be noted, in particular, that the beneficiary is recognised as having a right to receive the subsidy, since a taxable supply has been made by it (Case C‑184/00 Office des produits wallons  [2001] ECR I-9115, paragraphs 12 and 13).
34. It is also necessary to verify that the purchasers of the goods or services benefit from the subsidy granted to the beneficiary. The price payable by the purchaser must be fixed in such a way that it diminishes in proportion to the subsidy granted to the seller or supplier of the goods or services, which therefore constitutes an element in determining the price demanded by the latter. It must also be ascertained whether, objectively, the fact that a subsidy is paid to the seller or supplier allows the latter to sell the goods or supply the services at a price lower than he would have to demand in the absence of subsidy ( Office des produits wallons , paragraph 14).
35. The consideration represented by the subsidy must, at the very least, be identifiable. It is not necessary for the subsidy to correspond exactly to the diminution in the price of the goods or services supplied. It is sufficient if the relationship between the diminution in price and the subsidy, which may be at a flat rate, is significant ( Office des produits wallons , paragraph 17).
36. In conclusion, ‘subsidies directly linked to the price’ for the purposes of Article 11(A)(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive include only subsidies which constitute the whole or part of the consideration for a supply of goods or services and which are paid by a third party to the seller or supplier ( Office des produits wallons , paragraph 18).
Syndicat professionnel coordination des pêcheurs de l'étang de Berre et de la région v Électricité de France (EDF).
Date: 2004-07-15
27. It is settled case-law that the procedure provided for by Article 234 EC is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts (see, inter alia, Case C-343/90 Lourenço Dias  [1992] ECR I-4673, paragraph 14, and Case C-314/01 Siemens and ARGE Telekom  [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 33, and the case-law cited therein).
28. In the context of that cooperation, the national court seised of the dispute, which alone has direct knowledge of the facts of the main action and must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, is in the best position to assess, having regard to the particular features of the case, whether a preliminary ruling is necessary to enable it to give judgment and the relevance of the questions which it refers to the Court (see, inter alia,  Lourenço Dias , cited above, paragraph 15; Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital  [2002] ECR I-607, paragraph 18; and Siemens and ARGE Telekom , cited above, paragraph 34).
39. According to the settled case-law of the Court, a provision in an agreement concluded by the Community with a non-member country must be regarded as being directly applicable when, regard being had to its wording and to the purpose and nature of the agreement, the provision contains a clear and precise obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure (see inter alia Demirel , cited above, paragraph 14, and Case C-171/01 Wählergruppe Gemeinsam  [2003] ECR I-4301, paragraph 54).
41. That provision clearly, precisely and unconditionally lays down the obligation for Member States to subject discharges of the substances listed in Annex II to the Protocol to the issue by the competent national authorities of an authorisation taking due account of the provisions of Annex III.
47. In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the first question must be that both Article 6(3) of the Protocol and Article 6(1) of the amended Protocol, following its entry into force, have direct effect, so that any interested party is entitled to rely on those provisions before the national courts.
Scope of Articles 6(3) of the Protocol and 6(1) of the amended Protocol
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 2004-09-07
21. As the Court observed in paragraph 29 of its judgment in Commission  v Italy , the Community legislature meant to secure the principle of freedom to set rates in the non-life insurance sector, including the area of compulsory insurance such as insurance covering third-party liability arising from the use of motor vehicles. That principle implies, as the Court stated in the same paragraph of that judgment, the prohibition of any system of prior or systematic notification or approval of the rates which an insurance undertaking intends to use in its dealings with policyholders. The only derogation from that principle allowed by Directive 92/49 concerns prior notification and approval of ‘increases in premium rates’ in the framework of ‘general price-control systems’.
22. In Commission  v Italy , the Court held that the principle of freedom to set premiums was infringed by rate-freezing rules affecting both the fixing and the altering of the rates for insurance policies covering third-party liability arising from the use of motor vehicles in relation to risks situated within Italy ( Commission  v Italy , paragraphs 32 and 48).
23. The Luxembourg bonus-malus  system with which the present action is concerned is, as regards its impact on insurance undertakings’ rates, different in nature from the Italian legislation which was at issue in Commission  v Italy . It is true that the Luxembourg system has effects on changes in the amount of premiums. However, the system does not result in the direct setting of premium rates by the State, since insurance undertakings remain free to set the amount of the basic premium. In those circumstances, the Luxembourg bonus-malus  scheme cannot be equated with a system of approving premium rates that is contrary to the principle of freedom to set rates, as defined by the Court in paragraph 29 of the judgment in Commission  v Italy .
24. Full harmonisation in the field of non-life insurance rates precluding any national measure liable to have effects on rates cannot be presumed in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to this effect on the part of the Community legislature.
25. It is accordingly not possible to uphold the proposition upon which the Commission’s action is founded, which consists in contending that, despite the fact that the basic premium may be set entirely freely, the Luxembourg bonus-malus  system is contrary to the principle of freedom to set rates on the sole ground that it has effects on the alteration of that premium.
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2004-09-07
22. As the Court observed in paragraph 29 of its judgment in Commission  v Italy , the Community legislature meant to secure the principle of freedom to set rates in the non-life insurance sector, including the area of compulsory insurance such as insurance covering third-party liability arising from the use of motor vehicles. That principle implies, as the Court stated in the same paragraph of that judgment, the prohibition of any system of prior or systematic notification or approval of the rates which an insurance undertaking intends to use in its dealings with policyholders. The only derogation from that principle allowed by Directive 92/49 concerns prior notification and approval of ‘increases in premium rates’ in the framework of ‘general price-control systems’.
23. In Commission  v Italy , the Court held that the principle of freedom to set premiums was infringed by rate-freezing rules affecting both the fixing and the altering of the rates for insurance policies covering third-party liability arising from the use of motor vehicles in relation to risks situated within Italy ( Commission  v Italy , paragraphs 32 and 48).
24. The French bonus-malus  system with which the present action is concerned is, as regards its impact on insurance undertakings’ rates, different in nature from the Italian legislation which was at issue in Commission  v Italy . It is true that the French system has effects on changes in the amount of premiums. However, the system does not result in the direct setting of premium rates by the State, since insurance undertakings remain free to set the amount of the basic premium. In those circumstances, the French bonus-malus  scheme cannot be equated with a system of approving premium rates that is contrary to the principle of freedom to set rates, as defined by the Court in paragraph 29 of the judgment in Commission  v Italy .
25. Full harmonisation in the field of non-life insurance rates precluding any national measure liable to have effects on rates cannot be presumed in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to this effect on the part of the Community legislature.
26. It is accordingly not possible to uphold the proposition upon which the Commission’s action is founded, which consists in contending that, despite the fact that the basic premium may be set entirely freely, the French bonus-malus  system is contrary to the principle of freedom to set rates on the sole ground that it has effects on the alteration of that premium.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 2004-09-09
36. It must be borne in mind that the letter of formal notice from the Commission to a Member State, and then the reasoned opinion issued by the Commission, delimit the subject-matter of the dispute, so that it cannot thereafter be extended. The opportunity for the State concerned to be able to submit its observations, even if it chooses not to avail itself thereof, constitutes an essential guarantee intended by the EC Treaty, adherence to which is an essential formal requirement of the procedure for finding that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations. Consequently, the reasoned opinion and the proceedings brought by the Commission must be based on the same complaints as those set out in the letter of formal notice initiating the pre-litigation procedure (see, in particular, Case C‑191/95 Commission  v Germany  [1998] ECR I-5449, paragraph 55, and Case C‑340/96 Commission  v United Kingdom  [1999] ECR I-2023, paragraph 36).
53. As regards, first, the compulsory nature of the registration provided for by the Spanish rules, it must be borne in mind that Article 1(2) of Directive 91/439 provides for mutual recognition of driving licences issued by the Member States and that the Court has held that that recognition is to be carried out without any formality (see, in particular, Case C-246/00 Commission v Netherlands [2003] ECR I-7485, paragraph 60).
82. According to settled case-law, a Member State cannot plead provisions, practices or situations prevailing in its domestic legal order to justify failure to observe obligations and time-limits laid down by a directive (see, in particular, Case C‑66/03 Commission v France  [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 12).