Szatmári Malom Kft. v Mezőgazdasági és Vidékfejlesztési Hivatal Központi Szerve.
Date: 2014-05-15
27. In that regard, it should be recalled at the outset that, as stated in recital 61 to Regulation No 1698/2005 and in Article 71(3) thereof, while the rules on the eligibility of expenditure are, as a general rule, to be set at national level, that situation is subject to the special conditions laid down in that regulation for certain rural development measures (Case C‑592/11 Ketelä  EU:C:2012:673, paragraph 38).
29. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purposes of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (see, inter alia, Case C‑592/11 Ketelä  EU:C:2012:673, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
31. In such circumstances, the meaning and scope of terms for which EU law provides no definition must be determined by reference to their usual meaning in everyday language, while account is also taken of the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they form part (Case C‑592/11 Ketelä  EU:C:2012:673, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
32. As regards the terms used in Article 26 of Regulation No 1698/2005, it must be borne in mind that the Court has held that the scope of an expression such as ‘agricultural holding’ may, in particular, vary according to the specific objectives pursued by the rules of EU law in question (see Case 85/77 Azienda Avicola Sant’Anna  EU:C:1978:38, paragraph 9).
38. It follows from the distinction thus drawn by the EU legislature and from all the specifications made in Articles 26 and 28 of Regulation No 1698/2005 and in recitals 21 and 23 thereto that, in the regulatory context established by that regulation, the term ‘agricultural holdings’ as used in Articles 20(b)(i) and 26 of the regulation should be understood as referring to a holding that is engaged in the production of primary agricultural products (see also, to that effect, as regards earlier legislation relating to the two types of support examined here, Case 107/80 Cattaneo Adorno  v Commission  EU:C:1981:127, paragraphs 19 and 21).
54. In that regard, it should first of all be borne in mind that, although, by virtue of the very nature of regulations and of their function in the system of sources of EU law, the provisions of regulations generally have immediate effect in the national legal systems, without the need for the national authorities to adopt implementing measures, some of their provisions may nevertheless require, for their application, the adoption of implementing measures by the Member States (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑592/11 Ketelä  EU:C:2012:673, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
55. In that regard, it is settled law that Member States may adopt implementing measures for a regulation provided that they do not thereby obstruct its direct applicability or conceal its Community nature; that they specify that they are acting in exercise of a discretion granted to them under that regulation; and that they adhere to the parameters laid down thereunder (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑592/11 Ketelä  EU:C:2012:673, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
66. According to settled case-law, the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently, and that different situations must not be treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, inter alia, Case C‑127/07 Arcelor Atlantique and Lorraine and Others  EU:C:2008:728, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited, and Case C‑401/11 Soukupová  EU:C:2013:223, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
67. In that regard, the elements that characterise different situations and, accordingly, their comparability must in particular be determined and assessed in the light of the subject-matter and purpose of the EU act that makes the distinction in question (see, inter alia, Case C‑195/12 IBV & Cie  EU:C:2013:598, paragraphs 52 and 53 and the case-law cited).
70. In that context, it should be borne in mind, lastly, that it is settled law that, when national courts apply domestic law, it is binding upon them to interpret that law, so far as is possible, in such a way as to ensure compliance with EU law. That obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law is inherent in the system of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, since it enables national courts, for the matters within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law when they determine the disputes before them (see, inter alia, Case C‑138/12 Rusedespred EU:C:2013:233, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).