„DNB Bankaˮ AS v Valsts ieņēmumu dienests.
Date: 2017-09-21
26


According to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with all those elements for the interpretation of EU law which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not the referring court has specifically referred to them in its question (judgment of 20 October 2016, Danqua, C‑429/15, EU:C:2016:789, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
29


However, according to settled case-law, it is necessary, when interpreting a provision of EU law, to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments of 26 April 2012, Able UK, C‑225/11, EU:C:2012:252, paragraph 22, and of 4 April 2017, Fahimian, C‑544/15, EU:C:2017:255, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
33


As regards the aim of Article 132(1)(f), within Directive 2006/112, it is necessary to recall the purpose of all of the provisions of Article 132 of that directive, which is to exempt from VAT certain activities in the public interest with a view to facilitating access to certain services and the supply of certain goods by avoiding the increased costs that would result if they were subject to VAT (judgment of 5 October 2016, TMD, C‑412/15, EU:C:2016:738, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
34


Thus, the services provided by an IGP come within the exemption provided for in Article 132(1)(f) of Directive 2006/112 where the provision of those services contributes directly to the exercise of activities in the public interest referred to in Article 132 of that directive (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 October 2016, TMD, C‑412/15, EU:C:2016:738, paragraphs 31 to 33).
35


In addition, it must be recalled that the scope of the exemptions referred to in Article 132 of Directive 2006/112 is to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 October 2016, TMD, C‑412/15, EU:C:2016:738, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
40


In that regard, it should, however, be noted that national authorities could not reopen tax periods which have been definitively closed, on the basis of Article 132(1)(f) of Directive 2006/112, as interpreted in paragraph 37 above (see, by analogy, judgments of 6 October 2009, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, C‑40/08, EU:C:2009:615, paragraph 37, and of 21 December 2016, Gutiérrez Naranjo and Others, C‑154/15, C‑307/15 and C‑308/15, EU:C:2016:980, paragraph 68).
41


As regards tax periods which have not yet been definitively closed, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied on as such against that individual (see, inter alia, judgment of 19 April 2016, DI, C‑441/14, EU:C:2016:278, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). Thus, national authorities cannot rely on Article 132(1)(f) of Directive 2006/112, as interpreted in paragraph 37 above, in order to withhold that exemption from IGPs made up of entities such as credit institutions and, therefore, in order to refuse to exempt the supply of services by those IGPs from VAT.
42


In addition, the obligation on a national court to refer to the content of a directive when interpreting and applying the relevant rules of domestic law is limited by general principles of law, particularly those of legal certainty and non-retroactivity, and that obligation cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem (judgment of 15 April 2008, Impact, C‑268/06, EU:C:2008:223, paragraph 100).