AY.
Date: 2018-07-25
24


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court, before which the dispute has been brought and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (judgment of 12 October 2017, Sleutjes, C‑278/16, EU:C:2017:757, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
25


It follows that questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for this Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its object, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 12 October 2017, Sleutjes, C‑278/16, EU:C:2017:757, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
28


In any event, the admissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling is not called into question by the fact that the questions asked concern the obligations of the executing judicial authority, even though the referring court is the judicial authority that issued the EAW. The issue of an EAW could result in the arrest of the requested person and, therefore, affects the personal freedom of the latter. The Court has held that, with regard to proceedings relating to an EAW, observance of fundamental rights falls primarily within the responsibility of the issuing Member State (judgment of 23 January 2018, Piotrowski, C‑367/16, EU:C:2018:27, paragraph 50).
29


Therefore, in order to ensure observance of those rights — which may lead a judicial authority to decide to withdraw the EAW it issued — such an authority must be able to refer questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling.
33


As is apparent from the wording of Article 1(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584, Member States are required to execute any EAW on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provisions of that framework decision. Except in exceptional circumstances, the executing judicial authorities may therefore refuse to execute such a warrant only in the exhaustively listed cases of non-execution provided for by the framework decision and the execution of the EAW may be made subject only to one of the conditions listed exhaustively therein. Thus, the framework decision explicitly states the grounds for mandatory (Article 3) and optional (Articles 4 and 4a) non-execution of the EAW (see judgment of 10 August 2017, Tupikas, C‑270/17 PPU, EU:C:2017:628, paragraphs 50 and 51).
39


The purpose of that provision is to ensure that a person is not prosecuted or tried more than once in respect of the same acts (judgment of 16 November 2010, Mantello, C‑261/09, EU:C:2010:683, paragraph 40), and reflects the principle ne bis in idem enshrined in Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, according to which no one may be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence.
41


In that regard, it must be stated that, even though Article 3(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584 refers to a ‘judgment’, that provision is also applicable to decisions issued by an authority responsible for administering criminal justice in the national legal system concerned, definitively discontinuing criminal proceedings in a Member State, although such decisions are adopted without the involvement of a court and do not take the form of a judicial decision (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 June 2016, Kossowski, C‑486/14, EU:C:2016:483, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
42


According to the Court’s case-law, a requested person is considered to have been finally judged in respect of the same acts within the meaning of Article 3(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584 when, following criminal proceedings, further prosecution is definitively barred or when the judicial authorities of a Member State have adopted a decision by which the accused is finally acquitted in respect of the alleged acts (judgment of 16 November 2010, Mantello, C‑261/09, EU:C:2010:683, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
43


The delivery of a ‘final judgment’ within the meaning of Article 3(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584 thus implies that criminal proceedings had previously been instituted against the requested person (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 November 2010, Mantello, C‑261/09, EU:C:2010:683, paragraphs 46 and 47; of 5 June 2014, M, C‑398/12, EU:C:2014:1057, paragraphs 31 and 32; and of 29 June 2016, Kossowski, C‑486/14, EU:C:2016:483, paragraphs 34 and 35).
44


Moreover, the principle ne bis in idem applies only to persons who have been finally judged in a Member State (see judgment of 28 September 2006, Gasparini and Others, C‑467/04, EU:C:2006:610, paragraph 37). By contrast, it does not extend to persons who were merely interviewed in the course of a criminal investigation, such as witnesses.
52


It should also be borne in mind that, as the refusal to execute an EAW constitutes the exception, the grounds for non-execution of such a warrant must be interpreted strictly (see judgment of 23 January 2018, Piotrowski, C‑367/16, EU:C:2018:27, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
55


In addition, that ground for non-execution is not intended to protect a person from having to submit to investigations that may be undertaken successively, in respect of the same acts, in several Member States (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 June 2016, Kossowski, C‑486/14, EU:C:2016:483, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
56


Framework Decision 2002/584 comes within the scope of the European area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with regard to, amongst other matters, the prevention and combating of crime (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 June 2016, Kossowski, C‑486/14, EU:C:2016:483, paragraph 46).
57


Therefore, the second ground for non-execution laid down in Article 4(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584 must be interpreted in the light of the need to promote the prevention and combating of crime (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 June 2016, Kossowski, C‑486/14, EU:C:2016:483, paragraph 47).