larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
K v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie.
Date: 2018-11-07
22


For that purpose, the referring court must ensure, in particular, that the knowledge required to pass the civic integration examination is at a basic level, that the condition imposed by the national legislation does not lead to an autonomous residence permit not being granted to third country nationals who have demonstrated their willingness to pass the examination and have made every effort to achieve that objective, that due account is taken of specific individual circumstances and that the fees relating to that examination are not excessive (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2015, K and A, C‑153/14, EU:C:2015:453, paragraphs 54 to 70).
23


In that regard, it should be noted, in particular, that circumstances, such as the age, level of education, economic situation or health of a sponsor’s relevant family members, must lead the competent authorities not to subject the grant of an autonomous residence permit to passing a civic integration examination, when, due to those circumstances, they are unable to take or pass that examination (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2015, K and A, C‑153/14, EU:C:2015:453, paragraph 58).
X and X v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie.
Date: 2018-11-13
57


In that regard, it must be recalled that the take charge and take back procedures must necessarily be conducted in accordance with the rules laid down, inter alia, in Chapter VI of the Dublin III Regulation, and that they must, in particular, be carried out with due regard to a series of mandatory time limits (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 July 2017, Mengesteab, C‑670/16, EU:C:2017:587, paragraphs 49 and 50, and of 25 January 2018, Hasan, C‑360/16, EU:C:2018:35, paragraph 60).
69


It is apparent from the provisions cited in paragraphs 58 to 68 of the present judgment that the EU legislature thereby provided, as a framework for the take charge and take back procedures, a set of mandatory time limits which make a decisive contribution to achieving the objective of rapidly processing applications for international protection, as referred to in recital 5 of the Dublin III Regulation, by ensuring that those procedures will be implemented without undue delay (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 July 2017, Mengesteab, C‑670/16, EU:C:2017:587, paragraphs 53 and 54; of 25 October 2017, Shiri, C‑201/16, EU:C:2017:805, paragraph 31, and of 25 January 2018, Hasan, C‑360/16, EU:C:2018:35, paragraph 62).
85


It must also be noted, in that regard, that the present cases can be distinguished from those where the Court has applied the concept of a ‘reasonable period of time’. Whereas the significant feature of the latter cases is the absence of any provision of EU law stating precisely the time limit at issue (see, inter alia, judgments of 28 February 2013, Review Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, C‑334/12 RX-II, EU:C:2013:134, paragraphs 5, 28 and 33; of 16 July 2015, Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraphs 44 and 48; of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraphs 97 and 104; of 14 June 2016, Marchiani v Parliament, C‑566/14 P, EU:C:2016:437, paragraphs 89 and 95 to 97; of 13 September 2017, Khir Amayry, C‑60/16, EU:C:2017:675, paragraph 41; of 12 April 2018, A and S, C‑550/16, EU:C:2018:248, paragraphs 45 and 61, and of 27 June 2018, Diallo, C‑246/17, EU:C:2018:499, paragraphs 58 and 69), the Commission did however specify, in Article 5(2) of the Implementing Regulation, a precise time limit, of two weeks, within which the requested Member State is to endeavour to reply to a re-examination request that is sent to it by the requesting Member State.
UAB ,,Renerga“ v AB „Energijos skirstymo operatorius“ and AB „Lietuvos energijos gamyba“.
Date: 2018-11-14
20


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation or the validity of a rule of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (judgment of 12 November 2015, Hewlett-Packard Belgium, C‑572/13, EU:C:2015:750, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
21


However, it is apparent from settled case-law that a reference for a preliminary ruling from a national court can be rejected if EU law cannot be applied, either directly or indirectly, to the circumstances of the case (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 July 2011, Agafiţei and Others, C‑310/10, EU:C:2011:467, paragraph 28).
Hellenische Republik v Leo Kuhn.
Date: 2018-11-15
31


In so far as Regulation No 1215/2012 repeals and replaces Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1), it should be observed that the Court’s interpretation of the provisions of the latter regulation also applies to Regulation No 1215/2012, whenever the provisions of the two instruments of EU law may be regarded as equivalent (judgments of 16 November 2016, Schmidt, C‑417/15, EU:C:2016:881, paragraph 26, and of 9 March 2017, Pula Parking, C‑551/15, EU:C:2017:193, paragraph 31).
32


That is the case of Article 1(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 and Article 1(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, which limit the applicability of those regulations to ‘civil and commercial matters’, without, however, defining the content and scope of that notion, in relation to which the Court has held that that notion is to be regarded as an independent concept to be interpreted by referring, first, to the objectives and scheme of those regulations and, second, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems (judgments of 11 June 2015, Fahnenbrock and Others, C‑226/13, C‑245/13 and C‑247/13, EU:C:2015:383, paragraph 35, and of 9 March 2017, Pula Parking, C‑551/15, EU:C:2017:193, paragraph 33).
33


That interpretation results in the exclusion of certain legal actions and judicial decisions from the scope of Regulation No 1215/2012, by reason either of the legal relationships between the parties to the action or of the subject matter of the action (judgment of 15 February 2007, Lechouritou and Others, C‑292/05, EU:C:2007:102, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
34


Thus, the Court has held that, although certain actions between a public authority and a person governed by private law may come within the scope of that regulation, it is otherwise where the public authority is acting in the exercise of its public powers (judgment of 15 February 2007, Lechouritou and Others, C‑292/05, EU:C:2007:102, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
35


That applies, namely, to disputes resulting from the exercise of public powers by one of the parties to the case, as it exercises powers falling outside the scope of the ordinary legal rules applicable to relationships between private individuals (judgment of 15 February 2007, Lechouritou and Others, C‑292/05, EU:C:2007:102, paragraph 34).
Verbraucherzentrale Baden-Württemberg e.V. v Germanwings GmbH.
Date: 2018-11-15
23


In this context, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law of the Court, in interpreting a provision of EU law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the objectives of the legislation of which it forms part and the origin of that legislation (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2018, E LATS, C‑154/17, EU:C:2018:560, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
24


As regards the objectives of Article 23(1) in conjunction with Article 2(18) of Regulation No 1008/2008, it is clear from both the heading and the content of Article 23(1) that it seeks to ensure in particular that there is information and transparency with regard to prices for air services from an airport located in a Member State, and thereby contributes to safeguarding protection of customers who use those services (judgment of 6 July 2017, Air Berlin, C‑290/16, EU:C:2017:523, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
37


According to the Court’s case-law, the places of departure and arrival of the flight concerned must be regarded, equally, as the places of main provision of the air services (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 March 2018, flightright and Others, C‑274/16, C‑447/16 and C‑448/16, EU:C:2018:160, paragraph 68), since those are the places where the performance of those services respectively starts and finishes.
Heiko Jonny Maniero v Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes eV.
Date: 2018-11-15
30


It should be noted, in that regard, that, since Directive 2000/43 provides no definition at all of the concept of ‘education’, the meaning and scope of that term must, as the Court has consistently held, be determined by considering its usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which it occurs and the purposes of the rules of which it is part (see, by analogy, judgment of 3 September 2014, Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds, C‑201/13, EU:C:2014:2132, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
35


As regards, specifically, the material scope of Directive 2000/43, it is apparent from recital 12 of the directive that, in order to ensure the development of democratic and tolerant societies which allow the participation of all persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, specific action in the field of discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin should in particular cover areas such as those listed in Article 3(1) of that directive (judgments of 12 May 2011, Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn, C‑391/09, EU:C:2011:291, paragraph 41, and of 16 July 2015, CHEZRazpredelenie Bulgaria, C‑83/14, EU:C:2015:480, paragraph 40).
36


Consequently, as the Court has already held, in the light of the objective of Directive 2000/43 and the nature of the rights which it seeks to safeguard, and in view of the fact that that directive is merely an expression, within the area under consideration, of the principle of equality, which is one of the general principles of EU law, as recognised in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the scope of that directive cannot be defined restrictively (judgments of 12 May 2011, Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn, C‑391/09, EU:C:2011:291, paragraph 43, and of 16 July 2015, CHEZRazpredelenie Bulgaria, C‑83/14, EU:C:2015:480, paragraph 42).
47


The concept of ‘particular disadvantage’, within the meaning of that provision, must be understood as meaning that it is particularly persons of a particular racial or ethnic origin, because of the provision, criterion or practice in question, who are disadvantaged (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 July 2015, CHEZRazpredelenie Bulgaria, C‑83/14, EU:C:2015:480, paragraph 100, and of 6 April 2017, Jyske Finans, C‑668/15, EU:C:2017:278, paragraph 27).
48


Such a concept therefore applies only where the alleged discriminatory measure has the effect of placing a particular ethnic origin at a disadvantage. In addition, for the purposes of ascertaining whether or not there is unfavourable treatment, it is necessary to carry out, not a general abstract comparison, but a specific concrete comparison, in the light of the favourable treatment in question (judgment of 6 April 2017, Jyske Finans, C‑668/15, EU:C:2017:278, paragraphs 31 and 32).
Zako SPRL v Sanidel SA.
Date: 2018-11-21
25


In the second place, the directive aims to coordinate the laws of the Member States as regards the legal relationship between the parties to a commercial agency contract (judgment of 3 December 2015, Quenon K., C‑338/14, EU:C:2015:795, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
26


As is clear from the second and third recitals, that directive seeks to protect commercial agents in their relations with their principals, to promote the security of commercial transactions, and to facilitate trade in goods between Member States by harmonising their legal systems within the area of commercial representation (judgment of 3 December 2015, Quenon K., C‑338/14, EU:C:2015:795, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
28


In that context, in the absence of any provision in that directive requiring that the commercial agent perform his activity in an itinerant manner external to the principal’s premises, it must be held that the benefit of the protection conferred by that directive must also be extended to persons who, as in the case in the main proceedings, perform their activity from within that establishment (see, by analogy, judgment of 30 April 1998, Bellone, C‑215/97, EU:C:1998:189, paragraph 13).
ZSE Energia a.s. v RG.
Date: 2018-11-22
22


In that regard, it must be noted, first, that Article 3(1) of Regulation No 861/2007 does not define the concept of ‘parties’, nor does it refer to the law of the Member States on that issue. According to settled case-law, the need for uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (see, inter alia, judgment of 7 August 2018, Bichat and Others, C‑61/17, C‑62/17 and C‑72/17, EU:C:2018:653, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
25


Secondly, regarding the doubts expressed by the referring court as to the interpretation of the concept of ‘parties’ on account of a possible inconsistency in the Slovak-language version of Regulation No 861/2007, it must be recalled that the provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied in a uniform manner, in the light of the versions established in all of the languages of the European Union. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgment of 1 March 2016, Alo and Osso, C‑443/14 and C‑444/14, EU:C:2016:127, paragraph 27).
Finanzamt Goslar v baumgarten sports & more GmbH.
Date: 2018-11-29
22


It should be observed as a preliminary point that, according to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU, providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. With that in mind, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. Further, the Court may decide to take into consideration rules of EU law to which the national court has made no reference in the wording of its question (judgment of 1 February 2017, Município de Palmela, C‑144/16, EU:C:2017:76, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
28


It follows from the combined application of those two provisions that, in respect of the supply of services giving rise to successive payments, the chargeable event for VAT occurs and VAT becomes chargeable on expiry of the periods to which those payments relate (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2015, Asparuhovo Lake Investment Company, C‑463/14, EU:C:2015:542, paragraph 50).
30


That being said, and in order to provide a useful answer to the referring court, it must be noted that such appears to be the case of a service such as that in the main proceedings, which entails negotiating the placement of a player for a certain number of seasons with a club, and remunerated by means of conditional payments in instalments over several years, further to the placement (see, by analogy, judgment of 3 September 2015, Asparuhovo Lake Investment Company, C‑463/14, EU:C:2015:542, paragraph 49).
S v EA and Others.
Date: 2018-12-19
24


It must also be recalled that EU legislation displays a general tendency to enhance the quality of products within the framework of the common agricultural policy, in order to promote the reputation of those products through, inter alia, the use of designations of origin which enjoy special protection. It also aims to satisfy the consumers’ expectation regarding product quality and identifiable geographical origin, and to enable producers, in conditions of fair competition, to secure higher incomes in return for a genuine effort to improve quality (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 March 2011, Kakavetsos-Fragkopoulos, C‑161/09, EU:C:2011:110, paragraph 34).
25


In fact, the specification which subjects the attribution of PGI in particular to the slicing and packaging of ham in the area of production is intended to allow the persons entitled to use the PGI to keep under their control one of the ways in which the product appears on the market. That condition which it lays down aims better to safeguard the quality and authenticity of the product, and consequently the reputation of the PGI, for which those who are entitled to use it assume full and collective responsibility (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 May 2003, Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma and Salumificio S. Rita, C‑108/01, EU:C:2003:296, paragraph 65).
26


Against that background, a condition such as at issue in the main proceedings must be regarded as compatible with EU law, despite its restrictive effects on trade, if it is shown that it is necessary and proportionate and capable of safeguarding the quality of the product at issue, guaranteeing its origin or ensuring the control of the specification of that PGI (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 May 2003, Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma and Salumificio S. Rita, C‑108/01, EU:C:2003:296, paragraph 66).
33


In this regard, it must be recalled that, in the judgment of 20 May 2003, Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma and Salumificio S. Rita (C‑108/01, EU:C:2003:296, paragraphs 69, 74 and 75), the Court found that in the context where the protected designation of origin (PDO) specification of the product at issue in that case establishes the different steps of the slicing and packaging giving rise to very precise technical and control interventions, on the authenticity, quality, hygiene and labelling, some of which require specialised assessments, controls performed outside of the area of production provide less guarantees of the quality and authenticity of that product than those performed in the area of production according to the procedure provided in the specification.
34


That is in particular the case when the procedure laid down in the specification attributes the performance of systematic and thorough controls to experts who have specialist knowledge of the features of the products at issue and it is, therefore, hardly conceivable that such checks could be effectively introduced in other Member States (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 May 2003, Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma and Salumificio S. Rita, C‑108/01, EU:C:2003:296, paragraph 75).
Szef Krajowej Administracji Skarbowej v Skarpa Travel sp. z o.o. w Krakowie.
Date: 2018-12-19
24


It must be noted that the special VAT scheme applicable to travel agents, laid down in Articles 306 to 310 of the VAT Directive, contains rules specific to the activity of travel agents, which derogate from the normal VAT regime (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2012, Kozak, C‑557/11, EU:C:2012:672, paragraph 16).
27


The Court has already ruled that, as an exception to the normal system applicable under the VAT Directive, the scheme laid down in Articles 306 to 310 thereof must be applied only to the extent necessary to achieve its objective (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2012, Kozak, C‑557/11, EU:C:2012:672, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
28


According to the case-law of the Court, the essential aim of the rules of that special scheme is to avoid the difficulties to which economic operators would be exposed by application of the normal principles of the VAT Directive concerning transactions involving the supply of services bought in from third parties, since the application of the normal rules on the place of taxation, taxable amount and deduction of input tax would, by reason of the multiplicity of services and the places in which they are provided, entail practical difficulties for those undertakings of such a nature as to obstruct their operations (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2012, Kozak, C‑557/11, EU:C:2012:672, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
33


Nevertheless, Article 65 of the VAT Directive provides that, where payments are made on account before the goods or services are supplied, VAT becomes chargeable on receipt of the payment and on the amount received. That article constitutes a derogation from the rule laid down in Article 63 of that directive and, as such, must be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2014, FIRIN, C‑107/13, EU:C:2014:151, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
34


Thus, in order for VAT to become chargeable in such circumstances, all the relevant information concerning the chargeable event, namely, the future supply of services, must already be known and therefore, in particular, the services must be precisely designated at the time when the payment on account is made (judgment of 13 March 2014, FIRIN, C‑107/13, EU:C:2014:151, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
46


The projected costs thus estimated must be linked to the actual tourist service in respect of which the payment on account was received by the travel agent, since that profit margin and the taxable amount must be determined by reference to each individual supply of services provided by the travel agent, namely individually and not globally, having regard to groups of services or all services supplied during a given period (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 February 2018, Commission v Germany, C‑380/16, not published, EU:C:2018:76, paragraphs 89, 91 and 92).