Glencore Céréales France v Établissement national des produits de l'agriculture et de la mer (FranceAgriMer).
Date: 2017-03-02
23


First of all, it is appropriate to recall that, in accordance with Article 1 of Regulation No 2988/95 and as is apparent from the third recital of that regulation, Regulation No 2988/95 introduces ‘general rules … relating to homogenous checks and to administrative measures and penalties concerning irregularities with regard to [EU] law’, in order to ‘[counter] acts detrimental to the [EU’s] financial interests … in all areas’ (judgment of 11 June 2015, Pfeifer & Langen, C‑52/14, EU:C:2015:381, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
26


It is apparent from the settled case-law of the Court that the four-year limitation period referred to in Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 is applicable both to the irregularities leading to the imposition of an administrative penalty, within the meaning of Article 5 of that regulation, and to irregularities, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which are penalised by an administrative measure resulting in the withdrawal of the advantage wrongly obtained, in accordance with Article 4 of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 June 2015, Pfeifer & Langen, C‑52/14, EU:C:2015:381, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
35


It must be borne in mind that, in accordance with the case-law of the Court, an irregularity is ‘continuous or repeated’ for the purposes of the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 where it is committed by an operator who derives economic advantages from a body of similar transactions which infringe the same provision of EU law (judgment of 11 June 2015, Pfeifer & Langen, C‑52/14, EU:C:2015:381, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
38


It must be borne in mind that the commission of an irregularity, within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Regulation No 2988/95, requires two conditions to be satisfied, namely an economic operator’s act or omission that infringed EU law and a prejudice, or potential prejudice, caused to the budget of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, Firma Ernst Kollmer Fleischimport und -export, C‑59/14, EU:C:2015:660, paragraph 24).
47


The Court has held that, in the light of the conditions which must be satisfied before it may be found that there is an irregularity, noted in paragraph 38 above, the date from which the limitation period begins to run is the date of the event that last occurs, namely either the date of the occurrence of the prejudice, where the prejudice occurs after the act or omission infringing EU law, or the date of that act or omission, where the advantage at issue has been granted before the act or omission (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, Firma Ernst Kollmer Fleischimport und -export, C‑59/14, EU:C:2015:660, paragraph 26).
48


In that regard, the Court has stated that, as regards export refunds, ‘prejudice’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Regulation No 2988/95 occurs on the date that the definitive decision is made to grant the advantage at issue. It is from that time that a prejudice is in fact caused to the budget of the European Union. That prejudice could not be considered to exist before the date on which the advantage was definitively granted unless it were accepted that the limitation period for recovering an advantage is capable of running already from a time at which the advantage has not yet been granted (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, Firma Ernst Kollmer Fleischimport und -export, C‑59/14, EU:C:2015:660, paragraph 32). As regards a security, such as that referred to in Article 5a of Regulation No 3002/92, it must be held that prejudice, within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Regulation No 2988/95, occurs on the date of release of that security.
53


It is apparent from both the wording and scheme of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 that, in its fourth subparagraph, that provision sets an absolute limit applying to the time-bar of legal proceedings in respect of an irregularity, that limitation becoming effective at the latest on the day on which a period equal to twice the limitation period laid down in the first subparagraph thereof expires without the competent authority having imposed a penalty, except where the administrative procedure has been suspended in accordance with Article 6(1) of that regulation (judgment of 11 June 2015, Pfeifer & Langen, C‑52/14, EU:C:2015:381, paragraph 63).
54


Having regard to the Court’s case-law, it must be found that that absolute limit is applicable also to the adoption of administrative measures within the meaning of Article 4 of that regulation (judgment of 3 September 2015, Sodiaal International, C‑383/14, EU:C:2015:541, paragraph 33).
55


In addition, the Court has held that that limitation period helps to reinforce the legal certainty of the economic operators by preventing the limitation period of legal proceedings in respect of an irregularity from being extended indefinitely by repeated interrupting acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 June 2015, Pfeifer & Langen, C‑52/14, EU:C:2015:381, paragraph 64).
56


Consequently, except where the administrative procedure has been suspended in accordance with Article 6(1) of Regulation No 2988/95, the acts relating to investigation or legal proceedings adopted by the competent authority and notified to the person in question, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 3(1) of that regulation, do not have the effect of interrupting the limitation period laid down in the fourth subparagraph of Article 3(1) of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 June 2015, Pfeifer & Langen, C‑52/14, EU:C:2015:381, paragraph 72).
63


It must be borne in mind that, in accordance with Article 3(3) of Regulation No 2988/95, Member States may apply limitation periods which are longer than that minimum period of four years laid down in Article 3(1) thereof (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 September 2014, Cruz & Companhia, C‑341/13, EU:C:2014:2230, paragraph 54).
64


In that regard, Member States retain wide discretion in fixing longer limitation periods which they intend to apply in cases involving an irregularity that is detrimental to the European Union’s financial interests (judgment of 17 September 2014, Cruz & Companhia, C‑341/13, EU:C:2014:2230, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
65


It is also apparent from the case-law of the Court that under Article 3(3) of Regulation No 2988/95 Member States can, first, continue to apply longer limitation periods which existed at the date when that regulation was adopted and, secondly, introduce new rules on limitation providing for such longer limitation periods after that date (judgment of 29 January 2009, Josef Vosding Schlacht-, Kühl- und Zerlegebetrieb and Others, C‑278/07 to C‑280/07, EU:C:2009:38, paragraph 42).
70


In addition, while Member States provide for longer limitation periods pursuant to Article 3(3) of Regulation No 2988/95, they are not required, in the context of that provision, to provide for those longer limitation periods in specific and/or sectoral rules (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 January 2009, Josef Vosding Schlacht-, Kühl- und Zerlegebetrieb and Others, C‑278/07 to C‑280/07, EU:C:2009:38, paragraph 46). It is also open to them to adopt legislative provisions establishing a limitation period of a general nature (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 September 2014, Cruz & Companhia, C‑341/13, EU:C:2014:2230, paragraphs 57 and 63 and the case-law cited).
73


As regards the principle of legal certainty, as is apparent from the Court’s case-law in criminal matters, it is as a rule open to the Member States to extend limitation periods where the relevant offences have never become subject to limitation (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 September 2015, Taricco and Others, C‑105/14, EU:C:2015:555, paragraph 57).
74


As regards the principle of proportionality, it is to be noted that the application of a longer national limitation period, such as is referred to in Article 3(3) of Regulation No 2988/95, with a view to bringing proceedings in respect of irregularities, within the meaning of that regulation, must not go clearly beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective of protecting the European Union’s financial interests (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 September 2014, Cruz & Companhia, C‑341/13, EU:C:2014:2230, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited). As regards a five-year limitation period, such as that laid down in Article 2224 of the Civil Code, in the version resulting from Law No 2008-561, it must be pointed out that that period is only one year longer than the period laid down in Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95. Consequently, such a period does not go beyond what is necessary to enable the national authorities to bring proceedings in respect of irregularities prejudicing the European Union’s budget and complies with the requirement for proportionality.