larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Roberto Nicoli v Eridania SpA.
Date: 2004-10-12
27. As regards the issue of interpreting the notion of consumption, it is clear from paragraphs 71 to 78 of the judgment in Italy  v Council  that the Court examined only a supposed alteration in the method used by the Commission and Council to evaluate the future situation in Italy.
30. On the other hand, it is apparent from paragraphs 56 to 63 of the judgment in Italy  v Council , in which the Court examined the plea alleging lack or inadequacy of a statement of the reasons on which Regulation No 1361/98 was based in the light of Article 190 of the EC Treaty (now Article 253 EC), that that reasoning was held to be in keeping with the requirements of that provision. Indeed, in paragraph 63 of that judgment, the Court found that, in the context of the set of rules in issue and the way in which the market concerned had developed, the statement of reasons given in Regulation No 1361/98 for the classification of Italy as a non-deficit area for the marketing year 1998/99, whilst very succinct, sufficiently fulfilled the requirements laid down in the Court’s case-law regarding the statement of reasons.
32. As a preliminary point, it ought to be noted that estimated consumption for the coming year is one of two elements which the institutions must take into account in determining whether a situation of deficit or of surplus is to be foreseen for a particular area. As a matter of fact, there is a deficit for the purposes of Regulation No 1785/81 when total available production falls short of consumption (see Case C-289/97 Eridania  [2000] ECR I-5409, paragraph 46, and Italy  v Council , paragraph 76).
36. With regard to the ambit of the Court’s judicial review of the method adopted by the institutions in order to determine estimated consumption of sugar for the marketing year in question, it ought to be borne in mind that the Council and the Commission must extrapolate, on the basis of information notified by the Member States which relates both to the current year, as far as the pattern of consumption is concerned, and to the prospects for the forthcoming year, as regards the pattern of available production ( Eridania , paragraph 47).
37. Where the need to evaluate a complex economic situation is involved, the Community institutions enjoy a wide measure of discretion. In reviewing the legality of the exercise of such discretion, the Court cannot substitute its own assessment of the matter for that of the competent authority but must confine itself to examining whether that assessment is vitiated by a manifest error or misuse of power or whether the institution in question has not manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion (see Case C-369/95 Somalfruit and Camar  [1997] ECR I-6619, paragraph 50, and Case C-99/99 Italy  v Commission  [2000] ECR I-11535, paragraph 26).
Peter Paul, Cornelia Sonnen-Lütte and Christel Mörkens v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Date: 2004-10-12
38. In a number of the recitals in the preambles to the directives referred to in the second question, parts (a) and (b), it is stated in a general manner that one of the objectives of the planned harmonisation is to protect depositors.
39. Furthermore, Directives 77/780, 89/299 and 89/646 impose on the national authorities a number of supervisory obligations vis-à-vis credit institutions.
40. However, contrary to the claims of Paul and others, it does not necessarily follow either from the existence of such obligations or from the fact that the objectives pursued by those directives also include the protection of depositors that those directives seek to confer rights on depositors in the event that their deposits are unavailable as a result of defective supervision on the part of the competent national authorities.
49. It follows from the case-law that a State incurs liability for breach of a rule of Community law only where, in particular, the rule of law infringed is intended to confer rights on individuals (see Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I-1029, paragraph 51; Joined Cases C‑178/94, C-179/94 and C-188/94 to C-190/94 Dillenkofer and Others  [1996] ECR I-4845, paragraph 21; and Case C‑63/01 Evans  [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 83).
Vedial SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM).
Date: 2004-10-12
26. Even on the supposition that the principle under which the parties delimit the subject-matter of a case applies in proceedings such as those at first instance concerning an action against a decision of an appeal board of OHIM on an opposition to registration of a mark based on the likelihood of confusion with an earlier mark, OHIM does not in any event have the power to alter before the Court of First Instance the terms of the dispute, as delimited in the respective claims and allegations of the applicant for registration and of the opposing party.
31. Nor, secondly, is the action before the Court of First Instance against the decision of a Board of Appeal on an opposition open to OHIM. In fact, under Article 63(4) of Regulation No 40/94 such an action ‘shall be open to any party to proceedings before the Board of Appeal adversely affected by its decision’.
34. Moreover, contrary to the ordinary rule in regard to intervention set out in Article 116(4)(a) of the Rules of Procedure, Article 134(3) thereof provides that ‘[a]n intervener … may, in his response …, seek an order annulling or altering the decision of the Board of Appeal on a point not raised in the application’. By dint of a contrario  reasoning under the latter provision OHIM is not entitled, for its part, to formulate such forms of order.
51. For the purposes of applying Article 8 (1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94, the likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the mark applied for and the earlier mark are identical or similar, and that the goods or services covered in the application for registration are identical or similar to those in respect of which the earlier mark is registered. Those conditions are cumulative (see to that effect, on the identical provisions of Article 4(1)(b) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1), Case C-39/97 Canon [1998] ECR I-5507, paragraph 22).
54. Having found that there was no similarity between the earlier mark and the mark applied for, the Court of First Instance correctly concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion, whatever the reputation of the earlier mark and regardless of the degree of identity or similarity of the goods or services concerned.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Date: 2004-10-14
16. According to settled case-law, Member States may adopt rules for the application of a regulation if they do not obstruct its direct applicability, do not conceal its Community nature and specify that a discretion granted by the regulation is being exercised, and provided that they adhere to the parameters laid down under it (see, to that effect, Case 94/77 Zerbone  [1978] ECR 99, paragraph 27).
19. In the present case, it must be held that the Netherlands rules on shipments of waste contravene Article 7(4)(a) of Regulation No 259/93 inasmuch as they go beyond the provision which they are intended to clarify.
21. Moreover, by focusing on a comparison of the percentage of recoverable waste in the States of destination and dispatch, the Netherlands rules on shipments of waste allow an objection to be raised against a shipment of waste for recovery on the basis not only of an independent evaluation of the economic and environmental aspects of the recovery operation in the State of destination, but also of the treatment capacity available in the State of dispatch. The Court has held that, in the context of the Community rules on shipments of waste, considerations of self‑sufficiency and proximity do not apply to shipments of waste for recovery (Case C-203/96 Dusseldorp and Others  [1998] ECR I-4075, paragraphs 27 to 34).
31. In Case C-228/00 Commission  v Germany  [2003] ECR I-1439, paragraphs 41 to 43, the Court laid down three conditions for establishing whether the use of waste as a fuel is a recovery operation of the kind referred to in point R1 of Annex II B to Directive 75/442. First, the essential purpose of the operation referred to by that provision must be the generation of energy. Secondly, the energy generated by, and recovered from, combustion of the waste must be greater than the amount of energy consumed during the combustion process and that part of the surplus energy generated during combustion must effectively be used, either immediately in the form of the heat produced by incineration or, after processing, in the form of electricity. Thirdly, the greater part of the waste must be consumed during the operation and the greater part of the energy generated must be recovered and used.
32. According to the Court, criteria such as the calorific value of the waste, the amount of harmful substances contained in the incinerated waste or whether or not the waste has been mixed cannot, by contrast, be taken into consideration ( Commission v Germany , paragraph 47).
Kingdom of Spain v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2004-10-14
16. As stated in Commission v France , in paragraph 18, milk products are subject to a common organisation of the market.
19. The Court has consistently held that once the Community has established a common market organisation in a particular sector, it is for the Community to seek solutions to problems arising in the context of the common agricultural policy. Member States must therefore refrain from taking any unilateral measure in that area, even if that measure is likely to support the common policy of the Community ( Commission  v France , paragraph 18, Italy  v Commission , paragraph 19, and Zoni , paragraph 26).
21. In that regard, the argument put forward by the Spanish Government that it is clear from the judgment in Case C-313/99 Mulligan and Others [2002] ECR I-5719 that it is unnecessary for an aid to be expressly authorised by Regulation No 3950/92 cannot be accepted. As the Advocate General rightly states in paragraph 40 of his Opinion, in that case the Court held that the Irish scheme at issue was legitimate only because it fell within the scope of the measures authorised by Article 7(1) of Regulation No 3950/92 ( Mulligan , paragraph 29).
26. Moreover, as the Advocate General rightly pointed out in paragraph 44 of his Opinion, the reference to ‘one or more of the following actions’ in Article 8 of Regulation No 3950/92 enables the Member States to adopt singly or in combination any or all of the measures listed, but does not authorise them to provide for new types of actions in that field. Similarly, the ‘detailed rules’ which Member States may enact must serve to implement one or more of those measures.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Date: 2004-10-14
15. It is settled case-law that Article 43 EC precludes any national measure which, even though it is applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality, is liable to hamper or to render less attractive the exercise by Community nationals of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the Treaty (see, to that effect, Case C-19/92 Kraus  [1993] ECR I-1663, paragraph 32).
16. It follows from Article 48 EC that the right to freedom of establishment is guaranteed not only to Community nationals but also to companies formed in accordance with the legislation of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community (see, to that effect, Case 81/87 Daily Mail and General Trust  [1988] ECR 5483; Case C-212/97 Centros  [1999] ECR I-1459, paragraph 18; and Case C‑208/00 Überseering  [2002] ECR I-9919, paragraph 56).
17. Freedom of establishment may, however, in the absence of Community harmonisation measures, be limited by national regulations justified by the reasons stated in Article 46(1) EC or by pressing reasons of general interest (see, to that effect, Case 71/76 Thieffry  [1977] ECR 765, paragraphs 12 and 15, and Kraus , cited above, paragraph 32).
18. In that context, it is for the Member States to decide on the level at which they intend to ensure the protection of the objectives set out in Article 46(1) EC and of the general interest and also on the way in which that level must be attained. However, they can do so only within the limits set by the Treaty and, in particular, they must observe the principle of proportionality, which requires that the measures adopted be appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective which they pursue and do not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose (see, to that effect, Case C-106/91 Ramrath  [1992] ECR I-3351, paragraphs 29 and 30, and Kraus , paragraph 32).
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2004-10-14
25. It is settled case-law that the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is to give the Member State concerned an opportunity, on the one hand, to comply with its obligations under Community law and, on the other, to avail itself of its right to defend itself against the charges formulated by the Commission (see, in particular, Case C-152/98 Commission v Netherlands  [2001] ECR I-3463, paragraph 23, and Case C-439/99 Commission  v Italy [2002] ECR I-305, paragraph 10).
26. It follows that, first, the subject-matter of proceedings under Article 226 EC is delimited by the pre-litigation procedure governed by that provision. Accordingly, the application must be founded on the same grounds and pleas as the reasoned opinion. If a charge was not included in the reasoned opinion, it is inadmissible at the stage of proceedings before the Court (see, in particular, Commission  v Italy , cited above, paragraph 11).
27. Second, the reasoned opinion must contain a cogent and detailed exposition of the reasons which led the Commission to the conclusion that the Member State concerned had failed to fulfil one of its obligations under the EC Treaty (see, in particular, Case C-207/96 Commission  v Italy  [1997] ECR I-6869, paragraph 18, and Case C‑439/99 Commission  v Italy , cited above, paragraph 12).
34. That argument cannot be accepted. The principle of equal treatment of service providers, laid down in Article 3(2) of the Directive, and the principle of transparency which flows from it (see, by analogy, Case C-87/94 Commission  v Belgium [1996] ECR I-2043, paragraphs 51 to 53, and Case C-324/98 Telaustria and Telefonadress  [2000] ECR I-10745, paragraph 61) require the subject-matter of each contract and the criteria governing its award to be clearly defined.
38. In that regard, it should be recalled that, as the Commission correctly points out, that provision, as a derogation from a fundamental rule of the Treaty, must be interpreted strictly and the burden of proving the existence of exceptional circumstances justifying a derogation lies on the person seeking to rely on those circumstances (see Joined Cases C-20/01 and C-28/01 Commission  v Germany  [2003] ECR I-3609, paragraph 58).
Betriebskrankenkasse der Robert Bosch GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Date: 2004-10-14
19. Moreover, as the Court has already held, the rights conferred by those provisions are intended to facilitate the free movement of persons covered by social insurance (see Case C-368/98 Vanbraekel and Others  [2001] ECR I-5363, paragraph 32; Case C-326/00 IKA  [2003] ECR I-1703, paragraphs 38 and 51; and Case  C-56/01 Inizan  [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 21).
21. The Court has stated with respect to Article 22 of Regulation No 1408/71, furthermore, that that provision  is not intended to regulate, and therefore does not in any way prevent, reimbursement by Member States, at the rates in force in the competent State, of costs incurred in connection with treatment provided in another Member State where the legislation of the Member State in which the person concerned is insured makes provision for such reimbursement and the rates applied under that legislation are more beneficial than those applied by the Member State in which the treatment was provided (see, inter alia, Vanbraekel , cited above, paragraph 36).
Siomab SA v Institut bruxellois pour la gestion de l'environnement.
Date: 2004-10-19
27. It should be noted first of all that, under the system established by the Regulation, all the competent authorities to which notification of a planned shipment of waste is addressed must check that the classification by the notifier is consistent with the provisions of the Regulation and object to a shipment which is incorrectly classified ( ASA , paragraph 40, and Case C-458/00 Commission  v Luxembourg  [2003] ECR I-1553, paragraph 21).
28. If the competent authority of dispatch considers that the purpose of the shipment has been incorrectly classified in the notification, the ground for its objection to the shipment must be the classification error itself, without reference to one of the specific provisions of the Regulation setting out the objections which the Member States may raise against a shipment of waste. The effect of that objection is, as with the other objections provided for in the Regulation, to prevent the shipment ( ASA , paragraph 47). However, it is not for the competent authority of dispatch to reclassify on its own initiative the purpose of the shipment of waste, since such a unilateral reclassification would result in one and the same shipment being examined by different competent authorities in the light of provisions falling under different chapters of the Regulation, which would be incompatible with the system established by the Regulation ( ASA , paragraph 48).
29. Moreover, the Court has held that the procedure laid down by the Regulation provides the notifier with a guarantee that the planned shipment will be examined within the periods prescribed by the Regulation and that he will be informed, upon the expiry of those periods at the latest, whether, and on what conditions, if any, the shipment can be ca rried out. Therefore, any objection in respect of the incorrect classification of the notified shipment as a shipment of waste for recovery must be raised by the competent authority of dispatch within the period prescribed by Article 7(2) of the Regulation ( ASA , paragraph 49).
Pharmacia Italia SpA, formerly Pharmacia & Upjohn SpA.
Date: 2004-10-19
19. It should furthermore be noted that:
– pursuant to Article 1(b) of the regulation, the term product as used in the regulation is defined as an active ingredient or combination of active ingredients of a medicinal product;
– pursuant to Article 3 of the regulation, the certificate is to be granted, inter alia, provided that the product has been granted a marketing authorisation as a medicinal product in accordance with Directive 65/65 or Directive 81/851; and
– pursuant to Article 4 of the regulation, the protection conferred by a certificate is to extend only to the product covered by the marketing authorisation for the corresponding medicinal product for any use of the product as a medicinal product that has been authorised before the expiry of the certificate.
20. It follows, first, that the decisive factor for the grant of the certificate is not the intended use of the medicinal product and, second, that the purpose of the protection conferred by the certificate relates to any use of the product as a medicinal product without any distinction between use of the product as a medicinal product for human use and as a veterinary medicinal product.
Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 2004-10-21
29. It should be noted that Article 1 of the Regulation clearly establishes the principle of freedom to provide maritime cabotage services within the Community (Case C-205/99 Analir and Others [2001] ECR I-1271, paragraph 20).
30. A national measure which requires from Community ships entered in a second or international register a certificate issued by the competent authority of the flag State declaring that that ship is authorised to provide cabotage services is liable to impede or render less attractive the provision of those services and therefore constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide them (see, to that effect, Analir , cited above, paragraph 22).
32. Secondly, it is important to note that freedom to provide services, as a fundamental principle of the EC Treaty, may be restricted only by rules which are justified by overriding reasons in the general interest and are applicable to all persons and undertakings pursuing an activity in the territory of the host Member State. Furthermore, in order to be so justified, the national legislation in question must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see Analir , cited above, paragraph 25, and case-law cited).
35. In those circumstances, the Commission, which has the burden of proof in proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations (see, inter alia, Case C-159/94 Commission  v France  [1997] ECR I-5815, paragraph 102, and case-law cited), has not been able to show that the Hellenic Republic, by requiring that certificate, has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Regulation.
Artrada (Freezone) NV and Others v Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees.
Date: 2004-10-28
41. It follows from all those factors that the answer to the second question is that:
Article 2(4) of Directive 92/46 is to be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘milk-based products’ covers both finished products and semi-finished products which must undergo further processing before they can be offered for sale to the consumer. In such a case, it is with regard to the semi-finished product that it must be ascertained whether its milk content is an essential part, in terms of quantity or for its characterisation. To do that, account must be taken of the characteristics and objective properties of the semi-finished product when it is imported, particularly the proportion of milk or milk product in the semi-finished product, the use which can be made of the semi-finished product and its taste.
Nürnberger Allgemeine Versicherungs AG v Portbridge Transport International BV.
Date: 2004-10-28
14. In that regard it must be noted that Article 57 introduces an exception to the general rule that the Brussels Convention takes precedence over other conventions signed by the Contracting States on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments. The purpose of that exception is to ensure compliance with the rules of jurisdiction laid down by specialised conventions, since when those rules were enacted account was taken of the specific features of the matters to which they relate (see Case C-406/92 Tatry  [1994] ECR I-5439, paragraph 24).
Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Svenska Spel AB.
Date: 2004-11-09
23. Under the 9th, 10th and 12th recitals of the preamble to the directive, its purpose is to promote and protect investment in data ‘storage’ and ‘processing’ systems which contribute to the development of an information market against a background of exponential growth in the amount of information generated and processed annually in all sectors of activity. It follows that the expression ‘investment in … the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents’ of a database must be understood, generally, to refer to investment in the creation of that database as such.