Samuel Sidney Evans v The Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and The Motor Insurers' Bureau.
Date: 2003-12-04
32.  The first subparagraph of Article 1(4) of the Second Directive contains no provision concerning the legal status of the body or the detailed arrangements for its authorisation. It expressly allows the Member States to regard compensation by the body as subsidiary and enables them to make provision for the settlement of claims between that body and those responsible for the accident and for relations with other insurers or social security bodies required to compensate the victim in respect of the same accident.
35.  As to whether it is sufficient, for the purposes of transposing the Second Directive, to rely on an existing body, it must be borne in mind that, whilst legislative action on the part of each Member State is not necessarily required in order to implement a directive, it is essential for national law to guarantee that the national authorities will effectively apply the directive in full, that the legal position under national law should be sufficiently precise and clear and that individuals are made fully aware of all their rights and, where appropriate, may rely on them before the national courts (Case C-365/93   Commission   v   Greece   [1995] ECR I-499, paragraph 9, and Case C-144/99   Commission   v   Netherlands   [2001] ECR I-3541, paragraph 17).
36.  As the Court has already made clear, the last-mentioned condition is of particular importance where the directive in question is intended to accord rights to nationals of other Member States (Commission   v   Greece  , cited above, paragraph 9, and   Commission   v   Netherlands  , cited above, paragraph 18).  That is the position in relation to the Second Directive, which is intended in particular, according to the fifth recital in its preamble, to guarantee victims adequate protection, irrespective of the Member State in which the accident occurred.
45.  It is settled case-law that in the absence of Community rules governing the matter it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, provided, however, that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (the principle of equivalence) and do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (the principle of effectiveness) (see, in particular, Case C-120/97   Upjohn   [1999] ECR I-223, paragraph 32).
46.  As regards application of the principle of effectiveness, each case which raises the question whether a national procedural provision renders application of Community law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national instances.  In the light of that analysis, the basic principles of the domestic judicial system, such as protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of procedure, must, where appropriate, be taken into consideration (see Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93   Van Schijndel and Van Veen   [1995] ECR I-4705, paragraph 19).
68.  Accordingly, compensation for loss cannot leave out of account factors, such as the  effluxion of time, which may in fact reduce its value (see, to that effect,   Marshall  , cited above, paragraph 31).
75.  The view of most of the Member States is that the question of reimbursement of costs incurred in connection with the procedure for obtaining compensation is a procedural matter.
76.  As pointed out in paragraph 45 of this judgment, in the absence of Community rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, in conformity with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
82.  First, as the Court has repeatedly held, the principle of liability on the part of a Member State for damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law for which the State is responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty (see, in particular, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90   Francovich and Others  [1991] ECR I-5357, paragraph 35; Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame   [1996] ECR I-1029, paragraph 31, and Case C-424/97   Haim   [2000] ECR I-5123, paragraph 26).
83.  As to the conditions to be satisfied for a Member State to be required to make reparation for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law for which the State is responsible, the Court has held that these are threefold: the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals; the breach must be sufficiently serious; and there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation incumbent on the State and the loss or damage sustained by the injured parties (Haim  , cited above, paragraph 36).
86.  In that connection, all the factors which characterise the situation must be taken into account.  Those factors include, in particular, the clarity and precision of the rule infringed, whether the infringement or the damage caused was intentional or involuntary, whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable, and the fact that the position taken by a Community institution may have contributed towards the adoption or maintenance of national measures or practices contrary to Community law (see   Haim  , cited above, paragraph 43).
87.  Those criteria must in principle be applied by the national courts in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Court (see, in particular,   Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame  , cited above, paragraphs 55 to 58).