Proceedings brought by A.
Date: 2018-07-25
5


The Court has confirmed that the provisions of the Convention are an integral part of the EU legal order and that provisions of EU legislation must as far as possible be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the Convention (judgment of 11 April 2013, HK Danmark, C‑335/11 and C‑337/11, EU:C:2013:222, paragraphs 30 and 32).
30


As a preliminary point, it is apparent from the documents before the Court that the Republic of Finland has not declared that the Disability Services Law is within the scope of Regulation No 883/2004. However, the Court has previously held that the fact that a Member State has failed to declare, as provided for by Article 9 of Regulation No 883/2004, that a law is covered by that regulation does not automatically mean that the law is outside the material scope of the regulation (see, inter alia, by analogy, judgments of 11 July 1996, Otte, C‑25/95, EU:C:1996:295, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited, and of 19 September 2013, Hliddal and Bornand, C‑216/12 and C‑217/12, EU:C:2013:568, paragraph 46).
31


The distinction between benefits falling within the scope of Regulation No 883/2004 and those which are outside it is based essentially on the constituent elements of each benefit, in particular its purpose and the conditions for its grant, and not on whether it is classified as a social security benefit by national legislation (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 5 March 1998, Molenaar, C‑160/96, EU:C:1998:84, paragraph 19; of 16 September 2015, Commission v Slovakia, C‑433/13, EU:C:2015:602, paragraph 70; and of 30 May 2018, Czerwiński, C‑517/16, EU:C:2018:350, paragraph 33).
32


The Court has consistently held that a benefit may be regarded as a social security benefit in so far as it is granted, without any individual and discretionary assessment of personal needs, to recipients on the basis of a legally defined position and provided that it relates to one of the risks expressly listed in Article 3(1) of Regulation No 883/2004 (see, inter alia, judgments of 27 March 1985, Hoeckx, 249/83,EU:C:1985:139, paragraphs 12 to 14; of 16 September 2015, Commission v Slovakia, C‑433/13, EU:C:2015:602, paragraph 71; and of 21 June 2017, Martinez Silva, C‑449/16, EU:C:2017:485, paragraph 20).
33


Given that the two conditions mentioned in the preceding paragraph are cumulative, the fact that one of them is not satisfied will mean that the benefit in question does not fall within the scope of Regulation No 883/2004.
34


It should be recalled that the first of those two conditions is satisfied if a benefit is granted in the light of objective criteria which, if they are met, confer entitlement to the benefit, the competent authority having no power to take account of other personal circumstances (see to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 16 July 1992, Hughes, C‑78/91, EU:C:1992:331, paragraph 17, and of 16 September 2015, Commission v Slovakia, C‑433/13, EU:C:2015:602, paragraph 73).
42


As regards more specifically care insurance, it is true that the Court has held, in essence, that whilst benefits pertaining to the risk of reliance on care have features that are peculiar to them, they must be treated as sickness benefits within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 883/2004 (see to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 5 March 1998, Molenaar, C‑160/96, EU:C:1998:84, paragraphs 23 to 25; of 30 June 2011, da Silva Martins, C‑388/09, EU:C:2011:439, paragraphs 40 to 45; and of 1 February 2017, Tolley, C‑430/15, EU:C:2017:74, paragraph 46).
43


However, treating the risk of reliance on care in the same way as the risk of sickness assumes that the purpose of benefits designed to provide cover against the risk of reliance on care is to improve the state of health and the quality of life of persons reliant on care (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 March 2001, Jauch, C‑215/99, EU:C:2001:139, paragraph 28; of 21 February 2006, Hosse, C‑286/03, EU:C:2006:125, paragraphs 38 to 44; and of 30 June 2011, da Silva Martins, C‑388/09, EU:C:2011:439, paragraph 45).
44


That is in particular the case, when, irrespective of the method of financing of those schemes, there is coverage of expenses entailed by the insured person’s reliance on care which relate, at the very least concurrently, to the care provided to the person and to the improvement of that person’s everyday life, for example, through the provision of equipment and assistance by third parties (see, inter alia, judgments of 5 March 1998, Molenaar, C‑160/96, EU:C:1998:84, paragraph 23; of 8 July 2004, Gaumain-Cerri and Barth, C‑502/01 and C‑31/02, EU:C:2004:413, paragraphs 3, 21 and 26; and of 12 July 2012, Commission v Germany, C‑562/10, EU:C:2012:442, paragraph 46).
45


It has also been held that benefits relating to the risk of reliance on care are at most supplementary to the ‘classic’ sickness benefits that fall within Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 883/2004 stricto sensu and are not necessarily an integral part of them (see, inter alia, judgments of 30 June 2011, da Silva Martins, C‑388/09, EU:C:2011:439, paragraph 47; and of 1 February 2017, Tolley, C‑430/15, EU:C:2017:74, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited.)
55


Having clarified that point, the Court observes that, as a Finnish national, A enjoys the status of citizen of the Union under Article 20(1) TFEU and may therefore rely on the rights conferred on those having that status, including against his Member State of origin (see, inter alia, judgment of 26 February 2015, Martens, C‑359/13, EU:C:2015:118, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
56


As the Court has held on numerous occasions, the status of citizen of the Union is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those among such nationals who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy, within the scope ratione materiae of the Treaty, the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for in that regard (see, inter alia, judgment of 2 June 2016, Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff, C‑438/14, EU:C:2016:401, paragraphs 29 and 30 and the case-law cited).
57


Situations falling within the scope ratione materiae of EU law include those which involve the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, in particular those involving the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States, as conferred by Article 21 TFEU (see, inter alia, judgment of 2 June 2016, Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff, C‑438/14, EU:C:2016:401, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
58


In that respect, the Court has stated that, although the Member States are competent, under Article 165(1) TFEU, as regards the content of teaching and the organisation of their respective education systems, they must exercise that competence in compliance with EU law and, in particular, in compliance with the Treaty provisions on the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States, as conferred by Article 21(1) TFEU on all citizens of the Union (judgment of 26 February 2015, Martens, C‑359/13, EU:C:2015:118, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
59


Moreover, EU law does not impose any obligation on the Member States to provide a system of funding for higher education pursued in a Member State or abroad. However, where a Member State provides for such a system which enables students to receive such grants, it must ensure that the detailed rules for the award of that funding do not create an unjustified restriction of the right to move and reside within the territory of the Member States (judgment of 26 February 2015, Martens, C‑359/13, EU:C:2015:118, paragraph 24).
60


It also follows from settled case-law that national legislation which places certain nationals at a disadvantage simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State constitutes a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 21(1) TFEU on every citizen of the Union (judgment of 26 February 2015, Martens, C‑359/13, EU:C:2015:118, paragraph 25).
61


Indeed, the opportunities offered by the Treaty in relation to freedom of movement for citizens of the Union cannot be fully effective if a national of a Member State can be dissuaded from using them by obstacles resulting from his stay in another Member State, because of legislation of his State of origin which penalises the mere fact that he has used those opportunities (see, inter alia, judgment of 26 February 2015, Martens, C‑359/13, EU:C:2015:118, paragraph 26).
62


That consideration is particularly important in the field of education, in view of the aims pursued by Article 6(e) TFEU and the second indent of Article 165(2) TFEU, namely, amongst other things, encouraging mobility of students and teachers (see, inter alia, judgment of 26 February 2015, Martens, C‑359/13, EU:C:2015:118, paragraph 27).
67


Such a restriction can be justified in the light of EU law only if it is based on objective considerations of public interest independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and if it is proportionate to the legitimate objective of the provisions of national law. It follows from the Court’s case-law that a measure is proportionate when, while appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective pursued, it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve it (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgment of 26 February 2015, Martens, C‑359/13, EU:C:2015:118, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
69


It is true that objectives of national legislation which seek to establish a genuine link between a claimant to short-term incapacity benefit in youth and the competent Member State and to preserve the financial balance of the national social security system, constitute, in principle, legitimate objectives capable of justifying restrictions on the rights of freedom of movement and residence under Article 21 TFEU (judgment of 21 July 2011, Stewart, C‑503/09, EU:C:2011:500, paragraph 90).
70


However, the Court concluded that the conditions requiring the presence of the person claiming the incapacity benefit could not be justified by the objectives mentioned in the preceding paragraph of this judgment. In particular, the Court held that, although the person claiming that benefit lived in a Member State other than the Member State concerned, the fact that there was a genuine and sufficient connection with the latter Member State could be established on the basis of factors other than the claimant’s presence in that Member State prior to her claim, such as the relationship between the claimant and the social security system of that Member State as well as the claimant’s family circumstances (judgment of 21 July 2011, Stewart, C‑503/09, EU:C:2011:500, paragraphs 97 to 102, 104 and 109).
71


The Court also held that that assessment applied with regard to the objective of ensuring the financial balance of the national social security system, since the need to establish a genuine and sufficient connection between the person claiming the benefit in question and the competent Member State enables the latter to satisfy itself that the economic cost of paying that benefit does not become unreasonable (judgment of 21 July 2011, Stewart, C‑503/09, EU:C:2011:500, paragraph 103).