larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Ori Martin SA v Court of Justice of the European Union.
Date: 2018-06-07
18


As regards the first ground of appeal, it should be noted that, so as not to neglect its role, the EU judicature must examine the various claims and pleas submitted by an applicant, as formulated in his pleadings, without modifying their nature or substance (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 June 1994, Klinke v Court of Justice, C‑298/93 P, EU:C:1994:273, paragraph 20).
23


Nevertheless, in paragraph 7 of the order under appeal, the General Court held that the appellant sought, by its action, to call into question the finding, in the judgment of 14 September 2016, Ori Martin and SLM v Commission (C‑490/15 P and C‑505/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:678), concerning the application of the presumption that the appellant exercised a decisive influence on SLM notwithstanding that, as is clear from the foregoing, the irregularity relied on by the appellant was based on a defect in the statement of reasons and therefore on breach of an essential procedural requirement, such that the General Court distorted the substance of the appellant’s sole claim for damages at first instance and therefore did not adequately address that claim.
24


However, according to settled case-law, where the grounds of a judgment of the General Court disclose an infringement of EU law but the operative part of the judgment is shown to be well founded for other legal reasons, the appeal must be dismissed (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2013, Rintisch v OHIM, C‑121/12 P, EU:C:2013:639, paragraph 35).
26


It should be noted, first, that the obligation to state reasons does not require the EU judicature to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case and that the reasoning may therefore be implicit on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the EU judicature has not upheld their arguments (judgment of 6 September 2012, Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej v Commission, C‑422/11 P and C‑423/11 P, EU:C:2012:553, paragraph 48). Second, under Article 256(1) TFEU and of the first paragraph of Article 59 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal may be brought on points of law only.
Christian Louboutin and Christian Louboutin Sas v van Haren Schoenen BV.
Date: 2018-06-12
20


Given that Directive 2008/95 provides no definition of the concept of ‘shape’, the meaning and scope of that concept must, as the Court has consistently held, be determined by considering its usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which it occurs and the purposes of the rules of which it is part (see, by analogy, judgment of 3 September 2014, Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds, C‑201/13, EU:C:2014:2132, paragraph 19).
21


As noted by the European Commission, in the context of trade mark law, the concept of ‘shape’ is usually understood as a set of lines or contours that outline the product concerned.
24


In that regard, it must be noted that, while it is true that the shape of the product or of a part of the product plays a role in creating an outline for the colour, it cannot, however, be held that a sign consists of that shape in the case where the registration of the mark did not seek to protect that shape but sought solely to protect the application of a colour to a specific part of that product.
Deutscher Naturschutzring – Dachverband der deutschen Natur- und Umweltschutzverbände e.V. v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Date: 2018-06-13
29


In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 12 October 2010Rosenbladt, C‑45/09, EU:C:2010:601, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
37


First, as regards the concept of ‘conservation measures’, it must be held that the words used in Article 11 of that regulation do not help to determine the scope of that concept. However, for the purposes of interpreting Article 11(1), account must be taken not only of the wording of that provision, but also its context and the objective it pursues (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 April 2011, Société fiduciaire nationale d’expertise comtable, C‑119/09, EU:C:2011:208, paragraph 25).
49


Furthermore, it must be stated more generally that, according to settled case-law, in order to satisfy the proportionality test, a measure must be capable of contributing to the objective pursued and not necessarily of attaining it by itself (see, by analogy, judgment of 21 December 2016, AGET Iraklis, C‑201/15, EU:C:2016:972, paragraph 92).
60


Furthermore, since Article 11(1) introduces an exception to the general rule, laid down in Article 6 of Regulation No 1380/2013, according to which the competence to adopt conservation measures is for the EU, its provisions must be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 June 2015, Zh. And O, C‑554/13, EU:C:2015:377, paragraph 42).
Asociación Nacional de Productores de Ganado Porcino v Administración del Estado.
Date: 2018-06-14
20


In that regard, first, it must be pointed out that it is solely for the national court, before which the dispute has been brought and which must assume responsibility for the judicial decision to be made, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the necessity and the relevance of the questions that it submits to the Court (see judgment of 21 June 2016, New Valmar, C‑15/15, EU:C:2016:464, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
21


Secondly, it must be noted that any national measure that is capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade within the European Union must be regarded as a measure having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions within the meaning of Article 34 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 October 2012, Elenca, C‑385/10, EU:C:2012:634, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited), and of 6 October 2015, Capoda Import-Export, C‑354/14, EU:C:2015:658, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
22


It is clear from the Court’s settled case-law that that provision is intended to apply not only to the actual effects but also to the potential effects of legislation. It cannot be considered inapplicable simply because at the present time there are no actual cases with a connection to another Member State (judgment of 22 October 1998, Commission v France, C‑184/96, EU:C:1998:495, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
24


In that regard, the Court has consistently held that national legislation that subjects goods from other Member States, where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, to certain conditions in order to be able to use the generic designation commonly used for that product, and which thus in certain cases requires producers to use designations which are unknown to, or less highly regarded by, consumers, does not absolutely preclude the importation into the Member State concerned of products originating in other Member States. Nevertheless, it is likely to make their marketing more difficult and thus impede trade between Member States (judgment of 5 December 2000, Guimont, C‑448/98, EU:C:2000:663, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
27


Moreover, as noted by the Commission, EU legislation displays a general tendency to emphasise the quality of products within the framework of the common agricultural policy, in order to promote the reputation of those products (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 May 2000, Belgium v Spain, C‑388/95, EU:C:2000:244, paragraph 53, and of 8 September 2009, Budějovický Budvar, C‑478/07, EU:C:2009:521, paragraph 109).
29


The Court has consistently held that a national measure applicable to all traders active in the national territory which has a greater effect on goods leaving the market of the exporting Member State than on the marketing of goods in the domestic market of that Member State is covered by the prohibition laid down by Article 35 TFEU (judgment of 21 June 2016, New Valmar, C‑15/15, EU:C:2016:464, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
Lubrizol France SAS v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2018-06-14
In that regard, the General Court’s assessment of the facts of the case before it does not constitute a point of law falling within the scope of the Court’s power of review, unless the General Court’s findings are vitiated by a substantive error or a distortion which is manifest from the documents in the file (judgment of 11 January 2017, Typke v Commission, C‑491/15 P, EU:C:2017:5, paragraph 58).
Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals, Operations Support Group v Orifarm GmbH.
Date: 2018-06-21
39


As the Court has consistently held, the holder of an intellectual or industrial property right protected by the legislation of a Member State cannot rely upon that legislation to prevent the importation of a product which has been lawfully marketed in another Member State by the holder himself or with his consent (see, inter alia, judgments of 14 July 1981, Merck, 187/80, EU:C:1981:180, paragraph 12, and of 12 February 2015, Merck Canada and Merck Sharp & Dohme, C‑539/13, EU:C:2015:87, paragraph 24).
41


The Specific Mechanisms thus derogate from the free movement of goods. However, the Court has consistently held that provisions in an Act of Accession which permit exceptions to or derogations from rules laid down by the Treaties must be interpreted strictly (see, inter alia, judgments of 5 December 1996, Merck and Beecham, C‑267/95 and C‑268/95, EU:C:1996:468, paragraph 23, and of 12 February 2015, Merck Canada and Merck Sharp & Dohme, C‑539/13, EU:C:2015:87, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
49


In that regard, it should be recalled that the Court has consistently held that the SPC is designed simply to re-establish a sufficient period of effective protection of the basic patent by permitting the holder to enjoy an additional period of exclusivity on the expiry of that patent, which is intended to compensate, at least in part, for the delay to the commercial exploitation of his invention by reason of the time which has elapsed between the date on which the application for the patent was filed and the date on which the first marketing authorisation in the European Union was granted (judgment of 12 December 2013, Eli Lilly and Company, C‑493/12, EU:C:2013:835, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
50


In order for an SPC to be granted, however, the cumulative conditions set out in Article 3 of the SPC Regulation must be fulfilled. That provision provides, in essence, that an SPC can be granted only if, at the date of the application, the product is protected by a basic patent in force and has not already been the subject of an SPC. In addition, that product must have been granted a marketing authorisation as a medicinal product which is still valid, in accordance with Directive 2001/83 or Directive 2001/82, as appropriate; and, lastly, that marketing authorisation must be the first in relation to that product as a medicinal product (judgment of 15 January 2015, Forsgren, C‑631/13, EU:C:2015:13, paragraph 32).
Petronas Lubricants Italy SpA v Livio Guida.
Date: 2018-06-21
23


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, first, for disputes related to contracts of employment, Section 5 of Chapter II of Regulation No 44/2001 lays down a series of rules whose objective, as is stated in recital 13 of that regulation, is to protect the weaker party to the contract by means of rules of jurisdiction that are more favourable to his interests (judgment of 14 September 2017, Nogueira and Others, C‑168/16 and C‑169/16, EU:C:2017:688, paragraph 49).
24


Those rules enable an employee to sue his employer before the court which he regards as closest to his interests, by giving him the option of proceeding before the courts of the Member State in which the employer is domiciled or the courts of the place in which the employee habitually carries out his work or, where that work is not carried out in any one country, before the courts of the place where the business which hired the employee is situated. The provisions of that section also limit the choice of jurisdiction by an employer suing an employee, and the possibility of derogating from the rules of jurisdiction laid down by that regulation (judgment of 14 September 2017, Nogueira and Others, C‑168/16 and C‑169/16, EU:C:2017:688, paragraph 50).
25


Secondly, the provisions included in Chapter II, Section 5, of Regulation No 44/2001 are not only specific but also exhaustive (judgment of 14 September 2017, Nogueira and Others, C‑168/16 and C‑169/16, EU:C:2017:688, paragraph 51).
26


As regards counter-claims, the rule in Article 6, point 3, of Regulation No 44/2001 has been incorporated in Article 20(2) of that regulation (judgment of 22 May 2008, Glaxosmithkline and Laboratoires Glaxosmithkline, C‑462/06, EU:C:2008:299, paragraph 22).
29


As for the concept of ‘counter-claim’, which is not defined in Article 20(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, it is necessary, in the light of what is recalled in paragraph 26 of this judgment, to take account of the concept of ‘counter-claim’ in Article 6, point 3, of Regulation No 44/2001, as interpreted by the Court. It is clear from the case-law of the Court that, in the interests of the sound administration of justice, the special jurisdiction for counter-claims enables the parties, in the same proceedings and before the same court, to litigate all their claims against each other that have a common origin. Thus, unnecessary multiple proceedings are avoided (judgment of 12 October 2016, Kostanjevec, C‑185/15, EU:C:2016:763, paragraph 37).
MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions.
Date: 2018-06-26
34


As is clear from Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 2006/54, there is direct discrimination based on sex if one person is treated less favourably on grounds of sex than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation. That concept must be understood in the same way in the context of Directive 79/7.
41


In that regard, it must be noted that the requirement relating to the comparability of situations does not require those situations to be identical, but only similar (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 May 2011, Römer, C‑147/08, EU:C:2011:286, paragraph 42, and of 19 July 2017, Abercrombie & Fitch Italia, C‑143/16, EU:C:2017:566, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
42


The comparability of situations must be assessed not in a global and abstract manner, but in a specific and concrete manner having regard to all the elements which characterise them, in the light, in particular, of the subject matter and purpose of the national legislation which makes the distinction at issue, as well as, where appropriate, in the light of the principles and objectives pertaining to the field to which that national legislation relates (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 December 2008, Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others, C‑127/07, EU:C:2008:728, paragraphs 25 and 26; of 16 July 2015, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria, C‑83/14, EU:C:2015:480, paragraphs 89 and 90; and of 9 March 2017, Milkova, C‑406/15, EU:C:2017:198, paragraphs 56 and 57 and the case-law cited).
50


However, according to the case-law of the Court, a derogation from the prohibition, set out in Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7, of all direct discrimination on grounds of sex is possible only in the situations exhaustively set out in the provisions of that directive (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 July 2005, Vergani, C‑207/04, EU:C:2005:495, paragraphs 34 and 35, and of 3 September 2014, X, C‑318/13, EU:C:2014:2133, paragraphs 34 and 35). As it is, the objective invoked by the United Kingdom Government does not correspond to any of the derogations allowed by that directive.
Spliethoff's Bevrachtingskantoor BV v European Commission.
Date: 2018-06-28
55


According to settled case-law, it follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) and Article 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the decision of the General Court under appeal and the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal. An appeal which merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the General Court, including those based on facts expressly rejected by the General Court, does not satisfy the requirement to state reasons under those provisions (judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
56


However, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the General Court, the points of law examined at first instance may be argued again in the course of an appeal. If an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already put forward before the General Court, the appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose. The appeal seeks precisely to challenge the General Court’s legal analysis of the arguments relied on at first instance (judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
Eva Soraya Checa Honrado v Fondo de Garantía Salarial.
Date: 2018-06-28
28


The first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2008/94 provides that Member States are to take the measures necessary to ensure that guarantee institutions guarantee, subject to Article 4 of the directive, payment of employees’ outstanding claims resulting from contracts of employment or employment relationships, including, where provided for by national law, severance pay on termination of employment relationships. The second paragraph of that article states that the claims taken over by the guarantee institution are the outstanding pay claims relating to a certain period determined by the Member States.
30


It follows from a combined reading of those provisions that it is for national law to specify which forms of compensation fall within the scope of the first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2008/94 (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 March 2017, Eschenbrenner, C‑496/15, EU:C:2017:152, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
31


However, the Court has repeatedly held that the power of national law, recognised by that directive, to specify the benefits payable by the guarantee institution is conditional upon the requirements flowing from the general principle of equality and non-discrimination (judgment of 21 February 2008, Robledillo Núñez, C‑498/06, EU:C:2008:109, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
32


That principle requires that comparable situations should not be treated differently unless such difference in treatment is objectively justified (judgments of 12 December 2002, Rodríguez Caballero, C‑442/00, EU:C:2002:752, paragraph 32; of 7 September 2006, Cordero Alonso, C‑81/05, EU:C:2006:529, paragraph 37; and of 17 January 2008, Velasco Navarro, C‑246/06, EU:C:2008:19, paragraph 36).
42


The difference in treatment thus afforded by Article 33(2) to workers whose claims result from compensation for termination of the employment relationship based on Article 40 of the Workers’ Statute can therefore be accepted, in accordance with the case-law recalled in paragraph 32 above, only if it is objectively justified (see also, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 2004, Olaso Valero, C‑520/03, EU:C:2004:826, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
46


The interpretation of the first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2008/94 defended by the Spanish Government is not, moreover, compatible with the social objective of that directive, which is, as follows from Article 1(1) thereof, read in conjunction with recital 3 of the directive, to guarantee employees a minimum of protection at EU level in the event of the employer’s insolvency through payment of outstanding claims resulting from contracts of employment or employment relationships (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 March 2017, Eschenbrenner, C‑496/15, EU:C:2017:152, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).
Wolfgang Wirth and Others v Thomson Airways Ltd.
Date: 2018-07-04
18


That definition thus sets out two cumulative conditions which must be satisfied if an air carrier is to be regarded as an ‘operating air carrier’ relating, first, to the operation of the flight in question and, second, to there being a contract concluded with a passenger.
19


The first condition relates to the concept of a ‘flight’, which is the predominant element of the two conditions. The Court has previously held that that concept must be understood as ‘an air transport operation, being as it were a “unit” of such transport, performed by an air carrier which fixes its itinerary’ (judgments of 10 July 2008, Emirates Airlines, C‑173/07, EU:C:2008:400, paragraph 40, of 13 October 2011, Sousa Rodríguez and Others, C‑83/10, EU:C:2011:652, paragraph 27, and of 22 June 2016, Mennens, C‑255/15, EU:C:2016:472, paragraph 20).
Marcandi Limited v Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs.
Date: 2018-07-05
64


Therefore, where they find that the same transaction has been the object of a different tax treatment in another Member State, the courts of a Member State before which a dispute raises issues involving an interpretation of provisions of EU law and requiring a decision by them have the power, or even the obligation, to refer a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court.
65


Moreover, it must be noted that the existence in one or several other Member States of different approaches to that prevailing in the Member State concerned must not, in any event, lead the courts of that Member State to interpret the provisions of the VAT Directive incorrectly.
66


Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the third question is that, when interpreting the relevant provisions of EU and national law, the courts of a Member State that find that the same transaction has been the object of a different tax treatment for the purposes of VAT in another Member State, have the power, or even — depending on whether there is a judicial remedy under national law against its decisions — the obligation, to refer a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court.