Oana Mădălina Călin v Direcţia Regională a Finanţelor Publice Ploieşti – Administraţia Judeţeană a Finanţelor Publice Dâmboviţa and Others.
Date: 2019-09-11
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In that regard, it is settled case-law that the right to a refund of taxes levied by a Member State in breach of rules of EU law is the consequence and complement of the rights conferred on individuals by provisions of EU law prohibiting such taxes, as interpreted by the Court. The Member States are therefore, in principle, required to repay taxes levied in breach of EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 November 1983, San Giorgio, 199/82, EU:C:1983:318, paragraph 12; of 19 July 2012, Littlewoods Retail and Others, C‑591/10, EU:C:2012:478, paragraph 24; and of 6 October 2015, Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 24).
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Nevertheless, attention should be drawn to the importance, both in the legal order of the European Union and in national legal systems, of the principle of res judicata. In order to ensure both stability of the law and legal relations and the sound administration of justice, it is important that judicial decisions which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the time limits provided for in that connection can no longer be called into question (judgments of 10 July 2014, Impresa Pizzarotti, C‑213/13, EU:C:2014:2067, paragraph 58; of 6 October 2015, Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 28; and of 29 July 2019, Hochtief Solutions Magyarországi Fióktelepe, C‑620/17, EU:C:2019:630, paragraph 54).
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Therefore, EU law does not require a national court to disapply domestic rules of procedure conferring finality on a judgment, even if to do so would make it possible to remedy a domestic situation which is incompatible with EU law (judgments of 10 July 2014, Impresa Pizzarotti, C‑213/13, EU:C:2014:2067, paragraph 59; of 6 October 2015, Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 29; and of 29 July 2019, Hochtief Solutions Magyarországi Fióktelepe, C‑620/17, EU:C:2019:630, paragraph 55).
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It has been held that EU law does not require a national judicial body automatically to go back on a decision having the authority of res judicata in order to take into account the interpretation of a relevant provision of EU law adopted by the Court (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 July 2014, Impresa Pizzarotti, C‑213/13, EU:C:2014:2067, paragraph 60; of 6 October 2015, Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 38; and of 29 July 2019, Hochtief Solutions Magyarországi Fióktelepe, C‑620/17, EU:C:2019:630, paragraph 56).
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However, if the applicable domestic rules of procedure provide the possibility, under certain conditions, for a national court to go back on a decision having the authority of res judicata in order to render the situation compatible with national law, that possibility must prevail if those conditions are met, in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, so that the situation at issue is brought back into line with EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 July 2014, Impresa Pizzarotti, C‑213/13, EU:C:2014:2067, paragraph 62; of 6 October 2015, Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 30; and of 29 July 2019, Hochtief Solutions Magyarországi Fióktelepe, C‑620/17, EU:C:2019:630, paragraph 60).
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In accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU, the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under EU law must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (judgment of 24 October 2018, XC and Others, C‑234/17, EU:C:2018:853, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
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The observance of those requirements must be analysed by reference to the role of the rules concerned in the procedure viewed as a whole, to the conduct of that procedure and to the special features of those rules before the various national courts (judgments of 27 June 2013, Agrokonsulting-04, C‑93/12, EU:C:2013:432, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited, and of 24 October 2018, XC and Others, C‑234/17, EU:C:2018:853, paragraph 24).
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It must, therefore, be ascertained whether the action for revision at issue in the main proceedings may be regarded as similar to an action based on a breach of national law, taking into consideration the purpose, cause of action and essential characteristics of those actions (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 June 2013, Agrokonsulting-04, C‑93/12, EU:C:2013:432, paragraph 39, and of 24 October 2018, XC and Others, C‑234/17, EU:C:2018:853, paragraph 27).
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As regards the principle of effectiveness, it should be borne in mind that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, every case in which the question arises as to whether a national procedural provision makes the application of EU law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its conduct and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national bodies. In that context, it is necessary, inter alia, to take into consideration, where relevant, the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of the procedure (judgments of 14 June 2012, Banco Español de Crédito, C‑618/10, EU:C:2012:349, paragraph 49; of 22 February 2018, INEOS Köln, C‑572/16, EU:C:2018:100, paragraph 44; and of 24 October 2018, XC and Others, C‑234/17, EU:C:2018:853, paragraph 49).
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As regards, more specifically, limitation periods, the Court has ruled that, in the interests of legal certainty, the setting of reasonable time limits for bringing proceedings is compatible with the principle of effectiveness (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 December 1976, Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral, 33/76, EU:C:1976:188, paragraph 5; of 10 July 1997, Palmisani, C‑261/95, EU:C:1997:351, paragraph 28; of 29 October 2015, BBVA, C‑8/14, EU:C:2015:731, paragraph 28; and of 22 February 2018, INEOS Köln, C‑572/16, EU:C:2018:100, paragraph 47).
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A limitation period for bringing an action for revision is reasonable in so far as it enables the individual to assess whether there are grounds to request revision of a final judgment and, where relevant, to prepare the action for revision of that judgment. In that regard, it is important to note that, in the present case, it has not been alleged that the time limit of one month prescribed for that purpose was unreasonable (see, by analogy, judgment of 6 October 2009, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, C‑40/08, EU:C:2009:615, paragraph 44).
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Furthermore, it is important to note that the time limit for bringing the action for revision at issue in the main proceedings starts to run from the date the parties are notified of the final judgment in question. Thus, it is not possible for the parties to find themselves in a situation in which that time limit has expired without them being aware of the final judgment (see, by analogy, judgment of 6 October 2009, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, C‑40/08, EU:C:2009:615, paragraph 45).
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As regards the rules for the application of that time limit, it should be borne in mind that the principle of legal certainty, the corollary of which is the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, requires, first, that rules of law must be clear and precise and, second, that their application must be foreseeable by those subject to them (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 February 1996, Duff and Others, C‑63/93, EU:C:1996:51, paragraph 20; of 10 September 2009, Plantanol, C‑201/08, EU:C:2009:539, paragraph 46; and of 11 June 2015, Berlington Hungary and Others, C‑98/14, EU:C:2015:386, paragraph 77).
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Furthermore, as the referring court has stated that the application of that time limit by the Curtea de Apel Ploiești (Court of Appeal, Ploiești) meant it was impossible for Ms Călin to be repaid the tax that was levied in breach of EU law, given that Ms Călin had no other national procedural means of obtaining repayment of that tax, it should be borne in mind that, as the Advocate General stated in point [105] of his Opinion, the principle of res judicata does not preclude recognition of the principle of State liability for the decision of a court adjudicating at last instance (judgment of 30 September 2003, Köbler, C‑224/01, EU:C:2003:513, paragraph 40), such as the referring court. Given, inter alia, that infringement, by such a decision, of rights deriving from EU law cannot normally be corrected thereafter, individuals cannot be deprived of the possibility of holding the State liable in order to obtain legal protection of their rights (judgments of 30 September 2003, Köbler, C‑224/01, EU:C:2003:513, paragraph 34; of 6 October 2015, Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 40; and of 24 October 2018, XC and Others, C‑234/17, EU:C:2018:853, paragraph 58).