Magoora sp. zo. o. v Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Krakowie.
Date: 2008-12-22
22. In that regard, it must be recalled that, in proceedings under Article 234 EC, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C‑119/05 Lucchini [2007] ECR I-6199, paragraph 43; Case C‑162/06 International Mail Spain  [2007] ECR I-9911, paragraph 23; and Case C‑221/07 Zablocka-Weyhermüller  [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 20).
23. The Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra  [2001] ECR I‑2099, paragraph 39; Joined Cases C‑94/04 and C‑202/94 Cipolla and Others  [2006] ECR I-11421, paragraph 25; Joined Cases C‑222/05 to C‑225/05 van der Weerd and Others  [2007] ECR I-4233, paragraph 22; Case C‑379/05 Amurta  [2007] ECR I‑9569, paragraph 64; and Zablocka-Weyhermüller , paragraph 21).
27. In this case, the Sixth Directive entered into force in the Republic of Poland on the date of its accession to the European Union; that is 1 May 2004. Therefore, that is the material date for the purposes of the application of the second subparagraph of Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive as regards that Member State (see, to that effect, Case C‑409/99 Metropol and Stadler  [2002] ECR I-81, paragraph 41).
28. According to the fundamental principle which underlies the common VAT system and which follows from Article 2 of First Council Directive 67/227/EEC of 11 April 1967 on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States concerning turnover taxes (OJ, English Special Edition, Series I, 1967, p. 14) and the Sixth Directive, VAT applies to each transaction by way of production or distribution after deduction has been made of the VAT which has been levied directly on transactions relating to inputs. It is settled case-law that the right of deduction provided for in Article 17 et seq. of the Sixth Directive is an integral part of the VAT scheme and in principle may not be limited. That right must be exercised immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on input transactions. Any limitation on the right of deduction of VAT affects the level of the tax burden and must be applied in a similar manner in all the Member States. Consequently, derogations are permitted only in the cases expressly provided for in the Sixth Directive (see Joined Cases C‑177/99 and C‑181/99 Ampafrance and Sanofi  [2000] ECR I-7013, paragraph 34; Metropol and Stadler , paragraph 42; and Case C‑371/07 Danfoss and AstraZeneca  [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 26). Furthermore, provisions laying down derogations from the principle of the right to deduct VAT, which ensures the neutrality of that tax, are to be interpreted strictly ( Metropol and Stadler , paragraph 59).
29. Article 17(2) of the Sixth Directive clearly sets out the principle of the taxable person’s right to deduct the amounts invoiced as VAT for goods supplied or services rendered to him, in so far as such goods or services are used for the purposes of his taxable transactions. The principle of the right to deduct VAT is none the less subject to the derogation in Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive, and, in particular, the second subparagraph thereof (see Metropol and Stadler , paragraphs 43 and 44, and Danfoss and AstraZeneca , paragraphs 27 and 28).
31. It is for the Community legislature to establish the Community system of exclusions from the right to deduct VAT and thereby to bring about the progressive harmonisation of national VAT legislation. Community law does not yet contain any provision listing the expenditure excluded from the right to deduct VAT (see, to that effect, Case C‑345/99 Commission  v France [2001] ECR I-4493, paragraph 20; Metropol and Stadler , paragraph 44; and Case C‑280/04 Jyske Finans  [2005] ECR I-10683, paragraph 23).
32. The interpretation of the national legislation in order to determine its content at the date of entry into force of the Sixth Directive and to establish whether the effect of that legislation was to extend, after the entry into force of the Sixth Directive, the scope of existing exclusions is in principle within the jurisdiction of the national court (see Metropol and Stadler , paragraph 47).
33. Furthermore, it must be observed that, in proceedings under Article 234 EC, which is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, any assessment of the facts in the case is a matter for the national court (see, in particular, Case C‑450/06 Varec  [2008] ECR I‑581, paragraph 23 and case-law cited). However, in order to give the national court a useful answer, the Court may, in a spirit of cooperation with national courts, provide it with all the guidance that it deems necessary (see, in particular, Case C‑49/07 MOTOE  [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 30).
34. It is for the Court of Justice to supply the referring court with guidance on interpreting the Community concept of ‘national legislation’ within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive, in order to enable that court to determine its content at the date of entry into force of that directive (see Metropol and Stadler , paragraph 47).
35. The second subparagraph of Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive contains a ‘standstill’ clause which provides for the retention of national exclusions from the right to deduct VAT which were applicable before the Sixth Directive entered into force ( Ampafrance and Sanofi , paragraph 5). The objective of that provision is to allow the Member States, pending the establishment by the Council of the Community system of exclusions from the right to deduct VAT, to maintain any rules of national law excluding the right to deduct which were actually applied by their public authorities at the date of entry into force of the Sixth Directive ( Metropol and Stadler , paragraph 48, and Danfoss and AstraZeneca , paragraphs 30 and 31).
36. Where, after the entry into force of the Sixth Directive, the legislation of a Member State is amended so as to reduce the scope of existing exemptions and thereby brings itself into line with the objective of the Sixth Directive, that legislation must be considered to be covered by the derogation in the second subparagraph of Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive and is not in breach of Article 17(2) (see Case C‑345/99 Commission  v France , paragraph 22; Metropol and Stadler , paragraph 45; and Danfoss and AstraZeneca , paragraph 32).
37. It must be recalled, according to the settled case-law of the Court, that national legislation does not constitute a derogation permitted by the second subparagraph of Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive if its effect is to increase, after the entry into force of that directive, the extent of existing exclusions, thus diverging from the objective of that directive (see Case C‑40/00 Commission  v France  [2001] ECR I-4539, paragraph 17; Case C‑155/01 Cookies World  [2003] ECR I-8785, paragraph 66; and Danfoss and AstraZeneca , paragraph 33).
38. It follows that, taking account of the objective of that provision, the concept of ‘national legislation’ within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive refers to the rules on deducting VAT existing and actually applied when that directive entered into force.
39. Furthermore, it must be recalled, as the Commission has submitted, that the ‘standstill’ clause, provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive is not intended to allow a new Member State to amend its domestic legislation on its accession to the European Union in a way which diverts that legislation from the objectives of that directive. An amendment to that effect would be contrary to the very spirit of that clause.
44. It is for the national court to interpret domestic law, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the Sixth Directive with a view to achieving the results sought by the latter, favouring the interpretation of the national rules which is the most consistent with that purpose in order thereby to achieve an outcome compatible with the provisions of the directive (see, to that effect, Case C‑212/04 Adeneler and Others [2006] ECR I-6057, paragraph 124), setting aside, if necessary, any contrary provision of national law (see, to that effect, Case C‑144/04 Mangold  [2005] ECR I-9981, paragraph 77).