Eugenia Florescu and Others v Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Sibiu and Others.
Date: 2017-06-13
30


In accordance with settled case-law, Article 267 TFEU confers on the Court jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the validity and interpretation of all acts of the EU institutions without exception (judgments of 13 December 1989, Grimaldi, C‑322/88, EU:C:1989:646, paragraph 8, and of 11 May 2006, Friesland Coberco Dairy Foods, C‑11/05, EU:C:2006:312, paragraph 36).
44


It should be recalled that the Charter’s scope, so far as action of the Member States is concerned, is defined in Article 51(1) of the Charter, according to which the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law (judgment of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 17).
48


It is true that the Memorandum of Understanding leaves Romania some discretion in deciding what measures are most likely to lead to performance of those undertakings. However, on the one hand, where a Member State adopts measures in the exercise of the discretion conferred upon it by an act of EU law, it must be regarded as implementing that law, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2011, N. S. and Others, C‑411/10 and C‑493/10, EU:C:2011:865, paragraphs 65 to 68). On the other hand, the objectives set out in Article 3(5) of Decision 2009/459, as well as those set out in the Memorandum of Understanding, are sufficiently detailed and precise to permit the inference that the purpose of the prohibition on combining a public-sector retirement pension with income from activities carried out in public institutions, stemming from Law No 329/2009, is to implement both the memorandum and that decision, and thus EU law, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter. Consequently, the latter is applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings.
49


In those circumstances, it is necessary to examine whether Article 17 of the Charter, in particular paragraph 1 thereof, precludes national legislation such as that at issue in the case in the main proceedings. In order to determine the scope of the fundamental right to peaceful enjoyment of property, it is necessary, having regard to Article 52(3) of the Charter, to take account of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, which enshrines that right (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 356).
50


In that regard, where legislation provides for the automatic payment of a social benefit, it generates a proprietary interest for persons meeting the requirements thereof falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to that convention (ECtHR, 7 July 2011, Stummer
v. Austria, CE:ECHR:2011:0707JUD003745202, § 82). The rights resulting from the payment of contributions to a social security scheme thus constitute rights of property for the purposes of that article (ECtHR, 12 October 2004, Kjartan Ásmundsson
v. Iceland, CE:ECHR:2004:1012JUD006066900, § 39). However, the right to property enshrined in that article cannot be interpreted as entitling a person to a pension of a particular amount (ECtHR, 12 October 2004, Kjartan Ásmundsson
v. Iceland, CE:ECHR:2004:1012JUD006066900, § 39).
51


With regard to Article 17 of the Charter, it is clear from the settled case-law of the Court that the right of property enshrined in that article is not absolute and that its exercise may be subject to restrictions justified by objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, Joined Cases C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).
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Consequently, a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings does not fall within the general framework established by Article 2(2) of Directive 2000/78 in order to combat certain forms of discrimination (see judgment of 21 May 2015, SCMD, C‑262/14, not published, EU:C:2015:336, paragraph 31).