larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Grande Área Metropolitana do Porto (GAMP) v Comissão Directiva do Programa Operacional Potencial Humano and Others.
Date: 2012-12-19
30. In that regard, it is apparent from the second paragraph of Article 174 TFEU, read in conjunction with the first paragraph of Article 175 TFEU, that the Structural Funds and the other financial instruments of the European Union which contribute to economic, social and territorial cohesion aim, in particular, to reduce disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions. Moreover, that objective is reiterated in recital 1 in the preamble to Regulation No 1083/2006 and must be taken into account by the Member States when implementing investments co-financed by those funds and instruments (see, on that latter point, Case C-166/07 Parliament  v Council  [2009] ECR I-7135, paragraph 45).
Georg Köck v Schutzverband gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb.
Date: 2013-01-17
26. It must be recalled that Article 2(d) of the Directive gives a particularly wide definition to the concept of ‘commercial practices’ as ‘any act, omission, course of conduct or representation, commercial communication including advertising and marketing, by a trader, directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers’ (Case C-540/08 Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag  [2010] ECR I-10909, paragraph 17).
29. It must be recalled that, as the Court has previously held, according to recital 8 in the preamble, the Directive ‘directly protects consumer economic interests from unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices’ and ensures, as stated in particular in Article 1 of the Directive, ‘a high level of consumer protection by approximating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States on unfair commercial practices harming consumers’ economic interests’ (order of 4 October 2012 in Case C-559/11 Pelckmans Turnhout , paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
30. As may be seen from recital 6 in the preamble to the Directive, it is only national legislation relating to unfair commercial practices which harm ‘only’ competitors’ economic interests or which relate to a transaction between traders that is excluded from the scope of the Directive ( Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag , paragraph 21).
35. According to settled case-law, the only commercial practices which can be regarded by national law as unfair without a case-by-case assessment against the provisions of Articles 5 to 9 of the Directive are those listed in Annex I to the Directive. Consequently, a practice not covered by that annex may be declared unfair only after an examination of its unfairness in accordance with the criteria set out in Articles 5 to 9 (see, to that effect, Case C-304/08 Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft  [2010] ECR I-217, paragraphs 41 to 45, and Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag , paragraphs 30 to 34).
44. The Directive, as the Advocate General observes in points 44 to 55 of her Opinion, leaves Member States a margin of discretion as to the choice of national measures intended, in accordance with Articles 11 and 13 of the Directive, to combat unfair commercial practices, on condition in particular that they are adequate and effective and that the penalties thus laid down are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
Woningstichting Maasdriel v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2013-01-17
25. It should be noted at the outset that, according to settled case-law, the terms used to specify exemptions such as that set out in Article 135 of the VAT Directive are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all goods and services supplied for consideration by a taxable person. Nevertheless, the interpretation of those terms must be consistent with the objectives pursued by those exemptions and comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT. Thus, the requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to define the exemptions referred to in Article 135 should be construed in such a way as to deprive the exemptions of their intended effect (see, to that effect, Case C-326/11 J.J. Komen en Zonen Beheer Heerhugowaard  [2012] ECR, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
30. First of all, it must be recalled that the Member States, when defining what land is to be regarded as being ‘building land’, must have regard to the objective pursued by Article 135(1)(k) of the VAT Directive, which seeks to exempt from VAT only supplies of land which has not been built on and is not intended to support a building (see, to that effect, Gemeente Emmen , paragraphs 24 and 25 and Don Bosco Onroerend Goed , paragraph 43).
31. To ensure compliance with the principle of fiscal neutrality, a fundamental principle of the common system of VAT, which precludes treating similar supplies of goods, which are thus in competition with each other, differently for VAT purposes and precludes economic operators who carry out the same activities from being treated differently as far as the levying of VAT is concerned (Case C-29/08 SKF  [2009] ECR I-10413, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited), it is therefore necessary that all land which has not been built on, and which is intended to support a building and, therefore, intended to be built on, be covered by that national definition.
32. Second, it must be noted that the declared intention of the parties concerning the VAT liability of a transaction must be taken into consideration in the course of an overall assessment of the circumstances of a transaction, provided that it is supported by objective evidence ( J.J. Komen en Zonen Beheer Heerhugowaard , paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
33. Accordingly, as the Court has already held that such evidence includes the extent to which the transformation work carried out by the vendor had advanced at the time of supply ( J.J. Komen en Zonen Beheer Heerhugowaard , paragraph 34), the completion before the time of supply, by the vendor, of demolition work for the purposes of a future construction, or the vendor’s understanding to carry out such demolition work with a view to future construction, can also form part of such evidence.
Geodis Calberson GE v Établissement national des produits de l’agriculture et de la mer (FranceAgriMer).
Date: 2013-01-17
30. With regard to the scope of that arbitration clause, it is established case-law that the Court may, in principle, hear and determine only claims arising from a contract which contains the arbitration clause or claims that are directly connected with the obligations arising from that contract (see Case 426/85 Commission  v Zoubek  [1986] ECR 4057, paragraph 11; Case C-114/94 IDE  v Commission  [1997] ECR I-803, paragraph 82; and Case C-337/96 Commission  v Iraco  [1998] ECR I-7943, paragraph 49).
32. Furthermore, for purposes of the proper administration of justice it is essential not to have a multiplicity of courts having jurisdiction in respect of one single contract, particularly on the basis of the contractual obligation at issue, and to prevent conflicting decisions (see, by analogy, Case C-96/00 Gabriel  [2002] ECR I-6367, paragraphs 57 and 58, and Case C-18/02 DFDS Torline  [2004] ECR I-1417, paragraph 26).
Mohamad Zakaria.
Date: 2013-01-17
29. In that respect, as is apparent from settled case-law, when the Court replies to a question submitted for a preliminary ruling by a Court of a Member State in accordance with Article 267 TFEU, it does not have jurisdiction to interpret the national law of that Member State (see, inter alia, Case C-37/92 Vanacker and Lesage  [1993] ECR I-4947, paragraph 7; Case C-511/03 Ten Kate Holding Musselkanaal and Others  [2005] ECR I-8979, paragraph 25, and Case C-506/04 Wilson  [2006] ECR I-8613, paragraph 34).
39. In any event, the decision to refer does not provide sufficient information regarding the main proceedings, in particular regarding the relevant facts, for the Court to determine the relevance of Article 6 of Regulation No 562/2006 for the purposes of examination of that action. Consequently, the Court is not in a position to determine whether the situation of the claimant in the main proceedings is governed by European Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, whose provisions are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing European Union law (see, to that effect, Case C-400/10 PPU McB. [2010] ECR I-8965, paragraph 51, and Case C-40/11 Iida  [2012] ECR, paragraphs 79 to 81).
41. On the other hand, if that court takes the view, in the light of the response given by the Court of Justice to the first question, that that situation is not governed by European Union law, it must examine it in the light of national law, taking into account also the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950, and to which all the Member States are party (see, to that effect, Case C-256/11 Dereci and Others  [2011] ECR, paragraphs 72 and 73).
European Commission v Tomkins plc.
Date: 2013-01-22
34. It is common ground between the parties that Tomkins’ liability results exclusively from the participation of its subsidiary Pegler in the cartel confirmed in the contested decision.
37. However, those considerations are not sufficient to cast doubt on the General Court’s finding at paragraph 38 of the judgment under appeal, since, in order to impute liability to any entity within a group, it is necessary to prove that one entity at least has committed an infringement of the European Union competition rules and that that fact be noted in a decision which has become definitive.
38. In the present case, however, no such proof has ultimately been furnished concerning the period from 31 December 1988 to 29 October 1993, since the General Court annulled in part the contested decision, so far as concerns that period, in its judgment in Pegler  v Commission . The reason for which it was found that Pegler had not acted unlawfully is, in this respect, irrelevant.
39. Consequently, the General Court was correct to rely on the premiss that the liability of Tomkins as parent company is, in the present case, purely derivative and secondary and thus depends on that of its subsidiary, Pegler, those two companies, moreover, having been ordered jointly and severally to pay the fine in respect of which the reduction was sought.
43. However, in a situation in which the liability of the parent company is wholly derived from that of its subsidiary, and in which both of those companies have brought actions seeking, inter alia, that the General Court reduce the fine by reason of a reduction in the duration of the infringement committed by the subsidiary, the notion of the ‘same object’ does not require that the scope of the applications of those companies, and the arguments on which they relied to contest the duration of the infringement accepted by the Commission, must be identical.
49. Thus, in a situation such as that in the present case, where the liability of the parent company is derived exclusively from that of its subsidiary and where the parent company and its subsidiary have brought parallel actions having the same object, the General Court was entitled, without ruling ultra petita , to take account of the outcome of the action brought by Pegler and to annul the contested decision in respect of the period prior to 29 October 1993 also in so far as Tomkins is concerned.
61. However, as is apparent from the considerations and conclusions of the Court in the context of the first, second and third grounds of appeal, that possibility does exist in certain circumstances. The application of that possibility is the result of a legal assessment by the General Court which the latter is entitled to make, w ithout notifying the parties, prior to the delivery of the judgment. To act in such a way does not constitute an infringement of the rights of the defence or of the right to a fair hearing.
Valeri Hariev Belov v CHEZ Elektro Balgaria AD and Others.
Date: 2013-01-31
38. In that regard, it should be recalled, as a preliminary point, that, according to settled case-law, in order to determine whether a body making a reference is a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU, which is a question governed by EU law alone, the Court takes account of a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes , whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent (see, in particular, Case C-196/09 Miles and Others  [2011] ECR I-5105, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
39. In addition, a national court may refer a question to the Court only if there is a case pending before it and if it is called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature (see, in particular, Case C-53/03 Syfait and Others  [2005] ECR I-4609, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
41. It follows that, in order to establish whether a national body, entrusted by law with different categories of functions, is to be regarded as a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, it is necessary to determine in what specific capacity it is acting within the particular legal context in which it seeks a ruling from the Court (see order in ANAS , paragraph 23).
52. Furthermore, it must be stated in that connection that, if such a decision of the KZD is, as stated, subject to appeal before an administrative court whose decision is itself subject to appeal before the Varhoven administrativen sad, the existence of those judicial appeals ensures the effectiveness of the mechanism of the request for a preliminary ruling provided for in Article 267 TFEU and the uniform interpretation of European Union law and, in the present case, in particular of Directive 2000/43, that that provision of the Treaty seeks to ensure. Under Article 267 TFEU, such national courts have the option or, where appropriate, are required to make a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court where a decision on the interpretation or the validity of European Union law is necessary to give their judgment.
54. Since the finding in paragraph 51 of this judgment suffices to conclude that when the KZD is called on to exercise a function such as that required of it in the main proceedings, that body is not a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, there is no need to examine whether the other criteria for assessing whether a referring body is a ‘court or tribunal’ for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU are satisfied by the KZD nor therefore to give a ruling on the other objections made by CEB and CRB in that regard (see, to that effect, Case C-517/09 RTL Belgium  [2010] ECR I-14093, paragraph 48).
Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky v Slovenská sporiteľňa a.s.
Date: 2013-02-07
17. For the purpose of applying Article 101(1) TFEU, there is no need to take account of the concrete effects of an agreement once it appears that it has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition (Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig  v Commission [1966] ECR 299; Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission  [2002] ECR I-8375, paragraph 508; and Case C-389/10 P KME Germany and Others v Commission [2011] ECR I-13125, paragraph 75).
18. Article 101 TFEU is intended to protect not only the interests of competitors or consumers but also the structure of the market and thus competition as such (Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others [2009] ECR I-9291, paragraph 63).
25. The Court observes in that regard that, for Article 101 TFEU to apply, it is not necessary for there to have been action by, or even knowledge on the part of, the partners or principal managers of the undertaking concerned; action by a person who is authorised to act on behalf of the undertaking suffices (Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80 Musique Diffusion française and Others  v Commission  [1983] ECR 1825, paragraph 97).
27. Moreover, it is settled case-law that when it is established that an undertaking has participated in anti-competitive meetings between competing undertakings, it is for that undertaking to put forward evidence to establish that its participation in those meeting was without any anti-competitive intention by demonstrating that it had indicated to its competitors that it was participating in those meetings in a spirit that was different from theirs. If an undertaking’s participation in such a meeting is not to be regarded as tacit approval of an unlawful initiative or as subscribing to what is decided there, the undertaking must publicly distance itself from that initiative in such a way that the other participants will think that it is putting an end to its participation, or it must report the initiative to the administrative authorities (judgment of 3 May 2012 in Case C-290/11 P Comap  v Commission , not published in the ECR, paragraphs 74 and 75 and the case-law cited).
30. Since Article 101(3) TFEU is applicable only when an agreement prohibited under Article 101(1) TFEU has been found to exist, the Court’s answer assumes that such a finding has been made.
RVS Levensverzekeringen NV v Belgische Staat.
Date: 2013-02-21
23. In accordance with settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of European Union law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, Case 292/82 Merck [1983] ECR 3781, paragraph 12; Case C-191/99 Kvaerner  [2001] ECR I-4447, paragraph 30; Case C-34/05 Schouten [2007] ECR I-1687, paragraph 25; and Case C-112/11 ebookers.com Deutschland [2012] ECR, paragraph 12).
42. It should be noted that, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the fact that the habitual residence of the policyholder is transferred to a Member State other than that of the establishment of the assurance undertaking with which the assurance contract has been concluded, is apt to bring that situation within the scope of the provisions relating to the freedom to provide services, irrespective of the fiscal arrangements applicable to the contract at issue. Indeed, in order to invoke the provisions of the TFEU relating to the freedom to provide services, it is sufficient for services to be provided to nationals of a Member State on the territory of another Member State (see, to that effect, Case C-55/98 Vestergaard  [1999] ECR I-7641, paragraph 18).
49. Whilst it follows from the case-law of the Court that such a conferral of competence must, as far as possible, be based on a concrete and objective criterion (see, to that effect, Kvaerner , paragraph 52), there is nothing to suggest that the competence over taxation conferred in accordance with that criterion has to remain unchanged throughout the term of the contract.
European Commission v Republic of Austria.
Date: 2013-02-28
62. According to settled case-law, in proceedings under Article 258 TFEU for failure to fulfil obligations, it is for the Commission to prove the allegation that the obligation has not been fulfilled. It is therefore the Commission’s responsibility to place before the Court the information needed to enable the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled, and in so doing the Commission may not rely on any presumptions (see, inter alia, Case C-494/01 Commission  v Ireland [2005] ECR I-3331, paragraph 41; Case C-335/07 Commission  v Finland  [2009] ECR I-9459, paragraph 46: and the judgment of 10 December 2009 in Case C-390/07 Commission  v United Kingdom , paragraph 43).
European Commission v Ireland.
Date: 2013-03-14
26. In any event, that concept was made clear by the Court in its judgments of 3 March 2011 in Case C‑41/09 Commission v Netherlands [2011] ECR I‑831, paragraphs 56 to 59 and of 12 May 2011 in Case C‑453/09 Commission v Germany , [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 44 to 47, that is to say before Ireland submitted its defence in the present case.
37. It should be noted that, in the above cases Commission v Ireland , paragraph 15, and Commission v United Kingdom , paragraph 14, the Court expressed its views on the determination of Member State and EU competences by declaring that the establishment of social reasons stems from the political choices of Member States and may not be subject to scrutiny by the European Union except where, by a distortion of that concept, it results in measures which fall, by virtue of their effect and true objectives, outside that context.
38. It follows from the wording of Article 110 of Directive 2006/112 and that case-law that Member States may invoke social reasons so long as they are ‘well defined’ and as the concept of social interest is not distorted, that is to say used for purposes other than social reasons.
42. In those circumstances, and given that Article 110 of Directive 2006/112 constitutes a derogation from the VAT system, which must be strictly interpreted, Ireland ought to have provided evidence that the reduced rate in question was adopted for reasons of exclusively social interest or, at least, for reasons of principally social interest.
51. As the Court has held, under the general scheme of value-added tax, the final consumer is the person who acquires goods or services for personal use, as opposed to an economic activity, and thus bears the tax. The result is that, in the light of the social purpose of Article 17 [which is taken up in substance by the second paragraph of Article 110 of Directive 2006/112], the term ‘final consumer’ can be applied only to a person who does not use exempted goods or services in the course of an economic activity. The provision of goods or services at a stage higher in the production or distribution chain which is nevertheless sufficiently close to the consumer to be of advantage to him must also be considered to be for the benefit of the final consumer as so defined (see above cases Commission v Ireland , paragraph 18, and Commission v United Kingdom , paragraph 17).
54. Ireland admits that those economic agents benefit from the reduced rate at issue, but argues, without providing any data, that, firstly, most of the persons who practise an equestrian sport or one relating to greyhounds do so in their private capacity as final consumers and furthermore that, according to the Court’s case‑law, it is possible to satisfy the second condition laid down under the second paragraph of Article 110 of Directive 2006/112 also in the event that the buyers are not final consumers, but where the upstream transaction which is subject to a reduced rate is sufficiently close to the consumer to be of advantage to him (see aforementioned cases Commission v Ireland , paragraph 18, and Commission v United Kingdom , paragraph 17).