larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Date: 2006-05-04
17. In the absence of any definition of the concept of ‘active ingredient’ in Regulation No 1768/92, the meaning and scope of those terms must be determined by considering the general context in which they are used and their usual meaning in everyday language (see, inter alia, Case 349/85 Denmark v Commission  [1988] ECR 169, paragraph 9, and Case C-164/98 P DIR International Film and Others v Commission  [2000] ECR I‑447, paragraph 26).
18. In this case, it is important to note that it is common ground, as the file in this case shows, that the expression ‘active ingredient’ is generally accepted in pharmacology not to include substances forming part of a medicinal product which do not have an effect of their own on the human or animal body.
19. In that regard, attention must be drawn to the fact that in point 11 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC), of 11 April 1990, concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products (COM(90) 101 final), to which the French Government referred in its oral observations, it is specified that ‘[t]he proposal for a Regulation therefore concerns only new medicinal products. It does not involve granting a [SPC] for all medicinal products that are authorised to be placed on the market. Only one [SPC] may be granted for any one product, a product being understood to mean an active substance in the strict sense. Minor changes to the medicinal product such as a new dose, the use of a different salt or ester or a different pharmaceutical form will not lead to the issue of a new [SPC].’
21. In fact, it is apparent from that memorandum that the pharmaceutical form of the medicinal product, to which an excipient may contribute, as noted by the Advocate General in point 11 of his Opinion and the French Government at the hearing, does not form part of the definition of ‘product’, which is understood to mean an ‘active substance’ or ‘active ingredient’ in the strict sense.
24. Thus, the first sentence of Article 3(2) of Regulation No 1610/96 itself provides that the holder of more than one patent for the same product is not to be granted more than one SPC for that product. As set out in recital 17 in the preamble to that regulation, the detailed rules in Article 3(2) thereof, in particular, are also valid, mutatis mutandis, for the interpretation of Article 3 of Regulation No 1768/92 .
25. In the light of the foregoing, the inevitable conclusion is that a substance which does not have any therapeutic effect of its own and which is used to obtain a certain pharmaceutical form of the medicinal product is not covered by the concept of ‘active ingredient’, which in turn is used to define the term ‘product’.
Reinhold Haug v Land Baden-Württemberg.
Date: 2006-05-04
17. In the procedure established by Article 234 EC providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (see, inter alia, Case C-88/99 Roquette Frères  [2000] ECR I-10465, paragraph 18, and Case C-469/00 Ravil  [2003] ECR I-5053, paragraph 27).
21. As the Court has held on a number of occasions, an inaccurate declaration of the eligible area in the application for aid, as referred to in Article 9(2) of Regulation No 3887/92, constitutes an irregularity within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Regulation No 2988/95 and the withdrawal of the aid under the same provision of Regulation No 3887/92, in the light of the difference between the area declared and the area actually determined, constitutes an administrative penalty within the meaning of Article 2(2) of Regulation No 2988/95 (Case C-354/95 National Farmers’ Union and Others  [1997] ECR I-4559, paragraphs 40 and 41; Case C‑304/00 Strawson and Gagg & Sons  [2002] ECR I‑10737, paragraph 46; and Case C‑94/05 Emsland-Stärke  [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraph 63; see also, by analogy, Case C‑295/02 Gerken  [2004] ECR I-6369, paragraph 50).
24. It should be noted in this connection, however, that, unlike Article 9(2) of Regulation No 3887/92, Article 31 of Regulation No 2419/2001 does not provide for any penalty. The title and wording of the latter provision indicate that it does no more than define a basis of calculation, without prejudice to reductions and exclusions in accordance with Articles 32 to 35 of Regulation No 2419/2001. That provision thus cannot constitute an amendment of the penalty under Article 9(2) of Regulation No 3887/92. This finding is further supported by the second paragraph of Article 32(1) of Regulation No 2419/2001, which reproduces in essence the rule provided for in the second paragraph of Article 9(2) of Regulation No 3887/92.
Commissioners of Customs & Excise and Attorney General v Federation of Technological Industries and Others
Date: 2006-05-11
28. Article 21(3) of the Sixth Directive therefore permits, as a rule, Member States to enact measures under which a person is to be jointly and severally liable to pay a sum in respect of VAT payable by another person made liable by one of the provisions of Article 21(1) and (2).
29. However, when they exercise the powers conferred on them by Community directives, Member States must comply with the general principles of law which form part of the Community legal order, which include, in particular, the principles of legal certainty and proportionality (see, to that effect, Case C‑396/98 Schloßstraße [2000] ECR I‑4279, paragraph 44, and Case C‑376/02 ‘Goed Wonen’  [2005] ECR I‑3445, paragraph 32).
30. With more particular regard to the principle of proportionality, it must be pointed out that, whilst it is legitimate for the measures adopted by the Member State, on the basis of Article 21(3) of the Sixth Directive, to seek to preserve the rights of the public exchequer as effectively as possible, such measures must not go further than is necessary for that purpose (see, to that effect, Molenheide and Others , paragraph 47).
32. While Article 21(3) of the Sixth Directive allows a Member State to make a person jointly and severally liable for the payment of VAT if, at the time of the supply, that person knew or had reasonable grounds to suspect that the VAT payable in respect of that supply, or of any previous or subsequent supply, would go unpaid, and to rely on presumptions in that regard, it is none the less true that such presumptions may not be formulated in such a way as to make it practically impossible or excessively difficult for the taxable person to rebut them with evidence to the contrary. As the Advocate General observed in point 27 of his Opinion, those presumptions would, de facto, bring about a system of strict liability, going beyond what is necessary to preserve the public exchequer’s rights.
33. Traders who take every precaution which could reasonably be required of them to ensure that their transactions do not form part of a chain which includes a transaction vitiated by VAT fraud must be able to rely on the legality of those transactions without the risk of being made jointly and severally liable to pay the VAT due from another taxable person (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑354/03, C‑355/03 and C‑484/03 Optigen and Others  [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 52).
34. It is for the national court to determine whether the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings complies with the general principles of Community law.
Magpar VI BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2006-05-18
44. Directive 69/335 does not define the concept of ‘transfer’, other than to refer to the laws of the Member States for such purpose. That concept must therefore be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community, having regard to the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, to that effect, Case C‑55/02 Commission  v Portugal  [2004] ECR I-9387, paragraphs 44 and 45, and the case-law cited).
European Parliament v Council of the European Union (C-317/04) and Commission of the European Communities (C-318/04).
Date: 2006-05-30
56. It follows that the transfer of PNR data to CBP constitutes processing operations concerning public security and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law.
57. While the view may rightly be taken that PNR data are initially collected by airlines in the course of an activity which falls within the scope of Community law, namely sale of an aeroplane ticket which provides entitlement to a supply of services, the data processing which is taken into account in the decision on adequacy is, however, quite different in nature. As pointed out in paragraph 55 of the present judgment, that decision concerns not data processing necessary for a supply of services, but data processing regarded as necessary for safeguarding public security and for law-enforcement purposes.
58. The Court held in paragraph 43 of Lindqvist , which was relied upon by the Commission in its defence, that the activities mentioned by way of example in the first indent of Article 3(2) of the Directive are, in any event, activities of the State or of State authorities and unrelated to the fields of activity of individuals. However, this does not mean that, because the PNR data have been collected by private operators for commercial purposes and it is they who arrange for their transfer to a third country, the transfer in question is not covered by that provision. The transfer falls within a framework established by the public authorities that relates to public security.
59. It follows from the foregoing considerations that the decision on adequacy concerns processing of personal data as referred to in the first indent of Article 3(2) of the Directive. That decision therefore does not fall within the scope of the Directive.
68. The Agreement relates to the same transfer of data as the decision on adequacy and therefore to data processing operations which, as has been stated above, are excluded from the scope of the Directive.
69. Consequently, Decision 2004/496 cannot have been validly adopted on the basis of Article 95 EC.
innoventif Limited.
Date: 2006-06-01
26. In that regard, it should be noted that the Court has stressed that it is important for the referring court to set out the precise reasons why it was unsure as to the interpretation of Community law and why it considered it necessary to refer questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling. The Court has thus ruled that it is essential that the referring court provide at the very least some explanation of the reasons for the choice of the Community provisions which it requires to be interpreted and of the link it establishes between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the dispute (see, inter alia, the order in Case C‑190/02 Viacom  [2002] ECR I-8287, paragraph 16, and the judgment in Joined Cases C‑453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04 ABNA and Others  [2005] ECR I-0000, paragraph 46).
29. In that connection, it must be noted that the jurisdiction of the Court is confined to considering provisions of Community law only (see the order in Case C-307/95 Max Mara  [1995] ECR I-5083, paragraph 5). It is for national courts to assess the scope of national provisions and the manner in which they must be applied (see the judgment in Case C‑45/94 Ayuntamiento de Ceuta [1995] ECR I-4385, paragraph 26).
39. Moreover, legislation which, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, requires the payment of an advance is not liable to place companies from other Member States in a less favourable factual or legal situation than companies from the Member State of establishment (see, to that effect, Case C‑70/95 Sodemare and Others  [1997] ECR I-3395, paragraph 33).
Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2006-06-22
24. Firstly, the Court interpreted in paragraph 31 of that judgment the scope of the third subparagraph of Article 88(2) EC, holding that the power held by the Council was clearly exceptional in character. It inferred from that that if the Member State concerned has made no application to the Council under that provision before the Commission declares the aid incompatible with the common market, the Council is no longer authorised to exercise the exceptional power conferred upon it by that provision in order to declare such aid compatible with the common market ( Commission  v Council , paragraph 33).
25. The Court holds that such an interpretation, which makes it possible to avoid the same State aid being the subject of conflicting decisions taken successively by the Commission and the Council, contributes to legal certainty ( Commission  v Council , paragraph 35).
27. It pointed out that, according to settled case-law, to hold that a Member State is able to grant to beneficiaries of such unlawful aid new aid in an amount equivalent to that of the unlawful aid, intended to neutralise the impact of the repayments which the beneficiaries are obliged to make pursuant to that decision, would clearly undermine the effectiveness of decisions taken by the Commission under Articles 87 EC and 88 EC ( Commission  v Council , paragraph 43).
28. The Court thus ruled that the Council can neither counter a Commission decision finding an aid incompatible with the common market by itself declaring that aid compatible with the market, nor undermine the effectiveness of such a decision by declaring compatible with the common market, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 88(2) EC, an aid designed to compensate the beneficiaries of the unlawful aid declared incompatible with the common market for the repayments they are required to make pursuant to that decision ( Commission  v Council , paragraphs 44 and 45).
Robert Hans Conijn v Finanzamt Hamburg-Nord.
Date: 2006-07-06
12. According to settled case-law, freedom of establishment for nationals of a Member State on the territory of another Member State includes the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the State of establishment (see, in particular, Case 270/83 Commission v France  [1986] ECR 273, paragraph 13; Case C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland  [1999] ECR I-2651, paragraph 22; and Case C-251/98 Baars  [2000] ECR I-2787, paragraph 27).
14. Although direct taxation falls within the competence of the Member States, the latter must none the less exercise that competence consistently with Community law (Case C-80/94 Wielockx  [1995] ECR I-2493, paragraph 16; Case C-35/98 Verkooijen  [2000] ECR I-4071, paragraph 32; and Case C-422/01 Skandia and Ramstedt  [2003] ECR I-6817, paragraph 25).
15. Thus, national tax law provisions must avoid any overt or covert discrimination on the basis of nationality (see, in particular, Wielockx , paragraph 16, and Case        C-385/00 De Groot  [2002] ECR I-11819, paragraph 75).
16. The fact, however, that a Member State does not grant to a non-resident certain tax benefits which it grants to a resident is not, as a rule, discriminatory having regard to the objective differences between the situations of residents and of non-residents, both from the point of view of the source of their income and from that of their personal ability to pay tax or their personal and family circumstances (Case C-279/93 Schumacker  [1995] ECR I-225, paragraph 34, and Case C-391/97 Gschwind  [1999] ECR I-5451, paragraph 23).
20. In relation to expenditure linked directly to the income of a person with restricted tax liability, the Court has held that, for expenditure such as business expenses linked with an activity in another Member State, a person with restricted tax liability must be treated in the same way as a person with unrestricted tax liability (see Case C-234/01 Gerritse  [2003] ECR I-5933, paragraph 27).
22. Costs involved in obtaining tax advice, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, were incurred by Mr Conijn in preparing his tax return in respect of income derived in Germany. His duty to file a tax return results from the fact that he receives income in that Member State. Costs incurred in obtaining tax advice are therefore linked directly to the income taxed in that Member State, with the result that they affect in the same way the income received by all taxable persons whether resident or non-resident.
Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN) v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2006-07-11
22. It follows that the second part of the single plea relied on by FENIN must be dismissed as inadmissible.
The merits
– Arguments of the parties
25. The Court of First Instance rightly held, in paragraph 35 of the judgment under appeal, that in Community competition law the definition of an ‘undertaking’ covers any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of that entity and the way in which it is financed (Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser  [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraph 21, and Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C‑354/01 and C‑355/01 AOK-Bundesverband and Others  [2004] ECR I-2493, paragraph 46). In accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance also stated, in paragraph 36 of the judgment under appeal, that it is the activity consisting in offering goods and services on a given market that is the characteristic feature of an economic activity (Case C‑35/96 Commission  v Italy  [1998] ECR I-3851, paragraph 36).
Franz Egenberger GmbH Molkerei und Trockenwerk v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung.
Date: 2006-07-11
33. As a preliminary point, according to settled case-law, the second subparagraph of Article 34(2) EC, which prohibits all discrimination in the context of the common agricultural policy, is merely a specific expression of the general principle of equal treatment, which requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated alike unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, inter alia, Case C-15/95 EARL de Kerlast  [1997] ECR I-1961, paragraph 35; Case C-292/97 Karlsson and Others  [2000] ECR I-2737, paragraph 39; Case C‑14/01 Niemann  [2003] ECR I‑2279, paragraph 49; and Joined Cases C‑87/03 and C‑100/03 Spain  v Council  [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 48).
Commission of the European Communities v Édith Cresson.
Date: 2006-07-11
50. In that regard, it should be noted that the Court may, of its own motion, on a proposal from the Advocate General or at the request of the parties, order the reopening of the oral procedure in accordance with Article 61 of the Rules of Procedure, if it considers that it lacks sufficient information or that the case should be decided on the basis of an argument which has not been discussed between the parties (see, inter alia, order of 4 February 2000 in Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar  [2000] ECR I‑665, paragraph 18, and Case C-210/03 Swedish Match  [2004] ECR I‑11893, paragraph 25).
72. While the Members of the Commission are thus under an obligation to conduct themselves in a manner which is beyond reproach, it does not, however, follow that the slightest deviation from those standards falls to be censured under Article 213(2) EC. A breach of a certain degree of gravity is required.
120. In so far as the findings made in the course of those proceedings relate to facts which are the same as those investigated in the context of the procedure referred to in Article 213(2) EC, and those findings are put to the Court in the documents which are before it, they may be taken into account by it in its examination of the conduct of which Mrs Cresson is accused for the purposes of that article.
121. However, the Court is not bound by the legal characterisation of the facts made in the context of the criminal proceedings and it is for the Court, exercising its discretion to the full, to investigate whether the conduct complained of in proceedings brought under Article 213(2) EC constitutes a breach of the obligations arising from the office of Member of the Commission.
Commission of the European Communities v Volkswagen AG.
Date: 2006-07-13
37. The Court of First Instance rightly noted, in paragraphs 30 to 34 of the judgment under appeal, that, in order to constitute an agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC, it is sufficient that an act or conduct which is apparently unilateral be the expression of the concurrence of wills of at least two parties, the form in which that concurrence is expressed not being by itself decisive.
39. The will of the parties may result from both the clauses of the dealership agreement in question and from the conduct of the parties, and in particular from the possibility of there being tacit acquiescence by the dealers in a call from the manufacturer (see, to that effect, Case C-338/00 P Volkswagen  v Commission , paragraphs 61 to 68).
45. Consequently, the Court of First Instance could not, without making an error of law, refrain from examining the clauses of the dealership agreement individually, taking account, where applicable, of all other relevant factors, such as the aims pursued by that agreement in the light of the economic and legal context in which it was signed.
46. With respect to the second possibility, that is, in the absence of relevant contractual provisions, the existence of an agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC presupposes the dealers’ explicit or tacit acquiescence to the measure adopted by the motor vehicle manufacturer (see, to that effect, BMW Belgium and Others  v Commission , paragraphs 28 to 30).
49. As regards in this case the interpretation made by the Court of First Instance of the clauses of the dealership agreement, it is clear from Article 225 EC and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice that the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to find the facts except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it and, second, to assess those facts. When the Court of First Instance has found or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 225 EC to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the Court of First Instance and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (see, in particular, Case C‑185/95 P Baustahlgewebe  v Commission  [1998] ECR I‑8417, paragraph 23).