Holcim (Romania) SA v European Commission.
Date: 2016-04-07
Lastly, as regards the data relating to the names of holders of the transferring accounts and acquiring accounts of the emission
         allowances and the date and time of those transactions, the Court has held that a request for the reporting of such data comes
         exclusively under the specific rules governing public reporting and confidentiality contained in Directive 2003/87 and in
         Regulation No 2216/2004 (see judgment in Ville de Lyon, C‑524/09, EU:C:2010:822, paragraph 41).
In addition, the Court found that such data must remain confidential for purposes other than the operation and maintenance
         of the registries (see judgment in Ville de Lyon, C‑524/09, EU:C:2010:822, paragraph 50).
In the light of those considerations, it must be found, first, that the General Court did not err in law in holding, in paragraphs 106
         and 107 of the judgment under appeal, that Article 10 of Regulation No 2216/2004 established, as a general rule, that the
         data held in the registries was confidential and that, therefore, the exceptions to that general rule had to be interpreted
         strictly.
In the first place, it must be found, first, that contrary to Holcim’s claims, the General Court did not accept, in paragraph 131
         of the judgment under appeal, that the Annex to Decision 13/CMP.1 forms part of the EU legal order and may be relied upon
         before the Courts of the European Union. By contrast, it held that, even if that were the case, the plea in law raised before
         it could be rejected on other grounds. Secondly, as is apparent from paragraph 46 above, a request for the reporting of the
         data contained in the registries comes exclusively under the specific rules governing public reporting and confidentiality
         contained in Directive 2003/87 and in Regulation No 2216/2004 (Ville de Lyon, C‑524/09, EU:C:2010:822, paragraph 41).
In addition, as the General Court found in paragraphs 144 and 145 of the judgment under appeal, the Kyoto units are instruments
         which the States and the international organisation party to that convention may use in order to meet their obligations laid
         down in it. On the other hand, in the EU scheme, the emission allowances are instruments that can belong to the assets of
         the natural and legal persons who carry out the activities referred to in Annex I to Directive 2003/87. Consequently, as is
         apparent from Article 1 of that directive, emission allowances reflect a commercial logic.
That logic consists in ensuring that the reductions of greenhouse gas emissions required to achieve a predetermined environmental
         outcome take place at the lowest cost. By allowing in particular the allowances that have been allocated to be sold, the scheme
         is intended to encourage a participant in the scheme to emit quantities of greenhouse gases that are less than the allowances
         originally allocated him, in order to sell the surplus to another participant who has emitted more than his allowance (judgment
         in Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others, C‑127/07, EU:C:2008:728, paragraph 32).
In that regard, it must be noted that, in an appeal, the appellant may not rely on pleas in law declared inadmissible by the
         General Court, where the finding that they are inadmissible is not contested (judgment in France Télécom v Commission, C‑202/07 P, EU:C:2009:214, paragraph 93).
It must be noted, first of all, that, in accordance with the principle of sound administration, the EU institutions must examine
         all the relevant particulars of a case with care and impartiality and gather all the factual and legal information necessary
         to exercise their discretion (see, to that effect, judgment in Brookfield New Zealand and Elaris v CPVO and Schniga, C‑534/10 P, EU:C:2012:813, paragraph 51).
Lastly, the third part of the 10th ground of appeal concerning Annex D.10 to the appeal is inadmissible, in that the appellant
         has not indicated sufficiently precisely the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of its application to have the
         judgment under appeal set aside (see, to that effect, judgment in Italy v Commission, C‑280/14 P, EU:C:2015:792, paragraph 42).
A plea alleging that liability is incurred for a lawful act of the European Union must be rejected, and the Court does not
         need to adjudicate on the possibility of liability being incurred on the part of the European Union for such acts, inasmuch
         as the material and non-material damage alleged by the appellant are not unusual or special (see, to that effect, judgments
         in Développement et Clemessy v Commission, 267/82, EU:C:1986:253, paragraph 33, and Sviluppo Italia Basilicata v Commission, C‑414/08 P, EU:C:2010:165, paragraph 141).