Pillar Securitisation Sàrl v Hildur Arnadottir.
Date: 2019-05-02
27


As regards the interpretation of the Lugano II Convention, it must, first of all, be noted that that convention is drafted in terms almost identical to the corresponding articles in Regulations Nos 44/2001 and 1215/2012 and a converging interpretation of those provisions that are equivalent must be ensured (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 December 2017, Schlömp, C‑467/16, EU:C:2017:993, paragraphs 46 and 47).
28


Article 15 of the Lugano II Convention concerns contracts concluded by a person, the consumer, for a purpose that can be regarded as being outside that person’s trade or profession. Those contracts are specified in Article 15(1)(a) to (c). As the Court has held, as regards the equivalent provision in Regulation No 44/2001 as reproduced in Regulation No 1215/2012, apart from certain transport contracts excluded from the scope of the rules on jurisdiction with regard to consumers by Article 15(3) of that convention, Article 15(1)(c) thereof covers all contracts, whatever their purpose, if they have been concluded by a consumer with a professional and fall within the latter’s commercial or professional activities (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 May 2009, Ilsinger, C‑180/06, EU:C:2009:303, paragraph 50).
34


In that regard, the Court has previously held that, in order to ensure compliance with the objectives pursued by the EU legislature in the sphere of consumer contracts, and the consistency of EU law, account must be taken, in particular, of the definition of ‘consumer’ in other rules of EU law (judgments of 5 December 2013, Vapenik, C‑508/12, EU:C:2013:790, paragraph 25, and of 25 January 2018, Schrems, C‑498/16, EU:C:2018:37, paragraph 28).
35


However, that need to ensure consistency between different instruments of EU law cannot, in any event, lead to the provisions of a regulation on jurisdiction being interpreted in a manner that is unconnected to the scheme and objectives pursued by that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 January 2014, Kainz, C‑45/13, EU:C:2014:7, paragraph 20).
38


As regards the objective of Directive 2008/48, as is clear from recitals 7 and 9 thereof, it consists in providing, as regards consumer credit, full and mandatory harmonisation in a number of key areas, which is regarded as necessary in order to ensure that all consumers in the European Union enjoy a high and equivalent level of protection of their interests and to facilitate the emergence of a well-functioning internal market in consumer credit (judgment of 27 March 2014, LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais, C‑565/12, EU:C:2014:190, paragraph 42).
39


The Court has indeed held that that objective seeks to ensure the effective protection of consumers against the irresponsible granting of credit agreements that are beyond their financial capacities and that may bankrupt them (judgment of 27 March 2014, LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais, C‑565/12, EU:C:2014:190, paragraph 43).
42


As to the purpose of the Lugano II Convention, that convention does not seek to harmonise the substantive law on consumer contracts, but to provide, as Regulation No 44/2001, then Regulation No 1215/2012, rules that determine which court has jurisdiction to hear a case in civil and commercial matters, in particular, in respect of a contract between a trader or professional and a person acting outside his trade or profession, in order to protect the latter in such a case. In pursuing that objective, the convention does not provide for a scope limited to any particular amounts and covers all types of contracts except for those stipulated in Article 15(3) thereof.