Glencore Agriculture Hungary Kft., formerly Glencore Grain Hungary Kft. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatóság.
Date: 2017-07-06
18


As a preliminary point, it should be noted that although Article 183 of the VAT Directive does not lay down any obligation to pay interest on a refund of overpaid VAT or the date from which such interest is payable, it cannot be concluded from that fact alone that that article must be interpreted as meaning that no control may be exercised under EU law over the procedures established by Member States for the refund of overpaid VAT (judgments of 12 May 2011, Enel Maritsa Iztok 3, C‑107/10, EU:C:2011:298, paragraphs 27 and 28, and of 24 October 2013, Rafinăria Steaua Română, C‑431/12, EU:C:2013:686, paragraph 19).
19


It follows from the Court’s case-law that some specific rules must be complied with by the Member States in implementing the right to a refund of overpaid VAT arising from Article 183 of the VAT Directive, interpreted in the light of the general context and principles governing VAT (see judgment of 24 October 2013, Rafinăria Steaua Română, C‑431/12, EU:C:2013:686, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
20


The Court has thus held that the conditions for the refund of overpaid VAT laid down by a Member State must not undermine the principle of fiscal neutrality by making the taxable person bear the burden of the VAT in whole or in part. In particular, such conditions must enable the taxable person, in appropriate circumstances, to recover the entirety of the credit arising from that overpayment of VAT. This implies that the refund be made within a reasonable period of time and that, in any event, the method of refund adopted must not entail any financial risk for the taxable person (judgments of 12 May 2011, Enel Maritsa Iztok 3, C‑107/10, EU:C:2011:298, paragraph 33; of 28 July 2011, Commission v Hungary, C‑274/10, EU:C:2011:530, paragraph 45; and order of 17 July 2014, Delphi Hungary Autóalkatrész Gyártó, C‑654/13, not published, EU:C:2014:2127, paragraph 31).
21


That period of time may, as a general rule, be extended in order to carry out a tax investigation and there is no need for such an extended period to be regarded as unreasonable provided that the extension does not go beyond what is necessary for the successful completion of the investigation (judgment of 12 May 2011, Enel Maritsa Iztok 3, C‑107/10, EU:C:2011:298, paragraph 53).
22


Where the refund of the overpaid VAT to the taxable person is not made within a reasonable period, the principle of fiscal neutrality of the VAT system requires that the financial losses incurred by the taxable person owing to the unavailability of the sums of money at issue should be compensated through the payment of default interest (judgment of 24 October 2013, Rafinăria Steaua Română, C‑431/12, EU:C:2013:686, paragraph 23).
23


It also follows from the Court’s case-law that the calculation of the interest payable by the Treasury which does not take as its starting point the date on which the overpaid VAT would have had to be repaid in the normal course of events in accordance with the VAT Directive is, in principle, contrary to the requirements of Article 183 of that directive (judgments of 12 May 2011, Enel Maritsa Iztok 3, C‑107/10, EU:C:2011:298, paragraph 51, and of 24 October 2013, Rafinăria Steaua Română, C‑431/12, EU:C:2013:686, paragraph 24).
34


As regards the obligations of the referring court, it should be noted that when national courts apply domestic law they are bound to interpret that law, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive concerned in order to achieve the result sought by the directive and, consequently, to comply with the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU. This obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law is inherent in the system of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, since it permits national courts, for the matters within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law when they determine the disputes before them (see, inter alia, judgment of 11 April 2013, Rusedespred, C‑138/12, EU:C:2013:233, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
35


In accordance with equally settled case-law, being called upon, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of EU law, a national court must give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national law, and it is not necessary for that court to request or to await the prior setting aside of that provision of national law by legislative or other constitutional means (judgment of 5 July 2016, Ognyanov, C‑614/14, EU:C:2016:514, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).