Harry Mensing v Finanzamt Hamm.
Date: 2018-11-29
22


It should also be noted that the scheme for the taxation of the profit margin made by the taxable dealer on the supply of works of art constitutes a special arrangement for VAT, derogating from the general scheme of the VAT Directive. Consequently, Articles 314 and 316 of that directive, which identify the cases in which this special arrangement is to be applied, must be construed narrowly (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 May 2017, Litdana, C‑624/15, EU:C:2017:389, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
23


However, that rule of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to set out that arrangement should be construed in such a way as to deprive it of its effects. In fact, the interpretation of those terms must conform to the objectives pursued by that arrangement and respect the requirements of tax neutrality (see, by analogy, judgment of 21 March 2013, PFC Clinic, C‑91/12, EU:C:2013:198, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
24


Furthermore, according to settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 21 September 2017, Aviva, C‑605/15, EU:C:2017:718, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
32


In the third place, as regards the general objectives pursued by the VAT Directive, it follows from recitals 4 and 7 of that directive that the directive aims to establish a VAT system that does not distort conditions of competition or hinder the free movement of goods and services. Furthermore, it is apparent from the Court’s settled case-law that the principle of tax neutrality is inherent to the common system of VAT established by the VAT Directive and that that principle precludes, in particular, economic operators carrying out the same transactions from being treated differently in relation to the collection of VAT (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2014, ATP PensionService, C‑464/12, EU:C:2014:139, paragraphs 42 and 44 and the case-law cited).
42


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts established in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need of a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, when the question put by the national court concerns the interpretation of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 17 March 2016, Aspiro, C‑40/15, EU:C:2016:172, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
45


A central principle of the VAT system is that the right to deduct input VAT affecting the acquisition of goods or services presupposes that the expenditures incurred in acquiring the goods are a component of the price of the taxed output transactions giving rise to the right to deduct (judgment of 28 November 2013, MDDP, C‑319/12, EU:C:2013:778, paragraph 41).