Commission of the European Communities v European Central Bank.
Date: 2003-07-10
74.  In that regard, it must certainly be borne in mind that according to settled case-law a decision adopted by the Community institutions which has not been challenged by its addressee within the time-limit laid down by the fifth paragraph of Article 230 EC becomes definitive as against that person (see, most recently, Case C-241/01   National Farmers' Union   [2002] ECR I-9079, paragraph 34, and the case-law cited).
75.  Furthermore, the Court has also held that the general principle, to which Article 241 EC gives expression and which has the effect of ensuring that every person has or will have had the opportunity to challenge a Community measure which forms the basis of a decision adversely affecting him, does not in any way preclude a regulation from becoming definitive as against an individual in regard to whom it must be considered to be an individual decision and who could undoubtedly have sought its annulment under Article 230 EC, a fact which prevents that individual from pleading the illegality of that regulation before the national court.  The Court has found that such a conclusion applies to regulations imposing anti-dumping duties by virtue of their dual nature as acts of a legislative nature and acts liable to be of direct and individual concern to certain traders (see Case C-239/99   Nachi Europe   [2001] ECR I-1197, paragraph 37).
76.  The principles thus recalled nevertheless do not in any way affect the rule laid down by Article 241 EC, which provides that any party may, in proceedings in which a regulation of the kind referred to in Article 241 EC is at issue, plead the grounds specified in the second paragraph of Article 230 EC in order to invoke before the Court of Justice the inapplicability of that regulation.
95.  It is clear from the foregoing considerations that the expression   "financial interests of the Community"   in Article 280 EC is not restricted exclusively to the budget of the European Community in the strict sense but also covers the resources and expenditure of the ECB (see, by analogy, in relation to the applicability to the European Investment Bank of Article 179 of the EC Treaty (now Article 236 EC), Case 110/75   Mills   v   EIB   [1976] ECR 955, paragraph 14).
134.  As is clear from the wording of Article 108 EC, the outside influences from which that provision seeks to shield the ECB and its decision-making bodies are those likely to interfere with the performance of the   "tasks"   which the EC Treaty and the ESCB Statute assign to the ECB.  As the Advocate General has pointed out at paragraphs 150 and 155 of his Opinion, Article 108 EC seeks, in essence, to shield the ECB from all political pressure in order to enable it effectively to pursue the objectives attributed to its tasks, through the independent exercise of the specific powers conferred on it for that purpose by the EC Treaty and the ESCB Statute.
135.  By contrast, as the Commission and the interveners have rightly pointed out, recognition that the ECB has such independence does not have the consequence of separating it entirely from the European Community and exempting it from every rule of Community law.  First, it is evident from Article 105(1) EC that the ECB is to contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the European Community, whilst Article 8 EC states that the ECB is to act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the EC Treaty and the ESCB Statute.  Second, as the Commission has observed, the ECB is, on the conditions laid down by the EC Treaty and the ESCB Statute, subject to various kinds of Community controls, notably review by the Court of Justice and control by the Court of Auditors. Finally, it is evident that it was not the intention of the Treaty draftsmen to shield the ECB from any kind of legislative action taken by the Community legislature, as is clear from,   inter alia  , Article 105(6) EC, Article 107(5) and (6) EC and Article 110(1), first indent, and (3) EC, which are cited by the Commission.
156.  As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of Community law, requires that measures implemented through Community provisions should be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it  (see,   inter alia  , Case 137/85   Maizena   [1987] ECR 4587, paragraph 15; and Case C-491/01   British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco   [2002] ECR I-11453, paragraph 122).
157.  With regard to judicial review of the conditions referred to in the previous paragraph, the Community legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in an area such as that involved in the present case, so that the legality of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see, to that effect,   British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco  , paragraph 123, and the case-law cited there).