Tilly-Sabco SAS v European Commission.
Date: 2017-09-20
64


Fourth, in so far as Tilly-Sabco considers that the evidence that it relied on before the General Court is capable of establishing a misuse of powers, it must be recalled that an act is vitiated by misuse of powers only if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence, to have been taken with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that stated or evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case (judgment of 4 December 2013, Commission v Council, C‑117/10, EU:C:2013:786, paragraph 96).
102


In those circumstances, it must be held that the first time limit is to enable an unhurried examination of a draft implementing act before a meeting, by the Management Committee members, and that the second must enable them to express their views on the draft. That finding is supported by Article 3(4) of Regulation No 182/2011 which states that, ‘until the committee delivers an opinion, any committee member may suggest amendments’.
103


Furthermore, since Article 291(3) TFEU expressly provides for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers conferred on it by paragraph 2 of that article, it must be held that the first time limit also aims to guarantee that the governments of the Member States are informed through their Management Committee members about the Commission’s proposals, so that those governments may, by means of internal and external consultations, define a position in order to protect the specific interests of each of them within the Management Committee.
114


Second, having regard, in particular, to the findings made in paragraphs 90, 91, 94, 95 and 102 to 104 of the present judgment, it must be held that the requirements laid down by Article 3(3) of Regulation No 182/2011 are essential procedural requirements intended by the FEU Treaty, which are essential procedural requirements governing the proper conduct of proceedings, breach of which renders the act concerned void (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 February 1998, Germany v Commission, C‑263/95, EU:C:1998:47, paragraph 32; of 24 June 2014, Parliament v Council, C‑658/11, EU:C:2014:2025, paragraph 80; and of 23 December 2015, Parliament v Council, C‑595/14, EU:C:2015:847, paragraph 35).
115


In particular, the Court has consistently held that the failure to comply with the procedural rules relating to the adoption of an act adversely affecting a person constitutes an infringement of an essential procedural requirement and if the EU judiciature finds that it was not validly adopted, it must draw the necessary conclusions from the infringement of an essential procedural requirement and, consequently, annul the act vitiated by that defect (judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 103, and of 24 June 2015, Spain v Commission, C‑263/13 P, EU:C:2015:415, paragraph 56).
116


Without there being any need to rule on the Commission’s argument that Tilly-Sabco lacks standing to rely on an infringement of Article 3(3) of Regulation No 182/2011, it suffices to observe that, where it finds such an infringement the Court of the European Union must examine that infringement of its own motion (judgment of 24 June 2015, Spain v Commission, C‑263/13 P, EU:C:2015:415, paragraph 56).