larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Marc Berel and Others v Administration des douanes de Rouen and Others.
Date: 2011-02-17
42. Article 213 confines itself to stating the principle of joint and several liability where there are several debtors liable for the same customs debt. It does not lay down any more specific rule on the implementation of that liability, in particular as regards the possible effect of a remission granted to one of the debtors on the liability of the others.
43. Nor, moreover, is such a rule expressly laid down elsewhere in the Customs Code or in the Implementing Regulation.
46. In the first place, since in accordance with point (b) of Article 233 of the Customs Code the remission of duty extinguishes the customs debt, it must be interpreted strictly. That article addresses the need to protect the EU’s own resources (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑230/08 Dansk Transport og Logistik  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
47. In the second place, it also follows from the Court’s case-law that the Member States retain the possibility of adopting measures to contribute effectively to the implementation of the objectives of the customs legislation, in particular the objective of ensuring that the customs debt is actually recovered, and may thus, in compliance with those objectives and in accordance with the principle of proportionality, prescribe if appropriate rules specifying the conditions of application of the provisions laid down in that legislation (see, to that effect, Case C‑414/02 Spedition Ulustrans  [2004] ECR I‑8633, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
48. It should be added that the aim of Article 213 of the Customs Code is precisely to achieve that objective of actual recovery of the customs debt, and hence to ensure the protection of the EU’s own resources. Joint and several liability constitutes an additional legal device made available to the national authorities to strengthen the effectiveness of the action they take for the recovery of customs debts.
58. In that regard, the Court has held that an operator who uses a customs agent, whether for direct or indirect representation, is in any event the debtor in respect of the customs debt as far as the customs authorities are concerned, and that he cannot avoid liability by relying on mistakes made by the agent (see Case C‑38/07 P Heuschen & Schrouff Oriëntal Foods Trading  v Commission  [2008] ECR I‑8599, paragraph 52).
62. That conclusion is borne out, moreover, by the principle that the repayment or remission of import or export duties, which may be made only under certain conditions and in cases specifically provided for, constitutes an exception to the normal import and export procedure and, consequently, the provisions which provide for repayment or remission are to be interpreted strictly (see, inter alia, Case C‑48/98 Söhl & Söhlke  [1999] ECR I‑7877, paragraph 52).
Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v Conseil des ministres.
Date: 2011-03-01
17. Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter state, respectively, that any discrimination based on sex is prohibited and that equality between men and women must be ensured in all areas. Since recital 4 to Directive 2004/113 expressly refers to Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter, the validity of Article 5(2) of that directive must be assessed in the light of those provisions (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑92/09 and C‑93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 46).
28. The Court has consistently held that the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently, and different situations must not be treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified (see Case C‑127/07 Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others  [2008] ECR I‑9895, paragraph 23).
32. Such a provision, which enables the Member States in question to maintain without temporal limitation an exemption from the rule of unisex premiums and benefits, works against the achievement of the objective of equal treatment between men and women, which is the purpose of Directive 2004/113, and is incompatible with Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter.
Direktsia "Obzhalvane i upravlenie na izpalnenieto"- Varna v Auto Nikolovi OOD.
Date: 2011-03-03
41. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in determining the scope of a provision of European Union law, its wording, objective and context must all be taken into account (see, to that effect, Case C‑280/04 Jyske Finans  [2005] ECR I‑10683, paragraph 34, and Case C‑116/10 Feltgen and Bacino Charter Company  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 12).
46. Next, it should be noted that the arrangements for the taxation of the profit margin made by the taxable dealer on the supply of second-hand goods, works of art, collectors’ items and antiques constitute a special arrangement for VAT – derogating from the general scheme of Directive 2006/112 – which, like the other special arrangements provided for in that directive, must be applied only to the extent necessary to achieve their objective (see Jyske Finans , paragraph 35).
47. As is apparent from recital 51 in the preamble to Directive 2006/112, the objective of the margin scheme is to avoid double taxation and distortions of competition between taxable persons in the area of second-hand goods (see, to that effect, Case C‑320/02 Stenholmen  [2004] ECR I‑3509, paragraph 25; and Jyske Finans , paragraphs 37 and 41).
48. To tax, on its overall price, the supply by a taxable dealer of second-hand goods, where the price at which that dealer purchased those goods includes a sum of input VAT which was paid by a person falling within one of the categories identified in Article 314(a) to (d) of that directive and which neither that person nor the taxable dealer was able to deduct, would lead to such double taxation (see, to that effect, Stenholmen , paragraph 25 and Jyske Finans , paragraph 38).
61. In that regard, according to the settled case-law of the Court, whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied on before the national courts by individuals against the State where the latter has failed to implement the directive in domestic law by the end of the period prescribed or where it has failed to implement the directive correctly (see Case C‑266/07 Flughafen Köln/Bonn  [2008] ECR I‑5999, paragraph 23; Case C‑138/07 Cobelfret  [2009] ECR I‑731, paragraph 58; and Case C‑243/09 Fuß  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 56).
Maurits Casteels v British Airways plc.
Date: 2011-03-10
19. It should be noted at the outset that Article 45 TFEU not only applies to the action of public authorities but also extends to rules of any other nature aimed at regulating gainful employment in a collective manner (see Case C‑325/08 Olympique Lyonnais  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
21. It is also settled case-law that all of the provisions of the FEU Treaty relating to the freedom of movement for persons are intended to facilitate the pursuit by European Union nationals of occupational activities of all kinds throughout the European Union, and preclude measures which might place such nationals at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic activity in the territory of another Member State (see Case C‑212/06 Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon [2008] ECR I‑1683, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited, and Olympique Lyonnais , paragraph 33).
22. Consequently, Article 45 TFEU militates against any measure which, even though applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality, is capable of hindering or rendering less attractive the exercise by European Union nationals of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty (see Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon , paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
29. By making no provision for account to be taken of years of service completed by a BA employee in a BA establishment in another Member State, and by treating the consensual transfer of a BA employee to a BA establishment in another Member State as a voluntary departure from BA, the Collective Agreement thus places workers who exercise their right to free movement at a disadvantage inasmuch as they suffer financial losses as well as an adverse effect on their supplementary pension rights. The prospect of such a disadvantage is liable to dissuade workers, such as Mr Casteels, from leaving their employer’s establishment in one Member State in order to take up a position with an establishment of that same employer in another Member State (see, to that effect, Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon , paragraph 48).
30. Since the scheme at issue in the main proceedings in the present case constitutes an obstacle to the freedom of movement for workers which is, in principle, prohibited by Article 45 TFEU, that scheme can be allowed only on condition that it pursues a legitimate objective in the public interest, is appropriate to ensuring the attainment of that objective, and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objective pursued (see, inter alia, Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon , paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
33. According to established case-law, it is for the national court, to the full extent of its discretion under national law, to interpret and apply domestic law in conformity with the requirements of European Union law (see Case 157/86 Murphy and Others  [1988] ECR 673, paragraph 11; Case C‑262/97 Engelbrecht  [2000] ECR I‑7321, paragraph 39; and Case C‑208/05 ITC  [2007] ECR I‑181, paragraph 68).
Charles Defossez v Christian Wiart and Others.
Date: 2011-03-10
19. In that regard, the Court has held that Directive 2002/74 has direct effect in the event of non-transposition only in respect of insolvencies arising after 8 October 2005 (Case C-246/06 Velasco Navarro  [2008] ECR I-105, paragraphs 27 to 29).
24. The Court has held previously in that regard that, although Directive 80/987 does not contain any provisions which expressly refer to the claims of employees having been employed in a Member State other than that in which their employer is established, it is nevertheless applicable to such claims and it is therefore necessary to determine the guarantee institution responsible for paying those claims in accordance with the provisions of that directive (see, to that effect, Case C-117/96 Mosbæk [1997] ECR I-5017, paragraphs 16 and 19).
25. The Court has held in respect of such a situation that, under Article 3 of Directive 80/987, the competent guarantee institution is that of the Member State in which, in accordance with Article 2(1) of the directive, either it is decided to open the proceedings for the collective satisfaction of creditors’ claims, or it has been established that the employer’s undertaking has been definitively closed down (see Mosbæk , paragraphs 20 and 27).
26. The Court has also held that it accords with the scheme of Directive 80/987 that the competent guarantee institution, except where it is fully financed by the public authorities, is the one which levied, or at all events should have levied, the insolvent employer’s contributions (see, to that effect, Mosbæk , paragraphs 24 and 25).
27. Moreover, in Case C-198/98 Everson and Barrass  [1999] ECR I-8903, to which the referring court refers in its order for reference, where, unlike the situation in Mosbæk , the insolvent employer had a business in the form of a branch in the Member State where the employees were employed, the Court held that the institution responsible for paying the outstanding claims is that of the Member State where that branch is established ( Everson and Barrass , paragraph 23). In addition, that competent guarantee institution was that of the Member State where the social security contributions from both the employer and the employees were paid.
32. Directive 80/987 is intended to guarantee employees a minimum level of protection under European Union law in the event of the insolvency of their employer (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑6/90 and C‑9/90 Francovich and Others [1991] ECR I‑5357, paragraph 3, and Case C-69/08 Visciano  [2009] ECR I‑6741, paragraph 27), without prejudice, in accordance with its Article 9, to more favourable provisions which the Member States may apply or introduce (see, to that effect, Case C‑160/01 Mau  [2003] ECR I‑4791, paragraph 32, and Case C‑278/05 Robins and Others  [2007] ECR I‑1053, paragraph 40).
Tanja Borger v Tiroler Gebietskrankenkasse.
Date: 2011-03-10
26. According to the Court’s case-law, a person has the status of ‘worker ’, within the meaning of Regulation No 1408/71, where he or she is covered, even if only in respect of a single risk, on a compulsory or optional basis, by a general or special social security scheme referred to in Article 1(a) of that regulation, irrespective of the existence of an employment relationship ( Dodl and Oberhollenzer , paragraph 34).
28. As regards the first of those points, suffice it to note that, according to Dodl and Oberhollenzer , in the determination of whether or not a person comes within the scope ratione personae  of Regulation No 1408/71, the existence of an employment relationship is irrelevant, as the determining factor in this regard is the fact that that person is insured, compulsorily or on an optional basis, for one or more of the contingencies covered by a general or special social security scheme mentioned in Article 1(a) of that regulation ( Dodl and Oberhollenzer , paragraph 31).
30. Lastly, as regards the fact that, when Ms Borger actually comes to claim her retirement pension, the periods of cover under the retirement insurance scheme in Austria may be taken into account, not in that State, but in Switzerland, it must be held that, as the European Commission submitted in its written observations, that circumstance does not preclude a person from being recognised as having the status of a worker. Whether or not a person comes within the scope ratione personae  of Regulation No 1408/71 depends, not on the materialisation of the contingency covered, and thus on the issue of determining in which of the two States those periods will be taken into account at the time of retirement, but rather on the fact of being actually covered, even if only in respect of a single risk, on a compulsory or optional basis, by a general or special social security scheme mentioned in Article 1(a) of that regulation.
European Commission v Italian Republic.
Date: 2011-03-29
45. Next, as regards the existence of restrictions on the freedom of establishment and on the freedom to provide services referred to in Articles 43 EC and 49 EC respectively, it is settled case-law that measures which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of such freedoms constitute such restrictions (see, to that effect, Case C‑439/99 Commission  v Italy [2002] ECR I‑305, paragraph 22; Case C‑442/02 CaixaBank France  [2004] ECR I‑8961, paragraph 11; Case C‑451/03 Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti  [2006] ECR I-2941, paragraph 31; and Case C‑330/07 Jobra [2008] ECR I‑9099, paragraph 19).
46. In particular, the concept of restriction covers measures taken by a Member State which, although applicable without distinction, affect access to the market for economic operators from other Member States (see, inter alia, CaixaBank France , paragraph 12, and Case C-518/06 Commission  v Italy  [2009] ECR I-3491, paragraph 64).
49. In this regard, it must be borne in mind at the outset that rules of a Member State do not constitute a restriction within the meaning of the EC Treaty solely by virtue of the fact that other Member States apply less strict, or more commercially favourable, rules to providers of similar services established in their territory (see Case C‑518/06 Commission v Italy , paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).
51. By contrast, such a restriction exists, in particular, if those lawyers are deprived of the opportunity of gaining access to the market of the host Member State under conditions of normal and effective competition (see, to that effect, CaixaBank France , paragraphs 13 and 14; Joined Cases C‑94/04 and C‑202/04 Cipolla and Others  [2006] ECR I-11421, paragraph 59; and Case C‑384/08 Attanasio Group  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 45).
Christina Ioanni Toki v Ypourgos Ethnikis paideias kai Thriskevmaton.
Date: 2011-04-05
21. As regards the scope of the two mechanisms of recognition provided for in points (a) and (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 3 of Directive 89/48, the Court has already ruled that it is clear from the general scheme of that Article 3 that only one of the two mechanisms may, as a general rule, apply in any particular factual context (Case C‑149/05 Price  [2006] ECR I‑7691, paragraph 36).
24. While it is true that the second subparagraph of Article 1(d) of Directive 89/48 provides that the professions covered by that provision are to be deemed to be regulated professions where they are pursued by a member of the organisation or association concerned, that deemed equivalence, as observed by the Advocate General in point 57 of his Opinion, is not full equivalence, and those professions do not constitute regulated professions within the meaning of Article 1(c) of that directive. Consequently, the recognition mechanism provided for in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 3 thereof cannot, contrary to the Court’s ruling in paragraphs 45 and 47 of Price , be relied on by members of such professions who apply for recognition. Furthermore, contrary to what seems to follow from paragraphs 36, 45, 46 and 48 of Price , it is the mechanism of recognition provided for in point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 3 of Directive 89/48 which is applicable to a profession falling under the second subparagraph of Article 1(d) of that directive.
41. In that regard, according to the Court’s case‑law, the expression ‘the profession in question’, in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 3 of Directive 89/48, is to be construed as covering professions which, in the Member State of origin and the host Member State, are identical or analogous or, in some cases, simply equivalent in terms of the activities they cover (Case C‑330/03 Colegio de Ingenieros de Caminos, Canales y Puertos  [2006] ECR I‑801, paragraph 20). That interpretation is equally valid, as observed by the Advocate General in point 75 of his Opinion, in relation to point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 3 of that directive, a provision which expressly refers to the pursuit of ‘the profession in question’.
Staatssecretaris van Financiën v Sony Supply Chain Solutions (Europe) BV.
Date: 2011-04-07
24. It must be recalled as a preliminary point that the purpose of a BTI is to provide the trader with legal certainty where there is a doubt as to the tariff classification of goods in the existing customs nomenclature (see Case C-199/09 Schenker  [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 16), thereby protecting him against any subsequent change in the position adopted by the customs authorities with regard to the classification of those goods (see Case C-315/96 Lopex Export  [1998] ECR I-317, paragraph 28).
26. In that connection, the Court has held that a BTI creates rights only for the holder (Case C-495/03 Intermodal Transports  [2005] ECR I-8151, paragraph 27).
31. Furthermore, the second subparagraph of Article 5(4) of the Customs Code provides that the person who fails to state that he is acting in the name of or on behalf of another person or who states that he is acting in the name of or on behalf of another person without being empowered to do so is to be deemed to be acting in his own name and on his own behalf. It follows that the representation must be express and cannot be implied.
41. However, a BTI may be relied on as evidence by a person other than its holder. Given that there is no legislation at European Union level governing the concept of proof, any type of evidence admissible under the procedural law of the Member States in proceedings similar to those laid down in Article 243 of the Customs Code is in principle admissible (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-310/98 and C-406/98 Met-Trans and Sagpol  [2000] ECR I-1797, paragraph 29).
42. Furthermore, the Court has held that the fact that the customs authorities of another Member State have issued a BTI for specific goods to a person not party to the dispute, before a court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, which seems to reflect a different interpretation of the CN headings from that which that court considers it must adopt in respect of similar goods in question in that dispute, most certainly must cause that court to take particular care in its assessment of whether there is no reasonable doubt as to the correct application of the CN (see Intermodal Transports , paragraph 34).
47. The Court has held that the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations cannot be relied upon against an unambiguous provision of European Union law; nor can the conduct of a national authority responsible for applying European Union law, which acts in breach of that law, give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of a trader of beneficial treatment contrary to European Union law (Case 316/86 Krücken [1988] ECR 2213, paragraph 24, Joined Cases C-31/91 to C-44/91 Lageder and Others [1993] ECR I-1761, paragraph 35, and Case C‑94/05 Emsland-Stärke  [2006] ECR I-2619, paragraph 31).
European Commission v Ireland.
Date: 2011-04-07
10. First, it is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation obtaining in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-23/05 Commission  v Luxembourg  [2005] ECR I-9535, paragraph 9, and judgment of 17 December 2009 in Case C-120/09 Commission  v Belgium , paragraph 19).
14. The finding of a failure to fulfil obligations of itself precludes granting Ireland’s application to suspend the proceedings pending possible withdrawal of the action by the Commission (Case C-366/00 Commission  v Luxembourg  [2002] ECR I-1749, paragraph 12, and judgment of 24 February 2005 in Case C-383/04 Commission  v Luxembourg , paragraph 7).
Mensch und Natur AG v Freistaat Bayern.
Date: 2011-04-14
28. Article 1(3) of Regulation No 258/97 introduces merely the possibility of determining, ‘where necessary’, whether a type of food or food ingredient falls within the scope of that regulation under what is known as the ‘comitology’ procedure laid down in Article 13 thereof (see Case C‑383/07 M‑K Europa  [2009] ECR I‑115, paragraph 40). However, it is not incumbent on an undertaking to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 13 ( M‑K Europa , paragraph 43).