Stichting Woonlinie and Others v European Commission.
Date: 2014-02-27
30. As well as other amendments, the Treaty of Lisbon, under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, relaxed the conditions governing the admissibility of actions for annulment brought by natural and legal persons against acts of the European Union by adding a third limb to that provision. Since the effect of that limb is that the admissibility of actions for annulment brought by natural and legal persons is not subject to the condition of individual concern, it also makes possible legal actions against regulatory acts which do not entail implementing measures and are of direct concern to an applicant (see, to that effect, Case C‑583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others  v Parliament and Council  [2013] ECR, paragraph 57).
31. The fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU provides, therefore, for two situations in which natural or legal persons are accorded standing to institute proceedings against an act which is not addressed to them. First, such proceedings may be instituted if the act is of direct and individual concern to them. Second, such persons may bring proceedings against a regulatory act not entailing implementing measures if that act is of direct concern to them (Case C‑274/12 P Telefónica  v Commission [2013] ECR, paragraph 19).
32. In this context, it should be recalled that the criterion which makes the admissibility of an action brought by a natural or legal person against a decision addressed to another person subject to the conditions governing admissibility laid down in the fourth subparagraph of Article 263 TFEU raises an absolute bar to proceeding which the European Union Courts may consider at any time, even of their own motion (see, to that effect, Case C‑362/06 P Sahlstedt and Others v Commission  [2009] ECR I‑2903, paragraph 22).
39. In the present case, first, the appellants seek, by their action, the annulment of the contested decision by which the Commission confirms that aid measure E 2/2005 is compatible with the common market, following the commitments provided by the Netherlands authorities amending the aid scheme from which the appellants benefitted. It is apparent from recital 41 to the contested decision that those commitments will be implemented by a ministerial decree and by a new housing law.
40. Secondly, the contested decision does not define the specific and actual consequences, for the appellants’ activities, of the application of commitments by the Netherlands authorities in the context of aid measure E 2/2005. Those consequences will materialise by way of measures adopted to implement the ministerial decree and the new housing law, which, as such, are themselves implementing measures entailed by the contested decision within the meaning of the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.
44. As the General Court pointed out in paragraph 26 of the order under appeal, third parties may be individually concerned by a decision addressed to another person only if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed (Case 25/62 Plaumann  v Commission  [1963] ECR 95, 107; Case C‑298/00 P Italy  v Commission  [2004] ECR I‑4087, paragraph 36; Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others  v Parliament and Council , paragraph 72; and Telefónica  v Commission , paragraph 46).
46. It is, however, clear from settled case-law that where the decision affects a group of persons who were identified or identifiable when that measure was adopted by reason of criteria specific to the members of the group, those persons may be individually concerned by that measure inasmuch as they form part of a limited class of traders and that that can be the case particularly when the decision alters rights acquired by the individual prior to its adoption (see, to that effect, Case C‑125/06 P Commission  v Infront WM  [2008] ECR I‑1451, paragraphs 71 and 72 and the case-law cited).
54. In this regard, it should be noted, first, that an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person is admissible only in so far as that person has an interest in having the contested act annulled. Such an interest requires that the annulment of that act must be capable, in itself, of having legal consequences and that the action may therefore, through its outcome, procure an advantage to the party which brought it (see, to that effect, Case C‑519/07 P Commission  v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina [2009] ECR I‑8495, paragraph 63).
55. Secondly, the appellants must, under the second limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, be concerned not only individually but also directly by the act which they are seeking to have annulled, in the sense that that act must directly affect the legal situation of those parties and leave no discretion to the authorities responsible for implementing that act, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from European Union law alone, without the application of any other intermediate rules (see, to that effect, Commission  v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina , paragraphs 48 and 49).
59. As was noted by the Advocate General in points 43 to 45 of his Opinion, in the context of the procedure under Article 19(1) of Regulation No 659/1999, it is the Commission’s decision recording the proposals of the Member State which renders those proposals binding.
60. In that regard, the fact that the amendments recorded by the contested decision were adopted by the Netherlands legislation cannot call that finding into question. As was also observed by the Advocate General in points 94 and 98 of his Opinion, the Kingdom of the Netherlands does not have any discretion when implementing the contested decision.
61. Consequently, it must be held that the contested decision, in so far as it concerns aid measure E 2/2005, directly affects the appellants’ legal position.