French Republic v European Parliament.
Date: 2020-06-25
19


In that regard, the Court held, in paragraphs 32, 35 and 37 of the judgment of 2 October 2018, France v Parliament (Exercise of budgetary powers) (C‑73/17, EU:C:2018:787), that, in the absence of any specific provision in point (a) of the sole article of that protocol, the words ‘budget session’ must be regarded as referring to all of the periods of plenary part-sessions during which the Parliament exercises its budgetary powers and to all of the acts adopted by the Parliament for that purpose. The exercise by the Parliament of its budgetary powers in plenary sitting constitutes a fundamental event in the democratic life of the European Union and requires, inter alia, a public debate in plenary sitting enabling the citizens of the European Union to acquaint themselves with the various political orientations expressed and, as a result, to form a political opinion on the European Union’s actions. Furthermore, the transparency afforded by a parliamentary debate in a plenary sitting is likely to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the budgetary procedure in the eyes of citizens of the European Union and the credibility of the latter’s actions. Accordingly, the words ‘budget session’ in point (a) of the sole article of the Protocol concerning the seats of the institutions encompass not only the ordinary plenary part-session during which the draft budget is considered at first reading, under Article 314(4) TFEU, but also the second reading, under Article 314(6) of that Treaty, which guarantees a public debate and vote, in a plenary sitting, on the joint text on the draft annual budget adopted under the conciliation procedure.
20


In the second place, the Parliament is obliged to comply with the requirements that Article 314 TFEU imposes on it for the exercise of its budgetary powers in plenary sitting. The purpose of the deadlines and time limits prescribed by that provision is to ensure that the annual budget of the European Union is adopted before the end of the year preceding the financial year in question, as a possible failure to observe them may result in the application of Article 315 TFEU concerning a revisionary budget (judgment of 2 October 2018, France v Parliament (Exercise of budgetary powers), C‑73/17, EU:C:2018:787, paragraph 38).
21


If, within the 14-day period prescribed by Article 314(6) TFEU, the debate and vote in the Parliament on the joint text on the draft annual budget have not taken place, the joint text may be adopted by the Council alone, under the conditions laid down in paragraph 7(a) of that article. It is of particular importance for the transparency and democratic legitimacy of action taken by the European Union, which are given expression through the procedure for adopting the annual budget, that the Parliament should exercise its powers under Article 314(6) TFEU and vote in plenary sitting on that joint text (judgment of 2 October 2018, France v Parliament (Exercise of budgetary powers), C‑73/17, EU:C:2018:787, paragraph 40).
22


In the third place, given that point (a) of the sole article of the Protocol concerning the seats of the institutions and Article 314 TFEU have the same legal value, the obligations arising under the sole article of the Protocol cannot, as such, prevail over those arising under Article 314 TFEU, and vice versa. Their application must be on a case-by-case basis and in a manner that reconciles those obligations and strikes a fair balance between them (judgment of 2 October 2018, France v Parliament (Exercise of budgetary powers), C‑73/17, EU:C:2018:787, paragraph 42).
23


Moreover, it is settled case-law that the Protocol concerning the seats of the institutions is predicated on mutual respect on the part of the Member States and the Parliament for each other’s areas of competence and on a reciprocal duty of sincere cooperation (judgment of 2 October 2018, France v Parliament (Exercise of budgetary powers), C‑73/17, EU:C:2018:787, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
24


Thus, the Parliament is obliged to exercise its budgetary powers in an ordinary plenary part-session held in Strasbourg, although that obligation, arising under point (a) of the sole article of the Protocol concerning the seats of the institutions, does not preclude the annual budget from being debated and voted on during an additional plenary part-session held in Brussels, if that is called for by essential requirements relating to the proper conduct of the budgetary procedure laid down in Article 314 TFEU. If that procedure were conducted in such a way as to give absolute precedence to observance of point (a) of the sole article of the Protocol to the detriment of the Parliament’s full participation in the budgetary procedure, that would be incompatible with the need to reconcile the obligations arising under those provisions, to which reference has been made in paragraph 22 of this judgment (judgment of 2 October 2018, France v Parliament (Exercise of budgetary powers), C‑73/17, EU:C:2018:787, paragraph 44).
25


As regards judicial review of compliance with the requirements stemming from paragraphs 22 to 24 of this judgment, the Court specified, in paragraph 45 of the judgment of 2 October 2018, France v Parliament (Exercise of budgetary powers) (C‑73/17, EU:C:2018:787), that when the Parliament undertakes the necessary reconciliation between the obligations under point (a) of the sole article of the Protocol concerning the seats of the institutions and those stemming from Article 314 TFEU, it has a discretion deriving from the essential requirements relating to the proper conduct of the budgetary procedure. That judicial review therefore concerns the question whether the Parliament made errors of assessment by opting to exercise some of its budgetary powers in the course of an additional plenary part-session.
29


However, the Court has already rejected such a premiss by ruling, in paragraph 50 of the judgment of 2 October 2018, France v Parliament (Exercise of budgetary power) (C‑73/17, EU:C:2018:787), that, at the time when the calendar of ordinary plenary part-sessions was adopted, it was fundamentally uncertain whether there would be a conciliation procedure and equally uncertain when that procedure would begin and, in the event of agreement on a joint text on the draft annual budget, when it would end.