Chantal Hectors v European Parliament.
Date: 2004-09-23
39. The duty to state reasons imposed by the second paragraph of Article 25 of the Staff Regulations and, as regards decisions taken as a result of a complaint, that imposed by the second subparagraph of Article 90(2) thereof, are intended, on the one hand, to provide the persons concerned with sufficient details to enable them to assess whether the decision was well founded and whether it would be expedient to bring legal proceedings to contest its legality and, on the other hand, to enable the Court to review the decision (see, inter alia, Case 195/80 Michel  v Parliament  [1981] ECR 2861, paragraph 22).
40. As the Court of First Instance correctly pointed out, in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the judgment under appeal, the competent authority, by analogy with the appointing authority, is bound to give a statement of reasons, at the very least when rejecting a complaint made by an unsuccessful candidate against the decision rejecting his candidature and/or against that appointing another candidate (see, in particular, with regard to the rejection of an official’s candidature, Case C‑115/92 P Parliament  v Volger  [1993] ECR I‑6549, paragraph 22). The extent of that duty must be determined on the basis of the particular facts of each case (Case C‑169/88 Prelle  v Commission [1989] ECR 4335, paragraph 9).
50. Since a total failure to state reasons prior to the commencement of proceedings cannot be remedied by explanations provided before the Court by the competent authority, by analogy to the appointing authority (see, to that effect, Case C‑343/87 Culin  v Commission [1990] ECR I‑225, paragraph 15), it must be held that the competent authority failed in its duty to state reasons.
61. First, as regards the non‑material damage resulting from the failure to state reasons for the contested decisions, it must be held that their annulment is in itself adequate compensation for the damage which the appellant has suffered in this case. The claim for compensation for that head of damage must, as a result, be dismissed (see, to that effect, Hochbaum & Rawes  v Commission , paragraph 22).
62. Secondly, so far as concerns the alleged material damage, it must be pointed out that the appellant did not particularise in her application the extent of the damage allegedly suffered but did so only in her reply. As a result, she did not comply with the requirements of Article 44(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance. The Court of Justice has, admittedly, accepted that, in certain special cases, particularly where the alleged loss is difficult to calculate, it is not absolutely necessary to particularise its exact extent in the application nor to calculate the amount of the compensation claimed (see, particularly, Case 74/74 CNTA  v Commission  [1975] ECR 533 and Case 90/78 Granaria  v Council and Commission  [1979] ECR 1081, 1090). However, in these proceedings, the appellant has not established, nor even claimed, the existence of special circumstances justifying the omission to calculate, in the application, that head of loss. Therefore, the claim for compensation for the material damage is inadmissible and must be dismissed.
63. It follows from the foregoing that the claim for damages cannot be upheld.