larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Steef Mennens v Emirates Direktion für Deutschland.
Date: 2016-06-22
15


Furthermore, it is clear from case-file that the interpretation requested of the Court is necessary to enable the referring court to give judgment in the case at issue in the main proceedings. In those circumstances, it is not for the Court, given the allocation of functions between itself and the national courts, to determine whether the decision to refer has been taken in accordance with the rules of national law governing the organisation of courts and their procedure (judgment of 23 November 2006 in Asnef-Equifax and Administración del Estado (C‑238/05, EU:C:2006:734, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited) or, consequently, to reject the request for a preliminary ruling.
20


A ‘flight’ is not defined by Regulation No 261/2004. However, it is apparent from settled case-law that a flight consists in an air transport operation, being as it were a ‘unit’ of such transport, performed by an air carrier which fixes its itinerary (judgments of 10 July 2008 in Emirates Airlines, C‑173/07, EU:C:2008:400, paragraph 40, and 13 October 2011 in Sousa Rodríguez and Others, C‑83/10, EU:C:2011:652, paragraph 27).
26


That analysis is supported by the objective of Regulation No 261/2004, which, as is clear from recitals 1, 2 and 4, is to ensure a high level of protection for passengers and consumers, by strengthening their rights in a number of situations involving serious trouble and inconvenience, and also redressing those situations in a standardised and immediate manner (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 January 2006 in IATA and ELFAA, C‑344/04, EU:C:2006:10, paragraph 82).
36


Those taxes and charges are unavoidable components of the final price to be paid by the passenger in order to avail of the service proposed by the air carrier (see, by analogy, judgments of 19 July 2012 in ebookers.com Deutschland, C‑112/11, EU:C:2012:487, paragraph 14, and 18 September 2014 in Vueling Airlines, C‑487/12, EU:C:2014:2232, paragraph 36).
Irina Nikolajeva v Multi Protect OÜ.
Date: 2016-06-22
33


That term relates only to exceptional situations in which, in the light of the specific features of the conduct alleged against the third party, in particular the fact that it is impossible for him to proceed with the acts alleged against him which have infringed or threaten to infringe the EU trade mark, such a court is not required to issue an order prohibiting a third party from proceeding with such acts, although an application to that end has been made by the proprietor of the mark (see, to this effect, judgment of 14 December 2006 in Nokia, C‑316/05, EU:C:2006:789, paragraph 35).
40


Indeed, under Article 24 of Regulation No 207/2009, which is in Section 4, headed ‘EU trade marks as objects of property’, applications for registration of EU trade marks can be the subject of various types of legal acts, such as a transfer, the creation of rights in rem, or licences, which possess the common feature that their purpose or effect is to create or transfer a right in respect of the trade mark concerned (see, to this effect, judgment of 4 February 2016 in Hassan, C‑163/15, EU:C:2016:71, paragraph 21).
45


Also, as the second sentence of Article 9(3) of Regulation No 207/2009 makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope, it follows, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, that the concept of ‘reasonable compensation’ in that provision must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation, having regard to the context of that provision and the objective pursued by the legislation concerned (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 December 2006 in Nokia, C‑316/05, EU:C:2006:789, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
Thomas Philipps GmbH & Co. KG v Grüne Welle Vertriebs GmbH.
Date: 2016-06-22
18


However, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments in Brain Products, C‑219/11, EU:C:2012:742, paragraph 13, and Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
19


As regards the context of which the first sentence of Article 33(2) of Regulation No 6/2002 is part, it should be observed, first of all, that the second sentence of that paragraph qualifies the rule set out in that first sentence as regards ‘third parties who have acquired rights’ in the registered Community design after the date of the legal act in question but who knew of the act at the date on which the rights were acquired. Article 33(3) establishes an exception to that rule in the case of a ‘person who acquires the registered Community design or a right concerning the registered Community design’ by way of transfer of the whole of the undertaking or by any other universal succession. Accordingly, an interpretation of Article 33(2) and (3) of Regulation No 6/2002 which is both literal and schematic gives support to the idea that it, as a whole, is intended to govern the enforceability of the legal acts referred to in Articles 28, 29 and 32 of the regulation in respect of third parties who have, or are likely to have, rights in the registered Community design (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 February 2016 in Hassan, C‑163/15, EU:C:2016:71, paragraph 20).
24


With regard to the purpose of the rule laid down in the first sentence of Article 33(2) of Regulation No 6/2002, it must be held that, having regard to what has been established in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the present judgment, the lack of effects, vis-à-vis third parties, of the legal acts referred to in Articles 28, 29 and 32 of that regulation which have not been entered in the register is intended to protect a person who has, or may have, rights in a Community design as an object of property. It follows that the first sentence of article 33(2) does not apply to a situation such as that in the main proceedings, in which the licence holder complains that a third party, by infringing the design, infringes the rights conferred by the registered Community design (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 February 2016 in Hassan, C‑163/15, EU:C:2016:71, paragraph 25).
Selena România Srl v Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice (DGRFP) București.
Date: 2016-06-30
29


More specifically, it follows from Article 13(3) of the Basic Regulation that, in the event of circumvention, the extension of established definitive measures takes effect from the date on which the registration was imposed pursuant to Article 14(5) of that regulation (judgment of 6 June 2013 in Paltrade, C‑667/11, EU:C:2013:368, paragraph 26).
30


Whilst Article 10(1) of the Basic Regulation affirms the principle of non-retroactivity of anti-dumping measures, since such measures cannot as a rule be applied to any goods other than those released for free circulation after the date on which the regulation introducing them entered into force, several provisions of the Basic Regulation derogate from that principle. Those provisions permit the application of anti-dumping measures to goods released for free circulation before the entry into force of the regulation introducing them, on condition that the imports at issue have been registered in accordance with Article 14(5) of the Basic Regulation (judgment of 17 December 2015 in APEX, C‑371/14, EU:C:2015:828, paragraph 48).
36


As is apparent from Article 26 of the Customs Code, although EU legislation provides that the origin of the goods must be evidenced by the production of a document, the production of that document does not prevent, in case of serious doubt, customs authorities from requiring any supplementary evidence to ensure that the indication of origin does comply with the rules established by EU legislation in this field. In that respect, the Court has already ruled that the purpose of the verification after the event is to check the accuracy of the origin indicated on the certificate of origin (see, by analogy, judgment of 8 November 2012 in Lagura Vermögensverwaltung, C‑438/11, EU:C:2012:703, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
37


It follows that the fact that goods are accompanied by certificates of origin is not a circumstance capable of preventing the recovery of duty due in respect of the import of those goods if, after that import has taken place, those certificates prove to be inaccurate (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 July 1997 in Pascoal & Filhos, C‑97/95, EU:C:1997:370, paragraphs 55 to 57 and the case-law cited).
Citroën Commerce GmbH v Zentralvereinigung des Kraffahrzeuggewerbes zur Aufrechterhaltung lauteren Wettbewerbs eV (ZLW).
Date: 2016-07-07
33


It is true that in its judgment of 10 July 2014 in Commission v Belgium (C‑421/12, EU:C:2014:2064, paragraph 59), the Court observed that the purpose of Directive 98/6 is to protect consumers not in relation to the indication of prices, in general or with regard to the economic reality of announcements of price reductions, but specifically in relation to the indication of the prices of products by reference to different units of quantity.
37


As a final price, the selling price must necessarily include the unavoidable and foreseeable components of the price, components that are necessarily payable by the consumer and constitute the pecuniary consideration for the acquisition of the product concerned (see, by analogy, judgment of 18 September 2014 in Vueling Airlines, C‑487/12, EU:C:2014:2232, paragraph 36).
43


It is true that Directive 2005/29 applies, in accordance with Article 3(1) of that directive, to unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices, as defined in Article 5 of the directive, before, during and after a commercial transaction in relation to a product. Article 2(d) of the directive defines commercial practices as being ‘any act, omission, course of conduct or representation, commercial communication including advertising and marketing, by a trader, directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers’ (see judgment of 16 July 2015 in Abcur, C‑544/13 and C‑545/13, EU:C:2015:481, paragraph 73).
Občina Gorje v Republika Slovenija.
Date: 2016-07-07
34


In this connection, it must be recalled that, although, by virtue of the very nature of regulations and of their function in the system of sources of EU law, the provisions of regulations generally have immediate effect in the national legal systems, without the need for the national authorities to adopt implementing measures, some of their provisions may nevertheless require, for their application, the adoption of implementing measures by the Member States (judgment of 25 October 2012 in Ketelä, C‑592/11, EU:C:2012:673, paragraph 35; order of 16 January 2014 in Dél-Zempléni Nektár Leader Nonprofit, C‑24/13, EU:C:2014:40, paragraph 14; and judgment of 15 May 2014 in Szatmári Malom, C‑135/13, EU:C:2014:327, paragraph 54).
35


Furthermore, it is established that Member States may adopt implementing measures for a regulation provided that they do not thereby obstruct its direct applicability or conceal its nature as an act of EU law; that they specify that they are acting in exercise of a discretion conferred on them under that regulation; and that they adhere to the parameters laid down thereunder (judgments of 25 October 2012 in Ketelä, C‑592/11, EU:C:2012:673, paragraph 36, and 15 May 2014 in Szatmári Malom, C‑135/13, EU:C:2014:327, paragraph 55).
36


It is by referring to the relevant provisions of the regulation concerned, interpreted in the light of the objectives of that regulation, that it may be determined whether they prohibit, require or allow Member States to adopt certain implementing measures and, particularly in the latter case, whether the measure concerned comes within the scope of the discretion that each Member State is recognised as having (judgment of 25 October 2012 in Ketelä, C‑592/11, EU:C:2012:673, paragraph 37).
37


First, as regards the relevant provisions of the regulation in question, it should be observed that under Article 71(3) of that regulation, the rules on eligibility of expenditure are, as a general rule, to be set at national level, subject to the special conditions laid down in that regulation for certain rural development measures (see, inter alia, judgment of 15 May 2014 in Szatmári Malom, C‑135/13, EU:C:2014:327, paragraph 27).
Hőszig Kft. v Alstom Power Thermal Services.
Date: 2016-07-07
29


Next, taking account of the objectives and the general scheme of that regulation, and in order to ensure the uniform application of that instrument, the concept of ‘agreement conferring jurisdiction’, referred to in Article 23 thereof, must be interpreted not as a simple reference to the national law of one or other of the States concerned, but as an independent concept (judgment of 7 February 2013 in Refcomp, C‑543/10, EU:C:2013:62, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
30


Lastly, in so far as the Brussels I Regulation replaces the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36), as amended by the successive accession conventions for the new Member States (‘the Brussels Convention’), in the relations between Member States, the interpretation provided by the Court in respect of the provisions of that convention is also valid for those of the regulation whenever the provisions of those instruments may be regarded as equivalent (judgment of 23 October 2014 in flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines, C‑302/13, EU:C:2014:2319, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
31


With regard to the first paragraph of Article 17 of that convention, which was replaced by Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation, the Court held that a jurisdiction clause, which serves a procedural purpose, is governed by the provisions of that convention, whose aim is to establish uniform rules of international jurisdiction (judgment of 3 July 1997 in Benincasa, C‑269/95, EU:C:1997:337, paragraph 25).
37


The court before which the matter is brought has the duty of examining, in limine litis, whether the jurisdiction clause was in fact the subject of consensus between the parties, which must be clearly and precisely demonstrated, the purpose of the requirements as to form imposed by Article 23(1) of the Brussels I Regulation being, in that regard, to ensure that consensus between the parties is in fact established (judgments of 6 May 1980 in Porta-Leasing, 784/79, EU:C:1980:123, paragraph 5 and the case-law cited, and 21 May 2015 in El Majdoub, C‑322/14, EU:C:2015:334, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
39


As regards a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which the jurisdiction clause is stipulated in the general conditions, the Court has already held that such a clause was lawful where the text of the contract signed by both parties itself contains an express reference to general conditions which include a jurisdiction clause (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 March 1999 in Castelletti, C‑159/97, EU:C:1999:142, paragraph 13, and 20 April 2016 in Profit Investment SIM, C‑366/13, EU:C:2016:282, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
Tommy Hilfiger Licensing LLC and Others v DELTA CENTER a.s.
Date: 2016-07-07
22


It is settled case-law that the third sentence of Article 11 of Directive 2004/48, like Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29 to which it refers, obliges Member States to ensure that an intermediary whose services are used by a third party in order to infringe an intellectual property right may, regardless of any liability of its own in relation to the facts at issue, be ordered to take measures aimed at bringing those infringements to an end and measures seeking to prevent further infringements (see to that effect, in particular, judgments of 12 July 2011 in L’Oréal and Others, C‑324/09, EU:C:2011:474, paragraphs 127 to 134, and 24 November 2011 in Scarlet Extended, C‑70/10, EU:C:2011:771, paragraphs 30 and 31).
23


For an economic operator to fall within the classification of ‘intermediary’ within the meaning of those provisions, it must be established that it provides a service capable of being used by one or more other persons in order to infringe one or more intellectual property rights, but it is not necessary that it maintain a specific relationship with that or those persons (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 March 2014 in UPC Telekabel Wien, C‑314/12, EU:C:2014:192, paragraphs 32 and 35).
25


Thus, as far as concerns electronic commerce, the Court held that an access provider which merely permits Internet access without proposing other services or exercising a review provides a service which is capable of being used by a third party to infringe intellectual property rights and must be classified as an ‘intermediary’ (see, to that effect, order of 19 February 2009 in LSG-Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung von Leistungsschutzrechten, C‑557/07, EU:C:2009:107, paragraph 43, and judgment of 27 March 2014 in UPC Telekabel Wien, C‑314/12, EU:C:2014:192, paragraph 32).
33


Next, it stated that those rules of national law must be constructed so as to achieve the objectives of Directive 2004/48. For that purpose, and in accordance with Article 3(2) of that directive, injunctions must be effective and dissuasive (judgment of 12 July 2011 in L’Oréal and Others, C‑324/09, EU:C:2011:474, paragraph 136).
34


Lastly, the Court held that injunctions must be equitable and proportionate. They must not therefore be excessively expensive and must not create barriers to legitimate trade. Nor can the intermediary be required to exercise general and permanent oversight over its customers. By contrast, the intermediary may be forced to take measures which contribute to avoiding new infringements of the same nature by the same market-trader from taking place (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 July 2011 in L’Oréal and Others, C‑324/09, EU:C:2011:474, paragraphs 138 to 141).
35


The Court thus took the view that any injunction within the meaning of the third sentence of Article 11 of Directive 2004/48 may be pronounced only if it ensures a fair balance between the protection of intellectual property and the absence of obstacles to legitimate trade (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 July 2011 in L’Oréal and Others, C‑324/09, EU:C:2011:474, paragraph 143).
Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV v Innova Vital GmbH.
Date: 2016-07-14
23


According to the Court’s settled case-law, for the purpose of interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, judgments of 17 November 1983 in Merck, 292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12; 4 May 2010 in TNT Express Nederland, C‑533/08, EU:C:2010:243, paragraph 44; and 17 March 2016 in Liffers, C‑99/15, EU:C:2016:173, paragraph 14).
27


Article 4(12) of Directive 2006/123 contains a similar definition of the concept of ‘commercial communication’. In that regard, the Court has stated that, for the purposes of that provision, a commercial communication covers not only traditional advertising but also other forms of advertising and communications of information intended to obtain new clients (see judgment of 5 April 2011 in Société fiduciaire nationale d’expertise comptable, C‑119/09, EU:C:2011:208, paragraph 33).
39


In that regard, as is apparent from recitals 1 and 18 of Regulation No 1924/2006, health protection is among the principal aims of that regulation (judgment of 6 September 2012 in Deutsches Weintor, C‑544/10, EU:C:2012:526, paragraph 45). Accordingly, it is necessary, in particular, to give the consumer the necessary information to make choices in full knowledge of the facts (judgments of 10 April 2014 in Ehrmann, C‑609/12, EU:C:2014:252, paragraph 40, and 17 December 2015 in Neptune Distribution, C‑157/14, EU:C:2015:823, paragraph 49).
41


As stated in recital 17 of that regulation, the scientific substantiation is to be the main aspect to be taken into account for the use of nutrition and health claims. Moreover, recital 23 of the regulation provides that the health claims are only be authorised for use in the European Union after a scientific assessment of the highest possible standard and that, in order to ensure harmonised scientific assessment of these claims, the European Food Safety Authority is to carry out such assessments.
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) v Xavier Grau Ferrer.
Date: 2016-07-21
24


According to settled case-law, provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all the languages of the European Union. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 November 2012in Kurcums Metal, C‑558/11, EU:C:2012:721, paragraph 48, and 9 April 2014 in GSV, C‑74/13, EU:C:2014:2058, paragraph 27).
25


In that connection, it must be recalled that Article 76(2) of Regulation No 207/2009, which constitutes the legal basis for Rule 50 of the Implementing Regulation, provides that the Office may disregard facts or evidence which are not submitted in due time by the parties concerned.
26


The Court has held that, when no proof of use of the mark concerned is submitted within the time limit set by the Office, the opposition must automatically be rejected by it. However, when evidence is produced within the time limit set by the Office, the production of supplementary evidence remains possible (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013 in New Yorker SHK Jeans v OHIM, C‑621/11 P, EU:C:2013:484, paragraphs 28 and 30).
27


As the Advocate General observed, in paragraphs 55 and 57 of his Opinion, Article 76(2) of Regulation No 207/2009 should be interpreted in the same way in relation to proof of the existence, validity and scope of protection of a trade mark since that provision contains a rule which applies horizontally within the scheme of that regulation, inasmuch as it applies irrespective of the nature of the proceedings concerned. It follows that Rule 50 of the Implementing Regulation cannot be interpreted as meaning that it extends the discretion of the Boards of Appeal to new evidence.
29


However, it must be recalled that it follows from settled case-law of the Court of Justice that where the grounds of a judgment of the General Court disclose an infringement of EU law but the operative part of the judgment is shown to be well founded for other legal reasons, the appeal must be dismissed (see, in particular, judgments of 15 December 1994 in Finsider v Commission, C‑320/92 P, EU:C:1994:414, paragraph 37; 16 December 1999 in CES v E, C‑150/98 P, EU:C:1999:616, paragraph 17, and 13 July 2000 in Salzgitter v Commission, C‑210/98 P, EU:C:2000:397, paragraph 58).