Andreas Kainz v Pantherwerke AG.
Date: 2014-01-16
19. In order to answer that question, it should be borne in mind, first, that, according to settled case-law, the provisions of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted independently, by reference to its scheme and purpose (see, inter alia, Case C‑189/08 Zuid‑Chemie  [2009] ECR I‑6917, paragraph 17, and Case C‑170/12 Pinckney  [2013] ECR, paragraph 23).
20. It must be stated next that, although it is apparent from recital 7 in the preamble to Regulation No 864/2007 that the European Union legislature sought to ensure consistency between Regulation No 44/2001, on the one hand, and the substantive scope and the provisions of Regulation No 864/2007, on the other, that does not mean, however, that the provisions of Regulation No 44/2001 must for that reason be interpreted in the light of the provisions of Regulation No 864/2007. The objective of consistency cannot, in any event, lead to the provisions of Regulation No 44/2001 being interpreted in a manner which is unconnected to the scheme and objectives pursued by that regulation.
21. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the system of common rules of conferment of jurisdiction laid down in Chapter II of Regulation No 44/2001 is based on the general rule, set out in Article 2(1), that persons domiciled in a Member State are to be sued in the courts of that State, irrespective of the nationality of the parties. It is only by way of derogation from that fundamental principle attributing jurisdiction to the courts of the defendant’s domicile that Section 2 of Chapter II of Regulation No 44/2001 makes provision for certain special jurisdictional rules, such as that laid down in Article 5(3) of that regulation (Case C‑147/12 ÖFAB  [2013] ECR, paragraph 30 and the case‑law cited).
22. Those rules of special jurisdiction must be interpreted restrictively and cannot give rise to an interpretation going beyond the cases expressly envisaged by that regulation ( ÖFAB , paragraph 31 and the case‑law cited).
23. It is, however, settled case-law that, in the case where the place in which the event which may give rise to liability in tort, delict or quasi‑delict occurs and the place where that event results in damage are not identical, the expression ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ in Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be understood as being intended to cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it, with the result that the defendant may be sued, at the option of the claimant, in the courts for either of those places (see, inter alia, Zuid‑Chemie , paragraph 23, and Pinckney , paragraph 26).
24. Since identification of one of those connecting factors is intended to enable the court objectively best placed to determine whether the elements establishing the liability of the person sued are present to assume jurisdiction, only the court within the jurisdiction of which the relevant connecting factor is to be found is the court before which an action may properly be brought is (see Pinckney , paragraph 28 and the case‑law cited).
26. The Court has already held in this connection that, with regard to product liability, this is the place where the event which damaged the product itself occurred (see, to that effect, Zuid‑Chemie , paragraph 27). This is, in principle, the place where the product in question was manufactured.
27. In so far as proximity to the place where the event which damaged the product itself occurred facilitates, on the grounds of, inter alia, the possibility of gathering evidence in order to establish the defect in question, the efficacious conduct of proceedings and, therefore, the sound administration of justice, the attribution of jurisdiction to the courts in that place is consistent with the rationale of the special jurisdiction conferred by Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, that is to say, the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred (see, to that effect, Zuid‑Chemie , paragraph 24, and Pinckney , paragraph 27).
31. Not only has the Court already held that Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 is specifically not designed to offer the weaker party stronger protection (see, to that effect, Case C‑133/11 Folien Fischer and Fofitec  [2012] ECR, paragraph 46), but it should also be noted that the interpretation proposed by Mr Kainz that the place of the event giving rise to the damage is the place where the product in question was transferred to the end consumer or to the reseller likewise does not guarantee that that consumer will, in all circumstances, be able to bring an action before the courts in the place where he is domiciled since that place may be elsewhere or even in another country.