larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
European Commission v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 2017-09-14
17


In accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (judgment of 10 April 2014, Commission v Italy, C‑85/13, not published, EU:C:2014:251, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
21


However, the Court has consistently held that it is for it to determine whether or not the alleged breach of obligations exists, even if the State concerned does not deny the breach (judgment of 10 March 2016, Commission v Spain, C‑38/15, not published, EU:C:2016:156, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
31


In addition, and in any event, in the context of an action for failure to fulfil obligations, the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is to give the Member State concerned an opportunity, on the one hand, to comply with its obligations under EU law and, on the other, to avail itself of its right to defend itself properly against the objections formulated by the Commission. The subject matter of proceedings under Article 258 TFEU is therefore delimited by the pre-litigation procedure prescribed by that provision. The proper conduct of that procedure constitutes an essential guarantee required by the FEU Treaty not only in order to protect the rights of the Member State concerned, but also in order to ensure that any contentious procedure will have a clearly defined dispute as its subject matter (judgment of 11 September 2014, Commission v Germany, C‑525/12, EU:C:2014:2202, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
Ovidiu-Mihaita Petrea v Ypourgou Esoterikon kai Dioikitikis Anasygrotisis.
Date: 2017-09-14
32


As regards, first of all, the withdrawal of the registration certificate, it has been held by the Court that the right of nationals of a Member State to enter the territory of another Member State and to reside there for the purposes intended by the EC Treaty is a right conferred directly by the Treaty, or, as the case may be, by the provisions adopted for its implementation. Therefore, the grant of a residence permit to a national of a Member State is to be regarded, not as a measure giving rise to rights, but as a measure by a Member State serving to prove the individual position of a national of another Member State with regard to provisions of European Union law (judgment of 21 July 2011, Dias, C‑325/09, EU:C:2011:498, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
33


Consequently, just as such a declaratory character means that a citizen’s residence may not be regarded as illegal, within the meaning of European Union law, solely on the ground that he does not hold a residence permit, it precludes a Union citizen’s residence from being regarded as legal, within the meaning of European Union law, solely on the ground that such a permit was validly issued to him (judgment of 21 July 2011, Dias, C‑325/09, EU:C:2011:498, paragraph 54).
58


In that regard, it is apparent from the Court’s settled case-law that, in the absence of EU rules, the Member States are responsible for designating the courts having jurisdiction and for determining the rules of procedure governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from European Union law. However, those rules must not be such as to render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (judgments of 29 April 2004, Orfanopoulos and Oliveri, C‑482/01 and C‑493/01, EU:C:2004:262, paragraph 80 and of 13 March 2014, Global Trans Lodzhistik, C‑29/13 and C‑30/13, EU:C:2014:140, paragraph 33).
60


As the Court has held on several occasions, it is compatible with EU law to lay down reasonable time limits for bringing proceedings in the interests of legal certainty, which protects both the individual and the administrative authority concerned (judgment of 17 November 2016, Stadt Wiener Neustad, C‑348/15, EU:C:2016:882, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
70


Next, it follows from the preparatory works to Directive 2004/38, in particular from the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [COM(2001) 257 final], that Article 30(1) of Directive 2004/38 does not mean that the removal order is to be translated into the language of the person concerned, but requires by contrast that the Member States take the necessary measures to ensure that the latter understands the content and implications of that decision, in accordance with the Court’s findings in the judgment of 18 May 1982, Adoui and Cornuaille (115/81 and 116/81, EU:C:1982:183, paragraph 13).
Feralpi Holding SpA v European Commission.
Date: 2017-09-21
27


It is established case-law that procedural rules are generally held to apply from the date on which they enter into force (judgments of 29 March 2011, ArcelorMittal Luxembourg v Commission and Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg and Others, C‑201/09 P and C‑216/09 P, EU:C:2011:190, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited; of 29 March 2011, ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission, C‑352/09 P, EU:C:2011:191, paragraph 88; and of 11 December 2012, Commission v Spain, C‑610/10, EU:C:2012:781, paragraph 45), even in a procedure that was initiated before that date, but is still pending after that date (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 December 2012, Commission v Spain, C‑610/10, EU:C:2012:781, paragraph 47).
28


In this case, as the decision at issue was adopted on the basis of Article 7(1) and Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, the procedure leading to that decision had to be conducted in accordance with that regulation and Regulation No 773/2004, the legal basis of which is Regulation No 1/2003 (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 March 2011, ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission, C‑352/09 P, EU:C:2011:191, paragraph 90), despite the fact that the procedure had been initiated before Regulation No 1/2003 came into force.
47


Accordingly, the procedure is necessarily vitiated, regardless of any possible detrimental consequences for Feralpi that could result from such an infringement (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 November 2012, Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob, C‑553/10 P and C‑554/10 P, EU:C:2012:682, paragraphs 46 to 52, and of 9 June 2016, CEPSA v Commission, C‑608/13 P, EU:C:2016:414, paragraph 36).
54


In respect of Feralpi’s request to the Court to grant it a compensatory remedy for harm allegedly caused by a breach, on the part of the General Court, of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, or to declare such a breach, it should be recalled that a breach by a Court of the European Union of its obligation under that provision to adjudicate on the cases before it within a reasonable time must be sanctioned in an action for damages brought before the General Court, since such an action constitutes an effective remedy. Accordingly, a claim for compensation for the damage caused by the failure on the part of the General Court to adjudicate within a reasonable time may not be made directly to the Court of Justice in the context of an appeal, but must be brought before the General Court itself. The General Court, which has jurisdiction under Article 256(1) TFEU, hearing a claim for damages, is required to rule on such a claim sitting in a different composition from that which heard the dispute which gave rise to the procedure whose duration is criticised (judgment of 9 June 2016, Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades and Others v Commission, C‑617/13 P, EU:C:2016:416, paragraphs 98 and 99 and the case-law cited).
Ferriere Nord SpA v European Commission.
Date: 2017-09-21
36


It is established case-law that procedural rules are generally held to apply from the date on which they enter into force (judgments of 29 March 2011, ArcelorMittal Luxembourg v Commission and Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg and Others, C‑201/09 P and C‑216/09 P, EU:C:2011:190, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited; of 29 March 2011, ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission, C‑352/09 P, EU:C:2011:191, paragraph 88; and of 11 December 2012, Commission v Spain, C‑610/10, EU:C:2012:781, paragraph 45), even in a procedure that was initiated before that date, but is still pending after that date (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 December 2012, Commission v Spain, C‑610/10, EU:C:2012:781, paragraph 47).
37


In this case, as the decision at issue was adopted on the basis of Article 7(1) and Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, the procedure leading to that decision had to be conducted in accordance with that regulation and Regulation No 773/2004, the legal basis of which is Regulation No 1/2003 (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 March 2011, ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission, C‑352/09 P, EU:C:2011:191, paragraph 90), despite the fact that the procedure had been initiated before Regulation No 1/2003 came into force.
55


Accordingly, the procedure is necessarily vitiated, regardless of any possible detrimental consequences for Ferriere Nord that could result from that infringement (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 November 2012, Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob, C‑553/10 P and C‑554/10 P, EU:C:2012:682, paragraphs 46 to 52, and of 9 June 2016, CEPSA v Commission, C‑608/13 P, EU:C:2016:414, paragraph 36).
Riva Fire SpA , en liquidation v European Commission.
Date: 2017-09-21
28


It is established case-law that procedural rules are generally held to apply from the date on which they enter into force (judgments of 29 March 2011, ArcelorMittal Luxembourg v Commission and Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg and Others, C‑201/09 P and C‑216/09 P, EU:C:2011:190, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited; of 29 March 2011, ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission, C‑352/09 P, EU:C:2011:191, paragraph 88; and of 11 December 2012, Commission v Spain, C‑610/10, EU:C:2012:781, paragraph 45), even in a procedure that was initiated before that date, but is still pending after that date (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 December 2012, Commission v Spain, C‑610/10, EU:C:2012:781, paragraph 47).
29


In this case, as the decision at issue was adopted on the basis of Article 7(1) and Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, the procedure leading to that decision had to be conducted in accordance with that regulation and Regulation No 773/2004, the legal basis of which is Regulation No 1/2003 (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 March 2011, ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission, C‑352/09 P, EU:C:2011:191, paragraph 90), despite the fact that the procedure had been initiated before Regulation No 1/2003 came into force.
49


Accordingly, the procedure is necessarily vitiated, regardless of any possible detrimental consequences for Riva that could result from that infringement (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 November 2012, Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob, C‑553/10 P and C‑554/10 P, EU:C:2012:682, paragraphs 46 to 52, and of 9 June 2016, CEPSA v Commission, C‑608/13 P, EU:C:2016:414, paragraph 36).
54


In respect of Riva’s request to the Court to declare a breach of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, it should be recalled that a breach, by a Court of the European Union, of its obligation under that provision to adjudicate on the cases before it within a reasonable time must be sanctioned in an action for damages brought before the General Court, since such an action constitutes an effective remedy. Accordingly, a claim for compensation for the damage caused by the failure on the part of the General Court to adjudicate within a reasonable time may not be made directly to the Court of Justice in the context of an appeal, but must be brought before the General Court itself. The General Court, which has jurisdiction under Article 256(1) TFEU, hearing a claim for damages, is required to rule on such a claim sitting in a different composition from that which heard the dispute which gave rise to the procedure whose duration is criticised (judgment of 9 June 2016, Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades and Others v Commission, C‑617/13 P, EU:C:2016:416, paragraphs 98 and 99 and the case-law cited).
Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs v Mercedes-Benz Financial Services UK Ltd.
Date: 2017-10-04
26


That type of contract may have features which are comparable to the acquisition of goods, or it may not, since it is open to the parties to provide that the lessee has the option of acquiring or not acquiring those goods at the end of the lease period (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 February 2012, Eon Aset Menidjmunt, C‑118/11, EU:C:2012:97, paragraphs 34 and 37).
27


The fact that a transfer of ownership is provided for on the expiry of the contract or the fact that the present value of the lease payments is practically identical to the market value of the property constitute, separately or together, criteria which permit a determination of whether a contract can be categorised as a ‘finance lease’ (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 February 2012, Eon Aset Menidjmunt, C‑118/11, EU:C:2012:97, paragraph 38, and of 2 July 2015, NLB Leasing, C‑209/14, EU:C:2015:440, paragraph 30).
41


Such a requirement would, however, be contrary to the VAT system’s objectives of ensuring legal certainty and facilitating application of the tax by having regard, save in exceptional cases, to the objective character of the transaction in question (see, by analogy, judgment of 6 April 1995, BLP Group, C‑4/94, EU:C:1995:107, paragraph 24).
Agenzia delle Entrate v Federal Express Europe Inc.
Date: 2017-10-04
37


In that regard, it should be recalled that, for VAT purposes, each transaction must normally be regarded as distinct and independent, as follows from the second subparagraph of Article 1(2) of the VAT Directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 January 2013, BGŻ Leasing, C‑224/11, EU:C:2013:15, paragraph 29).
38


Nevertheless, it is also clear from the case-law of the Court that, in certain circumstances, several formally distinct services, which could be supplied separately and thus give rise, separately, to taxation or exemption, must be considered to constitute a single transaction when they are not independent. There is a single supply where two or more elements or acts supplied by the taxable person to the customer are so closely linked that they form, objectively, a single, indivisible economic supply, which it would be artificial to split (judgment of 16 July 2015, Mapfre asistencia and Mapfre warranty, C‑584/13, EU:C:2015:488, paragraph 50).
42


It is settled case-law of the Court that the interpretation of the terms used to define the exemptions must be consistent with the objectives pursued by those exemptions, guarantee their effects and comply with the principle of fiscal neutrality (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 March 2013, PFC Clinic, C‑91/12, EU:C:2013:198, paragraph 23).
44


The Court has already acknowledged, as regards relief from import duty of goods of negligible value, that such relief aims at administrative simplification of customs procedures (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2009, Har Vaessen Douane Service, C‑7/08, EU:C:2009:417, paragraph 33).
Hanssen Beleggingen BV v Tanja Prast-Knipping.
Date: 2017-10-05
30


For the purposes of answering that question, it must be borne in mind, first, that the Court has already held that Article 22(4) of Regulation No 44/2001 reflects the same system as Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention and is, moreover, drafted in almost identical terms so that it is necessary to ensure continuity in the interpretation of those provisions (judgment of 12 July 2012, Solvay, C‑616/10, EU:C:2012:445, paragraph 43).
31


The Court points out, next, that the concept of proceedings ‘concerned with the registration or validity of [intellectual property rights]’, referred to in those provisions, is an ‘independent concept’ intended to have uniform application in all contracting States (judgments of 15 November 1983, Duijnstee, 288/82, EU:C:1983:326, paragraph 19, and of 13 July 2006, GAT, C‑4/03, EU:C:2006:457, paragraph 14).
32


The Court has, lastly, held that provisions which confer exclusive jurisdiction, such as Article 16 of the Brussels Convention and Article 22 of Regulation No 44/2001, must not be given a wider interpretation than is required by their objective, since they deprive the parties of the choice of forum which would otherwise be theirs and may, in certain cases, result in a situation whereby the parties are brought before a court which is not that of any of them (judgments of 10 January 1990, Reichert and Kockler, C‑115/88, EU:C:1990:3, paragraph 9, and of 12 May 2011, BVG, C‑144/10, EU:C:2011:300, paragraph 30).
33


The objective of Article 22(4) of Regulation No 44/2001 is to ensure that jurisdiction for proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of intellectual property rights rests with courts closely linked in fact and law to the register, since those courts are best placed to adjudicate on cases where the validity of the right, or even the existence of the deposit or registration, is in dispute (see, to that effect, as regards Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention, judgment of 13 July 2006, GAT, C‑4/03, EU:C:2006:457, paragraphs 21 and 22).
34


Accordingly, the Court has held, in cases concerning jurisdiction in the field of patents, that, where the dispute concerns neither the validity of a patent nor the existence of its deposit or registration, the dispute is not covered by the concept of proceedings ‘concerned with the registration or validity of patents’ and therefore falls outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in which the right was registered (judgments of 15 November 1983, Duijnstee, 288/82, EU:C:1983:326, paragraphs 22 to 25, and of 13 July 2006, GAT, C‑4/03, EU:C:2006:457, paragraphs 15 and 16).
35


Proceedings concerning exclusively the question of who is entitled to a patent do not therefore fall within the scope of such exclusive jurisdiction (judgment of 15 November 1983, Duijnstee, 288/82, EU:C:1983:326, paragraph 26).
Tigers GmbH v Hauptzollamt Landshut.
Date: 2017-10-12
21


According to settled case-law, for the purpose of interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 16 November 2016, Hemming and Others, C‑316/15, EU:C:2016:879, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
29


That said, in that respect, Article 78 of that code establishes a procedure enabling customs authorities, on their own initiative or at the request of the declarant, to amend the customs declaration after release of the goods covered by that declaration, that is to say, after that declaration has been made.
30


To that effect, those authorities may, pursuant to Article 78(1) and (2), first, amend the customs declaration, namely re-examine it, and, second, inspect relevant documents and data in order to ensure the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration. If that re-examination or those inspections show that the provisions governing the customs procedure in question have been applied on the basis of incorrect or incomplete information, the customs authorities must, in accordance with Article 78(3), take the measures necessary to regularise the situation, taking account of the new information available to them.
31


It thus follows from Article 78 of the Customs Code as a whole that it is permissible to present new material which may be taken into consideration by the customs authorities after the customs declaration has been made. The specific logic of that article is to bring the customs procedure into line with the actual situation (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 December 2015, Veloserviss, C‑427/14, EU:C:2015:803, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
Proceedings brought by Aleksandra Kubicka.
Date: 2017-10-12
30


The German and Hungarian Governments question the admissibility of the question referred on the ground that it is hypothetical.
31


According to settled case-law, the procedure set out in Article 267 TFEU is an instrument of cooperation between the Court and the national courts, which gives the latter the responsibility to determine, in view of the special features of each case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to give their judgment and the relevance of the questions which they put to the Court (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 April 2014, Weber, C‑438/12, EU:C:2014:212, paragraph 34, and of 2 March 2017, Pérez Retamero, C‑97/16, EU:C:2017:158, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
32


Therefore, the Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to enable it to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, judgments of 3 April 2014, Weber, C‑438/12, EU:C:2014:212, paragraph 35, and of 2 March 2017, Pérez Retamero, C‑97/16, EU:C:2017:158, paragraphs 21 and 22 and the case-law cited).
57


In this context, to accept that Article 1(2)(l) of Regulation No 650/2012 allows the acquisition of ownership of an asset by legacy ‘by vindication’ to be excluded from the scope of that regulation would lead to the fragmentation of the succession, which is incompatible with the wording of Article 23 of the same regulation and with its objective.
59


Furthermore, it should be added that Regulation No 650/2012 provides for the creation of a certificate which must allow every heir, legatee or entitled person mentioned in the certificate to prove in another Member State his status and rights and, in particular, to demonstrate the attribution of a specific asset to the legatee mentioned in that certificate.
60


According to Article 69(1) of that regulation, the certificate is to produce effects in all Member States, without any special procedure being required. Article 69(2) provides that the person mentioned in the Certificate as the legatee is to be presumed to have the status mentioned in the Certificate with no conditions and/or restrictions being attached to those rights other than those stated in the Certificate.
Shields & Sons Partnership v The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs.
Date: 2017-10-12
33


It should be recalled that the flat-rate scheme is a scheme which derogates from and is an exception to the general scheme of the VAT Directive and which must therefore be applied only to the extent necessary to achieve its objective (judgments of 15 July 2004, Harbs, C‑321/02, EU:C:2004:447, paragraph 27; of 8 March 2012, Commission v Portugal, C‑524/10, EU:C:2012:129, paragraph 49; and of 12 October 2016, Nigl and Others, C‑340/15, EU:C:2016:764, paragraph 37).
34


Among the two objectives of the flat-rate scheme is that relating to the need for administrative simplification for the farmers concerned, which must be reconciled with the objective of offsetting the input VAT borne by those farmers when acquiring goods used for the purposes of their activities (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 March 2012, Commission v Portugal, C‑524/10, EU:C:2012:129, paragraph 50, and of 12 October 2016, Nigl and Others, C‑340/15, EU:C:2016:764, paragraph 38).
41


Indeed, the Court has already held that, as a matter of principle, the flat-rate scheme cannot ensure the complete neutrality of VAT, since the flat-rate scheme is intended precisely to reconcile that objective with the objective of simplification of the rules to which flat-rate farmers are subject (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 March 2012, Commission v Portugal, C‑524/10, EU:C:2012:129, paragraph 53).