larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Emiliano Torralbo Marcos v Korota SA and Fondo de Garantía Salarial.
Date: 2014-03-27
27. According to the established case‑law of the Court, in the context of a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the Court may interpret Union law only within the limits of the powers conferred upon it (see Case C‑400/10 PPU McB  EU:C:2010:582, paragraph 51, and orders in Case C‑14/13 Cholakova  EU:C:2013:374, paragraph 21, and Case C‑371/13 Schuster & Co Ecologic  EU:C:2013:748, paragraph 14).
28. In this regard, it should be recalled that the Charter’s scope so far as concerns action of the Member States is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, according to which the provisions of the Charter are addressed to Member States only when they are implementing European Union law (Case C‑617/10 Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 17).
29. Article 51(1) of the Charter confirms the Court’s settled case-law, which states that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by European Union law, but not outside such situations (see Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 19, and the order in Case C‑258/13 Sociedade Agrícola e Imobiliária da Quinta de S. Paio, EU:C:2013:810, paragraph 19).
30. Where a legal situation does not fall within the scope of Union law, the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on it and any Charter provisions relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction (see, to that effect, Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 22; and the orders in Sociedade Agrícola e Imobiliária da Quinta de S. Paio EU:C:2013:810, paragraph 20; Joined Cases C‑614/12 and C‑10/13 Dutka and Sajtos  EU:C:2014:30, paragraph 15; and Case C‑332/13 Weigl EU:C:2014:31, paragraph 14).
32. In the context of the present request for a preliminary ruling, the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings governs, in general, certain fees connected with the administration of justice. It is not intended to implement provisions of European Union law. In addition, European Union law does not contain any specific rules in that area or any which are likely to affect that national legislation.
40. The fact that, by the steps he has taken, Mr Torralbo Marcos is seeking, according to the statements of the referring court, to obtain such a declaration of insolvency in order to benefit from the Fogasa’s intervention in accordance with Article 3 of Directive 2008/94 is not sufficient to allow the view to be taken that the situation at issue in the main proceedings, at their present stage, falls within the scope of the directive and, consequently, of European Union law.
Ulrike Elfriede Grauel Rüffer v Katerina Pokorná.
Date: 2014-03-27
19. In order to answer that question, it must be recalled, first of all, that, as regards the same provisions, the Court, in Bickel and Franz  (C‑274/96 EU:C:1998:563, paragraphs 19 and 31), held that the right conferred by national rules to have criminal proceedings conducted in a language other than the principal language of the State concerned falls within the scope of European Union law, which precludes national rules which confer on citizens whose language is that particular language and who are resident in a defined area, the right to require that criminal proceedings be conducted in that language, without conferring the same right on nationals of other Member States travelling or staying in that area, whose language is the same.
22. As regards the observation of the Italian Government, according to which there is no reason to extend the right to use the ethnic and cultural minority language concerned to a citizen of a Member State other than the Italian Republic who is present on an infrequent and temporary basis in that region, since the measures are available to him which guarantee that he will able to exercise his rights of defence in an appropriate manner, even where he is without any knowledge of the official language of the host State, it must be observed that the same argument was put forward by the Italian Government in the case which gave rise to the judgment in Bickel and Franz  (EU:C:1998:563, paragraph 21) and that the Court dismissed it in paragraphs 24 to 26 thereof, holding that the rules at issue in the main proceedings ran counter to the principle of non-discrimination.
23. Such legislation could be justified only if it were based on objective considerations independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national provisions ( Bickel and Franz  EU:C:1998:563, paragraph 27).
25. In the second place, as regards the observation made by that government relating to the extra costs which would be incurred by the Member State concerned, the application of those language rules to citizens of the European Union, it is settled case-law that aims of a purely economic nature cannot constitute pressing reasons of public interest justifying a restriction of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty (see Case C‑109/04, Krannemann , EU:2005:187, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
CTP — Compagnia Trasporti Pubblici SpA v Regione Campania and Provincia di Napoli.
Date: 2014-04-03
20. First, nothing in the documents before the Court suggests that the Italian Republic has made use of the option, provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 1(1) of Regulation No 1191/69, of excluding from the scope of that regulation any undertakings whose activities are confined exclusively to the operation of urban, suburban or regional services. Consequently, the provisions of that regulation are fully applicable to the cases in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling must be examined in the light of those provisions (see, by analogy, Case C‑504/07 Antrop and Others  EU:C:2009:290, paragraph 17).
21. Second, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the referring court alone can determine the subject-matter of the questions it proposes to refer to the Court. It is solely for the national courts before which actions are brought, and which must bear the responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the special features of each case both the need of a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which they submit to the Court (Case C‑154/05 Kersbergen-Lap and Dams-Schipper  EU:C:2006:449, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
Hauptzollamt Köln v Kronos Titan GmbH and Hauptzollamt Krefeld v Rhein-Ruhr Beschichtungs-Service GmbH.
Date: 2014-04-03
25. As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, in determining the scope of a provision of EU law, its wording, context and objectives must all be taken into account (Case C‑306/12 Spedition Welter , EU:C:2013:650, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
28. So far as concerns the context of the provision at issue in the main proceedings, the scheme of Directive 2003/96 is founded on a clear distinction between motor fuels and heating fuels. That distinction, introduced in recitals 17 and 18 in the preamble to that directive, is applied, inter alia, by Articles 7 to 9 of the directive, relating to the detailed rules for setting the minimum levels of taxation applicable, on the one hand, to heating fuels and, on the other, to motor fuels and to products used as motor fuels for specific industrial and commercial purposes.
31. As regards the objectives pursued by the regime of which the provision at issue in the main proceedings forms part, it is apparent from recitals 3 to 5 in the preamble to Directive 2003/96 that the EU legislature sought, by means of the distinction drawn between motor fuels and heating fuels and by prescribing a certain number of minimum levels of taxation, to ensure that the internal market functions properly.
33. What is more, construing Article 2(3) of Directive 2003/96 as meaning that the criterion of use as motor fuel or heating fuel is decisive serves to preclude possible distortions of competition between products used for the same purposes.
Sintax Trading OÜ v Maksu- ja Tolliamet.
Date: 2014-04-09
41. Furthermore, although it is true that the holder of the intellectual property right has an essential role so that the measures necessary in order to prevent the placing on the market of counterfeit and pirated goods are taken in its own interest (see, to that effect, Case C‑223/98 Adidas  EU:C:1999:500, paragraph 26), such a finding cannot prevent the customs authorities from taking any action, for the purposes of Regulation No 1383/2003, without the initiative of the right-holder.
47. By thus limiting itself to referring to the application of the law in force in the Member State concerned in order to determine whether there has been an infringement of an intellectual property right, the EU legislature has not, in principle, ruled out the possibility that an authority other than a judicial authority may be designated as the authority competent to give a decision on the merits of a case. Furthermore, the Court has already held that such powers may be entrusted to an authority other than a judicial authority (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑446/09 and C‑495/09 Philips EU:C:2011:796, paragraph 69).
48. It must be observed, in that regard, that it is clear from the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, which, according to the settled case-law of the Court, forms an integral part of the European Union legal order (see, to that effect, Case C‑180/11 Bericap  EU:C:2012:717, paragraph 67), and in particular the provisions of Article 49 thereof, that the enforcement of intellectual property rights may be ensured in the context of administrative procedures on the merits of the case provided that they conform with the guarantees laid down in particular by Article 41 of that agreement.
50. Although it is for the national legal order of each Member State to lay down the rules for the exercise of such powers, pursuant to the principle of procedural autonomy, that is so provided that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar national actions and that they do not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law, in particular by Regulation No 1383/2003 to the holders of intellectual property rights and to declarants, holders or owners of the goods concerned (see, to that effect, Case C‑429/12 Pohl  EU:C:2014:12, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
Ville d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve and Others v Région wallonne.
Date: 2014-04-09
23. However, in the absence of any indication in the order for reference that the court hearing the dispute, in order to assess the legality of the contested decision, must place itself at the date on which it rules, it must be held that Directive 2001/42 is not applicable to the main proceedings, inasmuch as both the permit issued on 18 December 2003 and the Ministerial Order of 10 May 2004 confirming it were adopted before the time-limit for transposing that directive expired (see, by analogy, Joined Cases C‑53/02 and C‑217/02 Commune de Braine-le-Château and Others  EU:C:2004:205, paragraph 45).
29. It follows that a national legislative provision such as that at issue in the main proceedings, insofar as its scope consists solely of providing that, by derogation from the common law, it is possible to renew permits for operating landfills already authorised at the date of entry into force of the waste management plan in the Member State concerned for the same plots of land, even if that land is not included in the plan, cannot, of itself, be regarded as an organised and coherent system for achieving the objectives inherent in a ‘waste management plan’, within the meaning of Article 7(1) of Directive 75/442 (see, to that effect, Case C‑387/97 Commission  v Greece  EU:C:2000:356, paragraph 76).
30. Nevertheless, it is clear from the settled case-law of the Court that the fact that the referring court’s question refers to certain provisions of EU law does not mean that the Court may not provide the national court with all the guidance on points of interpretation which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to those points in its question. It is, in this regard, for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the referring court, in particular from the grounds of the decision to make the reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject-matter of the dispute (see, inter alia, Case C‑418/11 Texdata Software  EU:C:2013:588, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
33. However, Article 14 of Directive 1999/31 makes ‘landfills which have been granted a permit, or which are already in operation at the time of [its] transposition …’, which must be effected by 16 July 2001 at the latest, subject to a transitional derogating system.
34. It follows from that transitional system that, in order to be able to continue to operate, those landfills must, within eight years after 16 July 2001, be brought into line with the new environmental requirements set out in Article 8 of Directive 1999/31, with the exception of those listed in Annex I, point 1, thereto. That exception concerns precisely the requirements as to the siting of the landfill.
Maatschap T. van Oosterom en A. van Oosterom-Boelhouwer v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie.
Date: 2014-04-10
31. It is settled case-law that questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is wholly unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose; where the problem is hypothetical; or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see Case C‑152/11 Odar  EU:C:2012:772, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
32. That presumption of relevance cannot be rebutted by the simple fact that one of the parties to the main proceedings contests certain facts, the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine and on which the delimitation of the subject-matter of those proceedings depends (Case C‑379/05 Amurta  EU:C:2007:655, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).
Ehrmann AG v Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV.
Date: 2014-04-10
40. Moreover, as Article 1 of Regulation No 1924/2006 states, the regulation aims to ensure the effective functioning of the internal market whilst providing a high level of consumer protection. In that regard, recitals 1 and 9 in the preamble to that regulation explain that it is necessary in particular to give the consumer the necessary information to make choices in full knowledge of the facts.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2014-04-30
30. As regards, first, the plea of inadmissibility mentioned in the preceding paragraph of this judgment, it must be recalled that, under Article 120(c) of the Rules of Procedure and the case-law relating thereto, an application initiating proceedings must state the subject-matter of the dispute and a summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based. That statement must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare his defence and the Court to rule on the application. It is therefore necessary for the essential points of law and of fact on which a case is based to be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself and for the heads of claim to be set out unambiguously so that the Court does not rule ultra petita  or fail to rule on a claim (Case C‑360/11 Commission  v Spain EU:C:2013:17, paragraph 26, and Case C‑545/10 Commission  v Czech Republic  EU:C:2013:509, paragraph 108).
Birgit Wagener v Bundesagentur für Arbeit — Familienkasse Villingen-Schwenningen.
Date: 2014-04-30
34. In order to identify the paragraph of Article 107 of Regulation No 574/72 that applies in the case before the referring court, it must be noted that Article 107(1) of that regulation sets out the detailed rules for currency conversion solely for the purposes of the provisions expressly referred to therein (see, to that effect, Case C‑201/91 Grisvard and Kreitz  EU:C:1992:368, paragraphs 23 and 25).
38. Since the wording of Article 107 of Regulation No 574/72 is unequivocal as to the relationship between paragraphs 1 and 6 thereof, the arguments based on the greater convenience of the method referred to in Article 107(1) of that regulation cannot prevail against such a wording (see, to that effect, Grisvard and Kreitz , paragraphs 23 and 25).
45. Since the wording of Article 107(6) of Regulation No 574/72 unconditionally links the conversion of benefits to the official rate of exchange on the day of ‘payment’, it must be read as referring to the conversion of benefits which are paid by the State of employment, as that payment is made in all circumstances, whereas the benefits provided for by the State of residence are paid only in specific circumstances, and is therefore conditional and uncertain.
46. Moreover, such an interpretation guarantees the effectiveness of the rules against overlapping benefits — such as the rule laid down in Article 10(1)(a) of Regulation No 574/72 — which seek to ensure that the person entitled to benefits paid by several Member States receives a total amount of benefits which is equal to the amount of the most favourable benefit to which he is entitled under the legislation of a single Member State (see, to that effect, Case 98/80 Romano  EU:C:1981:104, paragraph 24).
47. It must be noted that, in a case such as that before the referring court, the person entitled to family allowances paid by the State of employment lives in the Member State which grants the differential supplement to family allowances, with the result that the allowances paid by the State of employment are transferred to the State of residence. It is not until that benefit has been paid by the State of employment and the amount converted into the currency of the State of residence that the person concerned may be entitled to that supplement in the latter State where the amount converted is lower than the amount due by way of the same benefit under the legislation of the State of residence.
Ordre des architectes v État belge.
Date: 2014-04-30
19. Directive 2005/36 provides for the mutual recognition of professional qualifications as regards access to a certain number of regulated professions. Under Articles 1 and 4(1) of that directive, the fundamental purpose of mutual recognition is to allow the holder of a professional qualification giving access to a regulated profession in the holder’s home Member State to gain access, in the host Member State, to the same profession as that for which he is qualified in the home Member State, and to practise that profession in the host Member State under the same conditions as its own nationals.
20. So far as concerns the profession of architect, amongst others, Directive 2005/36 provides — as is apparent from recital 19 in the preamble thereto — for a system of automatic recognition of the evidence of formal qualifications based on coordinated minimum conditions for training.
21. Under the case-law relating to Directive 85/384, which was repealed by Directive 2005/36, such a system of mutual recognition of the evidence of formal qualifications precludes the host Member State from imposing additional requirements for the recognition of professional qualifications which satisfy the conditions for qualification laid down by the EU rules (see, to that effect, Case C‑43/06 Commission v Portugal  EU:C:2007:300, paragraphs 27 and 28, and Case C‑111/12 Ordine degli Ingegneri di Verona e Provincia and Others EU:C:2013:100, paragraphs 43 and 44).
European Commission v European Parliament and Council of the European Union.
Date: 2014-05-06
29. According to settled case-law of the Court, the choice of legal basis for a European Union measure must rest on objective factors that are amenable to judicial review; these include the aim and content of that measure (see, to that effect, Case C‑411/06 Commission  v Parliament and Council  EU:C:2009:518, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited, and Case C‑130/10 Parliament  v Council  EU:C:2012:472, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
30. If examination of the measure concerned reveals that it pursues a twofold purpose or that it has a twofold component and if one of those is identifiable as the main or predominant purpose or component, whereas the other is merely incidental, that measure must be based on a single legal basis, namely that required by the main or predominant purpose or component (Case C‑137/12 Commission  v Council  EU:C:2013:675, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).
43. The Court has already held that measures seeking to improve road safety form part of transport policy and may therefore be adopted on the basis of Article 91(1)(c) TFEU in so far as they are ‘measures to improve transport safety’ within the meaning of that provision (see Joined Cases C‑184/02 and C‑223/02 Spain and Finland  v Parliament and Council  EU:C:2004:497, paragraph 30).
Idrodinamica Spurgo Velox srl and Others v Acquedotto Pugliese SpA.
Date: 2014-05-08
29. It should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling from a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (Case C‑279/12 Fish Legal and Shirley EU:C:2013:853, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
37.  In accordance with the case-law of the Court, effective procedures for review of infringements of the provisions applicable in the field of public procurement can be realised only if the periods laid down for bringing such proceedings start to run only from the date on which the claimant knew, or ought to have known, of the alleged infringement of those provisions (see, to that effect, Uniplex (UK)  EU:C:2010:45, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
39. In that regard, it must be held that the decision authorising the change in composition of the consortium to which the contract had been awarded necessitates an amendment of the award decision which may be regarded as substantial if, in the light of the particular features of the tender award procedure in question, it alters one of the essential elements that were decisive in the adoption of the award decision. In that situation, all relevant measures provided for by national law would have to be taken to remedy that irregularity, which might extend to a new award procedure (see, by analogy, Case C‑91/08 Wall  EU:C:2010:182, paragraphs 38, 39, 42 and 43).