Jean-Michel Adrien and Others v Premier ministre and Others.
Date: 2016-10-06
22


As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that, although Member States retain the power to organise their social security schemes, they must nonetheless, when exercising that power, observe EU law and, in particular, the provisions of the FEU Treaty on freedom of movement for workers and the right of establishment (see judgments of 1 April 2008, Government of the French Community and Walloon Government, C‑212/06, EU:C:2008:178, paragraph 43, and of 21 January 2016, Commission v Cyprus, C‑515/14, EU:C:2016:30, paragraph 38).
24


Firstly, with regard to the applicability of the provisions of the FEU Treaty on the freedom of movement for workers, it follows from settled case-law that any EU national working in a Member State other than his Member State of origin and who has accepted a post in an international organisation also comes within the scope of Article 45 TFEU (see judgments of 15 March 1989, Echternach and Moritz, 389/87 and 390/87, EU:C:1989:130, paragraph 11; of 16 February 2006, Rockler, C‑137/04, EU:C:2006:106, paragraph 15, and of 4 July 2013, Gardella, C‑233/12, EU:C:2013:449, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
25


It follows that EU nationals working for an EU institution or body in a Member State other than their Member State of origin, such as the appellants in the main proceedings, may not be refused the rights and social advantages which Article 45 TFEU affords them (see judgments of 15 March 1989, Echternach and Moritz, 389/87 and 390/87, EU:C:1989:130, paragraph 12, and of 16 February 2006, Rockler, C‑137/04, EU:C:2006:106, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).
26


Secondly, as regards whether national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings constitutes an obstacle to the freedom of movement for workers within the EU, it must be borne in mind that Article 45 TFEU precludes any measure which, albeit applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality, is liable to hinder or render less attractive the exercise by EU nationals of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the FEU Treaty (judgments of 1 April 2008, Government of the French Community and Walloon Government, C‑212/06, EU:C:2008:178, paragraph 45; of 10 March 2011, Casteels, C‑379/09, EU:C:2011:131, paragraph 22; and of 5 February 2015, Commission v Belgium, C‑317/14, EU:C:2015:63, paragraph 23)
27


Indeed, while EU primary law can offer no guarantee to an insured person that moving to another Member State will be neutral in terms of social security, in particular where sickness and old-age pensions are concerned, since, given the disparities between the Member States’ social security schemes and legislation, such a move may be to the advantage of the person concerned in terms of social security, or not, depending on the circumstances, it is settled case-law that, where its application is less favourable, national legislation is consistent with EU law only to the extent that, in particular, such legislation does not place the worker at a disadvantage compared with those who pursue all their activities in the Member State where it applies and does not purely and simply result in the payment of social security contributions on which there is no return (judgments of 18 April 2013, Mulders, C‑548/11, EU:C:2013:249, paragraph 45, and of 21 January 2016, Commission v Cyprus, C‑515/14, EU:C:2016:30, paragraph 40).
28


Thus, the Court has repeatedly classified measures which have the effect of causing workers, as a consequence of the exercise of their right to freedom of movement, to lose the social security advantages afforded them by the legislation of one Member State as obstacles, especially where those advantages represent the counterpart of contributions which they have paid (see judgments of 21 October 1975, Petroni, EU:C:1975:129, paragraph 13; of 1 April 2008, Government of the French Community and Walloon Government, C‑212/06, EU:C:2008:178, paragraph 46; and of 18 April 2013, Mulders, C‑548/11, EU:C:2013:249, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
37


Accordingly, it is not necessary to rule on the interpretation of Article 48 TFEU or of Article 4(3) TEU.