Krupp Hoesch Stahl AG v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2003-10-02
19.  First of all, it should be pointed out that, as is clear from Article 32d(1) CS and Article 51 of the ECSC Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal lies on a point of law only. Therefore, the Court of First Instance has sole jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence, except where those facts and that evidence have been distorted (see, to that effect, Case C-136/92 P   Commission   v   Brazzelli Lualdi and Others   [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraphs 49 and 66; Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P, C-251/99 P, C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P   Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others   v   Commission   [2002] ECR I-8375, paragraph 194; and Case C-312/00 P   Commission   v   Camar and Tico   [2002] ECR I-11355, paragraph 69).
55.  Moreover, it should be borne in mind that, although as a general rule the Community judicature undertakes a comprehensive review of the question whether or not the conditions for applying the competition provisions of the EC and ECSC Treaties are met, its review of complex economic appraisals made by the Commission is necessarily limited to verifying whether the relevant rules on procedure and on the statement of reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of appraisal or misuse of powers (see, to that effect, with respect to Article 85 of the EC Treaty (now Article 81 EC), Case 42/84   Remia and Others   v   Commission   [1985] ECR 2545, paragraph 34, and Joined Cases 142/84 and 156/84   BAT and Reynolds   v   Commission   [1987] ECR 4487, paragraph 62).
58.  According to the case-law relating to the tractor market, referred to in paragraph 47 of this judgment, in which the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice examined for the first time an agreement on the exchange of information in the context of the EC Treaty, and the general findings of which can be applied to the ECSC Treaty, such an agreement is incompatible with the rules on competition if it reduces or removes the degree of uncertainty as to the operation of the market in question with the result that competition between undertakings is restricted (see, in particular, Case C-7/95 P   John Deere  , cited above, paragraph 90).
59.  The criteria of coordination and cooperation necessary for determining the existence of a concerted practice, far from requiring an actual   "plan"   to have been worked out, are to be understood in the light of the concept inherent in the provisions of the EC and ECSC Treaties on competition, according to which each trader must determine independently the policy which he intends to adopt on the common market and the conditions which he intends to offer to his customers (see Case C-7/95 P   John Deere  , paragraph 86 and the case-law cited therein).
60.  While it is true that this requirement of independence does not deprive traders of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing or anticipated conduct of their competitors, it does, however, strictly preclude any direct or indirect contact between such traders, the object or effect of which is to create conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market in question, regard being had to the nature of the products or services offered, the size and number of the undertakings and the volume of the said market (Case C-7/95 P   John Deere  , paragraph 87 and the case-law cited therein).
110.  It is settled case-law that the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an individual decision is based is to enable the Court to review the legality of the decision and to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the decision is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested (Case 32/86   Sisma   v   Commission   [1987] ECR 1645, paragraph 8).
114.  With regard to statements of figures relating to the calculation of fines, it is appropriate to point out that, however useful and desirable such figures may be, they are not essential to compliance with the duty to state reasons for a decision imposing fines; in any event, the Commission cannot, by mechanical recourse to arithmetical formulas alone, divest itself of its own power of assessment (Case C-291/98 P   Sarrió   v   Commission   [2000] ECR I-9991, paragraphs 75 to 77, and   Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij  , cited above, paragraph 464).
121.  The general principle of Community law that everyone is entitled to a fair hearing, and in particular the right to legal process within a reasonable period, is applicable in the context of proceedings brought against a Commission decision imposing fines on an undertaking for infringement of competition law (Baustahlgewebe  , paragraph 21, and   Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij  , paragraph 179).
122.  The reasonableness of a period is to be appraised in the light of the circumstances specific to each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the applicant and of the competent authorities (Baustahlgewebe  , paragraph 29, and   Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij  , paragraph 187).
123.  The Court has held in that regard that the list of criteria is not exhaustive and that the assessment of the reasonableness of a period does not require a systematic examination of the circumstances of the case in the light of each of them, where the duration of the proceedings appears justified in the light of one of them. The purpose of those criteria is to determine whether the time taken in the handling of a case is justified. Thus, the complexity of the case or the dilatory conduct of the applicant may be deemed to justify a duration which is prima facie too long. Conversely, the time taken may be regarded as longer than is reasonable in the light of just one criterion, in particular where its duration is the result of the conduct of the competent authorities. Where appropriate, the duration of a procedural stage may be regarded as reasonable from the outset if it appears to be consistent with the average time taken in handling a case of its type (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij  , paragraph 188).