Gazdasági Versenyhivatal v Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Österreich.
Date: 2016-07-28
28


In that connection, it should be recalled that in so far as Regulation No 44/2001 replaces the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, as amended by the successive conventions relating to the accession of new Member States to that convention (‘the Brussels Convention’, the interpretation provided by the Court in respect of the provisions of the Brussels Convention is valid also for those of the regulation whenever the provisions of those instruments may be regarded as equivalent (judgment of 14 November 2013 in Maletic, C‑478/12, EU:C:2013:735, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
30


In order to ensure, as far as possible, that the rights and obligations which derive from Regulation No 44/2001 for the Member States and the persons to whom it applies are equal and uniform, ‘civil and commercial matters’ should not be interpreted as a mere reference to the internal law of one or other of the States concerned. That concept must be regarded as an independent concept to be interpreted by referring, first, to the objectives and scheme of that regulation and, second, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems (judgment of 23 October 2014 in flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines, C‑302/13, EU:C:2014:2319, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
31


In order to determine whether a matter falls within the scope of that regulation, the elements which characterise the nature of the legal relationships between the parties to the dispute or the subject matter thereof must be examined (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 April 2013 in Sapir and Others, C‑645/11, EU:C:2013:228, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited, and 12 September 2013 in Sunico and Others, C‑49/12, EU:C:2013:545, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
32


The Court has thus held that, although certain actions between a public authority and a person governed by private law may come within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001, it is otherwise where the public authority is acting in the exercise of its public powers (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 April 2013 in Sapir and Others, C‑645/11, EU:C:2013:228, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited, and 12 September 2013 in Sunico and Others, C‑49/12, EU:C:2013:545, paragraph 34).
33


In order to determine whether that is the case in a dispute such as that in the main proceedings, it is necessary to identify the legal relationship between the parties to the dispute and to examine the basis of, and the detailed rules applicable to, the action brought (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 May 2003 in Préservatrice foncière TIARD, C‑266/01, EU:C:2003:282, paragraph 23; 11 April 2013 in Sapir and Others, C‑645/11, EU:C:2013:228, paragraph 34; and 12 September 2013 in Sunico and Others, C‑49/12, EU:C:2013:545, paragraph 35).
34


In that connection, it must be observed that, while private actions brought to ensure compliance with competition law fall within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001 (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 October 2014 in flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines, C‑302/13, EU:C:2014:2319, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited, and 21 May 2015 in CDC Hydrogen Peroxide, C‑352/13, EU:C:2015:335, paragraph 56), as the Advocate General pointed out in point 34 of his Opinion, it is equally evident that a penalty imposed by an administrative authority in the exercise of the regulatory powers conferred upon it under national legislation comes within the concept of ‘administrative matters’, excluded from the scope of Regulation No 44/2001 in accordance with Article 1(1) thereof. That applies, in particular, to a penalty imposed by reason of an infringement of provisions of national law prohibiting restrictions on competition.
40


On those grounds, the Court held that, whatever the nature of the proceedings afforded by national law, the fact that in recovering those costs the applicant acts pursuant to a debt which arises from an act of public authority is sufficient for its action to be treated as being outside the ambit of the Brussels Convention (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 1980 in Rüffer, 814/79, EU:C:1980:291, paragraph 15).