SL v Vueling Airlines SA.
Date: 2020-07-09
20


According to the Court’s settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case in the main proceedings, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, of which the Montreal Convention forms an integral part (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 May 2010, Walz, C‑63/09, EU:C:2010:251, paragraphs 19 and 20, and of 12 April 2018, Finnair, C‑258/16, EU:C:2018:252, paragraphs 19 and 20), the Court is in principle required to give a ruling (see, inter alia, judgments of 19 November 2019, A.K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18, EU:C:2019:982, paragraph 97, and of 19 December 2019, Junqueras Vies, C‑502/19, EU:C:2019:1115, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
21


It follows that questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 March 2018, flightright and Others, C‑274/16, C‑447/16 and C‑448/16, EU:C:2018:160, paragraph 46, and of 24 October 2018, XC and Others, C‑234/17, EU:C:2018:853, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).
22


However, those circumstances in no way prevent a national court from referring a question for a preliminary ruling to this Court, the answer to which, in the submission of one of the parties in the main proceedings, leaves no scope for any reasonable doubt. Thus, even if that were the case, that question does not thereby become inadmissible (judgment of 1 December 2011, Painer, C‑145/10, EU:C:2011:798, paragraphs 64 and 65).
26


To that end, it should be noted at the outset that, in accordance with Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2027/97, the liability of European Union air carriers in respect of passengers and their baggage is to be governed by all provisions of the Montreal Convention relevant to such liability (judgments of 6 May 2010, Walz, C‑63/09, EU:C:2010:251, paragraph 18, and of 19 December 2019, Niki Luftfahrt, C‑532/18, EU:C:2019:1127, paragraph 29).
27


Similarly, it is settled case-law that the provisions of an international treaty, such as the Montreal Convention, must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose, in keeping with general international law, which is binding on the European Union, as codified by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, p. 331) (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 May 2010, Walz, C‑63/09, EU:C:2010:251, paragraph 23; of 22 November 2012, Espada Sánchez and Others, C‑410/11, EU:C:2012:747, paragraphs 20 to 22; and of 19 December 2019, Niki Luftfahrt, C‑532/18, EU:C:2019:1127, paragraph 31).
29


Pursuant to Article 17(2) of the Montreal Convention, the air carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of destruction or loss of, or of damage to, checked baggage ‘upon condition only that the event which caused the destruction, loss or damage took place on board the aircraft or during any period within which the checked baggage was in the charge of the carrier’ (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 May 2010, Walz, C‑63/09, EU:C:2010:251, paragraph 32, and of 22 November 2012, Espada Sánchez and Others, C‑410/11, EU:C:2012:747, paragraphs 25 and 26). Consequently, that provision merely establishes the conditions under which air passengers are granted the right to compensation in the event of the destruction, loss or damage of checked baggage.
30


As regards Article 22(2) of the Montreal Convention, the Court has held not only that, in the carriage of baggage, the liability of an air carrier in the case of destruction, loss, damage or delay ‘is limited’, from 30 December 2009 until 28 December 2019, to the sum of 1131 SDRs per passenger, but also that the limit laid down in that provision constitutes a maximum limit for compensation which cannot accrue automatically and in full to any passenger, even in the event of loss of his or her baggage (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 November 2012, Espada Sánchez and Others, C‑410/11, EU:C:2012:747, paragraph 34).
31


The Court has also held that the limitation of compensation laid down in Article 22(2) of the Montreal Convention must be applied to the total damage caused, regardless of whether that damage is material or non-material. In that regard, it has stated that the possibility for the passenger to make a special declaration of interest at the time when the checked baggage is handed over to the carrier, under the second part of that provision, confirms that the limit of an air carrier’s liability for the damage resulting from the loss of baggage is, in the absence of any special declaration of interest in delivery, an absolute limit which includes both non‑material and material damage (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 May 2010, Walz, C‑63/09, EU:C:2010:251, paragraphs 37 and 38).
37


It should be recalled that the Court has held that, for the purposes of the compensation provided for under Article 22(2) of the Montreal Convention, it is for the passengers concerned, subject to review by the national court, to establish to the requisite legal standard the contents of the lost baggage (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 November 2012, Espada Sánchez and Others, C‑410/11, EU:C:2012:747, paragraph 35).
39


It is settled case-law that, in the absence of EU rules in the field, it is for the national legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law. Those rules must not, however, be any less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not be framed in such a way as to render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the legal order of the European Union (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 16 December 1976, Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral, 33/76, EU:C:1976:188, paragraph 5; of 13 March 2007, Unibet, C‑432/05, EU:C:2007:163, paragraphs 38, 39 and 43; and of 11 September 2019, Călin, C‑676/17, EU:C:2019:700, paragraph 30).
40


The observance of those two principles must be examined by reference to the role of the rules concerned in the procedure viewed as a whole, to the conduct of that procedure and to the special features of those rules before the various national courts (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2019, Călin, C‑676/17, EU:C:2019:700, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
43


As regards, in particular, the weight of the lost baggage, in so far as, in principle, only the carrier is in a position to provide such evidence, after checking that baggage, it should be borne in mind that, in order to ensure compliance with the principle of effectiveness, if the national court finds that the fact of requiring a party to bear the burden of proof is likely to make it impossible or excessively difficult for such evidence to be adduced, since inter alia that evidence relates to information which that party will not have, the national court is required to use all procedures available to it under national law, including that of ordering the necessary measures of inquiry, in particular the production by one of the parties or a third party of a particular document (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 September 2006, Laboratoires Boiron, C‑526/04, EU:C:2006:528, paragraph 55).