Openbaar Ministerie v Krzysztof Marek Poltorak.
Date: 2016-11-10
21


In the second place, according to the case-law of the Court, it is appropriate to take into account the fact that the person concerned in the main proceedings is currently deprived of his liberty and that the question as to whether he may continue to be held in custody depends on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings (judgment of 16 July 2015, Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 24). According to the explanations provided by the referring court, the detention measure against Mr Poltorak was ordered in the context of the execution of the European arrest warrant issued against him.
24


As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, as is apparent from Article 1(1) and (2) and recitals 5 and 7 thereof in particular, the purpose of the Framework Decision is to replace the multilateral system of extradition based on the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957 with a system of surrender between judicial authorities of convicted or suspected persons for the purpose of enforcing judgments or of conducting prosecutions, the system of surrender being based on the principle of mutual recognition (judgment of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).
25


The Framework Decision thus seeks, by the establishment of a new simplified and more effective system for the surrender of persons convicted or suspected of having infringed criminal law, to facilitate and accelerate judicial cooperation with a view to contributing to the attainment of the objective set for the European Union to become an area of freedom, security and justice, founded on the high level of confidence which should exist between the Member States (judgment of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).
26


Both the principle of mutual trust between the Member States and the principle of mutual recognition are, in EU law, of fundamental importance given that they allow an area without internal borders to be created and maintained. More specifically, the principle of mutual trust requires, particularly with regard to the area of freedom, security and justice, each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law (judgment of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
27


The principle of mutual recognition, which is the ‘cornerstone’ of judicial cooperation, means that, pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Framework Decision, Member States are in principle obliged to give effect to a European arrest warrant. The executing judicial authority may refuse to execute such a warrant only in the cases, exhaustively listed, of obligatory non-execution, laid down in Article 3 of the Framework Decision, or of optional non-execution, laid down in Articles 4 and 4a of the Framework Decision. Moreover, the execution of the European arrest warrant may be made subject only to one of the conditions exhaustively laid down in Article 5 of the Framework Decision (judgment of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraphs 79 and 80 and the case-law cited).
28


However, only European arrest warrants, within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision, must be executed in accordance with the provisions of that decision. It follows from Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision that the European arrest warrant constitutes a ‘judicial decision’, which requires that it be issued by a ‘judicial authority’, within the meaning of Article 6(1) thereof.
30


Although Article 6(1) of the Framework Decision does refer, in accordance with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States, to the law of those States, it must be held that that reference is limited to designating the judicial authority with the competence to issue the European arrest warrant. Accordingly, that reference does not concern the definition of the term ‘judicial authority’ in itself.
31


In those circumstances, the meaning and scope of the term ‘judicial authority’, within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Framework Decision, cannot be left to the assessment of each Member State (see, by analogy, judgments of 17 July 2008, Kozłowski, C‑66/08, EU:C:2008:437, paragraph 43, and of 16 November 2010, Mantello, C‑261/09, EU:C:2010:683, paragraph 38).
32


It follows that the term ‘judicial authority’, contained in Article 6(1) of the Framework Decision, requires, throughout the Union, an autonomous and uniform interpretation, which, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, must take into account the terms of that provision, its context and the objective of the Framework Decision (see, by analogy, judgment of 28 July 2016, JZ, C‑294/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:610, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
33


Thus, as regards the wording of Article 6(1) of the Framework Decision, it should be noted that the words ‘judicial authority’, contained in that provision, are not limited to designating only the judges or courts of a Member State, but may extend, more broadly, to the authorities required to participate in administering justice in the legal system concerned.
35


In the first place, it is generally accepted that the term ‘judiciary’ does not cover police services. That term refers to the judiciary, which must, as the Advocate General observed in point 39 of his Opinion, be distinguished, in accordance with the principle of the separation of powers which characterises the operation of the rule of law, from the executive. Thus, judicial authorities are traditionally construed as the authorities that administer justice, unlike, inter alia, administrative authorities or police authorities, which are within the province of the executive.
39


In that regard, the Court has held that the entire surrender procedure between Member States provided for by the Framework Decision is, in accordance with that decision, carried out under judicial supervision, ensuring that decisions relating to European arrest warrants are attended by all the guarantees appropriate for decisions of such a kind (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 May 2013, F., C‑168/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:358, paragraphs 39 and 46).
40


In particular, it is stated in recital 8 of the Framework Decision that decisions on the execution of the European arrest warrant must be subject to sufficient controls, which means that a judicial authority of the Member State where the requested person has been arrested has to take a decision on his surrender. Moreover, Article 6 of the Framework Decision provides that not only that decision but also the decision on issuing the warrant must be taken by a judicial authority. Action by a judicial authority is likewise required at other stages of the surrender procedure, such as hearing the requested person, deciding to keep him in detention, or deciding on his temporary transfer (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 May 2013, F., C‑168/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:358, paragraph 45).
55


It should be recalled in this connection that, according to settled case-law, the interpretation which, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 267 TFEU, the Court gives to a rule of EU law clarifies and defines the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be, or ought to have been, understood and applied from the time of its coming into force. It follows that the rule as thus interpreted may and must be applied by the courts to legal relationships arising and established before the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation, provided that in other respects the conditions for bringing before the courts having jurisdiction an action relating to the application of that rule are satisfied (judgment of 17 September 2014, Liivimaa Lihaveis, C‑562/12, EU:C:2014:2229, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).
56


It is only quite exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the EU legal order, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling into question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed: those concerned must have acted in good faith and there must be a risk of serious difficulties (judgments of 27 February 2014, Transportes Jordi Besora, C‑82/12, EU:C:2014:108, paragraph 41, and of 22 September 2016, Microsoft Mobile Sales International and Others, C‑110/15, EU:C:2016:717, paragraph 60).