larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Asma Bougnaoui and Association de défense des droits de l’homme (ADDH) v Micropole SA.
Date: 2017-03-14
29


In the same recital, the EU legislature also referred to the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of EU law. Among the rights resulting from those common traditions, which have been reaffirmed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), is the right to freedom of conscience and religion enshrined in Article 10(1) of the Charter. In accordance with that provision, that right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. As is apparent from the explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17), the right guaranteed in Article 10(1) of the Charter corresponds to the right guaranteed in Article 9 of the ECHR and, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, has the same meaning and scope.
30


In so far as the ECHR and, subsequently, the Charter use the term ‘religion’ in a broad sense, in that they include in it the freedom of persons to manifest their religion, the EU legislature must be considered to have intended to take the same approach when adopting Directive 2000/78, and therefore the concept of ‘religion’ in Article 1 of that directive should be interpreted as covering both the forum internum, that is the fact of having a belief, and the forum externum, that is the manifestation of religious faith in public.
37


That said, it should be borne in mind that the Court has repeatedly held that it is clear from Article 4(1) of Directive 2000/78 that it is not the ground on which the difference of treatment is based but a characteristic related to that ground which must constitute a genuine and determining occupational requirement (see judgments of 12 January 2010, Wolf, C‑229/08, EU:C:2010:3, paragraph 35; of 13 September 2011, Prigge and Others, C‑447/09, EU:C:2011:573, paragraph 66; of 13 November 2014, Vital Pérez, C‑416/13, EU:C:2014:2371, paragraph 36; and of 15 November 2016, Salaberria Sorondo, C‑258/15, EU:C:2016:873, paragraph 33).
Hitachi Chemical Europe GmbH and Polynt SpA v European Chemicals Agency.
Date: 2017-03-15
20


In determining whether, as Hitachi and Polynt claim, the General Court erred in law by holding, in paragraphs 61, 68, 71 and 81 of the judgment under appeal, that Article 57(f) of the REACH Regulation requires an analysis of the intrinsic properties of the substances concerned, to the exclusion of any consideration of data relating to human exposure reflecting the risk management measures in force, it must be recalled that, under Article 1(1) of the REACH Regulation, the purpose of that regulation is to ensure a high level of protection of human health and the environment, including the promotion of alternative methods for assessment of hazards of substances, as well as the free circulation of substances on the internal market while enhancing competitiveness and innovation. To that end, that regulation introduces an integrated system for monitoring chemical substances, including registration, evaluation and authorisation, together with possible restrictions on their use.
25


It is thus clear from its wording that Article 57 of the REACH Regulation does not require, in respect of the substances concerned, a risk assessment to be carried out analogous to that required, in the context of the evaluation procedure, under section 6 of Annex I to that regulation, or, in the context of the authorisation procedure, under Article 64(4) thereof, or, as regards the restriction procedure, under Article 70 of that regulation. It is clear, furthermore, that Article 57 provides, at point (f), for an independent mechanism that makes it possible to identify, as being of very high concern, substances which have not already been designated as such under that provision.
Stichting Woonlinie and Others v European Commission.
Date: 2017-03-15
44


As regards the fact, on which the General Court relied in paragraphs 58, 74 and 86 of the order under appeal, that in the present case that assessment is set out, not in the decision at issue but in the Article 17 letter, it must however be noted that, according to settled case-law of the Court, intermediate measures whose aim is to prepare the final decision do not, in principle, constitute acts which may form the subject matter of an action for annulment (judgment of 13 October 2011, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 50).
45


An action for annulment against measures expressing a provisional opinion of the Commission might make it necessary for the EU judicature to arrive at a decision on questions on which the institution concerned has not yet had an opportunity to state its position and would as a result anticipate the arguments on the substance of the case, confusing different procedural stages both administrative and judicial (judgment of 13 October 2011, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 51).
46


Likewise, it follows from the case-law that an intermediate measure is not capable of forming the subject matter of an action if it is established that the illegality attaching to that measure can be relied on in support of an action against the final decision for which it represents a preparatory step. In such circumstances, the action brought against the decision terminating the procedure will provide sufficient judicial protection (judgment of 13 October 2011, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).
53


However, since the examination of the compatibility with the internal market of existing aid involves complex economic and social evaluations, the Commission enjoys broad discretion. In that context, judicial review of the manner in which that discretion is exercised is confined to establishing that the rules of procedure and the rules relating to the duty to give reasons have been complied with and to verifying the accuracy of the facts relied on and that there has been no error of law, manifest error in the assessment of the facts or misuse of powers (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 September 2002, Spain v Commission, C‑351/98, EU:C:2002:530, paragraph 74).
62


It must be noted, in that respect, that the Court has held that, in the context of the procedure under Article 19(1) of Regulation No 659/1999, it is the Commission’s decision recording the proposals of the Member State which renders those proposals binding (judgment of 27 February 2014, Stichting Woonlinie and Others v Commission, C‑133/12 P, EU:C:2014:105, paragraph 59).
Stichting Woonpunt and Others v European Commission.
Date: 2017-03-15
44


As regards the fact, on which the General Court relied in paragraphs 58, 74 and 86 of the order under appeal, that in the present case that assessment is set out, not in the decision at issue but in the Article 17 letter, it must however be noted that, according to settled case-law of the Court, intermediate measures whose aim is to prepare the final decision do not, in principle, constitute acts which may form the subject matter of an action for annulment (judgment of 13 October 2011, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 50).
Flibtravel International SA and Leonard Travel International SA v AAL Renting SA and Others.
Date: 2017-03-15
18


According to settled case-law, for the purpose of interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 16 November 2016, Hemming and Others, C‑316/15, EU:C:2016:879, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
23


The contrary interpretation, advocated by the defendants in the main proceedings, would moreover be such as to undermine the effectiveness of Article 58 TFEU, which implies, in accordance with Article 91 TFEU, that application of the principles governing freedom to provide transport services must be achieved by introducing a common transport policy (see judgment of 22 December 2010, Yellow Cab Verkehrsbetrieb, C‑338/09, EU:C:2010:814, paragraph 30), inasmuch as Article 96(1) TFEU would thus have the effect of directly prohibiting a large proportion of the measures which could be described as restrictions on the freedom to provide transport services without such a rule having been adopted by the EU legislature.
Staatlich genehmigte Gesellschaft der Autoren, Komponisten und Musikverleger registrierte Genossenschaft mbH (AKM) v Zürs.net Betriebs GmbH.
Date: 2017-03-16
21


It should be noted that Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 corresponds in substance to Article 11bis(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention. Thus, when the Court interprets the concept of ‘communication to the public’ within the meaning of Article 3(1), it does so in conformity with that convention provision, pursuant to the Court’s consistent case-law (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 December 2006, SGAE, C‑306/05, EU:C:2006:764, paragraphs 40 and 41).
22


The Court has previously held that the concept of ‘communication to the public’, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, includes two cumulative criteria, namely, an ‘act of communication’ of a work and the communication of that work to a ‘public’ (judgment of 31 May 2016, Reha Training, C‑117/15, EU:C:2016:379, paragraph 37).
23


More specifically, it is evident from the Court’s case-law, first, that the act of communication refers to any transmission of the protected works, irrespective of the technical means or process used, and every transmission or retransmission of a work which uses a specific technical means must, as a rule, be individually authorised by the author of the work in question (see judgment of 31 May 2016, Reha Training, C‑117/15, EU:C:2016:379, paragraph 38 and 39).
24


Second, in order to come within the concept of ‘communication to the public’, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, it is also necessary that protected works be actually communicated to a ‘public’, the term ‘public’ being understood to mean an indeterminate number of potential recipients and, moreover, a fairly large number of persons (see judgment of 31 May 2016, Reha Training, C‑117/15, EU:C:2016:379, paragraph 40 and 41).
25


Furthermore, the Court has already held that the transmission of protected works by a body other than that which had obtained the original authorisation of communication is a ‘communication to the public’, within the meaning of that provision, when such works are transmitted to a new public, that is to say, to a public which was not taken into account by the authors of the protected works when they granted the original authorisation for the use of their works (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 May 2016, Reha Training, C‑117/15, EU:C:2016:379, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
37


According to the Court’s settled case-law, provisions of a directive which derogate from a general principle established by that directive must be interpreted strictly (judgments of 16 July 2009, Infopaq International, C‑5/08, EU:C:2009:465, paragraph 56, and of 10 April 2014, ACI Adam and Others, C‑435/12, EU:C:2014:254, paragraph 22).
38


It follows that the various exceptions and limitations provided for in Article 5(3) of Directive 2001/29, including that laid down in point (o) of that provision, must be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 December 2011, Painer, C‑145/10, EU:C:2011:798, paragraph 109).
Criminal proceedings against Ianos Tranca and Others.
Date: 2017-03-22
36


In order to answer those questions, it must be stated that the Court has already held that, having regard in particular to Articles 2, 3 and 6 of Directive 2012/13, the service of a penalty order, such as that laid down by the German law at issue in the cases in the main proceedings, must be considered to be a form of communication of the accusation against the person concerned, with the result that it must comply with the requirements set out in Article 6 (judgment of 15 October 2015, Covaci, C‑216/14, EU:C:2015:686, paragraph 61).
37


It is true that Directive 2012/13 does not regulate the procedures whereby information about the accusation, in accordance with Article 6 of that directive, must be given to that person (judgment of 15 October 2015, Covaci, C‑216/14, EU:C:2015:686, paragraph 62).
38


However, those procedures cannot undermine the objective referred to in, inter alia, that article, which, as is also apparent from recital 27 of that directive, consists in enabling suspects or persons accused of committing a criminal offence to prepare their defence and in safeguarding the fairness of the proceedings (judgment of 15 October 2015, Covaci,C‑216/14, EU:C:2015:686, paragraph 63).
40


In that regard, the Court has already observed that both the objective of enabling the accused person to prepare his defence and the need to avoid any kind of discrimination between (i) accused persons with a residence within the jurisdiction of the national law concerned and (ii) accused persons whose residence does not fall within that jurisdiction, who alone are required to appoint a person authorised to accept service of judicial decisions, require the whole of that period for lodging an objection to be available to the accused person (judgment of 15 October 2015, Covaci, C‑216/14, EU:C:2015:686, paragraph 65).
41


In that context, admittedly, if the period of two weeks at issue in the main proceedings began to run from the time when the accused person actually became aware of the penalty order, it would be certain that the whole of that period is available to that person (judgment of 15 October 2015, Covaci, C‑216/14, EU:C:2015:686, paragraph 66).
42


However, Article 6 of Directive 2012/13 does not require that period to begin to run from the moment when the person accused was actually aware of the penalty order concerning him. On the other hand, the procedure must be fair and the effective exercise of the rights of the defence must be guaranteed.
43


The Court has already accepted that that is the case where, if national legislation provides that that period for lodging an objection begins to run from the service of the penalty order on the person authorised by the accused person, the duration of that period is not reduced by the time needed by the authorised person to transmit the penalty order to its addressee, so that the addressee benefits from that period in its entirety (see judgment of 15 October 2015, Covaci, C‑216/14, EU:C:2015:686, paragraph 67).
Furkan Tekdemir v Kreis Bergstraße.
Date: 2017-03-29
25


In that regard, it should be noted that it is settled case-law of the Court that the ‘standstill’ clause contained in Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 prohibits generally the introduction of any new national measure having the object or effect of making the exercise by a Turkish national of the freedom of movement for workers on national territory subject to conditions more restrictive than those which applied at the time when Decision No 1/80 entered into force with regard to the Member State concerned (judgment of 7 November 2013, Demir, C‑225/12, EU:C:2013:725, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
31


In that context, the Court points out that, as is apparent from its case-law, national legislation tightening the conditions for family reunification of Turkish workers lawfully residing in the Member State in question, in relation to the conditions applicable at the time of the entry into force in that Member State of Decision No 1/80, constitutes a new restriction, within the meaning of Article 13 of that decision, on the exercise by such Turkish workers of the freedom of movement for workers in that Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 April 2016, Genc, C‑561/14, EU:C:2016:247, paragraph 50).
33


In that regard, the Court has already held that a restriction whose the object or effect is to make the exercise by a Turkish national of the freedom of movement of workers in national territory subject to conditions more stringent than those applicable on the date of entry into force of Decision No 1/80 is prohibited, unless it falls within the restrictions referred to in Article 14 of that decision or it is justified by an overriding reason in the public interest, is suitable to achieve the legitimate objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (judgment of 12 April 2016, Genc, C‑561/14, EU:C:2016:247, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
38


In addition, the Court has held that the objective of preventing unlawful entry and residence constitutes an overriding reason in the public interest for the purposes of Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 November 2013, Demir, C‑225/12, EU:C:2013:725, paragraph 41).
39


In those circumstances, as the Advocate General stated in paragraph 17 of his Opinion, the objective of efficient management of migration flows may constitute an overriding reason in the public interest capable of justifying a new restriction within the meaning of Article 13 of Decision No 1/80.
43


However, the principle of proportionality also requires that the procedure for implementing such a requirement does not exceed what is necessary for achieving the objective pursued.
Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV v DHL Paket GmbH.
Date: 2017-03-30
26


Secondly, it must be recalled that, under Article 7(4)(b) of Directive 2005/29, the geographical address and the identity of the trader, such as his trading name and, where applicable, the geographical address and the identity of the trader on whose behalf he is acting constitute material information. However, that provision must be read in conjunction with Article 7(1) of that directive, according to which the commercial practice at issue must be assessed having regard, inter alia, to its factual context and the limitations of the medium of communication used (judgment of 12 May 2011, Ving Sverige, C‑122/10, EU:C:2011:299, paragraph 53).
27


Moreover, under Article 7(3) of Directive 2005/29, account is to be taken, in deciding whether information has been omitted, of the limitations of space and time of the medium of communication used and of the measures taken by the trader to make that information available to consumers by other means (judgment of 12 May 2011, Ving Sverige, C‑122/10, EU:C:2011:299, paragraph 54).
28


It follows that the extent of the information relating to the geographical address and the identity of the trader which has to be communicated, by a trader, in an invitation to purchase, must be assessed on the basis of the context of that invitation, the nature and characteristics of the product and the medium of communication used (judgment of 12 May 2011, Ving Sverige, C‑122/10, EU:C:2011:299, paragraph 55).
József Lingurár v Miniszterelnökséget vezető miniszter.
Date: 2017-03-30
17


In this connection, it must be recalled that, although, by virtue of the very nature of regulations and of their function in the system of sources of EU law, the provisions of regulations generally have immediate effect in the national legal systems, without the need for the national authorities to adopt implementing measures, some of their provisions may nevertheless require, for their application, the adoption of implementing measures by the Member States (judgments of 25 October 2012, Ketelä, C‑592/11, EU:C:2012:673, paragraph 35; of 15 May 2014, Szatmári Malom, C‑135/13, EU:C:2014:327, paragraph 54, and of 7 July 2016, Občina Gorje, C‑111/15, EU:C:2016:532, paragraph 34).
18


Furthermore, it is established that Member States may adopt implementing measures for a regulation provided that they do not thereby obstruct its direct applicability or conceal its nature as an act of EU law; that they specify that they are acting in exercise of a discretion conferred on them under that regulation; and that they adhere to the parameters laid down thereunder (judgments of 25 October 2012, Ketelä, C‑592/11, EU:C:2012:673, paragraph 36; of 15 May 2014, Szatmári Malom, C‑135/13, EU:C:2014:327, paragraph 55; and of 7 July 2016, Občina Gorje, C‑111/15, EU:C:2016:532, paragraph 35).
19


It is by referring to the relevant provisions of the regulation concerned, interpreted in the light of the objectives of that regulation, that it may be determined whether they prohibit, require or allow Member States to adopt certain implementing measures and, particularly in the latter case, whether the measure concerned comes within the scope of the discretion that each Member State is recognised as having (judgments of 25 October 2012, Ketelä, C‑592/11, EU:C:2012:673, paragraph 37, and of 7 July 2016, Občina Gorje, C‑111/15, EU:C:2016:532, paragraph 36).
29


Secondly, the national provisions adopted by the Member State in the exercise of its power to implement EU legislation must observe the general principles of EU law, in particular that of proportionality (see, to that effect, as regards fraud prevention, judgment of 28 October 2010, SGS Belgium and Others, C‑367/09, EU:C:2010:648, paragraph 40).
Changshu City Standard Parts Factory and Ningbo Jinding Fastener Co. Ltd v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2017-04-05
27


The appellants put forward two grounds of appeal in support of their appeals. The first ground of appeal concerns the exclusion of certain export transactions for the purposes of calculating the dumping margin. The second ground of appeal concerns the EU institutions’ refusal to make certain adjustments in the context of the comparison between the normal value and the export price.
45


Accordingly, the Commission’s argument that this ground of appeal is ineffective cannot be accepted.
50


In so doing, the General Court took the view that, when calculating the dumping margin, under Article 2(11) of the basic regulation, the EU institutions were justified in excluding certain export transactions from that calculation in the absence of ‘comparable prices’ and where no other method of calculation would have enabled a ‘fairer comparison’ to be made, as long as the calculation was made on the basis of a ‘significant representation’ of the product types under consideration.
61


Accordingly, in the light of its wording, objective and context, Article 2(11) of the basic regulation cannot be interpreted as allowing export transactions to the European Union relating to certain types of the product under consideration to be excluded from the calculation of the dumping margin. On the contrary, it follows from that provision that the EU institutions are required to take into account all those transactions for the purposes of that calculation.
Unionen v Almega Tjänsteförbunden and ISS Facility Services AB.
Date: 2017-04-06
18


As the Court has consistently held, that directive is intended to safeguard the rights of employees in the event of a change of employer by allowing them to continue to work for the transferee employer on the same conditions as those agreed with the transferor (see, for example, judgment of 27 November 2008, Juuri, C‑396/07, EU:C:2008:656, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited). The purpose of that directive is to ensure, as far as possible, that the contract of employment or employment relationship continues unchanged with the transferee, in order to prevent the workers concerned from being placed in a less favourable position solely as a result of the transfer (see judgment of 6 September 2011, Scattolon, C‑108/10, EU:C:2011:542, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).