larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
VAS „Ceļu satiksmes drošības direkcija“ and Latvijas Republikas Satiksmes ministrija v Kaspars Nīmanis.
Date: 2015-06-25
36. At the outset, it should be stated that observance of the normal residence condition is an essential element of the system established by that directive, the linchpin of which is the principle of mutual recognition of driving licences (see, to that effect, judgment in Hofmann , C‑419/10, EU:C:2012:240, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
37. The Court has held that the normal residence condition helps, inter alia, in the fight against ‘driving-licence tourism’, in the absence of complete harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the issuing of driving licences, and that that condition is indispensable if observance of the condition of fitness to drive is to be monitored (see, with regard to the normal residence condition laid down in Article 7(1)(b) of Council Directive 91/439/EEC of 29 July 1991 on driving licences (OJ 1991 L 237, p. 1), judgments in Wiedemann and Funk , C‑329/06 and C‑343/06, EU:C:2008:366, paragraph 69; in Zerche and Others , C‑334/06 to C‑336/06, EU:C:2008:367, paragraph 66; and in Grasser , C‑184/10, EU:C:2011:324, paragraph 27).
38. The Court has accordingly taken the view that, in certain cases, failure to observe the condition of normal residence is capable, in itself, of justifying the refusal by a Member State to recognise a driving licence issued by another Member State (see, with regard to the normal residence condition laid down in Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 91/439, judgments in Apelt , C‑224/10, EU:C:2011:655, paragraph 34, and in Akyüz , C‑467/10, EU:C:2012:112, paragraph 61).
Proceedings brought by VĮ „Indėlių ir investicijų draudimas“ and Virgilijus Vidutis Nemaniūnas.
Date: 2015-06-25
56. In that regard, according to settled case-law, in applying national law, the national court called upon to interpret it is required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU (judgment in Marleasing , C‑106/89, EU:C:1990:395, paragraph 8).
57. In the event of an interpretation in conformity with EU law not being possible, it must be stated that whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied upon before the national courts by individuals against the Member State where the latter has failed to transpose the directive into domestic law by the end of the period prescribed or where it has failed to transpose it correctly (judgmen t in Dominguez , C‑282/10, EU:C:2012:33, paragraph 33).
58. In the present case, as the Advocate General has observed in point 86 of his Opinion, Directive 97/9 is, in so far it concerns the delimitation of the cases protected, sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to be relied on directly by individuals.
59. Moreover, it should be recalled that the entities against which the provisions of a directive that are capable of having direct effect may be relied upon include a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the State and has for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals (judgment in Dominguez , C‑282/10, EU:C:2012:33, paragraph 39). It is for the referring court to determine whether those conditions are met by IID which, it is common ground, has responsibility for guaranteeing the protection of deposits and of investments vis-à-vis investors in the event of the insolvency of investment firms.
60. If that were the case, the national court — since Directive 97/9 meets, in so far it concerns the delimitation of the cases protected, the requisite conditions for it to produce direct effect — would have to discount all domestic provisions that are contrary to the directive and, consequently, refrain from applying the condition concerning the use of funds without the investor’s consent, when it comes to define the scope of the investments covered by the protection scheme provided for by that directive.
CO Sociedad de Gestión y Participación SA and Others v De Nederlandsche Bank NV and Others.
Date: 2015-06-25
27. However, according to settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, judgment in SGAE , C‑306/05, EU:C:2006:764, paragraph 34).
44. Next, it should be noted that, where a national authority adopts measures which fall within the scope of EU law, those measures must comply with the general principles of that law such as, inter alia, the principle of proportionality which requires that those measures be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it (see, inter alia, to that effect, judgment in ABNA and Others , C‑453/03, C‑11/04, C‑12/04 and C‑194/04, EU:C:2005:741, paragraph 68).
Loutfi Management Propriété Intellectuelle SARL v AMJ Meatproducts NV and Halalsupply NV.
Date: 2015-06-25
21. The likelihood of confusion must in particular be assessed by reference to the perception of the relevant public, which consists of average consumers of the products or services in question, who are reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect (see, to that effect, judgment in Henkel  v OHIM , C‑456/01 P and C‑457/01 P, EU:C:2004:258, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
23. As to the likelihood of confusion on the part of the public that may exist between the Community marks and the sign considered, according to the settled case-law of the Court the existence of such a likelihood must be appreciated globally, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the particular case. That assessment includes a visual, aural or conceptual comparison of the signs at issue, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components (see, to that effect, judgments in Aceites del Sur-Coosur v Koipe, C‑498/07 P, EU:C:2009:503, paragraphs 59 and 60, and XXXLutz Marken v OHIM, C‑306/11 P, EU:C:2012:401, paragraph 39).
25. It follows from the above that those phonetic and conceptual differences should be taken into account because, if they are not, the assessment of the likelihood of confusion could be made only partially and, as a result, without taking into account the overall impression made by the Community trade marks and the sign considered on the relevant public.
Saatgut-Treuhandverwaltungs GmbH v Gerhard und Jürgen Vogel GbR and Others.
Date: 2015-06-25
20. It should be noted, first, that Article 13(2) of Regulation No 2100/94 provides that the authorisation of the holder of the plant variety right is required, in respect of variety constituents or harvested material of the protected variety, inter alia, for production or reproduction (multiplication). In that context, Article 14(1) of that regulation establishes a derogation from that rule, insofar as use of the product of the harvest obtained by farmers, on their own holding, for propagating purposes in the field is not conditional upon authorisation by the holder of the right where they fulfil certain conditions expressly set out in Article 14(3) of that regulation (see judgment in Geistbeck , C‑509/10, EU:C:2012:416, paragraphs 21 and 22).
22. A farmer who does not pay equitable remuneration to the holder when he uses the product of the harvest obtained by planting propagating material of a protected variety cannot rely on Article 14(1) of Regulation No 2100/94 and, therefore, must be regarded as having undertaken, without being entitled to do so, one of the acts set out in Article 13(2) of that regulation. Accordingly, it follows from Article 94 of that regulation that an action may be brought against such a farmer by the holder for an injunction in respect of the infringement or for payment of fair compensation, or both. If the infringement is intentional or negligent, the farmer is also obliged to pay damages to make good the loss suffered by the holder (judgment in Schulin , C‑305/00, EU:C:2003:218, paragraph 71).
29. In the second place, it should be recalled that the holders of plant variety rights alone are responsible for the control and supervision of the use of the protected varieties in the context of authorised planting and they depend, therefore, on the good faith and cooperation of the farmers concerned (judgment in Geistbeck , C‑509/10, EU:C:2012:416, paragraph 42). Accordingly, the absence of a precisely defined period within which farmers are required to comply with the obligation to pay equitable remuneration by way of derogation is liable to encourage farmers to defer that payment indefinitely, in the hope of avoiding payment altogether. To allow farmers to avoid complying with their own obligations towards holders in such a way would be at odds with the objective set out in Article 2 of Regulation No 1768/95 of maintaining a reasonable balance between the legitimate interests of the farmers and the holders concerned.
Davide Gullotta and Farmacia di Gullotta Davide & C. Sas v Ministero della Salute and Azienda Sanitaria Provinciale di Catania.
Date: 2015-07-02
19. As the Advocate General noted in points 68 to 74 of his Opinion, that order does not make clear why the referring court expresses doubts concerning the compatibility of the legislation at issue in the main proceedings with Article 15 of the Charter and it contains no information allowing the Court to provide the referring court with guidance on the interpretation of EU law which would enable it to resolve the legal problems before it.
20. According to settled case-law, the Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, to that effect, judgment in OTP Bank , C‑672/13, EU:C:2015:185, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
23. According to settled case-law, the mere creation of a dominant position through the grant of special or exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 106(1) TFEU is not in itself incompatible with Article 102 TFEU. A Member State will be in breach of the prohibitions laid down by those two provisions only if the undertaking in question, merely by exercising the special or exclusive rights conferred upon it, is led to abuse its dominant position or where such rights are liable to create a situation in which that undertaking is led to commit such abuses (judgment in Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti , C‑451/03, EU:C:2006:208, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
24. Consequently, the question arises not only as to whether the national legislation has had the effect of granting pharmacies special or exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 106(1) TFEU, but also as to whether such legislation can have led to abuse of a dominant position (see, to that effect, judgment in Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti , C‑451/03, EU:C:2006:208, paragraph 24).
25. However, as the Advocate General noted in points 79 and 82 of his Opinion, the order for reference lacks any explanation as to why the referring court considers that the legislation at issue does not comply with Articles 102 and 106 TFEU. It does not explain, in particular, why that legislation would be likely to induce pharmacies to abuse their position.
Landesamt für Landwirtschaft, Umwelt und ländliche Räume des Landes Schleswig-Holstein v Dr. med. vet. Uta Wree.
Date: 2015-07-02
36. Next, the categorisation of the areas at issue as ‘permanent pasture’ within the meaning of Article 2(c) of Regulation No 1120/2009 depends on the actual use of the land in question, so that an area must be classified as ‘agricultural’ where it is used as ‘permanent pasture’ within the meaning of that provision (see, by analogy, judgment in Landkreis Bad Dürkheim , C‑61/09, EU:C:2010:606, paragraph 37).
44. Lastly, it must be borne in mind that, in order to be eligible for aid within the meaning of Article 34(2)(a) of Regulation No 73/2009, the agricultural areas at issue must be allocated to the relevant farmer’s holding. The Court has held in that regard that this is the case where the farmer enjoys a degree of autonomy with regard to that area sufficient for the carrying-out of his agricultural activity (see, by analogy, judgment in Landkreis Bad Dürkheim , C‑61/09, EU:C:2010:606, paragraphs 58 and 62).
European Commission v Ireland.
Date: 2015-07-09
20. It is settled case-law, first, that the classification of ‘working time’ within the meaning of Directive 2003/88 as a period when the worker is present results from his obligation to be at the disposal of his employer (judgment in Dellas and Others , C‑14/04, EU:C:2005:728, paragraph 58 and order in Grigore , C‑258/10, EU:C:2011:122, paragraph 53).
21. The determining factor is that he is required to be physically present at the place determined by the employer and to be available to the employer in order to be able to provide the appropriate services immediately in case of need (judgment in Dellas and Others , C‑14/04, EU:C:2005:728, paragraph 48, and orders in Vorel , C‑437/05, EU:C:2007:23, paragraph 28, and Grigore , C‑258/10, EU:C:2011:122, paragraph 53).
22. Secondly, in proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations, it is for the Commission to prove the existence of the alleged infringement and to provide the Court with the information necessary for it to determine whether the infringement is made out, and the Commission may not rely on any presumption for that purpose (see, in particular, judgment in Commission  v Pologne , C‑356/13, EU:C:2014:2386, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited).
23. In addition, with regard, in particular, to a complaint concerning the implementation of a national provision, proof of a Member State’s failure to fulfil its obligations requires production of evidence different from that usually taken into account in an action for failure to fulfil obligations concerning solely the terms of a national provision and, in those circumstances, failure to fulfil obligations can be established only by means of sufficiently documented and detailed proof of the alleged practice of the national administration for which the Member State concerned is answerable (see judgments in Commission  v Belgium , C‑287/03, EU:C:2005:282, paragraph 28 and Commission  v Germany C‑441/02, EU:C:2006:253, paragraph 49).
41. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that provisions transposing a directive must allow individuals to refer to a clear, precise and unequivocal legal framework (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission  v Ireland , C‑282/02, EU:C:2005:334, paragraph 80).
Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp. and ZTE Deutschland GmbH.
Date: 2015-07-16
45. First of all, it must be recalled that the concept of an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU is an objective concept relating to the conduct of a dominant undertaking which, on a market where the degree of competition is already weakened precisely because of the presence of the undertaking concerned, through recourse to methods different from those governing normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition (judgments in Hoffmann-La Roche  v Commission , 85/76, EU:C:1979:36, paragraph 91; AKZO  v Commission , C‑62/86, EU:C:1991:286, paragraph 69; and Tomra Systems and Others  v Commission , C‑549/10 P, EU:C:2012:221, paragraph 17).
46. It is, in this connection, settled case-law that the exercise of an exclusive right linked to an intellectual-property right — in the case in the main proceedings, namely the right to bring an action for infringement — forms part of the rights of the proprietor of an intellectual-property right, with the result that the exercise of such a right, even if it is the act of an undertaking holding a dominant position, cannot in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position (see, to that effect, judgments in Volvo , 238/87, EU:C:1988:477, paragraph 8; RTE and ITP  v Commission , C‑241/91 P and C‑242/91 P, EU:C:1995:98, paragraph 49; and IMS Health , C‑418/01, EU:C:2004:257, paragraph 34).
47. However, it is also settled case-law that the exercise of an exclusive right linked to an intellectual-property right by the proprietor may, in exceptional circumstances, involve abusive conduct for the purposes of Article 102 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments in Volvo , 238/87, EU:C:1988:477, paragraph 9; RTE and ITP  v Commission , C‑241/91 P and C‑242/91 P, EU:C:1995:98, paragraph 50; and IMS Health , C‑418/01, EU:C:2004:257, paragraph 35).
56. In this connection, due account must be taken of the specific legal and factual circumstances in the case (see, to that effect, judgment in Post Danmark , C‑209/10, EU:C:2012:172, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
57. Thus, the need to enforce intellectual-property rights, covered by, inter alia, Directive 2004/48, which — in accordance with Article 17(2) of the Charter — provides for a range of legal remedies aimed at ensuring a high level of protection for intellectual-property rights in the internal market, and the right to effective judicial protection guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, comprising various elements, including the right of access to a tribunal, must be taken into consideration (see, to that effect, judgment in Otis and Others , C‑199/11, EU:C:2012:684, paragraph 48).
A v B.
Date: 2015-07-16
31. The need for the uniform application of EU law requires that, to the extent that the provisions of Article 3(c) and (d) of Regulation No 4/2009 make no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining the meaning and scope of that concept, that concept must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment in Kásler and Káslerné Rábai , C‑26/13, EU:C:2014:282, paragraph 37).
32. That interpretation must take into account the wording of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, to that effect, judgment in A , C‑523/07, EU:C:2009:225, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
34. While the criteria for attributing jurisdiction set out therein are alternative in so far as they are linked by the conjunction ‘or’, it cannot however be unequivocally established from that wording whether the alternative nature of those criteria means that the applications relating to child maintenance are ancillary only to one set of proceedings concerning parental responsibility, or whether those applications may be deemed ancillary also to proceedings concerning the status of a person.
Sommer Antriebs- und Funktechnik GmbH v Rademacher Geräte-Elektronik GmbH & Co. KG.
Date: 2015-07-16
32. It should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law of the Court, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling from a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgments in Fish Legal and Shirley , C‑279/12, EU:C:2013:853, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited therein, and Idrodinamica Spurgo Velox and Others , C‑161/13, EU:C:2014:307, paragraph 29).
46. In that regard, in the absence of a definition of the word ‘tools’ in those directives, it is necessary, in order to determine the scope of that word, to refer to its usual and everyday accepted meaning (see, by analogy, judgment in Endendijk , C‑187/07, EU:C:2008:197, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited therein). That word normally refers to any article used to carry out particular work or a particular task.
Andrejs Surmačs v Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija.
Date: 2015-09-02
21. Finally, it is clear from the first recital in the preamble to Directive 94/19 that it has the dual objective of protecting savers in the event of the unavailability of deposits made in credit institutions and of increasing the stability of the banking system.
24. Since the categories laid down in Annex I to Directive 94/19 constitute an exception to the general rule in Article 3 of that directive, they must be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, judgment in Fastweb , C‑19/13, EU:C:2014:2194, paragraph 40).
28. In that regard, according to the Court’ s settled case-law, for the purpose of interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment in Rosselle , C‑65/14, EU:C:2015:339, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). The origins of a provision of EU law may also provide information relevant to its interpretation (judgment in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others  v Parliament and Council , C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 50).
Christophe Bohez v Ingrid Wiertz.
Date: 2015-09-09
32. In that regard, it should be recalled that the scope of Regulation No 44/2001 is limited to ‘civil and commercial matters’. That scope is determined essentially according to the factors characterising the nature of the legal relationships between the parties to the action or the subject-matter of the action (see judgment in Realchemie Nederland , C‑406/09, EU:C:2011:668, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
33. More particularly, as regards interim measures, the Court considers that their inclusion in the scope of Regulation No 44/2001 is determined not by their own nature but by the nature of the rights that they serve to protect (see judgment in Realchemie Nederland , C‑406/09, EU:C:2011:668, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
34. Thus, as regards the enforcement in a Member State of an order to pay a fine, which has been imposed by a court of another Member State, for the purpose of ensuring compliance with a prohibition laid down in a judgment given in that Member State in civil and commercial matters, the Court has stated that the nature of that right of enforcement depends on the nature of the subjective right, for infringement of which enforcement was ordered (see, to that effect, judgment in Realchemie Nederland , C‑406/09, EU:C:2011:668, paragraph 42).
58. As has been recalled in paragraph 40 of this judgment, the importance of rights of access, which are essential for the protection of the right of a child to maintain a personal relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, which is laid down in Article 24(3) of the Charter, prompted the EU legislature to provide for a specific scheme in order to facilitate enforcement of judgments concerning rights of access. That scheme is based on the principle of mutual trust between Member States in the fact that their respective national legal systems are capable of providing an equivalent and effective protection of fundamental rights, recognised at EU level, in particular, in the Charter (judgment in Aguirre Zarraga , C–491/10 PPU, EU:C:2010:828, paragraph 70), and precludes any review of the judgment given by the court of the State of origin.