larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Nannoka Vulcanus Industries BV v College van gedeputeerde staten van Gelderland.
Date: 2015-09-10
61. In that regard, it should be added that an interpretation of Annex IIB to Directive 1999/13 as precluding a time extension from being given, where substitutes containing little or no solvent are still under development, to the operator of an installation for which a constant solid content of product can be assumed, would, in any event, be contrary to the principle of legal certainty, which requires that EU rules enable those concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations which are imposed on them and that those persons must be able to ascertain unequivocally what their obligations are and take steps accordingly (see, to that effect, judgments in BGL , C‑78/01, EU:C:2003:490, paragraph 71 and ArcelorMittal Luxembourg v Commission and Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg and Others , C‑201/09 P and C‑216/09 P, EU:C:2011:190, paragraph 68).
73. Since it is an exception to the general provisions of Directive 1999/13, the time extension provided for in point (i) of the first paragraph of Annex IIB(2) to that directive must be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, judgment in ACI Adam and Others , C‑435/12, EU:C:2014:254, paragraph 22, and the case-law cited).
Confederazione Cooperative Italiane and Others v Associazione Nazionale degli Industriali delle Conserve Alimentari Vegetali (Anicav) and Others.
Date: 2015-09-17
46. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the condition that the contested decision must be of direct concern to a natural or legal person, as laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, requires that the contested EU measure must directly affect the legal situation of the individual and leave no discretion to its addressees responsible for implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from EU rules without the application of other intermediate rules (see judgments in Glencore Grain  v Commission , C‑404/96 P, EU:C:1998:196, paragraph 41; Front national  v Parliament , C‑486/01 P, EU:C:2004:394, paragraph 34; Commission  v Ente per le Ville Vesuviane and Ente per le Ville Vesuviane  v Commission , C‑445/07 P and C‑455/07 P, EU:C:2009:529, paragraph 45, and Stichting Woonpunt and Others  v Commission , C‑132/12 P, EU:C:2014:100, paragraph 68).
49. Such a fact cannot of itself allow the view to be taken that their legal position is affected by the contested provisions, adopted in the context of the Common Agricultural Policy and that, accordingly, those provisions are of direct concern to them (see, to that effect, judgment in T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares  v Commission , C‑456/13 P, EU:C:2015:284, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
Fratelli De Pra SpA and SAIV SpA v Agenzia Entrate - Direzione Provinciale Ufficio Controlli Belluno and Agenzia Entrate - Direzione Provinciale Ufficio Controlli Vicenza.
Date: 2015-09-17
27. By its first three questions, the referring court asks the Court about the compatibility of the Italian legislation with the rules of EU law. It must be borne in mind, however, that it is not the task of the Court, in preliminary ruling proceedings, to rule upon the compatibility of provisions of national law with the legal rules of the European Union. By contrast, the Court does have jurisdiction to give the national court full guidance on the interpretation of EU law in order to enable it to determine the issue of compatibility for the purposes of the case before it (see judgment in Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales , C‑118/08, EU:C:2010:39, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited, and order in Agricola Esposito , C‑492/09, EU:C:2010:766, paragraph 19).
The first and fourth questions
41. Next, the argument put forward by De Pra and SAIV to the effect that a charge such as the TCG is contrary to Article 12 of Directive 2002/20 because it is not an administrative charge paid by way of fees intended to cover only the administrative costs incurred in the issue, management, control and enforcement of the applicable general authorisation scheme, cannot be upheld. The Court has held previously that a charge the trigger for which is linked not to a general authorisation procedure for access to the electronic telecommunications services market but to the use of mobile telephony services provided by operators and which is ultimately borne by the user of such services does not fall within the scope of Article 12 (see judgment in Vodafone Malta and Mobisle Communications , C‑71/12, EU:C:2013:431, paragraphs 25 and 29).
OKG AB v Skatteverket.
Date: 2015-10-01
24. It should be noted that the first question, as formulated by the referring court, is based on the premiss that Directive 2003/96 is applicable ratione materiae to the dispute in the main proceedings. According to the wording of Article 1 of that directive, its scope is restricted to the taxation of energy products and electricity, as defined in Article 2(1) and (2) thereof.
26. It is appropriate to begin by recalling that Article 2(1) of that directive defines ‘energy products’ for the purposes of that directive by drawing up an exhaustive list of the products covered by that definition by reference to the codes of the combined nomenclature (judgment in Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems , C‑5/14, EU:C:2015:354, paragraph 47).
31. In that regard, given the definition of ‘tax on the thermal power of a nuclear reactor’ in paragraph 28 of this judgment, it must be observed that the tax at issue in the main proceedings consists in the levying of a fixed monthly amount calculated according to a theoretical value, being the quantity of megawatts of maximum thermal power fixed for each nuclear reactor by the authorisation, issued by the national authorities, to own and operate that nuclear reactor. Moreover, the holder of the authorisation to own and operate a nuclear reactor remains liable for the tax on the thermal power even when it is not being operated, except for extraordinary power stoppages of over 90 consecutive days.
32. There is therefore no link between, on the one hand, the chargeable event for the tax at issue in the main proceedings, being the theoretical production capacity of the nuclear reactor and, on the other, the amount of electricity actually generated by that reactor.
33. Accordingly, the thermal power of a nuclear reactor, as construed in the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, does not come within the definition of ‘electricity’ for the purposes of Directive 2003/96.
34. Thirdly, in the light of the considerations set out in paragraphs 31 and 32 of this judgment, a tax such as the one at issue in the main proceedings cannot be regarded as having been calculated directly or indirectly on the quantity of energy products and electricity ‘at the time of release for consumption’ within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Directive 2003/96.
35. Similarly, nor can there be said to be a direct and inseverable link between the chargeable event for the tax and the consumption of electricity generated by a given nuclear reactor, as held in the judgment in Braathens (C‑346/97, EU:C:1999:291, paragraph 23).
Criminal proceedings against Skerdjan Celaj.
Date: 2015-10-01
20. It is important at the outset to bear in mind that Directive 2008/115 concerns only the return of illegally staying third-country nationals and is thus not designed to harmonise in their entirety Member State rules on the stay of foreign nationals. Therefore, that directive does not preclude, in principle, the law of a Member State from classifying the unlawful re-entry of a third-country national in breach of an entry ban as an offence and laying down criminal law sanctions to deter and penalise such an infringement (see, by analogy, judgments in Achughbabian , C‑329/11, EU:C:2011:807, paragraph 28, and Sagor , C‑430/11, EU:C:2012:777, paragraph 31).
21. According to settled case-law, a Member State may not apply criminal law rules liable to jeopardise the attainment of the objectives pursued by that directive and thus to deprive it of its effectiveness (judgment in Sagor , C‑430/11, EU:C:2012:777, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
26. It is true that, according to the case-law of the Court, the common standards and procedures established by Directive 2008/115 would be undermined if, after establishing that a third-country national is staying illegally, the Member State were to preface the implementation of the return decision, or even the adoption of that decision, with a criminal prosecution which could lead to a term of imprisonment during the course of the return procedure, in so far as such a step would risk delaying the removal (see, to that effect, judgments in El Dridi , C‑61/11 PPU, EU:C:2011:268, paragraph 59; Achughbabian , C‑329/11, EU:C:2011:807, paragraphs 37 to 39 and 45; and Sagor , C‑430/11, EU:C:2012:777, paragraph 33).
29. Furthermore, the Court has already held that Directive 2008/115 does not preclude penal sanctions being imposed, following national rules of criminal procedure, on third-country nationals to whom the return procedure established by that directive has been applied and who are illegally staying in the territory of a Member State without there being any justified ground for non-return (judgment in Achughbabian , C‑329/11, EU:C:2011:807, paragraph 48).
31. Nevertheless, in so far as the situation of the third-country national concerned, which led to the removal preceding the new unlawful entry into the territory of a Member State, fell within the scope of Directive 2008/115, the imposition of a criminal law sanction, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, is admissible only on the condition that the entry ban issued against that national complies with Article 11 of that directive, a matter which is for the referring court to determine.
32. The imposition of such a criminal law sanction is moreover subject to full observance both of fundamental rights, particularly those guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (see, to that effect, judgment in Achughbabian , C‑329/11, EU:C:2011:807, paragraph 49), and, as the case may be, of the Geneva Convention, in particular Article 31(1) thereof.
Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco (AIFA) and Ministero della Salute v Doc Generici srl.
Date: 2015-10-01
33. It must be recalled in this regard that, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. The Court has a duty to interpret all provisions of EU law which national courts require in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court by those courts (see, inter alia, judgments in Campina , Case C‑45/06, EU:C:2007:154, paragraphs 30 and 31, and Fuß , EU:C:2010:609, paragraph 39).
34. Consequently, even if, formally, the referring court has limited its questions to the interpretation of Article 3(2) of Regulation No 297/95, that does not prevent this Court from providing the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of EU law that may be of assistance in adjudicating in the case pending before it, whether or not the referring court has referred to them in the wording of its questions. It is, in this regard, for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision to make the reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject-matter of the dispute (see, to that effect, judgment in Fuß , EU:C:2010:609, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
43. In accordance with the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is required, where a question of EU law is raised before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the Court of Justice, unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the provision of EU law in question has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt (see, inter alia, judgments in Cilfit and Others , 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 21, and Boxus and Others , C‑128/09 to C‑131/09, C‑134/09 and C‑135/09, EU:C:2011:667, paragraph 31).
Proceedings brought by Marie Matoušková.
Date: 2015-10-06
29. Such a measure relates directly to the legal capacity of a natural person (see, by analogy, judgment in Schneider , C‑386/12, EU:C:2013:633, paragraph 26) and, by its nature, constitutes an action intended to ensure that the requirements of protection and assistance of minor children are met.
31. Therefore, the fact that the approval at issue in the main proceedings has been requested in succession proceedings cannot be regarded as decisive as to whether that measure should be classified as falling within the law on succession. The need to obtain approval from the court dealing with guardianship matters is a direct consequence of the status and capacity of the minor children and constitutes a protective measure for the child relating to the administration, conservation or disposal of the child’s property in the exercise of parental responsibility within the meaning of Article 1(1)(b) and 2(e) of Regulation No 2201/2003.
34. Moreover, that interpretation of the scope of Regulations No 2201/2003 and No 650/2012 is consistent with the case-law of the Court which is designed to avoid any overlap between the rules of law that those texts lay down and any legal vacuum (see, by analogy, judgment in Nickel & Goeldner Spedition , C‑157/13, EU:C:2014:2145, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
Seattle Genetics Inc. v Österreichisches Patentamt.
Date: 2015-10-06
23. It is the Court’s established case-law that the need for a uniform application of EU law requires that, where a provision of EU law makes no reference to the law of the Member States with regard to a particular concept, that concept must be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment in Brüstle , C‑34/10, EU:C:2011:669, paragraph 25).
26. It should be noted in that regard that, as is apparent from recitals 7 and 8 in the preamble thereto, Regulation No 469/2009 establishes a uniform solution at European Union level by creating an SPC which may be obtained by the holder of a national or European patent under the same conditions in each Member State. It thus aims to prevent the heterogeneous development of national laws leading to further disparities which would be likely to create obstacles to the free movement of medicinal products within the European Union and thus directly affect the establishment and functioning of the internal market (see, to that effect, judgment in Medeva , C‑322/10, EU:C:2011:773, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
32. It should be noted in that regard that the fundamental objective of Regulation No 469/2009, as mentioned, inter alia, in recitals 3 to 5 and 8 and 9 in the preamble thereto, is to re-establish a sufficient period of effective protection of a basic patent by permitting the holder to enjoy an additional period of exclusivity on the expiry of his patent, which is intended to compensate, at least in part, for the delay to the commercial exploitation of his invention by reason of the time which has elapsed between the date on which the application for that patent was filed and the date on which the first marketing authorisation in the European Union was granted (see, to that effect, judgment in Actavis Group PTC and Actavis UK , C‑577/13, EU:C:2015:165, paragraph 34).
György Balázs v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Dél-alföldi Regionális Vám- és Pénzügyőri Főigazgatósága.
Date: 2015-10-15
26. In that regard, it is appropriate to point out that, according to settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, judgments in Budĕjovický Budvar , C‑478/07, EU:C:2009:521, paragraph 63; Zanotti , C‑56/09, EU:C:2010:288, paragraph 15; and Melki and Abdeli , C‑188/10 and C‑189/10, EU:C:2010:363, paragraph 27).
42. In so far as the specification at issue in the main proceedings thus does not fall within the scope of the field harmonised by Directive 98/70, it should be observed, in the first place, that it is clear from the case-law of the Court that a Member State may subject the placing on the market in its territory of a product not covered by technical specifications harmonised or recognised at EU level to requirements which comply with obligations under the FEU Treaty, in particular, in the present case, the principle of the free movement of goods set out in Articles 34 TFEU and 36 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission  v Portugal , C‑432/03, EU:C:2005:669, paragraph 35, and Lidl Magyarország , C‑132/08, EU:C:2009:281, paragraph 45).
43. In the second place, it should be noted that, in accordance with Article 8 of Directive 98/34, Member States must, in order to allow preventive control under the provisions on the free movement of goods and, in particular, in relation to the justification of the obstacles that could be created in that regard, communicate to the Commission before their entry into force the draft provisions by which technical specifications are given binding effect (see, to that effect, judgments in Sandström , C‑433/05, EU:C:2010:184, paragraph 42, and Belgische Petroleum Unie and Others , C‑26/11, EU:C:2013:44, paragraphs 49 and 50).
52. In that regard, as has already been pointed out in paragraph 47 of this judgment, Article 1(6) contains only one definition of what constitutes a standard for the purposes of that directive, that provision aiming, moreover, not to prescribe, as such, requirements relating to standards, but to lay down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and, thus, preventive control with a view to protecting the free movement of goods (see, to that effect, judgment in Belgische Petroleum Unie and Others , C‑26/11, EU:C:2013:44, paragraph 49).
Debonair Trading Internacional Ldª v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs).
Date: 2015-10-15
32. According to settled case-law, where opposition to an application for registration of a trade mark is based on the existence of several trade marks with shared characteristics enabling them to be regarded as part of the same ‘family’ or ‘series’ of trade marks, account should be taken, in the assessment of the likelihood of confusion, of the fact that, in the case of a ‘family’ or ‘series’ of trade marks, a likelihood of confusion results from the fact that the consumer may be mistaken as to the provenance or origin of goods or services covered by the trade mark applied for and consider, erroneously, that the latter trade mark is part of that family or series of marks (see, in particular, judgment in Union Investment Privatfonds  v UniCredito Italiano , C‑317/10 P, EU:C:2011:405, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
33. In that context, the Court has pointed out that the existence of a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public must be assessed globally, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case (see, in particular, judgment in Union Investment Privatfonds  v UniCredito Italiano , C‑317/10 P, EU:C:2011:405, paragraph 55).
Direktor na Agentsia "Mitnitsi" v Biovet AD.
Date: 2015-10-15
17. It should be observed as a preliminary point that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU, providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (see judgment in Brasserie Bouquet , C‑285/14, EU:C:2015:353, point 15). The fact that a national court has, formally speaking, worded a question referred for a preliminary ruling with reference to certain provisions of EU law does not prevent the Court from providing that court with all the guidance on points of interpretation which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not it has referred to those points in its questions. In that regard, it is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision referring the questions, the points of EU law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject-matter of the dispute (see judgment in Essent Energie Productie , C‑91/13, EU:C:2014:2206, point 36).