larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Danisco Sugar AB v Allmänna ombudet.
Date: 1997-11-27
24 In order to establish whether a law introducing a levy on sugar stocks, such as the Lageravgiftslag, is contrary to the provisions of Community law concerning the common organization of the markets in the sugar sector, it must be determined whether that law concerns an area for which the Community rules make exhaustive provision or interferes with the proper functioning of the mechanisms provided by the common organization of the markets, in particular through its influence on price formation or on the structure of agricultural holdings (see Case 222/82 Apple and Pear Development Council v Lewis [1983] ECR 4083, paragraphs 23 and 31, and Case 218/85 Cerafel v Le Campion [1986] ECR 3513, paragraph 13).
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1997-11-27
8 On the first point, suffice it to note that the German legislation in force cannot in any way be regarded as ensuring transposition of the Directive, which, in Article 23(1), second subparagraph, expressly requires the Member States to adopt provisions containing a reference to that Directive or accompanied by such reference.  Moreover, the Federal Government itself acknowledges the need to adopt a new text in order to ensure the Directive's transposition.
10 Lastly, the fact that no active substances have yet been listed in Annex I to the Directive cannot, in the absence of express provision to that effect, relieve Member States of their obligation to adopt within the period prescribed the measures necessary to comply with the Directive. That obligation remains, whether or not all the conditions for the implementation of the provisions of Community law have already been fulfilled. As the Commission was right to observe, the point of transposing the relevant provisions is to ensure that the principle of the mutual recognition of authorizations is implemented as soon as the active substances are listed in Annex I to the Directive.
Helmut Kampelmann and Others v Landschaftsverband Westfalen-Lippe (C-253/96 to C-256/96), Stadtwerke Witten GmbH v Andreas Schade (C-257/96) and Klaus Haseley v Stadtwerke Altena GmbH (C-258/96).
Date: 1997-12-04
30 It should be noted at the outset that under Article 6 of the Directive, national rules concerning the burden of proof are not to be affected, as such, by the Directive.
39 The fact that that provision allows the Member State to choose between two categories of information to be notified to the employee does not render it impossible to determine with sufficient precision, on the basis of the provisions of the Directive alone, the content of the rights thus conferred on individuals, the scope of which is not in the discretion of the Member State whichever choice it makes (see Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357, paragraph 17).
46 In addition, it has consistently been held that a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied upon as such against an individual (see, inter alia, Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori v Recreb [1994] ECR I-3325, paragraph 20).  It may, however, be relied on against organizations or bodies which are subject to the authority or control of the State or have special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable to relations between individuals, such as local or regional authorities or other bodies which, irrespective of their legal form, have been given responsibility, by the public authorities and under their supervision, for providing a public service (Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839, paragraph 31, and Case C-188/89 Foster and Others v British Gas [1990] ECR I-3313, paragraph 19).
47 In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the second question must be that individuals may rely on Article 2(2)(c) of the Directive directly before the national courts as against the State and any organizations or bodies which are subject to the authority or control of the State or have special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable to relations between individuals, either where the State has failed to transpose the Directive into national law within the prescribed period or where it has not done so correctly.  It is not open to a Member State to transpose Article 2(2)(c)(ii) of the Directive in such a way as to allow the employer, in every case, to confine the information to be notified to the employee to a mere job designation.
The third question
49 Since, as stated at paragraph 43 above, the German legislature has opted for the aspects in Article 2(2)(c)(ii) of the Directive, there is no need to answer the third question (see, inter alia, Case 126/80 Salonia v Poidomani and Baglieri [1981] ECR 1563, paragraph 6, and Case 166/84 Thomasdünger v Oberfinanzdirektion Frankfurt am Main [1985] ECR 3001, paragraph 11).
The fifth question
Tiercé Ladbroke SA v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1997-12-09
33 Ladbroke's argument disregards the specific nature of bets on Belgian races and what differentiates them from bets on French races. Since the two categories of bet are not identical, the existence of an advantage for the purposes of Article 92(1) of the Treaty cannot be deduced automatically from the difference of treatment to which they are subject.
35 Furthermore, the system of statutory and fiscal retentions on bets on French horse-races was adopted in the light of the specific regulatory and economic conditions prevailing with regard to horse-racing and totalizator betting in France. There can be no requirement to transpose that system to totalizator betting on Belgian horse-races, which are organized under different regulatory and economic conditions. Moreover, since the levy rates in France and Belgium differ and the application of Belgian rates to bets placed in France is justified for reasons relating to the logic of the totalizator betting system referred to in paragraph 34 of this judgment, that levy  cannot, in any event, be shared out between the various recipients on exactly the same basis in the two cases.
Leonhard Knubben Speditions GmbH v Hauptzollamt Mannheim.
Date: 1997-12-09
14 It is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the customs classification of goods must generally be their objective characteristics and properties, as defined by the wording of the headings of the Combined Nomenclature and the notes to the sections or chapters (Case C-164/95 Fábrica de Queijo Eru Portuguesa v Alfândega de Lisboa [1997] ECR I-3441, paragraph 13).  There are also explanatory notes drawn up, so far as the Combined Nomenclature is concerned, by the European Commission, which may be an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force (Joined Cases C-106/94 and C-139/94 Colin and Dupré [1995] ECR I-4759, paragraph 21, and Case C-201/96 LTM [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 17).
Locamion SA v Directeur des services fiscaux d'Indre-et-Loire.
Date: 1997-12-11
7 Article 12(1) of the Directive sets out an exhaustive list of taxes and duties other than capital duty which, notwithstanding Articles 10 and 11, may affect capital companies in connection with the transactions referred to in the latter provisions (see, to that effect, Case 36/86 Ministeriet for Skatter og Afgifter v Dansk Sparinvest [1988] ECR 409, paragraph 9, and Joined Cases C-71/91 and C-178/91 Ponente Carni and Cispadana Costruzioni [1993] ECR I-1915, paragraph 24).
20 It is clear from paragraph 34 of the judgment in Bautiaa and Société Française Maritime that the merger transactions at issue in that case constituted an increase in the capital of a capital company by contribution of assets of any kind, within the meaning of Article 4(1)(c) of the Directive, in the particular circumstances referred to in Article 7(1)(b), that is to say, the transfer by one or more capital companies of all of their assets and liabilities to one or more capital companies which are in the process of being formed or which are already in existence.
34 As to Article 10(c) of the Directive, it should be noted that the registration charge is unrelated to the legal form of the entity which owns the vehicles in respect of which the levy is due.  It may just as well be a natural person as a legal person, or a partnership as a capital company (see Case C-2/94 Denkavit Internationaal and Others [1996] ECR I-2827, paragraphs 23 to 26).  The registration charge cannot therefore be linked to formalities to which companies may be made subject by reason of their legal form.
Società Immobiliare SIF SpA v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato.
Date: 1997-12-11
28 It is the Court's duty to interpret all provisions of Community law which national courts need in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court of Justice by those courts (Case C-280/91 Viessmann [1993] ECR I-971, paragraph 17).
34 The transfer duties referred to in Article 12(1)(b) of the Directive must be regarded as registration charges levied in connection with certain transactions involving the transfer of businesses or immovable property, on the basis of general and objective criteria.
35 That provision draws no distinction between the kinds of transfer duties which may be charged by the Member States. It permits Member States, in general terms, to charge - separately from capital duty, but in relation to a contribution to a capital company - duties in respect of which the operative event is objectively linked to the transfer of businesses or immovable property.
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1997-12-11
9 It has consistently been held that mere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the administration and are not given the appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the proper fulfilment of a Member State's obligations under Article 189 of the EC Treaty (see, inter alia, Case C-242/94 Commission v Spain [1995] ECR I-3031, paragraph 6).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 1997-12-16
14 As regards Directive 93/53, it should be pointed out that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see Case C-60/96 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 15).
16 As regards the transposition of Articles 2 and 7 of Directive 93/113, it has consistently been held that mere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the administration and are not given the appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the proper fulfilment of obligations under the Treaty (Case C-311/95 Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I-2433, paragraph 7).
Fábrica de Queijo Eru Portuguesa Ldª v Subdirector-Geral das Alfândegas, and Ministério Público.
Date: 1997-12-16
22 That being so, it need merely be held that a trader is not entitled to expect that, when he has benefited from decisions of a national authority that do not comply with a clear and unequivocal rule of Community law, the same authority will adopt a further decision in breach of Community law.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 1997-12-18
11 As regards, first, the provisions of the Directive which the Kingdom of Spain claims were transposed by Law No 30/1995, it must be borne in mind that the Court has consistently held that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in the Member State as it stood at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-289/94 Commission v Italy [1996] ECR I-4405, paragraph 20).
13 As regards, second, the provisions of the Directive which the Kingdom of Spain considers to have been transposed by rules in force before the end of the period laid down by the Commission, it must be observed that, as the Commission has rightly pointed out, it is necessary in this case to adopt a specific measure transposing the Directive, since the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Directive expressly requires Member States to ensure that their measures transposing the Directive include a reference to it or that such reference is made when they are officially published (see, to the same effect, Case C-137/96 Commission v Germany [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 8). The measures on which the Kingdom of Spain relies, however, mentioned in paragraph 8 above, do not meet that requirement.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 1997-12-18
13 As regards, first, the provisions of the Directive which the Kingdom of Spain claims were transposed by Law No 30/1995, it must be borne in mind that the Court has consistently held that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in the Member State as it stood at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-289/94 Commission v Italy [1996] ECR I-4405, paragraph 20).
15 As regards, second, the provisions of the Directive which the Kingdom of Spain considers to have been transposed by rules in force before the end of the period laid down by the Commission, it must be observed that, as the Commission has rightly pointed out, it is necessary in this case to adopt a specific measure transposing the Directive, since the second paragraph of Article 57(1) expressly requires Member States to ensure that their measures transposing the Directive include a reference to it or that such reference is made when they are officially published (see, to the same effect, Case C-137/96 Commission v Germany [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 8).  The measures on which the Kingdom of Spain relies, however, mentioned in paragraph 8 above, do not meet that requirement.
Techex Computer + Grafik Vertriebs GmbH v Hauptzollamt München.
Date: 1997-12-18
11 As the Court has repeatedly held, the decisive criterion for the customs classification of goods must be sought generally in their objective characteristics and qualities, as defined in the relevant heading of the Common Customs Tariff and in the notes to the sections or chapters (see, in particular, the judgment in Case C-11/93 Siemens Nixdorf [1994] ECR I-1945, paragraph 11).
12 Both the notes which head the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff and the Explanatory Notes to the Nomenclature of the Customs Operations Council are important means for ensuring the uniform application of the Tariff and as such may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (see Siemens Nixdorf, cited above, paragraph 12).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 1997-12-18
26 Although it is true, as the Kingdom of Belgium has pointed out, that a law was adopted on 25 March 1996 with that intention, it should be observed that, since it contains no substantive provision transposing the directive but merely empowers an authority subsequently to adopt the requisite substantive provisions, that law cannot be regarded as effecting a complete and accurate transposition of the directive.
27 With regard to the first argument relied on by the Belgian Government, the Court has consistently held that a Member State may not rely on circumstances in its internal legal system to justify its failure to comply with obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (Cases C-109/94, C-207/94 and C-225/94 Commission v Greece [1995] ECR I-1791, paragraph 11).
30 Finally, where the finding of a failure by a Member State to fulfil its obligations is not bound up with a finding as to the damage flowing therefrom, a Member State may not rely on the argument that the failure to adopt measures to transpose a directive has had no adverse consequences for the functioning of the internal market or of that directive.
Didier Tabouillot v Directeur des services fiscaux de Meurthe-et-Moselle.
Date: 1997-12-18
21 It is settled case-law (see Case 148/77 Hansen v Hauptzollamt Flensburg [1978] ECR 1787, paragraph 23, Joined Cases C-228/90 to C-234/90, C-339/90 and C-353/90 Simba and Others v Ministero delle Finanze [1992] ECR I-3713, paragraph 14, and Case C-130/92 Oto v Ministero delle Finanze [1994] ECR I-3281, paragraph 18) that Article 95 applies only to goods imported from other Member States and, where appropriate, to goods originating in non-member countries which are in free circulation in the Member States. It follows that that provision is not applicable to products imported directly from non-member countries.
Ballast Nedam Groep NV v Belgische Staat.
Date: 1997-12-18
1 By judgment of 18 December 1996, received at the Court on 13 January 1997, the Raad van State (Council of State), Belgium, referred to the Court under Article 177 of the EC Treaty a question concerning the interpretation of the judgment given by the Court in Case C-389/92 Ballast Nedam Group v Belgian State [1994] ECR I-1289 (hereinafter `BNG I').
8 For its part, the Belgian Government contends, with reference to the judgment of the Court in Joined Cases 27/86, 28/86 and 29/86 CEI and Others [1987] ECR 3347, that the Member States enjoy a margin of discretion in assessing the classification criteria to be satisfied by a contractor upon examination of an application for registration lodged by a dominant legal person of a group, even if the condition laid down by the Court is satisfied.
9 The reference to that case is not relevant. Whilst, as the Court pointed out at paragraph 22 of the judgment in CEI and Others, the criteria for classification in the various official lists of recognized contractors provided for in Article 28 of Directive 71/305 are not harmonized, that is not true of some of the qualitative selection criteria laid down in Articles 23 to 28, in particular references attesting to contractors' financial and economic standing and their technical knowledge and ability provided for in Articles 25 and 26. It is clear from the judgment in BNG I that the condition laid down by the Court therein specifically relates to references for demonstrating the technical, financial and economic standing of a company seeking registration on an official list of approved contractors.
10 In that judgment, the Court stated first that a holding company which does not itself execute works may not, because its subsidiaries which do carry out works are separate legal persons, be precluded on that ground from participation in public works contract procedures (paragraph 15).
11 It went on to state that it is for the contract-awarding authorities, as Article 20 of Directive 71/305 specifies, to check the suitability of contractors in accordance with the criteria referred to in Articles 25 to 28 of that directive (paragraph 16).
12 Finally, the Court explained that when a company produces references relating to its subsidiaries in order to prove its economic and financial standing and technical knowledge, it must establish that, whatever the nature of its legal link with those subsidiaries, it actually has available to it the resources of the latter which are necessary for carrying out the contracts. It is for the national court to assess, in the light of the factual and legal circumstances before it, whether such proof has been produced in the main proceedings (paragraph 17).
Hartmut Simon v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main.
Date: 1998-01-15
15 Suffice it to note in this regard that it is settled case-law that, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of a provision of Community law, the Court of Justice is in principle bound to give a ruling (Case C-134/94 Esso Española v Comunidad Autónoma de Canarias [1995] ECR I-4223 and Case C-125/94 Aprile v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1995] ECR I-2919, paragraph 17).  A request for a preliminary ruling from a national court may be rejected only if it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law sought by that court bears no relation to the actual nature of the case or the subject-matter of the main action (Case C-129/94 Ruiz Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-1829, paragraph 7).
20 In contrast, as the Court stated in paragraphs 15 and 16 of its judgment in Milchwerke Köln/Wuppertal, cited above, a milk purchaser is not liable to pay the additional levy and cannot be held liable for payment of that levy under, in particular, Article 15(4) of Regulation No 1546/88, which requires purchasers to pay over to the competent agency the amount of levy collected from each producer.  In this regard, it follows from Article 9 of Regulation No 857/84 that the purchaser is required to draw up an account prior to collection.
Göritz Intransco International GmbH v Hauptzollamt Düsseldorf.
Date: 1998-01-15
22 It is clear, moreover, from the sixth and eighth recitals in the preamble to the Code that the aim of the simplified customs procedures is that `customs formalities and controls should be ... kept to a minimum' whilst ensuring that the simplifications provided for are not liable to affect adversely the customs interests of the Community.
Südzucker Mannheim/Ochsenfurt AG v Hauptzollamt Mannheim.
Date: 1998-01-29
31 It should be noted that in order to establish whether a provision of Community law is in conformity with the principle of proportionality it is necessary to ascertain whether the means which it employs are appropriate and necessary to attain the objective sought.  Where Community legislation makes a distinction between a primary obligation, compliance with which is necessary in order to attain the objective sought, and a secondary obligation, essentially of an administrative nature, it cannot, without breaching the principle of proportionality, penalise failure to comply with the secondary obligation as severely as failure to comply with the primary obligation (see Man (Sugar), paragraph 20, and Maas, paragraph 15).
41 In addition, to allow other evidence, such as shipment certificates, when the products in question have already been exported, would make it quite impossible for the competent customs authorities to check whether the information given in those documents was accurate and would entail excessive administrative work for the Member States responsible for evaluating that evidence (see, to that effect, Case 15/83 Denkavit Nederland v Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten [1984] ECR 2171, paragraph 30).
43 In those circumstances, compliance with the customs formalities provided for on the export of C sugar, like the actual exportation, must be regarded as forming part of the primary obligations under the system in question, in so far as those formalities are not only intended to simplify administrative procedures but are also necessary to the proper functioning of the quota system in the sugar sector. They are not therefore to be classed as secondary obligations of an essentially administrative nature, failure to comply with which cannot be penalised as severely as infringement of a primary obligation without breaching the principle of proportionality.