HK v European Commission.
Date: 2019-12-19
26


In that regard, it should be observed that, according to settled case-law, to allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice pleas and arguments which it did not raise before the General Court would be to authorise it to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the General Court. In an appeal, the Court’s jurisdiction is therefore confined to review of the findings of law on the pleas and arguments argued before the first courts (judgment of 1 June 1994, Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others, C‑136/92 P, EU:C:1994:211, paragraph 59, and of 8 November 2016, BSH v EUIPO, C‑43/15 P, EU:C:2016:837, paragraph 43).
27


However, where a ground of appeal is admissible, it is in principle for the appellant to set out arguments in support of it as he or she sees fit, whether by relying on arguments already used before the General Court or by developing new arguments, in particular in relation to the positions adopted by that Court. Otherwise, the appeal procedure would be deprived of part of its purpose (judgment of 18 January 2007, PKK and KNK v Council, C‑229/05 P, EU:C:2007:32, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).
38


It has consistently been held that the statement of the reasons on which a judgment of the General Court is based must clearly and unequivocally disclose the General Court’s reasoning in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the decision taken and the Court of Justice to exercise its power of review (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 October 2010, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, C‑280/08 P, EU:C:2010:603, paragraphs 135 and 136, and order of 4 June 2019, Aldo Supermarkets v EUIPO, C‑822/18 P, not published, EU:C:2019:466, paragraph 18).
39


The question whether the grounds of a judgment of the General Court are contradictory or inadequate is a question of law which is amenable, as such, to judicial review on appeal (judgments of 17 December 1998, Baustahlgewebe v Commission, C‑185/95 P, EU:C:1998:608, paragraph 25, and of 23 January 2019, Klement v EUIPO, C‑698/17 P, not published, EU:C:2019:48, paragraph 29).
66


According to settled case-law, the principle of non-discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated alike unless such treatment is objectively justified (judgment of 20 June 2019, Ustariz Aróstegui, C‑72/18, EU:C:2019:516, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
67


The comparability of different situations must be assessed with regard to all the elements which characterise them. Those elements must, in particular, be determined and assessed in the light of the subject matter and purpose of the EU act which makes the distinction in question. The principles and objectives of the field to which the act relates must also be taken into account (judgment of 16 December 2008, Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others, C‑127/07, EU:C:2008:728, paragraph 26, and of 6 June 2019, P. M. and Others, C‑264/18, EU:C:2019:472, paragraph 29).
70


The grant of the survivor’s pension, in contrast, depends solely on the legal nature of the ties between the person concerned and the deceased official (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 May 2001, D and Sweden v Council, C‑122/99 P and C‑125/99 P, EU:C:2001:304, paragraph 47).
72


In that regard, it follows from the Court’s case-law that although de facto unions and legally recognised unions, such as marriage, may display similarities in certain respects, those similarities do not necessarily mean that those two types of union must be treated in the same way (judgment of 15 April 2010, Gualtieri v Commission, C‑485/08 P, EU:C:2010:188, paragraph 75).
88


It should be borne in mind that the principle of prohibition of fraud and abuse of rights is a general principle of EU law which individuals must comply with (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 February 2018, Altun and Others, C‑359/16, EU:C:2018:63, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
93


In that regard, it should be stated that, in civil service issues, a claim for compensation for material and non-material damage must be rejected in so far as they are closely linked to the claim for annulment, which itself was dismissed as unfounded (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 March 2001, Connolly v Commission, C‑274/99 P, EU:C:2001:127, paragraph 129).