larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Proceedings brought by Oulun Sähkönmyynti Oy.
Date: 2019-05-02
21


In accordance with settled case-law, when interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments of 2 September 2015, Surmačs, C‑127/14, EU:C:2015:522, paragraph 28, and of 16 November 2016, DHL Express (Austria), C‑2/15, EU:C:2016:880, paragraph 19).
24


In accordance with Article 1 thereof, Directive 2012/27 aims solely to establish a common framework of measures for the promotion of energy efficiency within the European Union in order to ensure the achievement of the objective set by the Union to increase energy efficiency by 20% by 2020 and to pave the way for further energy efficiency improvements beyond that date (judgment of 7 August 2018, Saras Energía, C‑561/16, EU:C:2018:633, paragraph 24).
Monachos Eirinaios, kata kosmon Antonios Giakoumakis tou Emmanouil v Dikigorikos Syllogos Athinon.
Date: 2019-05-07
24


In that regard, the Court has already had occasion to hold that Directive 98/5 establishes a mechanism for the mutual recognition of the professional titles of lawyers who migrate and wish to practise under the professional title obtained in the home Member State (judgment of 17 July 2014, Torresi, C‑58/13 and C‑59/13, EU:C:2014:2088, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
25


Furthermore, as is clear from recital 6 of Directive 98/5, by that directive the EU legislature sought, inter alia, to put an end to the differences in national rules on the conditions for registration with the competent authorities, which gave rise to inequalities and obstacles to freedom of movement (judgment of 17 July 2014, Torresi, C‑58/13 and C‑59/13, EU:C:2014:2088, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
26


In that context, Article 3 of Directive 98/5 harmonises fully the preconditions for exercise of the right of establishment conferred by that directive, laying down that a lawyer who wishes to practise in a Member State other than that in which he obtained his professional qualification is obliged to register with the competent authority of that Member State, which must effect that registration ‘upon presentation of a certificate attesting to his registration with the competent authority of the home Member State’ (judgment of 17 July 2014, Torresi, C‑58/13 and C‑59/13, EU:C:2014:2088, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
27


In that regard, the Court has already held that the presentation to the competent authority of the host Member State of a certificate attesting to registration with the competent authority of the home Member State is the only condition to which registration of the person concerned in the host Member State, enabling him to practise there under his home-country professional title, may be subject (judgment of 17 July 2014, Torresi, C‑58/13 and C‑59/13, EU:C:2014:2088, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
31


Those rules, unlike the rules concerning the preconditions for such registration, have not been harmonised and may therefore differ considerably from those in force in the home Member State. Moreover, as Article 7(1) of Directive 98/5 confirms, failure to comply with those rules is liable to lead to application of the penalties provided for in the law of the host Member State. Those penalties may, where appropriate, include removal from the register of the relevant bar in that Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 December 2010, Jakubowska, C‑225/09, EU:C:2010:729, paragraph 57).
Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg - Förderbank v European Central Bank.
Date: 2019-05-08
41


The national competent authorities thus assist the ECB in carrying out the tasks conferred on it by Regulation No 1024/2013, by a decentralised implementation of some of those tasks in relation to less significant credit institutions, within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 6(4) of that regulation.
53


In particular, the General Court, in paragraph 68 of the judgment under appeal, correctly recalled that the assessment of the proportionality of a measure must be reconciled with compliance with the discretion that may have been conferred on the EU institutions at the time it was adopted (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 December 2006, Germany v Parliament and Council, C‑380/03, EU:C:2006:772, paragraph 145 and the case-law cited).
85


According to the Court’s settled case-law, the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Court to exercise its power of review (judgments of 5 December 2013, Solvay v Commission, C‑455/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:796, paragraph 90, and of 10 March 2016, HeidelbergCement v Commission, C‑247/14 P, EU:C:2016:149, paragraph 16).
87


It is also settled case-law that the requirement to state reasons must be assessed by reference to the circumstances of the case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to specify all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (judgments of 5 December 2013, Solvay v Commission, C‑455/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:796, paragraph 91, and of 10 March 2016, HeidelbergCement v Commission, C‑247/14 P, EU:C:2016:149, paragraph 16).
Staatssecretaris van Financiën v L.W. Geelen.
Date: 2019-05-08
It follows that Article 9(2) of the Sixth Directive must not be regarded as an exception to a general rule which must be narrowly construed (judgment of 27 October 2005, Levob Verzekeringen and OV Bank, C‑41/04, EU:C:2005:649, paragraph 34).
Antonio Pasquale Mastromartino v Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Consob).
Date: 2019-05-08
25


In the present case, although it is for the referring court alone to rule on the classification of ‘financial advisers authorised to provide offsite services’ in accordance with the particular circumstances of the case pending before it, the Court of Justice does, however, have jurisdiction to elicit the criteria that the national court must apply to that end (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 November 2017, Robeco Hollands Bezit and Others, C‑658/15, EU:C:2017:870, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
34


It should be recalled that the provisions of the FEU Treaty on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services do not apply to a situation which is confined in all respects within a single Member State (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 November 2016, Ullens de Schooten, C‑268/15, EU:C:2016:874, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited, and of 14 November 2018, NKBM, C‑215/17, EU:C:2018:901, paragraph 41).
36


While it cannot be excluded at the outset that national legislation which is applicable without distinction to the internal and cross-border activities of such an adviser might, depending on the circumstances of the case, produce effects which are not confined within a single Member State, the Court has previously held, in such a case, that it cannot, where the referring court does not indicate something other than that the national legislation applies without distinction, consider that the request for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the provisions of the FEU Treaty on the fundamental freedoms is necessary to enable that court to give judgment in the case pending before it (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 November 2016, Ullens de Schooten, C‑268/15, EU:C:2016:874, paragraphs 50 and 54, and of 14 November 2018, NKBM, C‑215/17, EU:C:2018:901, paragraphs 42 to 44).
Hellenic Republic v European Commission.
Date: 2019-05-15
43


It is, admittedly, settled case-law that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside, and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (judgment of 4 July 2000, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission, C‑352/98 P, EU:C:2000:361, paragraph 34).
52


Finally, since the definition of ‘permanent pasture’ is contained in Regulation No 796/2004, which is intended to implement Regulation No 1782/2003, that concept is, under settled case-law of the Court, to be interpreted in conformity with the basic act (judgment of 26 July 2017, Czech Republic v Commission, C‑696/15 P, EU:C:2017:595, paragraph 33).
54


Accordingly, it follows from the foregoing that, as the Advocate General has stated in point 63 of her Opinion, the decisive criterion in respect of the definition of ‘permanent pasture’ is not the type of vegetation covering the agricultural area, but the actual use of that area for an agricultural activity that is typical for ‘permanent pasture’. Consequently, the presence of ligneous plants or of shrubs cannot, in itself, prevent classification of an area as ‘permanent pasture’, as long as their presence does not compromise the actual use of that area for an agricultural activity (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 2016, Planes Bresco, C‑333/15 and C‑334/15, EU:C:2016:426, paragraph 35).
73


It is clear from settled case-law that the requirement that the General Court give reasons for its decisions cannot be interpreted as meaning that it is obliged to respond in detail to every single argument advanced by a party, particularly if the argument is not sufficiently clear and precise and is not adequately supported by evidence (judgment of 11 January 2007, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission, C‑404/04 P, not published, EU:C:2007:6, paragraph 90).
108


As regards the Commission’s plea of inadmissibility based on the vagueness and brevity of the fifth ground of appeal, which are said to have made it impossible for the Commission to respond to it, it should be recalled that, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, it follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal. In this regard, Article 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice specifies that the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on must identify precisely those points in the grounds of the decision of the General Court which are contested (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraphs 42 and 43 and the case-law cited).
VM Vermögens-Management GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office.
Date: 2019-05-15
48


It should be observed that, in accordance with the approach set out in the first paragraph of Point IV of Communication No 4/03 and Point V of Communication No 2/12, the designation of the headings of Classes 35 and 36 of the Nice Agreement in the application for the Vermögensmanufaktur mark was intended to protect that mark for all the services in the alphabetical list for those classes (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 February 2017, Brandconcern v EUIPO and Scooters India, C‑577/14 P, EU:C:2017:122, paragraphs 31 and 32).
68


It should be borne in mind that, under Article 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal lies on points of law only. The General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence. The appraisal of those facts and the assessment of that evidence thus does not, save where they distort the evidence, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (see, inter alia, judgment of 6 September 2018, Bundesverband Souvenir — Geschenke — Ehrenpreise v EUIPO, C‑488/16 P, EU:C:2018:673, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
74


Next, in paragraph 111 of that judgment, the General Court merely stated that the contested mark is neither sufficiently original or resonant nor sufficiently unusual in terms of its formal structure so as not to require at least some interpretation, thought or analysis on the part of the relevant public, whereas, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice (judgment of 21 January 2010, Audi v OHIM, C‑398/08 P, EU:C:2010:29, paragraph 47), the existence of such characteristics is not a necessary condition for establishing the distinctive character of a laudatory reference.
76


In doing so, the General Court disregarded the case-law of the Court of Justice, according to which such a finding is not sufficient for the purposes of concluding that a mark has no distinctive character, since that mark may be perceived at the same time as promotional information and as an indication of origin, endowed with distinctive character (judgment of 21 January 2010, Audi v OHIM, C‑398/08 P, EU:C:2010:29, paragraph 44).
82


Moreover, in paragraph 99 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court also observed that, according to the Court of Justice’s case-law, the laudatory connotation of a word mark does not mean that it cannot be appropriate for the purposes of guaranteeing to consumers the origin of the goods or services which it covers. Thus, a mark can be perceived by the relevant public both as a promotional formula and as an indication of the commercial origin of the goods or services that it designates (judgment of 21 January 2010, Audi v OHIM, C‑398/08 P, EU:C:2010:29, paragraph 45).
M. Çoban v Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen (Uwv).
Date: 2019-05-15
37


In that regard, it should be noted that Decision No 3/80 seeks to coordinate the Member States’ social security schemes with a view to enabling Turkish workers employed or formerly employed in the Union, members of their families and their survivors to qualify for benefits in the traditional branches of social security (judgment of 10 September 1996, Taflan-Met and Others, C‑277/94, EU:C:1996:315, paragraph 26).
43


Decision No 3/80 neither makes any exception to nor imposes any restriction on the waiving of residence clauses set out in the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) thereof (judgment of 26 May 2011, Akdas and Others, C‑485/07, EU:C:2011:346, paragraph 80).
58


Additionally, as is apparent from recitals 4, 6 and 12 of Directive 2003/109, the principal objective of that directive is the integration of third-country nationals who are long-term residents in the Member States. Similarly, as is clear from recital 2 the directive seeks, by granting the status of long-term resident to such third-country nationals, to approximate the legal status of third-country nationals to that of Member States’ nationals (judgment of 18 October 2012, Singh, C‑502/10, EU:C:2012:636, paragraph 45).
European Commission v Sabine Tuerck.
Date: 2019-05-15
22


It follows that Article 11(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations does not authorise the institution at issue to make any deductions from the part of that capital which corresponds to the amount of pension rights itself. In that regard, it results from the case-law referred to by the General Court in paragraph 24 of the judgment under appeal, not only that only the national authority concerned is competent to calculate that amount, but also that that amount may not be subsequently amended or contested by the Commission (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 November 1989, Bonazzi-Bertottili v Commission, 75/88, 146/88 and 147/88, not published, EU:C:1989:410, paragraphs 17 and 20, and of 5 December 2013, Časta, C‑166/12, EU:C:2013:792, paragraphs 29 and 32).
53


For that reason, such grounds must, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, be rejected as inadmissible, except where they constitute the amplification of the grounds set out in the application initiating proceedings and where they are closely linked with the latter (judgment of 20 December 2017, Spain v Council, C‑521/15, EU:C:2017:982, paragraph 141 and the case-law cited).
56


As is apparent from the settled case-law, calling into question the statement of reasons for an act, which is concerned with infringement of essential procedural requirements, and the contestation of the merits of that act, which to its substantive legality, constitute two distinct grounds which may be relied on in the context of an action for annulment or an appeal (judgments of 2 April 1998, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France, C‑367/95 P, EU:C:1998:154, paragraph 67, and of 28 July 2011, Mediaset v Commission, C‑403/10 P, not published, EU:C:2011:533, paragraph 111).
65


As regards, in the second place, the argument alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons set out in paragraph 60 of the present judgment, it must be noted that it is settled case-law that that obligation requires the General Court not to respond to each of the parties’ arguments, but only to give reasons for its decision in a way that enables those parties to know the reasons justifying them and the Court to exercise its power of review in the event of an appeal (judgments of 9 September 2008, FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission, C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 P, EU:C:2008:476, paragraph 96, and of 6 September 2012, Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej v Commission, C‑422/11 P and C‑423/11 P, EU:C:2012:553, paragraph 48).
CJ v European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).
Date: 2019-05-15
In the second place, the assessment of the facts and evidence does not, save where the facts or evidence are distorted, constitute a point of law, which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (judgment of 2 September 2010, Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v OHIM, C‑254/09 P, EU:C:2010:488, paragraph 49). Such a distortion must be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and evidence (judgment of 2 September 2010, Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v OHIM, C‑254/09 P, EU:C:2010:488, paragraph 50).
As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that the force of res judicata extends only to the grounds of a judgment which constitute the necessary support of its operative part and are, therefore, inseparable from it (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 September 1999, Commission v  AssiDomän Kraft Products and Others, C‑310/97 P, EU:C:1999:407, paragraph 54, and of 15 November 2012, Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung and Others, C‑456/11, EU:C:2012:719, paragraph 40).
Therefore, where a European Union Court annuls a decision, the grounds on which that court has rejected certain arguments put forward by the parties do not have the force of res judicata (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 49, and of 25 July 2018, Société des produits Nestlé and Others v Mondelez UK Holdings & Services, C‑84/17 P,  C‑85/17 P and C‑95/17 P, EU:C:2018:596, paragraphs 52 and 53).
However, it should be recalled that, in accordance with the case-law of the Court, where one of the grounds adopted by the General Court is sufficient to sustain the operative part of its judgment, any defects that vitiate other grounds given in the judgment concerned in any event have no bearing on that operative part and, accordingly, a plea relying on such defects is ineffective and must be dismissed (judgment of 29 April 2004, Commission v CAS Succhi di Frutta, C–496/99 P, EU:C:2004:236, paragraph 68, and order of 30 June 2016, Slovenská pošta v  Commission, C‑293/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:511, paragraph 46).
Conti 11. Container Schiffahrts-GmbH & Co. KG MS "MSC Flaminia" v Land Niedersachsen.
Date: 2019-05-16
37


According to the Court’s settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it forms part (judgment of 17 October 2018, Günter Hartmann Tabakvertrieb, C‑425/17, EU:C:2018:830, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
38


It should also be pointed out that, since Article 1(3)(b) of Regulation No 1013/2006 lays down an exception to application of the regulation’s provisions, it must, in principle, be interpreted strictly. Nonetheless, that principle of strict interpretation cannot mean that the words used by that provision to define the scope of the exception which it lays down are to be construed in such a way as to deprive that exception of its intended effect (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 September 2014, Fastweb, C‑19/13, EU:C:2014:2194, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
47


It is true that, according to Article 1(1) of Regulation No 1013/2006 and recital 7 thereof, the regulation establishes procedures and control regimes for shipments of waste in a way which takes account of the need to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment and human health. In particular, it follows from Articles 3(1) and 4(1) of the regulation, read in conjunction with recital 14 thereof, that, for shipments between Member States of waste destined for disposal operations and hazardous waste destined for recovery operations, a prior written notification must be submitted to the competent authorities, enabling them to take the necessary measures for the protection of human health and the environment (judgment of 26 November 2015, Total Waste Recycling, C‑487/14, EU:C:2015:780, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).