Kingdom of Belgium v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2005-04-14
30. It must be borne in mind that the principle of legal certainty is a fundamental principle of Community law which requires, in particular, that rules should be clear and precise, so that individuals may be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and may take steps accordingly (see Case 169/80 Gondrand Frères and Garancini [1981] ECR 1931 and Case C-143/93 Van Es Douane Agenten [1996] ECR I-431, paragraph 27).
31. However, where a degree of uncertainty regarding the meaning and scope of a rule of law is inherent in that rule, it is necessary, in the context of an action of the present kind, in which the Kingdom of Belgium bases its complaints essentially on hypothetical situations, for the examination of it to be confined to the question whether the legal measure at issue displays such ambiguity as to make it difficult for that Member State to resolve with sufficient certainty any doubts as to the scope or meaning of the contested regulation.
33. It must be stated first of all that the contested regulation was adopted on the basis of Regulation No 994/98 and that, pursuant to Article 249 EC, it is binding and of general application. The guidelines and the multisectoral framework, on the contrary, have no legal basis either in the Treaty or in any legal act adopted under it. It follows that in the event of any overlap, the provisions of the contested regulation take precedence over those of the guidelines or the multisectoral framework (see, with regard to the scope of guidelines as compared with Treaty provisions, Case C-288/96 Germany v Commission  [2000] ECR I-8237, paragraph 62, and Case C-310/99 Italy v Commission [2002] ECR I‑2289, paragraph 52).
57. In that connection it must be borne in mind that the second subparagraph of Article 7(1) EC requires each institution to act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the Treat y.
58. In this case, the Council, by means of Regulation No 994/98, conferred on the Commission the power to declare that certain categories of aid are compatible with the common market and are not subject to the obligation of notification. Having regard to Article 87 EC, the Council thus confined itself to empowering the Commission to give effect to paragraph 3 of that article by laying down exceptions to the principle of incompatibility of aid enunciated in paragraph 1 thereof. By contrast, it did not confer on the Commission any power to interpret Article 87(1) EC, which defines the concept of State aid. The Commission therefore had no power to lay down a binding and general definition of the concept of State aid. It thus acted within the limits of its powers and, accordingly, did not contravene the general principles of legal certainty, subsidiarity and proportionality.
The second limb of the second plea
61. A breach of the principle of proportionality presupposes that the Community measure imposes on those to whom it is addressed an obligation which goes further than is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the aim pursued by that measure.
64. It must be pointed out that the Commission is required to ensure that Articles 87 EC and 88 EC are applied consistently with other provisions of the Treaty (see, to that effect, Case C-225/91 Matra v Commission [1993] ECR I-3203, paragraph 42).
67. Nevertheless, in the sphere of State aid, the Commission enjoys a wide discretion, the exercise of which involves assessments of an economic and social nature which must be made within a Community context (see Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1433, paragraph 34, and Case C-156/98 Germany  v Commission [2000] ECR I-6857, paragraph 67). That will in particular be the case when the Commission wishes to reconcile the objective of ensuring undistorted competition in the common market with other Community objectives such as the promotion of employment.
68. When the Commission enjoys a wide discretion of that kind, the Court, in reviewing the legality of exercise of that power, cannot substitute its own assessment in that matter for that of the competent authority but must confine itself to examining whether the latter assessment contains a manifest error or constitutes a misuse of powers or whether the authority in question clearly exceeded the bounds of its discretion (see Case C-288/96 Germany  v Commission , cited above, paragraph 26, and Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00 Omega Air and Others  [2002] ECR I-2569, paragraph 64).
71. It must be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (Case C-304/01 Spain  v Commission [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 31, and Case C-210/03 Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 70).
78. Furthermore, the amendment of the latter provision by the Treaty of Amsterdam has no ramifications for this case. It must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, in the context of the organisation of the powers of the Community the choice of the legal basis for a measure must rest on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review. Those factors include in particular the aim and content of the measure (see, in particular, Case C-269/97 Commission  v Council [2000] ECR I‑2257, paragraph 43, and Case C-36/98 Spain  v Council  [2001] ECR I-779, paragraph 58).
79. If examination of a Community measure shows that it pursues a twofold purpose or that it has a twofold component, and if one of these is identifiable as the main or predominant purpose or component, whereas the other is merely incidental, the act must be based on a single legal basis, namely that required by the main or predominant purpose or component (see, in particular, Case C-42/97 Parliament  v Council [1999] ECR I-869, paragraphs 39 and 40, and Case C-36/98 Spain v Council , cited above, paragraph 59).