Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2015-03-05
48. In accordance with Article 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal is to be limited to points of law. The General Court therefore has exclusive jurisdiction to establish the facts except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and to assess the evidence accepted. The establishment of those facts and the assessment of that evidence do not, save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice (judgments in France  v Commission , C‑559/12 P, EU:C:2014:217, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited, and Commune de Millau and SEMEA  v Commission , C‑531/12 P, EU:C:2014:2008, paragraph 56).
49. It should be noted in that respect that distortion must be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (judgment in General Motors  v Commission , C‑551/03 P, EU:C:2006:229, paragraph 54).
51. With regard to the complaint that the General Court erred in law in holding that the Council was not bound to produce proof of the materiality of the transactions concerned, it must be borne in mind that it is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded (judgment in Commission and Others  v Kadi , C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 121). Since the facts relating to the actual existence of the relevant transactions may be regarded as being undisputed in the present case, the General Court did not err in law.
91. It notes that the appellant bases its arguments on case-law relating to the principle of protection of legitimate expectations in criminal matters, the imposition of fines or the recovery of State aid. However, the restrictive measures in the present case are not penalties but prospective precautionary measures. It argues that the risk that an entity may act reprehensibly may be sufficient (judgment in Council  v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft , C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 85). Moreover, the system of notification of certain decisions by competent national authorities does not bind the EU institutions or other Member States.
93. The principle of legal certainty requires that legislation be clear and precise and that its application be foreseeable for all interested parties (judgment in France  v Commission , C‑325/91, EU:C:1993:245, paragraph 26).
95. As regards the argument regarding breach of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, the General Court did not err in law in recalling in paragraph 174 of the judgment under appeal the case-law according to which the right to rely on that principle extends to any person in a situation where an EU institution has caused him to entertain expectations which are justified by precise assurances provided to him. However, if a prudent and alert economic operator could have foreseen the adoption of an EU measure likely to affect his interests, he cannot plead that principle if the measure is adopted (in addition to the case-law cited in paragraph 174 of the judgment under appeal, see judgment in Alcoa Trasformazioni  v Commission , C‑194/09 P, EU:C:2011:497, paragraph 71).