larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
BU v Markt24 GmbH.
Date: 2021-02-25
According to the referring court, the duration and permanence of the employment relationship during the period from 6 September to 15 December 2017 are established. That court adds that both the pre-contractual phase preceding the conclusion of the contract at issue and the conclusion of the contract itself took place in Austria, since BU had also been registered with the Austrian social security institution.
The referring court also claims that, as is the case with consumers, employees constitute a group of persons in need of protection, who should not be placed in a worse position by EU legislation as compared with national legislation. According to that court, reference should be made, in particular, to the financial situation of the employee, which, in the case of low pay, makes it more difficult to bring proceedings before the courts of another Member State.
Les Chirurgiens-Dentistes de France and Others v Ministre des Solidarités et de la Santé and Others.
Date: 2021-02-25
Such a literal interpretation of that provision is consistent with the context and purpose of that directive.
In that regard, it must be stated that both the origins of Directive 2005/36 and the scheme thereof confirm that the EU legislature intended to distinguish between the use of the term ‘professions’ and that of  ‘professionals’.
Such partial access satisfies, first, the general objective of the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of persons and services, as set out in recital 1 of Directive 2005/36 as amended. Second, it also meets the more specific objective set out in recital 7 of Directive 2013/55, namely to go beyond Directive 2005/36, which applied only to professionals wishing to pursue the same profession in another Member State, and to grant partial access to professionals requesting that access where, in the host Member State, the activities concerned are part of a profession with a larger scope of activities than in the home Member State and the differences between the fields of activity are so large that a full programme of education and training would be required from the professionals to compensate  for shortcomings.
Furthermore, as observed by the Advocate General, in essence, in point 33 of his Opinion, authorising partial access for activities included in the professions concerned by automatic recognition under, inter alia, Chapter III of Title III of Directive 2005/36 as amended, is not such as to undermine the harmonisation of the minimum training requirements for those professions, as set out in recital 1 of Directive 2013/55.
It is apparent from Article 4f(5) of Directive 2005/36 as amended that the activities allowed in the context of partial access to a regulated profession are to be exercised under the professional title of the home Member State, if necessary translated into the languages of the host Member State, and under the condition that the professionals concerned must clearly indicate to the service recipients the scope of their professional activities. Thus, the fact of being entitled to pursue only part of the activities included in a profession concerned by automatic recognition does not call into question the system established by that directive, under which only persons meeting the minimum training requirements laid down by the directive for a profession concerned by automatic recognition may actually benefit from such recognition and pursue all the activities which such a profession includes.
VS v Hauptzollamt Münster.
Date: 2021-03-03
However, the Finanzgericht Düsseldorf (Finance Court, Düsseldorf) has expressed doubts as to whether the rules laid down in Article 87(4) of the Customs Code can be applied by analogy to the incurrence of an import VAT debt.  First, the competence to recover customs duty, excise duty and VAT must be analysed separately (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2019, Federal Express Corporation Deutsche Niederlassung, C‑26/18, EU:C:2019:579, paragraph 44). Secondly, Article 71 of the VAT Directive concerns only the issue of when the VAT is incurred and makes no reference to the criteria, set out by Articles 60 and 61 of that directive, for determining the place of importation.
Next, import VAT and customs duties display comparable essential features since they arise from the fact of importation of goods into the Union and the subsequent distribution of those goods through the economic channels of the Member States.  That parallel nature is confirmed by the fact that the second subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive authorises Member States to link the chargeable event and the date on which the VAT on importation becomes chargeable with those laid down for customs duties (judgment of 10 July 2019, Federal Express Corporation Deutsche Niederlassung, C‑26/18, EU:C:2019:579, paragraph 41).
Lastly, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, in addition to the customs debt, there may also be a requirement to pay VAT where, on the basis of the particular unlawful conduct which gave rise to the customs debt, it can be presumed that the goods entered the economic network of the Union and, consequently, that they may have undergone consumption, that is, the act on which VAT is levied (judgment of 10 July 2019, Federal Express Corporation Deutsche Niederlassung, C‑26/18, EU:C:2019:579, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
However, such a presumption may be rebutted if it is established that, despite failures to comply with customs legislation which result in the incurrence of a customs debt on importation in the Member State where those failures occurred, goods have been introduced into the economic network of the Union via the territory of another Member State, where they were intended for consumption. In that case, the chargeable event for VAT on importation occurs in that other Member State (judgment of 10 July 2019, Federal Express Corporation Deutsche Niederlassung, C‑26/18, EU:C:2019:579, paragraph 48).
In those circumstances, the Court found that the goods in question had entered the economic network of the Union in the Member State of their final destination and that, consequently, the import VAT relating to those goods had arisen in that Member State (see, to the effect, judgment of 10 July 2019, Federal Express Corporation Deutsche Niederlassung, C‑26/18, EU:C:2019:579, paragraph 53).
UH v An tAire Talmhaíochta Bia agus Mara, Éire agus an tArd-Aighne.
Date: 2021-03-17
In that regard, as the Advocate General observed in point 26 of his Opinion, the arguments raised by both Ireland and the Polish Government relate to the substance of the action brought by the applicant in the main proceedings. It must however be recalled that arguments which concern matters relating to  the substance of an action cannot affect the admissibility of the questions referred (see, to that effect, the judgment of 19 November 2019, A.K. and Others  (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court)  (C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18, EU:C:2019:982, paragraph 111).
Moreover, according to the Court’s settled case-law, questions as to the interpretation of EU law which are referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not for this Court to verify, enjoy a presumption of relevance (judgment of 2 February 2021, Consob, C‑481/19, EU:C:2021:84, paragraph 29). That presumption of relevance cannot be rebutted by the possibility that the applicant might ultimately be unsuccessful in the main proceedings before the national court, in particular on the basis of an interpretation of EU law adopted by the Court.
In that regard, it must be recalled that the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by that directive and their duty, under Article 4(3) TEU and Article 288 TFEU, to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation is binding on all the authorities of Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (judgments of 19 April 2016, DI, C‑441/14, EU:C:2016:278, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited; of 4 October 2018, Link Logistik N&N, C‑384/17, EU:C:2018:810, paragraph 57, and of 13 December 2018, Hein, C‑385/17, EU:C:2018:1018, paragraph 49).
In that regard, it should nevertheless be recalled that, as the referring court has found that Directive 2001/82 was incorrectly transposed, it is required to take all the appropriate general and particular measures to ensure that the result prescribed by that directive is attained (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 October 1996, Kraaijeveld and Others, C‑72/95, EU:C:1996:404, paragraph 55).
Until Directive 2001/82 is repealed by that regulation, the provisions of the directive remain binding for so long as the Court of Justice has not ruled that they are invalid (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 February 1979, Granaria, 101/78, EU:C:1979:38, paragraph 5, and of 21 September 1989, Hoechst v Commission, 46/87 and 227/88, EU:C:1989:337, paragraph 64).
Accordingly, the Court alone may, exceptionally and for overriding considerations of legal certainty, grant a provisional suspension of the effects of a rule of EU law with regard to a national law that is contrary to it (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 July 2016, Association France Nature Environnement, C‑379/15, EU:C:2016:603, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
Proceedings brought by A.
Date: 2021-03-24
In those circumstances, a purely literal interpretation of Article 22a(1)(a) of Directive 2006/43, based on the text of one or more language versions, to the exclusion of the others, cannot prevail. According to the Court’s settled case-law, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision or be made to override the other language versions. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all languages of the European Union (see, in particular, judgment of 8 October 2020, Combinova, C‑476/19, EU:C:2020:802, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
H. Lundbeck A/S and Lundbeck Ltd v European Commission.
Date: 2021-03-25
131


In order for a given agreement to be characterised as a ‘restriction by object’, all that matters are the specific characteristics of that agreement (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 January 2020, Generics (UK) and Others, C‑307/18, EU:C:2020:52, paragraphs 84 and 85) from which any particular harmfulness of that agreement for competition can be inferred, where necessary as a result of a detailed analysis of that agreement, its objectives and the economic and legal context of which it forms part.
164


Furthermore, the fact that certain manufacturers of generic medicines or members of Lundbeck’s staff may have expressed doubts as to the legality of the agreements at issue or agreements similar to those agreements is a factor that is entirely capable of substantiating the finding that Lundbeck was in a position to determine that its conduct was or, at the very least, may have been anticompetitive in nature.
Eutelsat SA v Autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des postes and Inmarsat Ventures SE, anciennement Inmarsat Ventures Ltd.
Date: 2021-04-15
In accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, EU legislation must, so far as possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with international law (judgment of 4 September 2014, Zeman, C‑543/12, EU:C:2014:2143, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). That applies in particular where such a text has recourse to specific concepts employed in an international agreement concluded under the aegis of an international organisation, such as the ITU, of which all EU Member States are members and of which the European Union itself is a ‘Sector Member’.
Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea v SC Piscicola Tulcea SA and Ira Invest SRL v Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea.
Date: 2021-04-29
54


Regarding Case C‑294/19, it should be noted at the outset that the relevant period relating to the facts in the main proceedings is from 2007 to 2014 and, before 1 January 2009, the applicable regulation during the period from 2007 to that date was Regulation No 1782/2003 (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2015, Demmer, C‑684/13, EU:C:2015:439, paragraphs 49 and 50).
55


Nevertheless, the Court held that the concept of ‘eligible hectare’ as defined in Article 34(2)(a) of Regulation No 73/2009 is the same as that of ‘eligible hectare’ within the meaning of Article 44(2) of Regulation No 1782/2003 and that, therefore, the interpretation of that first provision also applies to the second (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2015, Demmer, C‑684/13, EU:C:2015:439, paragraphs 52 and 53).
62


It is settled case-law that classification as ‘arable land’ and, consequently, as an ‘agricultural area’, for the purposes of those provisions, depends on the actual use of the land in question (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 October 2010, Landkreis Bad Dürkheim, C‑61/09, EU:C:2010:606, paragraph 37; of 2 July 2015, Wree, C‑422/13, EU:C:2015:438, paragraph 36; and of 2 July 2015, Demmer, C‑684/13, EU:C:2015:439, paragraph 56).
63


It follows that an area must be classified as ‘agricultural’ where it is actually used as ‘arable land’ within the meaning of the provisions recalled in paragraph 61 of the present judgment (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 October 2010, Landkreis Bad Dürkheim, C‑61/09, EU:C:2010:606, paragraph 37) and that that classification cannot be called into question on the sole ground that such an area has been used as arable land contrary to national law relating to the classification of land.
64


In addition, it should be borne in mind that, in order to be eligible for the aid in question, the areas at issue in the main proceedings must be agricultural areas, be part of a farmer’s holding and be used for agricultural activities or, where the areas are used as well for non-agricultural activities, predominantly used for agricultural activities (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2015, Demmer, C‑684/13, EU:C:2015:439, paragraph 54).
Granarolo SpA v Ministero dell'Ambiente e della Tutela del Territorio e del Mare and Others.
Date: 2021-04-29
As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it.  To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (judgment of 26 October 2016, Yara Suomi and Others, C‑506/14, EU:C:2016:799, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
The fact that a national court has, formally speaking, worded its request for a preliminary ruling by referring to certain provisions of EU law does not preclude the Court of Justice from providing to the national court all the elements of interpretation which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to them in its questions. It is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the order for reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of the dispute (judgment of 27 June 2018, Turbogás, C‑90/17, EU:C:2018:498, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
As regards the other criteria laid down in Article 3(e) of Directive 2003/87, the Court has held that an activity relates directly to an activity covered by Annex I to that directive where it is essential to the carrying out of that activity and where that direct association is, moreover, evidenced by the existence of a technical connection in circumstances where the relevant activity is integrated into the same technical process of the activity covered by Annex I (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 2016, Elektriciteits Produktiemaatschappij Zuid-Nederland EPZ, C‑158/15, EU:C:2016:422, paragraph 30).
In the second place, it must be noted that the principle of prohibition of fraud and abuse of rights is a general principle of EU law with which individuals must comply. The application of EU legislation cannot be extended to cover transactions carried out for the purpose of fraudulently or wrongfully obtaining advantages provided for by EU law (judgment of 28 October 2020, Kreis Heinsberg, C‑112/19, EU:C:2020:864, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
In particular, the principle that abusive practices are prohibited is intended to bar wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic reality and are set up with the sole aim of obtaining an undue advantage (see, by analogy, judgment of 18 June 2020, KrakVet Marek Batko, C‑276/18, EU:C:2020:485, paragraph 84  and the case-law cited).
Natumi GmbH v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen.
Date: 2021-04-29
It must be noted in this regard that, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, in interpreting a provision of EU law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also its context and the objectives of the legislation of which it forms part (judgment of 19 September 2018, González Castro, C‑41/17, EU:C:2018:736, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
It is apparent from the case-law of the Court that an implementing regulation must, if possible, be given an interpretation consistent with the basic regulation (judgment of 19 July 2012, Pie Optiek, C‑376/11, EU:C:2012:502, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
AR v Stadt Pforzheim.
Date: 2021-04-29
In that regard, it should be recalled that, in paragraph 71 of the judgment of 23 April 2015, Aykul (C‑260/13, EU:C:2015:257), the Court found that Article 2(1) and the second subparagraph of Article 11(4) of Directive 2006/126 were to be interpreted as meaning that a Member State in whose territory the holder of a driving licence issued by another Member State is staying temporarily is not precluded from refusing to recognise the validity of that driving licence on account of unlawful conduct on the part of its holder in the territory of the first Member State after that driving licence has been issued that results, under the national law of the first Member State, in unfitness to drive motor vehicles.
It should also be borne in mind, in that regard, that the Court has held that, although Directive 2006/126 provides only for a minimum degree of harmonisation of the national provisions relating to the conditions under which a driving licence may be issued, that directive does, however, bring about exhaustive harmonisation of documents proving the existence of a right to drive which must be recognised by the Member States pursuant to Article 2(1) thereof (judgment of 26 October 2017, I, C‑195/16, EU:C:2017:815, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
YL v Altenrhein Luftfahrt GmbH.
Date: 2021-05-12
According to the Court’s settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case in the main proceedings, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court.  Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, of which the Montreal Convention forms an integral part, the Court is in principle required to give a ruling (judgment of 9 July 2020, Vueling Airlines, C‑86/19, EU:C:2020:538, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
YJ v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS).
Date: 2021-05-12
17


In that regard, it should be noted that, in accordance with settled case-law, it is for the Court, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation with national courts, to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to decide the case before it and, to that end, the Court should, where necessary, reformulate the questions referred to it (judgment of 3 March 2020, Gómez del Moral Guasch, C‑125/18, EU:C:2020:138, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
19


In that regard, it must be noted that the concept of ‘direct discrimination on ground of sex’, referred to in Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7, must be understood as covering any situation in which one person is treated less favourably on grounds of sex than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation (judgment of 26 June 2018, MB(Change of gender and retirement pension), C‑451/16, EU:C:2018:492, paragraph 34). It follows that, in order for direct discrimination to be ‘on ground of sex’, a person must be treated unfavourably on account of being male or female.
Bankia SA v Unión Mutua Asistencial de Seguros (UMAS).
Date: 2021-06-03
It should be recalled, in the first place, that the system established by Article 267 TFEU with a view to ensuring that EU law is interpreted uniformly throughout the Member States institutes direct cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts by means of a procedure which is completely independent of any initiative by the parties. Consequently, although the referring court is at liberty to request the parties to the dispute before it to suggest wording suitable for the questions to be referred, the fact remains that it is for that court alone ultimately to decide both the form and content of those questions (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013,  Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, C‑136/12, EU:C:2013:489, paragraphs 28 to 30).
UE and HC v Vorarlberger Landes- und Hypotheken-Bank AG.
Date: 2021-07-01
Article 63(1) and (2)(a) of that regulation, concerning the purpose of the European Certificate of Succession, lists the persons who may use it, namely heirs, legatees having direct rights to the estate and executors of wills or administrators of the estate, to prove, in another Member State, in particular their status and/or succession rights (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 March 2018, Mahnkopf, C‑558/16, EU:C:2018:138, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
C.J. v Région wallonne.
Date: 2021-07-08
While, as is apparent from the order for reference, the holding at issue in the main proceedings takes the form of an association without legal personality, which includes, in addition to the applicant in the main proceedings, natural persons who are not young farmers, it must be noted that the wording of that provision does not either prejudge the legal form which such a holding may take (see, to this effect, judgment of 25 October 2012, Ketelä, C‑592/11, EU:C:2012:673, paragraph 42) or preclude the possibility of setting up as head of a holding with other farmers.
In order to determine the scope of the criterion for determining the upper threshold for access to business start-up aid, under the third subparagraph of Article 19(4) of Regulation No 1305/2013, read in conjunction with Article 5(2) of Delegated Regulation No 807/2014, it is necessary to have regard first and foremost to the terms of the provisions interpreted, where necessary, in the light of the context to which they belong and the objectives of Regulation No 1305/2013 (judgment of 25 October 2012, Ketelä, C‑592/11, EU:C:2012:673, paragraph 39).