larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1994-06-01
3 With regard to those various arguments, it should first be noted that the amendment of the national rule at issue, now under way, is insufficient to eliminate the failure to fulfil obligations since the subject-matter of the proceedings in an action for failure to fulfil obligations is limited in time to the end of the pre-litigation phase (see the judgment in Case C-361/88 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-2567). Furthermore, mere administrative measures, by their very nature open to amendment at the will of the administration and lacking sufficient publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting valid compliance with the Treaty obligations (see judgment in Case C-236/91 Commission v Ireland [1992] ECR I-5933, paragraph 6).
4 Secondly, it is for the Commission to judge at what time it will bring an action for failure to fulfil obligations; the considerations which determine its choice of time cannot affect the admissibility of the action (see judgment in Case 7/68 Commission v Italy [1968] ECR 423). That being so, the fact, on the one hand, that no action was taken further to the reasoned opinion, either immediately or shortly afterwards, and, on the other hand, that the subject of the failure to fulfil obligations was not formally raised at a bilateral meeting, could not confer on the Member State concerned a legitimate expectation that the procedure was at an end.
14 In that connection, it should be noted that in the absence of specific Community requirements the Member States may choose the means which they consider appropriate to protect public health on their territory (see judgment in Case C-290/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-3317).
25 That argument cannot be upheld. The German regulation in question constitutes a new technical specification within the meaning of Article 1, cited above, since non-reusable sterile medical instruments may henceforth be marketed or used in Germany only if certain obligations are fulfilled the application of which was formerly confined to the labelling of medicinal products. The application, to given products, of a rule which previously only affected other products, constitutes, with regard to the former, a new regulation and must therefore be notified in accordance with the directive.
26 That finding is not called in question by the fact that, as contended by the German Government, the extension of the scope of the rule is based on an enabling provision which was previously communicated to the Commission. That enabling measure, taken as such, does not require to be notified on the basis of Article 8 aforesaid since it does not constitute a new specification. The situation is different as regards the implementation of that measure, which does constitute a new specification which must be notified.
European Parliament v Council of the European Union.
Date: 1994-06-01
10 The Court has consistently held that the duty to consult the European Parliament in the course of the legislative procedure, in the cases provided for by the Treaty, includes a requirement that the Parliament be reconsulted on each occasion when the text finally adopted, viewed as a whole, departs substantially from the text on which the Parliament has already been consulted, except where the amendments essentially correspond to the wish of the Parliament itself (see the judgments in Case C-65/90 Parliament v Council [1992] ECR I-4593, and in Joined Cases C-13/92 to C-16/92 Driessen en Zonen and Others v Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat [1993] ECR I-4751, at paragraph 23).
15 The case-law of the Court shows that, when the regulation adopted broadly corresponds to the Parliament' s wishes, the Council may dispense with further consultation (see the judgment in Case 817/79 Buyl v Commission [1982] ECR 245, at paragraph 23). In the present case, however, the Council has not produced any text enabling the conclusion to be drawn that the Parliament expressly declared itself in favour of a progressive liberalization of cabotage in passenger transport. Indeed, the resolution cited by the Council, which concerns the liberalization of cabotage in road haulage operations, namely a different sector from the one in question here, contains no indication to that effect. The Council' s argument cannot, therefore, be upheld.
16 The Kingdom of Spain refers, however, to the opinions of various parliamentary committees which, according to the Kingdom of Spain, came out in favour of the progressive liberalization of cabotage in passenger transport operations before the resolution of 10 March 1988 was adopted.
21 In that connection, the Court has held that the principles governing freedom to provide transport services, as established in particular by Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty, must be applied by introducing a common transport policy (see the judgment in Case 13/83 Parliament v Council [1985] ECR 1513, at paragraph 62). Simply to annul the contested regulation would be likely to call in question the degree of liberalization which that regulation sought to achieve.
Henri de Compte v European Parliament.
Date: 1994-06-02
94 In paragraph 202 the Court of First Instance sets out an alternative line of reasoning. Since the applicant' s pleas contesting the principal line of reasoning have been rejected, there is no need to consider those contesting the alternative reasoning.
96 The error to which the applicant points is simply a drafting error, as is apparent from a comparison between the wording used in paragraph 203 and that employed in paragraph 195, in which the Court of First Instance sets out the questions with which it wishes to deal in the following paragraphs. A reading of paragraph 195 shows that the Court of First Instance links the lack of supporting documents to the deficit of BFR 4 100 000 and not to the transaction by which those two cheques were encashed. In those circumstances, the drafting error cannot be regarded as an error of reasoning which could justify the annulment of the contested judgment on that point (see, to that effect, with regard to regulations, the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-27/90 SITPA v ONIFLOHR [1991] ECR I-133, paragraph 13).
Criminal proceedings against Van Swieten BV.
Date: 1994-06-02
22 As regards the question of the commencement of the "period of 24 hours" referred to in Article 8(1) of Regulation No 3820/85, it should be borne in mind that that regulation is intended in particular to ensure road safety and to improve working conditions for drivers.
23 With that in mind, Article 8(1) of Regulation No 3820/85 seeks, by providing that each period of 24 hours must include a minimum number of hours of rest per day, to ensure that driving times and rest periods alternate, so that drivers do not remain at the wheel of their vehicles for periods of such length as to cause tiredness and jeopardize road safety.
Criminal proceedings against Tankstation 't Heukske vof and J. B. E. Boermans.
Date: 1994-06-02
11 The Court has consistently held that all measures which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade constitute measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions (judgment in Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5).
12 However, the application to products from other Member States of national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States within the meaning of the Dassonville judgment, cited above, provided that those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and provided that they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States. Where those conditions are fulfilled, the application of such rules to the sale of products from another Member State meeting the requirements laid down by that State is not by nature such as to prevent their access to the market or to impede access any more than it impedes the access of domestic products. Such rules therefore fall outside the scope of Article 30 of the Treaty (see the judgment in Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097, paragraphs 16 and 17).
13 The conditions laid down in the judgment last cited are fulfilled in the case of rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings.
14 The rules in question relate to the times and places at which the goods in question may be sold to consumers. However, they apply to all relevant traders without distinguishing between the origin of the products in question and do not affect the marketing of products from other Member States in a manner different from that in which they affect domestic products.
16 Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty per se are concerned only with the conduct of undertakings and not with national legislation of Member States. The Court has consistently held, however, that Articles 85 and 86, in conjunction with Article 5 of the Treaty, require the Member States not to introduce or maintain in force measures, even of a legislative nature, which may render ineffective the competition rules applicable to undertakings. Such would be the case, the Court has held, if a Member State were to require or favour the adoption of agreements, decisions or concerted practices contrary to Article 85 or to reinforce their effects, or to deprive its own rules of the character of State legislation by delegating to private traders responsibility for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere (see the judgment in Case 267/86 Van Eycke v ASPA [1988] ECR 4769, paragraph 16, and, most recently, the judgment in Case C-332/89 Marchandise and Others [1991] ECR I-1027, paragraph 22).
Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH v Emilio Boch.
Date: 1994-06-02
17 It follows from the foregoing that in order to be a "judgment" for the purposes of the Convention the decision must emanate from a judicial body of a Contracting State deciding on its own authority on the issues between the parties.
18 That condition is not fulfilled in the case of a settlement, even if it was reached in a court of a Contracting State and brings legal proceedings to an end. Settlements in court are essentially contractual in that their terms depend first and foremost on the parties' intention, as the Experts' Report explains (op. cit., p. 56)
20 As has already been stated in paragraph 15 of this judgment, the definition of "judgment" given in Article 25 applies to all the provisions of the Convention in which that term is used. Moreover, Article 27 constitutes an obstacle to the achievement of one of the fundamental objectives of the Convention, which is to facilitate, to the greatest extent possible, the free movement of judgments by providing for a simple and rapid enforcement procedure. Article 27 must therefore be interpreted strictly, which precludes treating a court settlement as a judgment given by a court or tribunal.
Exportslachterijen van Oordegem BVBA v Belgische Dienst voor Bedrijfsleven en Landbouw and Generale Bank NV.
Date: 1994-06-02
16 As regards the use of Community funds resulting, as in this case, from the implementation of the common agricultural policy, Article 8(1) of Regulation No 729/70, which is the basic regulation governing the obligations of the Community and the Member States in connection with the financing of the common agricultural policy, provides as follows:
"The Member States in accordance with national provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action shall take the measures necessary to:
- satisfy themselves that transactions financed by the Fund are actually carried out and are executed correctly;
- prevent and deal with irregularities;
- recover sums lost as a result of irregularities or negligence.
..."
17 That provision, which expressly lays down in that specific area the obligations imposed on Member States by Article 5 of the Treaty defines, the Court has said, the principles according to which the Community and the Member States must ensure the implementation of Community decisions on agricultural intervention financed by the Fund and combat fraud and irregularities in relation to those operations (BayWa, cited above, paragraph 13).
18 That article thus imposes on the Member States the general obligation to take the measures necessary to satisfy themselves that the transactions financed by the Fund are actually carried out and are executed correctly, even if the specific Community act does not expressly provide for the adoption of particular supervisory measures (Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission [1990] ECR I-2321, paragraphs 16 and 17).
19 It should also be emphasized that in the case of supervisory measures adopted at the national level in order to implement Community rules regarding the common agricultural policy the national authorities must act with the same degree of care as they exercise in implementing the corresponding national legislation, in order to prevent any erosion of the effectiveness of Community law (BayWa, cited above, paragraph 22).
20 The national measures must, moreover, satisfy the general principle of proportionality, that is to say, they must not exceed what is necessary and appropriate in order to achieve the desired aim (Case 77/81 Zuckerfabrik Franken v Germany [1982] ECR 681).
AC-ATEL Electronics Vertriebs GmbH v Hauptzollamt München-Mitte.
Date: 1994-06-02
16 On that point, it should be borne in mind that Article 177 of the Treaty is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, so that, when ruling on the interpretation or validity of Community provisions, the latter is empowered to do so only on the basis of the facts which the national court puts before it (see the judgment in Case 104/77 Oehlschlaeger v Hauptzollamt Emmerich [1978] ECR 791, point 4).
17 It is not for the Court of Justice, but for the national court, to ascertain the facts which have given rise to the dispute and to establish the consequences which they have for the judgment which it is required to deliver (see the judgment in Case 17/81 Pabst & Richarz v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg [1982] ECR 1331, paragraph 12).
18 It is, moreover, solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume the responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of each case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the question which it submits to the Court (see the judgments in Case 247/86 Alsatel v Novasam [1988] ECR 5987, paragraph 8, and in Case C-127/92 Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary of State for Health [1993] ECR I-5535, paragraph 10).
19 The Finanzgericht Munich has stated in its order for reference that the circuits imported by AC-ATEL were unquestionably products falling within tariff subheading 8542 11 43, namely DRAMs with a storage capacity exceeding 256 Kbits but not exceeding 4 Mbits. It is also apparent from the order for reference that the national court implicitly refused to submit to the Court the question raised by AC-ATEL at the hearing.
21 The Court has consistently held that, in interpreting a provision of Community law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also its context and the aims pursued by the legislation of which it forms part (see the judgment in Case C-136/91 Findling Waelzlager v Hauptzollamt Karlsruhe [1993] ECR I-1793, paragraph 11).
Empire Stores Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise.
Date: 1994-06-02
12 According to the judgment in Case 230/87 Naturally Yours Cosmetics Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1988] ECR 6365, paragraphs 11, 12 and 16, the consideration for a supply of goods may consist in a provision of services, and so constitute the taxable amount within the meaning of Article 11A(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive in respect of such supply, if there is a direct link between the supply of goods and the provision of services and if the value of those services can be expressed in monetary terms.
16 The link between the supply of the article without extra charge and the introduction of a potential customer must be regarded as direct, since if the service is not provided no article is due from or supplied without extra charge by Empire Stores.
17 Moreover, since the services provided to Empire Stores are remunerated by the supply of goods the value of the services can unquestionably be expressed in monetary terms.
18 As for the determination of that value, which is the substance of the second question, the Court held in Naturally Yours Cosmetics (cited above), at paragraph 16, that the consideration taken as the taxable amount in respect of a supply of goods is a subjective value, since the taxable amount is the consideration actually received and not a value estimated according to objective criteria.
19 Where that value is not a sum of money agreed between the parties, it must, in order to be subjective, be the value which the recipient of the services constituting the consideration for the supply of goods attributes to the services which he is seeking to obtain and must correspond to the amount which he is prepared to spend for that purpose. Where, as here, the supply of goods is involved, that value can only be the price which the supplier has paid for the article which he is supplying without extra charge in consideration of the services in question.
Punto Casa SpA v Sindaco del Comune di Capena and Comune di Capena and Promozioni Polivalenti Venete Soc. coop. arl (PPV) v Sindaco del Comune di Torri di Quartesolo and Comune di Torri di Quartesolo.
Date: 1994-06-02
11 The Court has consistently held that any measure capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade constitutes a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction (judgment in Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5).
12 The Court has also held that the application to products from other Member States of national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States, within the meaning of the Dassonville judgment, cited above, provided that those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and provided that they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States. Where those conditions are fulfilled, the application of such rules to the sale of products from another Member State meeting the requirements laid down by that State is not by nature such as to prevent their access to the market or to impede access any more than it impedes the access of domestic products. Such rules therefore fall outside the scope of Article 30 of the Treaty (see the judgment in Joined Cases C-267 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097, paragraphs 16 and 17).
15 Accordingly, the answer to the national court must be that Article 30 of the Treaty is to be interpreted as not applying to national legislation on the closure of shops which applies to all traders operating within the national territory and which affects in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States.
Question 2
Elliniko Dimosio v Ellinika Dimitriaka AE.
Date: 1994-06-08
17 In that context, all the Commission can do is to draw the attention of the Member States to the Community rules which they must apply and, in cooperating with the Member States at the administrative level, give them its interpretation as to the application of those rules. That interpretation has no binding force and neither the competent authorities of the Member States nor, still less, individuals, can be bound by it.
23 In the absence of binding Community provisions, it was for the Member States themselves to set, for the grant of refunds on the export of agricultural products to non-member countries, maximum radioactivity levels for the purpose of determining whether agricultural products intended for export to non-member countries are "products of sound and fair marketable quality" within the meaning of Article 15 of Regulation No 2730/79 and Article 13 of Regulation No 3665/87.
Criminal proceedings against Marc Michielsen and Geybels Transport Service NV.
Date: 1994-06-09
14 It follows from those provisions that the concept of "daily working period" in Article 15(2) is wider than that of "period of work" in Article 15(3). The former refers to the entire working day in the sense of an uninterrupted span of time, whereas the latter only covers the times at which the driver is actually engaged in activities having a bearing on driving, including the driving time. Consequently, "periods of availability", "breaks in work and daily rest periods", as mentioned in Article 15(3) of Regulation No 3821/85, do not fall within the concept "period of work", since the fact that those terms are preceded by the term "all other periods of work" precludes their being regarded as forming part of the "period of work".
25 The starting point, for the purpose of determining when the daily working period, thus defined, begins and ends, is to be found in the judgment of the Court of 2 June 1994 in Van Swieten (Case C-313/92, not yet published in the ECR, paragraphs 22 to 27), in which the Court held that the driver' s daily period of activity commences at the time when he activates the tachograph following a weekly or daily rest period. If the daily rest is taken in two or three separate periods, the period of activity begins at the end of the rest period of at least eight hours' duration. Consequently, the end of the daily working period coincides with the beginning of a daily rest period or, if the daily rest is taken in two or three separate periods, at the beginning of a rest period extending over a minimum of eight consecutive hours.