larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
José Vicente Olaso Valero v Fondo de Garantía Salarial (Fogasa).
Date: 2004-12-16
30. The ambit of Directive 80/987 is defined in Article 1 thereof.  A reading of Article 1(1) in conjunction with Article 3(1) of that directive makes it clear that the directive covers only those claims made by workers that arise from contracts of employment or employment relationships where those claims relate to pay within the meaning of Article 3(1) (see Rodríguez Caballero,  paragraph 26).
31. According to Article 2(2) of Directive 80/987, it is for national law to specify the term ‘pay’ and to define it ( Rodríguez Caballero,  paragraph 27).  In the circumstances, that directive therefore refers back to Spanish law.
34. The right reserved to national law to specify the benefits payable by the guarantee institution is conditional upon observance of fundamental rights, which include inter alia the general principle of equality and non-discrimination.  That principle requires that comparable situations should not be treated differently unless such difference in treatment is objectively justified ( Rodríguez Caballero , paragraphs 29 to 32).
35. Workers who have been unfairly dismissed are in a comparable situation in so far as they are entitled to compensation where they are not reinstated.
36. The different treatment afforded to those workers under the Spanish legislation, in so far as claims relating to compensation for unfair dismissal are payable by Fogasa only if they have been determined by a judgment or administrative decision, can thus be accepted only if it is objectively justified (see, to that effect, Rodríguez Caballero , paragraph 34).
37. In this connection it has to be observed that the documents before the Court do not supply any information additional to that which the Court has already had an opportunity of examining in Rodríguez Caballero , paragraphs 36 to 38.  It follows that no persuasive argument has been made to justify the difference in treatment between claims corresponding to compensation for unfair dismissal awarded by a judgment or administrative decision and claims for compensation for unfair dismissal established in conciliation proceedings.
F. J. Pape v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij.
Date: 2005-01-13
14. It is apparent from the Court’s case-law that taxes do not fall within the scope of the Treaty provisions on State aid unless they constitute the means of financing an aid measure and are thus an integral part of that measure (the judgment in SWNB , cited above, paragraph 25).
15. For a tax, or part of a tax, to be regarded as forming an integral part of an aid measure, it must be hypothecated to the aid measure under the relevant national rules. In the event of such hypothecation, the revenue from the tax has a direct impact on the amount of the aid and, consequently, on the assessment of the compatibility of the aid with the common market (see, to that effect, Case 47/69 France  v Commission  [1970] 487, paragraphs 17, 20 and 21, and the judgment in SWNB , paragraph 26).
16. The documents in the file submitted to the Court do not suggest that the levy imposed by the Meststoffenwet is hypothecated to the aid for the transport of manure introduced on the basis of Article 9(4) of that law. Under the Meststoffenwet, the competent authorities may exercise discretion in allocating the revenue from the levy to the various purposes, including that provided for in Article 9(4). The revenue from the levy therefore has no direct impact on the amount of aid as it may be used to finance other measures provided for in that law which do not have all the features of aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the Treaty (now Article 87(1) EC).
Società Italiana Dragaggi SpA and Others v Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti and Regione Autonoma Friuli Venezia Giulia.
Date: 2005-01-13
25. It thus follows from the foregoing that, on a proper construction of Article 4(5) of the Directive, the protective measures prescribed in Article 6(2), (3) and (4) of the Directive are required only as regards sites which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 4(2) of the Directive, are on the list of sites selected as sites of Community importance adopted by the Commission in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 21 of the Directive.
26. This does not mean that the Member States are not to protect sites as soon as they propose them, under Article 4(1) of the Directive, as sites eligible for identification as sites of Community importance on the national list transmitted to the Commission.
28. In the present instance, it should be remembered that the national lists of sites eligible for identification as sites of Community importance must contain sites which, at national level, have an ecological interest that is relevant from the point of view of the Directive’s objective of conservation of natural habitats and wild fauna and flora (see Case C-371/98 First Corporate Shipping  [2000] ECR I‑9235, paragraph 22).
29. It is apparent, therefore, that in the case of sites eligible for identification as sites of Community importance that are mentioned on the national lists transmitted to the Commission and may include in particular sites hosting priority natural habitat types or priority species, the Member States are, by virtue of the Directive, required to take protective measures appropriate for the purpose of safeguarding that ecological interest.
30. The answer to the question referred must therefore be that:
– on a proper construction of Article 4(5) of the Directive, the protective measures prescribed in Article 6(2), (3) and (4) of the Directive are required only as regards sites which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 4(2) of the Directive, are on the list of sites selected as sites of Community importance adopted by the Commission in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 21 of the Directive;
– in the case of sites eligible for identification as sites of Community importance which are included in the national lists transmitted to the Commission and, in particular, sites hosting priority natural habitat types or priority species, the Member States are, by virtue of the Directive, required to take protective measures that are appropriate, from the point of view of the Directive’s conservation objective, for the purpose of safeguarding the relevant ecological interest which those sites have at national level.
Albert Nardone v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2005-01-13
48. Since the second plea is directed against a superabundant ground for the judgment under appeal, it must be rejected as nugatory (see, inter alia, Case C-244/91 P Pincherle  v Commission [1993] ECR I-6965, paragraphs 25 and 31, and the order of 12 December 1996 in Case C-49/96 P Progoulis  v Commission  [1996] ECR I-6803, paragraph 27).
Heinecken Brouwerijen BV v Hoofdproductschap Akkerbouw.
Date: 2005-01-13
16. It should be noted that the Court has consistently held that the second subparagraph of Article 34(2) EC, which prohibits all discrimination in the context of the common agricultural policy, is merely a specific expression of the general principle of equal treatment, which requires that comparable situations not be treated differently and different situations not be treated alike unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, inter alia, Case 203/86 Spain  v Council  [1988] ECR 4563, paragraph 25, Case C-15/95 EARL de Kerlast  [1997] ECR I-1961, paragraph 35, Case C-292/97 Karlsson and Others [2000] ECR I-2737, paragraph 39, and Case C-14/01 Niemann [2003] ECR I-2279, paragraph 49).
Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2005-01-18
50. In that regard, as the Court held in its judgment in Case 16/88 Commission  v Council [1989] ECR 3457, paragraph 10, following the amendments made to Article 145 of the EC Treaty (now Article 202 EC) by the Single European Act, the Council may reserve the right to exercise implementing powers directly only in specific cases, and it must state in detail the grounds for such a decision.
51. That means that the Council must properly explain, by reference to the nature and content of the basic instrument to be implemented or amended, why exception is being made to the rule that, under the system established by the Treaty, when measures implementing a basic instrument need to be taken at Community level, it is the Commission which, in the normal course of events, is responsible for exercising that power.
Rosa García Blanco v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS) and Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social (TGSS).
Date: 2005-01-20
23. By letter of 11 April 2003, that court replied that it maintained its reference, in particular because the Court’s answer in the main proceedings could be of use to it in other proceedings pending before it.
26. It should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the procedure provided for in Article 234 EC is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts by means of which the former provides the latter with interpretation of such Community law as is necessary for them to give judgment in cases upon which they are called to adjudicate (see, inter alia, Case C‑231/89 Gmurzynska-Bscher  [1990] ECR I‑4003, paragraph 18; Case C‑314/96 Djabali  [1998] ECR I‑1149, paragraph 17; and Case C‑318/00 Bacardi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins  [2003] ECR I‑905, paragraph 41).
27. Thus it is clear from both the wording and the scheme of Article 234 EC that a national court or tribunal is not empowered to bring a matter before the Court of Justice by way of a reference for a preliminary ruling unless a case is pending before it, in which it is called upon to give a decision which is capable of taking account of the preliminary ruling (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑422/93 to C‑424/93 Zabala Erasun and Others  [1995] ECR I-1567, paragraph 28, and Djabali , paragraph 18).
28. The justification for a reference for a preliminary ruling is not that it enables advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions to be delivered but rather that it is necessary for the effective resolution of a dispute ( Djabali , paragraph 19; Bacardi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins , paragraph 42; and Joined Cases C‑480/00 to C‑482/00, C‑484/00, C‑489/00 to C‑491/00 and C‑497/00 to C‑499/00 Azienda Agricola Ettore Ribaldi and Others  [2004] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 72).
29. In the case at issue in the main proceedings, after the Juzgado de lo Social n o  3 de Orense had made its reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling, the retirement pension applied for by Mrs García Blanco under the Spanish social security scheme was granted her, with effect from the date on which she was able to enforce her entitlement to a retirement pension. Moreover, it is common ground that Mrs García Blanco’s daughter, in her capacity as her successor, waived that statutory pension in order to receive the family member’s allowance.
30. The conclusion must therefore be that the claims of the claimant in the main proceedings have been met in their entirety.
31. In those circumstances, an answer by the Court to the questions put by the Juzgado de lo Social n o  3 de Orense would be of no use to that court.
SmithKline Beecham plc v Lægemiddelstyrelsen.
Date: 2005-01-20
16. In its judgment in Case C-368/96 Generics (UK) and Others  [1998] ECR I-7967, paragraph 36, the Court held that a medicinal product is essentially similar to an original medicinal product, for the purposes of Article 4.8(a)(iii) of Directive 65/65, where it satisfies the criteria of having the same qualitative and quantitative composition in terms of active principles, of having the same pharmaceutical form and of being bioequivalent, unless it is apparent in the light of scientific knowledge that it differs significantly from the original product as regards safety or efficacy.
Merck, Sharp & Dohme BV v Belgian State.
Date: 2005-01-20
23. That interpretation of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the Directive is corroborated by the objective of the Directive, which, as stated in the sixth recital, is to allow the persons concerned to ensure that the administrative entry of medicinal products satisfies objective criteria and that there is no discrimination between national medicinal products and those from other Member States (see Case C-229/00 Commission  v Finland  [2003] ECR I-5727, paragraph 39).
24. In the light of those considerations, the answer to the first part of the question must be that the time-limit laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the Directive is a mandatory time-limit which the national authorities are not entitled to exceed.
The consequences of exceeding the time-limit within which the competent authority is to respond
27. In that regard, the sixth recital of the preamble to the directive states that the transparency requirements deriving from the Directive do not affect national policies on price setting and on the determination of social security schemes except as far as it is necessary to attain transparency within the meaning of the Directive. It follows that the Directive has as its underlying principle the idea of minimum interference in the organisation by Member States of their domestic social security policies.
28. It follows from settled case-law, moreover, that Community law does not detract from the power of the Member States to organise their social security systems (see, in particular, Case 238/82 Duphar and Others  [1984] ECR 523, paragraph 16, and Case C-70/95 Sodemare and Others  [1997] ECR I-3395, paragraph 27), and that, in the absence of harmonisation at Community level, it is for the laws of each Member State to determine the circumstances in which social security benefits are granted (see, in particular, Case 110/79 Coonan [1980] ECR 1445, paragraph 12; Case C-349/87 Paraschi  [1991] ECR I-4501, paragraph 15; and Joined Cases C-4/95 and C-5/95 Stöber and Piosa Pereira  [1997] ECR I-511, paragraph 36).
29. Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision in the Directive, it is for the Member States to determine the effects of exceeding the time-limit, on condition that the rules which it adopts are not less favourable than those concerning similar situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render the rights conferred by the Community legal order impossible or difficult in practice to exercise (see Case C-255/00 Grundig Italiana  [2002] ECR I-8003, paragraph 33, and Case C-129/00 Commission  v Italy  [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 25).
Glaxosmithkline SA v Belgian State.
Date: 2005-01-20
22. It is settled case-law that the Court has no jurisdiction to answer a question raised by a national court where it is quite obvious that the interpretation or the appraisal of the validity of a rule of Community law sought by the national court bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted (see Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 39, and Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital  [2002] ECR I-607, paragraph 19).
29. That interpretation of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the Directive is corroborated by the objective of the Directive, which, as stated in the sixth recital, is to allow the persons concerned to ensure that the administrative entry of medicinal products satisfies objective criteria and that there is no discrimination between national medicinal products and those from other Member States (see Case C-229/00 Commission  v Finland  [2003] ECR I-5727, paragraph 39).
30. In the light of those considerations, the answer to the first part of the question must be that the time-limit laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the Directive is a mandatory time-limit which the national authorities are not entitled to exceed.
The consequences of exceeding the time-limit where a previous decision adopted in good time has been annulled
38. In the absence of that limit, the exercise of the applicant’s right to obtain a reasoned decision within the mandatory 90-day time-limit, which may be extended by a further 90 days, would be excessively difficult (see Case C-255/00 Grundig Italiana  [2002] ECR I-8003, paragraph 33, and Case C-129/00 Commission  v Italy  [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 25). In effect, the Member States could impose a longer time-limit for implementation of the decision annulling the initial decision than that which the Directive prescribes for the closure of the administrative procedure. In that case, the decision of annulment would not protect the applicant’s right.
Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Austria.
Date: 2005-01-27
35. According to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, in particular Case C-173/01 Commission  v Greece  [2002] ECR I-6129, paragraph 7, and Case C-114/02 Commission  v France  [2003] ECR I-3783, paragraph 9).
38. As regards the argument relied on by the Republic of Austria, that putting in place regeneration plants on its territory is uneconomical and that in those circumstances and by reason of the principle of proportionality the obligations of the Member States concerned should be modified according to the actual circumstances prevailing in them, it must be recalled, as the Court held in paragraphs 35 to 43 of its judgment in Case C-102/97 Commission  v Germany [1999] ECR I‑5051, that one of the primary objectives of the Directive was to give priority to the processing of waste oils by regeneration. Therefore, to consider that the technical, economic and organisational circumstances obtaining in a Member State automatically constituted constraints making it impossible to adopt the measures provided for in Article 3(1) of the Directive would deprive that provision of all practical effect, since the obligation imposed on Member States would be limited by maintenance of the status quo, with the result that there would be no genuine obligation to take the measures necessary to give priority to the processing of waste oils by regeneration.
39. Furthermore, as regards such priority, it must be pointed out, as the Court stated in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the judgment in Commission  v Germany , that the reference to ‘technical, economic and organisational constraints’ in Article 3(1) of the Directive forms part of a provision giving general expression to the obligation imposed on Member States and that the Community legislature did not thereby intend to provide limited exceptions to a rule having general application, but to define the scope and content of a positive obligation to give priority to the processing of waste oils by regeneration.
Commission of the European Communities v Portuguese Republic.
Date: 2005-01-27
29. It must be recalled, as a preliminary point, that, as the Court held in its judgment in Case C-102/97 Commission  v Germany [1999] ECR I-5051, paragraph 35, one of the primary objectives of the Directive was to give priority to the processing of waste oils by regeneration. That objective, expressed in the second recital in the preamble to Directive 87/101, is justified by the fact t hat regeneration is the most rational way of re‑using waste oils in view of the energy savings that can thereby be achieved.
32. As the Court held in paragraph 25 of its judgment in Case C-424/02 Commission  v United Kingdom  [2004] ECR I-0000, although it is acceptable that Member States first carry out studies and draw up reports in order to determine how waste oils should be disposed of, those preparatory steps must nevertheless be followed by tangible measures aimed at giving priority to regeneration, in order to comply with the obligation laid down by Article 3(1) of the Directive.
35. As to the argument relied on by the Portuguese Republic that setting up regeneration plants on its territory was not viable and that, in those circumstances and by reason of the principle of proportionality, the obligations of the Member States concerned should be modified in accordance with actual circumstances, it must be recalled that, as the Court held in paragraphs 35 and 43 of its judgment in Commission  v Germany , one of the primary objectives of the Directive was to give priority to the processing of waste oils by regeneration. Therefore, to consider that the technical, economic and organisational circumstances obtaining in a Member State automatically constituted constraints making it impossible to adopt the measures provided for in Article 3(1) of the Directive would deprive that provision of all practical effect, since the obligation imposed on Member States would be limited by maintenance of the status quo, with the result that there would be no genuine obligation to take the measures necessary to give priority treatment to the processing of waste oils by regeneration.
36. Furthermore, as regards that priority, it must be pointed out, as the Court stated in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the judgment in Commission v Germany , that the reference to ‘technical, economic and organisational constraints’ in Article 3(1) of the Directive forms part of a provision giving general expression to the obligation imposed on Member States and that the Community legislature did not thereby intend to provide limited exceptions to a rule having general application, but to define the scope and content of a positive obligation to give priority to the processing of waste oils by regeneration.