larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Criminal proceedings against Antoine Kortas.
Date: 1999-06-01
21 The Court has consistently held (see, inter alia, Case 8/81 Becker [1982] ECR 53, paragraph 25; Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo [1989] ECR 1839, paragraph 29; and Joined Cases C-246/94 to C-249/94 Cooperativa Agricola Zootecnica S. Antonio and Others [1996] ECR I-4373, paragraph 17) that, whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied upon before the national courts by an individual against the State where that State has failed to implement the directive in national law by the end of the period prescribed or where it has failed to implement the directive correctly.
27 The aim of the procedure under that provision is to ensure that no Member State applies national rules derogating from the harmonised legislation without obtaining due confirmation from the Commission.
28 As the Court has consistently held (Case C-41/93 France v Commission [1994] ECR I-1829, paragraphs 29 and 30), measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which are such as to hinder intra-Community trade would be rendered ineffective if Member States retained the right unilaterally to apply national rules derogating from those measures and a Member State is not, therefore, authorised to apply the national provisions notified by it under Article 100a(4) until after it has obtained a decision from the Commission confirming them.
Paula Gomez-Rivero v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit.
Date: 1999-06-03
26 As the Court held in Case 7/75 Mr and Mrs F. v Belgian State [1975] ECR 679, at paragraph 16, it follows from Article 2(1) of Regulation No 1408/71, defining the persons covered by the regulation, read in conjunction with Article 3(1), which sets out the fundamental principle of equal treatment, that the members of a worker's family who have not worked and do not work in an employed capacity, whether professionally or otherwise, as referred to in Title II of that regulation, must be allowed the benefit of the social security legislation of the Member State in which they reside under the same conditions as the nationals of that State.
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1999-06-08
19 With regard to that submission the Court observes that, in Case C-191/95 Commission v Germany [1998] ECR I-5449, at paragraphs 48 to 50, the Court considered an identical plea presented by the German Government concerning the circumstances in which the Commission adopts reasoned opinions. There the Court held first of all that the principle of collegiality which governs the functioning of the Commission is based on the equal participation of the Commissioners in the adoption of decisions and implies that decisions should be the subject of collective deliberation and that all the members of the college of Commissioners should bear collective responsibility at the political level. It then explained that the formal requirements for effective compliance with the principle of collegiality varied according to the nature and legal effects of the acts adopted. A reasoned opinion merely conferred upon the Commission the right, but not a duty, to commence proceedings before the Court. The decision to commence proceedings before the Court did not per se alter the legal position in question.
34 Next, it must be observed that, even if in 46 areas limit values were exceeded only once in only one season, the 1995 season, as mentioned in paragraph 29 of this judgment, that too constitutes an infringement of the Directive.
35 Contrary to what the German Government claims, it is not sufficient to take all reasonably practicable measures: the Directive requires the Member States to take all necessary measures to ensure that bathing waters conform to the limit values set therein, within a period which is longer than that laid down for transposition of the Directive, in order to enable the Member States to satisfy such a requirement (Commission v United Kingdom, cited above, paragraphs 42 and 44). The Directive therefore requires the Member States to ensure that certain results are achieved and, apart from the derogations provided for, does not allow them to rely on particular circumstances to justify a failure to fulfil that obligation (Commission v  United Kingdom, cited above, paragraph 43, and Case C-92/96 Commission v  Spain [1998] ECR I-505, paragraph 28). The German Government does not rely on any of those derogations with regard to those areas.
41 It follows that even if, under the Directive, the absolute impossibility of fulfilling the obligations arising from the Directive could justify a failure to comply with it, the Federal Republic has not succeeded in proving absolute impossibility in this case.
Jutta Johannes v Hartmut Johannes.
Date: 1999-06-10
19 So, the Staff Regulations are intended only to regulate the legal relations between the European institutions and their officials, by establishing a series of reciprocal rights and obligations and by affording certain members of an official's family rights which they may assert in relation to the European Communities.
26 It should be noted in that regard that the prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down by Article 6 of the Treaty applies only within the Treaty's area of application (Case C-291/96 Grado and Bashir [1997] ECR I-5531, paragraph 13).
Unibank A/S v Flemming G. Christensen.
Date: 1999-06-17
14 It must be borne in mind at the outset that Article 50 of the Brussels Convention treats a `document which has been formally drawn up or registered as an authentic instrument and is enforceable in one Contracting State' in the same way, with regard to its enforceability in the other Contracting States, as judgments within the meaning of Article 25 of that Convention, in that it declares the provisions on enforcement contained in Article 31 et seq. thereof also to be applicable to such documents.  The purpose of those provisions is to achieve one of the fundamental objectives of the Brussels Convention, which is to facilitate, to the greatest possible extent, the free movement of judgments by providing for a simple and rapid enforcement procedure (see Case 148/84 Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank [1985] ECR 1981, paragraph 16, and Case C-414/92 Solo Kleinmotoren [1994] ECR I-2237, paragraph 20).
15 Since the instruments covered by Article 50 of the Brussels Convention are enforced under exactly the same conditions as judgments, the authentic nature of such instruments must be established beyond dispute so that the court in the State in which enforcement is sought is in a position to rely on their authenticity.  Since instruments drawn up between private parties are not inherently authentic, the involvement of a public authority or any other authority empowered for that purpose by the State of origin is needed in order to endow them with the character of authentic instruments.
21 It follows from all the foregoing that the answer to the first question must be that an acknowledgment of indebtedness enforceable under the law of the State of origin whose authenticity has not been established by a public authority or other authority empowered for that purpose by that State does not constitute an authentic instrument within the meaning of Article 50 of the Brussels Convention.
The second question
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 1999-06-17
19 In that connection, it should be borne in mind that, under the first paragraph of Article 5 of the EC Treaty (now the first paragraph of Article 10 EC), the Member States are to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community.  Such action includes directives which, pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 189 of the EC Treaty (now Article 249 EC), are binding as to the result to be achieved upon each Member State to which they are addressed.  Under the Court's case-law, that obligation implies, for each Member State to which a directive is addressed, adopting, within the framework of its national legal system, all the measures necessary to ensure that the directive is fully effective, in accordance with the objective which it pursues (see Case C-208/90 Emmott [1991] ECR I-4269, paragraph 18).
20 According to Article 1 of the directive, and as the Court confirmed in its judgment in Case C-190/90 Commission v Netherlands [1992] ECR I-3265, paragraph 18, the purpose of the directive is, inter alia, to ensure that the necessary measures are adopted to prevent major accidents caused by certain industrial activities, and to limit the consequences of any such accidents.
Société critouridienne de distribution (Socridis) v Receveur principal des douanes.
Date: 1999-06-17
17 In that context, the second paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty is intended, more specifically, to prevent any form of indirect fiscal protectionism affecting imported products which, although not similar, within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 95, to domestic products, nevertheless compete with some of them, even if only partially, indirectly or potentially (Case 356/85 Commission v Belgium [1987] ECR 3299, paragraphs 6 and 7).
18 In that connection, only commonly consumed wines, which in general are cheap wines, have enough characteristics in common with beer to constitute an alternative choice for consumers and may therefore be regarded as being in competition with beer for the purposes of the second paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty (Commission v Belgium, cited above, paragraph 11). Consequently, the ground of invalidity based on that provision relied on by Socridis to challenge the minimum excise duty fixed by Directive 92/84 arises only to the extent that it applies to commonly consumed wines.
19 Next, the Court has consistently held that directives do not infringe the Treaty if they leave the Member States a sufficiently wide margin of appreciation to enable them to transpose them into national law in a manner consistent with the requirements of the Treaty (see to that effect Case 5/88 Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 2609, paragraph 22).
26 Furthermore, the Court has consistently held that the Community institutions are free to introduce harmonisation gradually or in stages. It is generally difficult to implement such measures because they require the competent Community institutions to draw up, on the basis of diverse and complex national provisions, common rules in harmony with the aims laid down by the Treaty and approved by a qualified majority of the Members of the Council, or even, as is the case in fiscal matters, the unanimous agreement of the latter (see to that effect Case 37/83 Rewe-Zentrale v Landwirtschaftskammer Rheinland [1984] ECR 1229, paragraph 20, and Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament and Council [1997] ECR I-2405, paragraph 43).
ED Srl v Italo Fenocchio.
Date: 1999-06-22
10 According to the settled case-law of the Court, Article 34 of the Treaty applies to national measures which have as their specific object or effect the restriction of patterns of exports and thereby the establishment of a difference in treatment between the domestic trade of a Member State and its export trade, in such a way as to provide a particular advantage for national production or for the domestic market of the State in question (see, in particular, Case 237/82 Jongeneel Kaas and Others v Netherlands [1984] ECR 483, paragraph 22).
11 It is true that the effect of the national provision referred to in paragraph 4 above is to subject traders to different procedural rules according to whether they supply goods within the Member State concerned or export them to other Member States.  However, as the French and Austrian Governments have rightly pointed out, the possibility that nationals would therefore hesitate to sell goods to purchasers established in other Member States is too uncertain and indirect for that national provision to be regarded as liable to hinder trade between Member States (see, in a different context, Case C-69/88 Krantz v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen [1990] ECR I-583, paragraph 11, Case C-339/89 Alsthom Atlantique v Sulzer [1991] ECR I-107, paragraphs 14 and 15, and Case C-93/92 CMC Motorradcenter v Baskiciogullari [1993] ECR I-5009, paragraph 12).
Battital Srl v Regione Piemonte.
Date: 1999-07-01
28 It is settled case-law (see, inter alia, Case 6/64 Costa [1964] ECR 585, at p. 593, Case 13/78 Eggers [1978] ECR 1935, paragraph 19, and Joined Cases 141/81, 142/81 and 143/81 Holdijk and Others [1982] ECR 1299, paragraph 8) that it is not for the Court, in proceedings brought under Article 177 of the EC Treaty, to rule on the compatibility of provisions of national law with Community law. The Court does, however, have jurisdiction to provide the national court with all such factors relating to the interpretation of Community law as may enable that court to determine the compatibility of those provisions with Community law.
Spyridoula Celia Alexopoulou v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1999-07-01
13 Such an argument was, however, manifestly contrary to a consistent line of cases decided by the Court of Justice according to which, concerning classification in grade, the appointing authority has a wide discretion, in particular for the purpose of assessing the previous practical experience of a person recruited as an official (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 66/83 to 68/83 and 136/83 to 140/83 Hattet and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 2459, paragraph 28; Joined Cases 314/86 and 315/86 De Szy-Tarisse and Feyaerts v Commission [1988] ECR 6013, paragraph 26; and Case C-298/93 P Klinke v Court of Justice [1994] ECR I-3009, paragraph 15; see also Alexopoulou I, paragraph 19).
14 In those circumstances, a given level of practical experience cannot confer on the person possessing it a right to be appointed to the higher grade of the career bracket concerned (see Klinke, paragraph 30; Alexopoulou I, paragraph 20; and Case T-12/97 Barnett v Commission [1997] ECR-SC I-A-313 and II-863, paragraph 50).
32 The conclusion as to the exceptional nature of the option of resorting to Article 31(2) of the Staff Regulations adds nothing new to the earlier case-law, according to which the option available to the administration to appoint a newly-recruited official to the higher grade in the starting or intermediate career bracket must be construed as an exception to the general classification rules (see Case 146/84 De Santis v Court of Auditors [1985] ECR 1723, paragraph 9; see also Case T-18/90 Jongen v Commission [1991] ECR II-187, paragraph 12; and Alexopoulou I, paragraph 20).
33 The reason for that exceptional nature is the competent authority's obligation to reconcile the use of its power under Article 31(2) with the observance of the requirements arising from the concept of a career bracket within the meaning of Article 5 of, and Annex I to, the Staff Regulations (De Santis, paragraph 9; and Alexopoulou I, paragraph 20).
41 To allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea in law which it has not raised before the Court of First Instance would be to allow it to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the Court of First Instance.
Sebago Inc. and Ancienne Maison Dubois & Fils SA v G-B Unic SA.
Date: 1999-07-01
17 The Court finds, first, that the interveners in the present case are correct in submitting that the answer to the first three questions referred has already been given by the Court in Silhouette. The Court held, in paragraphs 18 and 26 of that judgment, that, according to the text of Article 7 of the Directive itself, rights conferred by the mark are exhausted only if the products have been put on the market in the Community (in the EEA since the EEA Agreement entered into force) and that the Directive does not leave it open to the Member States to provide in their domestic law for exhaustion of the rights conferred by the trade mark in respect of products put on the market in non-member countries.
19 The text of Article 7(1) of the Directive does not give a direct answer to that question. Nevertheless, the rights conferred by the trade mark are exhausted only in respect of the individual items of the product which have been put on the market with the proprietor's consent in the territory there defined. The proprietor may continue to prohibit the use of the mark in pursuance of the right conferred on him by the Directive in regard to individual items of that product which have been put on the market in that territory without his consent.
20 That is the interpretation of Article 7(1) that the Court has already adopted. Thus, the Court has already held that the purpose of that provision is to make possible the further marketing of an individual item of a product bearing a trade mark that has been put on the market with the consent of the trade-mark proprietor and to prevent him from opposing such marketing (Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior v Evora [1997] ECR I-6013, paragraphs 37 and 38, and Case C-63/97 BMW v Deenik [1999] ECR I-905, paragraph 57). That interpretation is, moreover, confirmed by Article 7(2) of the Directive which, in its reference to the `further commercialisation' of goods, shows that the principle of exhaustion concerns only specific goods which have first been put on the market with the consent of the trade-mark proprietor.
21 Furthermore, in adopting Article 7 of the Directive, which limits exhaustion of the right conferred by the trade mark to cases where the goods bearing the mark have been put on the market in the Community (in the EEA since the EEA Agreement entered into force), the Community legislature has made it clear that putting such goods on the market outside that territory does not exhaust the proprietor's right to oppose the importation of those goods without his consent and thereby to control the initial marketing in the Community (in the EEA since the EEA Agreement entered into force) of goods bearing the mark. That protection would be devoid of substance if, for there to be exhaustion within the meaning of Article 7, it were sufficient for the trade-mark proprietor to have consented to the putting on the market in that territory of goods which were identical or similar to those in respect of which exhaustion is claimed.
Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1999-07-08
31 It is clear from settled case-law (see, in particular, Case C-150/94 United Kingdom v Council [1998] ECR I-7235, paragraph 36) that the fourth paragraph of Article 37 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice does not prevent an intervener from using arguments different from those used by the party it is supporting, provided the intervener seeks to support that party's submissions.
57 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, pursuant to Article 168A of the EC Treaty (now Article 225 EC) and the first paragraph of Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal may rely only on grounds relating to the infringement of rules of law, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts. The appraisal by the Court of First Instance of the evidence put before it does not constitute, save where the clear sense of that evidence has been distorted, a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (see, inter alia, Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-667, paragraphs 10 and 42).
59 On the other hand, the Court of Justice must examine the question whether the Court of First Instance committed an error of law in refusing the applicant's request to reopen the oral procedure and order measures of inquiry.
60 As regards the request for measures of inquiry, the case-law of the Court (see, in particular, Case 77/70 Prelle v Commission [1971] ECR 561, paragraph 7, and Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 53) makes it clear that, if made after the oral procedure is closed, such a request may be admitted only if it relates to facts which may have a decisive influence on the outcome of the case and which the party concerned could not put forward before the close of the oral procedure.
64 Secondly, even when submitting its application, the applicant was in a position to identify the documents sought and to provide the Court of First Instance with at least minimum evidence of the expediency of those measures of inquiry or measures of organisation of procedure for the purposes of the proceedings, in order to prove that the Polypropylene Decision had been altered after its adoption by the College of the Members of the Commission, as some of the applicants in the PVC cases had done (see, to that effect, the judgment in Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, paragraphs 93 and 94).
Hoechst AG v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1999-07-08
33 It is clear from settled case-law (see, in particular, Case C-150/94 United Kingdom v Council [1998] ECR I-7235, paragraph 36) that the fourth paragraph of Article 37 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice does not prevent an intervener from using arguments different from those used by the party it is supporting, provided the intervener seeks to support that party's submissions.
38 In that regard, it should be borne in mind, first, that, pursuant to Article 168A of the EC Treaty (now Article 225 EC) and the first paragraph of Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal may rely only on grounds relating to the infringement of rules of law, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts. The appraisal by the Court of First Instance of the evidence put before it does not constitute, save where the clear sense of that evidence has been distorted, a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (see, inter alia, Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-667, paragraphs 10 and 42).
68 With regard, first, to Hoechst's complaints alleging lack of notification of the Polypropylene Decision, it must be stated immediately that non-notification could have no consequence other than a finding of the non-existence or annulment of the act in question.
101 As the Court of Justice held in its judgment in Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, paragraph 93, a party is entitled to ask the Court of First Instance, as a measure of organisation of procedure, to order the opposite party to produce documents which are in its possession.
104 As regards the request for measures of inquiry, the case-law of the Court (see, in particular, Case 77/70 Prelle v Commission [1971] ECR 561, paragraph 7, and Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 53) makes it clear that, if made after the oral procedure is closed, such a request can be admitted only if it relates to facts which may have a decisive influence and which the party concerned could not put forward before the close of the oral procedure.
109 Secondly, even when submitting its application, Hoechst was in a position to provide the Court of First Instance with at least minimum evidence of the expediency of measures of organisation of procedure or inquiry for the purposes of the proceedings in order to prove that the Polypropylene Decision had been adopted in breach of the language rules applicable or altered after its adoption by the College of Members of the Commission, or that the originals were lacking, as certain applicants in the PVC cases did (see, to that effect, Baustahlgewebe v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 93 and 94).