larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Evropaïki Dynamiki - Proigmena Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE v European Central Bank (ECB).
Date: 2011-06-09
49. In that connection, the Court finds that, in referring to the case-law of this Court, the General Court was fully entitled to find that, first, an applicant cannot have a legitimate interest in annulment of a decision where it is already certain that that decision which concerns it cannot be other than reconfirmed (see, to that effect, Case 432/85 Souna v Commission  [1987] ECR 2229, paragraph 20) and, second, a plea for annulment is inadmissible on the ground of lack of interest in bringing proceedings where, even if it were well founded, annulment of the contested act on the basis of that plea would not give the applicant satisfaction (see, to that effect, Case 37/72 Marcato  v Commission  [1973] ECR 361, paragraphs 2 to 8).
51. As regards Evropaïki Dynamiki’s argument that, in any event, it retained an interest in bringing proceedings in relation to the first seven pleas of its action, since it was possible for it to obtain the required permit through a subsidiary established in Germany, Evropaïki Dynamiki did not refer to such a possibility before the General Court. To allow it to put forward for the first time an argument which it did not raise before the General Court would be to authorise it to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the General Court. In an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is confined to review of the findings of law on the pleas argued before the General Court (see Joined Cases C‑514/07 P, C‑528/07 P and C‑532/07 P Sweden and Others v API and Commission [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 126 and case-law cited). The argument is therefore inadmissible.
55. In that connection, it should be noted that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the General Court’s decision which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see, inter alia, Case C‑425/07 P AEPI  v Commission  [2009] ECR I‑3205, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited). That requirement is not satisfied by a ground of appeal which, without even including an argument specifically identifying the error allegedly vitiating the decision under appeal, merely reproduces arguments previously submitted before the General Court. Such a ground of appeal amounts in reality to no more than a request for re-examination of a plea submitted before the General Court, which the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to undertake (see, in particular, Case C‑131/03 P Reynolds Tobacco and Others  v Commission  [2006] ECR I‑7795, paragraph 50 and case‑law cited).
Eleftheri tileorasi AE «ALTER CHANNEL» and Konstantinos Giannikos v Ypourgos Typou kai Meson Mazikis Enimerosis and Ethniko Symvoulio Radiotileorasis.
Date: 2011-06-09
23. According to settled case-law, the need for uniform application and accordingly a uniform interpretation of the provisions of EU law makes it impossible for one version of the text of a provision to be considered, in case of doubt, in isolation, but requires, on the contrary, that it be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages (Case C‑63/06 Profisa [2007] ECR I-3239, paragraph 13 and the case-law cited).
24. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part ( Profisa , paragraph 14 and the case-law cited).
Electrosteel Europe SA v Edil Centro SpA.
Date: 2011-06-09
16. It should first of all be stated that, after the present reference for a preliminary ruling was lodged by the referring court, the Court gave judgment in Case C‑381/08 Car Trim  [2010] ECR I-0000, in which it held, in paragraph 2 of the operative part, that the first indent of Article 5(1)(b) of the Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of a sale involving carriage of goods, the place where, under the contract, the goods sold were delivered or should have been delivered must be determined on the basis of the provisions of that contract. Where it is impossible to determine the place of delivery on that basis, without reference to the substantive law applicable to the contract, that place is the place where the physical transfer of the goods took place, as a result of which the purchaser obtained, or should have obtained, actual power of disposal over those goods at the final destination of the sales transaction.
Marija Omejc v Republika Slovenija.
Date: 2011-06-16
19. In such circumstances, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the need for a uniform application of European Union law and the principle of equality require the terms of a provision of European Union law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope normally to be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union; that interpretation must take into account the context of the provision and the objective of the relevant legislation (see, in particular, Case 327/82 Ekro [1984] ECR 107, paragraph 11; Case C-287/98 Linster [2000] ECR I‑6917, paragraph 43; and Case-467/08 Padawan [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 32).
21. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case‑law, in interpreting a provision of European Union law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, Case 292/82 Merck [1983] ECR 3781, paragraph 12; Case C‑34/05 Schouten [2007] ECR I‑1687, paragraph 25; and Case C‑116/10 Felgen and Bacino Charter Company  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 12).
24. In view of the linguistic differences, the purport of the concept of European Union law in question cannot be determined on the basis of an exclusively textual interpretation. That expression must therefore be interpreted in the light of the context in which it is used and of the aims and scheme of the regulation of which it is part (see, to that effect, Case C-372/88 Cricket St Thomas  [1990] ECR I-1345, paragraph 19; Case C‑455/05 Velvet & Steel Immobilien  [2007] ECR I-3225, paragraph 20; and Case C-239/07 Sabatauskas and Others  [2008] ECR I-7523, paragraph 39).
26. Lastly, it is clear from the wording of Recitals 29 and 55 in the preamble to Regulation No 796/2004 that the latter aim is intended, in particular, as far as concerns the making of checks, to ensure effective monitoring of the aid schemes managed under the integrated system and to protect the Community’s financial interests effectively by adopting adequate measures to combat irregularities and fraud.
27. It follows that checks are indispensable so that the objectives pursued by Regulation No 796/2004 may be achieved and, therefore, on that view, the fact of preventing them from being carried out cannot but lead to serious legal consequences, such as the rejection of the aid applications concerned as provided for by Article 23(2) of that regulation with respect to on-the-spot checks.
Unomedical A/S v Skatteministeriet.
Date: 2011-06-16
25. At the outset, it should be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the interests of legal certainty and for ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and the notes to the sections or chapters (see, inter alia, Case C‑142/06 Olicom  [2007] ECR I‑6675, paragraph 16; Case C‑376/07 Kamino International Logistics  [2009] ECR I‑1167, paragraph 31; and Joined Cases C‑288/09 and C‑289/09 British Sky Broadcasting Group and Pace [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 60).
29. In that regard, it must be noted, as did the national court, that Regulation No 2658/87, in the versions applicable to the main proceedings, does not define the notions of ‘parts’ and ‘accessories’ within the meaning of Chapter 90 of the CN. However, the Court, ruling on the scope of those concepts in connection with heading 8473 of the CN for the purpose of classifying ink cartridges for printers, stated that the notion of ‘parts’ implies a whole for the operation of which the part is essential and that the notion of ‘accessories’ implies an interchangeable part designed to adapt a machine for a particular operation, or to increase its range of operations, or to perform a particular service relative to the main function of the machine (see Turbon International , paragraphs 30 and 32).
Union Investment Privatfonds GmbH v UniCredito Italiano SpA.
Date: 2011-06-16
45. However, it is settled case-law that the existence of a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public must be assessed globally, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case (see, to that effect, Case C-251/95 SABEL  [1997] ECR I-6191, paragraph 22; Case C-342/97 Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer [1999] ECR I‑3819, paragraph 18; Case C-334/05 P OHIM  v Shaker  [2007] ECR I‑4529, paragraph 34; and the judgment of 20 September 2007 in Case C-193/06 P Nestlé  v OHIM, paragraph 33). Whereas the evaluation of those factors is an issue of fact that cannot be reviewed by the Court, failure to take all of those factors into account, on the other hand, constitutes an error of law (see, to that effect, Case C-51/09 P Becker  v Harman International Industries  [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 40) and may, as such, be raised before the Court in the context of an appeal.
46. This also applies to the claim put forward by OHIM, according to which the General Court distorted the analysis carried out by the Board of Appeal, as distortion of the content of an act also constitutes an error of law (Case C‑164/98 P DIR International Film and Others  v Commission  [2000] ECR I‑447, paragraph 48).
53. With regard to the claim that the General Court applied Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 incorrectly, it should be pointed out that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, the risk that the public might believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically-linked undertakings, constitutes a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 (see, to that effect, Case C‑39/97 Canon  [1998] ECR I-5507, paragraph 29; Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer , paragraph 17; OHIM  v Shaker , paragraph 33; and Nestlé  v OHIM , paragraph 32).
54. Where an opposition is based on the existence of several trade marks with shared characteristics enabling them to be regarded as part of the same ‘family’ or ‘series’ of trade marks, account should be taken, in the assessment of the likelihood of confusion, of the fact that, in the case of a ‘family’ or ‘series’ of trade marks, a likelihood of confusion results from the fact that the consumer may be mistaken as to the provenance or origin of goods or services covered by the trade mark applied for and consider, erroneously, that the latter trade mark is part of that family or series of marks (see, to that effect, Case C-234/06 P Il Ponte Finanziaria  v OHIM  [2007] ECR I‑7333, paragraphs 62 and 63, and Case C‑16/06 P Les Éditions Albert René  v OHIM [2008] ECR I‑10053, paragraph 101).
55. As pointed out in paragraph 45 of the present judgment, the existence of a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public must be assessed globally, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case.
Zollamt Linz Wels v Laki DOOEL.
Date: 2011-06-16
35. As was correctly observed by the Commission, in order for a customs debt to be incurred, mere intent to use goods placed under the temporary importation procedure otherwise than on the conditions to which they are subject is not in itself an infringement so long as that intent does not take the form of an act or omission which objectively constitutes an infringement of the relevant rules (see, to that effect, Case C‑66/99 D. Wandel [2001] ECR I-873, paragraph 48).
36. Therefore, in order to establish the irregularity committed by the use of a vehicle exported under the total relief procedure, it is necessary to take into consideration only the transport operations carried out by that vehicle. The final destination of the goods and whatever the general intent of the owner of the vehicle may have been are therefore irrelevant (see, to that effect, Siig , paragraph 20). Therefore, an irregularity in respect of the use of the vehicle must be established taking into consideration solely the journeys made by that vehicle.
39. In that regard, as the Austrian Government and the Commission have pointed out, the change in some language versions of the Implementing Regulation to the wording of the definition of ‘internal traffic’ from that used in Article 670 does not alter the content of that provision. It is settled law that in the case of divergence between the different language versions of a text of European Union law, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part (see, inter alia, Case C‑340/08 M and Others  [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 44). As is apparent from paragraph 35 above, an interpretation of Article 555 that bases the establishment of an irregularity on the intent of the haulier would be inconsistent with the scheme of the rules of which that provision forms part.
Staat der Nederlanden v Denkavit Nederland BV and Others.
Date: 2011-06-22
37. As a preliminary point, it is appropriate to recall that, as regards the combat against the spread of diseases likely to constitute a serious hazard to animals or to human health, such as BSE, the Court has already held that Article 10 of Directive 90/425 brings about the complete harmonisation of the precautionary measures against such diseases and defines precisely the respective obligations and tasks of the Member States and of the Commission in this field (see, to that effect, Case C‑52/92 Commission v Portugal [1993] ECR I-2961, paragraph 19).
38. In fact, the Commission is, under that provision, to adopt the necessary measures after reviewing the situation in the Standing Veterinary Committee. Member States may, if they detect a disease in the course of a check, only take the preventive measures provided for in the Community rules and, on serious public or animal health grounds, may take strictly limited interim protective measures pending the measures to be taken by the Commission (see, to that effect, Commission v Portugal , paragraph 9).
51. As regards the question whether there was, at the time when the national temporary regulation was adopted, an outbreak of a zoonosis, disease or other cause likely to constitute a serious hazard to animals or to human health within the meaning of that provision, that condition is likely to be met when new information significantly alters the perception of the danger represented by the disease (Case C-220/01 Lennox  [2003] ECR I‑7091, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).
66. In that regard, the Court has already held that the adoption by the Commission of a decision which is not immediately applicable cannot, as such, be regarded as precluding a Member State from itself taking interim protective measures pursuant to the fourth subparagraph of Article 9(1) of Directive 89/662 (Case C-477/98 Eurostock  [2000] ECR I-10695, paragraph 58). The interim protective measures at EU level at issue in Eurostock  are equivalent to those referred to in the fourth subparagraph of Article 10(1) of Directive 90/425.
69. Were that court to conclude that such was the case and that the national temporary regulation could, in principle, be treated as an interim protective measure complying with the fourth subparagraph of Article 10(1) of Directive 90/425, it would still have to establish whether the principle of proportionality had been observed (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-96/03 and C-97/03 Tempelman and van Schaijk  [2005] ECR I‑1895, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
Viamex Agrar Handels GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas.
Date: 2011-06-30
31. With regard to that second situation, the Court has held that it is for the competent authority to assess whether a failure to comply with a provision of Directive 91/628 has had an impact on animal welfare (see, to that effect, Viamex Agrar Handels and ZVK , paragraph 44, and Case C‑96/06 Viamex Agrar Handels [2008] ECR I‑1413, paragraph 51).
32. In that regard, the Court has held that non-compliance with Directive 91/628 which may result in a reduction in or forfeiture of export refunds relates only to the provisions of that directive which have an impact on the welfare of animals, that is to say, their physical condition and/or their health, and does not relate to the provisions of that directive which, in principle, have no such impact ( Viamex Agrar Handels and ZVK , paragraph 42).
33. The Court has also held that it is for the competent authority to assess whether a failure to comply with a provision of Directive 91/628 can be remedied and whether such failure must result in the export refund being forfeited, reduced or retained. It is also for that authority to decide whether the export refund must be reduced on a pro rata basis according to the number of animals which may, in its view, have suffered as a result of non-compliance with Directive 91/628 or whether that refund should not be paid since the failure to comply with a provision of that directive has inevitably had an impact on the welfare of all the animals (see, to that effect, Viamex Agrar Handels and ZVK , paragraph 44, and Viamex Agrar Handels , paragraph 51).
36. The Court held in paragraph 47 of Viamex Agrar Handels  that the wording of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 615/98 clearly shows that the European Union legislature made the payment of export refunds conditional upon compliance with Directive 91/628, regardless of any proof of actual and specific injury suffered by the animals during their transportation.
37. In this respect, the welfare of the animals is liable to be endangered and can no longer be guaranteed once the provisions of Directive 91/628 concerning their health are no longer complied with. Also, in practice, it is not always possible for the competent authority to ascertain that the animals have actually suffered, or been injured, as a result of non‑compliance with those provisions (see, to that effect, Viamex Agrar Handels , paragraphs 48 and 49).
IMC Securities BV v Stichting Autoriteit Financiële Markten.
Date: 2011-07-07
25. According to settled case-law, the need for uniform application and, accordingly, for uniform interpretation of an EU measure makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in isolation, but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim which the latter seeks to achieve, in the light, in particular, of the versions in all languages (see, inter alia, Case 29/69 Stauder  [1969] ECR 419, paragraph 3; Joined Cases C‑261/08 and C‑348/08 Zurita García and Choque Cabrera  [2009] ECR I‑10143, paragraph 54; and Case C‑473/08 Eulitz [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22).
27. In that respect, it should be noted that the purpose of Directive 2003/6 – as is reiterated, in particular, in recitals 2 and 12 in the preamble thereto – is to protect the integrity of EU financial markets and to enhance investor confidence in those markets. That confidence depends on, inter alia, investors being placed on an equal footing and protected against the improper use of insider information and price manipulations (see, to that effect, Case C‑45/08 Spector Photo Group and Van Raemdonck  [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 47).
Rakvere Piim AS and Maag Piimatööstus AS v Veterinaar- ja Toiduamet.
Date: 2011-07-07
17. In order to answer that question, it must be borne in mind that, by virtue of the very nature of regulations and of their function in the system of sources of EU law, the provisions of a regulation, as a general rule, have immediate effect in the national legal systems without its being necessary for the national authorities to adopt measures of application (see Case 93/71 Leonesio  [1972] ECR 287, paragraph 5, and Case C‑278/02 Handlbauer  [2004] ECR I‑6171, paragraph 25).
18. Some of the provisions of regulations may none the less necessitate, for their implementation, the adoption of measures of application by the Member States ( Handlbauer , paragraph 26).
22. It follows that the minimum rates thus fixed must be considered as being basic rates from which the Member States are not, in principle, free to derogate.
25. First, concerning fees where the standard rates are defined on the basis of the costs borne by the competent authorities over a given period of time, it should be noted that the amount of those costs is already taken into account when determining those rates. In addition, as the Court has already ruled, a standard fee by its very nature exceeds the actual cost of the measures which it is intended to finance in certain cases and is lower than that cost in other cases (Case C‑270/07 Commission  v Germany  [2009] ECR I‑1983, paragraph 32).
27. The interpretation to the effect that the Member States are not, in principle, able to derogate in a general and discretionary manner from the minimum rates set out in Annex IV, section B to Regulation No 882/2004 is borne out by the fact that even use of the option provided for in Article 27(6) of that regulation, which allows those States to set the official control fee below the minimum rates referred to in that annex for certain undertakings, is subject to certain conditions. In a situation such as that described by the national court, Article 27(6) of Regulation No 882/2004 does not, therefore, allow a Member State to fix the fees in question below the minimum rates laid down in Annex IV, section B to that regulation.
28. It follows that Article 27(3) and (4) of Regulation No 882/2004 and Annex IV, section B to that regulation leave no discretion to the Member States as regards the fixing of the minimum rates referred to in those provisions, nor do they call for the adoption of implementing measures by those Member States.
Gentcho Pavlov and Gregor Famira v Ausschuss der Rechtsanwaltskammer Wien.
Date: 2011-07-07
24. It should be added that, while the exercise of the activities of a trainee lawyer can take place in an employment relationship as in the case of the dispute in the main proceedings, it also constitutes the practical part of the training necessary for access to the regulated profession of lawyer (see, to that effect, Case C‑313/01 Morgenbesser  [2003] ECR I‑13467, paragraph 51).