Criminal proceedings against Magatte Gueye (C-483/09) and Valentín Salmerón Sánchez (C-1/10).
Date: 2011-09-15
38. It should be observed that, like Article 267 TFEU, Article 35(3)(a) EU makes a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling subject to the condition that the national court ‘considers that a decision on the question is necessary in order to enable it to give judgment’, and accordingly the case-law of the Court on the admissibility of references under Article 267 TFEU is, in principle, transposable to references for a preliminary ruling submitted to the Court under Article 35 EU (see, to that effect, Case C‑105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I‑5285, paragraph 29).
39. Within the framework of the cooperation between the Court and national courts and tribunals established by Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C‑415/93 Bosman  [1995] ECR I‑4921, paragraph 59, and Case C‑391/09 Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 30).
40. However, in the light of the task conferred on the Court by Article 267 TFEU, the Court may refuse to give a ruling on questions submitted by a national court or tribunal where it is quite obvious that the interpretation which is sought of the provisions of EU law referred to in the questions bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or to its purpose or where the problem is hypothetical (see, to that effect, Case C‑404/07 Katz [2008] ECR I‑7607, paragraph 31 and case-law cited).
46. Before examining the first four questions, it must be observed that recital 8 of the preamble to the Framework Decision, which is the subject of the first question, does not in itself have any binding legal force (see Case C‑562/08 Müller Fleisch [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 40).
47. Moreover, it should be noted that, formally, the referring court has limited its second, third and fourth questions to the interpretation of Articles 2 and 8 of the Framework Decision. Such a situation does not however prevent the Court from providing the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of EU law, including, in the present case, those which may relate to another provision of the Framework Decision, which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case before it, whether or not that court has specifically referred to them in the questions (see, to that effect, Case C‑434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 24).
52. As is clear from recitals 3 and 4 of its preamble, the aim of the Framework Decision is only that, within criminal proceedings as defined in Article 1(c) thereof, minimum standards should be drawn up for the protection of victims of crimes and victims should be afforded a high level of protection, particularly in respect of their access to justice.
53. Recital 9 of the preamble to the Framework Decision states moreover that its provisions do not impose an obligation on Member States to ensure that victims will be treated in a manner equivalent to that of a party to proceedings.
55. The provisions of the Framework Decision must be interpreted in such a way that fundamental rights, including in particular the right to respect for family and private life, as stated in Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, are respected (see, inter alia, Pupino , paragraph 59, and Katz , paragraph 48).
57. Article 3 of the Framework Decision, while imposing on Member States the obligation to safeguard the possibility for victims to be heard during proceedings and to supply evidence, leaves to the national authorities a large measure of discretion with regard to the specific means by which they implement that objective (see, to that effect, Katz , paragraph 46).
58. However, in order not to deprive the first paragraph of Article 3 of the Framework Decision of much of its practical effect or to infringe the obligations stated in Article 2(1) thereof, those provisions imply, in any event, that the victim is to be able to give testimony in the course of the criminal proceedings which can be taken into account as evidence ( Katz , paragraph 47).
59. Thus, to guarantee that the victim can effectively and adequately take part in the criminal proceedings, his or her right to be heard must permit not only the possibility of objectively describing what happened, but also the opportunity to express his or her opinion.
69. Lastly, it is clear that the fact that it is mandatory to impose an injunction to stay away in accordance with the substantive law at issue in the main proceedings does not, per se, fall within the scope of the Framework Decision and, accordingly, it cannot, in any event, be assessed in the light of the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
70. In the light of all the foregoing, the answer to the first four questions is that Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Framework Decision must be interpreted as not precluding the mandatory imposition of an injunction to stay away for a minimum period, provided for as an ancillary penalty by the criminal law of a Member State, on persons who commit crimes of violence within the family, even when the victims of those crimes oppose the application of such a penalty.
The fifth question
72. In that regard, it must be observed that, in addition to the fact that Article 34(2) EU leaves to national authorities the choice of form and methods necessary to achieve the desired result of Framework Decisions, Article 10(1) of the Framework Decision does no more than require Member States to seek to promote mediation in criminal cases for offences which they ‘consider … appropriate’, and consequently the choice of the offences for which mediation is to be available is for the Member States to determine (see Case C‑205/09 Eredics and Sápi [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 37).
74. It follows from the very wording of Article 10(1) and from the large measure of discretion which the Framework Decision leaves to national authorities with regard to the specific means by which they implement its objectives that, in deciding to exclude the application of the mediation procedure for a particular type of offence, a choice to be made on criminal justice policy grounds, the national legislature has not exceeded its discretion (see, by analogy, Eredics and Sápi , paragraph 38).