European Commission v Dimos Zagoriou.
Date: 2017-11-09
16


Accordingly, it is for the national legal system of each Member State, by virtue of the principle of its procedural autonomy, to make such a determination and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law. Nonetheless, it is clear from the settled case-law of the Court that the application of national law must not undermine the application and effectiveness of EU law and that that would be the case, in particular, if such an application made it impossible in practice to recover the sums improperly granted. National legislation must also be applied in a manner which is not discriminatory as compared to procedures for deciding similar national disputes and the national authorities must act with the same degree of care, and in accordance with rules and procedures which do not make the recovery of the sums in question more difficult, as in comparable cases concerning solely the application of corresponding national legislation (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2008, Vereniging Nationaal Overlegorgaan Sociale Werkvoorziening and Others, C‑383/06 to C‑385/06, EU:C:2008:165, paragraphs 48 and 50 and the case-law cited).
19


To that end, it is appropriate, on the one hand, to identify the comparable procedures or action and, on the other, to determine whether the actions concerning enforcement of an act covered by Article 299 TFEU are handled in a less favourable manner than comparable actions concerning the enforcement of an act of a national public authority.
20


With regard, firstly, to the comparability of actions, it is solely for the national court, which has direct knowledge of the detailed procedural rules applicable, to ascertain whether the actions concerned are similar as regards their purpose, cause of action and essential characteristics (judgment of 27 June 2013, Agrokonsulting-04, C‑93/12, EU:C:2013:432, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
21


Secondly, with regard to the similar handling of the actions, it must be borne in mind that every case in which the question arises as to whether a procedural rule of national law based on EU law is less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions, the national court must take into account the role played by that provision in the procedure as a whole, as well as the operation and any special features of that procedure before the different national courts (judgment of 1 December 1998, Levez, C‑326/96, EU:C:1998:577, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
23


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that a procedural rule under which similar disputes are heard in different national courts, depending on whether those disputes involve EU law or national law, does not necessarily constitute a procedural rule which may be classified as unfavourable (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 February 2015, Baczó and Vizsnyiczai, C‑567/13, EU:C:2015:88, paragraph 46).
24


In that regard, it is clear in the present case that, on the one hand, no complaint has been made that actions brought, in particular, before the civil courts are less favourable to the Commission than those brought before the administrative courts and, on the other, the file before the Court does not contain any indication to that effect. Accordingly, it is for the national court to examine any disregard which there may be, in the present case, of the principle of equivalence.
31


Accordingly, in the absence of EU law rules specifying those persons and enabling the determination in particular of whether enforcement may be pursued against a person other than the addressee of the Commission decision, it is for the internal legal order of each Member State to establish the persons against whom enforcement may be pursued, on condition, however, that the national rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not make it excessively difficult or impossible in practice to exercise the rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2015, Baczó and Vizsnyiczai, C‑567/13, EU:C:2015:88, paragraphs 41 and 42 and the case-law cited).