Sumanan Vethanayagam and Others v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken.
Date: 2019-07-29
35


Second, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is in principle required to give a ruling (judgment of 4 December 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality and Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, C‑378/17, EU:C:2018:979, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
36


It follows that questions relating to EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court for a preliminary ruling only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 4 December 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality and Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, C‑378/17, EU:C:2018:979, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
42


As regards the interpretation of Article 32(3) of the Visa Code, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, in interpreting provisions of EU law it is necessary to consider not only their wording but also the context in which they occur and the objectives pursued by the rules of which they are part (judgment of 7 February 2018, American Express, C‑304/16, EU:C:2018:66, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
45


The Court of Justice has already held in that regard that, by referring back to the legislation of the Member States in that way, the EU legislature left to the Member States the task of deciding both the nature and the specific conditions of the remedies available to visa applicants (judgment of 13 December 2017, El Hassani, C‑403/16, EU:C:2017:960, paragraph 25).
79


It must be noted in that respect that, as is clear from recital 29 of the Visa Code, the provisions of that code, including the right to appeal under Article 32(3) of that code, must be interpreted in accordance with the fundamental rights and principles recognised by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’) and by the Charter.
80


The principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law, referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, is a general principle of EU law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR, now reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter (judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 35).
81


In the specific context of Article 32(3) of the Visa Code, it is for each Member State to ensure that fundamental rights, in particular effective judicial protection, are upheld when deciding the nature and specific conditions of the remedies against decisions refusing visas, in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (see to that effect, judgment of 13 December 2017, El Hassani, C‑403/16, EU:C:2017:960, paragraphs 25 and 42).