Ampliscientifica Srl and Amplifin SpA v Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze and Agenzia delle Entrate.
Date: 2008-05-22
19. It is to be observed, secondly, that the effect of implementing the scheme established in the second subparagraph of Article 4(4) of the Sixth Directive is that national legislation adopted on the basis of that provision allows persons, in particular companies, which are bound to one another by financial, economic and organisational links no longer to be treated as separate taxable persons for the purposes of VAT but to be treated as a single taxable person. Thus, where that provision is implemented by a Member State, the closely linked person or persons within the meaning of that provision cannot be treated as a taxable person or persons within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the Sixth Directive (see, to that effect, Case C‑355/06 van der Steen  [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 20). It follows that treatment as a single taxable person precludes persons who are thus closely linked from continuing to submit VAT declarations separately and from continuing to be identified, within and outside their group, as individual taxable persons, since the single taxable person alone is authorised to submit such declarations.
25. As regards, first, the principle of fiscal neutrality, it is a fundamental principle of the common system of VAT (see, inter alia, Case C‑454/98 Schmeink & Cofreth and Strobel  [2000] ECR I‑6973, paragraph 59) which precludes, on the one hand, treating similar goods, which are thus in competition with each other, differently for VAT purposes (Case C‑283/95 Fischer  [1998] ECR I‑3369, paragraphs 21 and 27, and Case C-481/98 Commission v France [2001] ECR I‑3369, paragraph 22) and, on the other, treating similar economic transactions, which are therefore in competition with each other, differently for VAT purposes (Case C‑109/02 Commission v Germany [2003] ECR I‑12691, paragraph 20; Case C‑382/02 Cimber Air  [2004] ECR I‑8379, paragraph 24; and Case C‑97/06 Navicon  [2007] ECR I‑0000. paragraph 21).
27. Next, the principle prohibiting the abuse of rights is intended to ensure, particularly in the field of VAT, that Community legislation is not extended to cover abusive practices by economic operators, that is to say transactions carried out not in the context of normal commercial operations, but solely for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining advantages provided for by Community law (Case C‑255/02 Halifax [2006] ECR I‑1609, paragraphs 69 and 70).
28. The effect of that principle is therefore to prohibit wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic reality and are set up with the sole aim of obtaining a tax advantage (see, to that effect, Case C‑196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas  [2006] ECR I‑7995, paragraph 55).
29. Moreover, preventing possible tax evasion, avoidance and abuse is an objective recognised and encouraged by the Sixth Directive ( Halifax , paragraph 71).
31. Lastly, as regards the principle of proportionality, national legislation which, in the same way as the 1979 Decree, lays down a time‑limit of between one and two years in order for taxpayers to be able to make VAT declarations and payments in accordance with simplified procedures is, in the light of the objective of combating tax evasion and bogus legal arrangements, consistent with the principle of proportionality. Conversely, if no time‑limit had been imposed, the effect might have been to permit individual operations to be carried out justifying the ad hoc formation of legal structures. Such national legislation is likely to encourage abuse and evasion, the prevention of which is precisely one of the objectives pursued by Community law (see, to that effect, Case C‑494/04 Heintz van Landewijck  [2006] ECR I‑5381, paragraphs 42 and 43, and Case C­374/06 BATIG  [2007] ECR I‑000, paragraph 39).