Ministero delle Finanze v Spac SpA.
Date: 1998-09-15
13 By the first part of its question, the national court seeks to ascertain whether Community law precludes a Member State from resisting actions for repayment of charges levied in breach of Community law by relying on a time-limit under national law of three years, by way of derogation from the ordinary rules governing actions between private individuals for the recovery of sums paid but not due, for which the period allowed is more favourable.  The national court is thus asking the Court of Justice to clarify its case-law according to which national detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law must not be less favourable than those governing similar actions under national law (see, in particular, Case 33/76 Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer Saarland [1976] ECR 1989 and Case 45/76 Comet v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2043).
17 As the Court has held on several occasions, a comparison of the national systems shows that the problem of disputing charges which have been unlawfully claimed or refunding charges which have been paid when not due is settled in different ways in the various Member States, and even within a single Member State, according to the various kinds of taxes or charges in question.  In certain cases, objections or claims of this type are subject to specific procedural conditions and time-limits under the law with regard both to complaints submitted to the tax authorities and to legal proceedings.  In other cases, claims for repayment of charges which were paid but not due must be brought before the ordinary courts, mainly in the form of claims for the refunding of sums paid but not owed, such actions being available for varying lengths of time, in some cases for the limitation period laid down under the general law (see Case 68/79 Just v Ministry for Fiscal Affairs [1980] ECR 501, paragraphs 22 and 23; Case 61/79 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Denkavit Italiana [1980] ECR 1205, paragraphs 23 and 24; Case 811/79 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Ariete [1980] ECR 2545, paragraphs 10 and 11, and Case 826/79 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Mireco [1980] ECR 2559, paragraphs 11 and 12).
18 This diversity between national systems derives mainly from the lack of Community rules on the refunding of national charges levied though not due.  In such circumstances, in accordance with settled case-law of the Court of Justice, it is for the national legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, provided that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness)  (Rewe, paragraph 5, Comet, paragraphs 13 and 16, both cited above, and, more recently, Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck v Belgian State [1995] ECR I-4599, paragraph 12).
19 As regards the latter principle, the Court has held that it is compatible with Community law to lay down reasonable limitation periods for bringing proceedings in the interests of legal certainty which protects both the taxpayer and the administration concerned (see Rewe, paragraph 5, Comet, paragraphs 17 and 18, and Denkavit Italiana, paragraph 23, all cited above; see also Case C-261/95 Palmisani v INPS [1997] ECR I-4025, paragraph 28, and Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum v  benrå Havn and Others [1997] ECR I-4085, paragraph 48).  Such time-limits are not liable to render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law.  In that regard, a time-limit of three years under national law, reckoned from the date of the contested payments, appears reasonable (see the judgment of today's date in Case C-231/96 Edis v Ministero delle Finanze [1998] ECR I-4951, paragraph 35).
20 Observance of the principle of equivalence implies, for its part, that the procedural rule at issue applies without distinction to actions alleging infringements of Community law and to those alleging infringements of national law, with respect to the same kind of charges or dues.  That principle cannot, however, be interpreted as obliging a Member State to extend its most favourable rules governing repayment to all actions for repayment of charges or dues levied in breach of Community law (Edis, cited above, paragraph 36).
21 Thus, Community law does not preclude the legislation of a Member State from laying down, alongside a limitation period applicable under the ordinary law to actions between private individuals for the recovery of sums paid but not due, special detailed rules, which are less favourable, governing claims and legal proceedings to challenge the imposition of charges and other levies.  The position would be different only if those detailed rules applied solely to actions based on Community law for the repayment of such charges or levies (Edis, cited above, paragraph 37).
22 In this case, it should be noted that the time-limit at issue applies not only to repayment of the contested registration charge but also to that of all governmental charges of that kind.  Moreover, according to information provided by the Italian Government and not disputed, a similar time-limit also applies to actions for repayment of certain indirect taxes.  Nor does it appear from the wording of the provision at issue that it applies only to actions based on Community law.  Furthermore, as the Advocate General observed in point 26 of his Opinion in this case and in points 62 to 64 of his Opinion in Edis, it is clear from the case-law of the Corte Suprema di Cassazione that time-limits relating to taxes apply also to actions for repayment of charges or dues levied under laws that have been declared incompatible with the Italian Constitution (Edis, cited above, paragraph 38).
23 The answer to the first part of the question must therefore be that Community law does not prohibit a Member State from resisting actions for repayment of charges levied in breach of Community law by relying on a time-limit under national law of three years, by way of derogation from the ordinary rules governing actions between private individuals for the recovery of sums paid but not due, for which the period allowed is more favourable, provided that that time-limit applies in the same way to actions based on Community law for repayment of such charges as to those based on national law.
The second part of the question
27 It is clear from the answer given to the first part of the question that Community law does not in principle prohibit a Member State from resisting actions for repayment of charges levied in breach of Community law by relying on a time-limit under national law of three years.
28 It is true that in paragraph 23 of Emmott, cited above, the Court held that, until such time as a directive has been properly transposed, a defaulting Member State may not rely on an individual's delay in initiating proceedings against it in order to protect rights conferred on him by the provisions of a directive and that a period laid down by national law within which proceedings must be initiated cannot begin to run before that time.
29 However, as was confirmed by the Court in paragraph 26 of Johnson, cited above, it is clear from the judgment in Steenhorst-Neerings, cited above, that the solution adopted in Emmott was justified by the particular circumstances of that case, in which a time-bar had the result of depriving the plaintiff in the main proceedings of any opportunity whatever to rely on her right to equal treatment under a Community directive (see also Haahr Petroleum, cited above, paragraph 52, and Joined Cases C-114/95 and C-115/95 Texaco and Olieselskabet Danmark [1997] ECR I-4263, paragraph 48).
30 The Court thus held in Fantask and Others, cited above, that Community law does not prevent a Member State which has not properly transposed Directive 69/335 from resisting actions for repayment of duties levied in breach thereof by relying on a limitation period under domestic law of five years reckoned from the date on which those duties became payable (see also Edis, cited above, paragraph 47).