Genentech Inc. v Hoechst GmbH and Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH.
Date: 2016-07-07
22


It should, however, be borne in mind, first, that, in the context of Article 267 TFEU, the Court has no jurisdiction to rule either on the interpretation of provisions of national laws or national regulations or on their conformity with EU law (see, inter alia, judgment of 11 March 2010 in Attanasio Group, C‑384/08, EU:C:2010:133, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited) and, second, that it is not for the Court to determine whether the decision whereby a matter is brought before it was taken in accordance with the rules of national law governing the organisation of the courts and their procedure (judgments of 14 January 1982 in Reina, 65/81, EU:C:1982:6, paragraph 8, and of 23 November 2006 in Asnef-Equifax and Administración del Estado, C‑238/05, EU:C:2006:734, paragraph 14).
23


The Court must abide by the decision from a court of a Member State requesting a preliminary ruling in so far as that decision has not been overturned in any appeal procedures provided for by national law (judgments of 12 February 1974 in Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf, 146/73, EU:C:1974:12, paragraph 3, and of 1 December 2005 in Burtscher, C‑213/04, EU:C:2005:731, paragraph 32). In the present case, it is apparent from the evidence produced during the proceedings that, by order of 18 November 2015, the Cour de cassation dismissed the appeal brought by Hoechst against the decision requesting a preliminary ruling, with the result that the view cannot be taken that that decision has been overturned.
26


It must be borne in mind in this regard that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the question put concerns the interpretation of a provision of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgments of 13 March 2001 in PreussenElektra, C‑379/98, EU:C:2001:160, paragraphs 38 and 39, and of 22 June 2010 in Melki and Abdeli, C‑188/10 and C‑189/10, EU:C:2010:363, paragraph 27).
27


In the present case, since the referring court raises the question whether Article 101 TFEU precludes the licence agreement from being implemented in accordance with the interpretation which was given to it by the sole arbitrator, it is not entirely obvious that the question referred to the Court as to the interpretation to be given to this provision of the TFEU is irrelevant for the purpose of resolving the dispute in the main proceedings. The order for reference sets out, briefly but precisely, the origin and nature of this dispute, the outcome of which it regards as dependent on the interpretation of Article 101 TFEU. It follows that the referring court has adequately defined the factual and legal framework within which it made its request for interpretation of EU law to enable the Court to provide a useful reply to that request.
39


It should further be recalled that the Court has already ruled, in the context of an exclusive licence agreement, that the obligation to pay a royalty, even after the expiry of the period of validity of the licensed patent, may reflect a commercial assessment of the value to be attributed to the possibilities of exploitation granted by the licence agreement, especially when that obligation to pay was embodied in a licence agreement entered into before the patent was granted (judgment of 12 May 1989 in Ottung, 320/87, ECR, EU:C:1989:195, paragraph 11). In such circumstances, where the licensee may freely terminate the agreement by giving reasonable notice, an obligation to pay a royalty throughout the validity of the agreement cannot come within the scope of the prohibition set out in Article 101(1) TFEU (judgment of 12 May 1989 in Ottung, 320/87, EU:C:1989:195, paragraph 13).