Agro Foreign Trade & Agency Ltd v Petersime NV.
Date: 2017-02-16
23


In that respect, it should be recalled that, as regards the interpretation of provisions of national law, the Court is in principle required to base its consideration on the description given in the order for reference. It is settled case-law that the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to interpret the internal law of a Member State (judgment of 17 March 2011, Naftiliaki Etaireia Thasou and Amaltheia I Naftiki Etaireia, C‑128/10 and C‑129/10, EU:C:2011:163, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
27


It should be noted that such a situation is not expressly referred to in Articles 17 and 18 of Directive 86/653 or in the other provisions thereof. However, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, judgment of 20 November 2014, Utopia, C‑40/14, EU:C:2014:2389, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
28


In that connection, it is common ground that that directive aims to coordinate the laws of the Member States as regards the legal relationship between the parties to a commercial agency contract (judgment of 23 March 2006, Honyvem Informazioni Commerciali, C‑465/04, EU:C:2006:199, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
29


As is clear from the second and third recitals of Directive 86/653, the harmonising measures seek to protect commercial agents in their relations with their principals, to eliminate restrictions on the carrying-on of the activities of commercial agents, to make the conditions of competition within the Community uniform, to promote the security of commercial transactions, and to facilitate trade in goods between Member States by harmonising their legal systems within the area of commercial representation. To those ends, that directive establishes, inter alia, rules governing the conclusion and termination of agency contracts, in Articles 13 to 20 (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 October 2013, Unamar, C‑184/12, EU:C:2013:663, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited, and of 3 December 2015, Quenon K., C‑338/14, EU:C:2015:795, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
30


In that context, the Court has already held that Articles 17 and 18 of Directive 86/653 are of crucial importance, as they define the level of protection which the European Union legislature considered reasonable to grant commercial agents in the course of the creation of the single market, and that the regime established by that directive for that purpose is mandatory in nature (see judgment of 17 October 2013, Unamar, C‑184/12, EU:C:2013:663, paragraphs 39 and 40).
31


Moreover, the Court has stated that the purpose of the regime established in Articles 17 to 19 of that directive is to protect, for all commercial agents, freedom of establishment and the operation of undistorted competition in the internal market, so that those provisions must therefore be observed throughout the Community if those objectives of the FEU Treaty are to be attained (judgment of 9 November 2000, Ingmar, C‑381/98, EU:C:2000:605, paragraph 24).
32


Finally, the Court has held that it is essential for the European Union legal order that a principal established in a non-member country, whose commercial agent carries on his activity within the European Union, cannot evade those provisions by the simple expedient of a choice-of-law clause. The purpose served by the provisions in question requires that they be applied where the situation is closely connected with the European Union, in particular where the commercial agent carries on his activity in the territory of a Member State, irrespective of the law by which the parties intended the contract to be governed (judgment of 9 November 2000, Ingmar, C‑381/98, EU:C:2000:605, paragraph 25).
38


As regards Article 14 of the Association Agreement, it is clear, admittedly, from the wording of that provision as well as from the objective of that agreement, that the principles enshrined in Articles Article 45 and 46 TFEU, and in the provisions of the Treaty relating to the freedom to provide services, must be extended, so far as possible, to Turkish nationals to eliminate restrictions on the freedom to provide services between the contracting parties (judgment of 21 October 2003, Abatay and Others, C‑317/01 and C‑369/01, EU:C:2003:572, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited).
39


However, the interpretation given to the provisions of European Union law, including Treaty provisions, concerning the internal market cannot be automatically applied by analogy to the interpretation of an agreement concluded by the European Union with a non-Member State, unless there are express provisions to that effect laid down by the agreement itself (judgment of 24 September 2013, Demirkan, C‑221/11, EU:C:2013:583, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
40


In that regard, the Court has already held that the use in Article 14 of the Association Agreement of the verb ‘to be guided by’ indicates that the contracting parties are not obliged to apply the provisions of the Treaty on freedom to provide services or indeed those adopted for the implementation of those provisions but simply to consider them as a source of guidance for the measures to be adopted in order to implement the objectives laid down in that agreement (judgment of 24 September 2013, Demirkan, C‑221/11, EU:C:2013:583, paragraph 45).
41


Moreover, with regard, in particular to the association between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey, the Court has already held that, in deciding whether a provision of European Union law lends itself to application by analogy under that association, a comparison must be made between the objective pursued by the Association Agreement and the context of which it forms a part, on the one hand, and those of the European Union law instrument in question, on the other (judgment of 24 September 2013, Demirkan, C‑221/11, EU:C:2013:583, paragraph 48).
42


It should be noted that the Association Agreement and the Additional Protocol are intended essentially to promote the economic development of Turkey and pursue, therefore, a solely economic purpose (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 September 2013, Demirkan, C‑221/11, EU:C:2013:583, paragraph 50).
43


The development of economic freedoms for the purpose of bringing about freedom of movement for persons of a general nature which may be compared to that afforded to European Union citizens under Article 21 TFEU is not the object of the Association Agreement. Neither that agreement nor the Additional Protocol establishes any general principle of freedom of movement of persons between Turkey and the European Union. Furthermore, the Association Agreement guarantees the enjoyment of certain rights only within the territory of the host Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 September 2013, Demirkan, C‑221/11, EU:C:2013:583, paragraph 53).
47


As regards Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol, it is settled case-law that the standstill clauses set out in Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 of the Association Council of 19 September 1980 on the development of the Association, and annexed to the Association Agreement, and in Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol prohibit generally the introduction of new internal measures which are intended to or have the effect of making the exercise by a Turkish citizen of an economic freedom subject, on the territory of the Member State concerned, to conditions more stringent than those which were applicable at the date of entry into force of that decision or that protocol as regards that Member State (judgment of 12 April 2016, Genc, C‑561/14, EU:C:2016:247, paragraph 33).