larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Date: 2001-11-08
43 In order to establish whether the national provisions at issue are consistent with Article 17(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive, it should first be recalled that, as the Court has previously held, Article 17(1) and (2) of the Sixth Directive specifies the conditions giving rise to the right to deduct VAT and the extent of that right and that provision does not leave the Member States any discretion as regards its implementation (Case C-62/93 BP Supergas [1995] ECR I-1883, paragraph 35).
51 It is apparent from paragraph 14 of that judgment that the Court held in Intiem that it was only as far as possible that the VAT deduction system laid down by the Sixth Directive had to apply in such a way that its scope corresponded to the sphere of the taxable person's business activity.
55 It is true that the solution thus imposed by the wording of Article 17(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive may not appear fully consistent with the purpose of that provision and with certain objectives pursued by the Sixth Directive, such as fiscal neutrality and the avoidance of double taxation.
56 The fact remains, however, that, in the absence of intervention by the Community legislature, the system for deduction of VAT which it has created, as defined by the Sixth Directive, does not provide any basis for a right entitling taxable persons to deduct VAT in the circumstances referred to in Article 23 of the implementing decree of 12 August 1968 or enable any detailed rules for the application of such a right to be established (see, by analogy, Case C-165/88 ORO Amsterdam Beheer and Concerto [1989] ECR 4081, paragraphs 16, 22, 23 and 24).
71 Article 18 of the Sixth Directive relates solely to the conditions governing exercise of the right to deduct, the actual existence of such a right being dealt with in Article 17.
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2001-11-08
31 Although information obtained subsequently, and in particular the report of 18 September 1998, enabled the Commission to make its complaints more specific, it is nevertheless the case that the subject-matter of the complaints raised in the proceedings remains in substance the same, namely compliance with the obligations arising under Articles 5, 6 and 10 of the directive (see, to the same effect, Case 178/84 Commission v Germany (Beer Purity) [1987] ECR 1227, paragraph 22). As is evident from the conduct of the written and oral procedure before the Court, the Member State concerned has been kept sufficiently informed of the complaints and has had ample opportunity to defend itself in accordance with the provisions of Article 169 of the Treaty.
38 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see Case C-207/00 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-4571, paragraph 27).
45 That argument must be rejected. It must be observed that Member States may not plead their late implementation of a directive as justification for failure to fulfil, or late fulfilment of, other obligations imposed by the directive (see Case C-274/98 Commission v Spain [2000] ECR I-2823, paragraph 22).
47 It is settled case-law that in the context of proceedings under Article 169 of the Treaty for failure to fulfil obligations it is for the Commission to prove the existence of the alleged failure, and it may not rely on any presumption for that purpose (see, inter alia, Case C-214/98 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-9601, paragraph 42).
61 The fact that there is no information at all about those three regions in the documents before the Court may be regarded as sufficient evidence of failure to comply with Article 6 of the directive. As regards the other regions and autonomous provinces, it was incumbent upon the Commission to prove the allegation that the obligation has not been fulfilled and to place before the Court the information needed to enable it to determine whether the obligation has not been fulfilled (see, in particular, Case C-263/99 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-4195, paragraph 27).
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2001-11-13
14 It is clear from Article 4(1) of the Directive that Member States are required to take the necessary measures to ensure that, within 10 years following its notification, the quality of bathing water conforms to the limit values set in accordance with Article 3 of that Directive. The Directive therefore requires the Member States to ensure that certain results are achieved and, apart from the derogations provided for, does not allow them to rely on particular circumstances to justify a failure to fulfil that obligation (see Case C-56/90 Commission v United Kingdom [1993] ECR I-4109, paragraphs 42 to 44, and Case C-307/98 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I-3933, paragraphs 48 and 49).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2001-11-15
12 It must be noted, at the outset, that it follows both from the purpose of the directive, which, according to the 15th recital, applies to all risks, and from the wording of Article 6(3)(a) thereof, that employers are obliged to evaluate all risks to the safety and health of workers.
13 It should also be noted that the occupational risks which are to be evaluated by employers are not fixed once and for all, but are continually changing in relation, particularly, to the progressive development of working conditions and scientific research concerning such risks.
21 On that point, it must be recalled that it is settled law that transposing a directive into national law does not necessarily require its provisions to be reproduced verbatim in a specific, express law or regulation; a general legal context may, depending on the content of the directive in question, be sufficient, provided that it does effectively ensure the full application of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner (see, inter alia, Case C-214/98 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-9601, paragraph 49, and Case C-38/99 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-10941, paragraph 53).
22 It is particularly important, in order to satisfy the requirement of legal certainty, that individuals should have the benefit of a clear and precise legal situation enabling them to ascertain the full extent of their rights and duties and, where appropriate, to rely on them before the national courts (Case C-236/95 Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I-4459, paragraph 13).
23 In that regard, it must be noted that Article 7(1) and (3) of the directive require employers to arrange a service of prevention and protection from occupational risks within the undertaking or, if its internal capabilities are insufficient, to enlist external help.
36 In order to implement that obligation, Member States must adopt laws or regulations which comply with the requirements of the directive and which are brought to the attention of the undertakings concerned by appropriate means, so as to enable them to be aware of their obligations in the matter and the competent national authorities to check that those measures are complied with.
Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2001-11-22
57 Finally, according to the settled case-law of the Court, in the particular context of the preparation of decisions on the clearance of accounts, the reasons for a decision must be considered adequate if the Member State to which the decision is addressed was closely involved in the decision-making process and is therefore aware of the reasons why the Commission considered that it was not required to charge the sum in dispute to the EAGGF (see Germany v Commission, cited above, paragraph 21).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2001-11-29
20 At the outset, it is appropriate to recall that the Court has consistently held that the Commission must indicate, in any application made under Article 226 EC, the specific complaints on which the Court is asked to rule and, at the very least in summary form, the legal and factual particulars on which those complaints are based (see, inter alia, Case C-375/95 Commission v Greece [1997] ECR I-5981, paragraph 35).
21 So far as concerns more particularly the obligation to indicate the legal particulars on which the complaints made by the Commission are based, it is not sufficient for the Commission, in order to claim that the defendant Member State has not complied with a provision of Community law, merely to cite that provision in the section of the reasoned opinion or of the application which covers the legal context and which is purely descriptive and lacking of any explanatory character.
23 However, if the Commission claims that national legislation is contrary to the system, scheme or spirit of a harmonisation directive, without relating the breach of Community law which results from it to any specific provisions of that directive, its application cannot, on that fact alone, be held to be inadmissible. Nevertheless, in such a situation, the Court may only consider whether the national legislation in issue is, in that sense, contrary to the directive concerned.
51 Further, whilst the recognition and coordination directives seek to achieve a clear separation of the professions of dental practitioner and doctor, there is no indication that the harmonised regime established by those directives also aims at preventing doctors covered by Article 19 of the recognition directive from being registered as doctors, which would in effect remove their right to practise medicine.
Giuseppe Conte v Stefania Rossi.
Date: 2001-11-29
21 The debtor against whom the payment order is sought can challenge that opinion during the subsequent judicial proceedings, which are inter partes and which only he can institute (see, on Article 645 of the Code, Case C-474/93 Hengst Import [1995] ECR I-2113, paragraph 15, on the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters). That opinion cannot therefore constitute a decision by an association of undertakings which may in itself restrict or distort competition within the meaning of Article 85 of the Treaty.
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2001-12-06
48 In this connection, it must be observed that Article 5(1) of Directive 97/33 provides that, when establishing a mechanism for sharing out the net cost of the universal service obligations, Member States must take due account of the principles of transparency in setting the contributions to be made.
49 Since the reference values chosen will have an impact on the amount of any contribution demanded of new market entrants, it is important that those values are set in accordance with objective criteria and that like is compared with like so as to ensure transparency; this will enable new entrants to calculate their probable costs and income. Any factor that makes that calculation more difficult is likely to discourage them from entering the market.
68 As the Commission has pointed out, that implies a principle that every service provider must maintain a list of its own customers who do not wish to be listed in the general directory and not disclose the names of those customers to the body which prepares the general telephone directory. Every service provider will, therefore, have its own ex-directory list, the maintenance of which falls within the scope of the management of its own customer accounts, rather than within the scope of the universal service. The fact that customers of a new market entrant must pay to be included in the ex-directory list maintained by the new entrant has no bearing on the costs of or revenue derived from the creation of telephone directories by the established service providers themselves.
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2001-12-06
7 So far as the transposition of Directive 98/51 is concerned, it is appropriate to point out that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C-147/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2387, paragraph 26).
Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 2001-12-06
8 So far as the incorporation of Directives 97/41, 98/51 and 98/67 is concerned, it is appropriate to point out, first, that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C-147/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2387, paragraph 26).
9 It should be recalled also, that, even where the default has been remedied after the time-limit given in the reasoned opinion has expired, there is still an interest in pursuing the action in order to establish the basis of liability which a Member State may incur, as a result of its default, towards other Member States, the Community or private parties (see, inter alia, Case C-29/90 Commission v Greece [1992] ECR I-1971, paragraph 12, and Case C-207/00 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-4571, paragraph 28).
Kloosterboer Rotterdam BV v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij.
Date: 2001-12-13
28 According to settled case-law, the Commission is authorised to adopt, in particular with regard to agriculture, all the measures which are necessary or appropriate for the implementation of the basic legislation, provided that they are not contrary to such legislation or to the implementing legislation adopted by the Council (see inter alia Joined Cases C-9/95, C-23/95 and C-156/95 Belgium and Germany v Commission [1997] ECR I-645, paragraph 37, and Case C-48/98 Söhl & Söhlke [1999] ECR I-7877, paragraph 36).
European Parliament v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2001-12-13
8 In accordance with Article 19(3) of Regulation No 820/97, the Commission presented to the European Parliament and to the Council on 13 October 1999 a report on the situation regarding the implementation of beef labelling systems in the different Member States (COM(1999) 486 final, hereinafter the Commission report). In that report, it recorded various shortcomings concerning the identification and registration of bovine animals. In that regard, it noted, first, that, in most Member States, passports were operational only in respect of animals born after 1 January 1998, next, that difficulties had been observed regarding the transfer of information about animals upon their being exported (on account of information being lost when a new passport was issued) and, lastly, that databases containing the relevant data would not be operational by the date envisaged.
10 The Commission, taking those aspects into account, presented two proposals for regulations based on Article 152 EC:
- the first was designed to substitute, in place of Regulation No 820/97, a new regulation having the same object but providing for the introduction of compulsory indications by two separate steps, the second of which was to commence on 1 January 2003 (hereinafter the first Commission proposal);
- the second (hereinafter the second Commission proposal) was designed temporarily to prolong application of the labelling provisions prescribed by Regulation No 820/97 pending adoption of the first Commission proposal.
39 It should be borne in mind in that regard that, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 7(1) EC, the Community institutions may act only within the limits of the powers conferred upon them by the Treaty.
Ingemar Nilsson v Länsstyrelsen i Norrbottens län.
Date: 2001-12-13
27 As to Regulation No 3887/92, the Court has already held that its object is to introduce provisions which effectively prevent and penalise irregularities and fraudulent acts (Case C-354/95 National Farmers' Union and Others [1997] ECR I-4559, paragraph 51).
Henri Mouflin v Recteur de l'académie de Reims.
Date: 2001-12-13
22 In that case, the Court held that pensions provided under a scheme such as the French retirement scheme for civil servants fall within the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty.
23 Accordingly, the reply to the first part of the first question is that pensions provided under a scheme such as the French retirement scheme for civil servants fall within the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty.
The second part
28 The principle of equal pay enshrined in Article 119 of the Treaty, like the general principle of non-discrimination of which it is a particular expression, presupposes that male and female workers whom it covers are in comparable situations (see Case C-218/98 Abdoulaye and Others [1999] ECR I-5723, paragraph 16).
Commission of the European Communities v Ireland.
Date: 2001-12-13
11 As the Advocate General has pointed out in point 6 of his Opinion, it is irrelevant that no high-speed train is currently operational in Ireland. The fact that an activity referred to in a directive does not exist in a particular Member State cannot release that State from its obligation to adopt laws or regulations in order to ensure that all the provisions of the directive are properly transposed (see, to that effect, Case C-214/98 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-9601, paragraph 22).
12 It is necessary that all persons subject to the law in Ireland, like other persons subject to the law within the Community, should know what their rights and duties are if and when a high-speed rail system is created and operated in that Member State.
13 It is only where transposition of a directive is pointless for reasons of geography that it is not mandatory (see, to that effect, Case 420/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2983, paragraph 5). That is not so in the case of Ireland, as may be seen from map 3.7 in Annex I to Decision No 1692/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 1996 on Community guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network (OJ 1996 L 228, p. 1).
14 As regards the TSIs, it is not apparent from the terms of the directive and, in particular, of Article 23 thereof that preparing TSIs is a pre-condition for the implementation of the directive.
15 It follows that the fact that the TSIs have not yet been adopted is irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether or not Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations.
Pascual Juan Cubero Vermurie v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2001-12-13
20It should be noted that the question whether the grounds of a judgment of the Court of First Instance are contradictory is a question of law which is amenable, as such, to judicial review on appeal (Case C-401/96 P Somaco v Commission [1998] ECR I-2587, paragraph 53).
31Furthermore, to the extent that the third part of the plea criticises the Court of First Instance for not having held that the appellant had merits superior to those of M.G., it must be borne in mind that it is settled case-law that the Community court cannot substitute its assessment of the merits and qualifications of candidates for that of the appointing authority (see, in particular, Case 282/81 Ragusa v Commission [1983] ECR 1245, paragraph 13).
French Republic v Monsanto Company and Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2002-01-08
31 It must be held in that regard that the mere act of preparing a draft regulation including BST in Annex II to Regulation No 2377/90 cannot, as such, be interpreted as acceptance of the contested judgment. In any event, Monsanto Company has not in any way shown how the submission of that draft meant that the French Government and the Commission had ceased to have any interest in the legal outcome of the case.
37 Second, the objection of res judicata presupposes that the action alleged to be inadmissible and the action culminating in the decision having the force of res judicata are between the same parties, have the same subject-matter and are based on the same cause of action, which is not the position as regards the present appeal and the Lilly case.
56 It should be borne in mind, first of all, that, even on the assumption that the Commission did abandon some of its arguments, the fourth paragraph of Article 37 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, which is applicable to the Court of First Instance by virtue of Article 46 of that Statute, does not preclude an intervener from using arguments different from those used by the party it is supporting, provided that the intervener seeks to support that party's submissions (Case C-200/92 P ICI v Commission [1999] ECR I-4399, paragraph 31).
68 In that regard, it follows from Article 225 EC, the first paragraph of Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see, in particular, Case C-352/98 P Bergadem and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291, paragraph 34).
69 In the present case, the French Government does not state which grounds of the contested judgment, taken from the Lilly judgment, are vitiated by an error of law. Nor does it indicate in any way the extent to which the new factors which it raises could have had the slightest bearing on those grounds.
80 It follows from those various provisions that the procedures for establishing MRLs and issuing marketing authorisations are inherently linked, inasmuch as a marketing authorisation will not be issued in respect of a veterinary medicinal product for administration to food-producing animals unless an MRL has been established, and, by the same token, an MRL will not be established for a new pharmacologically active substance unless that substance is intended to be placed on the market.