Mono Car Styling SA, in liquidation v Dervis Odemis and Others
Date: 2009-07-16
27. In that regard, it must be recalled that, in proceedings under Article 234 EC, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C‑119/05 Lucchini  [2007] ECR I‑6199, paragraph 43, and Case C‑414/07 Magoora  [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22).
28. Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra  [2001] ECR I‑2099, paragraph 39; Joined Cases C‑94/04 and C‑202/94 Cipolla and Others  [2006] ECR I‑11421, paragraph 25; and Magoora , paragraph 23).
35. However, it should be pointed out that, although it is true that Directive 98/59 merely carries out a partial harmonisation of the rules for the protection of workers in the event of collective redundancies, it is also true that the limited character of such harmonisation cannot deprive the provisions of the directive of useful effect (see, in regard to Directive 75/129, Case C‑383/92 Commission  v United Kingdom  [1994] ECR I‑2479, paragraph 25).
41. Finally, the Court has already had occasion to rule that the right to information and consultation, previously provided for in an identical manner by Directive 75/129, is exercised through workers’ representatives (see, to that effect, Commission  v United Kingdom , paragraphs 17 and 23, and Case C‑385/05 Confédération générale du travail and Others  [2007] ECR I‑611, paragraph 48).
47. It is to be noted at the outset that, according to settled case-law, the principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of Community law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and which has also been reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, proclaimed on 7 December 2000 in Nice (OJ 2000 C 364, p. 1) (see, in particular, Case C‑432/05 Unibet  [2007] ECR I‑2271, paragraph 37, and Joined Cases C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation  v Council and Commission  [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 335).
48. Moreover, the Court has consistently held that, in the absence of Community rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law but the Member States, however, are responsible for ensuring that those rights are effectively protected in each case (Case C‑268/06 Impact  [2008] ECR I‑2483, paragraphs 44 and 45 and the case-law cited therein).
49. Thus, whilst it is, in principle, for national law to determine an individual’s standing and legal interest in bringing proceedings, Community law nevertheless requires, in addition to observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, that the national legislation does not undermine the right to effective judicial protection (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑87/90 to C‑89/90 Verholen and Others  [1991] ECR I‑3757, paragraph 24; Case C‑13/01 Safalero  [2003] ECR I‑8679, paragraph 50; and Unibet , paragraph 42).
59. It is certainly true that, according to settled case-law, a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied upon as such against an individual, so that even a clear, precise and unconditional provision of a directive seeking to confer rights or impose obligations on individuals cannot of itself apply in proceedings exclusively between private parties (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑397/01 to C‑403/01 Pfeiffer and Others  [2004] ECR I‑8835, paragraphs 108 and 109).
60. However, when it applies domestic law, a national court is bound to interpret that law, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive concerned in order to achieve the result sought by the directive and consequently comply with the third paragraph of Article 249 EC (see, to that effect, Pfeiffer and Others , paragraph 113).
61. That obligation to interpret national law in conformity with Community law concerns all the provisions of national law and is limited by the general principles of law, particularly those of legal certainty and non-retroactivity, and that obligation cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem  (see, to that effect, Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmegen  [1987] ECR 3969, paragraph 13; Case C‑212/04 Adeneler and Others  [2006] ECR I‑6057, paragraph 110; Impact , paragraph 100; and Case C‑378/07 Angelidaki and Others  [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 199).
62. The principle of interpreting national law in conformity with Community law thus imposed by Community law requires the national court to consider national law as a whole in order to assess to what extent it may be applied so as not to produce a result contrary to that sought by the directive at issue (see, to that effect, Pfeiffer and Others , paragraph 115).
63. If the application of interpretive methods recognised by national law enables, in certain circumstances, a provision of domestic law to be construed in such a way as to avoid conflict with another rule of domestic law or the scope of that provision to be restricted to that end by applying it only in so far as it is compatible with the rule concerned, the national court is bound to use those methods in order to achieve the result sought by the directive at issue (see, to that effect, Pfeiffer and Others , paragraph 116).