Laurence Prinz v Region Hannover (C-523/11) and Philipp Seeberger v Studentenwerk Heidelberg (C-585/11).
Date: 2013-07-18
23. First of all, it must be recalled that, as German nationals, Ms Prinz and Mr Seeberger enjoy the status of citizens of the Union under Article 20(1) TFEU and may therefore rely on the rights conferred on those having that status, including against their Mem ber State of origin (see, Case C‑192/05 Tas-Hagen and Tas  [2006] ECR I‑10451, paragraph 19, and Joined Cases C‑11/06 and C‑12/06 Morgan and Bucher  [2007] ECR I‑9161, paragraph 22).
24. As the Court has repeatedly held, Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy within the scope ratione materiae  of the TFEU the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for (Case C‑184/99 Grzelczyk  [2001] ECR I‑6193, paragraph 31; Case C‑224/98 D’Hoop  [2002] ECR I‑6191, paragraph 28; and Case C‑46/12 N.  [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 27).
25. The situations falling within the scope of European Union law include those involving the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, in particular those involving the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States, as conferred by Article 21 TFEU ( Tas-Hagen and Tas , paragraph 22; Case C‑76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz  [2007] ECR I‑6849, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited; and Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 23).
26. In that connection, it must be recalled, as the German Government and the Commission have observed, that although the Member States are competent, under Article 165(1) TFEU as regards the content of teaching and the organisation of their respective education systems, it is none the less the case that that competence must be exercised in compliance with European Union law and, in particular, in compliance with the Treaty provisions on the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States, as conferred by Article 21(1) TFEU (see, Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
27. National legislation which places at a disadvantage certain of the nationals of the Member State concerned simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State is a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 18(1) EC on every citizen of the Union (see Case C‑406/04 De Cuyper  [2006] ECR I‑6497, paragraph 39; Tas-Hagen and Tas , paragraph 31; and Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 25).
28. Indeed, the opportunities offered by the Treaty in relation to freedom of movement for citizens of the Union cannot be fully effective if a national of a Member State can be deterred from availing himself of them by obstacles placed in the way of his stay in another Member State by legislation of his State of origin penalising the mere fact that he has used those opportunities (see, to that effect, D’Hoop , paragraph 31; Case C‑224/02 Pusa  [2004] ECR I‑5763, paragraph 19; and Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 26).
29. That consideration is particularly important in the field of education in view of the aims pursued by Article 6(e) TFEU and the second indent of Article 165(2) TFEU, namely, inter alia, encouraging mobility of students and teachers (see D’Hoop , paragraph 32; Case C-147/03 Commission  v Austria [2005] ECR I-5969, paragraph 44; and Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 27).
30. Consequently, where a Member State provides for a system of education or training grants which enables students to receive such grants if they pursue studies in another Member State, it must ensure that the detailed rules for the award of those grants do not create an unjustified restriction of the right to move and reside within the territory of the Member States laid down in Article 21 TFEU (see Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 28).
31. It must be stated that a condition of uninterrupted residence of three years, like that laid down in Article 16(3) of the BAföG, even though it applies without distinction to German nationals and other citizens of the European Union, constitutes a restriction on the right to freedom of movement and residence enjoyed by all citizens of the Union pursuant to Article 21 TFEU.
32. Such a condition is likely to dissuade nationals, such as the applicants in the main proceedings, from exercising their right to freedom of movement and residence in another Member State, given the impact that exercising that freedom is likely to have on the right to the education or training grant.
33. According to settled case-law, legislation which is likely to restrict a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty can be justified in the light of European Union law only if it is based on objective considerations of public interest independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and if it is proportionate to the legitimate objective pursued by the provisions of national law (see De Cuyper , paragraph 40; Tas-Hagen and Tas , paragraph 33; and Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 33) It also follows from the case-law that a measure is proportionate when, while appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective pursued, it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it ( De Cuyper , paragraph 42; Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 33; and Case C‑379/11 Caves Krier Frères  [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
36. In that connection, it is true that the Court has recognised that it may be legitimate for a Member State, in order to ensure that the grant of assistance to cover the maintenance costs of students from other Member States does not become an unreasonable burden which could have consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be granted by that State, to grant such assistance only to students who have demonstrated a certain degree of integration into the society of that State, and that if a risk exists that a Member State may have to bear such an unreasonable burden, similar considerations may apply as regards the award by that State of education or training grants to students wishing to study in other Member States ( Morgan and Bucher , paragraphs 43 and 44 and the case-law cited).
37. However, according to settled case-law, the proof required to demonstrate the genuine link must not be too exclusive in nature or unduly favour one element which is not necessarily representative of the real and effective degree of connection between the claimant and this Member State, to the exclusion of all other representative elements (see, to that effect, D’Hoop , paragraph 39; Case C‑503/09 Stewart  [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 95; and Case C‑75/11 Commission  v Austria  [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 62).
38. Although the existence of a certain level of integration may be regarded as established by the finding that a student has resided in the Member State where he may apply for an education or training grant for a certain period, a sole condition of residence, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, risks, as the Advocate General observes in point 95 of her Opinion, excluding from funding students who, despite not having resided for an uninterrupted period of three years in Germany immediately prior to studying abroad, are nevertheless sufficiently connected to German society. That may be the case where the student is a national of the State concerned and was educated there for a significant period or on account of other factors such as, in particular, his family, employment, language skills or the existence of other social and economic factors. Furthermore, other provisions of the legislation at issue in the main proceedings themselves permit factors distinct from the place of residence of the applicant for the grant to be relevant, both in order to establish the centre of family interests of the person concerned and to determine whether the conditions for the award of the grant are fulfilled in the case of home-country nationals who have established their permanent residence abroad.