larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Odvolací finanční ředitelství v Pavlína Baštová.
Date: 2016-11-10
59


As regards the interpretation of that annex, it must first be recalled that provisions which are in the nature of exceptions to a principle must be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 December 1995, Oude Luttikhuis and Others, EU:C:1995:434, paragraph 23, and of 17 June 2010, Commission v France, C‑492/08, EU:C:2010:348, paragraph 35).
60


Secondly, the concepts used in Annex III to the VAT Directive must be interpreted in accordance with the normal sense of the terms at issue (judgment of 4 June 2015, Commission v Poland, C‑678/13, not published, EU:C:2015:358, paragraph 46).
70


A transaction is a single supply where, in particular, two or more components or acts supplied by the taxable person are so closely linked that they form, objectively, a single, indivisible economic supply, which it would be artificial to split (judgments of 27 October 2005, Levob Verzekeringen and OV Bank, C‑41/04, EU:C:2005:649, paragraph 22, and of 29 March 2007, Aktiebolaget NN, C‑111/05, EU:C:2007:195, paragraph 23).
71


Such is also the case where one or more components are to be regarded as constituting the principal service, while one or more components are to be regarded, by contrast, as one or more ancillary services which share the tax treatment of the principal service. In particular, a service is regarded as ancillary to a principal service if it does not constitute for customers an aim in itself, but a means of better enjoying the principal service supplied (judgments of 25 February 1999, CPP, C‑349/96, EU:C:1999:93, paragraph 30, and of 21 February 2008, Part Service, C‑425/06, EU:C:2008:108, paragraph 52).
J.J. de Lange v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2016-11-10
16


It must be recalled from the outset that, according to settled case-law of the Court, it is apparent both from the title and preamble and from the content and purpose of Directive 2000/78 that that directive is intended to lay down a general framework in order to guarantee equal treatment in employment and occupation for all persons, by offering them effective protection against discrimination on any of the grounds mentioned in its Article 1, which include age (judgment of 26 September 2013, Dansk Jurist- og Økonomforbund, C‑546/11, EU:C:2013:603, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited, and judgment of 2 June 2016, C, C‑122/15, EU:C:2016:391, paragraph 19).
21


Thus, and read in the light of Article 16(a) of Directive 2000/78, pursuant to which Member States must take the measures necessary to ensure that any laws, regulations and administrative provisions contrary to the principle of equal treatment are abolished, Article 3(1)(b) of that directive must be taken to mean that it also covers a tax provision such as that at issue in the main proceedings, adopted with the aim of promoting access to training for young people and, consequently, improving their position on the labour market (see, by analogy, judgment of 21 July 2005, Vergani, C‑207/04, EU:C:2005:495, paragraph 26).
27


Consequently, the objective of promoting the position of young people on the labour market in order to promote their vocational integration or ensure their protection can be regarded as legitimate for the purposes of Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78.
DHL Express (Austria) GmbH v Post-Control-Kommission and Bundesminister für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie.
Date: 2016-11-16
19


It should be noted at the outset that, when interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part. The background to a provision of EU law may also contain elements relevant to its interpretation (judgment of 2 September 2015, Surmačs, C‑127/14, EU:C:2015:522, paragraph 28).
20


In that regard, it is appropriate to recall, in the first place, that under Article 9(1) of Directive 97/67, Member States may make undertakings active in the postal sector subject to general authorisations with regard to services which fall outside the scope of the universal service, while Article 9(2), first subparagraph, of that directive provides that Member States may introduce authorisation procedures with regard to services which fall within the scope of the universal service.
26


On the other hand, Article 9(2), second subparagraph, second indent, of Directive 97/67 allows Member States to subject the granting of authorisations to compliance with requirements concerning the quality, availability and performance of the relevant services. Given the lack of precision as to which services this obligation applies to, it should be pointed out, as the Advocate General observed in point 42 of his Opinion, that it is clear from the travaux préparatoires for Directive 2008/6 that the EU legislature intended to remove not only the remaining obstacles to full market opening for certain universal service providers but also all other obstacles to the provision of postal services. Failing any indication to the contrary and taking into account the nature of the obligation at issue, it therefore appears that all postal service providers may be required to fulfil the obligation referred to in Article 9(2), second subparagraph, second indent, of Directive 97/67.
Timothy Martin Hemming and Others v Westminster City Council.
Date: 2016-11-16
27


According to the Court’s settled case-law, for the purpose of interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, in particular, judgment of 14 July 2016, Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb, C‑19/15, EU:C:2016:563, paragraph 23).
31


While the Court has not yet had occasion to interpret that concept in the context of the Services Directive, it has clarified, in another context, that in calculating the amount of duties paid by way of fees or dues, the Member States are entitled to take account, not only of the material and salary costs which are directly related to the effecting of the transactions in respect of which they are incurred, but also of the proportion of the overheads of the competent authority which can be attributed to those transactions (judgment of 2 December 1997, Fantask and Others, C‑188/95, EU:C:1997:580, paragraph 30).
32


In addition, the Court has clarified — indeed, in relation to a provision of EU law expressly allowing the costs relating to the implementation, management and monitoring of a regime for issuing individual licences to be taken into account in calculating administrative costs — that the costs taken into account may not include the expenditure linked to the authority in question’s general supervisory activities (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2006, i-21 Germany and Arcor, C‑392/04 and C‑422/04, EU:C:2006:586, paragraphs 34 and 35).
Betriebsrat der Ruhrlandklinik gGmbH v Ruhrlandklinik gGmbH.
Date: 2016-11-17
27


In accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, the essential feature of an employment relationship is that, for a certain period of time, a person performs services for and under the direction of another person, in return for which he receives remuneration, the legal characterisation under national law and the form of that relationship, as well as the nature of the legal relationship between those two persons, not being decisive in that regard (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 November 2010, Danosa, C‑232/09, EU:C:2010:674, paragraphs 39 and 40 and the case-law cited).
44


As regards the interpretation of the concept of ‘economic activities’ as referred to in Article 1(2) of Directive 2008/104, it should be noted that, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, any activity consisting in offering goods or services on a given market is economic in nature (see, inter alia, judgments of 18 June 1998, Commission v Italy, C‑35/96, EU:C:1998:303, paragraph 36; 6 September 2011, Scattolon, C‑108/10, EU:C:2011:542, paragraph 43; and 23 February 2016, Commission v Hungary, C‑179/14, EU:C:2016:108, paragraph 149).
46


Contrary to what Ruhrlandklinik contends, the fact that the association does not operate for gain is, under the express wording of Article 1(2) of Directive 2008/104 and in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court (see, inter alia, judgment of 3 December 2015, Pfotenhilfe-Ungarn, C‑301/14, EU:C:2015:793, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited), not relevant in that regard. The legal form of that association, constituted as an association, is likewise not relevant since it has no bearing on the economic nature of the activities pursued.
Nelsons GmbH v Ayonnax Nutripharm GmbH and Bachblütentreff Ltd.
Date: 2016-11-23
31


In that connection, it must be recalled that Article 28(2) of Regulation No 1924/2006 refers to products bearing a trade mark or brand name which must be regarded as nutrition or health claims within the meaning of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Green — Swan Pharmaceuticals CR, C‑299/12, EU:C:2013:501, paragraph 36).
39


In those circumstances, Article 28(2) of Regulation No 1924/2006 must be understood as referring only to foodstuffs bearing a trade mark or brand name which must be considered a nutrition or health claim within the meaning of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Green — Swan Pharmaceuticals CR, C‑299/12, EU:C:2013:501, paragraph 37).
Bund Naturschutz in Bayern e.V. and Harald Wilde v Freistaat Bayern.
Date: 2016-11-24
23


Although the scope of Directive 2011/92 — like that of Directive 85/337 — is wide and its purpose very broad (see to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 28 February 2008, Abraham and Others, C‑2/07, EU:C:2008:133, paragraph 32, and of 25 July 2008, Ecologistas en Acción-CODA, C‑142/07, EU:C:2008:445, paragraph 28), a purposive interpretation of the first-mentioned directive nevertheless cannot disregard the clearly expressed intention of the EU legislature (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 March 2011, Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest and Others, C‑275/09, EU:C:2011:154, paragraph 29).
30


In the first place, it should be noted that point 7(b) of Annex I to Directive 2011/92 and the reference to the AGR were couched in the same terms in Directive 85/337. As regards the application of the latter, the Court has already held that, since not all the Member States are party to that agreement, that reference concerned the version of the agreement in force when Directive 85/337 was adopted, namely the version of 15 November 1975 (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 July 2008, Ecologistas en Acción-CODA, C‑142/07, EU:C:2008:445, paragraph 30).
34


In the third place, an express road is, according to that definition, a road reserved for automobile traffic accessible only from interchanges or controlled junctions and on which stopping and parking are prohibited. It does not follow from that definition that roads sited in urban areas would a priori be excluded. On the contrary, unless roads in built-up areas are expressly excluded, the words ‘express roads’ cover urban roads which have the characteristics set out in Annex II to the AGR (judgment of 25 July 2008, Ecologistas en Acción-CODA, C‑142/07, EU:C:2008:445, paragraph 31).
37


As the referring court has pointed out, the Court of Justice has given a broad interpretation of the provisions of point 7(b) and (c) of Annex I to Directive 85/337 (which have been restated in identical terms in point 7(b) and (c) of Annex I to Directive 2011/92), holding that a project for refurbishment of a road which would be equivalent, by its scale and the manner in which it is carried out, to construction may be regarded as a construction project for the purposes of those provisions (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 July 2008, Ecologistas en Acción-CODA, C‑142/07, EU:C:2008:445, paragraph 36, and of 17 March 2011, Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest and Others, C‑275/09, EU:C:2011:154, paragraph 27).
39


It must be noted that the word ‘construction’ used in point 7(a) of Annex I to Directive 2011/92 is in no way ambiguous and is to be understood as having its normal meaning, namely as referring to the carrying-out of works not previously existing or to the physical alteration of existing installations (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 March 2011, Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest and Others, C‑275/09, EU:C:2011:154, paragraph 26).
Lohmann & Rauscher International GmbH & Co. KG v BIOS Medical Services GmbH.
Date: 2016-11-24
27


In this regard, it should be noted that Directive 93/42, which constitutes a harmonisation measure adopted pursuant to Article 100a of the EC Treaty (subsequently Article 95 EC), is intended to promote the free movement of medical devices which comply with the requirements of that directive, by replacing the various legislative, regulatory and administrative measures in force in the Member States which create barriers to free trade (judgments of 14 June 2007, Medipac-Kazantzidis, C‑6/05, EU:C:2007:337, paragraph 51, and of 19 November 2009, Nordiska Dental, C‑288/08, EU:C:2009:718, paragraph 20).
28


Directive 93/42 harmonises the essential requirements to be met by medical devices falling within its scope of application. Once those devices comply with the harmonised standards and are certified in accordance with the procedures provided for by that directive, they must be presumed to comply with those essential requirements and therefore be deemed to be appropriate for the use for which they are intended (judgment of 14 June 2007, Medipac-Kazantzidis, C‑6/05, EU:C:2007:337, paragraph 42).
30


It therefore follows from those provisions that medical devices the conformity of which with the essential requirements of Directive 93/42 has been evaluated according to one of the procedures laid down in Article 11 of that directive and which bear a CE marking must be allowed to move freely throughout the European Union, and no Member State can require that such a product must undergo a further conformity assessment procedure (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 June 2007, Medipac-Kazantzidis, C‑6/05, EU:C:2007:337, paragraph 42). That is the reason why Directive 93/42 does not provide for any compliance review mechanism to be added to or supplement those provided for in Article 11 of that directive.
35


In particular, Article 8(1) of Directive 93/42 places Member States which have found that there are risks, linked to medical devices which have been certified as being in compliance with that directive, to the health and/or safety of patients or users or, where applicable, other persons under a duty to take all appropriate interim measures to withdraw those medical devices from the market, or to prohibit or restrict their being placed on the market or put into service. In those circumstances, the Member State concerned is required under that provision to notify the Commission immediately of the measures taken, indicating in particular the reasons for those measures. Under Article 8(2) of Directive 93/42, the Commission must in turn examine whether those interim measures are justified and, where that is found to be indeed the case, it must immediately inform the Member State which initiated the measures, as well as the other Member States, accordingly (see judgments of 14 June 2007, Medipac-Kazantzidis, C‑6/05, EU:C:2007:337, paragraph 46, and of 19 November 2009, Nordiska Dental, C‑288/08, EU:C:2009:718, paragraph 24).
Vodoopskrba i odvodnja d.o.o. v Željka Klafurić.
Date: 2016-12-07
16


It must be borne in mind that, under the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU, providing for cooperation between referring courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. In that regard, it is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision referring the questions, the points of EU law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of the dispute (see, inter alia, judgment of 14 April 2016, Cervati and Malvi, C‑131/14, EU:C:2016:255, paragraph 26).
18


As the Court has already noted, Directive 2000/60 is a framework directive adopted on the basis of Article 175(1) EC (now Article 192 TFEU). It establishes common principles and an overall framework for action in relation to water protection and coordinates, integrates and, in a longer perspective, develops the overall principles and the structures for protection and sustainable use of water in the European Union. The common principles and overall framework for action which it lays down are to be developed subsequently by the Member States, which are to adopt a series of individual measures in accordance with the timescales laid down in the directive. However, the directive does not seek to achieve complete harmonisation of the rules of the Member States concerning water (see, inter alia, judgments of 30 November 2006, Commission v Luxembourg, C‑32/05, EU:C:2006:749, paragraph 41, and of 11 September 2014, Commission v Germany, C‑525/12, EU:C:2014:2202, paragraph 50).
Verein für Konsumenteninformation v INKO, Inkasso GmbH.
Date: 2016-12-08
27


In order to answer that question, it must, at the outset, be noted that Directive 2008/48 provides, as regards consumer credit, full and mandatory harmonisation in a number of key areas, which is regarded as necessary in order to ensure that all consumers in the European Union enjoy a high and equivalent level of protection of their interests and to facilitate the emergence of a well-functioning internal market in consumer credit (see judgment of 18 December 2014, CA Consumer Finance, C‑449/13, EU:C:2014:2464, paragraph 21).
34


Although Directive 2008/48 does not specifically define the concept of ‘charge’, it is important to note that, in accordance with Article 3(g) of that directive, the total cost of the credit to the consumer covers all the costs which he is required to pay in connection with the credit agreement and which are known to the creditor (see judgment of 21 April 2016, Radlinger and Radlingerová, C‑377/14, EU:C:2016:283, paragraph 84).
51


In that regard, as the Advocate General in essence stated in points 28 to 30 of her Opinion, the obligation laid down in Articles 5 and 6 of that directive, that pre-contractual information be provided to the consumer by the lender, or, where appropriate, through the credit intermediary, contributes to the attainment of the objective referred to in paragraph 27 of the present judgment of ensuring that all consumers enjoy a high level of protection of their interests (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 December 2014, CA Consumer Finance, C‑449/13, EU:C:2014:2464, paragraph 21, and 21 April 2016, Radlinger and Radlingerová, C‑377/14, EU:C:2016:283, paragraph 61).
Criminal proceedings against A and B.
Date: 2016-12-08
18


It should be noted, as a preliminary point, that Article 43 of the VAT Directive contains a general rule for determining the place where services are supplied for tax purposes, while Article 44 et seq. of the directive provide a number of specific instances of such places. As follows from settled case-law of the Court on the essentially identical provisions of Article 9 of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1), Article 43 of the VAT Directive does not take precedence over Article 44 et seq. of the directive. In every situation, the question which arises is whether that situation corresponds to one of the cases mentioned in Article 44 et seq. of the directive. If not, it falls within the scope of Article 43 of the directive (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 26 September 1996, Dudda, C‑327/94, EU:C:1996:355, paragraphs 20 and 21, and 6 November 2008, Kollektivavtalsstiftelsen TRR Trygghetsrådet, C‑291/07, EU:C:2008:609, paragraphs 24 and 25).
19


It follows that Article 56(1)(a) of the VAT Directive is not to be regarded as an exception to a general rule, which must be narrowly construed (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 October 2005, Levob Verzekeringen and OV Bank, C‑41/04, EU:C:2005:649, paragraph 34, and 7 September 2006, Heger, C‑166/05, EU:C:2006:533, paragraph 17).
24


It should be recalled here that the purpose of the provisions of the VAT Directive determining the place where supplies of services are taxed is to avoid, first, conflicts of jurisdiction which may result in double taxation, and, secondly, non-taxation (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 November 2008, Kollektivavtalsstiftelsen TRR Trygghetsrådet, C‑291/07, EU:C:2008:609, paragraph 24, and 17 December 2015, WebMindLicenses, C‑419/14, EU:C:2015:832, paragraph 41).
25


The Court has previously held, with respect to Article 9 of Sixth Directive 77/388, that the underlying logic of the provisions concerning the place where a service is supplied requires that goods and services are taxed as far as possible at the place of consumption (judgment of 3 September 2009, RCI Europe, C‑37/08, EU:C:2009:507, paragraph 39).