Matra SA v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1993-06-15
11 On this point, it must be noted that under the third paragraph of Article 37 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EEC, submissions made in an application to intervene are limited to supporting the submissions of one of the parties. Moreover, under Article 93(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the intervener must accept the case as he finds it at the time of his intervention.
12 It follows that the interveners have no standing to raise a plea of inadmissibility and the Court is thus not obliged to examine the pleas put forward by them (see the judgment in Case C-313/90 CIRFS v Commission [1993] ECR I-1125).
14 It is settled case-law that persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may claim to be concerned within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 173 only if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes which are particular to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed (judgment in Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission [1963] ECR 95).
16 As the Court has already held (see, as the most recent authority, Case C-198/91 Cook v Commission [1993] ECR I-2487), the preliminary stage of the procedure for reviewing aid under Article 93(3) of the Treaty, which is intended merely to allow the Commission to form a prima facie opinion on the partial or complete conformity of the aid in question, must be distinguished from the examination under Article 93(2) of the Treaty. It is only in connection with the latter examination, which is designed to enable the Commission to be fully informed of all the facts of the case, that the Treaty imposes an obligation on the Commission to give the parties concerned notice to submit their comments.
17 Where, without initiating the procedure under Article 93(2), the Commission finds on the basis of Article 93(3) that an aid is compatible with the common market, the persons intended to benefit from those procedural guarantees may secure compliance therewith only if they are able to challenge that decision by the Commission before the Court.
18 The parties concerned, within the meaning of Article 93(2) of the Treaty, have been defined by the Court as the persons, undertakings or associations whose interests might be affected by the grant of the aid, in particular competing undertakings and trade associations (see, in particular, the judgments in Case 323/82 Intermills v Commission [1984] ECR 3809, paragraph 16, and Cook v Commission, cited above, paragraph 24).
19 In the present case, it cannot be disputed that as Matra is the leading Community producer of multi-purpose vehicles and a future competitor of Newco, its interests are affected by the grant of the aid at issue and that consequently it is an interested party within the meaning of Article 93(2) of the Treaty.
20 It follows that the application by Matra must be held to be admissible.
Substance
23 It should be noted at the outset, with a view to examining those complaints, that in the context of an action challenging legality, the Court' s function is solely to ascertain whether the contested decision is vititated by one of the grounds of unlawfulness set out in Article 173 of the Treaty, and the Court cannot substitute its own assessment of the facts, especially in the economic sphere, for that of the author of the decision.
24 Furthermore, it is settled law that, as regards the application of Article 93(3) of the Treaty, the Commission enjoys a wide discretion, the exercise of which involves assessments of an economic and social nature which must be made within a Community context (see inter alia the judgment in Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1433, paragraph 34).
25 In its review of legality, the Court must therefore restrict itself to determining whether the Commission has exceeded the scope of its discretion by a distortion or manifest error of assessment of the facts or by misuse of powers or abuse of process.
29 With respect to the investment in infrastructure and the training programme, it must be emphasized that the Commission found in the contested decision that the infrastructure and training measures would not benefit the joint venture exclusively, enabling it to conclude that the financial assistance granted by the Portuguese Republic should not be regarded as State aid.
30 Matra has thus been unable to demonstrate that, in that analysis and in its consequential appraisal of the financial assistance, the Commission carried out a manifestly erroneous assessment of the economic data.
33 As regards the complaint alleging failure to initiate the procedure under Article 93(2) of the Treaty, it is settled case-law (see, as the most recent authority, the Cook judgment, cited above, paragraph 29) that that procedure is essential whenever the Commission has serious difficulties in determining whether an aid is compatible with the common market. The Commission may thus restrict itself to the preliminary examination under Article 93(3) when taking a decision in favour of an aid only if it is able to satisfy itself after an initial examination that the aid is compatible with the Treaty. If, on the other hand, an initial examination leads the Commission to the opposite conclusion, or does not enable it to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the common market, the Commission is under a duty to carry out all the requisite consultations and for that purpose to initiate the procedure under Article 93(2).
41 It must be noted in this respect that while the procedure provided for in Articles 92 and 93 leaves a wide discretion to the Commission, and under certain conditions to the Council, in coming to a decision on the compatibility of a system of State aid with the requirements of the common market, it is clear from the general scheme of the Treaty that that procedure must never produce a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the Treaty (judgment in Case 73/79 Commission v Italy [1980] ECR 1533, paragraph 11). The Court has also held that those aspects of aid which contravene specific provisions of the Treaty other than Articles 92 and 93 may be so indissolubly linked to the object of the aid that it is impossible to evaluate them separately (judgment in Case 74/76 Iannelli v Meroni [1977] ECR 557).
42 That obligation on the part of the Commission to ensure that Articles 92 and 93 are applied consistently with other provisions of the Treaty is all the more necessary where those other provisions also pursue, as in the present case, the objective of undistorted competition in the common market.
48 Finally, with respect to the complaint alleging the statement of reasons in the contested decision to be defective, it suffices to note that a decision not to initiate the procedure under Article 93(2) of the Treaty, which is taken in a short space of time, need contain only the reasons why the Commission considers that it is not faced with serious difficulties in assessing the compatibility of the aid at issue with the common market. Furthermore, the statement of reasons for the contested decision must be assessed in the context of the SIBR and of the criteria laid down by the Community framework on State aid to the motor vehicle industry.