HTTS Hanseatic Trade Trust & Shipping GmbH v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2019-09-10
32


It is clear from the Court’s case-law that the European Union may incur non-contractual liability only if a number of conditions are fulfilled, namely the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals, the fact of damage and the existence of a causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the author of the act and the damage sustained by the injured parties (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 July 2003, Commission v Fresh Marine, C‑472/00 P, EU:C:2003:399, paragraph 25; of 19 April 2012, Artegodan v Commission, C‑221/10 P, EU:C:2012:216, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited; and of 13 December 2018, European Union v Kendrion, C‑150/17 P, EU:C:2018:1014, paragraph 117).
33


So far as concerns in particular the first of those conditions, which is the only one at issue in the present appeal, the Court has stated that a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals is established where the breach is one that implies that the institution concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits set on its discretion, the factors to be taken into consideration in that connection being, inter alia, the complexity of the situations to be regulated, the degree of clarity and precision of the rule breached and the measure of discretion left by that rule to the EU institution (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 April 2007, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, C‑282/05 P, EU:C:2007:226, paragraph 50, and of 30 May 2017, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, C‑45/15 P, EU:C:2017:402, paragraph 30).
37


So far as concerns the first component of that condition, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, in an action for annulment the legality of the contested act must be assessed on the basis of the facts and the law as they stood at the time when the act was adopted (judgments of 18 July 2013, Schindler Holding and Others v Commission, C‑501/11 P, EU:C:2013:522, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited, and of 3 September 2015, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission, C‑398/13 P, EU:C:2015:535, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
40


That conclusion is not called into question by the settled case-law, noted in essence by the General Court in paragraph 42 of the judgment under appeal, from which it follows that the action for damages is an autonomous form of action, with a particular purpose to fulfil within the system of legal remedies and subject to conditions of use dictated by its specific purpose (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 March 2004, Ombudsman v Lamberts, C‑234/02 P, EU:C:2004:174, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).That autonomy is without prejudice to the fact that, in order to assess the merits of such an action, the EU judicature is to analyse the legality of the conduct of the EU institution or body giving rise to the damage (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 March 2004, Ombudsman v Lamberts, C‑234/02 P, EU:C:2004:174, paragraphs 60 and 61).
41


Since Regulation No 961/2010 was annulled by the judgment of the General Court of 7 December 2011, HTTS v Council (T‑562/10, EU:T:2011:716), which, since an appeal was not brought against it within the time limit, had the force of res judicata, the first component of the first condition for non-contractual liability of the European Union was already fulfilled as regards that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 June 2006, P & O European Ferries (Vizcaya) and Diputación Foral de Vizcaya v Commission, C‑442/03 P and C‑471/03 P, EU:C:2006:356, paragraphs 41 to 45).
49


It should be pointed out that that is not the purpose of the limitation period prescribed in that provision. In accordance with settled case-law, that period has the function, first, of ensuring protection of the rights of the aggrieved person, who must have sufficient time in which to gather the appropriate information with a view to a possible action, and, second, of preventing the aggrieved person from being able to delay the exercise of his right to damages indefinitely (judgment of 8 November 2012, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, C‑469/11 P, EU:C:2012:705, paragraphs 33 and 53 and the case-law cited).
100


Second, since HTTS did not contest the legality of Regulation No 668/2010 by means of an action for annulment, it was for it to demonstrate that that regulation was unlawful, in the action giving rise to the judgment under appeal. Acts of the EU institutions are in principle presumed to be lawful and accordingly produce legal effects until such time as they are withdrawn, annulled in an action for annulment or declared invalid following a reference for a preliminary ruling or a plea of illegality (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, Schrems, C‑362/14, EU:C:2015:650, paragraph 52).
103


Inadequacy of the statement of reasons for an act imposing a restrictive measure is not, in itself, such as to give rise to non-contractual liability of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 September 2003, Eurocoton and Others v Council, C‑76/01 P, EU:C:2003:511, paragraph 98 and the case-law cited).
108


In addition, after concluding that there was not a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of EU law, the General Court, in paragraph 92 of the judgment under appeal, did not go on to examine the other conditions which must each be met in order for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 April 2007, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, C‑282/05 P, EU:C:2007:226, paragraph 57).