Deutsche Umwelthilfe eV v Freistaat Bayern.
Date: 2019-12-19
30


According to the referring court, this question arises in the context of the Court of Justice’s case-law according to which, where a Member State has failed to comply with the requirements of the second subparagraph of Article 13(1) of Directive 2008/50 and has not applied for a postponement of the deadline as provided for by Article 22 of the directive, it is for the national court having jurisdiction, should a case be brought before it, to take, in regard to the national authority, any necessary measure, such as an order in the appropriate terms, so that the authority establishes the plan required by the directive in accordance with the conditions laid down by the latter (judgment of 19 November 2014, ClientEarth, C‑404/13, EU:C:2014:2382, paragraph 58).
33


In that regard, it should be noted, in the first place, that, in the absence of harmonisation of national enforcement mechanisms, the details of their implementation are governed by the internal legal order of the Member States by virtue of the principle of procedural autonomy of those States. Nevertheless, the means of implementation must meet two conditions, namely that they are no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and that they do not make it impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (judgment of 26 June 2019, Kuhar, C‑407/18, EU:C:2019:537, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
34


In the second place, when the Member States implement EU law, they are required to ensure compliance with the right to an effective remedy enshrined in the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter (judgment of 29 July 2019, Torubarov, C‑556/17, EU:C:2019:626, paragraph 69), a provision which constitutes a reaffirmation of the principle of effective judicial protection. In the case of actions intended to secure compliance with environmental law, in the particular on the initiative of environmental protection associations as in the main proceedings, that right to an effective remedy is also enshrined in Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention.
35


According to the Court’s case-law, national legislation which results in a situation where the judgment of a court remains ineffective because that court does not have any means of securing observance of the judgment fails to comply with the essential content of the right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2019, Torubarov, C‑556/17, EU:C:2019:626, paragraph 72).
36


That right would be illusory if a Member State’s legal system were to allow a final, binding judicial decision to remain ineffective to the detriment of one party (judgments of 30 June 2016, Toma and Biroul Executorului Judecătoresc Horațiu-Vasile Cruduleci, C‑205/15, EU:C:2016:499, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited, and of 29 July 2019, Torubarov, C‑556/17, EU:C:2019:626, point 57).
37


More specifically, according to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights which relates to Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 — and in the light of which Article 47 of the Charter should be interpreted (judgment of 30 June 2016, Toma and Biroul Executorului Judecătoresc Horațiu-Vasile Cruduleci, C‑205/15, EU:C:2016:499, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited) — the fact that the public authorities do not comply with a final, enforceable judicial decision deprives that provision of all useful effect (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 19 March 1997, Hornsby v. Greece, CE:ECHR:1997:0319JUD001835791, §§ 41 and 45).
38


The right to an effective remedy is all the more important because, in the field covered by Directive 2008/50, failure to adopt the measures required by that directive would endanger human health (see, by analogy, judgment of 25 July 2008, Janecek, C‑237/07, EU:C:2008:447, paragraph 38).
39


In addition, in order to ensure effective judicial protection in the fields covered by EU environmental law, it is for the national court to interpret its national law in a way which, to the fullest extent possible, is consistent both with the objectives laid down in Article 9(3) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention and with the objective of effective judicial protection of the rights conferred by EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 March 2011, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, C‑240/09, EU:C:2011:125, paragraphs 50 and 51).
42


In that regard, it should be recalled that, where it is unable to interpret national law in compliance with the requirements of EU law, the national court, hearing a case within its jurisdiction, has, as an organ of a Member State, the obligation to disapply any provision of national law which is contrary to a provision of EU law with direct effect in the case pending before it (judgments of 9 March 1978, Simmenthal, 106/77, EU:C:1978:49, paragraph 21, and of 24 June 2019, Popławski, C‑573/17, EU:C:2019:530, paragraphs 58 and 61).
46


As regards the requirements that the legal basis for a limitation on the right to liberty must satisfy, the Court has already stated, in the light of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 21 October 2013, Del Río Prada v. Spain (CE:ECHR:2013:1021JUD004275009), that a law empowering a court to deprive a person of his or her liberty must, so as to meet the requirements of Article 52(1) of the Charter, be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application in order to avoid all risk of arbitrariness (judgment of 15 March 2017, Al Chodor, C‑528/15, EU:C:2017:213, paragraphs 38 and 40).
50


As regards the requirements stemming from the principle of proportionality, it is to be borne in mind that, where several fundamental rights are at issue, the assessment of observance of the principle of proportionality must be carried out in accordance with the need to reconcile the requirements of the protection of those various rights, striking a fair balance between them (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 January 2013, Sky Österreich, C‑283/11, EU:C:2013:28, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).
54


Furthermore, it should be remembered that the full effectiveness of EU law and effective protection of the rights which individuals derive from it may, where appropriate, be ensured by the principle of State liability for loss or damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of EU law for which the State can be held responsible, as that principle is inherent in the system of the treaties on which the European Union is based (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 March 1996, Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame, C‑46/93 and C‑48/93, EU:C:1996:79, paragraphs 20, 39 and 52, and of 28 July 2016, Tomášová, C‑168/15, EU:C:2016:602, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
55


That principle applies to any case in which a Member State breaches EU law, whichever public authority is responsible for the breach (judgment of 28 July 2016, Tomášová, C‑168/15, EU:C:2016:602, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).