Silvia Georgiana Câmpean v Serviciul Fiscal Municipal Mediaș, anciennement Administrația Finanțelor Publice a Municipiului Mediaș and Administrația Fondului pentru Mediu.
Date: 2016-06-30
29


First, it must be borne in mind that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, a presumption of relevance is enjoyed by questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine. In particular, it is not for the Court of Justice, in the context of the judicial cooperation established by Article 267 TFEU, to call into question or to verify the accuracy of the national court’s interpretation of national law, as such interpretation falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of that court. Thus, the Court, when a question is referred to it by a national court, must not go beyond the interpretation of national law as described to it by that court (see, inter alia, judgment of 6 October 2015 in Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraphs 12 and 13 and the case-law cited).
30


Moreover, the refusal by the Court to rule on a question referred by a national court is possible only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgments of 21 May 2015 in Verder LabTec, C‑657/13, EU:C:2015:331, paragraph 29, and 6 October 2015 in Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited).
34


As regards, second, the Romanian Government’s argument that the request for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible in so far as it relates to the interpretation of the instruments of the Council of Europe covered by the questions referred, it should be recalled that the power of the Court to provide interpretations by way of preliminary rulings, as follows from Article 267 TFEU, extends only to rules which are part of EU law (judgment of 4 May 2010 in TNT Express Nederland, C‑533/08, EU:C:2010:243, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited), which is not the case for the instruments of the Council of Europe referred to by the referring court in its first, second, fifth and sixth questions. The Court is thus not competent to rule on those questions in so far as they relate directly to the interpretation of such instruments.
37


In that regard, it is settled case-law that the right to a refund of taxes levied by a Member State in breach of rules of EU law is the consequence and complement of the rights conferred on individuals by provisions of EU law prohibiting such taxes, as interpreted by the Court. The Member States are therefore in principle required to repay taxes levied in breach of EU law with the related interest (see judgment of 6 October 2015 in Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraphs 24 and 25 and the case-law cited).
38


In the absence of EU legislation on the recovery of national taxes unduly levied, it is for each Member State, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, to designate the courts and tribunals with jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions at law for safeguarding the rights which taxpayers derive from EU law (see, inter alia, judgment of 6 October 2015 in Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
39


However, the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding the rights which taxpayers derive from EU law must not be any less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not be framed in such a way as to render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the legal order of the European Union (principle of effectiveness) (see, inter alia, judgment of 6 October 2015 in Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
40


Moreover, it must be recalled that the Court has already held that, in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation, a Member State may not adopt provisions making repayment of a tax held to be contrary to EU law by a judgment of the Court, or whose incompatibility with EU law is apparent from such a judgment, subject to conditions relating specifically to that tax which are less favourable than those which would otherwise be applied to that repayment of the tax (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 September 2002 in Prisco and CASER, C‑216/99, C‑222/99, EU:C:2002:472, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited, and 2 October 2003 in Weber’s Wine World and Others, C‑147/01, EU:C:2003:533, paragraph 87).
45


It is settled case-law that compliance with the principle of equivalence implies that Member States are not to provide less favourable procedural rules for claims for reimbursement of a tax based on an infringement of EU law than those applicable to similar actions for infringement of domestic law, given their purpose, their cause of action and their essential characteristics, (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 July 2012 in Littlewoods Retail and Others, C‑591/10, EU:C:2012:478, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
46


It is in principle for the national court, which has direct knowledge of the procedural rules intended to ensure that the rights derived by individuals from EU law are safeguarded under domestic law, to verify that they comply with the principle of equivalence. However, the Court may, for the purposes of the assessment which the national court will carry out, provide certain information to it relating to the interpretation of EU law (see judgments of 1 December 1998 in Levez, C‑326/96, EU:C:1998:577, paragraphs 39 and 40, and 19 July 2012 in Littlewoods Retail and Others, C‑591/10, EU:C:2012:478, paragraph 31).
55


Moreover, having regard to certain arguments raised by the applicant in the main proceedings in her written submissions, which could be interpreted as meaning that the rules on the execution of judicial decisions concerning the rights derived from the legal order of the EU must be identical regardless of the nature of the dispute, it must be pointed out that compliance with the principle of equivalence requires that actions based on an infringement of national law and similar actions based on an infringement of EU law be treated equally and not that there be equal treatment of national procedural rules applicable to proceedings of a different nature or applicable to proceedings falling within two different branches of law (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 2015 in Orizzonte Salute, C‑61/14, EU:C:2015:655, paragraph 67, and 6 October 2015 in Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
57


As regards the requirements of the principle of effectiveness, it is necessary to consider, first, whether a system of reimbursement of a tax levied in breach of EU law, such as the system put in place by the rules provided for in Article XV of OUG No 8/2014 and Decree No 365/741/2014, makes it excessively difficult or impossible in practice to exercise rights derived from the legal order of the EU, taking into account the role of those rules in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national bodies (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 June 2013 in Agrokonsulting-04, C‑93/12, EU:C:2013:432, paragraph 48, and 6 October 2015 in Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraphs 36 and 37).