larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Bas Jacob Adriaan Krijgsman v Surinaamse Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV.
Date: 2017-05-11
24


According to settled case-law, for the purposes of interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also its context and the objectives of the rules of which it is part (see judgment of 16 November 2016, Hemming and Others, C‑316/15, EU:C:2016:879, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
29


Nonetheless, it should be noted that the discharge of obligations by the operating air carrier pursuant to Regulation No 261/2004 is without prejudice to its rights to seek compensation, under the applicable national law, from any person who caused the air carrier to fail to fulfil its obligations, including third parties, as Article 13 of that regulation provides (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 September 2015, van derLans, C‑257/14, EU:C:2015:618, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) v Deluxe Entertainment Services Group Inc.
Date: 2017-05-17
27


As a preliminary point, it is apparent from settled case-law that the competent authority cannot merely carry out a minimal assessment of an application for registration, but it must, on the contrary, carry out a stringent and full examination in order to prevent trade marks from being improperly registered (judgment of 6 May 2003, Libertel, C‑104/01, EU:C:2003:244, paragraph 59).
28


Since registration of a mark is always sought for goods or services specified in the application for registration, the question whether registration can be refused on one of the absolute grounds must be assessed on the facts by reference to those goods or services (judgment of 15 February 2007, BVBA Management, Training en Consultancy, C‑239/05, EU:C:2007:99, paragraph 31).
29


It must be recalled that, according to the Court’s case-law, first, the examination of the absolute grounds for refusal must be carried out in relation to each of the goods or services for which trade mark registration is sought and, secondly, that the decision by which the competent authority refuses registration of a mark must, in principle, state reasons in respect of each of those goods or services (judgment of 15 February 2007, BVBA Management, Training en Consultancy, C‑239/05, EU:C:2007:99, paragraph 34, and order of 18 March 2010, CFCMCEE v OHIM, C‑282/09 P, EU:C:2010:153, paragraph 37).
30


However, as regards that last requirement, the Court has stated that the competent authority may use only general reasoning for all of the goods and services concerned where the same ground for refusal is given for a category or group of goods or services (judgments of 15 February 2007, BVBA Management, Training en Consultancy, C‑239/05, EU:C:2007:99, paragraph 37, and of 17 October 2013, Isdin v Bial-Portela, C‑597/12 P, EU:C:2013:672, paragraph 26).
31


The Court then made clear that such a power extends only to goods and services which are interlinked in a sufficiently direct and specific way, to the point where they form a sufficiently homogeneous category or group of goods or services (judgment of 17 October 2013, Isdin v Bial-Portela, C‑597/12 P, EU:C:2013:672, paragraph 27).
ERGO Poist’ovňa, a.s. v Alžbeta Barlíková.
Date: 2017-05-17
29


However, it follows from settled case-law that where domestic legislation adopts the same solutions as those adopted in EU law in order, in particular, to avoid discrimination against foreign nationals or any distortion of competition, it is clearly in the European Union’s interest that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, provisions or concepts taken from EU law should be interpreted uniformly, irrespective of the circumstances in which they are to apply (judgment of 3 December 2015, Quenon K., C‑338/14, EU:C:2015:795, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
37


According to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all the languages of the European Union. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgment of 1 March 2016, Alo and Osso, C‑443/14 and C‑444/14, EU:C:2016:127, paragraph 27).
41


In the second place, as regards the purpose of Directive 86/653, it should be borne in mind that it is apparent from its second and third recitals that one of the objectives of that directive is to protect the commercial agent in his relations with the principal (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 December 2015, Quenon K., C‑338/14, EU:C:2015:795, paragraph 23).
Portuguese Republic v European Commission.
Date: 2017-05-17
19


In so far as the Commission contests the admissibility of the present appeal on the ground that the Portuguese Republic is merely seeking re-examination of arguments previously put forward before the General Court, it should be recalled that it follows, inter alia, from Article 168(1)(d) and Article 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the decision which the appellant seeks to have set aside and the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal. An appeal which merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the General Court, including those based on facts expressly rejected by the General Court, does not satisfy the requirement to state reasons under those provisions (judgment of 19 January 2017, Commission v Total and Elf Aquitaine, C‑351/15 P, EU:C:2017:27, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
20


However, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the General Court, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal. Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the General Court, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (judgment of 19 January 2017, Commission v Total and Elf Aquitaine, C‑351/15 P, EU:C:2017:27, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
48


In this connection, it is clear from paragraphs 26 and 27 of the order under appeal that the decision at issue was notified to the Portuguese Republic on 23 June 2015 and that the Portuguese Republic was in a position to become acquainted with the content of that decision and the grounds on which it is based. Furthermore, in paragraph 42 of that order, the General Court found that the sole purpose of the subsequent communication of 20 July 2015 was to amend the print lay-out of the tables of figures in the annex to the decision at issue, and that this did not concern the Portuguese version, that version not having been subject to any amendment to either its content or presentation.
Portuguese Republic v European Commission.
Date: 2017-05-17
19


In so far as the Commission contests the admissibility of the present appeal on the ground that the Portuguese Republic is merely seeking re-examination of arguments previously put forward before the General Court, it should be recalled that it follows, inter alia, from Article 168(1)(d) and Article 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the decision which the appellant seeks to have set aside and the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal. An appeal which merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the General Court, including those based on facts expressly rejected by the General Court, does not satisfy the requirement to state reasons under those provisions (judgment of 19 January 2017, Commission v Total and Elf Aquitaine, C‑351/15 P, EU:C:2017:27, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
20


However, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the General Court, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal. Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the General Court, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (judgment of 19 January 2017, Commission v Total and Elf Aquitaine, C‑351/15 P, EU:C:2017:27, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
Proceedings brought by Gert Folk.
Date: 2017-06-01
22


The Court has already held that it follows from the first and second indents of Article 17 of Directive 2004/35, read in conjunction with recital 30 thereto, that the directive applies to damage caused by an emission, event or incident which took place on or after 30 April 2007, where the damage derives from activities which took place on or after that date or from activities which took place before that date, but were not brought to completion before that date (see judgment of 4 March 2015, Fipa Group and Others, C‑534/13, EU:C:2015:140, paragraph 44).
30


The application of that derogation presupposes that the conditions laid down in Article 4(7)(a) to (d) of that directive are satisfied (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 September 2012, Nomarchiaki Aftodioikisi Aitoloakarnanias and Others, C‑43/10, EU:C:2012:560, paragraph 67, and 4 May 2016, Commission v Austria, C‑346/14, EU:C:2016:322, paragraph 65 and 66).
31


Admittedly, Member States are required to refuse authorisation for projects which can result in deterioration of the status of the body of water concerned unless the view is taken that those projects are covered by the derogation of Article 4(7) of Directive 2000/60 (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 July 2015, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, C‑461/13, EU:C:2015:433, paragraph 50).
36


It should be borne in mind that, when a project is liable to have adverse effects on water, consent may be given to it if the conditions set out in Article 4(7)(a) to (d) of that directive are satisfied (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 May 2016, Commission v Austria, C‑346/14, EU:C:2016:322, paragraph 65).
37


In order to determine whether a project has been authorised without infringing Directive 2000/60, a court may review whether the authority which issued the authorisation complied with the conditions laid down in Article 4(7)(a) to (d) of that directive, by determining, first, whether all practicable steps were taken to mitigate the adverse impact of the activities on the status of the body of water concerned; second, whether the reasons behind those activities were specifically set out and explained; third, whether those activities serve an overriding general interest and/or the benefits to the environment and society linked to the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 4(1) are outweighed by the benefits to human health, the maintenance of human safety or the sustainable development resulting from those activities; and, fourth, whether the beneficial objectives pursued by that project cannot, for reasons of technical feasibility or disproportionate cost, be achieved by other means which are a significantly better environmental option (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2012, Nomarchiaki Aftodioikisi Aitoloakarnanias and Others, C‑43/10, EU:C:2012:560, paragraph 67).
Wallenborn Transports SA v Hauptzollamt Gießen.
Date: 2017-06-01
50


In the case in the main proceedings, it is common ground that the removal of the goods in question from customs supervision, as a consequence of the customs seals having been broken when they should not have been, gave rise to a customs debt under Article 203(1) of the Customs Code (see, in that regard, judgment of 15 May 2014, X, C‑480/12, EU:C:2014:329, paragraph 34).
51


That removal from customs supervision also ended the external transit procedure (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2002, Liberexim, C‑371/99, EU:C:2002:433, paragraph 53).
54


In that context, it must nevertheless be noted that the Court has held that, in addition to the customs debt, there may also be a requirement to pay VAT in the case where, on the basis of the particular unlawful conduct which gave rise to the customs debt, it can be presumed that the goods entered the economic network of the European Union and, consequently, that they may have undergone consumption, that is, the act on which VAT is levied (judgment of 2 June 2016, Eurogate Distribution and DHL Hub Leipzig, C‑226/14 and C‑228/14, EU:C:2016:405, paragraph 65).
55


In this regard, as the Advocate General observed in points 67 to 69 of his Opinion, in the event that goods liable to import duties are removed from customs supervision in a free zone and are no longer located in that zone, it should, in principle, be presumed that they have entered the economic network of the European Union.
61


It must, however, be noted that, as is apparent from its wording, Article 204 of the Customs Code applies only in cases not covered by Article 203 of that code. Accordingly, in order to determine which of those two articles causes a customs debt to be incurred, it is necessary, as a matter of priority, to consider whether in the factual situation in question there was removal from customs supervision for the purposes of Article 203(1) of the Customs Code. Only if that question is answered in the negative is it possible that Article 204 of the Customs Code may apply (judgment of 12 February 2004, Hamann International, C‑337/01, EU:C:2004:90, paragraphs 29 and 30).
Piotr Zarski v Andrzej Stadnicki.
Date: 2017-06-01
25


It must be observed that, according to settled case-law, the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (judgment of 18 October 2016, Nikiforidis, C‑135/15, EU:2016:774, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
26


As Article 12(4) of Directive 2011/7 makes no express reference to the law of the Member States, it should therefore be interpreted autonomously and uniformly. Such an interpretation must take into account the terms of that provision, its context and the objective of Directive 2011/7 (judgment of 10 November 2016, Kovalkovas, C‑477/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:861, paragraph 33).
34


Consequently, the answer to the second and third questions referred is that Article 12(4) of Directive 2011/7 must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States may exclude from the scope of that directive late payments in the performance of a contract concluded before 16 March 2013, even where those late payments occur after that date.
Schniga GmbH v Community Plant Variety Office.
Date: 2017-06-08
46


As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that the CPVO’s task is characterised by the scientific and technical complexity of the conditions governing the examination of applications for Community plant variety rights and, accordingly, the CPVO must be accorded a broad discretion in carrying out its functions (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2012, Brookfield New Zealand and Elaris v CPVO and Schniga, C‑534/10 P, EU:C:2012:813, paragraph 50). That broad discretion extends, inter alia, to verifying whether that variety has distinctive character for the purpose of Article 7(1) of the basic regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 April 2010, Schräder v CPVO, C‑38/09 P, EU:C:2010:196, paragraph 77).
47


Secondly, the CPVO, as a body of the European Union, is subject to the principle of sound administration, in accordance with which it must examine all the relevant particulars of an application for a Community plant variety right with care and impartiality and gather all the factual and legal information necessary to exercise its discretion. It must furthermore ensure the proper conduct and effectiveness of proceedings which it sets in motion (judgment of 19 December 2012, Brookfield New Zealand and Elaris v CPVO and Schniga, C‑534/10 P, EU:C:2012:813, paragraph 51).
56


In that regard, it must be recalled that, with regard to the broad discretion conferred on the CPVO, it may, if it considers it necessary, take account of facts and evidence submitted or produced by the parties out of time (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2012, Brookfield New Zealand and Elaris v CPVO and Schniga, C‑534/10 P, EU:C:2012:813, paragraph 50).
Sharda Europe BVBA v Administración del Estado and Syngenta Agro, SA.
Date: 2017-06-08
21


It must be recalled that, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision or be given priority over the other language versions in that regard. The need for uniform application and, therefore, for uniform interpretation of an EU measure precludes one version of the text being considered in isolation, but requires that the measure be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and purpose of the rules of which it forms part (see, inter alia, judgments of 27 October 1977, Bouchereau, 30/77, EU:C:1977:172, paragraph 14, and of 17 March 2016, Kødbranchens Fællesråd, C‑112/15, EU:C:2016:185, paragraph 36).
The Gibraltar Betting and Gaming Association Limited v Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs and Her Majesty's Treasury.
Date: 2017-06-13
29


In that regard, it should be noted that Gibraltar is a European territory for whose external relations a Member State, namely the United Kingdom, is responsible, and that EU law is applicable to that territory pursuant to Article 355(3) TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 September 2003, Commission v United Kingdom, C‑30/01, EU:C:2003:489, paragraph 47, and 12 September 2006, Spain v United Kingdom, C‑145/04, EU:C:2006:543, paragraph 19).
30


By way of derogation from Article 355(3) TFEU, under the 1972 Act of Accession, EU acts do not apply to Gibraltar in certain areas of EU law. Those exceptions were introduced on account of the special legal position of that territory, in particular its status as a free port (see, in that regard, judgment of 21 July 2005, Commission v United Kingdom, C‑349/03, EU:C:2005:488, paragraph 41). However, freedom to provide services, enshrined in Article 56 TFEU, is not one of those exceptions.
Mohammad Zadeh Khorassani v Kathrin Pflanz.
Date: 2017-06-14
26


In order to answer the question referred, for the purpose of interpreting the latter provision it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 November 2016, Ognyanov, C‑554/14, EU:C:2016:835, paragraph 31).
41


The purpose of Directive 2004/39 does not require a different interpretation of that provision. It is true that inter alia recitals 2 and 31 of that directive indicate that one of its objectives is to guarantee investor protection (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 May 2013, Genil 48 and Comercial Hostelera de Grandes Vinos, C‑604/11, EU:C:2013:344, paragraph 39).
Proceedings brought by Ilves Jakelu Oy.
Date: 2017-06-15
24


In that regard, it must be recalled that express postal services are distinguished from the universal postal service through the added value which they bring to the customers, for which the customers agree to pay more. These are specific services dissociable from the service of general interest which meet special needs of economic operators and which call for certain additional services not offered by the traditional postal service (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 May 1993, Corbeau, C‑320/91, EU:C:1993:198, paragraph 19).
25


In addition, it is apparent from recital 15 of Directive 97/67 that the option to negotiate contracts with customers individually does not correspond, in principle, with the concept of universal service provision (judgment of 23 April 2009, TNT Post UK, C‑357/07, EU:C:2009:248, paragraph 48).
27


In the second place, as regards the question whether the activity at issue in the main proceedings may be made subject to the granting of an individual licence, it must be recalled that under Article 9(1) of that directive, Member States may make undertakings active in the postal sector subject to general authorisations with regard to services which fall outside the scope of the universal service, while Article 9(2), first subparagraph, of that directive provides that Member States may introduce authorisation procedures, including individual licences, with regard to services which fall within the scope of the universal service (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 November 2016, DHL Express (Austria), C‑2/15, EU:C:2016:880, paragraph 20).
Proceedings brought by 'Agrodetalė' UAB.
Date: 2017-06-15
27


The EU type-approval procedure, as provided for by the EU legislature, is thus based on the principle of mutual recognition of the monitoring carried out by the approval authorities of the various Member States of compliance with the requirements set out in Directive 2003/37 and in the separate directives set out in Annex II, Chapter B, thereto (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 November 2010, Lahousse and Lavichy, C‑142/09, EU:C:2010:694, paragraph 27). Its objective is to guarantee and promote the operation of the internal market while safeguarding road safety, the environment and safety at work.
Lietuvos Respublikos transporto priemonių draudikų biuras v Gintaras Dockevičius and Jurgita Dockevičienė.
Date: 2017-06-15
36


The Court has already had occasion to find, in relation to similar acts which preceded that regulation, that they may not be regarded as acts taken by the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 1987, Demouche and Others, 152/83, EU:C:1987:421, paragraph 19, and of 12 November 1992, Fournier, C‑73/89, EU:C:1992:431, paragraphs 22 and 23).
37


The Court noted that those acts were drawn up and concluded by bodies governed by private law without any institution or body of the European Union having participated in their conclusion (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 1987, Demouche and Others, 152/83, EU:C:1987:421, paragraphs 18 and 19).
38


Moreover, the Court dismissed as irrelevant to the nature of those acts the circumstances that, first, their conclusion had been laid down as a condition for the entry into force of Directive 72/166; secondly, the period of applicability of that directive was conditional upon the period during which the measures in question were applied; thirdly, the Commission had noted each time, by a recommendation and by successive decisions, that those acts were consistent with the requirements of that directive; and, fourthly, those acts had been annexed to the Commission’s decisions and published with the latter in the Official Journal of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 1987, Demouche and Others, 152/83, EU:C:1987:421, paragraphs 19 and 20).
Al-Bashir Mohammed Al-Faqih and Others v European Commission.
Date: 2017-06-15
36


It is true that the Court of Justice has held that a person whose name was entered on a list of persons subject to restrictive measures had to be accepted as having at least a non-material interest in having that listing annulled, in view of the consequences for his reputation, even after the removal of his name from that list (see judgments of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331, paragraphs 70 to 72, and of 8 September 2016, Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction v Council, C‑459/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:646, paragraph 12).