Lies Craeynest and Others v Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest and Brussels Instituut voor Milieubeheer.
Date: 2019-06-26
31


According to settled case-law, under the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, it is for the courts of the Member States to ensure legal protection of an individual’s rights under EU law. In addition, the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU requires Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law (judgment of 19 November 2014, ClientEarth, C‑404/13, EU:C:2014:2382, paragraph 52).
32


In addition, the Court has noted on numerous occasions that it is incompatible with the binding effect that Article 288 TFEU ascribes to the directive to exclude, in principle, the possibility of the obligation imposed by that directive being relied on by the persons concerned. That consideration applies particularly in respect of a directive whose objective is to control and reduce atmospheric pollution and which is designed, therefore, to protect public health (judgments of 25 July 2008, Janecek, C‑237/07, EU:C:2008:447, paragraph 37, and of 19 November 2014, ClientEarth, C‑404/13, EU:C:2014:2382, paragraph 55).
34


In particular, where the EU legislature has, by directive, imposed on Member States the obligation to pursue a particular course of action, the effectiveness of such action would be weakened if individuals were prevented from relying on it before their national courts, and if the latter were prevented from taking it into consideration as an element of EU law in deciding whether the national legislature, in exercising the choice open to it as to the form and methods for implementation, has kept within the limits of its discretion set by the directive (judgment of 24 October 1996, Kraaijeveld and Others, C‑72/95, EU:C:1996:404, paragraph 56).
42


Some of the provisions of Directive 2008/50 referred to in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment contain clear, precise and unconditional obligations, which means that they can be invoked by individuals against the State.
45


However, the existence of such discretionary powers does not in any way mean that the decisions taken by those authorities in that connection are exempt from judicial review, in particular in order to verify whether they have exceeded the limits set for the exercise of those powers (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 October 1996, Kraaijeveld and Others, C‑72/95, EU:C:1996:404, paragraph 59, and of 25 July 2008, Janecek, C‑237/07, EU:C:2008:447, paragraph 46).
46


Moreover, despite the absence of rules of EU law on procedures for bringing actions before national courts, and in order to determine the rigour of judicial review of national decisions adopted pursuant to an act of EU law, it is necessary to take into account the purpose of the act and to ensure that its effectiveness is not undermined (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 June 2002, HI, C‑92/00, EU:C:2002:379, paragraph 59, and of 11 December 2014, Croce Amica One Italia, C‑440/13, EU:C:2014:2435, paragraph 40).
47


With regard to Directive 2008/50, the location of sampling points is central to the air quality assessment and improvement system it provides for, in particular where the level of pollution exceeds the upper assessment threshold referred to in Articles 5 and 6 thereof. As noted in paragraph 36 above, in that case, in accordance with Article 6(2) of Directive 2008/50, sampling points are the main instrument for assessing air quality.
48


The measurements obtained with those points enable Member States to ensure, as required by Article 13(1) of Directive 2008/50, that, throughout their zones and agglomerations, the levels of the pollutants identified in that directive do not exceed the limit values laid down in Annex XI thereto. If those limit values are exceeded after the deadline for their application, the Member State concerned is required to draw up, in accordance with Article 23(1) of that directive, an air quality plan which meets certain requirements (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 July 2008, Janecek, C‑237/07, EU:C:2008:447, paragraphs 35 and 42, and of 19 November 2014, ClientEarth, C‑404/13, EU:C:2014:2382, paragraphs 25 and 40).
49


It follows that the very purpose of Directive 2008/50 would be compromised if sampling points located in a given zone or agglomeration were not established in accordance with the criteria laid down therein.
53


Moreover, since individuals are entitled to have a court verify whether national legislation and its application remained within the limits of the margin of discretion allowed in Directive 2008/50 when the location of sampling points was chosen, the court designated for this purpose by national law also has jurisdiction to take all necessary measures in respect of the national authority concerned, such as an order, to ensure that such points are sited in accordance with the criteria laid down in that directive (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 July 2008, Janecek, C‑237/07, EU:C:2008:447, paragraphs 38 and 39, and of 19 November 2014, ClientEarth, C‑404/13, EU:C:2014:2382, paragraphs 55, 56 and 58).
54


In this respect, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that, in the absence of EU rules, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law, such as Directive 2008/50. However, the detailed rules provided for must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and must not make it impossible in practice or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 2015, East Sussex County Council, C‑71/14, EU:C:2015:656, paragraph 52, and of 22 February 2018, INEOS Köln, C‑572/16, EU:C:2018:100, paragraph 42). As regards the latter principle, it should be recalled that the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial is enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which constitutes a reaffirmation of the principle of effective judicial protection (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 July 2017, Sacko, C‑348/16, EU:C:2017:591, paragraph 31, and of 27 September 2017, Puškár, C‑73/16, EU:C:2017:725, paragraph 59).
60


When a literal interpretation of a provision of EU law does not permit its precise scope to be assessed, it must be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and the purpose of the rules of which it forms part (judgment of 6 June 2018, Koppers Denmark, C‑49/17, EU:C:2018:395, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
66


In the light of those considerations, it follows from the general scheme of Directive 2008/50 that, for the purposes of the assessment, by Member States, of whether the limit values set out in Annex XI to that directive have been complied with, the level of pollution measured at each individual sampling point is decisive.
68


In view of all the above considerations, the answer to the second question is that Article 13(1) and Article 23(1) of Directive 2008/50 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to establish whether a limit value with an averaging period of one calendar year, as laid down in Annex XI to that directive, has been exceeded, it is sufficient that a pollution level higher than that value be measured at a single sampling point.