larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Council national de l’ordre des médecins v Ministère des Affaires sociales et de la Santé.
Date: 2013-09-19
33. In that regard, it must be pointed out that Directive 2005/36 is intended to establish a clear separation of the professions of dental practitioner and doctor (see, in so far as Directives 78/686 and 78/687 are concerned, judgment in Case C‑202/99 Commission  v Italy  [2001] ECR I‑9319, paragraph 51, and order in Case C‑35/02 Vogel  [2003] ECR I‑12229, paragraph 33).
ÖBB-Personenverkehr AG.
Date: 2013-09-26
47. In that regard, it should be noted that the situation of undertakings operating in different transport sectors is not comparable since the different modes of transport – having regard to the manner in which they operate, the conditions governing their accessibility and the distribution of their networks – are not interchangeable as regards the conditions of their use. In those circumstances, the EU legislature was entitled to establish rules for providing a level of customer protection that varied according to the transport sector concerned (Case C‑12/11 McDonagh [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 56 and 57).
57. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, by virtue of the very nature of regulations and of their function in the system of sources of EU law, the provisions of a regulation, as a general rule, have immediate effect in the national legal systems without its being necessary for the national authorities to adopt measures of application (see Case C‑367/09 SGS Belgium and Others [2010] ECR I‑10761, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
58. However some of the provisions of a regulation may necessitate, for their implementation, the adoption of measures of application by the Member States ( SGS Belgium and Others , paragraph 33).
Centrotherm Systemtechnik GmbH v centrotherm Clean Solutions GmbH & Co. KG.
Date: 2013-09-26
72. It was in the light of the principles it had just reiterated that the General Court stated, in paragraph 26 of the judgment under appeal, that the concept of genuine use ‘therefore’ excludes all minimal and insufficient use ‘as the basis for a finding that a mark is being put to real and effective use on a given market’, before referring, in the same paragraph, to the case-law according to which the requirement of genuine use does not seek to assess commercial success or to review the economic strategy of an undertaking; nor is it intended to restrict trade mark protection to the case where large-scale commercial use has been made of the marks.
74. It follows that the statement in paragraph 26 of the judgment under appeal, by which the General Court restricts itself to looking back at consistent guidance from the case-law, contains no error of law.
Polyelectrolyte Producers Group GEIE (PPG) and SNF SAS v European Chemicals Agency (ECHA).
Date: 2013-09-26
33. Moreover, in so far as the wording of Article 102(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court could give rise to doubts, it is necessary, in the absence of any imperative reasons to the contrary, to favour an interpretation which does not result in the interested parties’ being time-barred and therefore depriving them of their right to resort to legal proceedings (see, to that effect, Case 117/78 Orlandi  v Commission  [1979] ECR 1613, paragraph 11).
34. More generally, the Court of Justice points out that, where the wording of a provision is unclear, account should be taken of the context of that provision and of the objectives which it pursues (see, to that effect, Case C‑149/11 Leno Merken  [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 39).
35. In that regard, it must be considered that the objective of the 14‑day time‑limit laid down in Article 102(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court is to ensure that interested parties have sufficient time within which to bring an action against published measures and, consequently, to observe the right to effective judicial protection, as is now laid down in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
Polyelectrolyte Producers Group GEIE (PPG) and SNF SAS v European Chemicals Agency (ECHA).
Date: 2013-09-26
32. Where the publication of a measure is provided for under European Union law, it is only as of the time of publication that such persons are able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and to take the necessary measures accordingly (see, to that effect, Case C‑345/06 Heinrich  [2009] ECR I‑1659, paragraph 44).
37. On the contrary, as the Advocate General has noted in point 55 of his Opinion, although it is settled case-law that only measures the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position are measures or decisions which may be the subject of an action for annulment for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU (see Case C‑131/03 Reynolds Tobacco and Others  v Commission  [2006] ECR I‑7795, paragraph 54 and the case‑law cited), it is not stated in that article that the bringing of such an action is subject to the publication and notification of those measures.
38. Moreover, the bringing of an action against a European Union measure prior to its publication, provided that that measure has been adopted, does not jeopardise the objective of a time-limit for bringing proceedings, which, according to settled case‑law, is to protect legal certainty by ensuring that European Union measures which produce legal effects may not indefinitely be called into question (see Case C‑241/01 National Farmers’ Union  [2002] ECR I‑9079, paragraph 34, and Joined Cases C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P Gbagbo and Others v Council [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 62).
Salzgitter Mannesmann Handel GmbH v SC Laminorul SA.
Date: 2013-09-26
22. In order to answer that question, it is necessary to interpret Article 34(4) of Regulation No 44/2001 in the light, not only of the wording of that provision, but also of the system established by the regulation and the objectives it pursues (see Case C‑619/10 Trade Agency  [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 27).
26. Following the lodging of the application referred to in Article 38(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, and as is clear from Article 41 thereof, the authorities of the Member State in which enforcement is sought must, at the beginning of the procedure, not do any more than ensure completion of those formalities with a view to issuing a declaration of enforceability for that judgment (see Trade Agency , paragraph 29).
27. In accordance with Article 43 of Regulation No 44/2001, the declaration of enforceability of a judgment delivered in a Member State other than the Member State in which enforcement is sought may, in a second stage of the procedure, be the subject of dispute. The grounds for dispute that may be relied upon are expressly set out in Articles 34 and 35 of Regulation No 44/2001, to which Article 45 thereof refers (see, to that effect, Trade Agency , paragraph 31).
28. That list is exhaustive in nature and its items must be interpreted strictly inasmuch as they constitute an obstacle to the attainment of one of the fundamental objectives of Regulation No 44/2001 intended to facilitate the free movement of judgments by establishing a simple and rapid enforcement procedure (see, to that effect, Cast C‑420/07 Apostolides  [2009] ECR I‑3571, paragraph 55 and the case‑law cited, and Case C‑139/10 Prism Investments  [2011] ECR I‑9511, paragraph 33).
32. As is clear from recitals 16 and 17 in the preamble to that regulation, the rules on recognition and enforcement are based on mutual trust in the administration of justice in the European Union which requires that judicial decisions delivered in one Member State are not only recognised automatically in another Member State, but also that the procedure for making those decisions enforceable in that Member State is efficient and rapid (see Trade Agency , paragraph 40).
Serebryannay vek EOOD v Direktor na Direktsia ‘Obzhalvane i upravlenie na izpalnenieto’ — Varna pri Tsentralno upravlenie na Natsionalna agentsia za prihodite.
Date: 2013-09-26
37. In that regard, it should be borne in mind, first, that the possibility of classifying a transaction as a transaction for consideration requires only that there be a direct link between the supply of goods or the provision of services and the consideration actually received by the taxable person (see Case C‑412/03 Hotel Scandic Gåsabäck  [2005] ECR I‑743, paragraph 22, and Case C‑285/10 Campsa Estaciones de Servicio  [2011] ECR I‑5059, paragraph 25). Such a direct link is established if there is a legal relationship between the provider of the service and the recipient pursuant to which there is reciprocal performance, the remuneration received by the provider of the service constituting the value actually given in return for the service supplied to the recipient (see, inter alia, Case C‑37/08 RCI Europe  [2009] ECR I‑7533, paragraph 24, and Case C‑520/10 Lebara  [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 27).
38. Secondly, the consideration for a supply of goods may consist of a supply of services, and so constitute the taxable amount within the meaning of Article 73 of the VAT Directive, provided, however, that there is a direct link between the supply of goods and the supply of services and that the value of those services can be expressed in monetary terms (Case C‑380/99 Bertelsmann  [2001] ECR I‑5163, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited). The same is true if a supply of services is performed in exchange for another supply of services, as long as the same conditions are satisfied.
39. Thirdly, barter contracts, under which the consideration is by definition in kind, and transactions for which the consideration is in money are, economically and commercially speaking, two identical situations (see, to that effect, Case C‑330/95 Goldsmiths  [1997] ECR I‑3801, paragraphs 23 to 25, and Case C‑549/11 Orfey  [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 35).
41. The fact that the supply of services in question will benefit the owner of the apartment at issue only after the contract has expired does not alter anything in that regard, seeing that, as from the conclusion of that contract, the parties to such a bilateral contract undertake to perform reciprocal services for each other (see, by analogy, Case C‑174/00 Kennemer Golf  [2002] ECR I‑3293, paragraph 40, and RCI Europe , paragraphs 31 and 33).
European Commission v Republic of Latvia.
Date: 2013-10-03
46. Firstly, it must be pointed out that, at the end of the procedure under Article 9 of Directive 2003/87, an NAP notified by a Member State to the Commission enjoys a presumption of legality, since, after the three-month time-limit laid down in Article 9(3) has expired, it is regarded as definitive where the Commission makes no observations, so that the Member State concerned may adopt it.
54. Furthermore, it is apparent from both Article 9(3) of Directive 2003/87 and the travaux préparatoires  to that directive that the power granted to the Commission consists only a power to review the conformity of the NAPs with the criteria laid down in Annex III to Directive 2003/87 and not a power to substitute or to harmonise which would include the power to fix a maximum quantity of greenhouse gas emission allowances to be allocated (Case C‑504/09 P Commission  v Poland  [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 80, and Case C‑505/09 P Commission  v Estonia  [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 82). The Commission therefore has the power only to review that conformity and to reject NAPs if they are incompatible with those criteria and those provisions.
European Commission v Italian Republic.
Date: 2013-10-03
41. Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/14 provides that the Member States are to establish a framework for levying charges and may also establish specific charging rules, while respecting the management independence of the infrastructure manager. Under that provision, it is for the infrastructure manager to determine the charge for the use of the infrastructure and also to collect it (see, inter alia, Case C‑483/10 Commission  v Spain  [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 39).
42. Article 4 further provides for an allocation of powers between the Member States and the infrastructure manager as regards the charging systems. Under that arrangement it is for the Member States to draw up a framework for levying charges, whilst the determination of the charge and collection fall to the infrastructure manager ( Commission  v Spain , paragraph 41).
43. It is useful in that regard to recall the objectives of Directive 2001/14. First of all, one of the objectives pursued by the charging system established by Directive 2001/14 is to ensure the management independence of the infrastructure manager. In other words, the infrastructure manager must use the charging scheme as a management tool. Thus, recital 12 in the preamble to that directive states that charging and capacity-allocation schemes should encourage railway infrastructure managers to optimise use of their infrastructure within the framework established by the Member States. Those managers could not achieve such optimal use by means of the charging system if their role was confined to calculating the amount of the charge in each individual case, applying a formula established in advance by ministerial order. Infrastructure managers must therefore be given a degree of flexibility in setting the amount of charges (see Commission  v Spain , paragraph 44).
63. It must be borne in mind, however, that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C‑111/00 Commission  v Austria  [2001] ECR I‑7555, paragraph 13, and Case C‑383/09 Commission  v France  [2011] ECR I‑4869, paragraph 22).
68. Yet according to settled case-law, in proceedings under Article 258 TFEU for failure to fulfil obligations it is for the Commission to prove the alleged failure. It is therefore the Commission’s responsibility to place before the Court the information needed to enable the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled, and in so doing the Commission may not rely on any presumption (see, inter alia, Case C‑494/01 Commission  v Ireland  [2005] ECR I‑3331, paragraph 41; Case C‑335/07 Commission  v Finland  [2009] ECR I‑9459, paragraph 46; and Case C‑556/10 Commission  v Germany [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 66).
Laboratoires Lyocentre v Lääkealan turvallisuus- ja kehittämiskeskus and Sosiaali- ja terveysalan lupa- ja valvontavirasto.
Date: 2013-10-03
41. Consequently, a product that falls within the definition of a ‘medicinal product’ within the meaning of Directive 2001/83 must be regarded as a medicinal product and may not be classified as a medical device within the meaning of Directive 93/42.
44. As regards more particularly the distinction between medicinal products and medical devices, Article 1(5)(c) of Directive 93/42 specifically requires the competent authorities to take particular account of the principal mode of action of the product. It thus follows from Article 1(2)(a) of that directive that only a product which does not achieve its principal intended action in or on the human body by pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means may be classified as a medical device.
45. None the less, as Union law currently stands, until harmonisation of the measures necessary to ensure the protection of health is more complete, it will be difficult to avoid the existence of differences in the classification of products as between Member States in the context of Directive 2001/83 (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑201/96 LTM  [1997] ECR I‑6147, paragraph 24, and Hecht-Pharma , paragraph 28).
48. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that the classification of a product in one Member State as a medical device bearing a CE marking, in accordance with Directive 93/42, does not preclude the competent authorities of another Member State from classifying the same product, on the basis of its pharmacological, immunological or metabolic action, as a medicinal product within the meaning of Article 1(2)(b) of Directive 2001/83.
The second question
Confédération paysanne v Ministre de l' Alimentation, de l' Agriculture et de la Pêche.
Date: 2013-10-03
22. According to settled case‑law, the necessity of uniform application and, accordingly, of uniform interpretation of an EU measure makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in isolation, but requires it to be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim pursued by the latter, in the light, in particular, of the versions in all the other official languages (see, inter alia, Case C‑569/08 Internetportal und Marketing  [2010] ECR I‑4871, paragraph 35, and Case C‑52/10 Eleftheri tileorasit and Giannikos [2011] ECR I‑4973, paragraph 23).
25. In particular, Article 40(5) of Regulation No 1782/2003, read in conjunction with Article 40(1), entitles farmers who, during the reference period, were under agri-environmental commitments pursuant to Regulation No 2078/92 and Regulation No 1257/1999 to request that their reference amount be calculated on the basis of the calendar year or years in the reference period which were not affected by those commitments (see Case C‑152/09 Grootes  [2010] ECR I‑11285, paragraph 60).
26. By extending the exceptional circumstances scheme to farmers who, during the reference period, were under agri-environmental commitments pursuant to Regulation No 2078/92 and Regulation No 1257/1999, the EU legislature considered that a farmer who has entered into agri-environmental commitments cannot be penalised in the context of a subsequent Union support scheme by reason of those very commitments, as that farmer was not in a position to foresee that his decision might have consequences on future direct payments under rules subsequently adopted (see Grootes , paragraphs 36 and 44).
37. It must be added that, in accordance with the principle of ‘cooperation in good faith’, it is for the national courts to apply, within the exercise of their jurisdiction, the first and second subparagraphs of Article 40(5) of Regulation No 1782/2003 and to give full effect to those provisions, refusing if necessary to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, including any subsequent national provision (see, to that effect, Case 106/77 Simmenthal  [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 24, and Case C‑617/10 Åkerberg Fransson  [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 45).
Costs
Criminal proceedings against Daniel Lundberg.
Date: 2013-10-03
18. In the absence of any definition of the term ‘non-commercial carriage of goods’, the meaning and scope of that term must be determined, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, by reference to the general context in which it is used and its usual meaning in everyday language (see, to that effect, Case C‑431/04 Massachusetts Institute of Technology  [2006] ECR I‑4089, paragraph 17 and the case‑law cited, and Case C‑395/2011 BLV Wohn‑und Gewerbebau  [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 25).
19. Moreover, in construing a provision of European Union law, it is necessary to consider the objectives pursued by the legislation in question and its effectiveness (Case C‑19/08 Petrosian  [2009] ECR I‑495, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
20. In the light of the derogations concerning use of a tachograph, the Court has held that such a derogation may not be interpreted in such a way as to extend its effects beyond what is necessary to safeguard the interests which it seeks to secure, and the scope of the derogations which it lays down must be determined in the light of the aims pursued by the legislation at issue (see Case C‑116/91 British Gas  [1992] ECR I‑4071, paragraph 12; Case C‑39/95 Goupil  [1996] ECR I‑1601, paragraph 8; Case C‑335/94 Mrozek and Jäger  [1996] ECR I‑1573, paragraph 9; Case C‑128/04 Raemdonck and Raemdonck-Janssens  [2005] ECR I‑2445, paragraph 19; and Case C‑554/09 Seeger  [2011] ECR I‑7131, paragraph 33).
31. With regard, on the one hand, to the latter, it is sufficient to recall that that regulation aims, as stated in paragraphs 25 to 28 of the present judgment, to harmonise the conditions of competition with regard to the road sector and to improve working conditions for the employees in that sector and road safety (see, in particular, Goupil , paragraph 10; Mrozek and Jäger , paragraph 11; Raemdonck and Raemdonck-Janssens , paragraph 22; and Seeger , paragraph 34), those objectives meaning in particular that, in principle, road transport vehicles must be equipped with an approved tachograph enabling compliance with driving times and drivers’ rest periods to be monitored.
Proceedings brought by Siegfried János Schneider.
Date: 2013-10-03
18. Furthermore, according to settled case-law, the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ for the purposes of Article 1 of Regulation No 44/2001 must be regarded as an autonomous concept to be interpreted by reference, first, to the objectives and scheme of that regulation and, second, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems. As a particular consequence, the scope of Regulation No 44/2001 must be determined essentially in the light of the legal relationships between the parties to the action or the subject-matter of the action (see, to that effect, Case C‑343/04 ČEZ  [2006] ECR I‑4557, paragraph 22, and Case C‑420/07 Apostolides  [2009] ECR I‑3571, paragraphs 41 and 42 and the case-law cited).
21. It should also be pointed out that, in its case-law relating to Article 16(1)(a) of the Brussels Convention – which, according to recital 19 of Regulation No 44/2001, also applies for the purposes of construing Article 22(1) of that regulation – the Court has held that that provision of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted as meaning that the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Contracting State in which the property is situated does not encompass all actions concerning rights in rem  in immovable property, but only those which both come within the scope of the convention and are actions which seek to determine the extent, content, ownership or possession of immovable property or the existence of other rights in rem  therein and to provide the holders of those rights with protection for the powers which attach to their interest (see, inter alia, Case C‑115/88 Reichert and Kockler  [1990] ECR I‑27, paragraph 11, and ČEZ , paragraph 30).
26. It follows that an application by a person who has been placed under guardianship for authorisation to dispose of his immovable property, such as the application under consideration by the referring court, is directly linked to the legal capacity of the natural person concerned for the purposes of Article 1(2)(a) of Regulation No 44/2001: the fact that judicial authorisation is necessary for the disposal of immovable property belonging to persons under guardianship is the immediate consequence of their lack of full legal capacity, being a requirement laid down for their protection in that context.
29. In that regard, it should be noted that, in pages 34 and 35 of Mr Jenard’s report, mention is made in the commentary on Article 16 of the Brussels Convention that the rule on jurisdiction lai d down in Article 16(1)(a) thereof – which corresponds to the rule laid down in Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, since both rules ‘take as their criterion the subject-matter of the action’ – covers ‘proceedings concerning rights in rem  in immovable property’.
30. As it is, the sole aim of the main proceedings is to determine whether it is in the interests of a person who lacks full legal capacity to dispose of his immovable property; his rights in rem  as owner of that property are not being called in question.