larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Denmark.
Date: 2003-01-30
23.  As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that it is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation obtaining in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C-220/99   Commission   v   France   [2001] ECR I-5831, paragraph 33; and Case C-323/01   Commission   v   Italy   [2002] ECR  I-4711, paragraph 8). It follows that, in the present case, only the bathing seasons 1995 to 1998 are relevant for determining whether there were infringements as alleged.
24.  Under Article 4(1) of the Directive, Member States are to take all necessary measures to ensure that the quality of bathing water conforms to the limit values set in accordance with Article 3 (see Case C-92/96   Commission   v   Spain   [1998] ECR I-505, paragraph 27; and Case C-307/98   Commission   v   Belgium   [2000] ECR I-3933, paragraph 48).
25.  In that regard, the conformity of the quality of bathing water to the limit values set by the Directive must be assessed each year and not over a number of years, as the Danish Government has argued. Article 13 of the Directive, as amended by Directive 91/692, requires the Member States to send to the Commission each year a report on the implementation of the Directive for the current year. It is not consonant with the objective of public-health protection pursued by the Directive for there to be a period of several years during which the Member States are free not to take any action. That interpretation is confirmed by paragraph 34 of the judgment in Case C-198/97   Commission   v   Germany   [1999] ECR I-3257, where the Court held that deviations even in a single season constitute an infringement of the Directive.
32.  It is clear that the infringement alleged against the Danish Government is of limited scope and has negligible practical consequences. However, as the Court has held (see Case C-209/89   Commission   v   Italy   [1991] ECR I-1575, paragraphs 6 and 19; Case C-404/99   Commission   v   France   [2001] ECR I-2667, paragraph 51), an action against a Member State for failure to fulfil its obligations is objective in nature and, consequently, where a Member State fails to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty or under secondary legislation, the infringement exists regardless of the frequency or the scale of the circumstances complained of.
Georgios Stylianakis v Elliniko Dimosio.
Date: 2003-02-06
18.  Article 8a(1) of the Treaty, which lays down in general terms the right of every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, is specifically applied in the provisions guaranteeing the freedom to provide services.
19.  The freedom to provide services confers rights on both providers of services and recipients and any restriction of that freedom may thus undermine the rights of a recipient of services. A recipient may therefore rely on those provisions against the measure concerned (see Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83   Luisi and Carbone   [1984] ECR 377, paragraph 16, Case C-158/96   Kohll   [1998] ECR I-1931, paragraph 35, and Case C-294/97   Eurowings Luftverkehr   [1999] ECR I-7447, paragraph 34).
20.  In light of the facts of the main proceedings, it is therefore unnecessary to rule on the interpretation of Article 8a of the Treaty (see, with respect to freedom of establishment, Case C-193/94   Skanavi and Chryssanthakopoulos   [1996] ECR I-929, paragraph 22, and, with respect to freedom of movement for workers, Case C-100/01   Oteiza Olazabal   [2002] ECR I-10981, paragraph 26).
Article 59 of the Treaty and Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2408/92
Observations submitted to the Court
24.  As is clear from the case-law of the Court, the very purpose of Regulation No 2408/92, which was adopted on the basis of Article 84(2) of the Treaty, is to define the conditions for applying in the air transport sector the principle of the freedom to provide services (see, to that effect, Case C-361/98   Italy   v   Commission   [2001] ECR I-385, paragraph 32).
25.  That freedom precludes the application of any national legislation which has the effect of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services purely within one Member State, irrespective of whether there is discrimination on the grounds of nationality or residence (see, to that effect,   Commission   v   France  , cited above, paragraph 17 to 21).
28.  Accordingly, since airport taxes directly and automatically influence the price of the journey, differences in the taxes to be paid by passengers will automatically be reflected in the transport cost, and thus, in the case in the main proceedings, access to domestic flights will be favoured over access to intra-Community flights (see Case C-70/99   Commission   v   Portugal   [2001] ECR I-4845, paragraph 20).
Auto Lease Holland BV v Bundesamt für Finanzen.
Date: 2003-02-06
31.  Under Article 5(1) of the Sixth Directive,   " "[s]upply of goods"   shall mean the transfer of the right to dispose of tangible property as owner
"  .
32.  As the Court found in paragraphs 7 and 8 of   Shipping and Forwarding Enterprise Safe  , it is clear from the wording of that provision that   "supply of goods"   does not refer to the transfer of ownership in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the applicable national law but covers any transfer of tangible property by one party which empowers the other party actually to dispose of it as if he were the owner of the property. The purpose of the Sixth Directive might be jeopardised if the preconditions for a supply of goods ─ which is one of the three taxable transactions ─ varied from one Member State to another, as do the conditions governing the transfer of ownership under civil law.
33.  Consequently, in order to answer the question referred, it is necessary to determine to whom, whether the lessor or the lessee, the oil companies transferred, in the main proceedings, that right actually to dispose of the fuel as owner.
34.  It is common ground that the lessee is empowered to dispose of the fuel as if he were the owner of that property. He obtains the fuel directly at filling stations and Auto Lease does not at any time have the right to decide in what way the fuel must be used or to what end.
35.  The argument to the effect that the fuel is supplied to Auto Lease, since the lessee purchases the fuel in the name and at the expense of that company, which advances the cost of that property, cannot be accepted. As the Commission rightly contends, the supplies were effected at Auto Lease's expense only ostensibly. The monthly payments made to Auto Lease constitute only an advance. The actual consumption, established at the end of the year, is the financial responsibility of the lessee who, consequently, wholly bears the costs of the supply of fuel.
36.  Accordingly, the fuel management agreement is not a contract for the supply of fuel, but rather a contract to finance its purchase. Auto Lease does not purchase the fuel in order subsequently to resell it to the lessee; the lessee purchases the fuel, having a free choice as to its quality and quantity, as well as the time of purchase. Auto Lease acts, in fact, as a supplier of credit vis-à-vis the lessee.
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 2003-02-13
21.  It should be noted first of all that under the system established by the Regulation all the competent authorities to which notification of a proposed shipment of waste is addressed must check that the classification by the notifier is consistent with the provisions of the Regulation and object to a shipment which is incorrectly classified (Case C-6/00   ASA   [2002] ECR I-1961, paragraph 40).
22.  If the competent authority of dispatch considers that the purpose of a shipment has been incorrectly classified in the notification, the ground for its objection to the shipment must be the classification error itself, without reference to one of the specific provisions of the Regulation setting out the objections which the Member States may make to a shipment of waste (ASA  , cited above, paragraph 47). In any event, it is not for the competent authority to reclassify ex officio the purpose of the shipment of waste (ASA  , cited above, paragraph 48).
36.  It follows from Article 3(1)(b) and the fourth recital of the Directive that the essential characteristic of a waste recovery operation is that its principal objective is that the waste serve a useful purpose in replacing other materials which would have had to be used for that purpose, thereby conserving natural resources (ASA  , cited above, paragraph 69).
43.  However, where the reclamation of the heat generated by the combustion constitutes only a secondary effect of an operation whose principal objective is the disposal of waste, it cannot affect the classification of that operation as a disposal operation.
44.  The Commission has not adduced any evidence in the context of its action which shows that, contrary to what the competent Luxembourg authorities considered in the contested decisions, the principal objective of the operation in question was the recovery of waste. It has not provided any evidence at all of this, such as the fact that the waste in question was intended for a plant which, unless it was supplied with waste, would have had to operate using a primary energy source, or that the waste was to have been delivered to the processing plant in exchange for payment by the plant operator to the producer or holder of the waste.
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 2003-02-13
28.  Now, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice relating to the obligations incumbent upon Member States in the transposition of Community directives, mere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the authorities and are not given the appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the proper fulfilment of obligations arising under the EC Treaty (see, in particular, Case C-159/99   Commission   v   Italy   [2001] ECR I-4007, paragraph 32, and Case C-394/00   Commission   v   Ireland   [2002] ECR I-581, paragraph 11).
43.  In so far as concerns protection against deterioration, as provided for by Article 6(2) of the Directive, it is plain that, whilst certain provisions of the Nature Protection Law pleaded in the present case, and in particular Articles 12 and 23, may contribute to the prevention of certain types of disturbance, the fact remains that they are incapable of completely transposing Article 6(2) of the Directive because they do not cover all types of disturbance that are significant in relation to the objectives of the Directive of the species for which the SACs are designated.
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2003-02-13
11. In that regard, it must be observed that it is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see,  inter alia , Case C-394/00  Commission  v  Ireland  [2002] ECR I-581, paragraph 12).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2003-02-25
26.  Thus Directive 92/49 is designed to secure freedom to market insurance products in the sector concerned within the Community (Commission   v   France  , cited above, paragraph 29).
29.  It is apparent that the Community legislature clearly meant to secure the principle of freedom to set rates in the non-life insurance sector, including the area of compulsory insurance such as insurance covering third-party liability arising from the use of motor vehicles.  That principle implies the prohibition of any system of prior or systematic notification or approval of the rates which an undertaking intends to use in its dealings with policy-holders.  The only derogation from that principle allowed by Directive 92/49 concerns prior notification and approval of   "increases in premium rates"   in the framework of a   "general price-control system"  .
32.  In this case, the parties agree that the rules governing premium rates laid down in Article 2(2) to (5) of the Decree-Law significantly restrict the freedom of insurance undertakings, including those operating under the right of establishment or the freedom to provide services, with regard to the fixing and altering of the rates for insurance policies covering third-party liability arising from the use of motor vehicles in relation to risks situated within Italy.
38.  As regards, second, the various public-interest considerations relied upon by the Italian Republic in order to justify the rules relating to premium rates at issue on the basis of Article 28 of Directive 92/49, paragraph 31 above makes it clear that the general good referred to in that provision cannot in any case be relied upon for the purpose of conferring legitimacy on the introduction or retention of national provisions which prejudice the principle of freedom to set rates, the exceptions to which have been specified in the harmonised rules laid down by Articles 6, 29 and 39 of that directive.
48.  It follows that, by introducing and maintaining in force rate-freezing rules applicable to all contracts of insurance in respect of third-party liability arising fromu the use of motor vehicles in relation to risks situated within Italian territory, without distinguishing between insurance companies having their head office in Italy and those conducting their business in Italy through branch offices or under the freedom to provide services, in breach of the principle of freedom to set premiums referred to in Articles 6, 29 and 39 of Directive 92/49, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive.
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 2003-02-27
22.  As the Court has held on a number of occasions, the justification for the prohibition of customs duties and any charges having an equivalent effect lies in the fact that any pecuniary charge, however small, imposed on goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, constitutes an obstacle to the movement of goods which is aggravated by the resulting administrative formalities. It follows that any pecuniary charge, whatever its designation and mode of application, which is imposed unilaterally on goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier and is not a customs duty in the strict sense constitutes a charge having an equivalent effect to a customs duty within the meaning of Articles 23 EC and 25 EC,  even if it is not imposed on behalf of the State (see,   inter alia  , Case 158/82   Commission   v   Denmark   [1983] ECR 3573, paragraph 18; and Case 18/87   Commission   v   Germany   [1988] ECR 5427, paragraph 5).
23.  However, the Court has also held that such a charge escapes that classification if it relates to a general system of internal dues applied systematically and in accordance with the same criteria to domestic products and imported products alike, if it constitutes payment for a service in fact rendered to the economic operator of a sum in proportion to the service, or again, subject to certain conditions, if it attaches to inspections carried out to fulfil obligations imposed by Community law (see   Commission   v   Germany  , cited above, paragraph 6, and case-law cited).
35.  In those circumstances, compliance by the Federal Republic of Germany with an obligation which Community law imposes on all the Member States in pursuit of a general interest, namely protection of health and the environment, does not confer on exporters of waste established in its territory any specific or definite benefit (see, to this effect,   Commission   v   Germany  , cited above, paragraph 7).
39.  It should be recalled in this connection that, since the pecuniary charge in question is intended solely as financially and economically justified compensation for an obligation imposed in equal measure on all the Member States by Community law, it cannot be regarded as equivalent to a customs duty; nor, consequently, can it fall within the ambit of the prohibition laid down in Articles 23 EC and 25 EC (Case 46/76   Bauhuis   [1977] ECR 5, paragraphs 34 to 36; and   Commission   v   Germany  , cited above, paragraph 14). This finding is not, in principle, precluded by the mere fact that other Member States themselves agree to finance the return of waste, including shipment and disposal or recovery, through their own budgets (see, to that effect, Case 89/76   Commission   v   Netherlands   [1977] ECR 1355, paragraph 18; Case 1/83   IGF   [1984] ECR 349, paragraphs 21 and 22; and   Commission   v   Germany  , cited above, paragraph 15).
Wiebke Busch v Klinikum Neustadt GmbH & Co. Betriebs-KG.
Date: 2003-02-27
38.  Article 5(1) of Directive 76/207 prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex as regards conditions of employment, which includes the conditions applicable to employees' returning to work following parental leave.
41.  It also follows from the case-law of the Court that discrimination on grounds of sex cannot be justified by the fact that she is temporarily prevented, by a legislative prohibition imposed because of pregnancy, from performing all of her duties (see   Habermann-Beltermann  , paragraphs 24 and 26; and   Mahlburg  , paragraph 27).
42.  To be sure, Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207 reserves to Member States the right to retain or introduce provisions which are intended to protect women in connection with   "pregnancy and maternity"  , by recognising the legitimacy, in terms of the principle of equal treatment, first, of protecting a woman's biological condition during and after pregnancy and, second, of protecting the special relationship between a woman and her child over the period which follows pregnancy and childbirth (see   Habermann-Beltermann  , paragraph 21). Articles 4(1) and 5 of Directive 92/85 also guarantee special protection for pregnant women and women who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding in respect of any activity liable to involve a specific risk to their safety or health or negative effects on the pregnancy or breastfeeding.
44.  As regards the financial consequences which might ensue for the employer from the obligation to reinstate a pregnant employee unable for the duration of the pregnancy, to carry out all her duties, the Court has already held that discrimination on grounds of sex cannot be justified on grounds relating to the financial loss for an employer (Dekker  , paragraph 12;   Mahlburg  , paragraph 29; and   Tele Danmark  , paragraph 28).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 2003-02-27
15.  In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the Court's case-law, Article 4(1) and (2) of the directive on birds requires the Member States to provide SPAs with a legal protection regime that is capable, in particular, of ensuring both the survival and reproduction of the bird species listed in Annex I to the directive and the breeding, moulting and wintering of migratory species not listed in that annex which are regular visitors (see Case C-166/97   Commission   v   France   [1999] ECR I-1719, paragraph 21).
16.  Since Article 7 of the directive on habitats provides that the obligations which arise, among others, under Article 6(2) of that directive are to replace those arising under the first sentence of Article 4(4) of the directive on birds in respect of SPAs, the legal status of protection of those areas must also guarantee the avoidance therein of the deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species as well as significant disturbance of the species for which those areas have been designated.
17.  The absence of any provision applying to the Région flamande linking the classification of a site as an SPA to the application of a status of protection such as that described in paragraphs 15 and 16 of this judgment undermines the objective of special protection for wild bird life set out in Article 4 of the directive on birds (see, in particular,  Case C-374/98   Commission   v   France   [2000] ECR I-10799, paragraph 55).
21.  In that regard, it is important to recall that, according to consistent case-law, the provisions of directives must be implemented with unquestionable binding force, and the specificity, precision and clarity necessary to satisfy the requirements of legal certainty (see, in particular, Case C-159/99   Commission   v   Italy   [2001] ECR I-4007, paragraph 32).  The principle of legal certainty requires appropriate publicity for the national measures adopted pursuant to Community rules in such a way as to enable the persons concerned by such measures to ascertain the scope of their rights and obligations in the particular area governed by Community law (see Case C-313/99   Mulligan and Others   [2002] ECR I-5719, paragraphs 51 and 52).
22.  With regard to maps demarcating SPAs, they must be invested with unquestionable binding force.  If not, the boundaries of SPAs could be challenged at any time.  Also, there would be a risk that the objective of protection under Article 4 of the directive on birds mentioned at paragraph 17 of this judgment would not be fully attained.
Commission of the European Communities v République de Finlande.
Date: 2003-03-06
16.  Article 4(1) of the Birds Directive requires Member States to classify as SPAs the most suitable territories in number and size for the conservation of the species mentioned in Annex I (Case C-3/96   Commission   v   Netherlands   [1998] ECR I-3031, paragraph 55).  Under Article 4(2), Member States are also to classify as SPAs the breeding, moulting and wintering areas and staging posts along the migration routes of migratory species (see, in that regard, Case C-166/97   Commission   v   France   [1999] ECR I-1719, paragraphs 14 and 15, and Case C-374/98   Commission   v   France   [2000] ECR I-10799, paragraph 16).