larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Land Hessen v Franz Mücksch OHG.
Date: 2011-09-15
29. In that regard, it must be borne in mind, first, that the obligation, arising from a directive, to achieve the result envisaged by that directive and the duty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation in the second subparagraph of Article 4(3) TEU is binding on all the authorities of the Member States (Joined Cases C‑397/01 to C‑403/01 Pfeiffer and Others  [2004] ECR I‑8835, paragraph 110, and Joined Cases C‑444/09 and C‑456/09 Gavieiro Gavieiro and Iglesias Torres  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 72).
30. Secondly, it is settled case-law that Member States may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances in their internal legal orders to justify a failure to comply with obligations under directives (Case C‑33/90 Commission  v Italy  [1991] ECR I‑5987, paragraph 24, and Case C‑388/01 Commission  v Italy  [2003] ECR I‑721, paragraph 27).
32. As to its being impossible for the city of Darmstadt, on account of the mandatory duty which it has in the present case, to take account of appropriate distances, it must be stated, as was pointed out by the Advocate General at point 44 of her Opinion, that it is for the national court to have recourse to the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law, which is inherent in the EC Treaty system in that it enables the national court to ensure, for matters within its jurisdiction, the full effectiveness of European Union law when it determines the dispute before it (see, to that effect, Case C‑160/01 Mau  [2003] ECR I‑4791, paragraph 34, and Case C‑555/07 Kücükdeveci  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 48).
33. In that regard, it is important to point out that the principle of interpreting national law in conformity with EU law thus imposed by EU law requires the national court to consider national law as a whole in order to assess to what extent it may be applied so as not to produce a result contrary to that sought by the directive at issue (see, to that effect, Pfeiffer and Others , paragraph 115, and Case C‑239/09 Seydaland Vereinigte Agrarbetriebe [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 50).
34. Furthermore, although the main proceedings are between a public authority and an individual, it is important to bear in mind that the Court has held that a Member State may, in principle, impose on individuals an interpretation of national law in keeping with the Directive (Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmegen [1987] ECR 3969, paragraphs 12 to 14, and Case C‑321/05 Kofoed  [2007] ECR I‑5795, paragraph 45).
Unió de Pagesos de Catalunya v Administración del Estado.
Date: 2011-09-15
16. It has consistently been held that the procedure provided for by Article 267 TFEU is an instrument for cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, by means of which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of European Union law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them (see, inter alia, Case C‑83/91 Meilicke  [1992] ECR I-4871, paragraph 22; Case C‑380/01 Schneider  [2004] ECR I-1389, paragraph 20; and Case C‑445/06 Danske Slagterier  [2009] ECR I-2119, paragraph 65).
17. In the context of that cooperation, questions relating to European Union law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may thus refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑94/04 and C‑202/04 Cipolla and Others  [2006] ECR I‑11421; and Joined Cases C‑570/07 and C‑571/07 Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 36).
18. The Court’s function in preliminary rulings is to assist in the administration of justice in the Member States and not to deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions (see, inter alia, Case C-112/00 Schmidberger  [2003] ECR I-5659, paragraph 32; Case C‑478/07 Budĕjovický Budvar [2009] ECR I-7721, paragraph 64; and Case C‑384/08 Attanasio Group  [2010] ECR I‑2055, paragraph 28).
Cathy Schulz-Delzers and Pascal Schulz v Finanzamt Stuttgart III.
Date: 2011-09-15
29. In the first place, Article 12 EC, which lays down a general prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of nationality, applies independently only to situations governed by European Union law for which the Treaty lays down no specific rules of non-discrimination. In relation to the freedom of movement for workers, the principle of non-discrimination was implemented by Article 39 EC (see, inter alia, Case C‑269/07 Commission  v Germany  [2009] ECR I‑7811, paragraphs 98 and 99 and the case-law cited).
30. Second, Article 18 EC, which sets out generally the right of every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, finds specific expression in Article 39 EC in relation to freedom of movement for workers (see Case C‑3/08 Leyman  [2009] ECR I‑9085, paragraph 20 and case-law cited).
31. It is clear that Ms Schulz-Delzers left France in order to reside in Germany and her status as worker within the meaning of Article 39 EC is not in dispute. Thus, it is in the light only of Article 39 EC that it is necessary to examine the questions referred (see, to that effect, inter alia, Leyman , paragraphs 18 to 20 and case-law cited).
34. In that regard, the Court has consistently held that Article 39 EC precludes, first, overt discrimination by reason of nationality and all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result (Case C‑279/93 Schumacker  [1995] ECR I‑225, paragraph 26) and that that article prohibits, second, provisions which preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin to exercise his right to freedom of movement (Case C‑385/00 Groot [2002] ECR I‑11819, paragraph 78).
42. In that regard, the Treaty offers no guarantee to a citizen of the Union that transferring his activities to a Member State other than that in which he previously resided will be neutral as regards taxation. Given the relevant disparities in the tax legislation of the Member States, such a transfer may be to the citizen’s advantage or not, according to circumstances (see, to that effect, Case C‑365/02 Lindfors  [2004] ECR I‑7183, paragraph 34, and Case C‑403/03 Schempp  [2005] ECR I‑6421, paragraph 45).
Mesopotamia Broadcast A/S METV (C-244/10) and Roj TV A/S (C-245/10) v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Date: 2011-09-22
31. It is also clear from recitals 9 and 10 in the preamble to Directive 89/552 that the obstacles which the Community legislature intended to abolish are those which result from disparities existing between the provisions of the Member States concerning the pursuit of broadcasting activities and of distribution of television programmes.
32. It follows that the fields coordinated by the Directive are coordinated only in so far as television broadcasting, as defined in Article 1(a), is concerned as such (see Joined Cases C‑34/95 to C‑36/95 De Agostini and TV-Shop  [1997] ECR I‑3843, paragraph 26).
34. It should also be recalled that the Directive does not completely harmonise the rules relating to the areas to which it applies, but that it lays down minimum rules for broadcasts which emanate from the European Union and which are intended to be received within it (see, Case C‑222/07 UTECA  [2009] ECR I‑1407, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
35. The Directive establishes, therefore, the principle of recognition, by the receiving Member State, of the control function of the Member State of origin with respect to the television broadcasts from broadcasters falling within its competence. Article 2a(1) of the Directive provides that Member States are to ensure freedom of reception and must not restrict retransmissions on their territory of television broadcasts from other Member States for reasons which fall within the fields coordinated by the Directive.
36. In that connection, the Court stated that it is solely for the Member State from which television broadcasts emanate to monitor the application of the law of the originating Member State applying to such broadcasts and to ensure compliance with Directive 89/552, and, second, that the receiving Member State is not authorised to exercise its own control for reasons which fall within the fields coordinated by the Directive (see, to that effect, Case C‑11/95 Commission  v Belgium  [1996] ECR I‑4115, paragraphs 34 and 86, and De Agostini and TV‑Shop , paragraph 27).
40. It follows that the scope of Article 22a of the Directive must be determined by considering the usual meaning in everyday language of the terms used in that article, while also taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they are part (see, Case C‑336/03 easyCar  [2005] ECR I‑1947, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
Bell & Ross BV v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM).
Date: 2011-09-22
28. In response to that plea, it must be noted that, although Article 111 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, on which the order under appeal is based, requires the Advocate General to be heard, Article 2(2) of those rules of procedure states that references to the Advocate General ‘apply only where a Judge has been designated as Advocate General’. In the present case, however, no judge was designated as Advocate General in the proceedings before the General Court.
43. It should be noted that the strict application of those procedural rules serves the requirements of legal certainty and the need to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice. In accordance with the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, no derogation from the procedural time-limits may be made save where the circumstances are quite exceptional, in the sense of being unforeseeable or amounting to force majeure  (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case 42/85 Cockerill-Sambre v Commission [1985] ECR 3749, paragraph 10; and order in Case C‑242/07 P Belgium v Commission  [2007] ECR I‑9757, paragraph 16).
48. The concept of unforeseeable circumstances contains an objective element relating to abnormal circumstances unconnected with the trader in question and a subjective element involving the obligation, on his part, to guard against the consequences of the abnormal event by taking appropriate steps without making unreasonable sacrifices. In particular, the trader must pay close attention to the course of the procedure set in motion and, in particular, demonstrate diligence in order to comply with the prescribed time-limits (see, to that effect Case C‑195/91 P Bayer v Commission  [1994] ECR I‑5619, paragraph 32; and order in Belgium  v Commission , paragraph 17).
56. With regard to the alleged breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, it should be recalled that the Court has repeatedly held that the right to rely on that principle extends to any person with regard to whom an institution of the European Union has given rise to justified hopes. However, a person may not plead infringement of the principle unless he has been given precise assurances by the administration (judgment of 24 November 2005 in Case C‑506/03 Germany v Commission , paragraph 58). Similarly, if a prudent and discriminating economic operator could have foreseen the adoption of a Community measure likely to affect his interests, he cannot plead that principle if the measure is adopted (Case 265/85 Van den Bergh en Jurgens and Van Dijk Food Products (Lopik) v EEC [1987] ECR 1155, paragraph 44).
European Commission v Ireland.
Date: 2011-09-29
44. It is clear from the very wording of those provisions that the derogation set out in Article 4 of the First Directive must be strictly interpreted, as a derogation or exception to a general rule must be interpreted narrowly (see, by analogy, Case C‑140/02 Anastasiou and Others  [2003] ECR I‑10635, paragraph 54; Case C‑337/06 Bayerischer Rundfunk and Others  [2007], ECR I‑11173, paragraph 64, and Case C‑111/09 ČPP Vienna Insurance Group [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 23).
57. Finally, with regard to the argument advanced by Ireland, concerning the advanced stage of the work undertaken internally for the VHI to obtain official authorisation, it is sufficient to point out that it is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation obtaining in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C‑296/01 Commission  v France  [2003] ECR I‑13909, paragraph 43, and Case C‑297/08 Commission  v Italy [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 79).
58. In that regard, the justifications invoked by Ireland, according to which the delay in the implementation of the 2008 Act, which will end the derogation concerning the VHI, is due to internal difficulties, cannot be upheld. As the Court has repeatedly held, a Member State cannot plead provisions, practices or situations prevailing in its domestic legal order to justify failure to observe obligations arising under European Union law (see, inter alia, Case C‑568/07 Commission  v Greece  [2009] ECR I‑4505, paragraph 50).
63. According to the settled case-law of the Court, even if judgments delivered under Article 258 TFEU were to have the same effects as those delivered under Article 267 TFEU and considerations of legal certainty might make it necessary, exceptionally, to limit their temporal effects, provided that the conditions laid down by the Court’s case-law in the context of Article 267 TFEU are met (see, to that effect, Case C‑178/05 Commission  v Greece [2007] ECR I‑4185, paragraph 67; Case C‑239/06 Commission  v Italy  [2009] ECR I‑11913, paragraph 59; Case C‑284/05 Commission  v Finland  [2009] ECR I‑11705, paragraph 58, and Case C‑387/05 Commission  v Italy  [2009] ECR I‑11831, paragraph 59) those conditions do not appear to have been satisfied in the present case.
European Commission v Portuguese Republic.
Date: 2011-10-06
28. It follows from settled case-law that the measures prohibited by Article 63(1) TFEU, as restrictions on the movement of capital, include those that are such as to discourage non-residents from making investments in a Member State or to discourage that Member State’s residents from doing so in other States (Joined Cases C‑436/08 and C‑437/08 Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen  [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 50).
33. As is apparent from settled case-law, national measures restricting the free movement of capital may be justified on the grounds set out in Article 63 TFEU or by overriding reasons relating to the public interest provided that they are appropriate to secure the attainment of the objective which they pursue and do not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see Case C‑233/09 Dijkman and Dijkman-Lavaleije [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
35. It should be noted that the Court has already acknowledged that the need to maintain the coherence of a tax system can justify a restriction on the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty (see Case C‑418/07 Papillon [2008] ECR I‑8947, paragraph 43, and Dijkman and Dijkman-Lavaleije , paragraph 54).
36. For an argument based on such a justification to succeed, the Court requires, however, a direct link to be established between the tax advantage concerned and the offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax levy, with the direct nature of that link falling to be examined in the light of the objective pursued by the rules in question (see Papillon , paragraph 44, and Dijkman and Dijkman-Lavaleije , paragraph 55).
37. In that regard, the Portuguese Republic has not satisfactorily shown that such a link exists where it merely submits that the corporation tax exemption offsets the income tax payable by members of pension funds resident in Portugal in respect of the pensions that they receive and thus allows the double taxation of that income to be avoided.
42. It is settled case-law that the need to guarantee the effectiveness of fiscal supervision constitutes an overriding reason in the public interest capable of justifying a restriction on the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty (see Dijkman and Dijkman-Lavaleije , paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).
46. National law that absolutely prevents a pension fund from submitting evidence that it satisfies the requirements that would allow it to benefit from the IRC exemption, if it were resident in Portugal, is not justified in the name of the effectiveness of fiscal supervision. It cannot be excluded, a priori, that pension funds resident in a Member State other than the Portuguese Republic may be able to provide relevant documentary evidence enabling the Portuguese tax authorities to ascertain, clearly and precisely, that they meet equivalent requirements to those laid down by Portuguese law, in their State of residence.
Astrid Preissl KEG v Landeshauptmann von Wien.
Date: 2011-10-06
26. In the second place, with regard to the more general context of paragraph 4 which must also be taken into consideration for the purposes of interpretation (see, to that effect, Case C‑116/10 Feltgen and Bacino Charter Company  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 12 and case-law cited), Article 5 of the regulation must be taken into account, as correctly contended by the Czech Government and the Commission.
Erich Albrecht and Others v Landeshauptmann von Wien.
Date: 2011-10-06
18. With regard to the context of those provisions, which must inter alia be considered in order to interpret them (see, to that effect, Case C‑116/10 Feltgen and Bacino Charter Company  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 12 and case-law cited), Article 5 of the regulation must be taken into account, as correctly stated by the applicants in the main proceedings, the Czech and Netherlands Governments and the European Commission.
Finanzamt Deggendorf v Markus Stoppelkamp.
Date: 2011-10-06
24. Article 1 of the E ighth Directive defines the concept of ‘taxable person not established within the territory of the country’ (judgment of 16 July 2009 in Case C‑244/08 Commission v Italy , paragraph 26).
25. For the purposes of that article, the status of taxable person not established within the territory of the country presupposes that the taxable person does not display in that country, during the reference period, any of the connecting factors identified therein (see, to that effect, Commission v Italy , paragraph 27).
26. Foremost among those factors are the seat of the economic activity and the existence of a fixed establishment from which business transactions are effected (see, to that effect, Commission v Italy , paragraph 28).
31. Other factors, such as the place of residence of the main directors and the place where general meetings are held, may also need to be taken into account during a second phase, for example when determining the effective place of business of a company exhibiting a fictitious presence, such as that of a ‘letter-box’ company (see, to that effect, Planzer Luxembourg , paragraphs 61 and 62).
34. Moreover, as the referring court has noted, the foregoing interpretation is that which offers the greatest legal certainty in so far as the presumption that the services are provided by a ‘taxable person not established within the territory of the country’ when the seat of that person’s economic activity is located outside that country, wherever his personal residence may be, is such as to simplify the application of the provisions of the Sixth Directive and, therefore, contributes to ensuring accurate and reliable collection of VAT.
Aurora Sousa Rodríguez and Others v Air France SA.
Date: 2011-10-13
27. In that regard, the Court has already held that a flight consists, in essence, of an air transport operation, being as it were a ‘unit’ of such transport, performed by an air carrier which fixes its itinerary (Case C‑173/07 Emirates Airlines [2008] ECR I‑5237, paragraph 40). Moreover, it has specified that the itinerary is an essential element of the flight, as the flight is operated in accordance with the carrier’s pre‑arranged planning (Joined Cases C‑402/07 and C‑432/07 Sturgeon and Others [2009] ECR I‑10923, paragraph 30).
30. In that regard, the Court has held that it is possible, as a rule, to conclude that there is a cancellation where the delayed flight for which the booking was made is ‘rolled over’ onto another flight, that is to say, where the planning for the original flight is abandoned and the passengers from that flight join passengers on a flight which was also planned but independently of the flight for which the passengers so transferred had made their bookings ( Sturgeon and Others , paragraph 36).
38. It follows from those provisions that the compensation granted to air passengers on the basis of Article 12 of Regulation No 261/2004 is intended to supplement the application of measures provided for by Regulation No 261/2004, so that passengers are compensated for the entirety of the damage that they have suffered due to the failure of the air carrier to fulfil its contractual obligations. That provision thus allows the national court to order the air carrier to compensate damage arising, for passengers, from breach of the contract of carriage by air on a legal basis other than Regulation No 261/2004, that is to say, in particular, in the conditions provided for by the Montreal Convention and national law.
39. In that regard, it must be recalled that the Court has already held that standardised and immediate measures taken pursuant to Regulation No 261/2004 do not themselves prevent the passengers concerned, should the same failure of the air carrier to fulfil its contractual obligations also cause them damage conferring entitlement to compensation, from being able to bring, in addition, actions to redress that damage under the conditions laid down by the Montreal Convention (see, to that effect, Case C‑344/04 IATA and ELFAA  [2006] ECR I‑403, paragraph 47).
41. In that regard, it should be recalled that, in its judgment in Case C‑63/09 Walz  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 29, the Court held that the term ‘damage’, referred to in Chapter III of the Montreal Convention, must be construed as including both material and non‑material damage. It follows that damage for which compensation may be payable pursuant to Article 12 of Regulation No 261/2004 may be not only material damage, but also non-material damage.
44. However, when a carrier fails to fulfil its obligations under Article 8 and Article 9 of Regulation No 261/2004, air passengers are justified in claiming a right to compensation on the basis of the factors set out in those articles.