Ca' Pasta Srl v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2000-05-25
25 In the case of acts or decisions drawn up in a procedure involving several stages, and particularly at the end of an internal procedure, it is only those measures which definitively determine the position of the institution upon the conclusion of that procedure which are open to challenge and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the final decision (see, for example, Case T-212/95 Oficemen v Commission [1997] ECR II-1161, paragraph 53).
26 In the letter at issue, the Commission informed the applicant of the "continuation of the internal procedure with a view to cancelling the contribution [granted to the applicant] and recovering the amount already paid".
28 The letter is therefore not a measure which produces binding legal effects such as to affect the interests of the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position within the meaning of the judgment in CSF and CSME v Commission, cited above. As the Commission rightly maintains, it is merely a letter providing information.
17 In response to the second plea made by Ca' Pasta, the Court held, at paragraph 29 of the contested order, that:
As to the adverse effects which the applicant claims to suffer as a result of the procedure pending before the Commission ... they are merely the logical consequence of the commencement of that procedure. Even if, as in the present case, the Commission adopts temporary measures in the context of that procedure, such effects do not indicate the existence of a measure which produces binding legal effects such as to affect the interests of the applicant.
The appeal
18 In its appeal, Ca' Pasta claims that the Court should:
- set aside the contested order,
- annul the measure adopted in the form of the letter at issue, and
- order the Commission to pay the costs.
19 Ca' Pasta makes two pleas in law in support of its appeal.
20 In its first plea, Ca' Pasta argues that the Court of First Instance breached general principles applying to actions against decisions brought under Article 173 of the Treaty and the principle of the rule of law, and that it infringed Regulation No 4028/86, Regulation No 1116/88 and Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 of 19 December 1988 laying down provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards coordination of the activities of the different Structural Funds between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments (OJ 1988 L 374, p. 1). According to Ca' Pasta, by failing to take into account the said principles and regulations, the contested order disregarded the fact that the decision to suspend the aid implicit in the letter at issue was a final decision.
21 In its second plea, Ca' Pasta argues that the statement of the reasons on which the contested order is based is inadequate, that the order contains contradictions, and that it breaches the general principle of the rights of the defence. Ca' Pasta asserts that it is obvious that the contested order is unlawful from the brevity of its grounds, which are so succinct as to make it impossible even to follow the logic on which it is based or, specifically, to understand the reasons why the letter at issue could and should be regarded as simply a letter providing information.
22 The Commission contends that the appeal should be dismissed and that Ca' Pasta should be ordered to pay the costs.
Findings of the Court of Justice
23 The first plea alleges that, by refusing to acknowledge that the letter at issue contains an implied decision to suspend aid, the Court of First Instance disregarded several regulations and principles of Community law, including Regulations Nos 4028/86 and 1116/88 on which Ca' Pasta relied at first instance. It is therefore appropriate to consider, as a preliminary point, whether or not application of those regulations was disregarded in the contested order.
24 In order to ascertain that, it is necessary first to establish what powers the Commission enjoys and what obligations fall upon it under Regulations Nos 4028/86 and 1116/88.
25 As the Court held in Case C-10/98 P Le Canne v Commission [1999] ECR I-6831, at paragraph 25, in connection with the reduction of Community financial aid previously granted, Article 44(1) of Regulation No 4028/86 confers on the Commission the power to suspend, reduce or discontinue aid in the event of one of the four conditions laid down in that article being met.
26 Also at paragraph 25 of that judgment, the Court held that, in conferring such a power on the Commission, Regulation No 4028/86 clearly aims to cover all decisions by the Commission which reduce, entirely or in part, the amount of the aid initially granted when one of the above conditions is met.
27 That objective applies equally to any decision suspending Community financial aid covered by the regulation, given that under Article 44(1) the Commission's powers include the power to decide to suspend ... aid.
28 Such an objective implies that, whilst the Commission is not bound to exercise the power conferred upon it by Article 44(1) of Regulation No 4028/86, that article explicitly requires that, should the Commission do so, it must do so in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 47. It is equally clear from Article 7 of Regulation No 1116/88 that the procedures it mentions must also be followed before aid can be suspended, reduced or discontinued under Article 44 of Regulation No 4028/86 (see Le Canne v Commission, cited above, at paragraph 25).
31 In this connection, it is appropriate to observe that, once an initial application for Community aid is approved, any act suspending the aid originally granted might have serious consequences for the applicant. As the Court observed at paragraph 27 of its judgment in Le Canne v Commission, such consequences highlight the importance of applying a procedure such as that laid down in Articles 44 and 47 of Regulation No 4028/96 and Article 7 of Regulation No 1116/88.