larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen (Uwv) v M.S. Demirci and Others.
Date: 2015-01-14
48. As regards Decision No 1/80, the Court has held that it is essentially aimed at the progressive integration of Turkish workers into the territory of the host Member State (see, to that effect, judgment in Abatay and Others , C‑317/01 and C‑369/01, EU:C:2003:572, paragraph 90).
49. To that end, the aim of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 is to consolidate progressively the position of Turkish workers in the host Member State (judgment in Payir and Others , C‑294/06, EU:C:2008:36, paragraph 37).
50. As for Decision No 3/80, Article 3(1) thereof constitutes the implementation and the concrete expression, in the particular field of social security, of the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in Article 9 of the Association Agreement (judgment in Akdas and Others , EU:C:2011:346, paragraph 98).
56. It must also be remembered that, in contrast to nationals of Member States, Turkish workers are not entitled to move freely within the Community but benefit only from certain rights in the host Member State (see judgments in Tetik , C‑171/95, EU:C:1997:31, paragraph 29, and Derin , C‑325/05, EU:C:2007:442, paragraph 66).
63. The Court observed that, as a Turkish national who has been duly registered as belonging to the legitimate labour force of a Member State within the meaning of Article 6 of Decision No 1/80 could not be entitled under that decision to remain in the territory of that State following an accident at work, that person cannot, therefore, be considered to have left the territory of the host Member State of his own volition (see, to that effect, judgment in Akdas and Others , EU:C:2011:346, paragraphs 93 and 94).
64. It is common ground that a Turkish national’s right of residence, as implicitly but necessarily guaranteed by Article 6 of Decision No 1/80 as a corollary of legal employment, ceases to exist if the person concerned becomes totally and permanently incapacitated for work (judgment in Bozkurt , C‑434/93, EU:C:1995:168, paragraph 40).
67. Thus, Article 7 of Decision No 1/80, concerning family reunification, which was at issue in that case, seeks to enable family members to be with a migrant worker, with a view to thus furthering, by means of family reunification, the employment and residence of the Turkish worker who is already legally integrated in the host Member State ( Kahveci and Inan , EU:C:2012:180, paragraph 32). That provision also seeks to deepen the lasting integration of the Turkish migrant worker’s family in the host Member State by granting to the family member concerned, after three years of legal residence, the possibility of himself gaining access to the labour force ( Kahveci and Inan , EU:C:2012:180, paragraph 33).
Ryanair Ltd v PR Aviation BV.
Date: 2015-01-15
30. As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied upon as such against an individual (see, inter alia, judgments in Faccini Dori , C‑91/92, EU:C:1994:292, paragraph 20; Kücükdeveci C‑555/07, EU:C:2010:21, paragraph 46; and Dominguez , C‑282/10, EU:C:2012:33, paragraph 37).
31. It is also settled case-law that in applying national law, the national court called on to interpret it is required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in question (see, inter alia, judgments in Pfeiffer and Others , C‑397/01 to C‑403/01, EU:C:2004:584, paragraph 114; Kücükdeveci , EU:C:2010:21, paragraph 48; and Dominguez , EU:C:2012:33, paragraph 24).
33. Although, as PR Aviation states, Article 1(2) of Directive 96/9 confers a wide scope on that concept, unencumbered by considerations of a formal, technical or material nature (see to that effect judgment in Fixtures Marketing , C‑444/02, EU:C:2004:697, paragraphs 20 to 32), the fact remains that the definition in that provision applies, according to the wording of that article, ‘for the purposes of this Directive’.
Agrooikosystimata EPE v Ypourgos Oikonomias kai Oikonomikon and Others.
Date: 2015-02-05
33. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, the provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied in a uniform manner, in the light of the versions established in all the EU languages and that, where there is a divergence between the various language versions of a text of EU law, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see judgment in GSV , C‑74/13, EU:C:2014:243, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
38. As follows from the second, tenth and twelfth recitals in the preamble to the regulation, it had instituted a Community aid scheme the main objective of which was to regulate the production of agricultural products (see, to that effect, judgment in Huber C‑336/00, EU:C:2002:509, paragraph 35).
40. In that regard, it must be stated that the notion of ‘agricultural activity’, as defined in Article 2(c) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers and amending Regulations (EEC) No 2019/93, (EC) No 1452/2001, (EC) No 1453/2001, (EC) No 1454/2001, (EC) 1868/94, (EC) No 1251/1999, (EC) No 1254/1999, (EC) No 1673/2000, (EEC) No 2358/71 and (EC) No 2529/2001 (OJ 2003 L 270, p. 1), which includes maintaining the land in good agricultural and environmental condition, cannot be used to interpret Regulation No 2078/92, given that that notion has been defined in the context of the decoupling of aid from agricultural production, that is to say in a context totally different from that in which the facts at issue in the main proceedings arise. In that context, agricultural aid was still granted in essence on the basis of production volume.
43. Furthermore, although the Court has held that environmental objectives form part of the objectives pursued by Regulation No 2078/92, it has also stated that the promotion of more environmentally-friendly forms of production — which is certainly a genuine objective — remains an ancillary one (see, to that effect, judgment in Huber EU:C:2002:509, paragraphs 32 and 36).
Miguel M. and Others.
Date: 2015-02-05
48. In such circumstances, it is settled case-law that the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all EU languages (judgment in Ivansson and Others , C‑307/13, EU:C:2014:2058, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
49. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, judgment in Kirin Amgen , C‑66/09, EU:C:2010:484, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
54. In that respect, as regards the legal system applicable to medicinal products within the internal market, it must be noted that Article 6(1) of Directive 2001/83 provides, in particular, that no medicinal product may be placed on the market of a Member State unless a marketing authorisation has been issued by the competent authorities of that State in accordance with that directive or unless an authorisation has been issued in accordance with the centralised procedure provided for in Regulation No 726/2004 for medicinal products referred to in the annex to that regulation (judgment in Commission  v Poland , C‑185/10, EU:C:2012:181, paragraph 26).
Grima Janet Nisttahuz Poclava v Jose María Ariza Toledano (Taberna del Marqués).
Date: 2015-02-05
29. It emerges in essence from the settled case-law of the Court that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (judgment in Åkerberg Fransson , C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 19 and case-law cited).
31. As the Spanish Government and the European Commission have pointed out, Directive 1999/70 and the Framework Agreement are applicable to all workers providing remunerated services in the context of a fixed-term employment relationship linking them to their employer (judgments in Del Cerro Alonso , C‑307/05, EU:C:2007:509, paragraph 28; Rosado Santana , C‑177/10, EU:C:2011:557, paragraph 40; and Valenza and Others , C‑302/11 to C‑305/11, EU:C:2012:646, paragraph 33).
43. In the grounds for its decision, the referring court also refers to Articles 2.2(b) and 4 of Convention No 158 on the Termination of Employment, adopted at Geneva on 22 June 1982 by the International Labour Organisation, and the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961. It must be held that the Court has no jurisdiction under Article 267 TFEU to rule on the interpretation of provisions of international law which bind Member States outside the framework of EU law (see judgments in Vandeweghe and Others , 130/73, EU:C:1973:131, paragraph 2 and TNT Express Nederland , C‑533/08, EU:C:2010:243, paragraph 61; the order in Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor , C‑134/12, EU:C:2012:288, paragraph 14; and the judgment in Qurbani , C‑481/13, EU:C:2014:2101, paragraph 22).
Raytek GmbH and Fluke Europe BV v Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs.
Date: 2015-02-12
29.  In order to answer the question referred, it should be noted that, with respect to the application of the CN, the Council of the European Union has conferred upon the Commission, acting in cooperation with the customs experts of the Member States, broad discretion to define the subject-matter of tariff headings falling to be considered for the classification of particular goods. However, the Commission’s power to adopt the measures mentioned in Article 9(1)(a) of Regulation No 2658/87, like the classification of the goods, does not authorise it to alter the subject-matter of the tariff headings which have been defined on the basis of the HS established by the HS convention whose scope the European Union has undertaken, under Article 3 thereof, not to modify (see, to that effect, judgments in France  v Commission , C‑267/94, EU:C:1995:453, paragraphs 19 and 20; Kawasaki Motors Europe , C‑15/05, EU:C:2006:259, paragraph 35; and Dinter and Europol Frost-Food , C‑522/07 and C‑65/08, EU:C:2009:663, paragraph 32).
31. In that regard, it should be recalled that it is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined by the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and of the notes to the sections or chapters (judgments in Kawasaki Motors Europe , EU:C:2006:259, paragraph 38; Dinter and Europol Frost-Food , EU:C:2009:663, paragraph 29; and Premis Medical , C‑273/09, EU:C:2010:809, paragraph 42).
34. It must be held that, on the basis of that description, the Commission was entitled to find, as is stated in the statement of reasons set out in column 3 of that annex, that, as ‘the apparat[uses are] capable of measuring temperature and representing the measured values in figures, which is a function covered by heading 9025’, and as ‘the purpose of the apparat[uses] is not to measure or to check quantities of heat but to detect the level of infrared radiation (temperature measurement)’, they must ‘be classified under CN code 9025 19 20 as [thermometers]’, the subheading concerned corresponding to thermometers and electronic pyrometers, not combined with other instruments in the same heading.
N.F. Gielen and Others.
Date: 2015-02-12
36. Although it is true that the objective of those regulations is to combat the diversion of substances commonly used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances by establishing a system to monitor trade in those substances together with effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, the fact remains that the penalising objective of those regulations cannot have any effect on the definition of the concept of ‘scheduled substance’ or on any classification of the substance concerned as a scheduled substance on the basis of that definition (see, by analogy, judgment in D. and G. , C‑358/13 and C‑181/14, EU:C:2014:2060, paragraph 49).
Merck Canada Inc. and Merck Sharp & Dohme Ltd v Sigma Pharmaceuticals plc.
Date: 2015-02-12
21. Sigma and the Commission consider that the functioning of the Specific Mechanism presupposes that each of the parties concerned is to make a sincere effort to respect the other’s legitimate interests (see, by analogy, judgments in Boehringer Ingelheim and Others , C‑143/00, EU:C:2002:246, paragraph 62, and The Wellcome Foundation , C‑276/05, EU:C:2008:756, paragraph 34). That conclusion is supported by the fact that the Specific Mechanism expressly provides that a one-month period is to elapse before the importation can be carried out.
24. It follows that, as from the date of accession, the principles laid down by the Court on the basis of Treaty articles relating to the free movement of goods are applicable to trade between the new Member States and the other EU Member States. The Court has consistently held that the proprietor of an industrial or commercial property right protected by the legislation of a Member State cannot rely upon that legislation to prevent the importation of a product which has been lawfully marketed in another Member State by the proprietor himself or with his consent. The Court has inferred from that principle that an inventor, or someone deriving rights from him, cannot invoke the patent which he holds in one Member State to prevent the importation of a product freely marketed by him in another Member State where the product is not patentable (judgments in Centrafarm and de Peijper , 15/74, EU:C:1974:114, paragraphs 11 and 12; Merck , 187/80, EU:C:1981:180, paragraphs 12 and 13; and Generics and Harris Pharmaceuticals , C‑191/90, EU:C:1992:407, paragraph 31).
25. However, the Specific Mechanism provides for a specific derogation from that principle. It is the Court’s well established case-law that provisions in an Act of Accession which permit exceptions to or derogations from rules laid down by the Treaties must be interpreted restrictively with reference to the Treaty provisions in question and must be limited to what is absolutely necessary to attain the objective pursued (judgment in Apostolides , C‑420/07, EU:C:2009:271, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). As the Advocate General observed at point 18 of his Opinion, the Specific Mechanism seeks to achieve a balance between effective protection of patent or SPC rights and the free movement of goods.
C.G. Sopora v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2015-02-24
22. In particular, the Court has held that the principle of equal treatment with regard to remuneration would be rendered ineffective if it could be undermined by discriminatory national provisions on income tax (judgments in Biehl , C‑175/88, EU:C:1990:186, paragraph 12, and in Schumacker , C‑279/93, EU:C:1995:31, paragraph 23).
23. Furthermore, the Court has consistently held that the rules regarding equal treatment prohibit not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, such as the residence criterion, lead in fact to the same result (judgments in Sotgiu , 152/73, EU:C:1974:13, paragraph 11, and in Schumacker , EU:C:1995:31, paragraph 26).
33. While it is true that considerations of an administrative nature cannot justify a derogation by a Member State from the rules of EU law (judgment in Terhoeve , C‑18/95, EU:C:1999:22, paragraph 45), it is also clear from the Court’s case-law that Member States cannot be denied the possibility of attaining legitimate objectives through the introduction of rules which are easily managed and supervised by the competent authorities (see judgments in Commission  v Italy , C‑110/05, EU:C:2009:66, paragraph 67; in Josemans , C‑137/09, EU:C:2010:774, paragraph 82; and in Commission  v Spain , C‑400/08, EU:C:2011:172, paragraph 124).
VDP Dental Laboratory NV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën and Staatssecretaris van Financiën v X BV and Nobel Biocare Nederland BV.
Date: 2015-02-26
38. The Court has already had occasion to rule that, where an exemption provided for by national law is incompatible with the VAT Directive, Article 168 of that directive does not permit a taxable person both to benefit from that exemption and to exercise the right to deduct tax (judgment in MDDP , C‑319/12, EU:C:2013:778, paragraph 45).
43. The purpose of the exemptions provided for in Article 132(1) of the VAT Directive is to facilitate access to certain services and the supply of certain goods by avoiding the increased costs that would result if they were subject to VAT (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission  v Germany , C‑287/00, EU:C:2002:388, paragraph 47, and in MDDP , EU:C:2013:778, paragraph 26).
44. It is settled case-law that those exemptions constitute independent concepts of EU law the purpose of which is to avoid divergences in the application of the VAT system from one Member State to another (see, inter alia, judgments in CPP , C‑349/96, EU:C:1999:93, paragraph 15, and in Skandia , C‑240/99, EU:C:2001:140, paragraph 23).
45. It must also be remembered that the aim of Article 132 of the VAT Directive is to exempt from VAT certain activities which are in the public interest. That provision does not, however, provide exemption from VAT for every activity performed in the public interest, but only for those which are listed therein and described in great detail (judgment in Institute of the Motor Industry , C‑149/97, EU:C:1998:536, paragraph 18).
46. The exemption of the supply of dental prostheses made by dentists and dental technicians is intended to ensure that the supply of health-related products does not become inaccessible by reason of the increased costs of those products if their supply were subject to VAT (see, concerning Article 13A(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive, now Article 132(1)(b) of the VAT Directive, judgment in Commission  v France , C‑76/99, EU:C:2001:12, paragraph 23).
60. It must be borne in mind that the Community system of VAT is the result of a gradual harmonisation of national legislation pursuant to Articles 113 TFEU and 115 TFEU. The Court has consistently held that this harmonisation, as brought about by successive directives and in particular by the Sixth Directive, is still only partial (judgments in ORO Amsterdam Beheer and Concerto , C‑165/88, EU:C:1989:608, paragraph 21, and in Eurodental , C‑240/05, EU:C:2006:763, paragraph 50).
61. The VAT Directive, by virtue of Article 370 thereof, authorised the Member States to retain certain provisions of their national legislation predating that directive which would, without that authorisation, be incompatible with that directive (see, to that effect, judgments in Idéal tourisme , C‑36/99, EU:C:2000:405, paragraph 38, and in Eurodental , EU:C:2006:763, paragraph 51).
Planet AE Anonymi Etaireia Parochis Symvouleftikon Ypiresion v European Commission.
Date: 2015-02-26
20. A question relating to the jurisdiction of the courts of the European Union must be raised by the Court of its own motion even if none of the parties has asked it to do so (see, to that effect, judgments in Germany v High Authority , 19/58, EU:C:1960:19, p. 488, and Ferriera Valsabbia and Others v Commission , 154/78, 205/78, 206/78, 226/78 to 228/78, 263/78, 264/78, 31/79, 39/79, 83/79 and 85/79, EU:C:1980:81, paragraph 7). In addition, the parties were invited to submit their observations on that question, which was raised by the Court of its own motion.
21. In that regard, the Court has already had occasion to rule that, while, under an arbitration clause entered into pursuant to Article 272 TFEU, the Court may be called on to decide a dispute on the basis of the national law governing the contract, its jurisdiction to determine a dispute concerning that contract falls to be determined solely with regard to Article 272 TFEU and the terms of the arbitration clause, and this cannot be affected by provisions of national law which allegedly exclude its jurisdiction (see judgments in Commission v Zoubek , 426/85, EU:C:1986:501, paragraph 10, and Commission v Feilhauer , C‑209/90, EU:C:1992:172, paragraph 13).
23. It follows from the foregoing that Article 272 TFEU is a specific provision allowing the courts of the European Union to be seised under an arbitration clause agreed by the parties for contracts governed by either public or private law, and without restriction as regards the nature of the action to be brought before the courts of the European Union.
25. Under the arbitration clause set out in Article 13 of the contracts at issue, the General Court or the Court of Justice, as the case may be, has jurisdiction to hear disputes between the European Union and the contractors as regards the validity, application or interpretation of those contracts. Nor does that arbitration clause limit the jurisdiction of the General Court or the Court of Justice on the basis of the nature of the action.
31. In that regard, it should be recalled that an applicant’s interest in bringing proceedings must, in the light of the purpose of the action, exist at the stage of lodging the action, failing which the action will be inadmissible (see, by analogy and as regards an action for annulment, judgments in Wunenburger v Commission , C‑362/05 P, EU:C:2007:322, paragraph 42, and Cañas v Commission , C‑269/12 P, EU:C:2013:415, paragraph 15).
34. In the light of the circumstances recalled at paragraphs 32 and 33 of this judgment, the appellant is not justified in submitting that, at the date on which its action was lodged before the General Court, it had a vested and current interest requiring judicial protection.
Les Laboratoires Servier SA v Ministre des Affaires sociales et de la Santé and Ministre de l'Économie et des Finances.
Date: 2015-02-26
21. It should be noted that the purpose of Directive 89/105, according to Article 1 thereof, is to ensure that any national measure to control the prices of medicinal products for human use or to restrict the range of medicinal products covered by the national sickness insurance systems complies with the requirements of that directive (judgments in Commission  v Austria , C‑424/99, EU:C:2001:642, paragraph 30, and Commission  v Finland , EU:C:2003:334, paragraph 37).
22. According to the sixth recital in the preamble to that directive, ensuring the effectiveness of that directive also requires that the persons concerned can verify that the official entry of medicinal products on the list corresponds to objective criteria and that there is no discrimination between national medicinal products and those from other Member States (judgment in Commission  v Finland , EU:C:2003:334, paragraph 39).
23. In accordance with the fifth recital in the preamble to Directive 89/105, the purpose of that directive is to ensure transparency of pricing, including the manner in which it operates in individual cases and the criteria on which it is based, and to provide public access to pricing arrangements for all those involved in the market in medicinal products in the Member States (see, to that effect, judgment in Pohl-Boskamp , C‑317/05, EU:C:2006:684, paragraph 29).