larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Möbel Kraft GmbH & Co. KG v ML.
Date: 2020-10-21
16


As a preliminary point, it should be noted that a contract concluded at a trade fair may be classified as an ‘off-premises contract’ within the meaning of Article 2(8) of Directive 2011/83, provided that the contract was not concluded at a trade fair stand, which may be regarded as a ‘business premises’ within the meaning of Article 2(9) of that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 August 2018, Verbraucherzentrale Berlin, C‑485/17, EU:C:2018:642, paragraphs 43 to 46).
21


In that respect, according to the Court’s settled case-law, where provisions of EU law do not refer to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining their meaning and scope, they must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, which interpretation must take into account not only the wording of those provisions but also their context and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2020, AFMB, C‑610/18, EU:C:2020:565, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
26


In that regard, the Court has held that Article 6(1) of Directive 2011/83 seeks to ensure the communication to consumers, before the conclusion of a contract, both of information concerning the contractual terms and the consequences of that conclusion, allowing consumers to decide whether they wish to be contractually bound to a trader, and of information necessary for proper performance of that contract and, in particular, for the exercise of their rights (judgment of 10 July 2019, Amazon EU, C‑649/17, EU:C:2019:576, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
Société Eco TLC v Ministre de la Transition écologique et solidaire and Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances.
Date: 2020-10-21
20


Moreover, according to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. With that in mind, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (judgment of 2 April 2020, Ruska Rederacjia, C‑897/19 PPU, EU:C:2020:262, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
23


In the first place, in order to assess whether a measure may be attributed to the State, it is necessary to examine whether the public authorities were involved in the adoption of that measure (judgment of 15 May 2019, Achema and Others, C‑706/17, EU:C:2019:407, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
26


The distinction established in that provision between ‘aid granted by a Member State’ and aid granted ‘through State resources’ does not mean that all advantages granted by the State constitute aid, whether they are financed with State resources or not, but is intended merely to bring within that definition both advantages which are granted directly by the State and those granted by a public or private body designated or established by the State (judgment of 28 March 2019, Germany v Commission, C‑405/16 P, EU:C:2019:268, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).
36


Article 107(1) TFEU covers all the financial means by which public authorities may actually support undertakings, irrespective of whether or not those means are permanent assets of the public sector. Even if the sums corresponding to the aid measure concerned are not permanently held by the Treasury, the fact that they constantly remain under public control, and therefore available to the competent national authorities, is sufficient for them to be categorised as ‘State resources’ (judgments of 16 May 2002, France v Commission, C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraph 37, and of 15 May 2019, Achema and Others, C‑706/17, EU:C:2019:407, paragraph 53).
Silver Plastics GmbH & Co. KG and Johannes Reifenhäuser Holding GmbH & Co. KG v European Commission.
Date: 2020-10-22
81


It must be borne in mind that the concept of a ‘single and continuous infringement’, as recognised in the case-law of the Court of Justice, presupposes the existence of an ‘overall plan’ which consists of various acts, each of which has the identical object of distorting competition in the internal market, irrespective of the fact that one or more of those acts could also, in themselves and taken in isolation, constitute an infringement of Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 26 January 2017, Villeroy & Boch v Commission, C‑644/13 P, EU:C:2017:59, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
Pegaso Srl Servizi Fiduciari and Others v Poste Tutela SpA.
Date: 2020-10-28
In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court.  Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation or the validity of a rule of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (judgment of 1 October 2019, Blaise and Others, C‑616/17, EU:C:2019:800,  paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
It follows that questions relating to EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to give a ruling on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation, or the determination of validity, of a rule of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 1 October 2019, Blaise and Others, C‑616/17, EU:C:2019:800, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited)
In that regard, the Court has held that Directive 2004/17 in fact applied not only to contracts awarded in the sphere of one of the activities expressly listed in Articles 3 to 7 thereof, but also to contracts which, even though they were different in nature and could as such normally fall within the scope of Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114), were used in the exercise of activities defined in Directive 2004/17.  The Court inferred from this that where a contract awarded by a contracting entity was connected with an activity which that entity carried out in the sectors listed in Articles 3 to 7 of that directive, in the sense that that contract was awarded in connection with and for the exercise of activities in one of those sectors, the contract was subject to the procedures laid down in that directive (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 April 2008, Ing. Aigner, C‑393/06, EU:C:2008:213, paragraphs 31 and 56 to 59, and of 19 April 2018, Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi, C‑152/17, EU:C:2018:264, paragraph 26).
Marvin M. v Kreis Heinsberg.
Date: 2020-10-28
25


According to the Court’s well-established case-law, that provision provides for the mutual recognition, without any formality, of driving licences issued by Member States (judgment of 26 October 2017, I, C‑195/16, EU:C:2017:815, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
26


That provision does not make any distinction between the means by which the driving licence is issued, namely following success in the tests laid down in Article 7 of Directive 2006/126 or following an exchange pursuant to Article 11(1) of that directive, the principle of mutual recognition applies equally as regards the driving licence issued from such an exchange, subject to the exceptions laid down by that directive.
46


The principle of prohibition of fraud and abuse of rights, expressed by that case-law, is a general principle of EU law with which individuals must comply. The application of EU legislation cannot be extended to cover transactions carried out for the purpose of fraudulently or wrongfully obtaining advantages provided for by EU law (judgment of 6 February 2018, Altun and Others, C‑359/16, EU:C:2018:63, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
Criminal proceedings against A and Others.
Date: 2020-12-08
That question arises in so far as, as follows from paragraph 25 above, the referring court is uncertain as to the applicability, in the context of Directive 2014/41, of the case-law stemming from the judgments of 27 May 2019, OG and PI (Public Prosecutor’s Offices in Lübeck and Zwickau) (C‑508/18 and C‑82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456, paragraph 90), and of 27 May 2019, PF (Prosecutor General of Lithuania) (C‑509/18, EU:C:2019:457, paragraph 57), in which the Court interpreted the concept of ‘issuing judicial authority’, set out in Article 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, as meaning that, in connection with the adoption of a decision to issue a European arrest warrant, it does not cover public prosecutors’ offices of a Member State which are exposed to such a risk.
According to the Court’s settled case-law, for the purpose of interpreting a provision of EU law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 3 March 2020, X (European arrest warrant – Double criminality), C‑717/18, EU:C:2020:142, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
Secondly, although the European investigation order is indeed an instrument based on the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition, the execution of which constitutes the rule and refusal to execute is intended to be an exception which must be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, judgment of 27 May 2019, OG and PI (Public Prosecutor’s Offices in Lübeck and Zwickau), C‑508/18 and C‑82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited), the provisions of Directive 2014/41 however allow the executing authority and, more broadly, the executing State to ensure that the principle of proportionality and the procedural and fundamental rights of the person concerned are respected.
European Commission v Hungary.
Date: 2020-12-17
According to the settled case-law of the Court, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (judgment of 28 January 2020, Commission v Italy (Directive combating late payment), C‑122/18, EU:C:2020:41, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). The assessment as to whether or not there has been a failure to fulfil obligations as claimed must therefore relate to the state of the domestic legislation in force on that date (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 July 2019, Commission v Belgium (Article 260(3) TFEU – High-speed networks), C‑543/17, EU:C:2019:573, paragraphs 23 and 24).
French Republic v European Commission.
Date: 2020-12-17
In this regard, in the first place, it follows from settled case-law of the Court that only intervention in accordance with the EU rules in the framework of the common organisation of agricultural markets is to be financed by the EAGF. Thus, only sums paid in accordance with the rules laid down in the context of that common organisation are borne by the EAGF. Accordingly, it is for the Member States to bear the burden of any other sum paid, and in particular any amounts which the national authorities wrongly believed themselves authorised to pay in the context of the common organisation of those markets (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 April 2002, Belgium v Commission, C‑332/00, EU:C:2002:235, paragraphs 35 and 44).
Thus, in a situation where all of the aid paid has been granted without any legal basis in EU law, that aid is excluded from EU financing, irrespective of whether or not there was any irregularity or negligence on the part of the national authorities (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 April 2002, Belgium v Commission, C‑332/00, EU:C:2002:235, paragraph 36).
In such a situation, the Commission, which has no discretion to accept or reject expenditure of EU funding (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 April 2002, Belgium v Commission, C‑332/00, EU:C:2002:235, paragraphs 36 and 45), must establish that the excluded aid was in fact paid without any legal basis.
Openbaar Ministerie v L.
Date: 2020-12-17
In the second place, it is necessary, according to the case-law of the Court, to take into account the fact that the person concerned in the case in the main proceedings is currently deprived of his liberty and that the question whether he may continue to be held in custody depends on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings (judgment of  27 May 2019, OG and PI (Public Prosecutor’s Offices in Lübeck and Zwickau)), C‑508/18 and  C‑82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456, paragraph 38  and the case-law cited).
In that regard, it should be noted that both the principle of mutual trust between the Member States and the principle of mutual recognition, which is itself based on the mutual trust between the latter, are, in EU law, of fundamental importance given that they allow an area without internal borders to be created and maintained. More specifically, the principle of mutual trust requires, particularly as regards the area of freedom, security and justice, each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law (Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 191, and judgment of 27 May 2019, OG and PI (Public Prosecutor’s Offices in Lübeck and Zwickau), C‑508/18 and C‑82/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:456, paragraph 43).
It follows that executing judicial authorities may therefore, in principle, refuse to execute such a warrant only on the grounds for non-execution exhaustively listed by Framework Decision 2002/584 and that execution of the warrant may be made subject only to one of the conditions exhaustively laid down in Article 5 thereof. Accordingly, while execution of the European arrest warrant constitutes the rule, refusal to execute is intended to be an exception which must be interpreted strictly (judgment of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice), C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
European Commission v Italian Republic.
Date: 2021-01-14
In that regard, it should be noted at the outset that, according to settled case-law relating to the burden of proof in proceedings for failure to fulfil an obligation under Article 258 TFEU, it is for the Commission to determine whether the obligation has not been fulfilled. It is the Commission that must provide the Court with the information necessary for it to determine whether the infringement is made out, and the Commission may not rely on any presumption for that purpose (judgment of 5 September 2019  Commission v Italy (Bacteria Xylella fastidiosa), C‑443/18, EU:C:2019:676, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
By providing for a harmonised system of taxation of energy products and electricity, Directive 2003/96 seeks, as is clear from recitals 2 to 5 and 24 thereof, to promote the proper functioning of the internal market in the energy sector, in particular by avoiding distortions of competition (judgment of 30 January 2020, Autoservizi Giordano, C‑513/18, EU:C:2020:59, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). To that end, that directive states, in Article 4(1) thereof, that the levels of taxation that Member States apply to the energy products and electricity listed in Article 2 of that directive may not be less than the minimum levels laid down by the directive, while including, in particular in Articles 5 and 7 and 15 to 19, a series of provisions which allow Member States to apply reductions, exemptions or differentiations from the level of taxation for certain products or for certain uses.
Criminal proceedings against OM.
Date: 2021-01-14
30


It should be recalled that the Charter’s scope of application, so far as concerns action of the Member States, is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, according to which the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law (judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
31


Article 51(1) of the Charter confirms the Court’s settled case-law, which states that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
32


Thus, where a legal situation does not come within the scope of EU law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and any provisions of the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction (judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
37


More specifically, it follows from Article 14(1) of Directive 2014/42 that it replaces only the first four indents of Article 1 and Article 3 of Framework Decision 2005/212 for the Member States bound by that directive, with the consequence that Article 2, 4 and 5 of that framework decision were maintained in force after the adoption of that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2020, Agro In 2001, C‑234/18, EU:C:2020:221, paragraph 48).
53


It is true that the right to property guaranteed by that provision does not constitute an absolute prerogative. In accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter, limitations may be placed on the exercise of the rights and freedoms enshrined therein, on condition that those limitations genuinely correspond to objectives of public interest pursued by the European Union and do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the right so guaranteed (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2020, Adusbef and Federconsumatori, C‑686/18, EU:C:2020:567, paragraph 85 and the case-law cited).
DB v Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Consob).
Date: 2021-02-02
According to the Court’s settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law or the assessment of its validity that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it and to understand the reasons for the referring court’s view that it needs answers to those questions in order to rule in the dispute before it (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 November 2009, Filipiak, C‑314/08, EU:C:2009:719, paragraphs 40 to 42, and of 12 December 2019, Slovenské elektrárne, C‑376/18, EU:C:2019:1068, paragraph 24).
European Commission v Kingdom of Sweden.
Date: 2021-02-25
Moreover, the General Court noted, in paragraphs 81 and 85 of the judgment under appeal, which it is appropriate to read together, that the Commission’s authorisation decision must not be based solely on assumptions that have not been confirmed or have been overturned by the information available to the Commission, in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice (see, by analogy, judgment of 17 September 2009, Commission v MTU Friedrichshafen, C‑520/07 P, EU:C:2009:557, paragraphs 52 and 53). Those two paragraphs of the judgment under appeal thus cannot be read as obliging the Commission to require an unreasonable level of proof from the applicant for authorisation.
Under the second paragraph of Article 264 TFEU, the Court may, if it considers it necessary to do so, state which of the effects of an act which it has declared void are to be considered definitive. In exercising the power conferred on it by that article, the Court is to have regard to respect for the principle of legal certainty and other public or private interests (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 September 2012, Parliament v Council, C‑490/10, EU:C:2012:525, paragraph 91; of 22 October 2013, Commission v Council, C‑137/12, EU:C:2013:675, paragraph 81; of 24 June 2014, Parliament v Council, C‑658/11, EU:C:2014:2025, paragraphs 90 and 91, and of 7 September 2016, Germany v Parliament and Council, C‑113/14, EU:C:2016:635, paragraph 83).
Bartosch Airport Supply Services GmbH v Zollamt Wien.
Date: 2021-02-25
It must be borne in mind, in the first place, that, in the interest of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the tariff classification of goods must be sought, as a general rule, in their objective characteristics and properties, as defined by the wording of the heading and subheading of the CN and by any section or chapter notes, before the other provisions of the General Rules come to bear (see, to that effect, in particular, judgments of 11 December 2008, Kip Europe and Others, C‑362/07 and C‑363/07, EU:C:2008:710, paragraph 39; of 12 July 2012, TNT Freight Management (Amsterdam), C‑291/11, EU:C:2012:459, paragraph 31; of 19 December 2019, Amoena, C‑77/18, EU:C:2019:1142, paragraphs 39 and 40; and of 26 March 2020, Pfizer Consumer Healthcare, C‑182/19, EU:C:2020:243, paragraph 37).
In the second place, despite the fact that they are not legally binding, the Explanatory Notes drawn up by the Commission as regards the CN and by the WCO as regards the HS may be an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various tariff headings (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 May 2014, Data I/O, C‑297/13, EU:C:2014:331, paragraph 33, and of 15 May 2019, Korado, C‑306/18, EU:C:2019:414, paragraph 35).
In the third place, where the classification cannot be made on the sole basis of the objective characteristics and properties of the product concerned, the intended use of that product may constitute an objective criterion for classification, provided that it is inherent to that product. That inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the objective characteristics and properties of that product (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 September 2019, TDK-Lambda Germany, C‑559/18, EU:C:2019:667, paragraph 27, and of 26 March 2020, Pfizer Consumer Healthcare, C‑182/19, EU:C:2020:243, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
In accordance with the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision or be given priority over the other language versions. Thus, the need for uniform interpretation and application of each provision of EU law precludes one linguistic version of the text being considered in isolation, but requires that the measure be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and purpose of the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 October 1977, Bouchereau, 30/77, EU:C:1977:172, paragraph 14, and of 8 June 2017, Sharda Europe, C‑293/16, EU:C:2017:430, paragraph 21).