larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
European Commission v Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg.
Date: 2013-07-11
34. In that connection, it must be recalled that, in the event of disruption to the service or danger, the adoption of measures necessary for restoring normal operating conditions, including the withdrawal of train paths, is not a matter of train path allocation (see, Case C-473/10 Commission  v Hungary  [2013] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 56 and 59).
35. Article 29 of Directive 2001/14 provides for the adoption of the measures necessary to address a situation in which train movements have been disrupted as a result of technical failure or accident and, where absolutely necessary, an emergency on account of a breakdown making the infrastructure temporarily unusable ( Commission  v Hungary , paragraph 57).
36. It must be stated that that provision concerns specific measures which must be taken when train movements have been disrupted in order to restore, for safety reasons, normal operating conditions, which is not the case with the other provisions in Chapter III of Directive 2001/14 which relate to the establishment of the working timetable and the ad hoc allocation of individual train paths. Measures adopted under Article 29 of that directive cannot therefore be regarded as directly concerning the essential function of allocating capacity or train paths for the purpose of Article 14(2) thereof, a function which must be entrusted to an independent allocation body. Rather, Article 29 deals with ad hoc measures which must be adopted in an emergency to deal with a specific situation and ensure that rights to capacity in the form of train paths may in fact be exercised by the operator holding such rights, in accordance with the working timetable ( Commission  v Hungary , paragraph 59).
Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v European Commission.
Date: 2013-07-18
11. The legitimacy of pursuing such an objective has also been recognised by the Court, which has stated that the marketing on an exclusive basis of events of high interest to the public is liable to restrict considerably the access of the general public to information relating to those events. However, in a democratic and pluralistic society, the right to receive information is of particular importance, and its importance is all the more evident in the case of such events (see Case C‑283/11 Sky Österreich  [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 51 and 52).
19. First, it is apparent from the significance of the discretion accorded to the Member States, referred to in paragraph 12 above, that the Commission’s power of review must be limited to determining whether the Member States have committed any manifest errors of assessment in designating events of major importance. In order to verify whether such an error of assessment has been committed, the Commission must therefore, inter alia, examine, carefully and impartially, all the relevant facts of the individual case, facts which support the conclusions reached (see, by analogy, Case C‑269/90 Technische Universität München  [1991] ECR I‑5469, paragraph 14, and Case C‑77/09 Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços  [2010] ECR I‑13533, paragraphs 56 and 57).
25. In so far as concerns the reasons why such advice was not followed by that authority, it is true that, as is required of the European Union institutions when adopting measures (see Case C‑413/06 P Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America  v Impala  [2008] ECR I‑4951, paragraph 166), that authority must disclose the reasons for designating an event as one of major importance in such a way as, on the one hand, to make the persons concerned aware of the reasons for the measure and thereby enable them to defend their rights and, on the other, to enable the Commission and the competent Courts to exercise their power of review.
47. In that regard, it is apparent from the case‑law of the Court of Justice that an error of law committed by the General Court does not invalidate the judgment under appeal if its operative part is well founded on other legal grounds (see, to that effect, Case C‑367/95 P Commission  v Sytraval and Brink’s France  [1998] ECR I‑1719, paragraph 47, and Case C‑352/09 P ThyssenKrupp Nirosata  v Commission  [2011] ECR I‑2359, paragraph 136).
European Commission v Republic of Poland.
Date: 2013-07-18
45. In this regard it is sufficient to observe that the Court has repeatedly held that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C‑152/05 Commission  v Germany  [2008] ECR I‑39, paragraph 15, and Case C‑286/12 Commission  v Hungary  [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
48. The Commission’s action could succeed only if Regulation No 1829/2003 nevertheless required the Republic of Poland to comply with certain obligations before 12 August 2008. In the context of the present case, such obligations would require, in particular, the Member States to refrain from adopting rules likely to produce negative effects contrary to the objectives of that regulation even before they came into force (see, to that effect, Case C‑508/08 Commission  v Malta  [2010] ECR I‑10589, paragraph 21). It is, however, clear that the Commission has not based any of the pleas put forward in support of its action on the existence of obligations resulting directly from that regulation.
Mark Alemo-Herron and Others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd.
Date: 2013-07-18
22. First, in paragraph 37 of Werhof , the Court held that Article 3(1) of Directive 77/187 must be interpreted as not precluding, in a situation where the contract of employment refers to a collective agreement binding the transferor, that the transferee, who is not party to such an agreement, is not bound by collective agreements subsequent to the one which was in force at the time of the transfer of the business.
25. However, Directive 77/187 does not aim solely to safeguard the interests of employees in the event of transfer of an undertaking, but seeks to ensure a fair balance between the interests of those employees, on the one hand, and those of the transferee, on the other. More particularly, it makes clear that the transferee must be in a position to make the adjustments and changes necessary to carry on its operations (see, to that effect, Werhof , paragraph 31).
30. Secondly, it is settled case-law that the provisions of Directive 2001/23 must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the fundamental rights as set out by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) (see, to that effect, Case C–179/11 Cimade and GISTI [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 42).
32. That fundamental right covers, inter alia, freedom of contract, as is apparent from the explanations provided as guidance to the interpretation of the Charter (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17) and which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, have to be taken into account for the interpretation of the Charter (Case C‑283/11 Sky Österreich  [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 42).
33. In the light of Article 3 of Directive 2001/23, it is apparent that, by reason of the freedom to conduct a business, the transferee must be able to assert its interests effectively in a contractual process to which it is party and to negotiate the aspects determining changes in the working conditions of its employees with a view to its future economic activity.
34. However, the transferee in the main proceedings is unable to participate in the collective bargaining body at issue. In those circumstances, the transferee can neither assert its interests effectively in a contractual process nor negotiate the aspects determining changes in working conditions for its employees with a view to its future economic activity.
35. In those circumstances, the transferee’s contractual freedom is seriously reduced to the point that such a limitation is liable to adversely affect the very essence of its freedom to conduct a business.
36. Article 3 of Directive 2001/23, read in conjunction with Article 8 of that directive, cannot be interpreted as entitling the Member States to take measures which, while being more favourable to employees, are liable to adversely affect the very essence of the transferee’s freedom to conduct a business (see, by analogy, Case C–544/10 Deutsches Weintor  [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 54 and 58).
Deutsche Umwelthilfe eV v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Date: 2013-07-18
19. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the Court has held that this provision can apply to ministries to the extent that they participate in the legislative process stricto sensu . However, the Court has not ruled on whether the same provision could also apply to ministries when they participate in a process that could lead to a norm of a lower rank than a law (Case C‑204/09 Flachglas Torgau [2012] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 34 and 51).
21. In order to determine whether the first sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 2(2) of Directive 2003/4 also refers to ministries when they participate in a process that could lead to a norm of a lower rank than a law, it must be recalled that, according to settled case‑law, the need for the uniform application of European Union law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of European Union law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, which must take into account the context of that provision and the purpose of the legislation in question (see Flachglas Torgau , paragraph 37).
23. In that regard, it is clear from paragraph 43 of Flachglas Torgau that the purpose of the exception provided for in the first sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 2(2) of Directive 2003/4 is to allow Member States to lay down appropriate rules to ensure that the process for the adoption of legislation runs smoothly, taking into account the fact that, in the various Member States, the provision of information to citizens is, usually, adequately ensured in the legislative process.
24. The Court has also stated that, having regard to the differences that could exist between the legislative procedures in Member States, a functional interpretation of the term ‘bodies or institutions acting in a legislative capacity’ is justified by the need to ensure a uniform application of Directive 2003/4 in those States ( Flachglas Torgau , paragraph 50).
28. Consequently, it is clear that both the wording of the first sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 2(2) of Directive 2003/4 and the aim pursued by the Aarhus Convention and by that directive of guaranteeing the right of access to environmental information held by public authorities and ensuring that, as a matter of course, the information is progressively made available and disseminated to the public ( Flachglas Torgau , paragraph 39) lead to the adoption of a narrow interpretation, according to which only those procedures that could result in the adoption of a law or a norm of an equivalent rank are covered by the first sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 2(2) of Directive 2003/4.
32. That interpretation is supported by the wording and the scheme of the Aarhus Convention, in the light of which Directive 2003/4 must be interpreted (see, by analogy, Case C‑115/09 Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen [2011] ECR I‑3673, paragraph 41).
Green — Swan Pharmaceuticals CR, a.s. v Státní zemědělská a potravinářská inspekce, ústřední inspektorát.
Date: 2013-07-18
22. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the starting-point for the definition of a ‘health claim’ within the meaning of Article 2(2)(5) of the regulation is the relationship that must exist between a food or one of its constituents and health; that definition provides no information as to whether that relationship must be direct or indirect, or as to its intensity or duration, so that the term ‘relationship’ must be understood in a broad sense (see Case C‑544/10 Deutsches Weintor [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 34).
36. In that context, as pointed out by the Czech Government and the Commission, Article 28(2) of the regulation, which establishes a derogating and transitional measure, only refers to a trade mark or to a brand name which already existed before 1 January 2005 and which can be considered a nutrition or health claim within the meaning of the regulation. Foods bearing such a trade mark or such a brand name may continue to be marketed until 19 January 2022.
37. Having regard to the preceding, the answer to the third question is that Article 28(2) of Regulation No 1924/2006 must be interpreted as referring only to foods bearing a trade mark or brand name which must be considered a nutrition or health claim within the meaning of that regulation and which, in that form, existed before 1 January 2005.
Costs
Metro Cash & Carry Danmark ApS v Skatteministeriet.
Date: 2013-07-18
23. As a preliminary point, it must be noted that, according to settled case-law, the purpose of Directive 92/12 is to lay down a number of rules on the holding, movement and monitoring of products subject to excise duty, in particular so as to ensure that chargeability of excise duties is identical in all the Member States (see Case C‑5/05 Joustra  [2006] ECR I‑11075, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
36. That conclusion is also supported by Article 33(3) of Directive 2008/118, which simplifies the provisions of Directive 92/12 by now referring only to the person ‘to whom the goods are delivered in the other Member State’.
45. In this respect, it must be noted that, products which are not held for private purposes must necessarily be regarded as being held for commercial purposes (see Joustra , paragraph 29).
The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs v Sunico ApS and Others.
Date: 2013-09-12
32. As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that, in so far as Regulation No 44/2001 now replaces the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36; ‘the Brussels Convention’) in relations between Member States, an interpretation given by the Court concerning that convention also applies to the regulation, where its provisions and those of the Brussels Convention may be treated as equivalent (see, in particular, Case C‑645/11 Sapir and Others  [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 31). Furthermore, is clear from recital 19 in the preamble to Regulation No 44/2001 that continuity in interpretation between the Brussels Convention and that regulation should be ensured.
33. In that regard, it must be stated that the scope of Regulation No 44/2001 is, like that of the Brussels Convention, limited to ‘civil and commercial matters’. It follows from settled case-law of the Court that that scope is defined essentially by the elements which characterise the nature of the legal relationships between the parties to the dispute or the subject-matter thereof (see, in particular, Case C‑406/09 Realchemie Nederland  [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 39, and Sapir and Others , paragraph 32).
34. The Court has thus held that, although certain actions between a public authority and a person governed by private law may come within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001, it is otherwise where the public authority is acting in the exercise of its public powers (see, in particular, Sapir and Others , paragraph 33 and the case‑law cited).
35. In order to determine whether that is the case in a dispute such as that in the main proceedings, it is necessary to examine the basis of, and the detailed rules applicable to, the action brought by the Commissioners, in the United Kingdom, before the High Court of Justice (see, by analogy, Case C‑271/00 Baten  [2002] ECR I‑10489, paragraph 31, and Case C‑266/01 Préservatrice foncière TIARD  [2003] ECR I‑4867, paragraph 23).
37. So far as the legal basis of the Commissioners’ claim is concerned, their action against Sunico is based not on United Kingdom VAT law, but on Sunico’s alleged involvement in a conspiracy to defraud, which comes under the law of tort of that Member State.
39. As the Commission and the United Kingdom Government have observed, in the context of that legal relationship, the Commissioners do not exercise any exceptional powers by comparison with the rules applicable to relationships between persons governed by private law. In particular, as the Advocate General has stated at point 44 of her Opinion, the Commissioners cannot, as they are generally able to do in the exercise of their powers as a public authority, themselves issue the enforceable document that would enable them to recover their debt, but, in order to do so in a context such as that of the main proceedings, must proceed through the normal legal channels.
Slancheva sila EOOD v Izpalnitelen direktor na Darzhaven fond «Zemedelie» Razplashtatelna agentsia.
Date: 2013-09-12
27. It is settled case-law that the scope of European Union regulations must not be extended to cover abuses on the part of a trader (see, to that effect, Case C‑279/05 Vonk Dairy Products  [2007] ECR I‑239, paragraph 31).
29. The Court has already held that, in those circumstances, evidence of an abusive practice requires, first, a combination of objective circumstances in which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by the European Union rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved, and, second, a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage from the European Union rules by creating artificially the conditions laid down for obtaining it (see, to that effect, Case C‑515/03 Eichsfelder Schlachtbetrieb  [2005] ECR I‑7355, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
30. Furthermore, it is for the national court to establish the existence of those two elements, evidence of which must be adduced in accordance with the rules of national law, provided that the effectiveness of European Union law is not thereby undermined (see, to that effect, Case C‑110/99 Emsland-Stärke  [2000] ECR I‑11569, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
39. Secondly, as regards the subjective element, it is the responsibility of the national court to determine the real substance and significance of the disputed application for financing (Case C‑255/02 Halifax and Others  [2006] ECR I‑1609, paragraph 81).
40. In so doing, the factual elements which can be taken into account by the referring court in order to establish the artificial nature of the creation of the conditions required to obtain an EAFRD payment include links of a legal, economic and/or personal nature between the persons involved in the investment operation concerned (see, to that effect, Emsland-Stärke , paragraph 58).
41. The existence of that subjective element can also be established by evidence of collusion, which may take the form of intentional coordination, between different investors applying for support under an EAFRD support scheme, in particular where the investment projects are identical and there is a geographical, economic, functional, legal and/or personal link between those projects (see, by analogy, Vonk Dairy Products , paragraph 33).
42. None the less, the Court has held that financing cannot be refused for a project where the investment in question may have some explanation other than the mere payment under the EAFRD support scheme (see, by analogy, Halifax and Others , paragraph 75).
Council of the European Union v European Parliament.
Date: 2013-09-17
50. It follows that, contrary to contentions of the Council and the Kingdom of Spain, the budgetary procedure laid down in Article 314 TFEU is not concluded by an act jointly signed by the Presidents of the Parliament and the Council. It is the act based on Article 314(9) TFEU – by which the President of the Parliament declares, after verifying that the procedure has been conducted lawfully, that the budget has been definitively adopted – which constitutes the final stage of the procedure for the adoption of the Union’s budget and endows the budget with binding force.
51. Accordingly, the Court has held that the act based on Article 203(7) of the EEC Treaty, the terms of which correspond to those of Article 314(9) TFEU, first, is adopted by the President of the Parliament in his capacity as an organ of that institution and must therefore be attributed to that institution and, second, endows the budget with binding force vis-à-vis both the institutions and the Member States (see Council  v Parliament , paragraph 8).
56. Accordingly, it is the President of the Parliament, in his capacity as organ of that institution, who, by adopting the act based on Article 314(9) TFEU, endows the Union’s budget with binding force at the conclusion of a procedure characterised by the joint action of the Parliament and the Council (see Council  v Parliament , paragraph 8).
Dashiqiao Sanqiang Refractory Materials Co. Ltd v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2013-09-19
17. It must be observed that the exception whereby the institutions may, in the review procedure, apply a method different from that used in the original investigation when the circumstances have changed must be interpreted strictly, for a derogation from or exception to a general rule must be interpreted narrowly (see judgment of 29 September 2011 in Case C‑82/10 Commission  v Ireland , paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
19. However, as regards the fact that such a change in circumstances for the purposes of Article 11(9) of the basic regulation constitutes an exception, it must be held that the requirement that a provision be interpreted strictly cannot permit the institutions to interpret and apply the provision in a manner inconsistent with its wording and purpose (see, to that effect, Case C-337/09 P Council  v Zhejiang Xinan Chemical Industrial Group  [2012] ECR I-0000, paragraph 93). In this respect, it must be observed that that provision prescribes in particular that the method applied must be consistent with Article 2 of the basic regulation.
Christian Van Buggenhout and Ilse Van de Mierop v Banque Internationale à Luxembourg SA.
Date: 2013-09-19
23. As a preliminary point, it must be observed that, even if Regulation No 1346/2000 contains, among others, conflict of laws rules aiming to determine international jurisdiction and the applicable law (see, to that effect Case C‑527/10 ERSTE Bank Hungary  [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited), Article 24 thereof does not count among such rules, but is a provision of substantive law which applies in each Member State independently of the lex concursus . The question referred asks only whether a payment such as that made by Dexia Banque Internationale à Luxembourg to Kostner on the order of Grontimmo falls within paragraph 1 of that provision, according to which, where an obligation has been honoured in a Member State for the benefit of a debtor who is subject to insolvency proceedings opened in another Member State when it should have been honoured for the benefit of the liquidator in those proceedings, the person honouring the obligation must be deemed to have discharged that obligation if he was unaware of the opening of proceedings.
26. According to settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see Case C‑533/08 TNT Express Nederland  [2010] ECR I‑4107, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
27. Furthermore, the need for a uniform interpretation of European Union regulations makes it impossible for the text of a provision to be considered, in case of doubt, in isolation but requires, on the contrary, that it should be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages (see, to that effect Case C‑199/08 Eschig [2009] ECR I‑8295, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).