larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände - Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband eV v deutsche internet versicherung AG.
Date: 2008-10-16
15. First of all, it should be recalled that according to settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of Community law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, in particular, Case C-301/98 KVS International  [2000] ECR I-3583, paragraph 21; Case C-156/98 Germany  v Commission  [2000] ECR I-6857, paragraph 50; Case C-53/05 Commission v Portugal  [2006] ECR I-6215, paragraph 20; and Case C-300/05 ZVK  [2006] ECR I-11169, paragraph 15).
40. Taking account of all of the foregoing considerations, the answers to the questions referred must be that Article 5(1)(c) of the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that a service provider is required to supply to recipients of the service, before the conclusion of a contract with them, in addition to its electronic mail address, other information which allows the service provider to be contacted rapidly and communicated with in a direct and effective manner. That information does not necessarily have to be a telephone number. That information may be in the form of an electronic enquiry template through which the recipients of the service can contact the service provider via the internet, to whom the service provider replies by electronic mail except in situations where a recipient of the service, who, after contacting the service provider electronically, finds himself without access to the electronic network, requests the latter to provide access to another, non‑electronic means of communication.
Costs
Kirtruna SL and Elisa Vigano v Red Elite de Electrodomésticos SA and Others.
Date: 2008-10-16
25. In that regard, it must be recalled that, in accordance with settled case‑law, the procedure provided for by Article 234 EC is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts, by means of which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of Community law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them (see, in particular, Case C‑83/91 Meilicke  [1992] ECR I‑4871, paragraph 22, and Case C‑380/01 Schneider  [2004] ECR I-1389, paragraph 20).
26. In the context of that cooperation, it is solely for the national court, before which the dispute has been brought and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling ( Schneider , paragraph 21 and case-law cited).
27. It follows that questions on the interpretation of Community law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, in particular, Joined Cases C‑94/04 and C‑202/04 Cipolla and Others  [2006] ECR I‑11421, paragraph 25, and Joined Cases C‑222/05 to C‑225/05 van der Weerd and Others  [2007] ECR I‑4233, paragraph 22).
34. In that regard, it is clear from the case‑law that the presumption of the relevance of the questions referred cannot be rebutted by the simple fact that one of the parties to the main proceedings contests certain facts, the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine and on which the delimitation of the subject-matter of those proceedings depends ( Cipolla and Others , paragraph 26, and van der Weerd and Others , paragraph 23).
46. In circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, the possible termination of the contracts of employment would not be due solely to the transfer of the undertaking. It would be caused by additional circumstances such as the failure of the transferee and the landlords to agree a new lease, the impossibility of finding other commercial premises or the impossibility of transferring the staff to other stores. Those circumstances can be described as economic, technical or organisational reasons for the purposes of Article 4(1).
Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2008-11-06
42. Moreover, the Commission contends that the appeal is inadmissible because the pleas on appeal are ineffective. Therefore, the Commission submits that, even if those pleas had to be upheld, the fact that they were well founded could not, in any event, lead to the judgment under appeal being set aside, in so far as other grounds forming a sound basis for the operative part of that judgment are not challenged in the appeal.
43. On 16 February 2004, the Commission sent a letter to the Hellenic Republic identifying the latter’s outstanding debts for the Abuja I and Abuja II projects. …
Trespa International BV v Nova Haven- en Vervoerbedrijf NV.
Date: 2008-11-06
32. In that regard, it is necessary to recall that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts provided for by Article 234 EC, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (see, inter alia, Case C‑144/04 Mangold  [2005] ECR I‑9981, paragraph 34; Case C‑217/05 Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio  [2006] ECR I‑11987, paragraph 16; and Case C‑119/05 Lucchini  [2007] ECR I‑6199, paragraph 43).
33. It follows that questions on the interpretation of Community law referred by a national court, in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance (see Case C‑300/01 Salzmann  [2003] ECR I‑4899, paragraph 31, and Joined Cases C‑94/04 and C‑202/04 Cipolla and Others  [2006] ECR I‑11421, paragraph 25). The presumption that questions referred by national courts for a preliminary ruling are relevant may be rebutted only in exceptional cases, where it is quite obvious that the interpretation which is sought of Community law bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or to its purpose or where the problem is hypothetical or the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, to that effect, Case C‑105/03 Pupino  [2005] ECR I‑5285, paragraph 30, and Case C‑467/05 Dell’Orto  [2007] ECR I‑5557, paragraph 40).
36. It must also be recalled that, in the context of proceedings under Article 234 EC, the Court cannot resolve a dispute concerning the facts. Such a dispute, like any other assessment of the facts involved, is within the province of the national court (see Case C‑279/06 CEPSA  [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 30, and the case-law cited).
Kollektivavtalsstiftelsen TRR Trygghetsrådet v Skatteverket.
Date: 2008-11-06
23. It should be borne in mind that the wording of Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive is, essentially, identical to that of Article 56(1)(c) of Directive 2006/112. It follows that those two provisions must be interpreted in the same way.
24. It should also be borne in mind that Article 9 of the Sixth Directive contains rules for determining the place where services are deemed to be supplied for VAT purposes. Whereas Article 9(1) lays down a general rule in that regard, Article 9(2) sets out a number of specific instances of places where certain services are deemed to be supplied. The object of those provisions is to avoid, first, conflicts of jurisdiction which may result in double taxation, and, secondly, non-taxation (see Case 168/84 Berkholz  [1985] ECR 2251, paragraph 14; Case C‑327/94 Dudda  [1996] ECR I‑4595, paragraph 20; Case C‑167/95 Linthorst, Pouwels en Scheres  [1997] ECR I‑1195, paragraph 10; Case C‑452/03 RAL (Channel Islands) and Others  [2005] ECR I‑3947, paragraph 23; and Case C‑114/05 Gillan Beach  [2006] ECR I‑2427, paragraph 14).
25. It is appropriate also to note that, as regards the relationship between paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 9 of the Sixth Directive, the Court has held that Article 9(1) in no way takes precedence over Article 9(2). In every situation, the question which arises is whether that situation is covered by one of the instances mentioned in Article 9(2) of that directive. If not, it falls within the scope of Article 9(1) ( Dudda , paragraph 21; Linthorst, Pouwels en Scheres , paragraph 11; RAL (Channel Islands) and Others , paragraph 24; and Gillan Beach , paragraph 15).
Association nationale pour la protection des eaux et rivières - TOS v Ministère de l’Écologie, du Développement et de l’Aménagement durables.
Date: 2008-11-06
25. Not only must the authorisation laid down in Article 6(2) of Directive 2006/11 be prior to any discharge liable to contain any of the List II substances, it must also specify the emission standards, which are based on the environmental quality standards set out in a programme established by the Member State in accordance with Article 6(1) and (3). The Court has, however, held on numerous occasions that it follows from Article 7(2) of Directive 76/464, of which the wording is identical to that of Article 6(2) of Directive 2006/11, that authorisations must contain emission standards which are applicable to authorised individual discharges and which have been calculated in accordance with the quality objectives previously laid down in a programme established pursuant to Article 7(1) to protect the expanses of water and watercourses in question (see, inter alia, Case C-282/02 Commission  v Ireland  [2005] ECR I-4653, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited). The Court also stated, in connection with Article 7(2), that the quality objectives fixed by those programmes on the basis of analyses of the waters affected serve as the point of reference for calculating the emission standards set in the prior authorisations (see Case C-384/97 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-3823, paragraph 41).
26. It follows that prior authorisation within the meaning of Article 6(2) of Directive 2006/11 means that every request for authorisation for that purpose must be examined individually and cannot be tacit (see, with particular regard to Article 7 of Directive 76/464, Case C-230/00 Commission  v Belgium  [2001] ECR I-4591, paragraph 16).
Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Poland.
Date: 2008-11-13
36. It must be borne in mind that the obligation on all operators of public telecommunications networks to negotiate when requested by other undertakings so authorised, as is apparent from Article 4(1) of the Access directive, concerns interconnection which, in accordance with the definition provided in Article 2(b) of that directive, ‘is a specific type of access implemented between public network operators’. Contrary to Article 26 of the Law on telecommunications, this obligation therefore does not concern other forms of access to networks, such as those defined in Article 2(a) of the directive and those provided for in the Law on telecommunications.
62. It must be pointed out, first, that the regulatory tasks of the national regulatory authority are set out in Articles 8 to 13 of the Framework Directive. Article 8(1) thereof provides that Member States are to ensure that, in carrying out those tasks, the national regulatory authorities take all reasonable measures which are aimed at achieving the objectives set out in paragraphs 2 to 4 of that article.
63. Furthermore, the Court has interpreted Article 8 as placing on the Member States the obligation to ensure that the national regulatory authorities take all reasonable measures aimed at promoting competition in the provision of electronic communications services, ensuring that there is no distortion or restriction of competition in the electronic communications sector and removing remaining obstacles to the provision of those services at European level (Case C‑380/05 Centro Europa 7  [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 81).
64. Secondly, the first subparagraph of Article 5(1) of the Access Directive refers to the powers and responsibilities of the national regulatory authorities in respect of access and interconnection. It provides that, acting in pursuit of the objectives set out in Article 8 of the Framework Directive, those authorities are to encourage and where appropriate ensure adequate access and interconnection, and interoperability of services, while promoting efficiency, sustainable competition, and giving the maximum benefit to end-users.
67. Fourthly, it is to be remembered that, according to settled case-law, in proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations it is incumbent upon the Commission to prove the alleged failure. It is the Commission’s responsibility to place before the Court the information needed to enable the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled, (Case C-387/06 Commission  v Finland  [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats Ltd.
Date: 2008-11-20
15. It must be recalled that, to come within the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC, an agreement must have ‘as [its] object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market’. It has, since the judgment in Case 56/65 LTM  [1966] ECR 235, 249, been settled case-law that the alternative nature of that requirement, indicated by the conjunction ‘or’, leads, first, to the need to consider the precise purpose of the agreement, in the economic context in which it is to be applied. Where, however, an analysis of the clauses of that agreement does not reveal the effect on competition to be sufficiently deleterious, its consequences should then be considered and for it to be caught by the prohibition it is necessary to find that those factors are present which show that competition has in fact been prevented or restricted or distorted to an appreciable extent.
16. In deciding whether an agreement is prohibited by Article 81(1) EC, there is therefore no need to take account of its actual effects once it appears that its object is to prevent, restrict or distort competition within the common market (Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig  v Commission  [1966] ECR 299, 342, and Case C‑105/04 P Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied  v Commission  [2006] ECR I‑8725, paragraph 125). That examination must be made in the light of the agreement’s content and economic context (Joined Cases 29/83 and 30/83 Compagnie royale asturienne des mines and Rheinzink  v Commission [1984] ECR 1679, paragraph 26, and Case C‑551/03 P General Motors  v Commission  [2006] ECR I‑3173, paragraph 66).
17. The distinction between ‘infringements by object’ and ‘infringements by effect’ arises from the fact that certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition.
21. In fact, to determine whether an agreement comes within the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC, close regard must be paid to the wording of its provisions and to the objectives which it is intended to attain. In that regard, even supposing it to be established that the parties to an agreement acted without any subjective intention of restricting competition, but with the object of remedying the effects of a crisis in their sector, such considerations are irrelevant for the purposes of applying that provision. Indeed, an agreement may be regarded as having a restrictive object even if it does not have the restriction of competition as its sole aim but also pursues other legitimate objectives ( General Motors  v Commission , paragraph 64 and the case-law cited). It is only in connection with Article 81(3) EC that matters such as those relied upon by BIDS may, if appropriate, be taken into consideration for the purposes of obtaining an exemption from the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC.
Foselev Sud-Ouest SARL v Administration des douanes et droits indirects.
Date: 2008-11-20
11. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the Court has held, first, that it would be incompatible with the binding effect attributed to decisions by Article 189 of the EEC Treaty (which became Article 189 of the EC Treaty, now Article 249 EC) to exclude in principle the possibility that persons affected may invoke the obligation imposed by the decision and, secondly, that a provision of a decision addressed to a Member State may be relied on as against that Member State where the provision in question imposes on its addressee an obligation which is unconditional and sufficiently clear and precise (Case C-156/91 Hansa Fleisch Ernst Mundt  [1992] ECR I-5567, paragraphs 12 and 13 and the case-law cited).
16. Thus, the aim and effect of Decision 2005/449 is not to compel the French Republic to grant the exemption proposed in its request for authorisation, but to authorise it to make such an exemption if it so wishes.
Mirja Juuri v Fazer Amica Oy.
Date: 2008-11-27
23. That is consistent with the aim of Directive 2001/23, which is intended to achieve only partial harmonisation in the field in question, essentially by extending the protection guaranteed to employees independently under the laws of the individual Member States to cover the case where an undertaking is transferred. It is not intended to establish a uniform level of protection throughout the Community on the basis of common criteria. Thus Directive 2001/23 can be relied on only to ensure that the employee is protected in his relations with the transferee to the same extent as he was in his relations with the transferor under the legal rules of the Member State concerned (Case C-4/01 Martin and Others  [2003] ECR I-12859, paragraph 41).
26. However, it should also be borne in mind that the freedom to choose the ways and means of ensuring that a directive is implemented does not affect the obligation incumbent upon on all Member States to which the directive is addressed to adopt, in their national legal systems, all the measures necessary to ensure that the directive concerned is fully effective in accordance with the objective which it pursues (see Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann  [1984] ECR 1891, paragraph 15, and Case C-268/06 Impact  [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 40).
27. The Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by that directive, as well as their duty under Article 10 EC to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation, is binding on all the authorities of the Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts ( von Colson and Kamann , paragraph 26, and Impact , paragraph 41).
28. In that connection, it should be borne in mind that Directive 2001/23 is intended to safeguard the rights of employees in the event of a change of employer by allowing them to continue to work for the transferee employer on the same conditions as those agreed with the transferor (see, inter alia, Case 324/86 Tellerup (‘Daddy’s Dance Hall’)  [1988] ECR 739, paragraph 9, and Case C‑499/04 Werhof [2006] ECR I-2397, paragraph 25).
34. It follows that Article 3(3) of Directive 2001/23 does not require the transferee to ensure that the working conditions agreed with the transferor are observed after the date of expiry of the collective agreement, even though that date coincides with the date on which the undertaking was transferred.
Metherma GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Düsseldorf.
Date: 2008-11-27
39. In that regard, it should be recalled that a regulation specifying the conditions for classification in a tariff heading or subheading is of a legislative nature and cannot have retroactive effect (Case 158/78 Biegi [1979] ECR 1103, paragraph 11 and Case C-479/99 CBA Computer  [2001] ECR I‑4391, paragraph 31). In addition, the Court of Justice may deem it necessary to consider provisions of Community law to which the national court has not referred when formulating its question for a preliminary ruling (see, to that effect, Case 35/85 Tissier [1986] ECR 1207, paragraph 9; Case C-315/88 Bagli Pennacchiotti  [1990] ECR I‑1323, paragraph 10; Case C-107/98 Teckal  [1999] ECR I‑8121, paragraph 39; and Joined Cases C‑329/06 and C-343/06 Wiedemann and Funk , [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 45).
46. It is settled case-law of the Court that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see Case 145/81 Wünsche [1982] ECR 2493, paragraph 12; Case C‑15/05 Kawasaki Motors Europe [2006] ECR I‑3657, paragraph 38; and Case C‑310/06 FTS International  [2007] ECR I‑6749, paragraph 27).
47. In addition, the intended use of a product may constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (see Case C‑459/93 Thyssen Haniel Logistic  [1995] ECR I‑1381, paragraph 13; Case C‑201/99 Deutsche Nichimen  [2001] ECR I-2701, paragraph 20; and Case C-142/06 Olicom  [2007] ECR I‑6675, paragraph 18).
48. Furthermore, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law of the Court, the explanatory notes drawn up, as regards the CN, by the Commission and, as regards the HS, by the World Customs Organisation may be an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various headings but do not have legally binding force (see Case  C-35/93 Develop Dr. Eisbein  [1994] ECR I‑2655, paragraph 21, and Case C-400/05 B.A.S. Trucks  [2007] ECR I‑311, paragraph 28). The content of those notes must therefore be in accordance with the provisions of the CN and may not alter their meaning (Case C-280/97 ROSE Elektrotechnik  [1999] ECR I‑689, paragraph 23; Case C-495/03 Intermodal Transports  [2005] ECR I‑8151, paragraph 48; and Case C‑445/04 Possehl Erzkontor  [2005] ECR I‑10721, paragraph 20).