M. G. Eman and O. B. Sevinger v College van burgemeester en wethouders van Den Haag.
Date: 2006-09-12
43. However, neither Article 190 EC nor the 1976 Act defines expressly and precisely who are to be entitled to the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament.
45. It follows from those considerations that, in the current state of Community law, the definition of the persons entitled to vote and to stand for election falls within the competence of each Member State in compliance with Community law. It must, however, be ascertained whether that law precludes a situation such as that in the main proceedings, in which Netherlands nationals residing in Aruba do not have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament.
46. First, it should be noted that the OCTs are subject to the special association arrangements set out in Part Four of the Treaty (Articles 182 EC to 188 EC) with the result that, failing express reference, the general provisions of the Treaty do not apply to them (see Leplat , paragraph 10, and Netherlands  v Council , paragraph 49).
57. In that regard, it must be observed that the principle of equal treatment or non‑discrimination, which is one of the general principles of Community law, requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (Joined Cases C‑453/03, C‑11/04, C‑12/04 and C‑194/04 ABNA and Others  [2005] ECR I‑10423, paragraph 63, and Case C‑344/04 IATA and ELFAA [2006] ECR 1‑403, paragraph 95).
67. Thus, in the absence of Community legislation in respect of disputes relating to the right to vote and stand for election to the European Parliament, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the detailed procedural rules governing actions at law intended to safeguard the rights which individuals derive from Community law, provided, first, that those rules are not less favourable than those governing rights which originate in domestic law (principle of equivalence) and, second, that they do not render impossible or excessively difficult in practice the exercise of rights conferred by the Community legal order (principle of effectiveness) (see, in particular, Case C‑443/03 Leffler  [2005] ECR I‑9611, paragraphs 49 and 50).
69. In that context, it must also be recalled that the principle of liability on the part of a Member State for damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law for which it can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty, and that a Member State is thus required to make reparation for the damage caused where the rule of law infringed is intended to confer rights on individuals, the breach is sufficiently serious and there is a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the State and the damage sustained by the injured parties (Joined Cases C‑46/93 and C‑48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame  [1996] ECR I‑1029, paragraphs 31 and 51, and Case C‑224/01 Köbler  [2003] ECR 1‑10239, paragraphs 30 and 51), although this does not mean that the State cannot incur liability under less strict conditions on the basis of national law ( Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame , paragraph 66).
70. Subject to the right of reparation which flows directly from Community law where the conditions referred to in the previous paragraph are satisfied, it is on the basis of rules of national law on liability that the State must make reparation for the consequences of the loss and damage caused, provided that the conditions for reparation of loss and damage laid down by national law are not less favourable than those relating to similar domestic claims and are not so framed as to make it, in practice, impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation ( Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame , paragraph 67).