Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Christine Kleist.
Date: 2010-11-18
24. A preliminary point to note is that the conditions for payment of a retirement pension and the conditions governing termination of employment are separate issues (see, to this effect, Case 152/84 Marshall  [1986] ECR 723, paragraph 32).
26. The term ‘dismissal’ contained in that provision, a term which must be given a wide meaning, covers an age limit set for the compulsory dismissal of workers pursuant to an employer’s general policy concerning retirement, even if the dismissal involves the grant of a retirement pension (see, by analogy, Marshall , paragraph 34, and Case 262/84 Beets-Proper  [1986] ECR 773, paragraph 36).
28. It should be observed at the outset that the Court has held that a general policy concerning dismissal involving the dismissal of a female employee solely because she has attained or passed the qualifying age for a retirement pension, which age is different under national legislation for men and for women, constitutes discrimination on grounds of sex, contrary to Directive 76/207/EEC (see, to this effect, Marshall , paragraph 38).
34. The comparability of such situations must be examined having regard inter alia to the object of the rules establishing the difference in treatment (see, to this effect, Case C-19/02 Hlozek  [2004] ECR I‑11491, paragraph 46, and, by analogy, Case C-127/07 Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others [2008] ECR I‑9895, paragraph 26).
36. In the context of that case, contrary to the position in the cases which gave rise to the judgments in Case C-132/92 Roberts  [1993] ECR I‑5579 (paragraph 20) and in Hlozek  (paragraph 48), the advantage accorded to female workers of being able to claim a retirement pension from an age five years younger than that set for male workers is not directly connected with the object of the rules establishing a difference in treatment.
37. That advantage cannot place female workers in a specific situation vis-à-vis male workers, as men and women are in identical situations so far as concerns the conditions governing termination of employment (see, to this effect, Case 151/84 Roberts  [1986] ECR 703, paragraph 36).
39. The Court has repeatedly held that, given the fundamental importance of the principle of equal treatment, the exception to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex, provided for in that provision, must be interpreted strictly, so as to be applicable only to the determination of pensionable age for the purposes of granting old-age and retirement pensions and to the possible consequences thereof for other social security benefits (see, to this effect, Marshall , paragraph 36; Case C-207/04 Vergani  [2005] ECR I‑7453, paragraph 33; and Case C-423/04 Richards  [2006] ECR I‑3585, paragraph 36).
42. In those circumstances, given that (i) the difference in treatment established by rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings is directly on grounds of sex, whilst, as is apparent from paragraph 37 of the present judgment, the situations of men and women are identical in the present instance, and (ii) Directive 76/207 contains no exception, applicable in the present case, to the principle of equal treatment, it must be concluded that that difference in treatment constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex (see, to this effect, Vergani , paragraph 34).
44. As regards, finally, the possibility that there is discrimination on the grounds of age within the meaning of Directive 2000/78, it should be recalled that, in proceedings under Article 234 EC, it is solely for the national court, before which the dispute has been brought and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (see, inter alia, Case C-45/09 Rosenbladt  [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 32).