Proceedings brought by Khadija Jafari and Zainab Jafari.
Date: 2017-07-26
41


It follows, in particular, from Article 3(1) and Article 7(1) of the Dublin III Regulation that the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection is, in principle, the Member State indicated by the criteria set out in Chapter III of the regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 June 2016, Ghezelbash, C‑63/15, EU:C:2016:409, paragraph 42).
44


It follows from that provision that the concept of a ‘visa’, within the meaning of the Dublin III Regulation, covers not only short-stay visas and airport transit visas, the procedures and issuing conditions for which are harmonised by the Visa Code, but also long-stay visas, which do not fall within the scope of that code and may, given the current absence of general measures adopted by the EU legislature on the basis of Article 79(2)(a) TFEU, be issued in accordance with national legislation (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 March 2017, X and X, C‑638/16 PPU, EU:C:2017:173, paragraphs 41 and 44).
52


Furthermore, within the framework established by that legislation, the Member States taking part in its adoption are required to issue visas in a uniform format, in the form of a sticker, both as regards short-stay visas, in accordance with Articles 27 to 29 of the Visa Code, and long-stay visas, in accordance with Article 18(1) of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement. The issuing of a visa for the purposes of that legislation therefore takes a form different from that for the grant of leave to enter, which, in accordance with Article 10(1) of the Schengen Borders Code, takes the form of a stamp on a travel document.
63


As regards, in particular, the acts mentioned by the referring court, it should be noted, in the first place, that the Return Directive provides, in Article 3(2) thereof, a definition only of the concept of ‘illegal stay’, which is not to be confused with that of ‘illegal entry’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 June 2016, Affum, C‑47/15, EU:C:2016:408, paragraph 60).
69


In addition, the concept of an ‘irregular crossing’ of a border is used, in Article 13(1) of the Dublin III Regulation, in connection with the specific purpose of that regulation, namely to determine the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection. There is no connection between that purpose and the second sentence of Article 12(1) of the Schengen Borders Code, since that sentence explains the relationship between border surveillance and the implementation of the return procedures provided for in the Return Directive.
73


Consequently, since the Dublin III Regulation does not define that concept, its meaning and scope must, as the Court has consistently held, be determined by considering its usual meaning, while also taking into account the context in which it occurs and the purposes of the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 January 2014, Diakité, C‑285/12, EU:C:2014:39, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
101


In any event, it should be noted that, under the second subparagraph of Article 3(2) of the Dublin III Regulation and Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, an applicant for international protection must not be transferred to the Member State responsible where that transfer entails a genuine risk that the person concerned may suffer inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 February 2017, C. K. and Others, C‑578/16 PPU, EU:C:2017:127, paragraph 65). Such an applicant cannot therefore be transferred if, following the arrival of an unusually large number of third-country nationals seeking international protection, such a risk existed in the Member State responsible.