Kingdom of the Netherlands v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2001-11-22
43 It should be pointed out in this respect that Community legislation must be certain and its application foreseeable by those subject to it (see, to that effect, Case 325/85 Ireland v Commission [1987] ECR 5041, paragraph 18).
46 After exhaustion of a tariff quota such as that in the present case, the products concerned can still be imported but against payment of customs duties (see, to that effect, Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar [2000] ECR I-675, paragraph 45).
53 As regards application of the Agreement establishing the WTO and the agreements and memorandums annexed to it (the WTO agreements) within the Community legal order, it follows from the judgment in Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR I-8395, paragraphs 42 to 47, that, having regard to their nature and structure, the WTO agreements are not in principle among the rules in the light of which the Court is to review the legality of measures adopted by the Community institutions.
54 It also follows from that judgment that it is only where the Community intended to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the Community measure refers expressly to the precise provisions of the WTO agreements, that it is for the Court to review the legality of the Community measure in question in the light of the WTO rules (see Portugal v Council, cited above, paragraph 49).
61 It is useful to begin by recalling the nature of the association with the OCTs laid down by the Treaty. That association is the subject of arrangements defined in Part Four of the Treaty (Articles 131 to 136), with the result that, failing express reference, the general provisions of the Treaty do not apply to the OCTs (see Case C-260/90 Leplat [1992] ECR I-643, paragraph 10).
64 The scheme of association with the OCTs confers advantages on those countries and territories in order to further their economic and social development. Those advantages are reflected, in particular, in the customs exemptions applicable to products originating in the OCTs when they are imported into the Community (see Case C-430/92 Netherlands v Commission [1994] ECR I-5197, paragraph 22).
65 However, it is also apparent from the Court's case law that, when the Council adopts measures under the second paragraph of Article 136 of the Treaty, it must take account not only of the principles in Part Four of the Treaty but also of the other principles of Community law, including those relating to the common agricultural policy (Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission [1999] ECR I-769, paragraph 37, and Emesa Sugar, cited above, paragraph 38).
66 That conclusion is, moreover, consistent with Article 3(r) and Article 131 of the Treaty, which provide that the Community is to promote the economic and social development of the OCTs, but without that promotion implying an obligation to give them privileged treatment (see Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 38).
67 In weighing the various objectives laid down by the Treaty, the Council, which enjoys for that purpose a considerable margin of discretion reflecting the political responsibilities entrusted to it by Treaty articles such as Article 136, may be prompted, in case of need, to curtail certain advantages previously granted to the OCTs (see Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar, cited above, paragraph 39).
70 Moreover, contrary to the Netherlands Government's claim, the competence of the Council to adopt safeguard measures is not limited to the situation set out in Article 134 of the Treaty, that provision concerns only one particular situation. It is not intended to restrict the Council's general competence, contained in the second paragraph of Article 136 of the Treaty, to lay down the details of and procedure for the implementation of the association having regard to all of the principles set out in the Treaty (see, to that effect, Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 41).
73 It should first be borne in mind that it is apparent from the Court's case-law that the Community institutions have been given a wide discretion in the application of Article 109 of the OCT Decision (see, to that effect, Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 48).
74 In cases involving such a discretion, the Community courts must restrict themselves to considering whether the exercise of that discretion contains a manifest error or constitutes a misuse of power or whether the Community institutions clearly exceeded the bounds of their discretion (see Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 48; see also, to that effect, Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 207, paragraph 40, and Case C-189/01 Jippes and Others [2001] ECR I-5689, paragraph 80).
75 The Community court's review must be limited in particular if, as in the present case, the Community institutions have to reconcile divergent interests and thus to select options within the context of the policy choices which are their own responsibility (see, to that effect, Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar, cited above, paragraph 53).
The quantities of rice originating in the OCTs imported into the Community
105 Given the Community institutions' wide discretion in the application of Article 109 of the OCT Decision, and the fact that that discretion can be exercised not only in relation to the nature and scope of the provisions which are to be adopted but also, to a certain extent, to the findings as to the basic facts (see, to that effect, Case C-150/94 United Kingdom v Council [1998] ECR I-7235, paragraph 55, and Case C-289/97 Eridania [2000] ECR I-5409, paragraph 48), it cannot be concluded that the Council committed a manifest error in its assessment of the information available to it when Regulation No 1036/97 was adopted.
131 It should be recalled in that respect that, according to settled case-law, in order to establish whether a provision of Community law complies with the principle of proportionality, it must be ascertained whether the means which it employs are suitable for the purpose of achieving the desired objective and whether they do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it (Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament and Council [1997] ECR I-2405, paragraph 54; Case C-284/95 Safety Hi-Tech [1998] ECR I-4301, paragraph 57; and Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 52).
135 As for the argument of the Netherlands Government that the introduction of a minimum price would have inflicted less disturbance on the economy of the OCTs and would have been just as effective in achieving the objectives pursued, it should be pointed out that, whilst ensuring that the rights of the OCTs are respected, the Community court cannot, without running the risk of overriding the wide discretion of the Council, substitute its assessment for that of the Council as to the choice of the most appropriate measure to prevent disruption of the Community market in rice if those measures have not been proved to be manifestly inappropriate for achieving the objective pursued (see, to that effect, Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-4973, paragraph 94 and Jippes and Others, cited above, paragraph 83).
145 Second, as stated at paragraph 74 of the present judgment, in cases involving such a discretion, the Community court must restrict itself to considering whether the exercise of that discretion contains a manifest error or constitutes a misuse of power or whether the Community institutions clearly exceeded the bounds of their discretion.
153 As the Court has repeatedly held, a measure is only vitiated by misuse of powers if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence to have been taken with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that stated or evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case (see Case 69/83 Lux v Court of Auditors [1984] ECR 2447, paragraph 30; Case C-331/88 Fedesa and Others [1990] ECR I-4023, paragraph 24; Case C-156/93 Parliament v Commission [1995] ECR I-2019, paragraph 31, and Case C-48/96 P Windpark Groothusen v Commission [1998] ECR I-2873, paragraph 52).
168 In the present case, whilst it is true that, in the application, the applicant confined itself to two grounds on which it claimed that Annex IV of the OCT Decision had been breached, the fact remains that the applicant was entitled to develop that plea and to set out any relevant further details in the reply, which is exactly what it did in introducing arguments concerning the consultation of the committee, provided for by Article 1(2) of that annex, and of the OCTs (see, to that effect, Case 74/74 CNTA v Commission [1975] ECR 533, paragraph 4).
169 Furthermore, as is apparent from the case-law of the Court, a plea which may be regarded as amplifying a plea made previously, whether directly or by implication, in the original application must be considered admissible (Case 306/81 Verros v Parliament [1983] ECR 1755, paragraphs 9 and 10).
187 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty must be appropriate to the nature of the measure in question. It must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the institution which enacted the measure so as to inform the persons concerned of the justification for the measure adopted and to enable the Court to exercise its powers of review (see Joined Cases C-63/90 and C-67/90 Portugal and Spain v Council [1992] ECR I-5073, paragraph 16; Case C-353/92 Greece v Council [1994] ECR I-3411, paragraph 19; and Joined Cases C-9/95, C-23/95 and C-156/95 Belgium and Germany v Commission [1997] ECR I-645, paragraph 44).
188 It is not necessary, however, for details of all relevant factual and legal aspects to be given, in so far as the question whether the statement of grounds for a decision meets the requirements of Article 190 of the Treaty must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. This is a fortiori the case where the Member States have been closely associated with the process of drafting the contested measure and are thus aware of the reasons underlying that measure (see Case C-478/93 Netherlands v Commission [1995] ECR I-3081, paragraphs 49 and 50, and Case C-466/93 Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others II [1995] ECR I-3799, paragraph 16).
189 Furthermore, in the case of a measure intended to have general application the preamble may be limited to indicating the general situation which led to its adoption, on the one hand, and the general objectives which it is intended to achieve, on the other (Case C-284/94 Spain v Council [1998] ECR I-7309, paragraph 28).
190 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held that if the contested measure clearly discloses the essential objective pursued by the institution, it would be excessive to require a specific statement of reasons for the various technical choices made (see, in particular, Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others II, paragraph 16, and Spain v Council, paragraph 30).
191 That is all the more so where, as in the present case, the Community institutions enjoy a wide margin of discretion in their choice of the means necessary to achieve a complex policy (see, to that effect, Spain v Council, cited above, paragraph 33).