larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
AK v Achmea Schadeverzekeringen NV and Stichting Achmea Rechtsbijstand.
Date: 2016-04-07
20


In the second place, according to settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgments in St. Nikolaus Brennerei und Likörfabrik, 337/82, EU:C:1984:69, paragraph 10; VEMW and Others, C‑17/03, EU:C:2005:362, paragraph 41; and Eschig, C‑199/08, EU:C:2009:538, paragraph 38).
21


In that regard, it is to be noted that the objective pursued by Directive 87/344, in particular Article 4 thereof, concerning the free choice of lawyer or representative, is to protect, broadly, the interests of insured persons. The general scope and obligatory nature that the right of the insured party to choose his lawyer or representative is recognised to possess militate against a restrictive interpretation of Article 4(1)(a) of that directive (see, to that effect, judgments in Eschig, C‑199/08, EU:C:2009:538, paragraphs 45 and 47, and Sneller, C‑442/12, EU:C:2013:717, paragraph 24).
24


Such an interpretation cannot be called into question by the argument of the defendants in the main proceedings that a broad interpretation of the right to a free choice of lawyer or representative would transform all legal expenses insurance into insurance based on the principle of ‘covering costs’, within the meaning of Article 3(2)(c) of Directive 87/344. The Court has previously held that the measures provided for in Article 3(2)(a) and (b) of Directive 87/344 retain their scope even in the case in which an independent right for the person with legal expenses insurance freely to choose his representative is inferred from Article 4(1)(a) of that directive (see, to that effect, judgment in Eschig, C‑199/08, EU:C:2009:538, paragraph 49).
25


Furthermore, as regards the possible financial consequences for legal expenses insurance schemes, it must be recalled that, even if such financial consequences could arise, they may not lead to a restrictive interpretation of Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 87/344. Directive 87/344 does not seek the complete harmonisation of the Member States’ legal expenses insurance contracts, and the Member States remain free, as EU law currently stands, to determine the body of rules applicable to those contracts, on condition that the principles laid down by that directive are not rendered meaningless (see, to that effect, judgment in Stark, C‑293/10, EU:C:2011:355, paragraph 31). Thus, the exercise by the insured person of the right to choose his representative does not mean that, in certain cases, limitations may not be set on the costs to be borne by the insurer (see judgment in Sneller, C‑442/12, EU:C:2013:717, paragraph 26).
Office national de l'emploi (ONEm) v M and M v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) and Caisse auxiliaire de paiement des allocations de chômage (CAPAC).
Date: 2016-04-07
26


In that respect, it must be recalled that it is settled case-law that a person seeking employment who has never been subject to the social security legislation of the Member State in which he claims unemployment benefits and thus has not completed, lastly, periods of insurance or of employment in accordance with the provisions of the legislation of that Member State cannot be entitled to unemployment benefits under Article 67 of Regulation No 1408/71 (see judgments in van Noorden, C‑272/90, EU:C:1991:219, paragraph 10; Martínez Losada and Others, C‑88/95, C‑102/95 and C‑103/95, EU:C:1997:69, paragraph 36; and the order in Verwayen-Boelen, C‑175/00, EU:C:2002:133, paragraph 26).
28


It is clear from the Court’s case-law that, in the context of Regulation No 1408/71, the taking into account by a Member State of periods of employment or insurance completed by the persons concerned under the legislation of another Member State for the purposes of the award of unemployment benefit is governed solely by Article 67 of that regulation (see judgment in Martínez Losada and Others, C‑88/95, C‑102/95 and C‑103/95, EU:C:1997:69, paragraph 27; and order in Verwayen-Boelen, C‑175/00, EU:C:2002:133, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, Article 3 of that regulation is not applicable where the same regulation contains specific provisions such as Article 67, which governs the entitlement of unemployed persons to unemployment benefits (see, to that effect, judgment in Adanez-Vega, C‑372/02, EU:C:2004:705, paragraph 57).
31


In that respect, it must be recalled, in the first place, that Article 48 TFEU does not prohibit the EU legislature from attaching conditions to the rights and advantages which it accords in order to ensure the freedom of movement for workers enshrined in Article 45 TFEU or from determining the limits thereto and, in the second place, that the Council of the European Union made proper use of its discretion in attaching such conditions, inter alia, to Article 67(3) of Regulation No 1408/71, which is designed to encourage unemployed persons to seek work in the Member State where they last paid unemployment insurance contributions, and to make that State bear the burden of providing the unemployment benefits (see, to that effect, judgment in Gray, C‑62/91, EU:C:1992:177, paragraphs 11 and 12).
33


As to whether Article 67(3) of Regulation No 1408/71 complies with Article 15(2) of the Charter, it must be borne in mind that Article 52(2) of the Charter provides that rights recognised by the Charter for which provision is made in the treaties are to be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined in the treaties. In that vein, Article 15(2) of the Charter reiterates inter alia the free movement of workers guaranteed by Article 45 TFEU, as the explanations relating to that provision confirm (OJ 2007, C 303, p. 17) (see judgment in Gardella, C‑233/12, EU:C:2013:449, paragraph 39).
Netherlands Maritime Technology Association, formerly Scheepsbouw Nederland v European Commission.
Date: 2016-04-14
It must also be stated, with respect to, in particular, the argument that the General Court failed to take into consideration
         the differentiation between leasing companies and certain investors, that the reasoning followed by the General Court, in
         paragraphs 91 to 101 of the judgment under appeal, necessarily implies the rejection of the arguments put forward by the appellant.
         Since the General Court is not required to reply exhaustively to each of the arguments put forward before it by the parties,
         it cannot be criticised of not having stated reasons for its findings (see, to that effect, the judgment in Gogos v Commission, C‑583/08 P, EU:C:2010:287, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
As regards the first argument, it must be recalled that, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, in proceedings for
         annulment, the General Court cannot substitute its own reasoning for that of the author of the contested act (see judgments
         in DIR International Film and Others v Commission, C‑164/98 P, EU:C:2000:48, paragraph 38, and British Aggregates v Commission, C‑487/06 P, EU:C:2008:757, paragraph 141).
Further, the obligation to state reasons does not require the General Court to provide an account which follows exhaustively
         and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case, and the reasoning may therefore be implicit on condition
         that it enables the persons concerned to know why the General Court has not upheld their arguments and provides the Court
         of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (see judgment in FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission, C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 P, EU:C:2008:476, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited).
It must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the concept of ‘State aid’ does not refer to State measures
         which differentiate between undertakings and which are, therefore, prima facie selective where that differentiation arises
         from the nature or the overall structure of the system of which they are part (judgments in Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, C‑106/09 P and C‑107/09 P, EU:C:2011:732, paragraph 145 and the case-law cited, and BNP Paribas and BNL v Commission, C‑452/10 P, EU:C:2012:366, paragraph 101). In carrying out the necessary comprehensive review of the characterisation of
         the tax scheme at issue as State aid, the General Court had to examine whether the differentiation between undertakings arising
         from that scheme was due to the nature or general scheme of the tax system of which it formed part (judgment in BNP Paribas and BNL v Commission, C‑452/10 P, EU:C:2012:366, paragraph 102).
Envirotec Denmark ApS v Skatteministeriet.
Date: 2016-05-26
27


According to the Court’s settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objective pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments of 26 January 2012 in ADV Allround, C‑218/10, EU:C:2012:35, paragraph 26, and of 19 July 2012 in A, C‑33/11, EU:C:2012:482, paragraph 27 and the case law cited). Similarly, the meaning and scope of terms for which EU law provides no definition must be determined by reference to their usual meaning in everyday language, while account is also taken of the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 December 2012 in BLV Wohn- und Gewerbebau, C‑395/11, EU:C:2012:799, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
28


In addition, where the various language versions differ, the scope of the provision in question cannot be determined on the basis of an interpretation which is exclusively textual, but must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 March 2005 in Fonden Marselisborg Lystbådehavn, C‑428/02, EU:C:2005:126, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited, and of 13 June 2013 in Promociones y Construcciones BJ 200, C‑125/12, EU:C:2013:392, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
33


In the second place, with regard to the context in which Article 198(2) of the VAT Directive occurs, it must be recalled that that provision enables Member States to introduce, in the situations referred to in that article, a reverse charge mechanism whereby the person liable for payment of VAT is the person who is the recipient of the transaction subject to that tax. That provision is therefore an exception to the general rule set out in Article 193 of that directive that VAT is payable by any taxable person carrying out a taxable supply of goods or services. It must therefore be interpreted strictly, without, however, rendering it ineffective (see, by analogy, judgment of 13 June 2013 in Promociones y Construcciones BJ 200, C‑125/12, EU:C:2013:392, paragraphs 23 and 31 and the case-law cited).
Rose Vision, SL v European Commission.
Date: 2016-05-26
24


It should be noted in that regard that, according to settled case-law, the statement of the reasons on which the judgment is based must clearly and unequivocally disclose the General Court’s thinking, so that the persons concerned can be apprised of the justification for the decision taken and the Court of Justice can exercise its power of review (see, inter alia, the judgment of 11 June 2015 in EMA v Commission, C‑100/14P, not published, EU:C:2015:382, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).
25


However, the obligation to state reasons does not require the General Court to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case and the reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the General Court has not upheld their arguments and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (judgments of 22 October 2014 in British Telecommunications v Commission, C‑620/13 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2309, paragraph 56 and of 11 June 2015 in EMA v Commission, C‑100/14 P, not published, EU:C:2015:382, paragraph 75).
26


The question whether the grounds of a judgment of the General Court are contradictory or inadequate is a question of law which is amenable, as such, to judicial review on appeal (see, inter alia, judgment of 19 December 2012 in Planet v Commission, C‑314/11 P, EU:C:2012:823, paragraph 63).
31


Therefore, it must be concluded that the statement of reasons in the judgment under appeal does not make apparent in a clear and comprehensible manner the reasoning of the General Court (see, in that regard, judgment of 19 December 2012 in Commission v Planet, C‑314/11 P, EU:C:2012:823, paragraph 66), which did not at any point explain why the appellant’s complaints challenging the conclusions of the audit report at issue did not permit those conclusions to be called into question. In those circumstances, the grounds of the judgment under appeal do not enable the interested parties to ascertain the reasons for that judgment nor the Court to exercise its power of review. In particular, such a statement of reasons, drafted in an apodictical manner, prevents the Court from reviewing whether the reasoning underlying the decision taken by the General Court is vitiated by contradiction.
33


Consequently, the second ground of appeal should be upheld and it is not necessary to examine the other grounds put forward by the appellant in support of its appeal (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 October 2013 in Isdin v Bial-Portela, C‑597/12 P, EU:C:2013:672, paragraph 30) in order to declare that appeal well-founded.
GD European Land Systems – Steyr GmbH v Zollamt Eisenstadt Flughafen Wien.
Date: 2016-05-26
27


When the Court is requested to give a preliminary ruling on a matter of tariff classification, its task is to provide the national court with guidance on the criteria which will enable the latter to classify the products at issue correctly in the CN, rather than to effect that classification itself, a fortiori since the Court does not necessarily have available to it all the information which is essential in that regard (judgments of 7 November 2002 in Lohmann and Medi Bayreuth, C‑260/00 to C‑263/00, EU:C:2002:637, paragraph 26, and 22 November 2012 in Digitalnet and Others, C‑320/11, C‑330/11, C‑382/11 and C‑383/11, EU:C:2012:745, paragraph 61).
28


The Court has, moreover, held that the general rules for the interpretation of the CN provide that the classification of goods is to be determined according to the terms of the headings and any section or chapter notes, the titles of sections, chapters and sub-chapters being provided for ease of reference only (judgments of 12 June 2014 in Lukoyl Neftohim Burgas, C-330/13, EU:C:2014:1757, paragraph 33, and 11 June 2015 in Baby Dan, C-272/14, EU:C:2015:388, paragraph 25).
29


It also follows from settled case-law of the Court that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties, as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and of the notes to the section or chapters (see, inter alia, judgments of 16 February 2006 in Proxxon, C‑500/04, EU:C:2006:111, paragraph 21, and 5 March 2015 in Vario Tek, C‑178/14, EU:C:2015:152, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
34


It must be possible to verify the ‘sole’ or ‘principal’ intended use of the turret system at the time of customs clearance and, therefore, when the application for release for free circulation of such goods is being considered (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 2015 in ALKA, C‑635/13, EU:C:2015:268, paragraph 37).
39


The Court has already held, in that regard, in relation to parts and accessories of machines, appliances and instruments, that the notion of ‘parts’ implies the existence of a whole machine for which those parts are essential for it to function and that the notion of ‘accessories’ implies an interchangeable part designed to adapt a machine for a particular operation, or to increase its range of operations, or to perform a particular service relative to the main function of the machine. In order to ensure a consistent and uniform application of the Common Customs Tariff, it must be possible to apply those definitions to heading 9305 of the CN, and in particular to subheading 9305 91 00 thereof (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 March 2015 in Oliver Medical, C‑547/13, EU:C:2015:139, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).
Valsts ieņēmumu dienests v SIA "Latvijas propāna gāze".
Date: 2016-05-26
15


In its judgment of 10 April 2014, that court referred, first, to the case-law of the Court of Justice, according to which in carrying out the tariff classification of goods it is necessary to identify, from among the materials of which they are composed, that which gives them their essential character. This may be done by determining whether the goods would retain their characteristic properties if one or other of their constituents were removed from them. The factor which determines the essential character of the goods may, depending on the type of goods, be determined, for example, by the nature of the constituent material or components, its bulk, quantity, weight or value, or the role of a constituent material in relation to the use of those goods (judgment in Kloosterboer Services, C‑173/08, EU:C:2009:382, paragraphs 31 and 32).
32


It is settled case-law of the Court that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties, as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and of the notes to the sections or chapters (judgments in Wünsche, 145/81, EU:C:1982:254, paragraph 12; Wiener SI, C‑338/95, EU:C:1997:552, paragraph 10; Intermodal Transports, C‑495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 47; Heuschen & Schrouff Oriëntal Foods Trading, C‑375/07, EU:C:2008:645, paragraph 43; and TSI, C‑183/15, EU:C:2015:808, paragraph 24).
33


The objective characteristics and properties of products must be capable of being assessed at the time of customs clearance (judgments in Foods Import, C‑38/95, EU:C:1996:488, paragraph 17; Medion and Canon Deutschland, C‑208/06 and C‑209/06, EU:C:2007:553, paragraph 36; and ALKA, C‑635/13, EU:C:2015:268, paragraph 37).
European Commission v Portuguese Republic.
Date: 2016-06-02
48


Even if it were true that, as the Portuguese Republic submits, ANA has never brought any pressure to bear in practice and that the National Institute for Civil Aviation, as the regulatory body for the civil aviation sector in Portugal, has never received the slightest complaint relating to the actions of the coordinator, such factual claims are ineffective as regards whether the Portuguese Republic has laid down the rules of law necessary to ensure that the coordinator is independent of any single interested party.
Eurogate Distribution GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt and DHL Hub Leipzig GmbH v Hauptzollamt Braunschweig.
Date: 2016-06-02
65


However, in the case in the main proceedings, it is not disputed that the non-fulfilment of that obligation was noticed after the relevant goods had been re-exported. As a result, those goods were covered by the customs warehouse procedure until they were re-exported and it is not disputed that there was no risk of them entering the European Union’s economic network. As the Advocate General stated in point 97 of his Opinion, in addition to the customs debt, there may also be a requirement to pay VAT where, based on the particular unlawful conduct which gave rise to the customs debt, it can be presumed that the goods entered the economic network of the Union and, consequently, that they may have undergone consumption, that is, the act on which VAT is levied.
66


Thus, since the goods at issue in the main proceedings had not yet left those arrangements at the date they were re-exported, even though they had been physically introduced into the territory of the European Union, they cannot have been the subject matter of an ‘importation’ within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Sixth Directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 November 2012 in Profitube, C‑165/11, EU:C:2012:692, paragraph 46).
67


Consequently, in the absence of importation at the date of the facts of the dispute in the main proceedings, the goods at issue were not subject to VAT under Article 2(2) of the Sixth Directive (judgment of 8 November 2012 in Profitube, C‑165/11, EU:C:2012:692, paragraph 48).
78


Therefore, since the goods at issue in the main proceedings had not yet left that arrangement at the date of their re-exportation, even though they had been physically introduced into the territory of the Union, they cannot be considered to have been the subject matter of an ‘importation’ within the meaning of Article 2(1)(d) of the VAT Directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 November 2012, Profitube, C‑165/11, EU:C:2012:692, paragraph 46).
79


Consequently, in the absence of importation at the date of the facts of the dispute in the main proceedings, the goods at issue were not subject to VAT under Article 2(1)(d) of the VAT Directive (judgment of 8 November 2012 in Profitube, C‑165/11, EU:C:2012:692, paragraph 48).
81


Moreover, the Court has already held that Article 4(10) of the Customs Code must be interpreted as meaning that import duties do not include the VAT to be levied on the importation of goods (judgment of 29 July 2010, Pakora Pluss, C‑248/09, EU:C:2010:457, paragraph 47).