larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Konrad Erzberger v TUI AG.
Date: 2017-07-18
25


According to settled case-law, noted by the Advocate General in point 39 of his Opinion, Article 18 TFEU, which enshrines the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, is intended to apply independently only to situations governed by EU law in respect of which the Treaty lays down no specific prohibition of discrimination (judgment of 4 September 2014, Schiebel Aircraft, C‑474/12, EU:C:2014:2139, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
26


Article 45(2) TFEU provides, in favour of employees, for specific rules governing non-discrimination on the basis of nationality in respect of employment conditions.
27


It follows that the situation of employees referred to in paragraph 24 of the present judgment must be examined solely on the basis of Article 45 TFEU.
33


According to the Court’s settled case-law, all the provisions of the Treaty on freedom of movement for persons are intended to facilitate the pursuit by Union nationals of occupational activities of all kinds throughout the EU, and preclude measures which might place Union nationals at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an activity in the territory of a Member State other than their Member State of origin. In that context, nationals of the Member States have in particular the right, which they derive directly from the Treaty, to leave their Member State of origin to enter the territory of another Member State and reside there in order to pursue an activity there. As a result, Article 45 TFEU precludes any national measure which is capable of hindering or rendering less attractive the exercise by Union nationals of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by that article (see, to that effect, judgments of 1 April 2008, Government of the French Community and Walloon Government, C‑212/06, EU:C:2008:178, paragraphs 44 and 45, and of 10 March 2011, Casteels, C‑379/09, EU:C:2011:131, paragraphs 21 and 22).
34


However, primary EU law cannot guarantee to a worker that moving to a Member State other than his Member State of origin will be neutral in terms of social security, since, given the disparities between the Member States’ social security schemes and legislation, such a move may be more or less advantageous for the person concerned in that regard (see, by analogy, judgments of 26 April 2007, Alevizos, C‑392/05, EU:C:2007:251, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited, and of 13 July 2016, Pöpperl, C‑187/15, EU:C:2016:550, paragraph 24).
35


Therefore, as the Advocate General in essence stated in points 75 and 78 of his Opinion, Article 45 TFEU does not grant to that worker the right to rely, in the host Member State, on the conditions of employment which he enjoyed in the Member State of origin under the national legislation of the latter State.
Landeskrankenanstalten-Betriebsgesellschaft - KABEG v Mutuelles du Mans assurances - MMA IARD SA.
Date: 2017-07-20
27


In that connection, it must be recalled that Section 3 of Chapter 2 of that regulation establishes an autonomous system for the conferral of jurisdiction in matters of insurance (judgment of 12 May 2005, Société financière et industrielle de Peloux, C‑112/03, EU:C:2005:280, paragraph 29).
28


In the same way as matters relating to workers and consumers, and as is clear from recital 13 of Regulation No 44/2001, a matter relating to insurance is characterised by a certain imbalance between the parties (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 May 2005, GIE Réunion européenne and Others, C‑77/04, EU:C:2005:327, paragraph 22) that the provisions of that section aim to correct by enabling the weaker party to benefit from rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests than the general rules provide for (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 September 2009, Vorarlberger Gebietskrankenkasse, C‑347/08, EU:C:2009:561, paragraph 40).
29


The questions of the referring court as to the classification of an employer, which is the statutory assignee of the injured party’s rights, as the ‘weaker party’ arise from the finding made by the Court that a social security institution, which is the statutory assignee of the rights of the person directly injured in a car accident cannot be classified as such, whereas a person to whom the rights of the person directly injured have passed, such as an heir, may be (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 September 2009, Vorarlberger Gebietskrankenkasse, C‑347/08, EU:C:2009:561, paragraphs 42 and 44).
33


It should also be recalled that the Court has held that the purpose of the reference in Article 11(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 is to add injured parties to the list of plaintiffs contained in Article 9(1)(b) of that regulation, without restricting the category of persons having suffered damage to those suffering it directly (judgments of 13 December 2007, FBTO Schadeverzekeringen, C‑463/06, EU:C:2007:792, paragraph 26, and of 17 September 2009, Vorarlberger Gebietskrankenkasse, C‑347/08, EU:C:2009:561, paragraph 27).
34


Furthermore, as the referring court observed in its order for reference, a case-by-case assessment of the question whether an employer which continues to pay the salary may be regarded as the economically weaker party in order to be covered by the definition of ‘injured party’ within the meaning of Article 11(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, would give rise to the risk of legal uncertainty and would be contrary to the objective of that regulation, laid down in recital 11 thereof, according to which the rules of jurisdiction must be highly predictable.
35


Therefore, it must be held that, pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, employers to which the rights of their employees to compensation have passed may, as persons which have suffered damage and whatever their size and legal form, rely on the rules of special jurisdiction laid down in Articles 8 to 10 of that regulation.
„Gelvora“ UAB v Valstybinė vartotojų teisių apsaugos tarnyba.
Date: 2017-07-20
19


As regards, first of all, the question whether a debt collection activity is liable to fall within the scope of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, it should be borne in mind, first, that Article 2(d) of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive defines, using a particularly broad formulation, the concept of ‘commercial practices’ as ‘any act, omission, course of conduct or representation, commercial communication including advertising and marketing, by a trader, directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers’ (judgment of 19 September 2013, CHS Tour Services, C‑435/11, EU:C:2013:574, paragraph 27).
Hannele Hälvä and Others v SOS-Lapsikylä ry.
Date: 2017-07-26
25


As a preliminary point, it must be observed that, save in the special case envisaged by Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88 concerning annual paid holidays, that directive is limited to regulating certain aspects of the organisation of working time in order to protect the safety and health of workers so that, generally, it does not apply to the remuneration of workers (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2015, Federación de Servicios Privados del sindicato Comisiones obreras, C‑266/14, EU:C:2015:578, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
31


According to settled case-law, the derogation laid down in Article 17(1) of Directive 2003/88 must be interpreted in such a way so as to limit its scope to what is strictly necessary to safeguard the interests whose protection the derogation permits (judgments of 9 September 2003, Jaeger, C‑151/02, EU:C:2003:437, paragraph 89, and of 14 October 2010, Union syndicale Solidaires Isère, C‑428/09, EU:C:2010:612, paragraph 40).
32


The Court has also held that Article 17(1) applies to workers whose working time, as a whole, is not measured or predetermined, or can be determined by the workers themselves on account of the specific characteristics of the activity carried out (judgments of 7 September 2006, Commission v United Kingdom, C‑484/04, EU:C:2006:526, paragraph 20, and of 14 October 2010, Union syndicale Solidaires Isère, C‑428/09, EU:C:2010:612, paragraph 41).
33


In that connection, when determining the specific circumstances of the case, the referring court must, as the Advocate General noted in point 68 of his Opinion, take account of the fact that the working time of a ‘relief parent’ is largely predetermined by the contract of employment and by the employer, since the number of 24 hour periods he must work every year is fixed by contract. Furthermore, that court must also take account of the fact that, at regular intervals, that employer draws up in advance lists indicating the 24 hour periods during which the ‘relief parent’ is responsible for running a children’s home.
41


On the other hand, it must be observed that any period during which the worker is at work, at the employer’s disposal and carrying out his activity or duties, in accordance with national laws and/or practices must be considered to be ‘working time’ within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/88 (judgment of 10 September 2015, Federación de Servicios Privados del sindicato Comisiones obreras, C‑266/14, EU:C:2015:578, paragraph 25).
42


Thus, the periods of inactivity within the 24 hour periods during which the ‘relief parent’ is in charge of the children’s home are part of the performance of that worker’s duties and are working hours where the ‘relief parent’ is required to be physically present at the place determined by the employer and to be available to the employer in order to be able to provide the appropriate services immediately in case of need (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 December 2005, Dellas and Others, C‑14/04, EU:C:2005:728, paragraph 48, and order of 11 January 2007, Vorel, C‑437/05, EU:C:2007:23, paragraph 28).
Superfoz - Supermercados Lda v Fazenda Pública.
Date: 2017-07-26
28


It should be recalled at the outset that the Court has consistently held that the fact that a question submitted by the referring court refers only to certain provisions of EU law does not mean that the Court may not provide it with all the guidance on points of interpretation that may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to those points in its questions. It is, in that regard, for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the referring court, in particular from the grounds of the decision to refer, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject matter of the dispute (see, inter alia, judgment of 7 March 2017, X and X, C‑638/16 PPU, EU:C:2017:173, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
33


Article 27 of that regulation specifically concerns fees and charges. Under paragraph 1 thereof, Member States may collect fees or charges solely in order to ‘cover the costs occasioned by official controls’. Thus, the fees or charges referred to in that article may be intended to cover only the costs which the Member States actually incur in performing controls in food establishments (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 March 2016, Kødbranchens Fællesråd, C‑112/15, EU:C:2016:185, paragraph 39).
34


In accordance with the wording of Article 26 of Regulation No 882/2004, read in the light of recital 32 of that regulation, Member States have a broad discretion to make available, in particular in the context of their general taxation, adequate financial resources to provide the necessary staff and other resources for official controls. On the other hand, that discretion is governed by the harmonised rules laid down in Article 27 of Regulation No 882/2004, where Member States decide to impose the fees or charges referred to in that article on operators (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 March 2016, Kødbranchens Fællesråd, C‑112/15, EU:C:2016:185, paragraphs 31 and 32).
47


Even assuming that a tax exemption for certain undertakings constitutes an aid measure within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, the possible unlawfulness of the aid is not such as to affect the legality of the charge in respect of which those undertakings are exempt. In that regard, the Court has held that businesses liable to pay a tax cannot rely on the argument that the exemption enjoyed by other businesses constitutes State aid in order to avoid payment of that tax (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 October 2005, Distribution Casino France and Others, C‑266/04 to C‑270/04, C‑276/04 and C‑321/04 to C‑325/04, EU:C:2005:657, paragraphs 42 and 43 and the case-law cited).
French Republic v Carl Schlyter.
Date: 2017-09-07
45


In this respect, it must be noted that the concept of investigation, appearing in the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, is an autonomous concept of EU law which must be interpreted taking into account, inter alia, its usual meaning as well as the context in which it occurs (see, by analogy, judgments of 9 March 2010, Commission v Germany, C‑518/07, EU:C:2010:125, paragraph 18 and of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 50).
61


According to the Court’s well-established case-law, in order to justify refusal of access to a document the disclosure of which has been requested, it is not sufficient, in principle, for that document to be covered by an activity mentioned in Article 4(2) and (3) of Regulation No 1049/2001. The institution concerned must also provide explanations as to how access to that document could specifically and actually undermine the interest protected by an exception laid down in that article (judgment of 27 February 2014, Commission v EnBW, C‑365/12 P, EU:C:2014:112, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).
69


As regards that objective of Directive 98/34, the General Court recalled, in paragraphs 37 and 85 of the judgment under appeal, the settled case-law of the Court of Justice according to which that directive protects, by means of preventive monitoring, the free movement of goods and services and the freedom of establishment of service operators, which form part of the foundations of the European Union, and that this control serves a useful purpose in that technical regulations falling within the scope of that directive may constitute obstacles to trade in goods between Member States, such obstacles being permissible only if they are necessary to satisfy compelling requirements relating to the public interest (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2014, Ivansson and Others, C‑307/13, EU:C:2014:2058, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
79


This conclusion is supported by the case-law of the Court of Justice according to which Directive 98/34 aims to enable economic operators to be apprised of the extent of the obligations that may be imposed on them and to anticipate the adoption of those texts by adapting, if necessary, their products or services in a timely manner (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 February 2016, Ince, C‑336/14, EU:C:2016:72, paragraph 83).
Hüttenwerke Krupp Mannesmann GmbH v Hauptzollamt Duisburg.
Date: 2017-09-07
23


It is therefore necessary to consider not only the terms of the third indent of Article 2(4)(b) of Directive 2003/96, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it forms part (see, inter alia, judgment of 10 September 2014, Holger Forstmann Transporte, C‑152/13, EU:C:2014:2184, paragraph 26).
26


As the Commission stated in its observations, it is because of the interchangeability of energy products and electricity that the legislature of the European Union chose to reserve a treatment similar to those products, for the purpose of defining the scope of application of Directive 2003/96 and, therefore, for the purposes of their taxation in accordance with that directive. Determining the material scope of that directive in such a way makes it possible to lay down minimum overall levels of taxation at EU level both for energy products and electricity and is ultimately aimed at achieving the twofold objective pursued by that directive, as set out in recitals 2 to 6, 7, 11 and 12 thereof, namely, first, to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market in the energy sector and, secondly, to encourage environmental policy objectives.
Heike Schottelius v Falk Seifert.
Date: 2017-09-07
25


It also follows from established case-law that, in principle, the Court only has jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of EU law that are actually applicable in the main proceedings (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 December 1997, Annibaldi, C‑309/96, EU:C:1997:631, paragraph 13, and of 7 July 2011, Agafiţei and Others, C‑310/10, EU:C:2011:467, paragraph 28 and case-law cited, and order of 14 April 2016, Târșia, C‑328/15, not published, EU:C:2016:273, paragraph 19 and case-law cited).
31


In the second place, it should be noted that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, it follows from the need for a uniform application of EU law that, where a provision thereof makes no reference to the law of the Member States with regard to a particular concept, that concept must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union which must take into account the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, inter alia, judgment of 9 November 2016, Wathelet, C‑149/15, EU:C:2016:840, paragraph 28 and case-law cited).
32


Although the text of Directive 1999/44 does not define ‘contract of sale’, nor does it contain any reference to national laws as regards the meaning to be applied to that term. It therefore follows that it must be regarded, for the purposes of application of the directive, as designating an autonomous concept of EU law which must be interpreted in a uniform manner throughout the European Union (see, by analogy, judgment of 18 October 2011, Brüstle, C‑34/10, EU:C:2011:669, paragraph 26).
Austria Asphalt GmbH & Co OG v Bundeskartellanwalt.
Date: 2017-09-07
20


When a textual interpretation of a provision of EU law does not permit its precise scope to be assessed, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to its purpose and general structure (see, to that effect, judgments of 31 March 1998, France and Others v Commission, C‑68/94 and C‑30/95, EU:C:1998:148, paragraph 168, and of 7 April 2016, Marchon Germany, C‑315/14, EU:C:2016:211, paragraphs 28 and 29).
21


As regards the objectives pursued by Regulation No 139/2004, it appears from recitals 5 and 6 thereof that the regulation seeks to ensure that the process of reorganisation of undertakings does not result in lasting damage to competition. According to those recitals, EU law must therefore include provisions governing those concentrations that may significantly impede effective competition in the internal market or in a substantial part of it and permitting effective control of all concentrations in terms of their effect on the structure of competition in the European Union. Accordingly, that regulation should apply to significant structural changes the impact of which on the market goes beyond the national borders of any one Member State.
30


Although it is certainly true that, according to recital 6 of the regulation, the preventative control of all concentrations established under that regulation concerns concentrations having an effect on the structure of competition in the European Union, it does not follow that any action of undertakings not producing such effects escapes the control of the Commission or that of the competent national competition authorities.
31


That regulation, like, in particular, Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, forms part of a legislative whole intended to implement Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and to establish a system of control ensuring that competition is not distorted in the internal market of the European Union.
32


As follows from Article 21(1) of Regulation No 139/2004, that regulation alone is to apply to concentrations as defined in Article 3 of the regulation, to which Regulation No 1/2003 is not, in principle, applicable.
33


By contrast, Regulation No 1/2003 continues to apply to the actions of undertakings which, without constituting a concentration within the meaning of Regulation No 139/2004, are nevertheless capable of leading to coordination between undertakings in breach of Article 101 TFEU and which, for that reason, are subject to the control of the Commission or of the national competition authorities.
Birgit Bossen and Others v Brussels Airlines SA/NV.
Date: 2017-09-07
19


However, the Court of Justice has pointed out that all European Union acts must be interpreted in accordance with primary law as a whole, including the principle of equal treatment, which requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 October 2012, Nelson and Others, C‑581/10 and C‑629/10, EU:C:2012:657, paragraph 33).
20


The Court found that passengers whose flights are delayed by three hours or more and passengers whose flights are cancelled and re-routed under conditions which do not comply with the limits laid down in Article 5(1)(c)(iii) of Regulation No 261/2004 must be regarded as being in comparable situations, in so far as they all suffer similar inconvenience, which is the basis of their compensation (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 October 2012, Nelson and Others, C‑581/10 and C‑629/10, EU:C:2012:657, paragraph 34).
21


It follows that Regulation No 261/2004 must be interpreted as meaning that passengers of flights delayed for three hours or more must receive the same compensation as passengers whose flights are cancelled, who are re-routed under conditions which do not comply with the limits laid down in Article 5(1)(c)(iii) of Regulation No 261/2004 (judgment of 23 October 2012, Nelson and Others, C‑581/10 and C‑629/10, EU:C:2012:657, paragraph 38).
26


The choice and extent of the various measures adopted in Regulation No 261/2004 by the legislature of the European Union vary according to the significance of the damage suffered by the passengers (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 January 2006, IATA and ELFAA, C‑344/04, EU:C:2006:10, paragraph 85). The different scales of the amount of compensation payable to passengers must, therefore, be regarded as reflecting the differences in the extent of the inconvenience suffered by the passengers concerned in the situations described in Article 7(1)(a) to (c) of Regulation No 261/2004.
27


In that regard, the Court has already stated that the justification for compensation for passengers falling under Article 5(1)(c)(iii) of that regulation is that, as a result of the flight cancellation at the very last moment, they are in practice denied the opportunity to reorganise their travel arrangements freely. Consequently, if, for one reason or another, they are absolutely required to reach their final destination at a particular time, they cannot avoid the loss of time inherent in the new situation, having no leeway in that regard (judgment of 23 October 2012, Nelson and Others, C‑581/10 and C‑629/10, EU:C:2012:657, paragraph 35).
31


In particular, the Court stated that the basis of their compensation was the inconvenience of having suffered a loss of time of three hours or more in relation to the original planning of that transport, as established, including in the case of connecting flights, upon arrival at their final destination (see to that effect, judgment of 26 February 2013, Folkerts, C‑11/11, EU:C:2013:106, paragraph 35).