larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Bellio F.lli Srl v Prefettura di Treviso.
Date: 2004-04-01
27. It should be recalled in this connection that, according to settled case-law, it is solely for the national courts before which actions are brought, and which must bear the responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the special features of each case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which they submit to the Court. Consequently, since the questions referred involve the interpretation of Community law, the Court is, in principle, obliged to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra  [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 38; Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital  [2002] ECR I-607, paragraph 18; Case C-373/00 Adolf Truley  [2003] ECR I-1931, paragraph 21, and Case C-18/01 Korhonen and Others  [2003] ECR I-5321, paragraph 19).
33. It should be recalled that the EEA Agreement was concluded by the European Economic Community and the European Coal and Steel Community, referred to in that agreement as ‘the Community’. Article 300(7) EC provides that ‘agreements concluded under the conditions set out in this article shall be binding on the institutions of the Community and on Member States’. Furthermore, the Court has held that the primacy of international agreements concluded by the Community over provisions of secondary Community legislation means that such provisions must, so far as is possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those agreements (Case C-61/94 Commission  v Germany  [1996] ECR I-3989, paragraph 52).
34. It should be emphasised in this connection that, as Article 6 of the EEA Agreement states, the provisions of the agreement, in so far as they are identical in substance to corresponding rules of the EC Treaty and to acts adopted in application of that Treaty, must, in their implementation and application, be interpreted in conformity with the relevant rulings of the Court given prior to the date of signature of the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, both the Court and the EFTA Court have recognised the need to ensure that the rules of the EEA Agreement which are identical in substance to those of the Treaty are interpreted uniformly (Case C-452/01 Ospelt and Schlössle Weissenberg Familienstiftung  [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 29, and Case E-1/03 EFTA Surveillance Authority  v Iceland , not yet published in the EFTA Court Reports, paragraph 27).
46. Having regard to the public health objective pursued by those decisions, they must be interpreted widely and the exception they lay down in respect of fish flour must be interpreted narrowly.
Förvaltnings AB Stenholmen v Riksskatteverket.
Date: 2004-04-01
25. On the contrary, as Advocate General Stix-Hackl noted at point 34 of her Opinion, to exclude those supplies from the special arrangements applicable to second-hand goods would be contrary to the express intention of the legislature to avoid double taxation, as set out in the third and fifth recitals to Directive 94/5.  To tax the supply by a taxable dealer of an animal such as a horse, bought from a private individual and sold on after training, on the basis of its total price would theoretically amount to double taxation since, however large that part of the price attributable to the training, part of the price would continue to represent the purchase price, including, in almost all cases, a sum paid in respect of input VAT by the private individual, which neither he nor the taxable dealer could deduct.
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 2004-04-01
6. However, it is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-63/02 Commission  v United Kingdom  [2003] ECR I-821, paragraph 11).
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 2004-04-01
7. According to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-211/02 Commission  v Luxembourg  [2003] ECR I-2429, paragraph 6).
Gregory Paul Turner v Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit, Harada Ltd and Changepoint SA.
Date: 2004-04-27
24. At the outset, it must be borne in mind that the Convention is necessarily based on the trust which the Contracting States accord to one another’s legal systems and judicial institutions. It is that mutual trust which has enabled a compulsory system of jurisdiction to be established, which all the courts within the purview of the Convention are required to respect, and as a corollary the waiver by those States of the right to apply their internal rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in favour of a simplified mechanism for the recognition and enforcement of judgments (Case C-116/02 Gasser  [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 72).
25. It is inherent in that principle of mutual trust that, within the scope of the Convention, the rules on jurisdiction that it lays down, which are common to all the courts of the Contracting States, may be interpreted and applied with the same authority by each of them (see, to that effect, Case C-351/89 Overseas Union Insurance and Others  [1991] ECR I-3317, paragraph 23, and Gasser, paragraph 48).
26. Similarly, otherwise than in a small number of exceptional cases listed in the first paragraph of Article 28 of the Convention, which are limited to the stage of recognition or enforcement and relate only to certain rules of special or exclusive jurisdiction that are not relevant here, the Convention does not permit the jurisdiction of a court to be reviewed by a court in another Contracting State (see, to that effect, Overseas Union Insurance and Others , paragraph 24).
29. Even if it were assumed, as has been contended, that an injunction could be regarded as a measure of a procedural nature intended to safeguard the integrity of the proceedings pending before the court which issues it, and therefore as being a matter of national law alone, it need merely be borne in mind that the application of national procedural rules may not impair the effectiveness of the Convention (Case C-365/88 Hagen  [1990] ECR I-1845, paragraph 20). However, that result would follow from the grant of an injunction of the kind at issue which, as has been established in paragraph 27 of this judgment, has the effect of limiting the application of the rules on jurisdiction laid down by the Convention.
Sakir Öztürk v Pensionsversicherungsanstalt der Arbeiter.
Date: 2004-04-28
49. It must be borne in mind that Article 9 of the Association Agreement prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality within the scope of that agreement, without prejudice to any special provisions which may be laid down by the Association Council. This means that, as in the case of the relationship between Article 12 EC and the special provisions of the EC Treaty or of secondary law, Article 9 of that agreement does not apply independently if the Association Council has adopted a specific non-discrimination rule, such as Article 3(1) of Decision 3/80 in the particular field of social security (see, to that effect, Kocak and Örs , paragraph 36).
54. As regards, second, the scope of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality embodied in Article 3(1) of Decision No 3/80, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the rule of equal treatment prohibits not only overt discrimination based on nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by applying other distinguishing criteria, achieve in practice the same result ( Kocak and Örs , paragraph 39).
57. It is not necessary in that respect to find that the domestic provision in question does in practice affect a substantially higher proportion of such migrant workers. It is sufficient that it is liable to have such an effect (see, by analogy, Case C‑237/94 O’Flynn [1996] ECR I-2617, paragraph 21).
59. However, before any decision is given as to possible justification for such inequality, it is appropriate to consider, in the third place, whether the application of the principle of non-discrimination, as embodied in Article 3(1) of Decision No 3/80, is sufficient by itself to eliminate the adverse effects on Turkish nationals of legislation of the kind at issue in the main proceedings, having regard to the fact that, in paragraph 38 of Taflan-Met , it was held that, for so long as supplementary measures of the kind set out in Regulation No 574/72, which are essential for the implementation of that decision, have not been adopted by the Council, the provisions thereof do not have direct effect in the territory of the Member States and cannot therefore be relied on before national courts (see also, to that effect, Sürül , cited above, paragraph 54).
60. That applies to the rule on aggregation of insurance periods in the various branches of social security referred to in Article 4(1) of Decision No 3/80. On the other hand, Article 3(1) of that decision lays down, within the scope thereof, a precise and unconditional principle such as is capable of being applied by a national court (see Sürül , paragraphs 62 to 74).
European Parliament v Carlo Ripa di Meana, Leoluca Orlando and Gastone Parigi.
Date: 2004-04-29
33. In that regard, it must be recalled that the Court may of its own motion, on a proposal from the Advocate General, or at the request of the parties, order that the oral procedure be reopened, in accordance with Article 61 of its Rules of Procedure, if it considers that it lacks sufficient information, or that the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties (see, inter alia, Case C-299/99 Philips  [2002] ECR I‑5475, paragraph 20; Case C‑184/01 P Hirschfeldt  v EEA [2002] ECR I‑10173, paragraph 30; and Case C‑209/01 Schilling and Fleck‑Schilling [2003] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 19).
40. It must be recalled, as a preliminary point, that it is clear from Article 225 EC and Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice that an appeal is to be limited to points of law. It is settled case-law that the Court of First Instance therefore has exclusive jurisdiction to find the facts, save where a substantive inaccuracy in its findings is attributable to the documents submitted to it, and to appraise those facts. That appraisal thus does not, save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice in an appeal (see inter alia Case C‑136/92 P Commission  v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraphs 47 to 49; Case C‑390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission  [1999] ECR I-769, paragraph 29, and the order in Case C-233/03 P(R) Linea GIG v Commission  [2003] ECR I‑7911, paragraphs 34 and 35).
41. However, it is settled law that, where the Court of First Instance has found or appraised the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 225 EC, to carry out a review of the legal classification of those facts and the legal inferences drawn from them by the Court of First Instance. As the Court of Justice has held on several occasions, such a classification is a question of law which, as such, may be subject to review by the Court of Justice in an appeal (see, inter alia, Case C-19/93 P Rendo and Others  v Commission  [1995] ECR I‑3319, paragraph 26, and Case C-154/99 P Politi  v European Training Foundation  [2000] ECR I‑5019, paragraph 11).
58. In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be held that the Court of First Instance did not err in law in characterising the letters of 4 February 1999 as ‘decisions of the European Parliament’ which were not confirmatory in character. Where such letters affect the specific financial situation of the Members concerned, they do in fact constitute measures having legal effects going beyond the internal organisation of the work of the institution. In that respect, they were therefore measures against which actions for annulment could be brought within the time‑limits laid down for that purpose (see, inter alia, to that effect, Weber  v Parliament , cited above, paragraph 11).
The Queen, on the application of Novartis Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd v The Licensing Authority established by the Medicines Act 1968 (acting by the Medicines Control Agency).
Date: 2004-04-29
66. If, as stated at paragraph 64 of the present judgment, the applicant for marketing authorisation for product C may refer to the pharmacological, toxicological and clinical documentation in respect of product B, which is the product of the development of the reference product A and essentially similar thereto, apart from the route of administration or the dose, as the case may be, since the differences in those two factors generally imply that products A and B are not bioequivalent (see paragraph 51 of the present judgment), it must, a fortiori , be able to do so where products A and B are distinguishable only by their different bioavailability, even though the route of administration and dose remain unchanged.
69. According to settled case-law, the principle of non-discrimination requires that comparable situations not be treated differently and different situations not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, inter alia, Case 106/83 Sermide  [1984] ECR 4209, paragraph 28, and Case C-137/00 Milk Marque and National Farmers’ Union  [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 126).
Kingdom of the Netherlands v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2004-04-29
42. It must be stated in that regard that the concept of aid has indeed been interpreted by the Court as not covering measures which differentiate between undertakings in relation to charges where that differentiation is the result of the nature and general scheme of the system of levies in question (see, to that effect, Case 173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] ECR 709, paragraph 33, Joined Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91 Sloman Neptun  [1993] ECR I-887, paragraph 21, Case C-390/98 Banks [2001] ECR I-6117, paragraph 33, and Case C-351/98 Spain v Commission [2002] ECR I-8031, paragraph 43).
43. It is for the Member State which has introduced such a differentiation between undertakings in relation to charges to show that it is actually justified by the nature and general scheme of the system in question.
51. Next it must be pointed out that the argument of the Netherlands Government that the MINAS system is not intended to generate tax revenue does not suffice to exclude the exemption at issue outright from classification as aid within the meaning of Article 87 EC. Article 87(1) EC does not distinguish between measures of State intervention by reference to their causes or their aims but defines them in relation to their effects (Case C-56/93 Belgium v Commission  [1996] ECR I-723, paragraph 79, Case C-241/94 France v Commission [1996] ECR I-4551, paragraph 20 and Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission  [1999] ECR I-3671, paragraph 25).
61. Although subsequently, in point 43 of the grounds of the contested decision, the Commission cites case-law holding that the outcome of a State aid procedure may never produce a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the Treaty (Case C-225/91 Matra v Commission [1993] ECR I-3203, paragraph 41), it concludes that, irrespective of the compliance of the national legislation with the Nitrates Directive, the tax relief must be regarded as pure operating aid.
65. It must be observed in that regard that the obligation to state reasons constitutes an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question of the merits of those reasons, which concern the substantive legality of the contested measure. The Court has consistently held that the statement of reasons required by Article 253 EC must be adapted to the nature of the measure in question and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in such a way as to make the persons concerned aware of the reasons for the measure and the Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction (see, inter alia, Joined Cases 296/82 and 318/82 Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek  v Commission  [1985] ECR 809, paragraph 19, Case C-350/88 Delacre and Others  v Commission  [1990] ECR I-395, paragraph 15, Case C-56/93 Belgium v Commission  [1996] ECR I-723, paragraph 86 and Case C-367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France [1998] ECR I-1719, paragraph 63).
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 2004-04-29
35. Directives 92/12, 92/81 and 94/74 were all adopted on the basis of Article 99 of the EC Treaty (now Article 93 EC). That provision empowers the Council to harmonise national legislation concerning, inter alia, excise duties, to the extent necessary to ensure the establishment and functioning of the internal market.
36. The first and fourth recitals in Directive 92/12 state that the establishment and functioning of the internal market also require the free movement of goods, including those subject to excise duties and that, for that purpose, chargeability of excise duties should be identical in all the Member States.
39. It is clear from the above that the objective of those three directives is to ensure the free movement of mineral oils in the internal market, and to avoid distortions of competition which could stem from different structures of excise duties.
40. That being the case, the harmonisation achieved at present is no more than partial (see, to that effect, Case C-434/97 Commission v France  [2000] ECR I-1129, paragraph 17).
44. The legislature thus established, at Community level and in a uniform manner, the uses of mineral oils which give rise to the levy of excise duty and which thus constitute the chargeable event. In so doing, it sought to avoid situations in which mineral oils subject to excise duty vary from one Member State to another according to their use, which would be such as to give rise to distortions of competition in intra-Community trade, the very distortions which the system of Community harmonisation seeks to counter (see paragraph 39 of this judgment).
European Parliament v Patrick Reynolds.
Date: 2004-04-29
53. As regards an official like Mr Reynolds, who was seconded in order to act as Secretary-General in a political group of the Parliament, it is not disputed that he was engaged for a particular purpose of an essentially political nature (see Case 25/68 Schertzer  v Parliament  [1977] ECR 1729, paragraph 42).
56. Where there is no longer any mutual confidence, for whatever reason, the official in question is no longer in a position to carry out his functions. In such circumstances sound administration therefore requires that the institution concerned take, with respect to that official, as soon as possible, a decision to terminate the secondment (see, by analogy, Case 124/78 List  v Commission  [1979] ECR 2499, paragraph 13, and Case C-294/95 P Ojha  v Commission  [1996] ECR I-5863, paragraphs 41 and 42).
Friedrich Skalka v Sozialversicherungsanstalt der gewerblichen Wirtschaft.
Date: 2004-04-29
19. The provisions in Article 10a of Regulation No 1408/71 derogating from the principle of the exportability of social security benefits must be interpreted strictly. That provision can apply only to benefits which satisfy the conditions defined in Article 4(2a) of Regulation No 1408/71, that is, benefits which are both special and non-contributory and which are listed in Annex IIa to that regulation (see Case C-215/99 Jauch , cited above, paragraph 21).
25. A special benefit within the meaning of Article 4(2a) of Regulation No 1408/71 is defined by its purpose.  It must either replace or supplement a social security benefit and be by its nature social assistance justified on economic and social grounds and fixed by legislation setting objective criteria (see to that effect Case C-20/96 Snares [1997] ECR I-6057, paragraphs 33, 42 and 43, Case C-297/96 Partridge [1998] ECR I-3467, paragraph 34, and Case C-43/99 Leclère and Deaconescu [2001] ECR I-4265, paragraph 32).
26. As all the interveners have stated, the Austrian compensatory supplement tops up a retirement pension or an invalidity pension.  It is by nature social assistance in so far as it is intended to ensure a minimum means of subsistence for its recipient where the pension is insufficient.  Its grant is dependent on objective criteria defined by law.  Consequently, it must be classified as a ‘special benefit’ within the meaning of Regulation No 1408/71.
Non-contributory benefit
28. The relevant determining criterion is how the benefit is actually financed (see to that effect Jauch , cited above, paragraphs 32 and 33).  The Court must consider whether that financing comes directly or indirectly from social contribut ions or from public resources.
29. In the case of the Austrian compensatory supplement, the costs are borne by a social institution which then receives reimbursement in full from the relevant Land, which in turn receives from the Federal budget the sums necessary to finance the benefit.  At no time do the contributions of insured persons form part of this financing arrangement.
30. Consequently, it is established that the Austrian compensatory supplement must be regarded as being non-contributory within the meaning of Article 4(2a) of Regulation No 1408/71.
Commission of the European Communities v Kvaerner Warnow Werft GmbH.
Date: 2004-04-29
25. In this regard, it should be noted that the Court may of its own motion, or on a proposal of the Advocate General, or at the request of the parties order that the oral procedure be reopened, in accordance with Article 61 of its Rules of Procedure, if it considers that it has insufficient information or that the case should be settled on the basis of an argument which was not sufficiently dealt with by the parties (see the order of 4 February 2000 in Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar [2000] ECR I-665, paragraph 18, and the judgments in Case C-309/99 Wouters and Others [2002] ECR I-1577, paragraph 42, Case C-209/01 Schilling and Fleck-Schilling [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 19, and Case C-147/02 Alabaster [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 35).
37. It should be observed, in this regard, that neither Directive 90/684 nor Directive 92/68 contains a definition of capacity or capacity restriction.  In addition, the actual production of an undertaking is not the same notion as production capacity (see, to that effect, Case 244/81 Klöckner-Werke v Commission [1983] ECR 1451, paragraphs 22 and 23).
49. In paragraphs 105 to 109 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance also sought to confirm its interpretation of those decisions by relying on its own case-law and that of the Court and by making reference to other documents from the case-file submitted to it.  However, the reasoning of that part of the judgment is superfluous having regard to that which, in paragraphs 91 to 104, formed the basis of that interpretation.  Therefore, and since the Court of First Instance did not err in law in arriving at that interpretation, the Commission’s complaints directed against the reasoning in paragraphs 105 to 109 of the judgment  are immaterial.  In accordance with settled case-law, those complaints, which cannot serve as the basis for setting aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance, must be rejected (see, inter alia, Case C-35/92 P Parliament v Frederiksen [1993] ECR I-991, paragraph 31, Case C-224/91 P Pincherle v Commission  [1993] ECR I-6965, paragraph 25, and Case C-264/95 P Commission v UIC [1997] ECR I‑1287, paragraph 48).