larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Annette Henke v Gemeinde Schierke and Verwaltungsgemeinschaft Brocken.
Date: 1996-10-15
14 Consequently, the reorganization of structures of the public administration or the transfer of administrative functions between public administrative authorities does not constitute a "transfer of an undertaking" within the meaning of the Directive.
15 This interpretation, moreover, is borne out by the terms used in most of the language versions of the Directive in order to designate the subject of the transfer (virksomhed, Unternehmen, entreprise, impresa, **********, onderneming, empresa, yritys, foeretag; and bedrift, Betrieb, business, établissement, stabilimento, ***********, vestiging, estabelecimento, centro de actividad) or the beneficiary of the transfer (indehaver, Inhaber, chef d' entreprise, imprenditore, **************, ondernemer, empresário, empresario) and is not contradicted by any of the other language versions of the text.
16 It appears from the documents in the case-file that the purpose of a number of municipalities in the Land of Saxony-Anhalt, including the municipality of Schierke, grouping together was, in particular, to improve the performance of those municipalities' administrative tasks. It resulted, inter alia, in the reorganization of administrative structures and the transfer of administration functions of the municipality of Schierke to a public entity specially set up for that purpose: the "Brocken" administrative collectivity (Verwaltungsgemeinschaft).
17 It appears that, in the circumstances to which the main proceedings relate, the transfer carried out between the municipality and the administrative collectivity related only to activities involving the exercise of public authority. Even if is assumed that those activities had aspects of an economic nature, they could only be ancillary.
18 In those circumstances, the reply to be given to the national court' s first question is that Article 1(1) of the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of a "transfer of an undertaking, business or part of a business" does not apply to the transfer of administrative functions from a municipality to an administrative collectivity such as the one in question in the main proceedings.
The second question
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 1996-10-17
9 In that connection, it suffices to note that the Court has consistently held that a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down by a directive (see, in particular, Case C-253/95 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-0000, paragraph 12).
Federal Republic of Germany, Hanseatische Industrie-Beteiligungen GmbH and Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1996-10-24
31 It should next be borne in mind that, according to the Court' s case-law, the requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the act in question (see in particular Joined Cases 296/82 and 318/82 Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v Commission [1985] ECR 809, paragraph 19).
32 It follows that in the present case the Commission had to take account of all the circumstances and all the relevant factors of the case.
52 While it is settled case-law that the relatively small size of an undertaking' s turnover in the Community does not a priori exclude the possibility that State intervention in its favour constitutes aid (Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission ("Tubemeuse") [1990] ECR I-959, paragraph 43), and while in certain cases the very circumstances in which the aid has been granted may show that it is liable to affect trade between Member States and to distort or threaten to distort competition, the Commission must at least set out those circumstances in the statement of the reasons for its decision (Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek, paragraph 24).
H. J. A. M. van Iersel (liquidator of Pluimvee- en wildverwerkende industrie De Venhorst BV) v Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij.
Date: 1996-10-24
29 It is not the presence of meat in the cutting room which gives rise to the fee. Each part of the fee laid down by Decision 88/408 is calculated on the basis of the weight of the meat. Article 3(1) of Decision 88/408 states that the fee covering the controls and inspections connected with the cutting operations is to be calculated on the basis of the unboned weight of the meat intended to be boned and cut. Therefore, that fee is payable only in respect of the unboned meat which is actually cut in the cutting room.
Eismann Alto Adige Srl v Ufficio IVA di Bolzano.
Date: 1996-10-24
14 The Court has consistently held that it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (see, in particular, Case C-387/93 Banchero [1995] ECR I-4663, paragraph 15). In this case, it appears from the case-file that the national court and the Ufficio IVA di Bolzano considered that under the Decree, which falls to be interpreted by the national court, Eismann was required to draw up accompanying documents. In those circumstances, the question referred for a preliminary ruling is admissible.
The question referred to the Court
16 The Court has consistently held that, in interpreting a provision of Community law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also its context and the aims pursued by the legislation of which it forms part (see Case C-30/93 AC-ATEL Electronics Vertriebs v Hauptzollamt Muenchen-Mitte [1994] ECR I-2305, at paragraph 21).
21 That interpretation is confirmed by the case-law of the Court according to which the Treaty does not prohibit a Member State from taxing national products more heavily than imported products; disparities of this kind result from the specific features of unharmonized national laws in areas falling within the Member States' competence (see Case 86/78 Peureux v Services Fiscaux de la Haute-Saône et du Territoire de Belfort [1979] ECR 897, paragraph 32).
Commission of the European Communities v Lisrestal - Organização Gestão de Restaurantes Colectivos Ldª, Gabinete Técnico de Informática Ldª (GTI), Lisnico - Serviço Marítimo Internacional Ldª, Rebocalis - Rebocagem e Assistência Marítima Ldª and Gaslimpo - Sociedade de Desgasificação de Navios SA.
Date: 1996-10-24
21 Observance of the right to be heard is, in all proceedings initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person, a fundamental principle of Community law which must be guaranteed even in the absence of any rules governing the proceedings in question (see, inter alia, Case C-135/92 Fiskano v Commission [1994] ECR I-2885, paragraph 39, and Joined Cases C-48/90 and C-66/90 Netherlands and Others v Commission [1992] ECR I-565, paragraph 44). That principle requires that the addressees of decisions which significantly affect their interests should be placed in a position in which they may effectively make known their views.
29 Furthermore, although a decision to suspend, reduce or withdraw Community assistance may sometimes reflect an assessment and evaluation by the competent national authorities, under Article 6(1) of Regulation No 2950/83 it is the Commission which adopts the final decision and takes sole legal liability for such a decision as against the beneficiaries.
30 Moreover, the fact that Article 6(1) requires the Member State concerned to be consulted before the Commission adopts a decision to suspend, reduce or withdraw the assistance does not justify the conclusion that a principle of Community law as fundamental as that which guarantees every person the right to be heard before the adoption of a decision capable of adversely affecting him does not apply.
40 The Court of Justice may examine such a plea only in so far as it seeks to contest the assessment made by the Court of First Instance of the tenor and wording of the letters of 19 October 1990 (Case C-39/93 P SFEI v Commission [1994] ECR I-2681, paragraph 26).
Viho Europe BV v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1996-10-24
15 It should be noted, first of all, that it is established that Parker holds 100% of the shares of its subsidiaries in Germany, Belgium, Spain, France and the Netherlands and that the sales and marketing activities of its subsidiaries are directed by an area team appointed by the parent company and which controls, in particular, sales targets, gross margins, sales costs, cash flow and stocks. The area team also lays down the range of products to be sold, monitors advertising and issues directives concerning prices and discounts.
16 Parker and its subsidiaries thus form a single economic unit within which the subsidiaries do not enjoy real autonomy in determining their course of action in the market, but carry out the instructions issued to them by the parent company controlling them (Case 48/69 ICI v Commission [1972] ECR 619, paragraphs 133 and 134; Case 15/74 Centrafarm v Sterling Drug [1974] ECR 1147, paragraph 41; Case 16/74 Centrafarm v Winthrop [1974] ECR 1183, paragraph 32; Case 30/87 Bodson v Pompes Funèbres [1988] ECR 2479, paragraph 19; and Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Others v Zentrale zur Bekaempfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs [1989] ECR 803, paragraph 35).
17 In those circumstances, the fact that Parker' s policy of referral, which consists essentially in dividing various national markets between its subsidiaries, might produce effects outside the ambit of the Parker group which are capable of affecting the competitive position of third parties cannot make Article 85(1) applicable, even when it is read in conjunction with Article 2 and Article 3(c) and (g) of the Treaty. On the other hand, such unilateral conduct could fall under Article 86 of the Treaty if the conditions for its application, as laid down in that article, were fulfilled.
25 Under Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, an appeal must contain the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on to support the form of order which the appellant seeks from the Court of Justice. It follows that an appeal must specify the alleged flaws in the judgment which it applies to have set aside and the legal arguments which specifically support that application.
Commission of the European Communities v Royale belge SA.
Date: 1996-10-24
45 It appears from the Court' s case-law, however, that the obligations of the insurers may not be substituted for the obligations under the Staff Regulations, thus depriving officials of the particular guarantees secured for them by the Staff Regulations (see to this effect Case 18/70 Duraffour v Council [1971] ECR 515, paragraph 15, and Case 115/76 Leonardini v Commission [1978] ECR 735, paragraph 11).
58 In contrast, in the event of consultation of the Medical Committee, whose medical appraisals properly so called, where given in lawful circumstances, must moreover be regarded as definitive and may not be disputed in the absence of any new matter of fact arising (see, in particular, Case 107/79 Schuerer v Commission [1980] ECR 1845, paragraph 10, Case 2/87 Biedermann v Court of Auditors [1988] ECR 143, paragraph 8, and Case T-1/92 Tallarico v Parliament [1993] ECR II-107, paragraph 67), the Rules do not provide for the notification by the appointing authority of a draft decision which has to be taken on the basis of the Medical Committee' s findings.
67 According to that case-law, the review by the Court may not extend to medical appraisals properly so called, which must be considered definitive provided that the conditions in which they are made are regular. The Court may review only the regularity of the constitution and functioning of such committees and the regularity of the opinions which they issue. From that point of view, the Court has jurisdiction to examine whether the opinion contains reasons enabling the reader to assess the considerations on which the conclusions which it contains were based (Case 257/81 K. v Council [1983] ECR 1, paragraph 17) and whether it has established a comprehensible link between the medical findings which it contains and the conclusions reached by the Medical Committee (Case 277/84 Jaensch v Commission [1987] ECR 4923, paragraph 15, and Case T-165/89 Plug v Commission [1992] ECR II-367, paragraph 75).
73 In this connection, it should first be recalled that it has been consistently held that the Medical Committee' s task, which consists in considering medical questions entirely objectively and independently, requires that it be allowed complete freedom of appraisal. Consequently, it is for the Medical Committee to decide to what extent account should be taken of medical reports previously drawn up (Biedermann v Court of Auditors, paragraph 19).
82 However, questions concerning the origin of a disease are by their nature medical questions (Case C-185/90 P Commission v Gill [1991] ECR I-4779, paragraph 25).
Roger Tremblay, Harry Kestenberg and Syndicat des exploitants de lieux de loisirs (SELL) v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1996-10-24
10 The Commission submits, first of all, that the appeal does not contain the names of the other parties to the proceedings before the Court of First Instance, contrary to Article 112(1)(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, and that the appellants have failed to mention the date on which the judgment under appeal was notified to them, contrary to Article 112(2) of those Rules.
11 As the Advocate General has rightly pointed out at paragraph 16 of his Opinion, those deficiencies are not sufficient to render the appeal inadmissible. First, no evidence has been put forward that the other parties to the proceedings before the Court of First Instance were prejudiced by the omission of their names. Secondly, the appeal was lodged within the prescribed period even if it must be considered that time ran from the date of the judgment.
Société sucrière agricole de Maizy and Société sucrière de Berneuil-sur-Aisne v Directeur régional des impôts.
Date: 1996-10-24
1 By judgment of 22 May 1995, received at the Court on 7 June 1995, the Tribunal Administratif (Administrative Court), Amiens (France), referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EC Treaty a number of questions on the interpretation of the Community rules relating to various levies in the sugar sector.
16 The same answer must be given in this case to the first question.
The second question
17 The national court does not state in its judgment which Community provisions on production levies it seeks to have interpreted. However, it is apparent from the observations submitted to the Court that the production levies referred to in that judgment are the basic production levy and the B levy, imposed by Article 28 of Regulation No 1785/81, as amended by Council Regulation (EEC) No 934/86 of 24 March 1986 (OJ 1986 L 87, p. 1).
Institut national d'assurances sociales pour travailleurs indépendants (Inasti) v Michel Picard.
Date: 1996-10-24
18 Where a claim for an award has been submitted to an institution of a Member State, it is incumbent on that institution, pursuant to Article 5 of the Treaty and Article 84 of Regulation No 1408/71, to cooperate with the competent institutions of the other Member States in order to proceed with the award and apportionment.
25 However, as the Court emphasized in its judgment in Case C-275/91 Iacobelli v INAMI [1993] ECR I-523, paragraph 13, the provisions of Article 36 of Regulation No 574/72 are of a procedural nature. They were laid down with the aim of simplifying administration in order to exempt migrant workers having rights to assert in different Member States from the requirement to lodge with the institutions in each of those States an application for the grant of the benefits which they may claim (see, to that effect, Case 108/75 Balsamo v INAMI [1976] ECR 375, paragraph 9, and Case 41/77 Warry [1977] ECR 2085, paragraph 28). The obligation imposed on migrant workers by the first sentence of Article 36(1) to send their claims for benefits to the institution closest to them ° that of their place of residence ° reflects such concern for administrative simplification.
Société Cadi Surgelés, Société Sofrigu, Société Sofroi and Société Sofriber v Ministre des Finances and Directeur général des douanes.
Date: 1996-11-07
14 According to established case-law, the Common Customs Tariff is intended to achieve an equalization of customs charges levied at the frontiers of the Community on products imported from non-member countries, in order to avoid any distortion of free internal circulation or of competitive conditions (Joined Cases 37/73 and 38/73 Diamantarbeiders v Indiamex [1973] ECR 1609, paragraph 9).
18 The Court accordingly held that Member States may not, after 1 July 1968, unilaterally introduce new charges on goods imported directly from non-member countries or raise the level of those in existence at that time (paragraph 22).
19 It follows that Member States have no right unilaterally to add national charges to the duties payable under the Community rules, otherwise such rules might be deprived of the requisite uniformity (Case C-125/94 Aprile v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1995] ECR I-2919, paragraph 35).
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 1996-11-07
22 As regards the arguments which the Luxembourg Government draws from its liberal policy on terminal equipment, it is sufficient to point out here that, according to the case-law of the Court, the fact that a practice is in conformity with the requirements of a directive in the matter of protection may not constitute a reason for not transposing that directive into national law by provisions capable of creating a situation which is sufficiently precise, clear and transparent to enable individuals to ascertain their rights and obligations (see, in particular, to this effect the judgment in Case C-361/88 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-2567, paragraph 24). Nor is a draft regulation capable of the transposing of Directive 91/263.
Bruna-Alessandra Züchner v Handelskrankenkasse (Ersatzkasse) Bremen.
Date: 1996-11-07
12 On the other hand, the directive does not apply to people who are not working and are not seeking work or to persons whose occupation or efforts to find work were not interrupted by one of the risks referred to in Article 3 of the directive (Joined Cases 48/88, 106/88 and 107/88 Achterberg-te Riele and Others v Sociale Verzekeringsbank, Amsterdam [1989] ECR 1963, paragraph 13, and Johnson, paragraph 20). The Court has also held that a person who has given up his or her occupational activity in order to attend to the upbringing of his or her children does not fall within the scope of the directive (Johnson, paragraph 19).
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1996-11-07
17 In any event, it is settled case-law that a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-236/95 Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I-0000, paragraph 18).
Siemens AG v Henry Nold.
Date: 1996-11-19
13 It should be borne in mind that the Second Directive seeks, pursuant to Article 54(3)(g) of the EC Treaty, to coordinate the safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty with a view to making such safeguards equivalent. According to the second recital in the preamble thereto, the Second Directive is therefore intended to ensure minimum equivalent protection for both shareholders and creditors of public limited liability companies.
F.lli Graffione SNC v Ditta Fransa.
Date: 1996-11-26
15 The Court of Justice has consistently held that Article 30 aims to prohibit all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade (see Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5).
16 Where the proprietor of a trade mark is prohibited from marketing products under that trade mark, traders who wish to market products under the trade mark in question may obtain those products only by importing them. In those circumstances, an injunction prohibiting the marketing of those products amounts, in practice, to an impediment to their importation and therefore constitutes an obstacle to intra-Community trade.
17 It is also settled law that obstacles to intra-Community trade resulting from disparities between provisions of national law must be accepted in so far as such provisions are applicable to domestic and imported products without distinction and may be justified as being necessary in order to satisfy overriding requirements relating inter alia to consumer protection or fair trading. However, in order to be permissible, such provisions must be proportionate to the objective pursued and that objective must not be capable of being achieved by measures which are less restrictive of intra-Community trade (see Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fuer Branntwein ("Cassis de Dijon") [1979] ECR 649, paragraph 8; Case C-238/89 Pall v Dalhausen [1990] ECR I-4827, paragraph 12; Case 126/91 Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft v Yves Rocher [1993] ECR I-2361, paragraph 12; and Case C-470/93 Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Koeln v Mars [1995] ECR I-1923, paragraph 15).
22 The possibility of allowing a prohibition of marketing on account of the misleading nature of a trade mark is not, in principle, precluded by the fact that the same trade mark is not considered to be misleading in other Member States. As the Advocate General has observed in paragraph 10 of his Opinion, it is possible that because of linguistic, cultural and social differences between the Member States a trade mark which is not liable to mislead a consumer in one Member State may be liable to do so in another.
24 According to the case-law of the Court, the risk of misleading consumers cannot override the requirements of the free movement of goods and so justify barriers to trade, unless that risk is sufficiently serious (see to that effect, in particular, the judgments in the Clinique and Mars cases, cited above).