Proceedings brought by Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich (RPO).
Date: 2017-03-07
24


Due consultation of the Parliament in the cases provided for by the EC Treaty, now the FEU Treaty, constitutes an essential formal requirement disregard of which means that the measure concerned is void (judgment of 10 May 1995, Parliament v Council, C‑417/93, EU:C:1995:127, paragraph 9).
25


Effective participation of the Parliament in the legislative process, in accordance with the procedures laid down by the Treaty, indeed represents an essential factor in the institutional balance intended by the Treaty, since the Parliament’s function reflects the fundamental democratic principle that the people should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative assembly (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 July 1995, Parliament v Council, C‑21/94, EU:C:1995:220, paragraph 17, and of 10 June 1997, Parliament v Council, C‑392/95, EU:C:1997:289, paragraph 14).
26


The obligation to consult the Parliament during the legislative procedure in the cases laid down by the Treaty means that the Parliament is consulted afresh whenever the text finally adopted, taken as a whole, differs in essence from the text on which the Parliament has already been consulted, except in cases where the amendments substantially correspond to a wish of the Parliament itself (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 October 1994, Germany v Council, C‑280/93, EU:C:1994:367, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
41


It should be recalled at the outset that the Court has consistently held that the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (judgments of 12 November 2014, Guardian Industries and Guardian Europe v Commission, C‑580/12 P, EU:C:2014:2363, paragraph 51, and of 4 May 2016, Pillbox 38, C‑477/14, EU:C:2016:324, paragraph 35).
42


In accordance with settled case-law of the Court, the factors which distinguish different situations, and the question whether those situations are comparable, must be determined and assessed in the light of the subject matter of the provisions in question and of the aim pursued by them, whilst account must be taken for that purpose of the principles and objectives of the field in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 2008, Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others, C‑127/07, EU:C:2008:728, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
52


Where a difference in treatment between two comparable situations is found, the principle of equal treatment is not infringed in so far as that difference is duly justified (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 2008, Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others, C‑127/07, EU:C:2008:728, paragraph 46).
53


That is the case, according to settled case-law of the Court, where the difference in treatment relates to a legally permitted objective pursued by the measure having the effect of giving rise to such a difference and is proportionate to that objective (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 October 2013, Schaible, C‑101/12, EU:C:2013:661, paragraph 77, and of 22 May 2014, Glatzel, C‑356/12, EU:C:2014:350, paragraph 43).
54


In that respect, it is understood that, when the EU legislature adopts a tax measure, it is called upon to make political, economic and social choices, and to rank divergent interests or to undertake complex assessments. Consequently, it should, in that context, be accorded a broad discretion, so that judicial review of compliance with the conditions set out in the previous paragraph of this judgment must be limited to review as to manifest error (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 December 2002, British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, C‑491/01, EU:C:2002:741, paragraph 123, and of 17 October 2013, Billerud Karlsborg and Billerud Skärblacka, C‑203/12, EU:C:2013:664, paragraph 35).
59


Indeed, the principle of legal certainty, which underlies that objective, requires that EU rules enable those concerned to know unequivocally the extent of their rights and obligations so that they are in a position to order their affairs with the benefit of full information (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 July 2010, Commission v United Kingdom, C‑582/08, EU:C:2010:429, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
60


Furthermore, the Court has already acknowledged the legitimacy of the objective consisting in the laying down by a legislature of general rules which can be easily applied by economic operators and are easily verified by the competent national authorities (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 February 2015, Sopora, C‑512/13, EU:C:2015:108, paragraph 33).