„ZPT“ AD v Narodno sabranie na Republika Bulgaria and Others.
Date: 2018-02-28
19


In that regard, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law of the Court, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, judgment of 22 September 2016, Breitsamer und Ulrich, C‑113/15, EU:C:2016:718, paragraph 33).
22


It must be borne in mind, first, that that argument relates to the substance of the request for a preliminary ruling, not to its admissibility. Second, proceedings seeking to render the State liable do not have the same purpose and do not necessarily involve the same parties as the proceedings resulting in the decision which has acquired the status of res judicata. It follows that the principle of res judicata does not preclude recognition of the principle of State liability by reason of a decision of a court adjudicating at last instance (judgment of 30 September 2003, Köbler, C‑224/01, EU:C:2003:513, paragraphs 39 and 40).
24


However, it follows from the principle of procedural autonomy that, in the absence of EU rules, it is for the legal system of each Member State to designate the court competent to determine disputes relating to the reparation of an infringement of EU law resulting from a decision of the national court of last instance (judgment of 30 September 2003, Köbler, C‑224/01, EU:C:2003:513, paragraph 59). In that context, it is not for the Court of Justice to rule on which courts have jurisdiction to hear an action seeking to establish liability such as that brought before the referring court (judgment of 23 November 2017, CHEZ Electro Bulgaria and FrontEx International, C‑427/16 and C‑428/16, EU:C:2017:890, paragraph 30).
28


Third, it is true that the second question, which asks whether State aid in favour of exported goods is compatible with competition in the internal market, is imprecise in its wording. However, in order to provide a useful answer, it is for the Court, if necessary, to reformulate the questions referred to it (see, inter alia, judgment of 17 December 2015, Szemerey, C‑330/14, EU:C:2015:826, paragraph 30).
36


However, in accordance with Article 109 TFEU, the Council of the European Union is authorised to make any appropriate regulations, in particular for determining the conditions in which Article 108(3) TFEU is to apply and the categories of aid exempt from the procedure under that provision (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 July 2016, Dilly’s Wellnesshotel, C‑493/14, EU:C:2016:577, paragraph 33). Thus, Regulation No 994/98 empowered the Commission to set, by way of regulation, a ceiling below which aid is not subject to the procedure of notification to the Commission laid down in Article 108 TFEU.
40


In the first place, the prohibition of quantitative restrictions on exports and of measures having equivalent effect applies both to the authorities of the European Union and to the Member States, with the result that a provision of secondary law can be challenged on that basis, including by means of a question submitted for a preliminary ruling on the issue of validity (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 May 1984, DenkavitNetherland, 15/83, EU:C:1984:183, paragraph 15).
43


In that regard, the Court has held that a national measure applicable to all traders active in the national territory which has a greater effect on goods leaving the market of the exporting Member State than on the marketing of goods in the domestic market of that Member State is covered by the prohibition laid down by Article 35 TFEU (see judgment of 21 June 2016, New Valmar, C‑15/15, EU:C:2016:464, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
44


It follows from that definition that classification as a ‘measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on exports’ presupposes the existence of restrictive effects on trade (judgment of 21 June 2016, New Valmar, C‑15/15, EU:C:2016:464, paragraph 42). Those effects may be of merely minor importance (judgment of 1 April 2008, Government of the French Community and Walloon Government, C‑212/06, EU:C:2008:178, paragraph 52), provided that they are not too uncertain or too indirect (judgment of 21 June 2016, New Valmar, C‑15/15, EU:C:2016:464, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
47


It follows that Article 35 TFEU cannot justify a measure contrary to Article 107 TFEU. The reasons for which the Court held that the provisions of the FEU Treaty on State aid cannot be used to frustrate the Treaty rules on the free movement of goods also justify the reciprocal assertion, namely that those provisions and those rules have a common purpose, namely to ensure the free movement of goods between Member States under normal conditions of competition (judgments of 5 June 1986, Commission v Italy, 103/84, EU:C:1986:229, paragraph 19, and of 20 March 1990, Du Pont de Nemours Italiana, C‑21/88, EU:C:1990:121, paragraphs 19 to 21).