European Parliament v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2015-02-12
20. The Parliament, referring to recitals 3 to 5 in the preamble to the contested Directive, claims that the main objective of the contested Directive corresponds to that of EU policy in the field of the environment, listed in Article 191(1) TFEU, particularly the objectives of the protection of human health and the prudent and rational use of natural resources. In its view, the contested Directive should have been based on Article 192(1) TFEU (see judgment in Commission  v Parliament and Council , C‑411/06, EU:C:2009:518, paragraphs 45 to 47).
24. The Parliament also claims, in its reply, that its argument does not question the principle set out in Article 106a(3) EA. According to the Parliament, the contested Directive should have had its legal basis in Article 192(1) TFEU since it fits into the regulatory framework established by Directive 98/83. By the contested Directive, the Council, acting on the basis of Articles 31 EA and 32 EA, enacted new rules regarding a particular aspect of the framework established by Directive 98/83, that is to say, protection requirements with regard to radioactive substances in water intended for human consumption, and accordingly acted contrary to the objective pursued by that directive. In determining the appropriate legal basis for the contested Directive, account ought to have been taken, first, of the fact that Directive 98/83 constitutes the cornerstone of the system of protecting human health against the harmful effects of contaminated water intended for human consumption and, secondly, of the fact that the contested Directive takes effect specifically in relation to one aspect of the scheme established by Directive 98/83 (see the judgment in UK  v Council , C‑656/11, EU:C:2014:97, paragraphs 50, 51, 64 and 66).
25. The Council and the interveners, after recalling that the provisions of Chapter 3 of Title II of the EAEC Treaty, which include Articles 31 EA and 32 EA, are to be interpreted broadly in order to give them practical effect (judgments in Parliament  v Council , C‑70/88, EU:C:1991:373, paragraph 14; Commission  v Council , C‑29/99, EU:C:2002:734, paragraphs 78 to 80, and ČEZ , C‑115/08, EU:C:2009:660, paragraphs 100 and 112), argue that, having regard to the purpose and content of the contested Directive, it was correctly based on Articles 31 EA and 32 EA.
Findings of the Court
29. As for the question whether the contested Directive could legitimately be adopted on the basis of Article 31 EA, it is clear from settled case-law that the choice of legal basis for a measure must rest on objective factors that are amenable to judicial review; these include the purpose and content of that measure (see, inter alia, judgments in Parliament  v Council , EU:C:1991:373, paragraph 9; Parliament  v Council , C‑130/10, EU:C:2012:472, paragraph 42; Commission  v Council , C‑137/12, EU:C:2013:675, paragraph 52; and Commission  v Parliament and Council , C‑43/12, EU:C:2014:298, paragraph 29).
30. The legal basis which has been used for the adoption of other European Union measures which might, in certain cases, display similar characteristics is irrelevant in that regard, as the legal basis for a measure must be determined having regard to its purpose and content (see judgment in United Kingdom  v Council , EU:C:2014:97, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited). The Parliament cannot therefore base any argument on the fact that the contested Directive contains certain aspects which are identical to those set out in Part C of Annex I to Directive 98/83, which itself was based on Article 130 S(1) of the EC Treaty, now Article 192(1) TFEU.
35. However, the Court has repeatedly held that the provisions of Chapter 3 of Title II of the EAEC Treaty are to be interpreted broadly in order to give them practical effect (see, inter alia, judgments in Commission  v Council , EU:C:2002:734, paragraph 78, and ČEZ , EU:C:2009:660, paragraph 100). Those provisions, which include Articles 30 EA and 31 EA, accordingly are intended to ensure the consistent and effective protection of the health of the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiations, whatever their source and whatever the categories of persons exposed to such radiations (judgments in Parliament  v Council , EU:C:1991:373, paragraph 14, and ČEZ , EU:C:2009:660, paragraph 112).
36. In addition, if the Treaties contain a more specific provision that is capable of constituting the legal basis for the measure in question, the measure must be founded on that provision (see judgments in Commission  v Council , C‑338/01, EU:C:2004:253, paragraph 60, and in Commission  v Council , Case C‑533/03, EU:C:2006:64, paragraph 45).
37. Article 31 EA constitutes a more specific legal basis for protecting the health of populations against radioactive substances in water intended for human consumption than the general legal basis resulting from Article 192(1) TFEU. The EAEC Treaty contains a set of rules relating precisely to the protection of populations and the environment against ionising radiations (judgment in ČEZ , EU:C:2009:660, paragraph 83).
45. According to settled case-law, the principle of legal certainty requires that rules of law be clear and precise and predictable in their effect, so that interested parties can ascertain their position in situations and legal relationships governed by EU law (see judgments in France Télécom  v Commission , C‑81/10 P, EU:C:2011:811, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited, and in LVK — 56 , C‑643/11, EU:C:2013:55, paragraph 51).
54. The Parliament notes that the choice of legal basis cannot in any case be based on considerations relating to the procedure to be followed for the adoption of the measure in question or relating to the scheme applicable to that measure once it is adopted (judgment in Commission  v Council , EU:C:2013:675, paragraph 74). Action to artificially separate part of a legislative act in force, which is clearly of a secondary nature in the general scheme of that measure, in order to be the subject of a separate legal measure with a different legal basis and subject to a different legal scheme, constitutes an infringement of the duty of sincere cooperation among institutions, enshrined in Article 13(2) TEU.
57. Under Article 13(2) TEU, the institutions are to practise mutual sincere cooperation.
58. That sincere cooperation, however, is exercised within the limits of the powers conferred by the Treaties on each institution. The obligation resulting from Article 13(2) TEU is therefore not such as to change those powers.
60. The fact that, for the purposes of adopting the contested Directive, the Parliament was consulted and did not intervene as co-legislator under the ordinary legislative procedure, is accordingly solely a result of the choice made by the framers of the treaties and not from an infringement of the principle of sincere cooperation (see, to that effect, judgment in Parliament  v Commission , EU:C:2012:472, paragraph 82).