Flughafen Köln/Bonn GmbH v Hauptzollamt Köln.
Date: 2008-07-17
23. According to settled case-law of the Court, whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied on before the national courts by individuals against the State where the latter has failed to implement the directive in domestic law by the end of the period prescribed or where it has failed to implement the directive correctly (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others  [1991] ECR I-5357, paragraph 11; Case C-62/00 Marks & Spencer  [2002] ECR I-6325, paragraph 25; and Joined Cases C-397/01 to C‑403/01 Pfeiffer and Others  [2004] ECR I-8835, paragraph 103).
29. With regard to the first condition, it must be held that Article 14(1)(a) of Directive 2003/96, in so far as it imposes on Member States the obligation not to impose taxation under the directive on energy products used to produce electricity, is sufficiently precise, since it lays down clearly the products covered by the exemption (see, by analogy, Case 8/81 Becker  [1982] ECR 53, paragraph 27, and Braathens , paragraph 31).
30. With regard to the second condition, it follows from the case-law that the fact that a provision of a directive gives Member States a choice does not necessarily render it impossible to determine with sufficient precision, on the basis of the provisions of the directive alone, the content of the rights thus conferred on individuals (see, to that effect, Francovich and Others , paragraph 17, and Joined Cases C-253/96 to C‑258/96 Kampelmann and Others  [1997] ECR I-6907, paragraph 39).
31. Thus, it follows from settled case-law that the unconditional nature of an obligation to grant an exemption cannot be affected at all by the degree of latitude afforded to Member States by introductory wording such as that contained in Article 14(1) of Directive 2003/96, according to which exemptions are granted by those States ‘under conditions which they shall lay down for the purpose of ensuring the correct and straightforward application of such exemptions and of preventing any evasion, avoidance or abuse’. A Member State may not rely, as against a taxpayer who is able to show that his tax position actually falls within one of the categories of exemption laid down in a directive, on its failure to adopt the very provisions which are intended to facilitate the application of that exemption (see, by analogy, Becker , paragraph 33; Braathens , paragraph 31; Case C-141/00 Kügler  [2002] ECR I-6833, paragraph 52; Case C-45/01 Dornier  [2003] ECR I-12911, paragraph 79; and Joined Cases C-453/02 and C-462/02 Linneweber and Akritidis  [2005] ECR I-1131, paragraph 34).
32. Contrary to what is submitted by the defendant in the main proceedings and by the Italian Government, that finding is not invalidated by the fact that Member States may, under the second sentence of Article 14(1)(a) of Directive 2003/96, impose taxation on the products in question for reasons of environmental policy. That is merely a potential limitation to the exemption rule, and a Member State which has not exercised that option cannot rely on its own failure to do so in order to refuse a taxpayer the benefit of an exemption which he may legitimately claim under Directive 2003/96 (see, by analogy, Kügler , paragraphs 59 and 60, and Linneweber and Akritidis , paragraph 35).
33. It follows that the obligation under Article 14(1)(a) of Directive 2003/96 to exempt from taxation under that directive energy products intended to produce electricity is sufficiently precise and unconditional to confer on individuals the right to rely on it in proceedings before national courts with a view to contesting national rules that are incompatible with it.
34. According to settled case-law, the right to obtain a refund of charges levied in a Member State in breach of rules of Community law is the consequence and the complement of the rights conferred on individuals by Community provisions as interpreted by the Court (see, inter alia, Case C-343/96 Dilexport  [1999] ECR I‑579, paragraph 23; Joined Cases C‑397/98 and C-410/98 Metallgesellschaft and Others  [2001] ECR I-1727, paragraph 84; and Marks & Spencer , paragraph 30).
37. In that regard, it must be stated that, by its question, the national court asked the Court of Justice only as to the interpretation of Article 14(1)(a) of Directive 2003/96 and that the abovementioned matters of fact and law, which were raised and discussed for the first time at the hearing before the Court, are not referred to either in the order for reference or in the written observations lodged by the interested parties. Moreover, the parties to the main proceedings confirmed, in response to a question put by the Court, that that aspect of the dispute was not addressed at any stage of the main proceedings.
38. In those circumstances, in the absence of more precise and detailed information on that point, the Court finds that the documents submitted to it do not indicate with sufficient clarity that those various matters may be relevant in resolving the case in the main proceedings and, therefore, of any use to the national court, which, as the court that must resolve the dispute, is best placed to determine the relevance of the questions referred to the Court in the light of the particular features of the case before it.