larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Paderborner Brauerei Haus Cramer KG v Hauptzollamt Bielefeld.
Date: 2011-07-14
28. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, pursuant to Article 26 of Directive 92/83, the version of the CN to be applied in the main proceedings is that set out in Regulation No 2587/91, which was in force when that directive was adopted, and not the versions set out in Regulations No 2031/2001 and No 1832/2002, which the referring court cites in its question.
31. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, inter alia, Case C‑142/06 Olicom  [2007] ECR I‑6675, paragraph 16, and Case C‑370/08 Data I/O [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 29).
32. The explanatory notes drawn up by the Commission as regards the CN and by the WCO as regards the HS are an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force ( Olicom , paragraph 17, and Data I/O , paragraph 30).
33. In the present case, it is apparent from the HS explanatory notes relating to heading 2203 of the CN that beer must be considered to be an alcoholic beverage. The classification of a product as a ‘beverage’ within the meaning of the CN depends on whether it is a liquid and is intended for human consumption (Case 114/80 Dr Ritter  [1981] ECR 895, paragraph 9).
37. In any event, the ‘malt beer base’ is not obtained purely and simply by fermentation but is thereafter subjected to ultrafiltration. As a result of this additional treatment, the product in question, which is produced from brewed beer, loses the objective properties and characteristics particular to beer. It does not look like beer and it also does not have the bitter taste specific to beer. According to the information provided by the referring court, the ‘malt beer base’ is a colourless, clear liquid which smells of alcohol and has a slightly bitter taste and an alcoholic strength by volume of 14%, which is used to produce a mixed drink marketed under the designation ‘Salitos Ice’. These objective properties and characteristics do not correspond to those of beer coming under heading 2203 of the CN but do, by contrast, correspond to those of ethyl alcohol under heading 2208 or are, in any event, akin to those properties and characteristics.
Scheuten Solar Technology GmbH v Finanzamt Gelsenkirchen-Süd.
Date: 2011-07-21
24. Recitals 2 to 4 in the preamble to Directive 2003/49 state that the aim of the directive is that double taxation should be eliminated with respect to interest and royalty payments between associated companies of different Member States, and that such payments should be subject to tax once in a single Member State. According to those recitals, the abolition of all taxation of those payments in the Member State where they arise is the most appropriate means of ensuring equality of tax treatment as between national and cross-border transactions.
25. The scope of Directive 2003/49, as defined in Article 1(1) of the directive, thus concerns the exemption of interest and royalty payments arising in their source Member State, provided that the beneficial owner is a company of another Member State or a permanent establishment situated in another Member State of a company of a Member State.
27. In this respect, Article 2(a) of Directive 2003/49 defines that interest as ‘income from debt-claims of every kind’. Only the actual beneficial owner can receive interest which constitutes income from such claims.
Nickel Institute v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions.
Date: 2011-07-21
59. First of all, it should be pointed out that in this complex technical and legal context, which in essence is in a state of flux, Directive 67/548 gives the Commission, in respect of the substance of the assessment, a broad discretion as to the scope of the measures to be taken to adapt the annexes to that directive to technical progress (Case C-425/08 Enviro Tech (Europe)  [2009] ECR I-10035, paragraph 46).
60. In accordance with settled case-law, where the European Union authorities have a broad discretion, in particular as to the assessment of highly complex scientific and technical facts in order to determine the nature and scope of the measures which they adopt, review by the European Union judicature is limited to verifying whether there has been a manifest error of assessment or a misuse of powers, or whether those authorities have manifestly exceeded the limits of their discretion. In such a context, the European Union judicature cannot substitute its assessment of scientific and technical facts for that of the institutions on which alone the EC Treaty has placed that task ( Enviro Tech (Europe) , paragraph 47).
Application of the read-across method in the context of assessment of the intrinsic properties of the nickel substances at issue in the main proceedings
97. Whilst it is true that the Court has held, first, that the statement of reasons for a European Union measure must appear in that measure and, second, that it must be adopted by the author of the measure (see Case C-378/00 Commission  v Parliament and Council  [2003] ECR I-937, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited), the fact remains that the degree of reasoning required varies.
98. Thus, the Court has previously held that the requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations (Case C-333/07 Régie Networks  [2008] ECR I-10807, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).
99. It is also clear from settled case-law that the scope of the obligation to state reasons depends on the nature of the measure in question and that, in the case of measures of general application, the statement of reasons may be confined to indicating the general situation which led to the adoption of the measure and the general objectives which it is intended to achieve. In that context, the Court has repeatedly ruled that if the contested measure clearly discloses the essential objective pursued by the institution, it would be excessive to require a specific statement of reasons for the various technical choices made (see, to this effect, Case C-221/09 AJD Tuna  [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
Károly Nagy v Mezőgazdasági és Vidékfejlesztési Hivatal.
Date: 2011-07-21
41. Next, it should be noted that the system for the identification and registration of the animals must be fully effective and reliable at all times so as, in particular, to enable the competent authorities, in the event of epizootic disease, to pinpoint as soon as possible the origin of an animal and immediately to take the necessary measures for avoiding any risk to public health (see Case C‑45/05 Maatschap Schonewille-Prins  [2007] ECR I‑3997, paragraph 41). In order to meet that need for constant effectiveness and reliability, it is for the keepers of animals to register their bovine animals in the computerised database of that system.
42. It follows, lastly, that the computerised database of the system for the identification and registration of animals is designed to ensure efficient tracing in real time of those animals, which is essential for public health reasons ( Maatschap Schonewille-Prins , paragraph 50). Accordingly, the database is required to be fully reliable. As a consequence, that database alone is able to confirm the fact that the conditions governing eligibility for the aid in question are met, such as those relating to the density of livestock.
47. The Court has consistently held that the principle of equal treatment, enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently, and different situations must not be treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, inter alia, Case C‑354/95 National Farmers’ Union and Others  [1997] ECR I‑4559, paragraph 61; Case C‑152/09 Grootes  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 66; and Case C‑236/09 Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 28).
Generics (UK) Ltd v Synaptech Inc.
Date: 2011-07-28
33. As regards the scope of the regulation, the Court has held, at paragraph 51 of the judgment in Case C‑195/09 Synthon  [2011] ECR I-0000, that Article 2 of Regulation No 1768/92 must be interpreted as meaning that a product, such as that at issue in the main proceedings giving rise to that judgment, which had been placed on the market in the Community as a medicinal product for human use before obtaining a marketing authorisation in accordance with Directive 65/65, and, in particular, without undergoing safety and efficacy testing, was not within the scope of Regulation No 1768/92 and could not therefore be the subject of an SPC.
Andreas Michael Seeger.
Date: 2011-07-28
33. Moreover, it should also be remembered that the conditions for applying Article 13(1)(d), second indent, of Regulation No 561/2006 are to be interpreted strictly, given that that provision constitutes a derogation from Articles 5 to 9 of that regulation.
34. In that regard, it should be noted that, if the interpretation of the concept of ‘materials’ argued for by Mr Seeger were adopted, the derogation in Article 13(1)(d), second indent, of Regulation No 561/2006 would extend, in principle, to all goods of a business nature, which would thus undermine the objectives of that regulation, namely improvement of the working conditions of personnel in the road transport sector and road safety.
35. Such an interpretation would, moreover, go against the requirement laid down in Article 13(1) of the said regulation, in so far as that interpretation would have the consequence, first, that a large number of drivers would no longer benefit from the protection of their working conditions as laid down by Regulation No 561/2006.
36. Secondly, such an extension of the derogation provided for in Article 13(1)(d), second indent, of Regulation No 561/2006 would have the effect that a large number of vehicles would be likely to be driven by such drivers who might thus legally drive long hours without a rest, which would be likely seriously to undermine the objective of road safety.
Office of Communications v Information Commissioner.
Date: 2011-07-28
22. It should be noted that, as is apparent from the scheme of Directive 2003/4 and, in particular, from the second subparagraph of Article 4(2) thereof, and from recital 16 in the preamble thereto, the right to information means that the disclosure of information should be the general rule and that public authorities should be permitted to refuse a request for environmental information only in a few specific and clearly defined cases. The grounds for refusal should therefore be interpreted restrictively, in such a way that the public interest served by disclosure is weighed against the interest served by the refusal.
25. Secondly, it should be observed that, when the interests involved are weighed, a number of separate interests may, cumulatively, militate in favour of disclosure.
26. Recital 1 to Directive 2003/4 sets out the various reasons for disclosure; they include, in particular, ‘a greater awareness of environmental matters, a free exchange of views, more effective participation by the public in environmental decision-making and … a better environment’.
29. That view is not undermined by the emphasis placed in the second sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 4(2) on the duty to weigh the interests involved ‘[i]n every particular case’. Such emphasis is intended to stress that interests must be weighed, not on the basis of a general measure, adopted by the national legislature for example, but on the basis of an actual and specific examination of each situation brought before the competent authorities in connection with a request for access to environmental information made on the basis of Directive 2003/4 (see, to that effect, Case C-266/09 Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Others  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 55 to 58).
Lidl & Companhia v Fazenda Pública.
Date: 2011-07-28
24. In this regard it is to be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case‑law, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, the national court alone has jurisdiction to find and assess the facts in the case before it and to interpret and apply national law. Similarly, it is solely for the national court, before which the dispute has been brought and which must assume responsibility for the judicial decision to be made, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for and the relevance of the questions that it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of European Union law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see Joined Cases C‑165/09 to C‑167/09 Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Others [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 47 and case-law cited).
25. It follows that questions referred for a preliminary ruling concerning European Union law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (Case C‑225/09 Jakubowska [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 28 and case-law cited).
33. As regards, first, point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 78 of Directive 2006/112, the Court has stated that if taxes, duties, levies and charges are to fall within the basis of assessment, even though they do not represent any added value and do not constitute the financial consideration for the supply of the goods, they must be directly linked to that supply (judgment of 22 December 2010 in Case C‑433/09 Commission  v Austria , paragraph 34 and case-law cited).
34. In this regard, it is clear from the case-law that whether or not the supplier of the vehicle has paid a tax in his own name and on his own behalf is decisive in ascertaining whether a tax is to be included in the value of the goods supplied and, if so, that the consideration to be taken into account in computing the taxable amount must, as a general rule, include the amount of the tax in question (see, to that effect, the judgment of 20 May 2010 in Case C‑228/09 Commission  v Poland , paragraph 40).
40. As regards, in the second place, point (c) of the first paragraph of Article 79 of Directive 2006/112, it cannot reasonably be maintained that the expenditure incurred by a registered operator or an authorised operator by way of ISV was incurred in the name and on behalf of the purchaser of the vehicle in question. To that effect, it is enough to state that, as is apparent from paragraph 35 above, the persons liable to pay ISV are the suppliers of the vehicles, not their purchasers (see, by analogy, Commission  v Austria , paragraph 48).
Pacific World Limited and FDD International Limited v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.
Date: 2011-07-28
28. It should be noted that it is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, inter alia, Case C‑142/06 Olicom  [2007] ECR I‑6675, paragraph 16, and Joined Cases C‑362/07 and C‑363/07 Kip Europe and Others  [2008] ECR I‑9489, paragraph 26).
29. It should also be recalled that the HS Explanatory Notes are important means of ensuring the uniform application of the Common Customs Tariff and, as such, may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (see Case C‑11/93 Siemens Nixdorf [1994] ECR I‑1945, paragraph 12; Case C‑382/95 Techex [1997] ECR I‑7363, paragraph 12; Case C‑15/05 Kawasaki Motors Europe [2006] ECR I‑3657, paragraph 36; and Case C‑123/09 Roeckl Sporthandschuhe [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 29).
Goods characteristic of sets such as those at issue in the main proceedings
33. CN General Rule 3(b) provides that goods put up for retail sale in sets, which cannot be classified by reference to CN General Rule 3(a), are to be classified as if they consisted of the component which gives them their essential character, in so far as this criterion is applicable (see Kip Europe and Others , paragraph 49, and Roeckl Sporthandschuhe , paragraph 33).
40. Secondly, it must be noted that, while it is true that the Common Customs Tariff contains, in certain cases, references to manufacturing processes and to the use for which goods are intended, it is generally preferred, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, to employ criteria for classification based on the objective characteristics and properties of products, which can be ascertained when customs clearance is obtained (see Case 38/76 Industriemetall LUMA [1976] ECR 2027, paragraph 7, and Case 40/88 Weber [1989] ECR 1395, paragraph 14).
41. Consequently, the manufacturing processes of a product are decisive only when a tariff heading expressly so provides (see Weber , paragraph 15).
48. According to settled case-law, firstly, the wording used in one language version of a provision of European Union law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. Secondly, the various language versions of a text of European Union law must be given a uniform interpretation and hence, in the case of divergence between the language versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part (see Joined Cases C‑230/09 and C‑231/09 Kurt und Thomas Etling and Others [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).
Lotta Gistö.
Date: 2011-07-28
14. In order to answer that question, it should be observed that Articles 13 and 14 of the Protocol establish a division of fiscal powers between the European Union and the Member State in which the official or other servant had his domicile for tax purposes before entering the service of the European Union (see Case C‑263/91 Kristoffersen  [1993] ECR I‑2755, paragraph 9, and Case C‑88/92 X  [1993] ECR I‑3315, paragraph 11).
15. Under Article 13 of the Protocol, officials and other servants of the European Union are liable to a tax for the benefit of the Union on the salaries, wages and emoluments paid to them by the Union, and those payments are exempt from national taxes (see Kristoffersen , paragraph 10).
16. Under the first paragraph of Article 14 of the Protocol, in the application inter alia of income tax, officials and other servants of the European Union who, solely by reason of the performance of their duties in the service of the Union, establish their residence in the territory of a Member State other than their State of domicile for tax purposes at the time of entering the service of the Union are to be considered, both in the Member State of their actual residence and in the State of domicile for tax purposes, as having maintained their domicile in the latter State provided that it is a member of the European Union (see Kristoffersen , paragraph 11, and X , paragraph 9).
17. It follows that, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 14 of the Protocol, the Member State of origin, in which the domicile of the official or other servant is maintained for tax purposes, remains in principle competent to tax all income, other than salaries, wages and emoluments paid to them by the European Union, of those persons and to subject them to income tax even if they are not actually resident there (see, to that effect, Case C‑209/01 Schilling and Fleck-Schilling  [2003] ECR I‑13389, paragraph 31). What constitutes income tax within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 14 of the Protocol must be determined according to the criteria of the national law applicable (see Kristoffersen , paragraph 12).
21. That interpretation does not contradict the principle of equal treatment, as it is settled case-law that, from the tax point of view, officials and other servants of the European Union and their spouses, in so far as the spouse is not separately engaged in a gainful occupation in the Member State in which the official or other servant performs his duties in the service of the European Union, cannot be regarded as being in the same situation as a migrant worker who becomes established in a Member State other than his State of origin (see, to that effect, Schilling and Fleck-Schilling , paragraph 29).
European Air Transport SA v Collège d'Environnement de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale and Région de Bruxelles-Capitale.
Date: 2011-09-08
24. In that regard, recital 10 in the preamble to that Directive states that the balanced approach constitutes a policy approach to address aeroplane noise, including international guidance for the introduction of operating restrictions on an airport‑by-airport basis. The ‘balanced approach’ to aircraft noise management, defined in Resolution A33-7, adopted by the 33rd ICAO Assembly, comprises four principal elements and requires careful assessment of all different options to mitigate noise, including reduction of aeroplane noise at source, land-use planning and management measures, noise abatement operational procedures and operating restrictions, without prejudice to relevant legal obligations, existing agreements, current laws and established policies (see, in particular, Case C‑442/05 Commission  v Belgium  [2007] ECR I‑4749, paragraph 38).
European Commission v Slovak Republic.
Date: 2011-09-15
41. According to settled case-law, the purpose of the first paragraph of Article 307 EC is to make clear, in accordance with the principles of international law, as set out in, inter alia, Article 30(4)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, that the application of the EC Treaty does not affect the duty of the Member State concerned to respect the rights of non-member countries under a prior agreement and to perform its obligations thereunder (see, to that effect, Case 812/79 Burgoa  [1980] ECR 2787, paragraph 8).
42. Furthermore, in order to determine whether a Community rule may be deprived of effect by an earlier international agreement, it is necessary to examine whether that agreement imposes on the Member State concerned obligations the performance of which may still be required by non-member countries which are parties to it (Case C‑158/91 Levy [1993] ECR I‑4287, paragraph 13).
44. It should, however, be borne in mind that, in its judgment in Case C‑62/98 Commission  v Portugal  [2000] ECR I‑5171, paragraph 49, the Court stated that, although, in the context of Article 307 EC, the Member States have a choice as to the appropriate steps to be taken to eliminate any incompatibilities existing between a pre-Community convention and the EC Treaty, if a Member State encounters difficulties which make adjustment of an agreement impossible, an obligation to denounce that agreement cannot be excluded.
45. In that case the Court had held, inter alia, that, since the agreement in question contained a clause which made express provision for the possibility of denunciation, its denunciation by the Portuguese Republic did not breach the rights which, in that case, the Republic of Angola enjoyed under it ( Commission  v Portugal , paragraph 46).