Sonia Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA.
Date: 2006-07-11
29. The question principally referred concerns in particular the interpretation of the concept of ‘disability’ for the purpose of Directive 2000/78. The Court’s interpretation of that concept is intended to enable the referring court to decide whether Ms Chacón Navas was, at the time of her dismissal, on account of her sickness, a person with a disability for the purpose of that directive who enjoyed the protection provided for in Article 3(1)(c) thereof.
32. As regards Eurest’s argument that it dismissed Ms Chacón Navas without reference to the fact that she was absent from work on grounds of sickness because, at that time, her services were no longer necessary, it must be recalled that, in proceedings under Article 234 EC, which are based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, any assessment of the facts in the case is a matter for the national court. Similarly, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C‑326/00 IKA  [2003] ECR I‑1703, paragraph 27, and Case C‑145/03 Keller  [2005] ECR I‑2529, paragraph 33).
33. Nevertheless, the Court has also stated that, in exceptional circumstances, it can examine the conditions in which the case was referred to it by the national court, in order to confirm its own jurisdiction (see, to that effect, Case 244/80 Foglia  [1981] ECR 3045, paragraph 21). The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra  [2001] ECR I‑2099, paragraph 39, and Case C‑35/99 Arduino  [2002] ECR I‑1529, paragraph 25).
40. It follows from the need for uniform application of Community law and the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of Community law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community, having regard to the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, inter alia, Case 327/82 Ekro  [1984] ECR 107, paragraph 11, and Case C‑323/03 Commission v Spain  [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 32).
41. As is apparent from Article 1, the purpose of Directive 2000/78 is to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination based on any of the grounds referred to in that article, which include disability, as regards employment and occupation.
43. Directive 2000/78 aims to combat certain types of discrimination as regards employment and occupation. In that context, the concept of ‘disability’ must be understood as referring to a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or psychological impairments and which hinders the participation of the person concerned in professional life.
44. However, by using the concept of ‘disability’ in Article 1 of that directive, the legislature deliberately chose a term which differs from ‘sickness’. The two concepts cannot therefore simply be treated as being the same.
45. Recital 16 in the preamble to Directive 2000/78 states that the ‘provision of measures to accommodate the needs of disabled people at the workplace plays an important role in combating discrimination on grounds of disability’. The importance which the Community legislature attaches to measures for adapting the workplace to the disability demonstrates that it envisaged situations in which participation in professional life is hindered over a long period of time. In order for the limitation to fall within the concept of ‘disability’, it must therefore be probable that it will last for a long time.
47. It follows from the above considerations that a person who has been dismissed by his employer solely on account of sickness does not fall within the general framework laid down for combating discrimination on grounds of disability by Directive 2000/78.
Protection of disabled persons as regards dismissal
48. Unfavourable treatment on grounds of disability undermines the protection provided for by Directive 2000/78 only in so far as it constitutes discrimination within the meaning of Article 2(1) of that directive.
51. The prohibition, as regards dismissal, of discrimination on grounds of disability contained in Articles 2(1) and 3(1)(c) of Directive 2000/78 precludes dismissal on grounds of disability which, in the light of the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities, is not justified by the fact that the person concerned is not competent, capable and available to perform the essential functions of  his post.
52. It follows from all the above considerations that the answer to the first question must be that:
– a person who has been dismissed by his employer solely on account of sickness does not fall within the general framework laid down for combating discrimination on grounds of disability by Directive 2000/78;
– the prohibition, as regards dismissal, of discrimination on grounds of disability contained in Articles 2(1) and 3(1)(c) of Directive 2000/78 precludes dismissal on grounds of disability which, in the light of the  obligation to provide reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities, is not justified by the fact that the person concerned is not competent, capable and available to perform the essential functions of  his post.
The second question
55. Article 13 EC and Article 137 EC, read in conjunction with Article 136 EC, contain only the rules governing the competencies of the Community. Moreover, Article 13 EC does not refer to discrimination on grounds of sickness as such in addition to discrimination on grounds of disability, and cannot therefore even constitute a legal basis for Council measures to combat such discrimination.
56. It is true that fundamental rights which form an integral part of the general principles of Community law include the general principle of non-discrimination. That principle is therefore binding on Member States where the national situation at issue in the main proceedings falls within the scope of Community law (see, to that effect, Case C‑442/00 Rodríguez Caballero  [2002] ECR I‑11915, paragraphs 30 and 32, and Case C‑112/00 Schmidberger  [2003] ECR I‑5659, paragraph 75, and the case‑law cited). However, it does not follow from this that the scope of Directive 2000/78 should be extended by analogy beyond the discrimination based on the grounds listed exhaustively in Article 1 thereof.
57. The answer to the second question must therefore be that sickness cannot as such be regarded as a ground in addition to those in relation to which Directive 2000/78 prohibits discrimination.
Costs