C and A v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie.
Date: 2018-11-07
29


It should be noted, first, that Article 2(c) of Directive 2003/86 states that the term ‘sponsor’ necessarily refers to a third country national and, second, that Article 3(3) of that directive provides that the directive is not to apply to members of the family of a Union citizen.
30


The EU legislature did not therefore intend the directive to apply to a third country national family member of an EU citizen who has not exercised his right of free movement, such as the applicants in the main proceedings, as indeed corroborated by the travaux préparatoires for Directive 2003/86 (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2011, Dereci and Others, C‑256/11, EU:C:2011:734, paragraphs 48 and 49).
31


It is clear, however, from the Court’s settled case-law that the Court has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on questions concerning provisions of EU law in situations in which, even if the facts of the case in the main proceedings do not fall directly within the field of application of EU law, provisions of EU law have been rendered applicable by domestic law due to a renvoi made by that law to the content of those provisions (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2011, Cicala, C‑482/10, EU:C:2011:868, paragraph 17; of 18 October 2012, Nolan, C‑583/10, EU:C:2012:638, paragraph 45; and of 15 November 2016, Ullens de Schooten, C‑268/15, EU:C:2016:874, paragraph 53).
32


In such circumstances, it is clearly in the interest of the European Union that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, provisions taken from EU law should be interpreted uniformly (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 October 2012, Nolan, C‑583/10, EU:C:2012:638, paragraph 46, and of 22 March 2018, Jacob and Lassus, C‑327/16 and C‑421/16, EU:C:2018:210, paragraph 34).
33


Thus, an interpretation by the Court of provisions of EU law in situations not falling within the scope of EU law is warranted where such provisions have been made directly and unconditionally applicable to such situations by national law, in order to ensure that those situations and situations falling within the scope of EU law are treated in the same way (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2011, Cicala, C‑482/10, EU:C:2011:868, paragraph 19; of 18 October 2012, Nolan, C‑583/10, EU:C:2012:638, paragraph 47; and of 7 November 2013, Romeo, C‑313/12, EU:C:2013:718, paragraph 33).
34


In the present case, the referring court, with exclusive jurisdiction to interpret national law under the framework of the system of judicial cooperation enshrined in Article 267 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 July 1997, Leur-Bloem, C‑28/95, EU:C:1997:369, paragraph 33, and of 14 June 2017,Online Games and Others, C‑685/15, EU:C:2017:452, paragraph 45), has made clear that it follows from Dutch law that, where, as in the present case, the national legislature subjects one situation falling within the scope of EU law and another outwith the scope of EU law to the same rule, those situations must be treated in the same way. The referring court infers that it was, under Dutch law, required to apply Article 15 of Directive 2003/86 to the cases in the main proceedings.
36


That conclusion cannot be called into question by the fact that Article 3(3) of Directive 2003/86 expressly excludes situations such as those at issue in the main proceedings from the scope of that directive.
37


It is to be noted, in that regard, that the Court has previously held that, where the condition stated in paragraph 33 above is satisfied, it may also have jurisdiction in situations covered by an express exclusion from the scope of EU legislation (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 October 2017, Solar Electric Martinique, C‑303/16, EU:C:2017:773, paragraphs 29 and 30, and of 27 June 2018, SGI and Valériane, C‑459/17 and C‑460/17, EU:C:2018:501, paragraph 28).
38


That solution is fully in line with the Court’s settled case-law set out in paragraphs 31 to 33 above, which is precisely intended to allow the Court to rule on the interpretation of provisions of EU law, irrespective of the circumstances in which those provisions are applicable, in situations which the drafters of the Treaties or the EU legislature did not consider it useful to include within the scope of those provisions (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 October 1990, Dzodzi, C‑297/88 and C‑197/89, EU:C:1990:360, paragraph 37).
39


In that context, it cannot be justified for the Court’s jurisdiction to vary depending on whether the scope of the relevant provision was limited by a definition of the cases to which it refers or by means of certain exclusions from its scope, since both legislative techniques may be used interchangeably.
40


It must indeed be held that, in the present case, the exclusion of family members of EU citizens from the scope of Directive 2003/86 is a consequence both of the definition of the term ‘sponsor’ given in Article 2(c) of that directive and of the exclusion set out in Article 3(3) thereof.
41


In addition, although the referring court has expressed doubts as to the jurisdiction of the Court according to the judgment of 18 October 2012, Nolan (C‑583/10, EU:C:2012:638), it should be noted that the case which gave rise to that judgment was characterised by particularities which do not apply to the cases in the main proceedings.
42


First, in the case which gave rise to that judgment, to have held that the Court had jurisdiction would have meant a departure from the logic underpinning the EU legislation at issue, which furthered the establishment or functioning of the internal market (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 October 2012, Nolan, C‑583/10, EU:C:2012:638, paragraphs 36 to 41).
43


Second, on the basis of the information in the file before the Court, it could not be ascertained in that case, as has been found in paragraph 35 above, whether the national law referred directly and unconditionally to EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 October 2012, Nolan, C‑583/10, EU:C:2012:638, paragraphs 51 and 52).
49


By introducing a reference to national law in Article 15(4) of Directive 2003/86, the EU legislature thereby indicated that it wished to leave to the discretion of each Member State the responsibility for determining the conditions under which an autonomous residence permit should be issued to a third country national who has resided over five years in that Member State by virtue of family reunification (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 April 2018, A and S, C‑550/16, EU:C:2018:248, paragraph 42).
50


In that regard, the rules governing the grant of an autonomous residence permit therefore differ from the rules relating to authorisation of family reunification, which include specific positive obligations and require the Member States, in cases determined by Directive 2003/86, to authorise that reunification without exercising their discretion (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2015, K and A, C‑153/14, EU:C:2015:453, paragraph 46).
51


Nevertheless, since the grant of an autonomous permit at the end of the period referred to in Article 15(1) of that directive is a general rule, the latitude left to the Member States by Article 15(4) of the directive must not be used by them in a manner which would undermine the objective and effectiveness of that article, which is, as stated in recital 15 thereof, to allow family members to be granted a status independent of that of the sponsor (see, by analogy, judgment of 9 July 2015, K and A, C‑153/14, EU:C:2015:453, paragraph 50).
52


Therefore, further conditions to which a Member State subjects the grant of an autonomous residence permit cannot be so onerous as to constitute a difficult obstacle to overcome, preventing, in practice, the third country nationals referred to in Article 15(1) of Directive 2003/86 from validly obtaining such a permit at the end of the period referred to in that provision (see, by analogy, judgment of 9 July 2015, K and A, C‑153/14, EU:C:2015:453, paragraph 59).
55


In the first place, laying down conditions in respect of integration appears in line with the general objective set by the EU legislature of facilitating the integration of third country nationals in Member States, as referred to in recital 15 of Directive 2003/86 (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 June 2006, Parliament v Council, C‑540/03, EU:C:2006:429, paragraph 69, and of 9 July 2015, K and A, C‑153/14, EU:C:2015:453, paragraph 53).
60


However, in order to further the objective of that provision and in accordance with the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law, the detailed rules for such a requirement must be suitable for achieving the objectives of the national legislation and must not go beyond what is necessary to attain them (see, by analogy, judgment of 9 July 2015, K and A, C‑153/14, EU:C:2015:453, paragraph 51).
61


The requirement to pass a civic integration examination must be capable of proving that the third country nationals in question have acquired knowledge of the language and society of the host Member State, which is undeniably useful for ensuring their integration within that Member State (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 June 2015, P and S, C‑579/13, EU:C:2015:369, paragraph 48, and of 9 July 2015, K and A, C‑153/14, EU:C:2015:453, paragraphs 53 and 54).
63


That implies, in particular, that the knowledge required to pass the civic integration examination is at a basic level, that the condition imposed by the national legislation does not lead to an autonomous residence permit not being granted to third country nationals who have demonstrated their willingness to pass the examination and have made every effort to achieve that objective, that due account is taken of specific individual circumstances and that the fees relating to that examination are not excessive (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2015, K and A, C‑153/14, EU:C:2015:453, paragraphs 54 to 70).
64


In that regard, it should be noted, in particular, that circumstances, such as the age, level of education, economic situation or health of a sponsor’s relevant family members, must lead the competent authorities not to subject the grant of an autonomous residence permit to passing a civic integration examination, when, due to those circumstances, they are unable to take or pass that examination (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2015, K and A, C‑153/14, EU:C:2015:453, paragraph 58).