Council of the European Union v Nadiany Bamba.
Date: 2012-11-15
40. The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in an appeal is limited to review of the findings of law on the pleas argued before the court of first instance. Consequently, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction, in such proceedings, solely to examine whether the argument within the appeal identifies an error of law vitiating the judgment under appeal (see, to that effect, Case C‑352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil  v Commission  [2000] ECR I‑5291, paragraph 35; Case C‑76/01 P Eurocoton and Others  v Council  [2003] ECR I‑10091, paragraph 47; and Case C‑348/06 P Commission  v Girardot [2008] ECR I‑833, paragraph 49).
41. The extent of the obligation to state the reasons for an act adopted by an institution of the European Union is a question of law reviewable by the Court on appeal (see, to that effect, Case C‑188/96 P Commission  v V  [1997] ECR I‑6561, paragraph 24, and Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others  v Commission  [2005] ECR I‑5425, paragraph 453).
49. According to a consistent body of case‑law, the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an act adversely affecting an individual is based, which is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the act is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested before the European Union judicature and, second, to enable that judicature to review the legality of that act (see Case C‑199/99 P Corus UK  v Commission  [2003] ECR I‑11177, paragraph 145; Dansk Rørindustri and Others  v Commission , paragraph 462; and Case C‑521/09 P Elf Aquitaine  v Commission  [2011] ECR I‑8947, paragraph 148).
50. The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in such a way as to enable the person concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measures and to enable the court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P Al-Aqsa  v Council  and Netherlands  v Al-Aqsa  [2012] ECR, paragraph 138 and the case‑law cited).
51. As the General Court pointed out in paragraph 40 of the judgment under appeal, where the person concerned is not afforded the opportunity to be heard before the adoption of an initial decision to freeze funds, compliance with the obligation to state reasons is all the more important because it constitutes the sole safeguard enabling the person concerned, at least after the adoption of that decision, to make effective use of the legal remedies available to him in order to challenge the lawfulness of that decision.
52. Therefore, the statement of reasons for an act of the Council which imposes a measure freezing funds must, as the General Court rightly stated in paragraph 47 of the judgment under appeal, identify the actual and specific reasons why the Council considers, in the exercise of its discretion, that that measure must be adopted in respect of the person concerned.
53. The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must, however, be appropriate to the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, inter alia, Case C‑367/95 P Commission  v Sytraval and Brink’s France [1998] ECR I‑1719, paragraph 63; Elf Aquitaine  v Commission , paragraph 150; and Al-Aqsa  v Council  and Netherlands  v Al-Aqsa , paragraphs 139 and 140).
54. In particular, the reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that measure was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him to understand the scope of the measure concerning him (Case C‑301/96 Germany  v Commission  [2003] ECR I‑9919, paragraph 89, and Case C‑42/01 Portugal  v Commission  [2004] ECR I‑6079, paragraphs 69 and 70).
60. It is also important to point out that the question of the statement of reasons, which concerns an essential procedural requirement, is separate from that of the evidence of the alleged conduct, which concerns the substantive legality of the act in question and involves assessing the truth of the facts set out in that act and the characterisation of those facts as evidence justifying the use of restrictive measures against the person concerned (see, to that effect, Case C‑66/02 Italy  v Commission  [2005] ECR I‑10901, paragraph 26, and Case C‑548/09 P Bank Melli Iran  v Council  [2011] ECR I‑11381, paragraph 88).
61. Thus, in the present case, review of compliance with the obligation to state reasons, which is intended to ascertain whether the notes provided by the Council in the contested acts were sufficient to allow the evidence which led that institution to impose restrictive measures against Ms Bamba to be known, must be distinguished from examination of the merits of the statement of reasons, which would consist, if appropriate, of ascertaining whether the evidence relied on by the Council is established and whether it is capable of justifying the adoption of those measures.
74. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in order to attain the objective pursued by the contested acts, the restrictive measures in question must, by their very nature, have a surprise effect. For that reason, the Council was not obliged to hear Ms Bamba before her name was included for the first time in the lists in question (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation  v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I‑6351, paragraphs 340 and 341, and Case C‑27/09 P France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran [2011] ECR I‑13427, paragraph 61).
81. That statement, combined with the statements in the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, was such as to enable Ms Bamba to identify both the remedy available to her in order to contest her inclusion in the lists in question and the time-limit for bringing an action which is, moreover, confirmed by the fact that she brought her action within the period prescribed by that provision.
85. In that regard, it is apparent from the reference made, in that second plea, to paragraphs 368 to 371 of the judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation  v Council and Commission , in which the Court found that an unjustified restriction of the right to property of the person concerned had taken place on the ground that restrictive measures had been adopted against him without his being furnished with any procedural guarantees enabling him to put his case to the competent authorities, that Ms Bamba infers the existence of a threat to her right to property from an alleged absence of such guarantees in the present case.