larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Kingdom of the Netherlands v Council of the European Union.
Date: 1996-04-30
24 According to the Court' s case-law (see, in particular, Case C-135/93 Spain v Commission [1995] ECR I-1651, paragraph 20), an action for annulment must be available in the case of all measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have legal effects.
35 In addition, at Community level, the importance of that right has been reaffirmed on various occasions, in particular in the declaration on the right of access to information annexed (as Declaration 17) to the Final Act of the Treaty on European Union, which links that right with the democratic nature of the institutions. Moreover, as appears from paragraphs 3 and 6 of this judgment, the European Council has called on the Council and the Commission on several occasions to implement that right.
36 It was in order to conform to this trend, which discloses a progressive affirmation of individuals' right of access to documents held by public authorities, that the Council deemed it necessary to amend the rules governing its internal organization, which had hitherto been based on the principle of confidentiality.
37 So long as the Community legislature has not adopted general rules on the right of public access to documents held by the Community institutions, the institutions must take measures as to the processing of such requests by virtue of their power of internal organization, which authorizes them to take appropriate measures in order to ensure their internal operation in conformity with the interests of good administration.
38 The fact that Decision 93/731 has legal effects vis-à-vis third parties cannot call in question its categorization as a measure of internal organization. There is nothing to prevent rules on the internal organization of the work of an institution having such effects (see, in particular, Case C-69/89 Nakajima v Council [1991] ECR I-2069, paragraphs 49 and 50, and Case C-137/92 P Commission v BASF and Others [1994] ECR I-2555, paragraphs 75 and 76).
41 As regards the plea alleging infringement of the principle of institutional balance, suffice it to say that, in so far as the decision at issue is one of the acts which the Council is empowered to adopt by virtue of its power of internal organization, the fact that it did not involve the Parliament in its adoption cannot detract from the Parliament' s prerogatives, which include participation, where provided for in the Treaties, in the process of the drafting of legislative measures (see, in particular, Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council [1990] ECR I-2041, paragraphs 21 and 28).
Article 22 of the Council' s Rules of Procedure
Ingrid Boukhalfa v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Date: 1996-04-30
13 It must be borne in mind that not only Article 48 of the Treaty but also regulations, as institutional acts adopted on the basis of the Treaty, apply in principle to the same geographical area as the Treaty itself (Case 61/77 Commission v Ireland [1978] ECR 417, paragraph 46).
15 The Court has consistently held that provisions of Community law may apply to professional activities pursued outside Community territory as long as the employment relationship retains a sufficiently close link with the Community (see, in particular, Case 237/83 Prodest v Caisse Primaire d' Assurance Maladie de Paris [1984] ECR 3153, paragraph 6, Case 9/88 Lopes da Veiga v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1989] ECR 2989, paragraph 15, and Case C-60/93 Aldewereld v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1994] ECR I-2991, paragraph 14). That principle must be deemed to extend also to cases in which there is a sufficiently close link between the employment relationship, on the one hand, and the law of a Member State and thus the relevant rules of Community law, on the other.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 1996-05-02
17 It should be noted in this regard that the Court has consistently held that the question whether there has been a failure to fulfil obligations must be examined on the basis of the position in which the Member State found itself at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (Case C-200/88 Commission v Greece [1990] ECR I-4299, paragraph 13).
41 Whilst it appears from that provision that Member States may always specify certain "types" of projects as being subject to assessment or may establish criteria and/or thresholds for determining which projects are to be subject to assessment, it must be emphasized that that power of the Member States is conferred within each of the classes listed in Annex II. This means that the Community legislature itself considered that all the classes of projects listed in Annex II may possibly have significant effects on the environment depending on the characteristics exhibited by those projects at the time when they were drawn up.
42 It follows that the criteria and/or the thresholds mentioned in Article 4(2) are designed to facilitate the examination of the actual characteristics exhibited by a given project in order to determine whether it is subject to the requirement to carry out an assessment and not to exempt in advance from that obligation certain whole classes of projects listed in Annex II which may be envisaged on the territory of a Member State.
43 Consequently, Article 4(2) does not empower the Member States to exclude generally and definitively from possible assessment one or more classes mentioned in Annex II.
56 Since the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its specific obligations under the directive, no purpose is served by considering the question whether it has thereby also failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 5 of the Treaty (see Case C-374/89 Commission v Belgium [1991] ECR I-367, paragraph 13).
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1996-05-02
12 The first point to note is that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-259/94 Commission v Greece [1995] ECR I-1947, paragraph 5).
13 Secondly, the effect of the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty is that Community directives must be implemented by appropriate implementing measures taken by the Member States. Only in specific circumstances, in particular where a Member State has failed to take the implementing measures required or has adopted measures which do not conform to a directive, has the Court recognized the right of persons affected thereby to rely in law on a directive as against a defaulting Member State. This minimum guarantee, arising from the binding nature of the obligation imposed on the Member States by the effect of directives under the third paragraph of Article 189, cannot justify a Member State absolving itself from taking in due time implementing measures sufficient to meet the purpose of each directive (see, in particular, Case C-433/93 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I-2303, paragraph 24). The German Government' s argument based on the direct effect of the directive cannot therefore be accepted either.
Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 1996-05-02
7 It has consistently been held that mere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the administration and are not given the appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the proper fulfilment of a Member State' s obligations under the Treaty (see inter alia Case C-242/94 Commission v Spain [1995] ECR I-3031, paragraph 6). The Greek Government' s argument based on the distribution of the ministerial circular cannot therefore be accepted.
A. Maas & Co. NV v Belgische Dienst voor Bedrijfsleven en Landbouw, now the Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau.
Date: 1996-05-23
37 As regards the agent' s failure to make observations or reservations, it is sufficient to state that, as far as the successful tenderer is concerned, his legal relations are not with the recipient country or its agent, but with the national intervention agency of the exporting Member State and those relations are governed by Community law (see Case 56/86 Société pour l' Exportation des Sucres v OBEA [1987] ECR 1423, paragraph 14).
Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 1996-05-23
10 The Court has previously held that the specific connection rule for transport services laid down in Article 9(2)(b) of the Sixth Directive is intended to ensure that each Member State taxes transport services as regards the parts of the journey carried out in its territory (Case C-30/89 Commission v France [1990] ECR I-691, paragraph 16). That article therefore requires Member States to charge VAT on services supplied by operators organizing round trips by sea as regards the part of the journey within territorial waters. That is, moreover, recognized by the Hellenic Republic itself.
12 First of all, the Hellenic Republic may not rely on the practical difficulties confronting it in order to refuse to charge VAT on round trips by sea. Such difficulties do not suffice, in any event, to establish the absolute impossibility for the defendant of properly implementing the Sixth Directive as laid down in the case-law (see, to that effect, Case C-74/91 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-5437, paragraph 12). Moreover, at the hearing, the Commission stated that it was willing to consider the possibility of flat-rate tax on such trips, by way of exception, if the Hellenic Republic proved that there existed serious administrative difficulties.
14 The Hellenic Republic also cannot rely on the absence of the definitive rules for charging VAT on passenger transport provided for in Article 28(5) of the Sixth Directive. Even if it is true that maintenance on a transitional basis of taxation rules which differ as between the Member States may give rise to distortions of competition, that fact cannot authorize the Hellenic Republic not to apply Articles 2 and 9 of the Sixth Directive correctly and thereby itself to create distortions of that kind to the detriment of the Member States which transposed the Sixth Directive correctly (see Commission v Germany, paragraph 25).
16 First, passenger transport must, in principle, be subject to VAT as regards parts of a journey carried out within territorial waters. It may be exempted from that tax only on the basis of the derogation provisions of the Sixth Directive, such as Article 28(3)(b). The Hellenic Republic cannot effectively rely on the fact that other Member States exempt those transport operations from VAT without authorization to do so in order not to apply the provisions of the Sixth Directive correctly (see, to that effect, Case C-146/89 Commission v United Kingdom [1991] ECR I-3533, paragraph 47).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 1996-06-06
10 Access to and the exercise of certain self-employed activities may thus be conditional on compliance with provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action justified by the general interest, such as rules relating to organization, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision and liability (judgments in Case 71/76 Thieffry v Conseil de l' Ordre des Avocats à la Cour de Paris [1977] ECR 765, paragraph 12, and Case C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dell' Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-4165, paragraph 35). Those provisions may stipulate in particular that the exercise of a specific activity is restricted to persons presenting certain guarantees and subject to particular rules or supervision.
11 Where access to or the exercise of a specific activity is subject to such conditions in the host Member State, a national of another Member State who wishes to exercise that activity must in principle comply with them (Gebhard, paragraph 36).
13 That article prohibits any discrimination against nationals of other Member States resulting from national legislation, regulations or practices (see to that effect the judgments in Case 270/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 273, paragraphs 13 and 14, and Case C-168/91 Konstantinidis [1993] ECR I-1191, paragraph 12). It prohibits in particular all national rules which are liable to place nationals of other Member States in a legal or factual situation which is less favourable than the situation, in the same circumstances, of a national of the Member State of establishment (Konstantinidis, paragraph 13).
26 Even if the aims pursued by the Italian legislation may be regarded as aims of "public policy" within the meaning of those provisions, it follows a fortiori from what has been said above that the obligations at issue are not indispensable for achieving those aims and thus cannot be regarded as justified from the point of view of those provisions (see the judgment in Case C-3/88 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 4035, paragraph 15).
27 Finally, the Italian Government cannot plead failure to respect the principle of reciprocity or rely on a possible infringement of the Treaty by another Member State to justify its own default (see the judgments in Case 232/78 Commission v France [1979] ECR 2729, paragraph 9, and Case 325/82 Commission v Germany [1984] ECR 777, paragraph 11).
31 The obligation for operators from other Member States to set up their principal establishment in Italy is the very negation of the freedom to provide services and, as can be seen from paragraphs 20 to 24 above, does not constitute a condition which is indispensable for attaining the aim pursued. It therefore infringes Article 59 of the Treaty (see the judgment in Case 205/84 Commission v Germany [1986] ECR 3755, paragraph 52).
The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte H. & R. Ecroyd Holdings Ltd and John Rupert Ecroyd.
Date: 1996-06-06
18 Following various judgments, and in particular the judgment in Case C-314/89 Rauh v Hauptzollamt Nuernberg-Fuerth [1991] ECR I-1647 ("the judgment in Rauh") concerning the interpretation and validity of Article 3a, the Council adopted Regulation No 1639/91 of 13 June 1991, cited above, which once again amended the milk quota rules.
47 Further, the principal aim of Regulation No 1078/77 was to re-establish equilibrium in the market for milk and milk products, on which there was a substantial surplus, by introducing a system of premiums for the non-marketing of milk and milk products.
48 Under the system established by that regulation, non-marketing for a period of five years was the essential condition for the grant of the premium.
49 The actual observance by a successor to an agricultural holding, such as Ecroyd Limited, of the undertaking given by its predecessor not to market milk or milk products during the non-marketing period fulfils both the condition and the aim referred to above.
50 Consequently, the failure to perform a mere formality, such as the giving of an undertaking to continue to perform the obligation entered into by his predecessor, cannot be regarded as causing the successor to an agricultural holding to be excluded from the non-marketing scheme, as would be the case if he had not in fact observed the non-marketing undertaking.
59 Following the ruling in Wehrs that the anti-accumulation rule was invalid but before adoption of Regulation No 2055/93 and in the presence of a complex system such as that of milk quotas, the state of the law relevant to the present case did not (as is shown, in substance, in points 76 to 87 of the Advocate General' s Opinion, and as is confirmed by the recitals in the preamble to Regulation No 2055/93) of itself, that is to say without readjustment of that system, permit the allocation of a special reference quantity to a producer in the situation of Ecroyd Limited.
69 In its judgment in Rauh the Court held that Article 3a had to be interpreted as permitting a producer, who had taken over a holding through an inheritance or similar means after the expiry of a non-marketing undertaking, to obtain, on the same basis as the originator of the inheritance himself, the award of a special reference quantity under the conditions laid down in Article 3a (paragraphs 19 and 25).
70 Following that judgment, Article 3a was amended by Regulation No 1639/91 so as to enable producers in the situation described in the previous paragraph who had not made an application within the prescribed period or whose application had been rejected, to make an application or repeat one already made.
Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1996-06-06
36 Where the Commission refuses to charge expenditure to the EAGGF on the ground that it was incurred as a result of breaches of Community rules imputable to a Member State, it is for the Member State to show that the conditions for obtaining the financing disallowed are satisfied (Case C-385/89 Greece v Commission [1992] ECR I-3225, paragraph 30). That case-law also applies in circumstances such as the present where on the basis of conclusive results of the testing of samples and an inspection of the production facilities the Commission decides that the Member State in question has not satisfied the obligation to check adequately the quality of the canned meat before releasing the delivery security and paying to the producer the amount indicated in his tender.
Binder GmbH & Co. International v Hauptzollamt Stuttgart-West.
Date: 1996-06-13
17 According to established case-law (see Case 345/82 Wuensche v Germany [1984] ECR 1995, paragraph 21, and Joined Cases C-296/93 and C-307/93 France and Ireland v Commission [1996] ECR I-795, paragraph 32), it must be verified whether the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment in its evaluation of the market in question.
22 In those circumstances, the Commission did not commit a manifest error of assessment by finding that there was a likelihood of serious disturbances on the Community market, which might endanger the objectives set out in Article 39 of the EC Treaty.
The reasons stated for the contested regulations
25 The Court has consistently held (see, in particular, France and Ireland v Commission, cited above, paragraph 72), that the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the EEC Treaty must be appropriate to the nature of the measure in dispute. It must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the Community institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to make the persons concerned aware of the justification for the measure and enable the Court to exercise its power of review.
34 Furthermore, having regard to the mean prices set by the voluntary-restraint agreements for previous years (ECU 845 per tonne for 1986/87, ECU 860 per tonne for 1987/88 and ECU 880 per tonne for 1988/89 and 1989/90) and the protective nature of the measures at issue, it has not been established ° as required by the case-law of the Court of Justice ° that the amount of ECU 88 per 100 kg, fixed for frozen strawberries without added sugar by Regulation No 2198/90, or that of ECU 92 per 100 kg, fixed by Regulation No 3797/90, exceed the level required to make the protective measures effective (see Case 77/86 The Queen v Customs and Excise, ex parte National Dried Fruit Trade Association [1988] ECR 757, paragraph 22).
Criminal proceedings against Jean-Louis Maurin.
Date: 1996-06-13
9 As is clear in particular from the first and eighth recitals in the preamble to Directive 79/112, that directive represents, as the Court has already stated, the initial stage of a harmonization process which is designed progressively to eliminate all obstacles to the free movement of foodstuffs resulting from the differences which exist between the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States with respect to the labelling of those products (judgment in Case C-17/93 Van der Veldt [1994] ECR I-3537, paragraph 26).
11 In contrast, the directive does not regulate the sale of foodstuffs complying with its requirements in respect of labelling and does not therefore impose any obligation on Member States where, as in the present case, there is a sale of products which comply with the directive but whose use-by date has expired.
12 It follows that the offence with which Mr Maurin is charged involves national legislation falling outside the scope of Community law and that the Court therefore does not have jurisdiction to determine whether the procedural rules applicable to such an offence amount to a breach of the principles concerning observance of the rights of the defence and of the adversarial nature of proceedings (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwaebisch Gmuend [1987] ECR 3719, paragraph 28).
Office national de l'emploi v Calogero Spataro.
Date: 1996-06-13
10 In Case C-163/89 Di Conti [1990] ECR I-1829, the Court held that Article 69(4) could not be interpreted without regard to the particular nature of the Belgian legislation, in particular Article 123 of the Royal Decree under which a worker who has become unemployed retains his status as a person entitled to unemployment benefit if the benefit has been interrupted for a period of less than three years. It therefore ruled that an unemployed person who returns to Belgium after the expiry of the period of three months laid down in Article 69(1)(c) requalifies for benefits under the Belgian unemployment benefit scheme on condition only that he has retained the status of an entitled person under Belgian legislation and that he has been employed for at least three months since his return to Belgium.
15 First, as the Court noted in Di Conti, at paragraph 12, Article 69(4) of the Regulation merely requires that an unemployed person who returns to Belgium must be employed there again for three months in order to requalify for benefits; it thus concerns requalification for benefits and not acquisition of entitlement thereto. Moreover, that provision was not concerned with conditions for acquisition of entitlement to unemployment benefits under Belgian law, but was enacted in return for unemployed persons being able under Belgian law to retain their right to benefits for quite a long period while not remaining available to the Belgian employment services (paragraph 16 of Di Conti).
16 Secondly, while a migrant worker loses his entitlement to unemployment benefits under the law of the competent State if he does not return there before the three- month period has expired, as pointed out in paragraph 7 of this judgment, that does not mean that he cannot acquire that entitlement anew in accordance with the conditions that normally apply under the law of that State. If that were not so, he would be in a less favourable position than if he had not claimed the benefit of Article 69 of the Regulation. The effect of the interpretation advanced by the Office National de l' Emploi and the Belgian Government would be to discourage the mobility of persons seeking employment that Article 69 seeks to promote, by making it more difficult for a worker who has exercised the right given to him by Article 69 to be entitled to unemployment benefit than for workers in Belgium as a whole (paragraph 13 of Di Conti).