Società Edilizia Turistica Alberghiera Residenziale (SETAR) SpA v Comune di Quartu S. Elena.
Date: 2014-12-18
31. In that regard, it should be noted that the Court has consistently held that, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, it may not rule on the compatibility with EU law of a provision of national law or interpret national legislation or rules (see, to that effect, the judgment in Vueling Airlines , C‑487/12, EU:C:2014:2232, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
32. However, the Court does have jurisdiction to provide the referring court with all the guidance as to the interpretation of EU law necessary to enable that court to make its own ruling on whether or not such provisions are compatible with EU law for the purposes of resolving the dispute before it (see, inter alia, the judgment in Lombardini and Mantovani , C‑285/99 and C‑286/99, EU:C:2001:640, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
36. In order to answer the first part of the question, thus reformulated, it must be borne in mind that the obligation on a Member State to take all the measures necessary to achieve the result prescribed by a directive is a binding obligation imposed by the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU and by Directive 2008/98 itself. That duty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, is binding on all the authorities of Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (see, inter alia, the judgment in Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging , C‑127/02, EU:C:2004:482, paragraph 65).
37. It is also settled law that, even in cases where Member States have a broad discretion, when transposing directives, as to the choice of method, they are nevertheless under a duty to ensure that the directive is fully effective and to meet the deadlines set therein, so that implementation is achieved uniformly throughout the European Union (see, to that effect, the judgment in Commission  v Italy , 10/76, EU:C:1976:125, paragraph 12).
44. In particular, Article 4(1) of Directive 2008/98, which establishes the waste hierarchy as it should be applied in waste prevention and management legislation and policy, does not support the inference that priority must be accorded to a system which permits waste producers to dispose of that waste independently. On the contrary, waste disposal is placed last in that order of precedence.
46. The correctness of that interpretation is also borne out by Article 14 of Directive 2008/98, concerning the distribution of waste management costs. That provision, which is in all essential respects identical to Article 15 of Directive 2006/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on waste (OJ 2006 L 114, p. 9), which it replaced, places Member States under a duty to ensure that all waste producers and waste holders collectively bear the cost of a waste management system (see, to that effect, the judgment in Futura Immobiliare and Others , C‑254/08, EU:C:2009:479, paragraph 46). The interpretation advocated by SETAR, on the other hand, would deprive Article 14 of Directive 2008/98 of practical effect, since it would enable waste producers and waste holders to avoid funding the waste management system that the Member States are obliged to establish.
47. In that respect, it should be noted that, in the absence of any rules of EU law imposing a specific method upon the Member States for financing the cost of waste management, that cost may, in accordance with the choice of the Member State concerned, equally well be financed by means of a tax or a charge or in any other manner, and that national legislation, which, for the purposes of financing the management of such a system, for example, provides for a tax calculated on the basis of an estimate of the volume of waste generated and not on the basis of the quantity of waste actually produced and presented for collection, cannot be considered contrary to Directive 2008/98 (see, to that effect, as regards Directive 2006/12, the judgment in Futura Immobiliare and Others , EU:C:2009:479, paragraphs 52 to 54).
48. However, while it is true that, in consequence, the competent national authorities have a broad discretion in determining the manner in which a tax such as that at issue in the main proceedings is to be calculated, the fact remains that the tax so determined must not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the objective pursued (see, to that effect, the judgment in Futura Immobiliare and Others , EU:C:2009:479, paragraph 55).