Arthur Gottwald v Bezirkshauptmannschaft Bregenz.
Date: 2009-10-01
16. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts provided for by Article 234 EC, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where questions submitted by national courts concern the interpretation of a provision of Community law, the Court of Justice is bound, in principle, to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra  [2001] ECR I‑2099, paragraph 38; Case C‑18/01 Korhonen and Others  [2003] ECR I‑5321, paragraph 19; and Case C‑295/05 Asemfo  [2007] ECR I‑2999, paragraph 30).
17. It follows that the presumption that questions referred by national courts for a preliminary ruling are relevant may be rebutted only in exceptional cases, where it is quite obvious that the interpretation which is sought of the provisions of Community law referred to in the questions bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or to its purpose (Case C‑415/93 Bosman  [1995] ECR I‑4921, paragraph 61, and Case C‑212/06 Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon  [2008] ECR I‑1683, paragraph 29).
23. As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, citizenship of the Union is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to receive the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for (Case C‑209/03 Bidar  [2005] ECR I‑2119, paragraph 31, and Case C‑403/03 Schempp  [2005] ECR I‑6421, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited).
24. In particular, as the Court has already held, any citizen of the Union may rely on Article 12 EC in all situations falling within the material scope of Community law (Case C‑85/96 Martínez Sala  [1998] ECR I‑2691, paragraph 62, and Schempp , paragraph 17).
25. Those situations include those involving the exercise of the right to move and reside within the territory of the Member States conferred by Article 18 EC (Case C‑148/02 Garcia Avello  [2003] ECR I‑11613, paragraph 24; Bidar , paragraph 33; and Case C‑158/07 Förster  [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 37).
27. In that regard, it is also apparent from case-law that the rules regarding equality of treatment between nationals and non-nationals prohibit not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other distinguishing criteria, lead to the same result (see, inter alia, Case C‑29/95 Pastoors and Trans-Cap  [1997] ECR I-285, paragraph 16; Case C‑224/00 Commission  v Italy  [2002] ECR I-2965, paragraph 15; and Case C‑28/04 Tod’s and Tod’s France  [2005] ECR I‑5781, paragraph 19).
28. That is true, in particular, of a measure under which a distinction is drawn on the basis of residence or ordinary residence, in that that requirement is liable to operate mainly to the detriment of nationals of other Member States, since non-residents are in the majority of cases foreigners (see, inter alia, Case C‑224/97 Ciola  [1999] ECR I‑2517, paragraph 14, and Case C‑388/01 Commission  v Italy  [2003] ECR I‑721, paragraph 14).
30. Such a difference in treatment can be justified only if it is based on objective considerations independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and is proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national provisions (see, inter alia, Case C‑224/98 D’Hoop  [2002] ECR I‑6191, paragraph 36; Garcia Avello , paragraph 31; and Bidar , paragraph 54).
32. In that regard, it must be noted that both the promotion of mobility and integration of disabled persons and the wish to ensure that there is a connection between the society of the Member State concerned and the recipient of a benefit such as that at issue in the main proceedings can indeed constitute objective considerations of public interest which are capable of justifying the fact that the conditions for the grant of the benefit may affect the freedom of movement of the citizens of the Union (see, by analogy, D’Hoop , paragraph 38; Case C‑192/05 Tas‑Hagen and Tas  [2006] ECR I‑10451, paragraph 35; and Case C‑499/06 Nerkowska  [2008] ECR I‑3993, paragraph 37).
33. Nevertheless, the fact remains that it is necessary for the condition of proportionality outlined in paragraph 30 of the present judgment to be met.  It follows from the case-law that a measure is proportionate when, while appropriate for securing the att ainment of the objective pursued, it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see, inter alia, Tas‑Hagen and Tas , paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
34. More specifically, with regard to the degree of connection of the recipient of a benefit with the society of the Member State concerned, the Court has already held that, with regard to benefits that are not covered by Community law, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, Member States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in deciding which criteria are to be used when assessing the degree of connection to society (see, to that effect, Tas-Hagen and Tas , paragraph 36).
35. Thus, the Court has accepted on certain conditions that national rules may require, in order to establish the existence of a certain degree of integration, that the recipient of the benefit in question has been resident or ordinarily resident in the Member State concerned for a certain period of time (see, to that effect, Bidar , paragraph 59, and Förster , paragraph 50).