Geoffrey Léger v Ministre des Affaires sociales, de la Santé et des Droits des femmes and Etablissement français du sang.
Date: 2015-04-29
35. According to the settled case-law of the Court, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all EU languages. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgments in Cricket St Thomas , C‑372/88, EU:C:1990:140, paragraphs 18 and 19; Kurcums Metal , C‑558/11, EU:C:2012:721, paragraph 48; and Ivansson and Others , C‑307/13, EU:C:2014:2058, paragraph 40).
41. According to the settled case-law of the Court, the requirements flowing from the protection of those fundamental rights are binding on Member States when they implement EU rules, so that they are bound to apply the rules in accordance with those requirements (see, to that effect, judgment in Parliament v Council , C‑540/03, EU:C:2006:429, paragraph 105 and the case-law cited). In that context, the Member States must make sure they do not rely on an interpretation of wording of secondary legislation which would be in conflict with those fundamental rights (see judgments in Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others , C‑305/05, EU:C:2007:383, paragraph 28, and O and Others , C‑356/11 and C‑357/11, EU:C:2012:776, paragraph 78).
48. Accordingly, among the provisions of the Charter, that decree must respect inter alia Article 21(1) thereof, according to which any discrimination based on sexual orientation must be prohibited. Article 21(1) is a particular expression of the principle of equal treatment, which is a general principle of EU law enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgments in Römer , C‑147/08, EU:C:2011:286, paragraph 59, and Glatzel , C‑356/12, EU:C:2014:350, paragraph 43).
54. Furthermore, that limitation respects the essential contents of the principle of non-discrimination. That limitation does not call into question the principle as such, as it concerns only the question, which is limited in scope, of deferrals from blood donation in order to protect the health of the recipients.
58. As regards the principle of proportionality, it follows from the case-law of the Court that the measures laid down by national legislation must not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by that legislation; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous among them, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see judgments in ERG and Others , C‑379/08 and C‑380/08, EU:C:2010:127, paragraph 86; Urbán , C‑210/10, EU:C:2012:64, paragraph 24; and Texdata Software , C‑418/11, EU:C:2013:588, paragraph 52).
61. In that connection, as is clear, inter alia, from Article 21 of Directive 2002/98, in order to ensure the quality and safety of blood and blood components, each donation of blood must be tested in conformity with the requirements listed in Annex IV to that directive, it being understood that those requirements will evolve in line with scientific and technical progress (judgment in Humanplasma , C‑421/09, EU:C:2010:760, paragraph 42). Pursuant to Annex IV, donors must be tested, inter alia, for HIV I/II.