Salzburger Gebietskrankenkasse and Bundesminister für Arbeit, Soziales und Konsumentenschutz v Alpenrind GmbH and Others.
Date: 2018-09-06
41


In particular, as regards the E 101 certificate, which preceded the A1 certificate, the Court has already held that the binding nature of the first certificate issued by the competent institution of a Member State, in accordance with Article 12a(1a) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 of 21 March 1972 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation No 1408/71 (OJ, English Special Edition 1972(I), p. 160), binds both the institutions and the courts of the Member State in which the activity is carried out (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 January 2006, Herbosch Kiere, C‑2/05, EU:C:2006:69, paragraphs 30 to 32, and of 27 April 2017, A-Rosa Flussschiff, C‑620/15, EU:C:2017:309, paragraph 51).
43


Similarly, the Court has already held that Regulation No 987/2009 codified the Court’s case-law, affirming the binding nature of the E 101 certificate and the exclusive competence of the issuing institution to assess the validity of that certificate, and expressly reproducing the procedure as a means of resolving disputes concerning both the accuracy of documents drawn up by the competent institution of a Member State and the determination of the legislation applicable to the worker concerned (judgment of 27 April 2017, A-Rosa Flusschiff, C‑620/15, EU:C:2017:309, paragraph 59, and order of 24 October 2017, BeluBienstleistung and Nikless, C‑474/16, not published, EU:C:2017:812, paragraph 19).
46


If it were to be accepted that, apart from cases of fraud or abuse of rights, the competent national institution could, by bringing proceedings before a court of the host Member State of the worker concerned to which that institution belongs, have an A1 certificate declared invalid, there would be a risk that the system based on sincere cooperation between the competent institutions of the Member States would be undermined (see, to that effect, as regards E 101 certificates, judgments of 26 January 2006, Herbosch Kiere, C‑2/05, EU:C:2006:69, paragraph 30; of 27 April 2017, A-Rosa Flusschiff, C‑620/15, EU:C:2017:309, paragraph 47; and of 6 February 2018, Altun and Others, C‑359/16, EU:C:2018:63, paragraphs 54, 55, 60 and 61).
50


In that regard it must be recalled, as the Court has consistently held, that it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it refers to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation or the validity of a rule of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (judgment of 7 February 2018, American Express, C‑304/16, EU:C:2018:66, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
51


It follows that questions relating to EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 7 February 2018, American Express, C‑304/16, EU:C:2018:66, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
61


As the Court has already held with regard to Regulation No 1408/71, if the Administrative Commission does not succeed in reconciling the points of view of the competent institutions on the question of the legislation applicable, the Member State in which the employee concerned actually works may, without prejudice to any legal remedies existing in the Member State to which the issuing institution belongs, at least bring infringement proceedings under Article 259 TFEU in order to enable the Court to examine in those proceedings the question of the legislation applicable to such an employee and, consequently, whether the information contained in the E 101 certificate is correct (judgment of 27 April 2017, A-Rosa Flusschiff, C‑620/15, EU:C:2017:309, paragraph 46).
68


According to settled case-law, it is for the national court to find the facts and determine the relevance of the questions it wishes to ask (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 October 2016, Hoogstad, C‑269/15, EU:C:2016:802, paragraph 19, and of 27 April 2017, A-Rosa Flussschiff, C‑620/15, EU:C:2017:309, paragraph 35).
70


First of all, it must be recalled that an E 101 certificate, issued in accordance with Article 11a of Regulation No 574/72, may have a retroactive effect. In particular, while it is preferable that such a certificate is issued before the beginning of the period concerned, it may also be issued during that period or indeed after its expiry (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 March 2000, Banks and Others, C‑178/97, EU:C:2000:169, paragraphs 52 to 57).
88


According to the Court’s settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 21 September 2017, Commission v Germany, C‑616/15, EU:C:2017:721, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).