Commission of the European Communities v Nederlandse Antillen.
Date: 2003-04-10
40.  In that respect, it should be noted that the Court may of its own motion, on a proposal from the Advocate General or at the request of the parties order the reopening of the oral procedure, in accordance with Article 61 of its Rules of Procedure, if it considers that it lacks sufficient information or that the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties (see Joined Cases C-270/97 and C-271/97   Deutsche Post   [2000] ECR I-929, paragraph 30, and Case C-299/99   Philips   [2002] ECR I-5475, paragraph 20).
64.  It is, however, important to consider whether, even though those regulations are of general application, the Netherlands Antilles may nevertheless be regarded as directly and individually concerned by them. The fact that a measure is of general application does not mean that it cannot be of direct and individual concern to certain natural or legal persons (see   Codorniu   v   Council  , cited above, paragraph 19).
65.  According to settled case-law, a measure of general application such as a regulation can be of individual concern to natural and legal persons only if it affects them by reason of certain attributes peculiar to them, or by reason of a factual situation which differentiates them from all other persons and distinguishes them individually in the same way as the addressee (see,   inter alia  , Case C-451/98   Antillean Rice Mills   v   Council   [2001] ECR I-8949, paragraph 49; Case C-50/00 P   Unión de Pequeños Agricultores   v   Council   [2002] ECR I-6677, paragraph 36, and Case C-312/00 P   Commission   v   Camar and Tico   [2002] ECR I-11355, paragraph 73).
68.  In those circumstances, it is not established that Regulations No 2352/97 and No 2494/97 had serious consequences in a significant sector of the economy of the Netherlands Antilles as distinct from every other OCT, or that they have been affected by the safeguard measures in question by reason of attributes distinguishing them from all other OCTs to which those regulations also apply.
70.  The Netherlands Antilles have not therefore proved that they are individually concerned, by reason of attributes peculiar to them, by Regulations No 2352/97 and No 2494/97.
71.  Second, as regards the question whether the Netherlands Antilles are in a factual situation which differentiates them from all other persons and distinguishes them individually in the same way as a person to whom a measure is addressed, they submit that they were exporting the greater part of rice originating in the OCTs to the Community and that, at the time when Regulations No 2352/97 and No 2494/97 were adopted, the Commission was aware of that particular situation and ought, therefore, to have taken it into account in assessing the impact of the planned safeguard measures on the Netherlands Antilles' economy.
72.  It should be noted in that regard that the fact that the Council or the Commission are required, by specific provisions, to take account of the consequences for the situation of certain individuals of the act they are intending to adopt may be such as to distinguish them individually (see,   Piraiki-Patraiki and Others   v   Commission  , cited above, paragraphs 28 and 31; Case C-390/95 P   Antillean Rice Mills and Others   v   Commission  , cited above, paragraph 25, and   Nederlandse Antillen   v   Council  , cited above, paragraph 67).
73.  Thus, where the Commission intends to adopt safeguard measures on the basis of Article 109(1) of the OCT Decision, it must, in so far as the circumstances of the case permit, inquire into the negative effects which its decision might have on the economy of the OCTs concerned as well as on the undertakings concerned (see Case C-390/95 P   Antillean Rice Mills and Others   v   Commission  , cited above, paragraph 26, and   Nederlandse Antillen   v   Council  , cited above, paragraph 68).
74.  However, it is clear from   Piraiki-Patraiki and Others   v   Commission  , cited above, that the finding of the existence of that obligation is not sufficient to establish that those OCTs and those undertakings are individually concerned by those measures within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty (see   Nederlandse Antillen   v   Council  , cited above, paragraph 70).
75.  At paragraph 28 of the judgment in   Piraiki-Patraiki and Others   v   Commission  , cited above, the Court, after finding that the Commission was required to inquire into the negative effects which its decision might have on the economy of the Member State concerned and on the undertakings concerned, did not conclude from that finding alone that all the undertakings concerned were individually concerned within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty. On the contrary, it considered that only those undertakings which had already entered into contracts which were due to be performed during the period of application of the contested decision but which had been prevented from being performed, in part or at all, were individually concerned within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty (see   Piraiki-Patraiki and Others   v   Commission  , paragraphs 28, 31 and 32, and   Nederlandse Antillen   v   Council  , paragraph 71).
76.  It follows from the foregoing that the finding that the Commission was required, in so far as the circumstances of the case so permitted, to take account, at the time when Regulations No 2352/97 and No 2494/97 were adopted, of the negative effects which those regulations might have on the economy of the OCTs concerned and on the undertakings concerned does not discharge the Netherlands Antilles from the burden of proving that they were affected by those regulations by reason of a factual situation which differentiates them from all other persons.