larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Saras Energía SA v Administración del Estado.
Date: 2018-08-07
24


As is clear from the Energy Efficiency Directive and, in particular, from recital 20 thereof, the EU legislature deliberately left the Member States a broad margin of discretion in the choice of methods suitable for fulfilling the energy efficiency objectives laid down in Article 1(1) of that directive (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 September 2013, IBV & Cie, C‑195/12, EU:C:2013:598, paragraph 61). The purpose of that directive is in fact to establish at EU level the general principles forming a framework for reducing energy consumption, while leaving to the Member States the choice of the means of implementation. Accordingly, the Energy Efficiency Directive seeks solely to establish, in accordance with Article 1 thereof, a common framework of measures for the promotion of energy efficiency within the European Union in order to ensure the achievement of the objective set by the Union to increase energy efficiency by 20% by 2020 and to pave the way for further energy efficiency improvements beyond that date.
35


Since the Member States have significant flexibility and a broad discretion in the area, the achievement of the objectives pursued by the Energy Efficiency Directive cannot be envisaged without each Member State having the opportunity to choose, from among various types of schemes, the system best suited to its particular situation, taking account, as follows from recital 20 of that directive, of specific national circumstances (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 September 2013, IBV & Cie, C‑195/12, EU:C:2013:598, paragraphs 62 and 70).
VTB Bank (Austria) AG v Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde.
Date: 2018-08-07
40


In that regard, it should be added that, when analysing financial correction measures implemented by Member States to protect the financial interests of the European Union, the Court has classified as an ‘administrative measure’ the obligation to give back an advantage improperly received by means of an irregularity (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 May 2016, Județul Neamț and Județul Bacău, C‑260/14 and C‑261/14, EU:C:2016:360, paragraphs 50 and 51).
Château du Grand Bois SCI v Etablissement national des produits de l'agriculture et de la mer (FranceAgriMer).
Date: 2018-08-07
30


According to the Court’s settled case-law, protection against arbitrary or disproportionate intervention by public authorities in the sphere of the private activities of any natural or legal person constitutes a general principle of EU law; such intervention must have a legal basis and must be justified on the grounds laid down by law (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 September 1989, Hoechst v Commission, 46/87 and 227/88, EU:C:1989:337, paragraph 19; of 22 October 2002, Roquette Frères, C‑94/00, EU:C:2002:603, paragraph 27, and of 16 May 2017, Berlioz Investment Fund, C‑682/15, EU:C:2017:373, paragraph 51).
32


In any event, the Court finds that the rejection of the aid application provided for in Article 78(3) of Regulation No 555/2008, as a serious legal consequence if vine growers or their representatives prevent the carrying-out of the on-the-spot check, is in itself an effective and sufficient way to achieve the objective, referred to in Article 76 of that regulation, of providing adequate protection for the financial interests of the European Union (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 June 2011, Omejc, C‑536/09, EU:C:2011:398, paragraphs 26 and 27). In order to attain that objective, general authorisation to access the place where the checks are to be carried out, granted in advance to control officials, is therefore unnecessary.
Administration des douanes et droits indirects and Etablissement national des produits de l'agriculture et de la mer (FranceAgriMer) v Hubert Clergeau and Others.
Date: 2018-08-07
26


As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the principle of the retroactive application of the more lenient criminal law, as enshrined in Article 49(1) of the Charter, is part of primary EU law. Even before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which conferred on the Charter the same legal value as the Treaties, the Court held that that principle followed from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and, therefore, had to be regarded as forming part of the general principles of EU law, which national courts must respect when applying national law (judgment of 6 October 2016, Paoletti and Others, C‑218/15, EU:C:2016:748, paragraph 25).
28


Furthermore, it should be noted that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (judgment of 14 June 2017, Online Games and Others, C‑685/15, EU:C:2017:452, paragraph 55).
30


In those circumstances, it must be held that the criminal charge provided for in Article 426(4) of the Customs Code and the main criminal proceedings at issue fall within the scope of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 28 of the present judgment, with the result that the referring court must respect, in the context of that procedure, the principle of the retroactive application of the more lenient criminal law, enshrined in the third sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter (see, by analogy, judgment of 3 May 2005, Berlusconi and Others, C‑387/02, C‑391/02 and C‑403/02, EU:C:2005:270, paragraph 69).
33


In that regard, it should be noted that the application of the more lenient criminal law necessarily involves a succession of laws over time and is based on the conclusion that the legislature changed its position either on the criminal classification of the act or the penalty to be applied to an offence (judgment of 6 October 2016, Paoletti and Others, C‑218/15, EU:C:2016:748, paragraph 27).
Gerhard Prenninger and Others v Oberösterreichische Landesregierung and Netz Oberösterreich GmbH.
Date: 2018-08-07
27


It should be recalled, in that regard, that, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, which are based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and tribunals and the Court of Justice, any assessment of the facts in the case is a matter for the national court or tribunal. In particular, the Court is empowered to rule only on the interpretation or the validity of EU acts on the basis of the facts placed before it by the national court or tribunal. It is for the national court or tribunal to ascertain the facts which have given rise to the dispute and to establish the consequences which they have for the judgment which it is required to deliver (judgment of 8 May 2008, Danske Svineproducenter, C‑491/06, EU:C:2008:263, paragraph 23).
30


In that regard, the Court has already held that the concepts in that annex are EU law concepts which must be interpreted independently (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 July 2008, Ecologistas en Acción-CODA, C‑142/07, EU:C:2008:445, paragraph 29).
35


The Court has held that the EIA Directive’s fundamental objective, as follows from Article 2(1) thereof, is that, before consent is given, projects likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or location should be made subject to a prior assessment with regard to their effects (judgment of 19 September 2000, Linster, C‑287/98, EU:C:2000:468, paragraph 52).
36


Moreover, the Court has pointed out on a number of occasions that the scope of the EIA Directive is wide and its purpose very broad (judgments of 24 October 1996, Kraaijeveld and Others, C‑72/95, EU:C:1996:404, paragraph 31, and of 28 February 2008, Abraham and Others, C‑2/07, EU:C:2008:133, paragraph 32).
39


That interpretation is not in any way called into question by the fact that the Austrian legislature’s aim, in authorising the practice of such clearances of paths, was allegedly to protect forests. First, the Court has held that the pursuit of beneficial effects on the environment was irrelevant in determining whether it was necessary to make a project subject to an assessment of its environmental effects (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 July 2008, Ecologistas en Acción-CODA, C‑142/07, EU:C:2008:445, paragraph 41).
Argo Kalda Mardi talu v Põllumajanduse Registrite ja Informatsiooni Amet (PRIA).
Date: 2018-08-07
35


It should be noted that the Court has held that it is the Member States which are to ensure that all agricultural land is maintained in good agricultural and environmental condition and which, to that end, are to define, at national or regional level, minimum requirements on the basis of the framework set up in the relevant annex to the regulation then in force, taking into account the specific characteristics of the areas concerned (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 July 2009, Horvath, C‑428/07, EU:C:2009:458, paragraph 25).
36


While the Member States are therefore bound, when defining those requirements, to comply with that annex, it nevertheless leaves them, by using general concepts and terms, a certain discretion with regard to the actual determination of those requirements (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 July 2009, Horvath, C‑428/07, EU:C:2009:458, paragraph 26).
37


Moreover, it is apparent from the wording itself of ‘good agricultural and environmental conditions’ that the Member States may adopt good agricultural and environmental conditions for environmental purposes (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 July 2009, Horvath, C‑428/07, EU:C:2009:458, paragraph 27).
43


Since the concept of ‘landscape features’ is not defined by Regulation No 1306/2013, it is necessary to interpret it, as was noted by the Advocate General in point 26 of her Opinion, taking into account its usual meaning and the context in which it is generally used (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2009, Horvath, C‑428/07, EU:C:2009:458, paragraph 34).
44


In that regard, it should be noted that a restrictive interpretation of the concept of ‘landscape features’, which, in particular, would exclude features resulting from human intervention — would be inconsistent with the discretion which Member States enjoy, in accordance with Article 94 of that regulation, in order to define the minimum requirements relating to good agricultural and environmental conditions (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2009, Horvath, C‑428/07, EU:C:2009:458, paragraph 37).
45


In that regard, the Court has held that landscape features are physical elements of the environment and that the requirements relating to the retention of those features must contribute to their preservation as such (judgment of 16 July 2009, Horvath, C‑428/07, EU:C:2009:458, paragraph 41).
Coöperatieve Vereniging SNB-REACT U.A. v Deepak Mehta.
Date: 2018-08-07
42


The EU legislature has defined the concept of ‘information society service’ as covering services which are provided at a distance, by means of electronic equipment for the processing and storage of data, at the individual request of a recipient of services, and normally in return for remuneration (judgment of 23 March 2010, Google France and Google, C‑236/08 to C‑238/08, EU:C:2010:159, paragraph 110). Furthermore, and as is apparent from the case-law of the Court, that concept includes in particular services contributing to facilitating relations between persons engaged in online sales activities and their customers (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 July 2011, L’Oréal and Others, C‑324/09, EU:C:2011:474, paragraph 109). In the present case, in so far as the Court does not have sufficient evidence to determine whether the service at issue in the case in the main proceedings comes within the scope of that notion, it is for the referring court to determine whether that is in fact the case.
47


Lastly, in that connection, it is settled case-law that Article 12(1), Article 13(1) and Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31 must be understood in the light of recital 42 of that directive, from which it follows that the exemptions from liability established in that directive cover only cases in which the activity of the information society service provider is of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies that that service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted or stored by the persons to whom he provides his services (judgments of 23 March 2010, Google France and Google, C‑236/08 to C‑238/08, EU:C:2010:159, paragraph 113, and of 15 September 2016, Mc Fadden, C‑484/14, EU:C:2016:689, paragraph 62).
48


By contrast, those limitations of liability do not apply in the case where a provider of information society services plays an active role, by allowing its customers to optimise their online sales activity (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 July 2011, L’Oréal and Others, C‑324/09, EU:C:2011:474, paragraphs 113, 116 and 123 and the case-law cited).
51


Nevertheless, it must be noted that if, following its examination, the referring court were to conclude that the activity of the service provider in the case in the main proceedings can benefit from the limitations of liability referred to in paragraph 43 of the present judgment, it may still, in accordance with Article 12(3), Article 13(2) and Article 14(3) of Directive 2000/31, address to the person concerned, in the case where the existence of an infringement or risk of infringement of an intellectual property right has been established to the requisite legal standard, a targeted measure intended to bring an end to that infringement or to prevent that risk (judgment of 15 September 2016, Mc Fadden, C‑484/14, EU:C:2016:689, paragraphs 77, 78 and 94).
Fundo de Garantia Automóvel v Alina Antónia Destapado Pão Mole Juliana and Cristiana Micaela Caetano Juliana.
Date: 2018-09-04
36


Article 3(1) of the First Directive, worded in very general terms, therefore requires Member States to establish, in their domestic legal systems, a general obligation to insure vehicles (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2013, Csonka and Others, C‑409/11, EU:C:2013:512, paragraph 24).
37


Accordingly, each Member State must ensure, subject to the derogations provided for in Article 4 of that directive, that every vehicle normally based in its territory is covered by a contract concluded with an insurance company in order to cover, up to the limits established by EU law, civil liability arising as a result of the use of that vehicle (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2013, Csonka and Others, C‑409/11, EU:C:2013:512, paragraph 28).
38


The concept of ‘vehicle’ is defined in Article 1(1) of the First Directive as ‘any motor vehicle intended for travel on land ...’. That definition is unconnected with the use which is made or may be made of the vehicle in question (judgments of 4 September 2014, Vnuk, C‑162/13, EU:C:2014:2146, paragraph 38, and of 28 November 2017, Rodrigues de Andrade, C‑514/16, EU:C:2017:908, paragraph 29).
45


Thus, the payment of compensation by such a body was designed to be a measure of last resort, envisaged only for situations referred to in that provision, and cannot be regarded as the implementation of a guarantee scheme in respect of insurance against civil liability relating to the use of vehicles otherwise than in those situations (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2013, Csonka and Others, C‑409/11, EU:C:2013:512, paragraphs 30 to 32).
47


Moreover, the interpretation set out in paragraphs 38 to 42 of the present judgment makes it possible to ensure the attainment of the objective of protecting the victims of accidents caused by motor vehicles, laid down by the directives concerning insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles, which has consistently been pursued and reinforced by the EU legislature (judgment of 28 November 2017, Rodrigues de Andrade, C‑514/16, EU:C:2017:908, paragraphs 32 and 33 and the case-law cited). That interpretation guarantees that those victims are, in any case, compensated, either by the insurer, under a contract entered into for that purpose, or by the body referred to in Article 1(4) of the Second Directive, in the event that the obligation to insure the vehicle involved in the accident has not been satisfied or where that vehicle has not been identified.
54


In that regard, it should be noted that Article 1(4) of the Second Directive expressly allows the Member States to regard compensation by that body as subsidiary and enables them to make provision for the settlement of claims between that body and those responsible for the accident and for relations with other insurers or social security bodies required to provide compensation to the victim in respect of the same accident (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 December 2003, Evans, C‑63/01, EU:C:2003:650, paragraph 32).
Bank Mellat v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2018-09-06
50


In that regard, it is important to bear in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, an applicant’s interest in bringing proceedings must, in the light of the purpose of the action, exist at the stage of lodging the action, failing which the action will be inadmissible. That purpose must, like the interest in bringing proceedings, continue until the final decision, failing which there will be no need to adjudicate; that presupposes that the action must be capable, if successful, of procuring an advantage for the party bringing it (judgments of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331, paragraph 61, and of 9 November 2017, HX v Council, C‑423/16 P, EU:C:2017:848, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
64


In that regard, it follows from the Court’s case-law that, in certain circumstances, an applicant may retain an interest in seeking the annulment of an act repealed in the course of proceedings, in order to induce the author of the contested act to make suitable amendments in the future, and thereby avoid the risk that the unlawfulness alleged in respect of that act will be repeated (judgment of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331, paragraph 63).
Dirk Harms and Others v Vueling Airlines SA.
Date: 2018-09-12
12


In accordance with Article 8(1)(a) of Regulation No 261/2004, read in conjunction with Article 5(1)(a) of that regulation, the onus is on the air carrier, in the event of cancellation of a flight, to offer assistance to the passengers concerned in the form of offering them, inter alia, reimbursement of their ticket, at the price at which it was bought, and, where necessary, a return flight to their first point of departure.
15


In that regard, it should be noted generally that the objectives of Regulation No 261/2004 are not only to ensure a high level of protection for passengers but also to strike a balance between the interests of passengers and those of air carriers (judgment of 19 November 2009, Sturgeon and Others, C‑402/07 and C‑432/07, EU:C:2009:716, paragraph 67).
18


That interpretation is supported by the Court’s case-law, from which it follows that the reimbursement of a part of the ‘price of the ticket’ provided for in Article 10(2)(a) to (c) of Regulation No 261/2004, in the event that the air carrier places a passenger in a class lower than that for which the ticket was purchased, must be determined by reference to solely ‘unavoidable’ components of that price, in the sense that it is necessary to pay them in order to avail of the service proposed by the air carrier in return (judgment of 22 June 2016, Mennens, C‑255/15, EU:C:2016:472, paragraph 36).
Rafal Prefeta v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions.
Date: 2018-09-13
37


In that regard, it is important to point out, as observed by the Advocate General in point 62 of his Opinion, that the possibility for an EU citizen who has temporarily ceased to pursue an activity as an employed or self-employed person of retaining his status of worker on the basis of Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38, as well as the corresponding right of residence under Article 7(1) of the directive, is based on the assumption that the citizen is available and able to re-enter the labour market of the host Member State within a reasonable period (see, by analogy, judgment of 19 June 2014, Saint Prix, C‑507/12, EU:C:2014:2007, paragraphs 38 to 41).
Česká pojišťovna a.s. v WCZ spol. s r.o.
Date: 2018-09-13
24


It is settled case-law that the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision or be given priority over the other language versions. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all EU languages (judgment of 6 June 2018, Tarragó da Silveira, C‑250/17, EU:C:2018:398, paragraph 20).
25


Secondly, it should be pointed out, so far as concerns the objective of Directive 2011/7, that the latter is intended to combat late payment in commercial transactions, that delay constituting, according to recital 12 of that directive, a breach of contract which has been made financially attractive to debtors because, inter alia, low or no interest is charged on late payments (judgment of 16 February 2017, IOS Finance EFC, C‑555/14, EU:C:2017:121, paragraph 24).
26


It follows that the objective of that directive is to provide effective protection for creditors against late payment (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 December 2016, Nemec, C‑256/15, EU:C:2016:954, paragraph 50). Such protection means offering those creditors the fullest possible compensation for the recovery costs incurred, in such a way as to discourage such late payment.
33


It should be noted that the preamble to an EU-law act has no binding legal force and cannot be relied on either as a ground for derogating from the actual provisions of the act in question or for interpreting those provisions in a manner that is clearly contrary to their wording (judgment of 19 June 2014, Karen Millen Fashions, C‑345/13, EU:C:2014:2013, paragraph 31).
Starman Aktsiaselts v Tarbijakaitseamet.
Date: 2018-09-13
23


Therefore, the interpretation of the first subparagraph of Article 21 of Directive 2011/83 must take into account not only the wording of that provision but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives of the rules of which it is part (see, by analogy, judgment of 2 March 2017, Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs Frankfurt am Main, C‑568/15, EU:C:2017:154, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
24


As regards, in the first place, the context of that provision, the Court has inferred from Articles 13 and 19 of Directive 2011/83 that, in principle, it is not for the consumer to bear charges other than ordinary charges if he exercises rights provided for by that directive, and that potential additional costs are therefore to be borne by the trader (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 March 2017, Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs Frankfurt am Main, C‑568/15, EU:C:2017:154, paragraphs 24 to 26).