larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Schieving-Nijstad vof and Others v Robert Groeneveld.
Date: 2001-09-13
31 First, the Court has held that Article 50(6) of TRIPs is a procedural provision intended to be applied by Community and national courts in accordance with obligations assumed both by the Community and by the Member States (Dior and Others, cited above, paragraph 46).
35 Nevertheless, it is apparent from the Court's case-law that, in a field to which TRIPs applies and in respect of which the Community has already legislated, the judicial authorities of the Member States are required by virtue of Community law, when called upon to apply national rules with a view to ordering provisional measures for the protection of rights falling within such a field, to do so as far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of Article 50 of TRIPs (see Hermès, paragraph 28, and Dior and Others, paragraph 47).
36 The primary objective of TRIPs is to strengthen and harmonise the protection of intellectual property on a worldwide scale (see in that regard Opinion 1/94 of 15 November 1994 [1994] ECR I-5267, paragraph 58).
53 The Court ruled that the provisions of TRIPs do not have direct effect, inasmuch as they are not such as to create rights upon which individuals may rely directly before the national courts by virtue of Community law (see the judgment in Dior and Others, paragraphs 44 and 46).
Hans Schwarzkopf GmbH & Co. KG v Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV.
Date: 2001-09-13
27 In adopting Directive 76/768, the Community legislature sought to reconcile the objective of achieving the free movement of cosmetic products and that of safeguarding public health.
28 As is clear from the second and third recitals of the preamble to Directive 76/768, the Community legislature, although finding that the differences between national laws on cosmetic products obliged Community cosmetic producers to vary their production according to the Member State for which the products were intended and that those differences impeded free movement of those products, concluded that those national provisions had the aim of safeguarding public health and that, consequently, Community harmonisation must pursue the same objective. The amendments subsequently made to Directive 76/768 were guided by those same considerations.
37 In this regard, it should be remembered that it is settled case-law that the prohibition of quantitative restrictions and of all measures having equivalent effect applies not only to national measures but also to measures adopted by the Community institutions (see, in particular, to this effect, the judgment in Case C-51/93 Meyhui [1994] ECR I-3879, paragraph 11).
38 It is also settled in case-law that Article 30 of the Treaty prohibits obstacles to the free movement of goods resulting from rules which lay down requirements to be met by such goods (such as requirements as to designation, form, size, weight, composition, presentation, labelling or packaging), even if those rules apply without distinction to all national and imported products, unless their application can be justified by a public-interest objective taking precedence over the free movement of goods (see, in particular, the judgment in Case C-33/97 Colim [1999] ECR I-3175, paragraph 38).
39 It is true that national linguistic requirements such as those authorised by Article 7(2) of the amended Directive 76/768 do indeed constitute an obstacle to intra-Community trade in that the products concerned must be given different labelling according to the language or languages prescribed in the Member State in which the products are marketed, thus entailing supplementary packaging costs. The necessity to modify the container or packaging also rules out there being any question of selling arrangements within the meaning of the judgment in Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097, paragraph 16.
40 Those obstacles are, however, justified by the public interest objective of protecting public health. The information which producers or distributors of cosmetic products covered by the amended Directive 76/768 are obliged to put on the product's container and packaging, save where it can be effectively conveyed by the use of pictogrammes or signs other than words, will be of no practical use unless it is given in a language which can be understood by the persons for whom it is intended (see, in relation to foodstuffs, Colim, cited above, paragraph 29).
Kingdom of Spain v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2001-09-13
9 In this respect, it must be pointed out that under Article 1(2)(a) of Decision 94/442, the position of the Body shall be without prejudice to the Commission's final decision on the clearance of the accounts. It follows that when the Commission makes its decision it is not bound by the findings of the Conciliation Body (Case C-44/97 Germany v Commission [1999] ECR I-7177, paragraph 18).
14 It must be observed at the outset that only intervention undertaken in accordance with the Community rules in the framework of the common organisation of agricultural markets is to be financed by the EAGGF (see Case C-247/98 Greece v Commission [2001] ECR I-1, paragraph 7, and Case C-278/98 Netherlands v Commission [2001] ECR I-1501, paragraph 38).
15 It is worth pointing out that, although it is for the Commission to prove an infringement of the rules of the common organisation of agricultural markets, it is not obliged to demonstrate exhaustively the insufficiency of the checks carried out by national administrations or the irregularity of the figures transmitted by them, but must present evidence of a serious and reasonable doubt with regard to those checks or those figures (see the abovementioned judgments in Greece v Commission, paragraphs 7 and 8, and Netherlands v Commission, paragraphs 39 and 40).
16 Moreover, when the Commission criticises a Member State for not having established an effective monitoring and checking system, the discovery of individual cases in which it finds that the applicable agricultural legislation has been disregarded is only one element among others to justify its criticism in relation to the efficacy of the monitoring and checking system established by the Member State (Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission [1990] ECR I-2321, paragraph 42, and Case C-48/91 Netherlands v Commission [1993] ECR I-5611, paragraph 32).
26 In this respect it must be recalled that the fact that the Commission did not take the appropriate action, on the financial level, on a finding of deficiencies pertaining to one financial year cannot deprive it of the right to do so in relation to subsequent financial years, particularly where those deficiencies have persisted; and that, moreover, subsequently ascertained deficiencies may also be taken into account in determining the level of the fixed adjustment (Germany v Commission, cited above, paragraph 14).
33 In this respect it must be noted that although Article 2(4) of Regulation No 2988/95 states that the procedures relating to the application of Community sanctions are governed by the law of the Member States, that must be [s]ubject to the Community law applicable. In particular, the rules and procedures provided for by the national law must not make it practically impossible to implement the Community legislation, or undermine its effectiveness (Joined Cases 205/82 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor and Others [1983] ECR 2633, paragraph 19, and Case C-110/99 Emsland-Stärke [2000] ECR -11569, paragraph 54).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 2001-09-13
31 Moreover, as the Court has already held, the fact that a directive provides for certain details to be decided on in the future cannot, in the absence of express provision to that effect, relieve Member States of their obligation to adopt within the prescribed period the measures necessary to comply with the directive. That obligation remains, whether or not all the conditions for the application of the provisions of Community law have already been fulfilled (see, in particular, Case C-137/96 Commission v Germany [1997] ECR I-6749, paragraph 10).
34 It should be noted first of all that it is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see in particular Case C-207/00 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-4571, paragraph 27).
37 It should be noted that, as the Court has already held, each Member State is free to delegate powers to its domestic authorities as it sees fit and to implement directives by means of measures adopted by regional or local authorities. That division of powers does not, however, release it from the obligation to ensure that the provisions of the directive are properly implemented in national law (see Joined Cases 227/85 to 230/85 Commission v Belgium [1988] ECR 1, paragraph 9, and Case C-131/88 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-825, paragraph 71).
38 In that regard, a directive must be transposed into national law by provisions capable of creating a situation which is sufficiently precise, clear and transparent to enable individuals to ascertain their rights and obligations (see in particular to that effect Case C-221/94 Commission v Luxembourg [1996] ECR I-5669, paragraph 22).
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2001-09-20
10 Moreover, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, among others, Case C-166/97 Commission v France [1999] ECR I-1719, paragraph 13).
Cordis Obst und Gemüse Großhandel GmbH v Commission of the European Communities and French Republic.
Date: 2001-09-27
12 It should be noted that, as is clear from the 22nd recital in the preamble to Regulation No 404/93, Article 30 of that regulation is intended to deal with any disturbance in the internal market which the replacement of the various national markets by the common organisation of the market threatened to bring about (see, inter alia, Belgium and Germany v Commission, paragraph 22, and the case-law cited). According to that recital, Article 30 gives the Commission the power to take any transitional measures required to overcome the difficulties of implementing the common organisation of the market. Furthermore, the Court has held that application of Article 30 is subject to the condition that the specific measures which the Commission must adopt are intended to assist transition from national arrangements to the common organisation of the market and that they are necessary for that purpose (see, inter alia, T. Port, paragraph 35).
17 Under Article 225 EC and Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal lies on a point of law only. Therefore, the Court of First Instance has sole jurisdiction to find and appraise the facts, except in a case where the factual inaccuracy of its findings is demonstrated by the evidence adduced before it. The appraisal of the facts does not constitute, save where the clear sense of the evidence produced before it is distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-280/99 P to C-282/99 P Moccia Irme and Others v Commission [2001] ECR I-4717, paragraph 78).
22 In response to that ground of appeal, it should be recalled first of all that, according to the Court's case-law, the Community institutions are required to act under Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 when, in particular, the transition to the common organisation of the market infringes certain traders' fundamental rights protected by Community law (see, inter alia, T. Port, paragraph 40). Those rights include the principle of equal treatment (see, inter alia, Germany v Council, paragraph 67).
European Investment Bank v Michel Hautem.
Date: 2001-10-02
33 Although the Court of First Instance made a correct finding of fact when it held, in the first and second sentences of paragraph 70 of the judgment under appeal, that Mr Hautem had participated in drawing up the documents found on Mr Yasse's computer, it misclassified their legal nature when it refused to consider that Mr Hautem had played an active role as an interested party and that they constituted commercial acts on Mr Hautem's part, although it made a finding to that effect in respect of the same documents in paragraphs 65 and 77 of the judgment in Yasse v EIB. In reality, Mr Hautem's participation in the creation of those documents may be explained by his personal interest in having a line of credit opened with Crédit Andorrà in the name of the two associates, as may be seen from the fax of the letter dated 19 August 1996 to Crédit Andorrà recommending Mr Hautem and Mr Yasse as customers and the application to open a line of credit sent to Crédit Andorrà by fax of 24 September 1996, the text of which is set out in paragraph 74 of the judgment in Yasse v EIB.
44 Under Article 225 EC and Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal lies on a point of law only. Therefore, the Court of First Instance has sole jurisdiction to find and appraise the facts, except in a case where the factual inaccuracy of its findings arises from evidence adduced before it. The appraisal of the facts by the Court of First Instance does not constitute, save where the clear sense of the evidence produced before it is distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (Joined Cases C-280/99 P to C-282/99 P Moccia Irme and Others v Commission [2001] ECR I-4717, paragraph 78).
45 However, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 225 EC to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the Court of First Instance and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (see Case C-7/95 P Deere v Commission [1998] ECR I-3111, paragraph 21). Furthermore, the question whether the grounds of a judgment of the Court of First Instance are contradictory or inadequate is a question of law which is amenable, as such, to judicial review on appeal (Case C-401/96 P Somaco v Commission [1998] ECR I-2587, paragraph 53).
93 Admittedly, in exercising that jurisdiction, the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice may not disregard the special characteristics of the system applicable to the staff of the Bank, which, as the Court of Justice observed in paragraph 22 of Mills v European Investment Bank, is contractual.
Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2001-10-04
28 In those circumstances, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, where a provision of Community law is open to several interpretations, preference must be given to that interpretation which ensures that the provision retains its effectiveness (see in particular Case C-434/97 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-1129, paragraph 21).
37 According to a general principle of interpretation, a provision must be interpreted, as far as possible, in such a way as not to detract from its validity.
41 Nor is the contested regulation vitiated by a defective statement of reasons. The question whether the obligation to provide a statement of reasons has been satisfied must be assessed with reference not only to the wording of the contested measure but also to its context and the whole body of legal rules governing the matter in question (see Case C-122/94 Commission v Council [1996] ECR I-881, paragraph 29).
Tele Danmark A/S v Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark (HK).
Date: 2001-10-04
25 As the Court has held on several occasions, the dismissal of a female worker on account of pregnancy constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex, contrary to Article 5(1) of Directive 76/207 (Case C-179/88 Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund [1990] ECR I-3979, paragraph 13; Case C-421/92 Habermann-Beltermann [1994] ECR I-1657, paragraph 15; and Case C-32/93 Webb [1994] ECR I-3567, paragraph 19).
26 It was also in view of the risk that a possible dismissal may pose for the physical and mental state of pregnant workers, workers who have recently given birth or those who are breastfeeding, including the particularly serious risk that they may be encouraged to have abortions, that the Community legislature, in Article 10 of Directive 92/85, laid down special protection for those workers by prohibiting dismissal during the period from the start of pregnancy to the end of maternity leave.
27 During that period, Article 10 of Directive 92/85 does not provide for any exception to, or derogation from, the prohibition of dismissing pregnant workers, save in exceptional cases not connected with their condition where the employer justifies the dismissal in writing.
28 The Court has held, moreover, that a refusal to employ a woman on account of her pregnancy cannot be justified on grounds relating to the financial loss which an employer who appointed a pregnant woman would suffer for the duration of her maternity leave (Case C-177/88 Dekker [1990] ECR I-3941, paragraph 12), and that the same conclusion must be drawn as regards the financial loss caused by the fact that the woman appointed cannot be employed in the post concerned for the duration of her pregnancy (Case C-207/98 Mahlburg [2000] ECR I-549, paragraph 29).
29 In paragraph 26 of Webb, the Court also held that, while the availability of an employee is necessarily, for the employer, a precondition for the proper performance of the employment contract, the protection afforded by Community law to a woman during pregnancy and after childbirth cannot be dependent on whether her presence at work during the period corresponding to maternity leave is essential to the proper functioning of the undertaking in which she is employed. A contrary interpretation would render ineffective the provisions of Directive 76/207.
33 Finally, Directives 76/207 and 92/85 do not make any distinction, as regards the scope of the principle of equal treatment for men and women, according to the duration of the employment relationship in question. Had the Community legislature wished to exclude fixed-term contracts, which represent a substantial proportion of employment relationships, from the scope of those directives, it would have done so expressly.
J.R. Bowden, J.L. Chapman and J.J. Doyle v Tuffnells Parcels Express Ltd.
Date: 2001-10-04
28 It is important to note at the outset that the questions submitted relate solely to the scope of the Directive. In particular, the national court does not seek guidance from the Court of Justice as to the extent of the prohibition of indirect discrimination between men and women as regards working conditions, as laid down in Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions (OJ 1976 L 39, p. 40), having regard to the difference of treatment referred to in the main proceedings regarding entitlement to paid annual leave as between part-time workers, who have no such entitlement, and full-time workers, who do, if it were the case that a much lower proportion of women than men worked full time (see, in that connection, Case C-457/93 Lewark [1996] ECR I-243, paragraph 28).
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 2001-10-04
8 In that regard, it must be pointed out that, in accordance with settled case-law, a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see Case C-470/98 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-4657, paragraph 11, and Case C-423/99 Commission v Italy [2000] ECR I-11167, paragraph 10).
Commissioners of Customs & Excise v Mirror Group plc.
Date: 2001-10-09
30 In that regard, it has consistently been held that the terms used to specify the exemptions provided for by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, inter alia, Case 348/87 Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties [1989] ECR 1737, paragraph 13; Case C-358/97 Commission v Ireland [2000] ECR I-6301, paragraph 52; Case C-359/97 Commission v United Kingdom [2000] ECR I-6355, paragraph 64; and Case C-150/99 Stockholm Lindöpark [2001] ECR I-493, paragraph 25).
31 The letting of immovable property for the purposes of Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive essentially involves the landlord of property assigning to the tenant, in return for rent and for an agreed period, the right to occupy his property and to exclude other persons from it (see, to that effect, Commission v Ireland, paragraphs 52 to 57, and Commission v United Kingdom, paragraphs 64 to 69, cited above, and Case C-326/99 Goed Wonen [2001] ECR I-6831, paragraph 55).
Ernst-Otto Flemmer (C-80/99) and Renate Christoffel (C-81/99) v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, represented by: Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung and Marike Leitensdorfer (C-82/99) v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung.
Date: 2001-10-09
39 As to which court has jurisdiction to decide disputes to which the Community is a party, Article 183 of the EC Treaty (now Article 240 EC) provides that the courts of the Member States have jurisdiction to hear such disputes, save where jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Justice by the Treaty.
42 No provision of the Treaty confers jurisdiction on the Court of Justice to hear disputes relating to the contractual liability of the Community, apart from Article 181 of the EC Treaty (now Article 238 EC), which is not relevant to the cases in the main proceedings. Under Article 178 of the Treaty, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction in disputes relating to compensation for damage provided for in the second paragraph of Article 215 thereof, a provision which only concerns the non-contractual liability of the Community, its contractual liability being covered by the first paragraph of Article 215.
47 Compensation under Regulation No 2187/93 remains a separate issue since the system set up by that regulation constitutes an alternative to the settlement of disputes by the courts and offers an additional means of making good damage.
55 Moreover, in so far as Community law, including its general principles, does not include common rules, according to settled case-law, the national authorities when implementing Community regulations must act in accordance with the procedural and substantive rules of their own national law. However, as the Court has held, recourse to rules of national law is possible only in so far as it is necessary for the implementation of provisions of Community law and in so far as the application of those rules of national law does not jeopardise the scope and effectiveness of that Community law, including its general principles (Joined Cases 146/81, 192/81 and 193/81 BayWa and Others [1982] ECR 1503, paragraph 29; Joined Cases 205/82 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor and Others [1983] ECR 2633, paragraphs 17 and 22).
60 Since the principles of the protection of legitimate expectations and assurance of legal certainty are part of the legal order of the Community, the fact that national legislation provides for the protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty cannot, therefore, be considered contrary to that same legal order (Deutsche Milchkontor, cited above, paragraph 30).
61 However, the principle that national legislation must be applied without discrimination in relation to purely national procedures of the same kind requires the interest of the Community to be taken fully into consideration in the assessment of the interests in question (Deutsche Milchkontor, cited above, paragraph 32).