larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
X v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie.
Date: 2018-07-05
26


In order to answer that question, it is necessary to take into account not only the wording of the provision concerned, but also its context and the general scheme of the rules of which it forms part and the objectives pursued thereby.
27


The scope of the take-back procedure is defined in Articles 23 and 24 of the Dublin III Regulation. It is apparent from Article 23(1) of that regulation that that procedure is applicable to, inter alia, the persons referred to in Article 18(1)(d) thereof (see, to that effect, order of 5 April 2017, Ahmed, C‑36/17, EU:C:2017:273, paragraphs 26 and 27, and judgment of 25 January 2018, Hasan, C‑360/16, EU:C:2018:35, paragraphs 42 and 43).
34


However, it was for those authorities, in accordance with Article 23(2) of that regulation, to make that request as quickly as possible and in any event within the periods laid down in that provision, as such a request could not validly be made after expiry of those periods (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 July 2017, Mengesteab, C‑670/16, EU:C:2017:587, paragraph 67).
35


It follows from both the wording of Article 23(3) of the Dublin III Regulation and the general scheme and objectives of that regulation that, in the case of the expiry of those periods, responsibility is to be transferred in full to the Member State in which a new application for international protection has been lodged (see, by analogy, judgments of 26 July 2017, Mengesteab, C‑670/16, EU:C:2017:587, paragraph 61, and of 25 October 2017, Shiri, C‑201/16, EU:C:2017:805, paragraph 30).
61


That interpretation is consistent with the objective of that provision, namely to maintain the prerogatives of the Member States in the exercise of the right to grant international protection (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 December 2013, Abdullahi, C‑394/12, EU:C:2013:813, paragraph 57, and of 16 February 2017, C.K. and Others, C‑578/16 PPU, EU:C:2017:127, paragraph 53).
Mast-Jägermeister SE v European Union Intellectual Property Office.
Date: 2018-07-05
48


According to settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the interpretation of provisions of EU law requires account to be taken not only of their wording but also of the context in which they occur and the objectives of the rules of which they form part (judgments of 19 September 2000, Germany v Commission, C‑156/98, EU:C:2000:467, paragraph 50, and of 19 October 2017, Raimund, C‑425/16, EU:C:2017:776, paragraph 22).
52


The literal interpretation of Article 36(1)(c) of Regulation No 6/2002 is confirmed by the teleological interpretation of that provision, which must contribute to the proper functioning of the system of registration of designs. Accordingly, the function of the graphic representation requirement is, in particular, to define the design itself in order to determine the precise subject of the protection afforded by the registered design to its proprietor (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 December 2002, Sieckmann, C‑273/00, EU:C:2002:748, paragraph 48).
53


In that regard, it should be noted that the entry of a design in a public register has the aim of making it accessible to the competent authorities and the public, particularly to economic operators. On the one hand, the competent authorities must know with clarity and precision the nature of the constituent elements of a design in order to be able to fulfil their obligations in relation to the prior examination of applications for registration and to the publication and maintenance of an appropriate and precise register of designs (see, by analogy, judgments of 12 December 2002, Sieckmann, C‑273/00, EU:C:2002:748, paragraphs 49 and 50, and of 19 June 2012, Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys, C‑307/10, EU:C:2012:361, paragraph 47).
54


On the other hand, economic operators must be able to acquaint themselves, with clarity and precision, with registrations or applications for registration made by their current or potential competitors and thus to obtain relevant information about the rights of third parties (see, by analogy, judgments of 12 December 2002, Sieckmann, C‑273/00, EU:C:2002:748, paragraph 51, and of 19 June 2012, Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys, C‑307/10, EU:C:2012:361, paragraph 48). Such a requirement, as the General Court points out, in essence, in paragraph 47 of the judgment under appeal, is intended to ensure legal certainty for third parties.
Verein für lauteren Wettbewerb eV v Princesport GmbH.
Date: 2018-07-05
27


Even though, formally, the referring court has limited its first question to the interpretation of Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1007/2011, such a situation does not prevent the Court from providing the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of EU law which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case before it, whether or not that court has specifically referred to them in that question (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 June 2016Lesar, C‑159/15, EU:C:2016:451, paragraph 22, and of 18 January 2017, Wortmann, C‑365/15, EU:C:2017:19, paragraph 33).
Bosphorus Queen Shipping Ltd Corp. v Rajavartiolaitos.
Date: 2018-07-11
44


First, with regard to the Montego Bay Convention, which was signed and approved by the EU, its provisions are an integral part of the European Union legal order and is binding on it. Therefore, the Court has jurisdiction to interpret those provisions. Furthermore, that convention has primacy over secondary EU legislation (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 June 2008, Intertanko and Others, C‑308/06, EU:C:2008:312, paragraphs 42 and 53) which must be interpreted as far as possible in accordance with those agreements.
45


Second, as far as concerns the Marpol Convention 73/78, to which the European Union is not a party, but which binds all its Member States, that convention is liable to have consequences for the interpretation of the Montego Bay Convention and, second, the provisions of secondary law which fall within the field of application of the Marpol Convention 73/78, such as those of Directive 2005/35. In view of the customary principle of good faith, which forms part of general international law, and of Article 4(3) TEU, the Court is to interpret the provisions by taking account of the Marpol Convention 73/78 (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 June 2008, Intertanko and Others, C‑308/06, EU:C:2008:312, paragraphs 47 and 52).
46


Third, concerning the Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas 1969, it must be observed, first, that the European Union has not acceded to that convention and, second, that the European Union cannot be regarded as having taken the place of the Member State, if only because not all of them are parties to that convention. It follows that that convention is not binding on the European Union and the court does not have jurisdiction to interpret it as such in a reference for a preliminary ruling (see, by analogy, judgment of 24 June 2008, Commune de Mesquer, C‑188/07, EU:C:2008:359, paragraph 85).
63


Such an interpretation of that provision is supported by the objective of the Montego Bay Convention, which is to strike a fair balance, for all those marine areas, between the interests of States as coastal States and the interests of States as flag States, which may conflict (judgment of 3 June 2008, Intertanko and Others, C‑308/06, EU:C:2008:312, paragraph 58).
67


In order to interpret the provisions of the Montego Bay Convention it is necessary to refer to the rules of customary international law reflected by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, which are binding on the EU institutions and are part of the EU legal order (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2018, Western Sahara Campaign UK, C‑266/16, EU:C:2018:118, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited), and from which it is clear that a treaty must be interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
Zurich Insurance plc and Metso Minerals Oy v Abnormal Load Services (International) Ltd.
Date: 2018-07-11
16


As regards the determination of ‘the place in a Member State where, under the contract, the services were provided or should have been provided’, the Court has held that, where there are several places at which services are provided in different Member States, the place of performance must, in principle, be understood as the place with the closest linking factor between the contract and the court having jurisdiction, which, as a general rule, will be at the place of the main provision of services (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 March 2010, Wood Floor Solutions Andreas Domberger, C‑19/09, EU:C:2010:137, paragraph 33).
17


In respect of that provision, in relation to a direct flight operated by the party with whom the passenger concerned has entered into a contract, the Court has concluded, after carrying out an analysis of the services the provision of which corresponds to the performance of the obligations arising from a contract to transport passengers by air, that the only places which have a direct link to those services, provided in performance of obligations linked to the subject matter of the contract, are those of the departure and arrival of the aircraft (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2009, Rehder, C‑204/08, EU:C:2009:439, paragraphs 40 and 41).
18


The Court has inferred from this that the place of arrival and the place of departure of the aircraft must be regarded alike as the places of the main provision of the services which are the subject of that air transport contract, justifying the fact that jurisdiction to deal with a claim for compensation founded on that transport contract lies, at the applicant’s choice, with the court which has territorial jurisdiction over the place of departure or the place of arrival of the aircraft, as those places are agreed in that contract (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2009, Rehder, C‑204/08, EU:C:2009:439, paragraphs 43 and 47).
24


That solution complies with the requirement of predictability, since it enables both the applicant and the defendant to identify the courts of the places, specified in the contract for carriage, of dispatch and delivery of the goods as the courts before which proceedings may be brought (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 September 2014, Nickel & Goeldner Spedition, C‑157/13, EU:C:2014:2145, paragraph 41).
COBRA SpA v Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico.
Date: 2018-07-11
29


As regards interpreting provisions of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only their wording but also the context in which they occur and the objectives pursued by the rules of which they form part (judgments of 19 September 2000, Germany v Commission, C‑156/98, EU:C:2000:467, paragraph 50; of 25 October 2011, eDate Advertising and Others, C‑509/09 and C‑161/10, EU:C:2011:685, paragraph 54; and of 26 July 2017, Jafari, C‑646/16, EU:C:2017:586, paragraph 73).
UAB ‘Spika’ and Others v Žuvininkystės tarnyba prie Lietuvos Respublikos žemės ūkio ministerijos.
Date: 2018-07-12
34


In that regard, it must be pointed out that, under Article 16 of the Charter, the freedom to conduct a business in accordance with European Union law is recognised. The protection conferred by that article covers the freedom to exercise an economic or commercial activity, freedom of contract and free competition (judgment of 17 October 2013, Schaible, C‑101/12, EU:C:2013:661, paragraph 25).
VAR Srl and Azienda Trasporti Milanesi SpA (ATM) v Iveco Orecchia SpA.
Date: 2018-07-12
29


First of all, the principle of equal treatment and the duty of transparency enshrined in Article 10 of that directive require, in particular, that tenderers must be in a position of equality both when they formulate their tenders and when those tenders are being assessed by the contracting authority, and constitute the basis of the EU rules on procedures for the award of public contracts (judgment of 24 May 2016, MT Højgaard and Züblin, C‑396/14, EU:C:2016:347, paragraph 37).
Profit Europe NV v Belgische Staat.
Date: 2018-07-12
25


Under the general rules for the interpretation of the CN, for legal purposes, the classification of goods in the subheadings of a heading is to be determined according to the terms of those subheadings and any related subheading, section or chapter notes, with the wording of section, chapter and subchapter titles being considered to be provided for ease of reference only.
Confédération paysanne and Others v Premier ministre and Ministre de l’agriculture, de l’agroalimentaire et de la forêt.
Date: 2018-07-25
41


At the outset, it should be pointed out that, as a provision derogating from the requirement to subject GMOs to the obligations laid down in Directive 2001/18, Article 3(1) thereof, read in conjunction with point 1 of Annex I B to that directive, must be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, judgment of 17 April 2018, Commission v Poland (Białowieża Forest), C‑441/17, EU:C:2018:255, paragraph 189 and the case-law cited).
42


Furthermore, for the purpose of interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 27 April 2017, Pinckernelle, C‑535/15, EU:C:2017:315, paragraph 31).
50


Furthermore, it has been emphasised, in recital 8 of that directive, that the precautionary principle was taken into account in the drafting of the directive and must also be taken into account in its implementation. Emphasis is also placed, in recital 55 of Directive 2001/18, on the need to follow closely the development and use of GMOs.
72


In that regard, it is necessary to state at the outset that, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is bound, in principle, to give a ruling (judgment of 22 February 2018, Kubota (UK) and EP Barrus, C‑545/16, EU:C:2018:101, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
73


In the context of the procedure for cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts that is established by Article 267 TFEU, questions concerning EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to give a ruling on a question referred by a national court for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU only where, for instance, the requirements concerning the content of a request for a preliminary ruling, set out in Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, are not satisfied or where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of a provision of EU law, or the assessment of its validity, which is sought by the national court, bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or to its purpose, or where the problem is hypothetical (judgment of 22 February 2018, Kubota (UK) and EP Barrus, C‑545/16, EU:C:2018:101, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
Dyson Ltd and Dyson BV v BSH Home Appliances NV.
Date: 2018-07-25
28


It should be recalled, as a preliminary point, that Directive 2005/29 is intended to establish uniform rules on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in order to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market and to achieve a high level of consumer protection (judgment of 26 October 2016, Canal Digital Danmark, C‑611/14, EU:C:2016:800, paragraph 25).
30


The notion of ‘commercial practices’ is defined by means of a particularly broad formulation, the practices covered by it needing to be commercial in nature, that is to say, originating from traders, and directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of their products to consumers (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 October 2013, RLvS, C‑391/12, EU:C:2013:669, paragraph 37).
47


It must be noted, as a preliminary point, that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the question referred to it (see, inter alia, judgment of 21 December 2016, Ucar and Kilic, C‑508/15 and C‑509/15, EU:C:2016:986, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
54


Nevertheless, it is apparent from the settled case-law of the Court that, in preliminary ruling proceedings, although it is ultimately for the national court to assess the facts, the Court of Justice, which is called on to provide answers of use to the national court, may provide guidance based inter alia on the documents in the file and on the written and oral observations which have been submitted to it, in order to enable the national court to give judgment (judgment of 5 June 2014, I, C‑255/13, EU:C:2014:1291, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
56


In addition, it must be noted that, in the context of Directive 2005/29, the benchmark to be used for a misleading commercial practice is that of the average consumer, who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, taking into account social, cultural and linguistic factors (judgments of 12 May 2011, Ving Sverige, C‑122/10, EU:C:2011:299, paragraph 22, and of 26 October 2016, Canal Digital Danmark, C‑611/14, EU:C:2016:800, paragraph 39). The inextricable link between the issues justifies the use of that same criterion also in the context of the assessment of the risk of error or of confusion referred to in Article 3(1)(b) of Directive 2010/30.
UAB ‘Aviabaltika’ v BAB ‘Ūkio bankas’.
Date: 2018-07-25
24


Next, regarding the general scheme and objectives of Directive 2002/47, it should be borne in mind that, according to recital 3 thereof, that directive is intended to contribute to the integration and cost-efficiency of the financial market and to the stability of the financial system in the European Union. To that end, Directive 2002/47 establishes a regime, the objective of which is to limit the administrative burdens for parties using financial collateral under the scope of the directive, to improve the legal certainty of such collateral by ensuring that certain provisions of national insolvency law do not apply to financial collateral arrangements in order to safeguard financial stability and limit contagion effects in case of a default of a party to a financial collateral arrangement (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 November 2016, Private Equity Insurance Group, C‑156/15, EU:C:2016:851, paragraph 23).
25


In that context, having regard to Article 4(1) of that directive, which provides that the taker of collateral under a security financial collateral arrangement must be able to realise the collateral in any of the manners described in the directive, the Court has held that that regime therefore confers an advantage on that financial collateral by comparison with other types of security which fall outside the scope of the directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 November 2016, Private Equity Insurance Group, C‑156/15, EU:C:2016:851, paragraphs 25 and 50).
40


According to the Court’s established case-law, the justification for a request for a preliminary ruling is not that it enables advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions to be delivered but rather that it is necessary for the effective resolution of a dispute concerning EU law (judgment of 10 November 2016, Private Equity Insurance Group, C‑156/15, EU:C:2016:851, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).
A v Migrationsverket.
Date: 2018-07-25
30


It must be noted that under recitals 11 and 12 and Article 1 of Directive 2013/32, the framework for granting international protection is based on the concept of a single procedure and minimum common rules (see, by analogy, judgment of 31 January 2013, D. and A., C‑175/11, EU:C:2013:45, paragraph 57).
Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli v Pilato SpA.
Date: 2018-07-25
24


Second, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and of the notes to the sections or chapters (judgment of 12 June 2014, Lukoyl Neftohim Burgas, C‑330/13, EU:C:2014:1757, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
25


Next, the intended use of a product may constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (judgment of 6 December 2007, Van Landeghem, C‑486/06, EU:C:2007:762, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
26


Lastly, it should be recalled, according to the Court’s case-law, that the Explanatory Note drawn up, as regards the CN, by the Commission and, as regards the HS, by the WCO, is an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various headings but does not have legally binding force. Moreover, although the WCO opinions classifying goods in the HS do not have legally binding force, they amount, as regards the classification of those goods in the CN, to indications which are an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various tariff headings of the CN (judgment of 6 December 2007, Van Landeghem, C‑486/06, EU:C:2007:762, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
29


Moreover, according to the wording of heading 8703, that is, ‘… motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons’, the principal intended use of those vehicles is decisive for their classification. It follows from the use of the term ‘designed’, as supported by the settled case-law of the Court referred to in paragraph 25 of this judgment, that the principal intended use of the vehicle is decisive, provided that it is inherent to the product. The intended use is determined by the general appearance of the vehicles at issue in the main proceedings and on the basis of the entirety of the characteristics of those vehicles which give them their essential character (judgment of 6 December 2007, Van Landeghem, C‑486/06, EU:C:2007:762, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
Jorge Luís Colino Sigüenza v Ayuntamiento de Valladolid and Others.
Date: 2018-08-07
39


In that respect, an interpretation of Article 1(1)(b) of Directive 2001/23 which excludes from the scope of that directive a situation in which the tangible assets essential to the performance of the activity in question have always been owned by the transferee (the local authority of Valladolid) would deprive that directive of part of its effectiveness (see judgment of 26 November 2015, Aira Pascual and Algeposa Terminales Ferroviarios, C‑509/14, EU:C:2015:781, paragraph 40).
45


Ultimately, it is for the referring court to establish, in the light of the foregoing considerations and taking into account all of the factual circumstances of the operation at issue, whether or not there was a transfer of undertaking in the main proceedings.