DK Recycling und Roheisen GmbH v European Commission.
Date: 2016-06-22
27


It must be borne in mind that the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Rules of Procedure of the Court make no provision for parties to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion (judgment of 4 September 2014 in Vnuk, C‑162/13, EU:C:2014:2146, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
28


However, the Court may, under Article 83 of its Rules of Procedure, at any time, after hearing the Advocate General, order the opening or reopening of the oral part of the procedure, in particular if it considers that it lacks sufficient information or where a party has, after the close of that part of the procedure, submitted a new fact which is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor for the decision of the Court.
42


According to the Court’s settled case-law, for a request for substitution of grounds to be admissible, the party concerned must have an interest in bringing proceedings, in so far as the request must be capable, if successful, of procuring an advantage to the party making it. That may be the case where the request for substitution of grounds amounts to a defence to one of the applicant’s pleas (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 2009 in GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v CommissionC‑501/06 P, C‑513/06 P, C‑515/06 P and C‑519/06 P
EU:C:2009:610, paragraph 23; of 21 December 2011 in Iride v Commission, C‑329/09 P, EU:C:2011:859, paragraphs 48 to 51; and of 11 July 2013 in Ziegler v Commission, C‑439/11 P, EU:C:2013:513, paragraph 42).
47


It must be noted that the Court has already ruled that provisions which, in order to be adopted, require political choices falling within the responsibilities of the EU legislature cannot be delegated by the legislature, and that, accordingly, implementing measures adopted by the Commission cannot amend essential elements of basic legislation or supplement it by new essential elements (judgment of 5 September 2012 in Parliament v Council, C‑355/10, EU:C:2012:516, paragraphs 65 and 66).
48


Identifying the elements of a matter which must be categorised as essential must be based on objective factors amenable to judicial review, and requires account to be taken of the characteristics and particular features of the field concerned (judgment of 10 September 2015 in Parliament v Council, C‑363/14, EU:C:2015:579, paragraph 47).
49


As regards the elements of Directive 2003/87 which must be categorised as essential within the meaning of the provisions and case-law cited in paragraphs 46 to 48 of the present judgment, it must be pointed out that, although the principal objective of that directive is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions substantially, that objective must be attained in compliance with a series of sub-objectives. As indicated in recitals 5 and 7 of that directive, those sub-objectives include the safeguarding of economic development and employment and the preservation of the integrity of the internal market and of conditions of competition (judgments of 29 March 2012 in Commission v Poland, C‑504/09 P, EU:C:2012:178, paragraph 77; in Commission v Estonia, C‑505/09 P, EU:C:2012:179, paragraph 79; and of 17 October 2013 in Iberdrola and Others, C‑566/11, C‑567/11, C‑580/11, C‑591/11, C‑620/11 and C‑640/11, EU:C:2013:660, paragraph 43).
50


The repeated reference to the sub-objective relating to the preservation of conditions of competition in the internal market, not only in recitals 5 and 7 of Directive 2003/87 but also in recitals 8 and 15 of Directive 2009/29, demonstrates the essential nature of that sub-objective in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading.
53


In providing for this method of free allocation of allowances, fully-harmonised on a sectoral basis, the legislature gave concrete expression to the essential requirement that distortions of competition in the internal market be minimised.