Ivo Muladi v Krajský úřad Moravskoslezského kraj.
Date: 2016-07-07
33


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the question put by the national court concerns the interpretation of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 17 March 2016 in Aspiro, C‑40/15, EU:C:2016:172, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
43


According to settled case-law of the Court, minimum harmonisation does not prevent the Member States from retaining or adopting more stringent measures, provided, however, that the latter are not liable seriously to compromise achievement of the result prescribed by the directive in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 November 2006 in Lidl Italia, C‑315/05, EU:C:2006:736, paragraph 48) and that they comply with the FEU Treaty (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 April 2009 in Scarpelli, C‑509/07, EU:C:2009:255, paragraph 24; 10 September 2009 in Commission v Belgium, C‑100/08, not published, EU:C:2009:537, paragraph 70; 1 March 2012 in Akyüz, C‑467/10, EU:C:2012:112, paragraph 53; and 25 April 2013 in Jyske Bank Gibraltar, C‑212/11, EU:C:2013:270, paragraph 60).
44


On the latter point, such measures may, notwithstanding their restrictive effect, be justified, provided that they meet an overriding requirement in the public interest, are appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue and do not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 April 2013 in Jyske Bank Gibraltar, C‑212/11, EU:C:2013:270, paragraph 60).
51


Lastly, an additional requirement, such as that imposed by the legislation at issue in the main proceedings, does not infringe Article 15 of the Charter. In fact, under Article 52(2) of the Charter, restrictions may be placed on the rights guaranteed by Article 15, provided that those restrictions genuinely meet objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union and do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference which infringes upon the very substance of the rights so guaranteed (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 June 2005 in Alessandrini and Others v Commission, C‑295/03 P, EU:C:2005:413, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited, and 4 July 2013 in Gardella, C‑233/12, EU:C:2013:449, paragraph 39). As has been found in paragraph 47 of this judgment, legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings meets those requirements.