larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
André Grootes v Amt für Landwirtschaft Parchim.
Date: 2010-11-11
36. In particular, Article 40(5) of Regulation No 1782/2003 allows farmers who were under agri-environmental commitments to avoid being penalised in the context of the single payment scheme by reason of the fact that they were under such commitments during the reference period.
41. Application of a provision by analogy, with regard to an economic operator, is possible where the legal rules applicable, on the one hand, are very similar to those which it is sought to have applied by analogy and, on the other hand, contain an omission which is incompatible with a general principle of Community law and which can be remedied by application by analogy of those other rules (Case 165/84 Krohn [1985] ECR 3997, paragraph 14).
43. Second, it must be held that, in contrast to Article 40(5) of Regulation No 1782/2003, Article 61 of that regulation does not govern the legal position of farmers who, on the reference date specified in Article 61, were under agri-environmental commitments, with the result that those farmers, by reason of the very fact that they had entered into such commitments, thereby risked being penalised in the context of the single payment scheme which was adopted subsequently. However, the principle of legal certainty, which is a fundamental principle of European Union law, requires that European Union rules binding on individuals must be clear and precise so that they may know without ambiguity what are their rights and obligations and may take steps accordingly (see Case C‑170/08 Nijemeisland [2009] ECR I‑5127, paragraph 44).
44. It follows that a farmer who has entered into agri-environmental commitments pursuant to Regulations No 2078/92 and No 1257/1999 cannot be penalised in the context of a subsequent European Union support scheme by reason of those very commitments, as that farmer was not in a position to foresee that his decision might have consequences on future direct payments under rules adopted subsequently (see, to that effect, Nijemeisland , paragraph 45).
60. As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, as is apparent from the wording of Article 40(5) of Regulation No 1782/2005, read in conjunction with Article 40(1), a farmer who, during the reference period, was under agri-environmental commitments is entitled to request that the reference amount be calculated on the basis of the calendar year or years in the reference period which were not affected by those commitments.
66. It must, furthermore, be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, inter alia, Case C‑343/09 Afton Chemical [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 74).
Criminal proceedings against Vincent Willy Lahousse and Lavichy BVBA.
Date: 2010-11-18
27. The EU type-approval procedure has therefore introduced a mechanism of mutual recognition of the monitoring by the approval authorities of the various Member States of compliance with the requirements set out in Directives 92/61 and 2002/24 and in the separate directives.
44. In the present case, the fact remains that a general prohibition on the sale or use of equipment designed to increase the power and/or speed of mopeds, as in the case in the main proceedings, may impede the free movement of these goods (see, by analogy, Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy  [2009] ECR I‑519, paragraph 58). Such an obstacle is prohibited by Article 34 TFEU unless it can be justified on one of the public interest grounds set out in Article 36 TFEU or in order to meet imperative requirements.
45. If the national provision in question in the main proceedings can be justified, in particular, by the objective of ensuring road safety, such measure must be appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective pursued and not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy , paragraph 59).
Alketa Xhymshiti v Bundesagentur für Arbeit - Familienkasse Lörrach.
Date: 2010-11-18
28. It should be noted in that regard that, under Article 1 of Regulation No 859/2003, a national of a non-member country must fulfil two conditions in order for the provisions of Regulations No 1408/71 and No 574/72 to be applicable in respect of that person and the members of his family. He must, first, be legally resident in a Member State and, secondly, not be in a situation which is confined in all respects within a single Member State. Recital 12 in the preamble to Regulation No 859/2003, which elaborates on the second condition, is to the effect that this concerns, inter alia, the situation of a national of a non-member country who has links only with a non-member country and a single Member State.
31. It is, however, established, as is stated by both the Commission of the European Communities and the referring court, that, for the purposes of the application of Regulations No 1408/71 and No 574/72, the Swiss Confederation is to be equated with a Member State of the European Union.
43. It must be observed that European Union law does not limit the power of the Member States to organise their social security schemes and that, in the absence of harmonisation at European Union level, it is for the legislation of each Member State to lay down the conditions under which social security benefits are granted, as well as the amount of such benefits and the period for which they are granted (Case C‑507/06 Klöppel  [2008] ECR I‑943, paragraph 16).
European Commission v Italian Republic.
Date: 2010-11-25
37. In the second place, it should also be noted that, as the Commission argues, the system of double names introduced by the Italian legislature does not comply with the requirements of Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 2000/13, which provides that the consumer must have information that is correct, neutral and objective, and that does not mislead him.
39. It should be borne in mind that the Court has held that the addition of vegetable fats other than cocoa butter to cocoa and chocolate products which satisfy the minimum contents required by Directive 73/241, now replaced by Directive 2000/36, cannot substantially alter the nature of those products to the point where they are transformed into different products (see Case C‑12/00 Commission  v Spain  [2003] ECR I‑459, paragraph 92, and Commission  v Italy , paragraph 87).
41. However, the inclusion in another part of the labelling of a neutral and objective statement informing consumers of the absence from the product of vegetable fats other than cocoa butter would be sufficient to ensure that consumers are given correct information (see, to that effect, Commission  v Spain , paragraph 93, and Commission  v Italy , paragraph 88).
Barsoum Chabo v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen.
Date: 2010-11-25
18. With regard to judicial review of the conditions for application of the principle of proportionality, having regard to the broad discretion of the European Union legislature in areas such as those in issue in the present case, which involve political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called on to undertake complex assessments, the legality of a measure adopted in those areas can be affected only if the measure is manifestly disproportionate having regard to the objectives which the competent institutions are seeking to pursue (see Joined Cases C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04 ABNA and Others  [2005] ECR I‑10423, paragraph 69, and Case C-504/04 Agrarproduktion Staebelow  [2006] ECR I‑679, paragraph 36).
Agrargut Bäbelin GmbH & Co. KG v Amt für Landwirtschaft Bützow.
Date: 2010-12-02
51. According to settled case-law, the principle of legal certainty requires that European Union rules should enable those concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations which are imposed on them. Individuals must be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are so that they may take steps accordingly (see, inter alia, Case C‑582/08 Commission v United Kingdom  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 49, and Case C‑152/09 Grootes  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 43).
Schenker SIA v Valsts ieņēmumu dienests.
Date: 2010-12-02
14. It should be noted at the outset that neither the Customs Code nor the Implementing Regulation contains a definition of the term ‘one type of goods’, as used in Article 6(2) of that regulation. It is necessary, therefore, when interpreting that term, to take account of the wording, the context and the objectives of that provision (see, to that effect, Case C-98/07 Nordania Finans and BG Factoring  [2008] ECR I-1281, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
16. Second, for the purposes of ascertaining which distinguishing features preclude goods with similar characteristics from being regarded as belonging to one type of goods, for the purposes of Article 6(2) of the Implementing Regulation, it should be recalled that the aim of the system of binding tariff information is to provide the trader with legal certainty where there is a doubt as to the tariff classification of goods (see Case C-315/96 Lopex Export [1998] ECR I‑317, paragraph 28). Thus, binding tariff information assures the holder of that information that the goods are classified under a precise tariff heading, making it possible to know in advance the amount of duty payable on completion of the customs formalities in relation to those goods.
17. In addition, that system facilitates the work of the customs services themselves, since the tariff classification of the goods that are the subject of binding tariff information is set for any future customs declaration relating to those goods while the information is valid (see Lopex Export , paragraph 19).
Edyta Joanna Jakubowska v Alessandro Maneggia.
Date: 2010-12-02
28. In the light of the various pleas of inadmissibility, it should be recalled that questions concerning European Union law enjoy a presumption of relevance. Thus, the Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04 Cipolla and Others  [2006] ECR I‑11421, paragraph 25, and to Joined Cases C-570/07 and C‑571/07 Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez  [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 36).
42. As regards the principle of legal certainty, the Court has consistently held that rules involving negative consequences for individuals should be clear and precise and their application predictable for those subject to them (Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals  v Commission  [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited). Neither the order for reference nor the observations submitted to the Court enable it to determine from what perspective or for what reason the clarity or foreseeability of Law No 339/2003 is challenged.
57. However, according to the unambiguous wording of Article 6 of Directive 98/5, the registration in a host Member State of lawyers practising under a professional title acquired in another Member State is to be subject to the rules of professional conduct in force in the host Member State. Those rules, unlike those concerning the preliminary conditions required for registration, have not been harmonised and may therefore differ considerably from those in force in the home Member State. Moreover, as Article 7(1) of Directive 98/5 confirms, the failure to comply with those rules may lead to a lawyer being removed from the register in the host Member State.
Vassiliki Stylianou Vandorou (C-422/09), Vassilios Alexandrou Giankoulis (C-425/09) and Ioannis Georgiou Askoxilakis (C-426/09) v Ypourgos Ethnikis Paideias kai Thriskevmaton.
Date: 2010-12-02
65. It must nevertheless be emphasised that measures adopted pursuant to European Union law must comply with the general principles of that law, specifically the principle of proportionality. According to the Court’s settled case-law, the scope of Article 4(1) of Directive 89/48, which expressly authorises compensatory measures, must be restricted to those cases where they are proportionate to the objective pursued (see Case C‑330/03 Colegio [2006] ECR I‑801, paragraph 24, and Case C‑197/06 Van Leuken  [2008] ECR I‑2627, paragraph 39).
66. In addition, as the Court has already explained, the effective exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Articles 39 EC and 43 EC can be unjustifiably hindered if the competent national authorities responsible for recognition of professional titles acquired in another Member State disregard relevant knowledge and qualifications already acquired by an applicant seeking entitlement to pursue, in that Member State, a profession which according to national legislation is subject to holding a diploma or professional qualification (see, to that effect, Case C‑340/89 Vlassopoulou  [1991] ECR I‑2357, paragraph 15, and Case C‑234/97 Fernández de Bobadilla  [1999] ECR I‑4773, paragraph 33).
67. Before imposing supplementary requirements to cover differences between the education and training provided in the Member State of origin and that provided in an applicant’s host Member State, the competent national authorities must therefore assess whether the knowledge acquired by an applicant, including knowledge acquired in the host Member State, in the course of practical experience can be taken into account for the purpose of proving possession of the knowledge required by the latter (see, to that effect, Vlassopoulou , paragraph 20; Fernández de Bobadilla , paragraph 33; Case C‑313/01 Morgenbesser  [2003] ECR I‑13467, paragraph 62; and Case C‑345/08 Peśla  [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 41).
69. However, in so far as all practical experience in the pursuit of related activities can increase an applicant’s knowledge, it is incumbent on the competent national authorities to take into consideration all practical experience of use in the pursuit of the profession to which access is sought. The precise value to attach to such experience will be for the competent national authority to determine in the light of the specific functions carried out, knowledge acquired and applied in pursuit of those functions, responsibilities assumed and the level of independence accorded to the person concerned.
71. It should be added that the obligation to take into account all the applicant’s relevant experience does not cease to exist as a result of the adoption of directives on mutual recognition of diplomas (see, to that effect, Case C‑238/98 Hocsman  [2000] ECR I‑6623, paragraphs 23 and 31; Case C‑232/99 Commission v Spain [2002] ECR I‑4235, paragraph 22; and Morgenbesser, paragraph 58).
Vlaamse Gemeenschap v Maurits Baesen.
Date: 2010-12-09
22. It should be noted at the outset that Regulation No 1408/71 implements Article 42 EC, which provides for coordination of national social security legislation rather than harmonisation. Substantive and procedural differences between the social security systems of individual Member States, and hence in the rights of persons working there, are therefore unaffected by that provision (see, in particular, Case 41/84 Pinna  [1986] ECR 1, paragraph 20; Case C‑340/94 de Jaeck  [1997] ECR I‑461, paragraph 18; and Case C‑208/07 von Chamier-Glisczinski  [2009] ECR I‑6095, paragraph 84).
23. As regards the persons who may rely upon the provisions on the coordination of the national social security schemes which it establishes, Regulation No 1408/71 refers to persons who are insured under those schemes ( de Jaeck , paragraph 19).
24. Furthermore, the Court has held that the terms ‘employed person’ and ‘self-employed person’ mentioned in Articles 1(a) and 2(1) of Regulation No 1408/71 refer to the definitions given to them by Member States’ social security legislation, regardless of the nature of the activity for the purposes of employment law ( de Jaeck , paragraph 19).
Minerva Kulturreisen GmbH v Finanzamt Freital.
Date: 2010-12-09
16. Secondly, it should be borne in mind that Article 26 of the Sixth Directive introduces an exception to the general rules on the taxable amount with respect to certain operations of travel agents and tour operators and that, as an exception to the normal rules of the Sixth Directive, Article 26 must be applied only to the extent necessary to achieve its objective (Joined Cases C‑308/96 and C‑94/97 Madgett and Baldwin  [1998] ECR I‑6229, paragraphs 5 and 34, and Case C‑149/01 First Choice Holidays  [2003] ECR I‑6289, paragraphs 21 and 22).
17. Thirdly, the objective of the special scheme under Article 26 of the Sixth Directive is to adapt the applicable rules to the specific nature of the activity of travel agents and tour operators ( Madgett and Baldwin , paragraph 18, and First Choice Holidays , paragraph 23).
18. In that regard, it is clear from the case-law that that activity is characterised by the fact that, in most cases, the services provided by such undertakings consist of multiple services, in particular transport and accommodation, supplied partly outside and partly inside the territory of the Member State in which the undertaking has established its business or has a fixed establishment. The application of the normal rules on place of taxation, taxable amount and deduction of input tax would, by reason of the multiplicity of services and the places in which they are provided, entail practical difficulties for those undertakings of such a nature as to obstruct their operations (see Madgett and Baldwin , paragraph 18, and First Choice Holidays , paragraph 24).
20. In paragraph 23 of Van Ginkel , the Court held that the exclusion from the scope of Article 26 of the Sixth Directive of services provided by a travel agent on the ground that they cover only the accommodation and not the transport of the traveller would lead to a complicated tax system in which the VAT rules applicable would depend upon the constituent elements of the services offered to each traveller and that such a tax system would fail to comply with the aims of the directive.
21. It is apparent from that judgment that the Court did not hold that any service whatsoever provided by a travel agent which is unrelated to a journey falls under the special scheme provided for in Article 26 of the Sixth Directive, but that the provision by a travel agent of accommodation comes within the scope of that provision, even if that service covers accommodation only and not transport.
22. It also follows from paragraph 24 of Van Ginkel  that where a service is not coupled with travel services, in particular transport and accommodation, it does not come within the scope of Article 26 of the Sixth Directive.
Kahla Thüringen Porzellan GmbH v European Commission.
Date: 2010-12-16
44. It must be pointed out that, as the Court has previously held, the scope of a decision by which the Commission raises no objections to an aid scheme notified by a Member State must be determined not only by reference to the actual wording of that decision, only a summary of which is published in the Official Journal of the European Communities , but also by taking account of the aid scheme notified by the Member State concerned (see, to that effect, Case C‑138/09 Todaro Nunziatina & C.  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 31, and C‑67/09 P Nuova Agricast and Cofra  v Commission [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 64).
47. In this respect, it must, however, be stated that, in the framework of the implementation of the general aid programme authorised by the Commission, the Federal Republic of Germany, which obviously had that letter at its disposal, could not distance itself from the information which it had provided to the Commission, but, on the contrary, had to take that information into account, in order to ensure that the individual national aid would be granted in accordance with that information.
63. In accordance with settled case-law, to which the General Court, moreover, correctly referred in paragraph 146 of the judgment under appeal, the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations applies to any individual in a situation in which an institution of the European Union, by giving that person precise assurances, has led him to entertain well-founded expectations (see, inter alia, judgment of 24 November 2005 in Case C-506/03 Germany v Commission , not published in the ECR, paragraph 58, and judgment in Case C‑213/06 P EAR  v Karatzoglou  [2007] ECR I‑6733, paragraph 33). Such assurances, in whatever form they are given, constitute precise, unconditional and consistent information (see, to that effect, judgment in Case C-47/07 P Masdar (UK)  v Commission  [2008] ECR I‑9761, paragraphs 34 and 81).
Bavaria NV v Bayerischer Brauerbund eV.
Date: 2010-12-22
40. It is settled case-law that, as a general rule, the principle of legal certainty precludes a European Union measure from taking effect from a point in time before its publication, but it may exceptionally be otherwise where the purpose to be achieved so demands and where the legitimate expectations of those concerned are duly respected. In that regard, in order to ensure observance of the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, the substantive rules of European Union law must be interpreted as applying to situations existing before their entry into force only in so far as it clearly follows from their terms, objectives or general scheme that such effect must be given to them (see Joined Cases C‑74/00 P and C‑75/00 P Falck and Acciaierie di Bolzano  v Commission  [2002] ECR I‑7869, paragraph 119 and the case-law cited).
41. Whilst the principle of legal certainty precludes a regulation from being applied retroactively, irrespective of whether such application might produce favourable or unfavourable effects for the person concerned, the same principle requires that any factual situation should normally, in the absence of any express contrary provision, be examined in the light of the legal rules existing at the time when the situation obtained. However, if the new law is thus valid only for the future, it also applies, save for derogation, to the future effects of situations which came about during the period of validity of the old law (see Case C‑154/05 Kersbergen-Lap and Dams-Schipper  [2006] ECR I‑6249, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
59. Since the system introduced by Regulation No 2081/92 is a uniform and exhaustive system of protection (see Case C‑478/07 Budějovický Budvar [2009] ECR I‑7721, paragraphs 114 and 115), it must be regarded as forming a complete system that does not leave the Member States the power to fill a lacuna by resorting to their national law. It is thus proper to seek a solution in the light of the scheme and also the aims and objectives of the provision and of the regulation at issue (see, to that effect, Case 159/73 Hannoversche Zucker  [1974] ECR 121, paragraph 4).