larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Evonik Degussa GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Date: 2018-05-17
29


It should be noted that Decision 2011/278 was adopted by the Commission, as is apparent, in particular, from Article 1 thereof, in order to determine, pursuant to Article 10a(1) of Directive 2003/87, the transitional Union-wide rules for the harmonised allocation of allowances. Although the measures thus adopted seek, as described in that latter provision, to amend the non-essential elements of Directive 2003/87 by supplementing it, the fact remains that the Commission was obliged, in that context, to respect the legal framework thus established by that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 July 2017, Czech Republic v Commission, C‑696/15 P, EU:C:2017:595, paragraph 51), including, in particular, its scope. It follows, furthermore, that it is necessary to interpret the provisions of Decision 2011/278 in the light of the requirements arising from Directive 2003/87.
31


Accordingly, as is clear from recital 4 of Decision 2011/278, the Commission has developed, to the extent feasible, benchmarks for products. As stated in that recital, the products covered by those benchmarks are those ‘produced from activities listed in Annex I to Directive 2003/87’.
41


That interpretation of Annex I, Part 2, to Decision 2011/278 is borne out by the objective of the allowance trading scheme, referred to in Article 1 of Directive 2003/87, of promoting reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner.
42


As is apparent from recital 8 of Directive 2003/87, from recital 8 of Directive 2009/29 and from recital 8 of Decision 2011/278, the achievement of that objective implies the inclusion in that system of activities which have some potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As confirmed by all the observations submitted to the Court, ‘production of hydrogen’ within the meaning of Annex I to Directive 2003/87 has such a potential because of the intensity of the emissions of greenhouse gases generated by that activity. By contrast, that is not the case of a process of separation of hydrogen contained in a rich gas mixture, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which seeks only to achieve a higher amount of hydrogen present in a gas mixture.
45


The Court has already held that it is necessary to avoid emissions of installations being taken into account twice in the allocation of allowances, since Directive 2003/87 and Decision 2011/278 preclude double counting of emissions and the double allocation of allowances (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 September 2016, Borealis and Others, C‑180/15, EU:C:2016:647, paragraphs 70 to 73).
Bruno Dell'Acqua v Eurocom Srl and Regione Lombardia.
Date: 2018-05-30
31


According to settled case-law of the Court, Article 267 TFEU establishes a procedure for direct cooperation between the Court and the courts of the Member States. In that procedure, which is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court, any assessment of the facts of the case is a matter for the national court, which must determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court, whilst the Court is empowered to give rulings on the interpretation or the validity of an EU provision only on the basis of the facts which the national court puts before it (see, inter alia, judgment of 25 October 2017, Polbud — Wykonawstwo, C‑106/16, EU:C:2017:804, paragraph 27).
40


However, since those assets are withdrawn from the EU budget and transferred to the Member States, they cannot be regarded, once paid out, as assets of the European Union, within the meaning of the last sentence of Article 1 of the Protocol. Such an interpretation is supported by the case-law of the Court, which states that, once the Commission has granted financial assistance to a Member State under a Fund, that State must be considered to be entitled to the financial assistance in question (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 September 2009, Commission v Ente per le Ville Vesuviane and Ente per le Ville Vesuviane v Commission, C‑445/07 P and C‑455/07 P, EU:C:2009:529, paragraph 51).
44


The provisions of Regulation No 1083/2006 relate to the relationship between the Commission and the Member State, but do not create a direct link between, on the one hand, the sums paid to the Member State under a Fund such as the ESF and, on the other hand, the authorities designated by the Member State to manage the financed interventions and the final beneficiaries (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 September 2009, Commission v Ente per le Ville Vesuviane and Ente per le Ville Vesuviane v Commission, C‑445/07 P and C‑455/07 P, EU:C:2009:529, paragraph 48).
Stefan Czerwiński v Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w Gdańsku.
Date: 2018-05-30
31


Thus, that declaration creates a presumption that the national laws in a declaration under Article 9 of Regulation No 883/2004 fall within the scope of those regulations and bind, in principle, the other Member States (judgment of 3 March 2016, Commission v Malta, C‑12/14, EU:C:2016:135, paragraph 38).
33


The Court has repeatedly held that the distinction between the benefits which are excluded from the scope of Regulation No 883/2004 and benefits which are covered essentially rests on the constituent elements of each benefit, in particular its purpose and the conditions for its grant, and not on whether the national law classifies it as a social security benefit or not (judgments of 27 March 1985, ScrivnerandCole, 122/84, EU:C:1985:145, paragraph 18; of 11 July 1996, Otte, C‑25/95, EU:C:1996:295, paragraph 21, and of 5 March 1998, Molenaar, C‑160/96, EU:C:1998:84, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
Irit Azoulay and Others v European Parliament.
Date: 2018-05-30
29


The Court points out that the appellants dispute a ground of the judgment under appeal included for the sake of completeness, without challenging the case-law according to which promises made by the administrative authorities of an institution to an official, which do not take account of the provisions of the Staff Regulations, cannot give rise to legitimate expectation on the part of the person to whom they are addressed (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 November 1983, Thyssen v Commission, 188/82, EU:C:1983:329, paragraph 11, and of 6 February 1986, Vlachou v Court of Auditors, 162/84, EU:C:1986:56, paragraph 6).
Confederazione Generale Italiana dei Trasporti e della Logistica (Confetra) and Others v Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni and Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico.
Date: 2018-05-31
38


In the second place, it is the Court’s established case-law that what distinguishes express mail services from the universal postal service is the added value which they bring to the customers, for which the customers agree to pay more. These are specific service, dissociable from the service of general interest, which meet the special needs of economic operators and call for certain additional services not offered by the traditional postal service (see, to that effect, the judgment of 15 June 2017, Ilves Jakelu, C‑368/15, EU:C:2017:462, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
Länsförsäkringar Sak Försäkringsaktiebolag and Others v Dödsboet efter Ingvar Mattsson and Länsförsäkringar Sak Försäkringsaktiebolag.
Date: 2018-05-31
39


In order to determine whether the pursuit of insurance mediation activity consisting of carrying out work preparatory to the conclusion of insurance contracts, within the meaning of that provision, is subject to the existence of an intention on the part of the insurance intermediary to conclude those contracts, it must be borne in mind that the Court has consistently held that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, judgment of 23 January 2018, Piotrowski, C‑367/16, EU:C:2018:27, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
Éva Nothartová v Sámson József Boldizsár.
Date: 2018-05-31
18


As a starting point, it must be noted that, since Articles 7(2) and 8(3) of Regulation No 1215/2012 repeat, in essence, the wording of Articles 5(3) and 6(3) respectively of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1), the interpretation provided by the Court regarding the provisions of the latter regulation and, before that, the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 1972 L 299, p. 32), as amended by subsequent accession conventions for the new Member States, remains valid for the equivalent provisions of Regulation No 1215/2012 (see, by analogy, judgments of 15 June 2017, Kareda, C‑249/16, EU:C:2017:472, paragraph 27; of 17 October 2017, Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan, C‑194/16, EU:C:2017:766, paragraph 24, and of 31 January 2018, Hofsoe, C‑106/17, EU:C:2018:50, paragraph 36).
22


It is in the interests of the sound administration of justice that the special jurisdiction for counterclaims enables the parties, in the same proceedings and before the same court, to litigate all their claims against each other that have a common origin. Unnecessary multiple proceedings are thus avoided (judgment of 12 October 2016, Kostanjevec, C‑185/15, EU:C:2016:763, paragraph 37).
28


Further, it follows from the settled case-law relating to the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, as amended, and Regulation No 44/2001, which is also relevant in the context of Regulation No 1215/2012, that the purpose of the latter is not to unify the procedural rules of the Member States, but to determine which court has jurisdiction in disputes concerning civil and commercial matters in relations between Member States and to facilitate the enforcement of judgments (judgment of 17 November 2011, Hypoteční banka, C‑327/10, EU:C:2011:745, paragraph 37). As that regulation does not determine the conditions in which, after having established its international jurisdiction pursuant to that regulation, a court may or must examine together a number of claims involving the same parties, those conditions fall, in theory, within the procedural autonomy of the Member States (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 March 2012, G, C‑292/10, EU:C:2012:142, paragraph 45).
Claudia Wegener v Royal Air Maroc SA.
Date: 2018-05-31
16


In that regard, the Court has already held that the irreversible loss of time that constitutes the inconvenience triggering the right to compensation provided for in Regulation No 261/2004 is that which materialises on arrival at the final destination (judgment of 26 February 2013, Folkerts, C‑11/11, EU:C:2013:106, paragraphs 32 and 33).
17


The concept of ‘final destination’ is defined in Article 2(h) of the regulation, as the destination on the ticket presented at the check-in counter or, in the case of directly connecting flights, the destination of the last flight taken by the passenger concerned (judgment of 26 February 2013, Folkerts, C‑11/11, EU:C:2013:106, paragraphs 34 and 35).
18


It follows from the term ‘last flight’ that the concept of ‘connecting flight’ must be understood as referring to two or more flights constituting a whole for the purposes of the right to compensation for passengers provided for in Regulation No 261/2004, like the connecting flight at issue in the case giving rise to the judgment of 26 February 2013, Folkerts (C‑11/11, EU:C:2013:106, paragraphs 17 and 18).
19


That is the case when two or more flights were booked as a single unit, as in the case giving rise to the judgment of 26 February 2013, Folkerts (C‑11/11, EU:C:2013:106, paragraph 16).
20


Consequently, a transport operation such as that at issue in the main proceedings must be considered as a connecting flight, such as that at issue in the case giving rise to the judgment of 26 February 2013, Folkerts (C‑11/11, EU:C:2013:106, paragraphs 35 and 38).
25


Taking account of all the aforementioned considerations, the answer to the question referred is that Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 261/2004 must be interpreted as meaning that the regulation applies to a passenger transport effected under a single booking and comprising, between its departure from an airport situated in the territory of a Member State and its arrival at an airport situated in the territory of a third State, a scheduled stopover outside the European Union with a change of aircraft.
Koppers Denmark ApS v Skatteministeriet.
Date: 2018-06-06
22


In accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, when a literal interpretation of a provision of EU law does not permit its precise scope to be assessed, it must be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and the purpose of the rules of which it forms part (see, inter alia, judgment of 7 September 2017, Austria Asphalt, C‑248/16, EU:C:2017:643, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
24


However, as is apparent from recital 22 of Directive 2003/96, the EU legislature considered that energy products should essentially be subject to a framework common to the Member States when used as heating fuel or motor fuel and that it is therefore in the nature and the logic of the tax system to exclude from the scope of the framework, in particular, energy products used for purposes other than as motor fuel or heating fuel. Thus, even though such products fall within the definition of ‘energy products’ for the purposes of Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/96, they are excluded from the scope of that directive by the first indent of Article 2(4)(b) thereof if they are not intended to be used as motor fuel or heating fuel (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 July 2007, Fendt Italiana, C‑145/06 and C‑146/06, EU:C:2007:411, paragraphs 35 and 43).
28


Second, that interpretation is borne out by the aims of Directive 2003/96. In this respect, it should be noted that, in making provision for a system of harmonised taxation of energy products and electricity, the directive seeks, as is apparent from recitals 2 to 7, 11, 12 and 24, to achieve a twofold objective, namely, first, to promote the proper functioning of the internal market in the energy sector, by avoiding, in particular, distortions of competition, and second, to further environmental policy objectives (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 7 September 2017, Hüttenwerke Krupp Mannesmann, C‑465/15, EU:C:2017:640, paragraph 26, and of 7 March 2018, Cristal Union, C‑31/17, EU:C:2018:168, paragraphs 29 and 34 and the case-law cited).
Virgílio Tarragó da Silveira v Massa Insolvente da Espírito Santo Financial Group, SA.
Date: 2018-06-06
20


According to the Court’s settled case-law, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision or be given priority over the other language versions. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all EU languages (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 July 2016, JZ, C‑294/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:610, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
24


First, as regards the context, Article 15 of Regulation No 1346/2000 must (i) be read in conjunction with Article 4(2)(f) of the same regulation which distinguishes ‘lawsuits pending’ from other proceedings brought by individual creditors (judgment of 9 November 2016, ENEFI, C‑212/15, EU:C:2016:841, paragraph 32). That provision does not in any way indicate that a lawsuit pending, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, must concern a specific asset or right. The use of the general expression ‘lawsuit pending’ confirms, on the contrary, that Article 15 of Regulation No 1346/2000 applies to lawsuits pending concerning not only a specific right or asset, but, more broadly, an asset or right that is part of the insolvency estate.
30


As the Court has already stated, it would be contradictory to interpret Article 15 of Regulation No 1346/2000 as also covering enforcement proceedings, with the consequence that the effects of the opening of insolvency proceedings would thus come within the scope of the law of the Member State in which such enforcement proceedings are pending, while, in parallel, Article 20(1) of that regulation, by explicitly requiring the return to the liquidator of everything obtained ‘through enforcement’, would render Article 15 ineffective (judgment of 9 November 2016, ENEFI, C‑212/15, EU:C:2016:841, paragraph 34).
31


Furthermore, Regulation No 1346/2000 is guided by the principle that the requirement of equal treatment of creditors, which, mutatis mutandis, underpins all insolvency proceedings, precludes, in general, proceedings brought by individual creditors by means of enforcement proceedings, introduced and conducted while insolvency proceedings against the debtor are pending (judgment of 9 November 2016, ENEFI, C‑212/15, EU:C:2016:841, paragraph 33).
32


Consequently, it must be held that enforcement proceedings do not fall within the scope of application of Article 15 of Regulation No 1346/2000 (judgment of 9 November 2016, ENEFI, C‑212/15, EU:C:2016:841, paragraph 35).
EP Agrarhandel GmbH v Bundesminister für Land-, Forst-, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft.
Date: 2018-06-07
33


It must be pointed out that the wording in the majority of the language versions of Article 2(4) of Decision 2001/672 states that the information is to be ‘reported’ to the competent national authority no later than 15 days after the date when the animals were moved to the pasture. It follows from that wording that the information must be sent before the deadline (see, by analogy, judgment of 1 April 2004, Borgmann, C‑1/02, EU:C:2004:202, paragraph 23).
36


Where there is divergence between the various language versions of a text of EU law, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgment of 26 April 2012, DR and TV2 Danmark, C‑510/10, EU:C:2012:244, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
41


Furthermore, Article 2(4) of Decision 2001/672, in its original version, did indeed provide that the information referred to in paragraph 2 of that article must be ‘introduced in the national database for bovine animals at the latest seven days after the date when the animals are moved to the pasture’. It follows therefrom that that information could not be regarded as having been introduced until it was actually registered in that database. It was not therefore sufficient that the notification was posted within the time limit (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 November 2004, Toeters and Verberk, C‑171/03, EU:C:2004:714, paragraph 43).
KP v LO.
Date: 2018-06-07
24


Secondly, according to settled case-law, an agreement concluded by the Council, in accordance with Article 218 TFEU, is, as far as the European Union is concerned, an act of one of its institutions, within the meaning of subparagraph (b) of the first paragraph of Article 267 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2009 in Bogiatzi, C‑301/08, EU:C:2009:649, paragraph 23).
25


It follows that the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the Hague Protocol.
41


Moreover, as is apparent inter alia from the Bonomi report and the objectives pursued by the Commission, which participated actively in the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Hague Protocol (see the Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations [COM (2005) 649]), that system seeks to guarantee the predictability of the applicable law by ensuring that the law designated is not devoid of a sufficient connection to the family situation at issue.
42


In this respect, Article 3(1) of the Hague Protocol primarily provides for the application of the law of the State of the creditor’s habitual residence, which is the most closely connected with the creditor’s situation and appears therefore to be that which is the best adapted to govern the specific problems which the maintenance creditor may encounter.
44


As regards the special rules set out in Article 4(2) to 4(4) of the Hague Protocol, which provide a range of primary and secondary connecting rules applicable in “cascade” and intended to counter the risk that the creditor is not able to obtain maintenance under the laws successively designated, Article 4(3) of the Hague Protocol designates first of all the law of the forum in cases where the creditor has seized the competent authority of the State in which the debtor has his habitual residence. As is apparent from point 59 of the Advocate General’s Opinion, that State has a connection with the family situation of the creditor and the debtor, at least in so far as the possibilities of the satisfaction of the creditor’s needs by the debtor are concerned. The predictability of that law is also attributable to the fact that it is dependent on the jurisdiction of the court chosen, which in the present case coincides with the jurisdiction under the traditional rule that the claimant must bring his action before the court of the defendant.
49


That analysis is justified by the close links between the Hague Protocol and Regulation No 4/2009. Indeed, Article 15 of the Regulation expressly refers to the Hague Protocol and designation of the courts with jurisdiction in accordance with that Regulation indirectly allows designation of the law of the forum. In addition, as the Advocate General has stated in point 56 of his Opinion, that regulation is based on the premiss that there is a connection between the maintenance to which a given dispute relates and the State whose courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the dispute.