Wolfgang Glatzel v Freistaat Bayern.
Date: 2014-05-22
43. The principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EU law, enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter, of which the principle of non-discrimination laid down in Article 21(1) of the Charter is a particular expression. According to settled case-law, that principle requires the EU legislature to ensure, in accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter, that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, to that effect, Case C‑550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals  v Commission  EU:C:2010:512, paragraphs 54 and 55 and the case-law cited). A difference in treatment is justified if it is based on an objective and reasonable criterion, that is, if the difference relates to a legally permitted aim pursued by the legislation in question, and it is proportionate to the aim pursued by the treatment concerned (Case C‑127/07 Arcelor Atlantique and Lorraine and Others  EU:C:2008:728, paragraph 47, and Case C‑101/12 Schaible  EU:C:2013:661, paragraph 77).
45. In its case-law on equal treatment in the area of employment and occupation, the Court has already held that the definition of ‘disability’ must be understood, for the purposes of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16) read in the light of the UN Convention on Disabilities, as long-term physical, mental or psychological impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other workers (Joined Cases C‑335/11 and C‑33711 HK Danmark  EU:C:2013:222, paragraphs 37 to 39; Case C‑312/11 Commission  v Italy  E U:C:2013:446, paragraph 56; and Case C‑363/12 Z EU:C:2014:159, paragraph 76).
49. In that connection, it must be recalled that the Court has already held, as regards the general principle of equal treatment in the context of grounds such as age or sex, that a difference of treatment which is based on a characteristic related to such grounds does not constitute discrimination — that is to say, an infringement of Article 21(1) of the Charter — where, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate (see, to that effect, as regards discrimination on grounds of age, Case C‑229/08 Wolf  EU:C:2010:3, paragraph 35, and Case C‑447/09 Prigge and Others  EU:C:2011:573, paragraph 66; and, as regards discrimination based on sex, Case 222/84 Johnston  EU:C:1986:206, paragraph 40, and Case C‑273/97 Sirdar  EU:C:1999:523, paragraph 25).
51. In that connection, according to settled case-law, the improvement of road safety is an objective of general interest of the European Union (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑55/93 van Schaik  EU:C:1994:363, paragraph 19; Case C‑451/99 Cura Anlagen  EU:C:2002:195, paragraph 59; Case 54/05 Commission  v Finland  EU:C:2007:168, paragraph 40; Case C‑110/95 Commission  v Italy  EU:C:2009:66, paragraph 60; Case C‑384/08 Attanasio Group  EU:C:2010:133, paragraph 50; Case C‑438/08 Commission  v Portugal  EU:C:2009:651, paragraph 48; Case C‑184/10 Grasser  EU:C:2011:324, paragraph 26; and Case C‑224/10 Apelt  EU:C:2011:655, paragraph 47). By laying down, in Annex III thereto, a minimum threshold of visual acuity for the worse eye for drivers in group 2, for the purposes of that annex, Directive 2006/126 aims to improve road safety and thus to attain an objective of general interest.
52. As far as concerns judicial review of the requirements of the principle of proportionality relating to the minimum standards for the visual acuity necessary to drive power-driven vehicles, it must be observed that, as regards complex medical assessments such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the EU legislature has a broad discretion and review by the Court is limited to verifying whether there has been a manifest error of assessment or a misuse of powers, or whether the legislature has manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion (see, to that effect Case C‑425/ 08 Enviro Tech (Europe)  EU:C:2009:635, paragraph 47; Case C‑343/09 Afton Chemical  EU:C:2010:419, paragraph 28; and Case C‑15/10 Etimine  EU:C:2011:504, paragraph 60).
53. However, the fact remains that, in cases involving such discretion the EU legislature must base its choice on objective criteria (see, Case C‑58/08 Vodafone and Others  EU:C:2010:321, paragraph 53) and it must ensure that fundamental rights are observed (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑92/09 and C‑93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert  EU:C:2010:662, paragraph 46; and Case C‑236/09 Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others  EU:C:2011:100, paragraph 17).
54. As regards the necessity of the minimum standards for vision of drivers of power-driven vehicles, it is essential, in order to ensure road safety, that the persons to whom a driving licence is issued possess sufficient physical capabilities, in particular with respect to their vision, in so far as physical defects may have significant consequences (see, by analogy, as regards airline pilots, Prigge and Others  EU:C:2011:573, paragraph 67). It is well known that vision is essential for the purposes of driving power-driven vehicles and, accordingly, the more that function is reduced, the more it becomes necessary to take into consideration requirements relating to road safety.
56. Thus, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, the principle of proportionality requires, in particular, the principle of equal treatment to be reconciled as far as possible with the requirements of road safety which determine the conditions for driving motor vehicles (see, by analogy, Johnston  EU:C:1986:206, paragraph 38; Sirdar  EU:C:1999:523, paragraph 26; and Case C‑285/98 Kreil  EU:C:2000:2, paragraph 23).
64. As far as concerns the determination of that minimum value relating to visual acuity required by Directive 2006/126, it must be recalled that the EU legislature has a broad discretion as to complex medical questions, such as those relating to the visual acuity necessary to drive power-driven vehicles. In such a context, the European Union judicature cannot substitute its assessment of scientific and technical facts for that of the legislature on which the founding treaties have conferred that task (with regard to the latter, see, inter alia, Afton Chemical  EU:C:2010:419, paragraph 28).
65. Moreover, the ‘Eyesight’ working group notes in its report a lack of scientific studies on several aspects of eyesight for drivers of power-driven vehicles. In that connection, according to the case-law of the Court, where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to the health of individuals, the EU legislature may take protective measures without having to wait until the reality and the seriousness of those risks become fully apparent (see, to that effect, Case C‑180/96 United Kingdom  v Commission  EU:C:1998:192, paragraph 99; Case C‑192/01 Commission  v Denmark  EU:C:2003:492, paragraph 49; and Case C‑77/09 Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços  EU:C:2010:803, paragraph 73).
68. In that connection, it must be recalled that the European Union approved the UN Convention on Disabilities by Decision 2010/48. Consequently, the provisions of that convention are, from the time of its entry into force, an integral part of the European Union legal order (see Case 181/73 Haegeman  EU:C:1974:41, paragraph 5, and Z  EU:C:2014:159, paragraph 73). Furthermore, it is clear from the appendix to Annex II to Decision 2010/48 that, as regards personal mobility, Directive 2006/126 is one of the legal acts of the European Union which refer to matters governed by that convention.
70. However, the fact remains that, according to the case-law of the Court, the primacy of international agreements concluded by the European Union over provisions of secondary legislation means that such provisions must, so far as is possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those agreements (see, inter alia, Case C‑61/94 Commission  v Germany  EU:C:1996:313, paragraph 52 ; HK Danmark  EU:C:2013:222 paragraph 29; and Z  EU:C:2014:159, paragraph 72).
78. Therefore, although Article 26 of the Charter requires the European Union to respect and recognise the right of persons with disabilities to benefit from integration measures, the principle enshrined by that article does not require the EU legislature to adopt any specific measure. In order for that article to be fully effective, it must be given more specific expression in European Union or national law. Accordingly, that article cannot by itself confer on individuals a subjective right which they may invoke as such (see, to that effect, as regards Article 27 of the Charter, Case C‑176/12 Association de mediation sociale  EU:C:2014:2, paragraphs 45 and 47).