Helga Krüsemann and Others v TUIfly GmbH.
Date: 2018-04-17
24


In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 28 February 2018, ZPT, C‑518/16, EU:C:2018:126, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
25


In the present case, it should be noted that the purpose of the first question referred by the Amtsgericht Hannover (Local Court, Hanover) is to obtain from the Court of Justice an interpretation of the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 in the light of the facts at issue in the main proceedings. The classification under EU law of facts established by the referring court involves, however, the interpretation of EU law for which, in the context of the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction (judgment of 20 December 2017, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi, C‑434/15, EU:C:2017:981, paragraph 20).
26


As to the criticisms made in respect of the third question referred by the Amtsgericht Hannover (Local Court, Hanover), it should be borne in mind that the presumption of relevance referred to in paragraph 24 of the present judgment cannot be rebutted by the mere fact that one of the parties in the main proceedings disputes certain facts relating to the disputes in the main proceedings, the accuracy of which it is not for the Court to determine, and on which the delimitation of the subject matter of those proceedings depends (judgment of 22 September 2016, Breitsamer und Ulrich, C‑113/15, EU:C:2016:718, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
30


In that regard, it should be noted that the EU legislature has laid down the obligations of air carriers in the event of cancellation or long delay of flights (that is, a delay equal to or in excess of three hours) in Article 5(1) of Regulation No 261/2004 (judgment of 4 May 2017, Pešková and Peška, C‑315/15, EU:C:2017:342, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
31


By way of derogation from Article 5(1) of Regulation No 261/2004, recitals 14 and 15 and Article 5(3) of that regulation state that an air carrier is to be released from its obligation to pay passengers compensation under Article 7 of Regulation No 261/2004 if the carrier can prove that the cancellation or delay is caused by extraordinary circumstances which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken (judgment of 4 May 2017, Pešková and Peška, C‑315/15, EU:C:2017:342, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
32


May be classified as ‘extraordinary circumstances’, within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, all events which, by their nature or origin, are not inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned and are beyond its actual control (judgment of 4 May 2017, Pešková and Peška, C‑315/15, EU:C:2017:342, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
34


In that regard, the Court has already had occasion to hold that the circumstances referred to in this recital are not necessarily and automatically grounds of exemption from the obligation to pay compensation provided for in Article 5(1)(c) of Regulation No 261/2004 (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 December 2008, Wallentin-Hermann, C‑549/07, EU:C:2008:771, paragraph 22) and that, consequently, it is necessary to assess, on a case by case basis, if it fulfils the two cumulative conditions recalled in paragraph 32 of the present judgment.
35


It is apparent from the case-law of the Court that any unexpected event need not necessarily be classified as an ‘extraordinary circumstance’, within the meaning of the term set out in the previous paragraph, but that such an event may be considered to be inherent in the normal carrying out of the activity of the air carrier concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 September 2015, van der Lans, C‑257/14, EU:C:2015:618, paragraph 42).
36


Furthermore, given the objective of Regulation No 261/2004, which is to ensure, as is apparent from recital 1 thereof, a high level of protection for passengers, and the fact that Article 5(3) of that regulation derogates from the principle of the right to compensation for passengers in the event of cancellation or substantial delay of a flight, the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’, within the meaning of that paragraph, must be strictly interpreted (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 December 2008, Wallentin-Hermann, C‑549/07, EU:C:2008:771, paragraph 20).