larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH v Alice van der Schee.
Date: 2009-09-10
22. In order to answer those questions, it is necessary to refer to the recitals in the preamble to Regulation No 44/2001. The second of those recitals states that certain differences between national rules governing jurisdiction and recognition of judgments hamper the sound operation of the internal market. The seventh recital in the preamble to that regulation provides that its scope must cover all the main civil and commercial matters. The 15th recital in the preamble to that regulation makes clear the need, in the interests of the harmonious administration of justice, to ensure that irreconcilable judgments will not be given in two Member States.
23. Those recitals indicate the intention on the part of the Community legislature to provide for a broad definition of the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ referred to in Article 1(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 and, consequently, to provide that the article should be broad in its scope.
26. That stated, it must be noted that, in its case-law relating to the Brussels Convention, the Court has held that an action is related to bankruptcy if it derives directly from the bankruptcy and is closely linked to proceedings for realising the assets or judicial supervision (see Case 133/78 Gourdain  [1979] ECR 733, paragraph 4). An action with such characteristics does not, therefore, fall within the scope of that convention (see Case C-339/07 Seagon  [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 19).
27. In so far as Regulation No 44/2001 has now replaced the Brussels Convention in relations between Member States, the interpretation provided by the Court in respect of the provisions of the Brussels Convention also applies to the provisions of Regulation No 44/2001 whenever both sets of provisions may be regarded as equivalent. It is also clear from the 19th recital in the preamble to Regulation No 44/2001 that continuity of interpretation should be ensured between the Brussels Convention and Regulation No 44/2001 (Case C-167/08 Draka NK Cables and Others [2009], ECR I-0000, paragraph 20).
31. It appears from the order for reference that German Graphics, the applicant in the proceedings before the Landgericht Braunschweig, has requested the recovery of assets owned by it and that the only question before the court relates to the ownership of certain machines situated on the premises of Holland Binding in the Netherlands. The answer to that question of law is independent of the opening of insolvency proceedings. The action brought by German Graphics sought only to ensure the application of the reservation of title clause in its own favour.
33. In those circumstances, the mere fact that the liquidator is a party to the proceedings is not sufficient to classify the proceedings brought before the Landgericht Braunschweig as proceedings deriving directly from the insolvency and being closely linked to proceedings for realising assets.
Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV v Adolf Darbo AG.
Date: 2009-09-10
60. In this respect, the Court has held that technological need is closely related to the assessment of what is necessary in order to protect public health. In the absence of a technological need justifying the use of an additive, there is no reason to incur the potential health risk resulting from authorisation of the use of that additive (see Case C‑3/00 Denmark v Commission  [2003] ECR I‑2643, paragraph 82).
Proceedings brought by Compañía Española de Comercialización de Aceite SA.
Date: 2009-10-01
25. In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case‑law, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see Case C‑213/07 Michaniki [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 33 and the case‑law cited).
26. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see Michaniki , paragraph 34 and the case‑law cited).
52. As the Court has already held, given that the scope of the Community competition rules is not the same as the scope of national competition rules, the mere fact that in Article 36 EC and Regulation No 26 the Community legislature has endeavoured to reconcile the objectives of the common agricultural policy with Community competition policy does not necessarily mean that any application of national competition law conflicts with Article 36 EC and Regulation No 26 ( Milk Marque and National Farmers’ Union , paragraph 66).
56. Moreover, as regards cases coming within the scope ratione materiae not only of Article 81(1) EC, but also of national competition law, the national authorities cannot take decisions which conflict with those of the Commission, or create the risk of such a conflict (see, to that effect, Case C‑344/98 Masterfoods and HB [2000] ECR I‑11369, paragraphs 51 and 52).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 2009-10-01
13. In that regard, the Court notes that it is settled case-law that Article 49 EC requires not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of nationality against service providers who are established in another Member State, but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less advantageous the activities of a service provider established in another Member State, where he lawfully provides similar services (see, in particular, Case C‑244/04 Commission  v Germany  [2006] ECR I‑885, paragraph 30).
14. However, where national legislation falling within an area which has not been harmonised at Community level is applicable without distinction to all persons and undertakings operating in the territory of the Member State concerned, it may, notwithstanding its restrictive effect on the freedom to provide services, be justified where it meets an overriding requirement in the public interest and that interest is not already safeguarded by the rules to which the service provider is subject in the Member State in which he is established and in so far as it is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it ( Commission  v Germany , paragraph 31, and case-law cited).
15. More particularly, it has already been held that a Member State may check that an undertaking established in another Member State, which deploys on the territory of the first-mentioned Member State workers who are nationals of a non-member State, is not availing itself of the freedom to provide services for a purpose other than the accomplishment of the service concerned ( Commission  v Germany , paragraph 40, and case-law cited).
16. In that context, the Court held that a requirement that the service provider furnishes a simple prior declaration certifying that the situation of the workers concerned is lawful, particularly in the light of the requirements of residence, work visas and social security cover in the Member State where that provider employs them, is a measure which, in principle, does not exceed what is necessary to prevent the abuse to which the implementation of the freedom to provide services may give rise (see, to that effect, Case C‑445/03 Commission  v Luxembourg  [2004] ECR I‑10191, paragraph 46, and Commission  v Germany , paragraphs 41 and 42).
Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Malta.
Date: 2009-10-01
7. It is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation obtaining in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C‑348/99 Commission  v Luxembourg  [2000] ECR I‑2917, paragraph 8, and Case C‑272/01 Commission  v Portugal [2004] ECR I‑6767, paragraph 29).
Commission of the European Communities v Ireland.
Date: 2009-10-01
10. It is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C‑168/03 Commission v Spain  [2004] ECR I‑8227, paragraph 24).
Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Finland.
Date: 2009-10-06
29. In this respect, the Court has previously ruled that a discharge for the purposes of Article 5(2) of Directive 91/271 exists irrespective of whether the waste water discharges directly or indirectly into a sensitive area (see, to that effect, Case C 396/00 Commission v Italy  [2002] ECR I-3949, paragraphs 29 to 32). As the Advocate General observed at point 72 of her Opinion, this is in keeping with the high level of protection provided for by Community policy on the environment under Article 174(2) EC.
33. The Court has already established that those requirements apply subject to the second paragraph of Annex II.A(a) to Directive 91/271 (Case C‑280/02 Commission v France  [2004] ECR I‑8573, paragraphs 104 and 105). Letter (ii) of that provision thus provides that, as regards coastal waters which are found to have a poor water exchange, or which receive large quantities of nutrients, for large agglomerations, the removal of phosphorus and/or nitrogen should be included unless it can be demonstrated that the removal will have no effect on the level of eutrophication.
46. In that regard, it is to be remembered that, according to settled case law, in proceedings under Article 226 EC for failure to fulfil obligations it is for the Commission to prove the alleged failure. It is the Commission’s responsibility to place before the Court all the information needed to enable the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled, and in so doing the Commission may not rely on any presumption (see, inter alia, Case 96/81 Commission v Netherlands  [1982] ECR 1791, paragraph 6, and Case C-135/05 Commission v Italy  [2007] ECR I‑3475, paragraph 26).
47. Moreover, where the Commission has adduced sufficient evidence to prove the relevant facts which occurred in the territory of the defendant Member State, it is for the latter to challenge in substance and in detail the information produced and the consequences flowing therefrom (see, to that effect, Case 272/86 Commission v Greece  [1988] ECR 4875, paragraph 21, and Case C-365/97 Commission v Italy  [1999] ECR I‑7773, paragraphs 84 and 86).
77. In those circumstances, the Commission has failed to show that the transfer of nitrogen from Finnish treatment plants of urban waste water from agglomerations of more than 10 000 p.e. whose discharges flow into the Gulf of Bothnia towards the Baltic Sea proper can be categorised as significant for the purposes of the case law according to which the flow of nitrogen caused by urban waste water discharged into eutrophied waters must be considered significant if it accounts for 10% or more of the total flow of nitrogen (see, to that effect, Commission v France , paragraph 77).
SPÖ Landesorganisation Kärnten v Finanzamt Klagenfurt.
Date: 2009-10-06
16. In that context, it must be pointed out that, although Article 4 of the Sixth VAT Directive gives a very wide scope to VAT, only activities of an economic nature are covered by that provision (see Case C-284/04 T‑Mobile Austria and Others  [2007] ECR I-5189, paragraph 34; and Case C‑369/04 Hutchison 3G and Others  [2007] ECR I‑5247, paragraph 28).
17. It is also apparent from settled case-law that an analysis of the definitions of taxable person and economic activities shows that the scope of the term economic activities is very wide, and that the term is objective in character, in the sense that the activity is considered per se and without regard to its purpose or results (see, inter alia, Case C‑223/03 University of Huddersfield  [2006] ECR I-1751, paragraph 47; T-Mobile Austria and Others , paragraph 35; and Hutchison 3G and Others , paragraph 29).
19. In that regard, it must be pointed out, first, that the basis of assessment for a provision of services is everything which makes up the consideration for the service provided and that a provision of services is therefore taxable only if there is a direct link between the service supplied and the consideration received. It follows that a supply of services is effected ‘for consideration’ within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the Sixth VAT Directive, and hence is taxable only if there is a legal relationship between the provider of the service and the recipient pursuant to which there is reciprocal performance, the remuneration received by the provider of the service constituting the value actually given in return for the service supplied to the recipient (Case C-16/93 Tolsma [1994] ECR I-743, paragraphs 13 and 14 and the case-law cited).
20. Secondly, it is important to point out that, under Article 4(2) of the Sixth VAT Directive, in accordance with the requirements of the principle of neutrality of the common system of value added tax, the term ‘exploitation’ refers to all transactions, whatever may be their legal form, by which it is sought to obtain income from the goods in question on a continuing basis (see, to that effect, Case C‑77/01 EDM  [2004] ECR I‑4295, paragraph 48, and Case C-8/03 BBL  [2004] ECR I-10157, paragraph 36).
Djurgården-Lilla Värtans Miljöskyddsförening v Stockholms kommun genom dess marknämnd.
Date: 2009-10-15
25. It is clear from settled case-law that the need for an application, and hence a uniform interpretation, of the provisions of Community law requires that, in cases of doubt, the text of a provision must not be considered in isolation in one of its versions, but, on the contrary, should be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages (Case C‑174/05 Zuid-Hollandse Milieufederatie and Natuur en Milieu  [2006] ECR I‑2443, paragraph 20, and Case C‑311/06 Consiglio Nazionale degli Ingegneri  [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 53).
26. Furthermore, the need for such an interpretation requires that in the case of divergence between the various language versions the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, Case C‑449/93 Rockfon  [1995] ECR I‑4291, paragraph 28).
29. Finally, it is clear from settled case-law that the scope of Directive 85/337 is wide and its purpose very broad (see, Case C‑2/07 Abraham and Others  [2008] ECR I‑1197, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
38. First, the right of access to a review procedure within the meaning of Article 10a of Directive 85/337 does not depend on whether the authority which adopted the decision or act at issue is an administrative body or a court of law. Second, participation in an environmental decision-making procedure under the conditions laid down in Articles 2(2) and 6(4) of Directive 85/337 is separate and has a different purpose from a legal review, since the latter may, where appropriate, be directed at a decision adopted at the end of that procedure. Therefore, participation in the decision-making procedure has no effect on the conditions for access to the review procedure.
39. Accordingly, the answer to the second question is that the members of the public concerned, within the meaning of Article 1(2) and 10a of Directive 85/337, must be able to have access to a review procedure to challenge the decision by which a body attached to a court of law of a Member State has given a ruling on a request for development consent, regardless of the role they might have played in the examination of that request by taking part in the procedure before that body and by expressing their views.
The third question
48. In that connection, it must be stated that, although Directive 85/337 provides that members of the public concerned who have a sufficient interest in challenging projects or have rights which may be impaired by projects are to have the right to challenge the decision which authorises it, that directive in no way permits access to review procedures to be limited on the ground that the persons concerned have already been able to express their views in the participatory phase of the decision‑making procedure established by Article 6(4) thereof.
Enviro Tech (Europe) Ltd v Belgian State.
Date: 2009-10-15
46. First of all, it must be pointed out that, in this complex technical and legal context, essentially in a state of flux, Directive 67/548 basically gives the Commission wide powers of assessment as to the scope of the measures to be taken to adapt the Annexes to that directive to technical progress.
47. As the Court has already held, where the Community authorities have a broad discretion, in particular as to the assessment of highly complex scientific and technical facts in order to determine the nature and scope of the measures which they adopt, review by the Community judicature is limited to verifying whether there has been a manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers, or whether those authorities have manifestly exceeded the limits of their discretion.  In such a context, the Community judicature cannot substitute its assessment of scientific and technical facts for that of the institutions on which alone the Treaty has placed that task (see Case C‑326/05 P Industrias Químicas del Vallés  v Commission  [2007] ECR I‑6557, paragraphs 75 to 77).
– The question of flammability
62. Thus, it is settled case-law that, where a Community authority is called upon, in the performance of its duties, to make complex assessments, its discretion applies also, to a certain extent, to the finding of facts underlying its action (see, to that effect, Case 138/79 Roquette Frères  v Council  [1980] ECR 3333, paragraph 25, and Case C‑120/97 Upjohn  [1999] ECR I‑223, paragraph 34).  Furthermore, in such circumstances, it is the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case (Case C‑269/90 Technische Universität München  [1991] ECR I‑5469, paragraph 14).
G. Elbertsen v Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit.
Date: 2009-10-22
37. As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that, when implementing Community legislation, the Member States are required to comply not only with the provisions of the regulation concerned, but also with the general principles of Community law, such as the principles of equal treatment, the protection of legitimate expectations, and proportionality (see, to that effect, Case C‑241/07 JK Otsa Talu  [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 46).
41. As regards, specifically, the principle of equal treatment, it has been consistently held that this principle requires that comparable situations not be treated differently and different situations not be treated alike unless such treatment is objectively justified (Case C‑313/04 Franz Egenberger  [2006] ECR I‑6331, paragraph 33 and case-law cited).
43. Furthermore, it must be noted that the principle of proportionality, which requires that the aim in view should be attained by exercising as little constraint as possible, does not preclude national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which is designed to avoid the implementation of the payment scheme leading to insignificant and wholly disproportionate reference amounts by comparison with the administrative costs borne by the Member State (see, to that effect, Case C‑16/89 Spronk  [1990] ECR I‑3185, paragraph 28).
45. As regards the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, it must be recalled that, in the field of the common agricultural policy, economic operators are not justified in having a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by the competent authorities in the exercise of their discretionary power will be maintained ( JK Otsa Talu , paragraph 51). It follows from this that the making of investments in production capacity or the purchase of land does not entitle the producer concerned to entertain any legitimate expectation based on the making of those investments in order to claim a reference amount allocated precisely on account of those investments (see, to that effect, Spronk , paragraph 29).
Dinter GmbH v Hauptzollamt Düsseldorf (C-522/07) and Europol Frost-Food GmbH v Hauptzollamt Krefeld (C-65/08).
Date: 2009-10-29
29. It should be borne in mind from the outset that according to settled case‑law, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, inter alia, Case C‑142/06 Olicom [2007] ECR I‑6675, paragraph 16 and the case‑law cited, and Case C‑362/07 Kip Europe and Others [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 26).
30. In that regard, both the notes to the chapters of the CN and the explanatory notes to the HS are important means for ensuring the uniform application of the Tariff and as such may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (see Case C‑11/93 Siemens Nixdorf [1994] ECR I‑1945, paragraph 12; Case C‑382/95 Techex [1997] ECR I‑7363, paragraph 12; Case C‑339/98 Peacock [2000] ECR I‑8947, paragraph 10; and Olicom , paragraph 17).
31. The content of those notes must therefore be in conformity with the provisions of the CN and may not alter the meaning of those provisions (see, inter alia, Case C‑280/97 ROSE Elektrotechnik [1999] ECR I‑689, paragraph 23; Case C‑42/99 Eru Portuguesa [2000] ECR I‑7691, paragraph 20; and Case C‑495/03 Intermodal Transports [2005] ECR I‑8151, paragraph 48).
32. It is appropriate to note in that regard that, according to settled case‑law, the Council has conferred upon the Commission, acting in cooperation with the customs experts of the Member States, a broad discretion to define the subject-matter of tariff headings falling to be considered for the classification of particular goods. However, the Commission’s power to adopt the measures mentioned in Article 9(1)(a), (b), (d) and (e) of Regulation No 2658/87, such as additional notes, does not authorise it to alter the subject-matter of the tariff headings which have been defined on the basis of the HS – established by the Convention on the HS – whose scope the Community has undertaken, under Article 3 thereof, not to modify (Case C‑267/94 France v Commission [1995] ECR I‑4845, paragraphs 19 and 20, and Case C‑15/05 Kawasaki Motors Europe [2006] ECR I‑3657, paragraph 35).