CTL Logistics GmbH v DB Netz AG.
Date: 2017-11-09
36


The objectives pursued by Directive 2001/14 include, in particular, that of ensuring non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure, as is set out, inter alia, in recitals 5 and 11 of that directive (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 February 2013, Commission v Hungary, C‑473/10, EU:C:2013:113, paragraph 47, and of 18 April 2013, Commission v France, C‑625/10, EU:C:2013:243, paragraph 49).
38


The charging system introduced by Directive 2001/14 as a management tool also serves to ensure pursuit of another objective, namely that of the independence of the infrastructure manager (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 February 2013, Commission v Spain, C‑483/10, EU:C:2013:114, paragraph 44, and of 28 February 2013, Commission v Germany, C‑556/10, EU:C:2013:116, paragraph 82).
39


Furthermore, by virtue of recital 12 of that directive, in order to achieve the objective of ensuring efficient use of the railway infrastructure, it is appropriate that those systems encourage railway infrastructure managers to optimise use of their infrastructure within the framework set out by Member States (see to that effect, judgment of 28 February 2013, Commission v Germany, C‑556/10, EU:C:2013:116, paragraph 82).
40


In order to achieve that objective, the infrastructure managers must be granted some degree of flexibility, as mentioned in recital 20 of Directive 2001/14 (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 February 2013, Commission v Spain, C‑483/10, EU:C:2013:114, paragraph 44, and of 28 February 2013, Commission v Germany, C‑556/10, EU:C:2013:116, paragraph 82).
41


Similarly, recital 34 of that directive states that investment in railway infrastructure is desirable and infrastructure charging schemes should provide incentives for infrastructure managers to make appropriate investments where they are economically attractive. There can be no incentive for managers to invest in infrastructure unless the charging scheme affords them a certain degree of flexibility (judgment of 28 February 2013, Commission v Spain, C‑483/10, EU:C:2013:114, paragraph 45).
49


Also in the context of the determination and collection of the charges for use of the railway infrastructure, the second subparagraph of Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/14 provides that the determination and collection of the charge for use of the railway infrastructure are tasks to be performed by the infrastructure managers, who are required to ensure the application of uniform principles, as provided for particularly in Article 4(4) and (5) of that directive (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 February 2013, Commission v Germany, C‑556/10, EU:C:2013:116, paragraph 84, and of 3 October 2013, Commission v Italy, C‑369/11, EU:C:2013:636, paragraph 41).
77


Secondly, it must be borne in mind that, under Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/14, the Member States are to establish a charging framework. They may also establish specific charging rules, while respecting the management independence of the infrastructure manager. Under that provision, it is for the infrastructure manager to determine the charge for the use of the infrastructure and also to collect it (see, inter alia, judgments of 28 February 2013, Commission v Spain, C‑483/10, EU:C:2013:114, paragraph 39, and of 3 October 2013, Commission v Italy, C‑369/11, EU:C:2013:636, paragraph 41).
78


Thus that provision establishes a division of powers between Member States and the infrastructure manager with regard to charging schemes. It is for the Member States to draw up a framework for levying charges, whilst the determination of the charge and collection fall, in principle, to the infrastructure manager (judgments of 28 February 2013, Commission v Spain, C‑483/10,EU:C:2013:114, paragraph 41; of 11 July 2013, Commission v Czech Republic, C‑545/10, EU:C:2013:509, point 34; and of 3 October 2013, Commission v Italy, C‑369/11, EU:C:2013:636, paragraph 42).
79


In order to ensure that the objective of management independence of the infrastructure manager is attained, the latter must, within the charging framework established by the Member States, be given a certain latitude in determining the amount of the charges so as to enable it to use that flexibility as a management tool (judgments of 28 February 2013, Commission v Spain, C‑483/10, EU:C:2013:114, paragraphs 44 and 49, and of 11 July 2013, Commission v Czech Republic, C‑545/10, EU:C:2013:509, point 35).
80


Thus, recital 12 of Directive 2001/14 states that charging and capacity-allocation schemes should encourage railway infrastructure managers to optimise use of their infrastructure within the framework established by the Member States (judgment of 28 February 2013, Commission v Spain, C‑483/10, EU:C:2013:114, paragraph 44).
81


Although it is true that those managers may in principle calculate the amount of the charge, using a charging system applying to all the railway undertakings, they could not achieve such optimal use by means of the charging system if they run the risk, at any time, of a civil court determining, in equity, under Paragraph 315 of the BGB, the charge applicable to a single railway undertaking which is party to the proceedings, the determination of that charge by that court thus restricting the infrastructure manager’s discretion to an extent incompatible with the objectives pursued by Directive 2001/14 (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2013, Commission v Italy, C‑369/11, EU:C:2013:636, paragraph 43).
82


It must be pointed out, in that context, that, in accordance with what is laid down in Article 8(2) of that directive, in order to encourage the infrastructure manager to achieve optimal use of its infrastructure, that manager must be in a position to set or to continue to set higher charges on the basis of the long-term costs of certain investment projects (judgment of 28 February 2013, Commission v Germany, C‑556/10, EU:C:2013:116, paragraph 83).