French Republic v European Commission.
Date: 2014-04-03
38. It must be stated first of all that, in accordance with Article 44(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the subject-matter of the proceedings and a summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based constitute two essential elements which must be included in the application initiating proceedings. Furthermore, under Article 48(2) of those Rules of Procedure, no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or fact which have come to light in the course of the procedure.
39. It must also be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, statements regarding the subject-matter of the dispute and a summary of the pleas in law, contained in any application initiating proceedings must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the EU judicative to rule on the application. Likewise the forms of order of such an application must be set out unambiguously so that that court does not rule ultra petita  or indeed fail to rule on a complaint (see, to that effect, Case C‑66/06 Commission  v Ireland  [2008] ECR I‑637, paragraphs 30 and 31; Case C‑165/08 Commission  v Poland  [2009] ECR I‑6843, paragraph 43; and the order of 7 May 2013 in Case C‑418/12 TME v Commission [2013] ECR, paragraph 33).
63. Such an assessment is consistent with the case-law of the Court relating to the principles on the administration of proof in the sector of State aid that the Commission is required to conduct a diligent and impartial examination of the contested measures, so that it has at its disposal, when adopting the final decision establishing the existence and, as the case may be, the incompatibility or unlawfulness of the aid, the most complete and reliable information possible for that purpose (see, to that effect, Case C‑290/07 P Commission v Scott  [2010] ECR I‑7763, paragraph 90).
65. As the Advocate General has stated at points 35 and 36 of his Opinion, in order to prove the existence of such a guarantee, which does not result expressly from any legislative or contractual document, it is permissible for the Commission to rely on the method of a firm, precise and consistent body of evidence to determine whether there is, in domestic law, a real obligation on the State to use its own resources for the purposes of covering losses of an EPIC in default and therefore, in accordance with settled case-law, a sufficiently concrete economic risk of burdens on the State budget (see Joined Cases C‑399/10 P Bouygues et Bouygues Télécom  v Commission and Others  and C‑401/10 P Commission v France and Others  [2013] ECR, paragraph 106 and the case-law cited).
78. As regards, in the first place, the arguments relating to errors in the analysis of French law, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, where the General Court has determined or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has sole jurisdiction under Article 256 TFEU to review their legal characterisation and the legal conclusions which were drawn from them. The appraisal of the facts does not therefore constitute, save where the clear sense of the evidence produced before the General Court is distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (see, inter alia, Case C‑551/03 P General Motors  v Commission  [2006] ECR I‑3173, paragraphs 51 and 52, and Case C‑352/09 P ThyssenKrupp Nirosta  v Commission  [2011] ECR I‑2359, paragraphs 179 and 180).
79. Accordingly, as for the examination, in the context of an appeal, of the General Court’s assessment with regard to national law, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction only to determine whether that law was distorted (Case C‑82/01 P Aéroports de Paris  v Commission  [2002] ECR I‑9297, paragraph 63, and judgment of 21 December 2011 in Case C‑318/09 P A2A  v Commission , paragraph 125).
80. In that regard it should nevertheless be noted that a distortion must be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (Case C‑487/06 P British Aggregates  v Commission [2008] ECR I‑10515, paragraph 98; Case C‑260/09 P Activision Blizzard Germany  v Commission  [2011] ECR I‑419, paragraph 53; and A2A  v Commission , paragraph 105).
81. In the present case, the French Republic did not claim such a distortion, in so far as it did not show that the General Court made findings going manifestly against the content of the provisions of French law at issue or even ascribed to one of them a scope which clearly it should not have received in relation to other aspects of the file.
83. Similarly, as regards the error of the legal classification of facts complained of in the alternative in the third ground of appeal, it is sufficient to note that, by that argument, the French Republic did not in fact dispute the consequences drawn from an incorrect legal categorisation of the provisions of French law at issue, having limited itself solely to calling into question the assessment of those provisions undertaken by the General Court.
85. As regards, in the second place, the argument relating to the failure to state reasons at paragraph 99 of the judgment under appeal as compared with the argument relating to the scope of Campoloro  for the purposes of finding the existence of a State guarantee in favour of La Poste, in the context of an appeal, it is necessary to bear in mind that the purpose of review by the Court of Justice is, primarily, to examine to what extent the General Court took into consideration, in a legally correct manner, all the arguments upon which the appellant relies (Case C‑202/07 P France Télécom  v Commission  [2009] ECR I‑2369, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
86. Nevertheless, according to settled case-law, the duty incumbent upon the General Court under Article 36 and the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union to state reasons for its judgments does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to understand the grounds of the General Court’s judgment and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient evidence to exercise its powers of review on appeal ( A2A  v Commission , paragraph 97 and the case-law cited).
94. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the concept of aid embraces not only positive benefits, but also measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, therefore, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect ( Bouygues et Bouygues Télécom  v Commission and Others , and Commission  v France and Others , paragraph 101 and the case-law cited). Also, State measures which, whatever their form, are likely directly or indirectly to favour certain undertakings or are to be regarded as an economic advantage which the recipient undertaking would not have obtained under normal market conditions, are regarded as aid (Case C‑280/00 Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg  [2003] ECR I‑7747, paragraph 84, and Case C‑279/08 P Commission  v Netherlands  [2011] ECR I‑7671, paragraph 87).
96. As the Court has already held, a borrower who has subscribed to a loan guaranteed by the public authorities of a Member State normally obtains an advantage inasmuch as the financial cost that it bears is less than that which it would have borne if it had had to obtain that same financing and that same guarantee at market prices (see Case C‑275/10 Residex Capital IV  [2011] ECR I‑13043, paragraph 39).
98. It is apparent, therefore, from those considerations that, as was noted by the Advocate General at point 58 of his Opinion, a simple presumption exists that the grant of an implied and unlimited State guarantee in favour of an undertaking which is not subject to the ordinary compulsory administration and winding-up procedures results in an improvement in its financial position through a reduction of charges which would normally encumber its budget.
99. Consequently, in the context of the procedure relating to existing schemes of aid, to prove the advantage obtained by such a guarantee to the recipient undertaking, it is sufficient for the Commission to establish the mere existence of that guarantee, without having to show the actual effects produced by it from the time that it is granted.