larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Grundig Italiana SpA v Ministero delle Finanze.
Date: 1998-06-17
10 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the Court has already held in Case C-130/92 OTO v Ministero delle Finanze [1994] ECR I-3281, paragraph 11, which concerned the interpretation of Community law with regard to the same Italian legislation, that a charge such as the national consumption tax at issue in the main proceedings must be regarded as an integral part of a general system of internal taxation within the meaning of Article 95 of the Treaty and that its compatibility with Community law must therefore be assessed on the basis of that article.
11 Moreover, it is settled case-law that the aim of Article 95 of the Treaty is to ensure free movement of goods between the Member States in normal conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms of protection which result from the application of internal taxation which discriminates against products from other Member States.  That provision is intended to cover all products from Member States, including products originating in non-member countries which are in free circulation in the Member States (Case 193/85 Co-Frutta v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1987] ECR 2085, paragraphs 25, 26 and 29).
12 It follows that a system of taxation can be considered compatible with Article 95 of the Treaty only if it is so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than domestic products (see, in particular, Case C-152/89 Commission v Luxembourg [1991] ECR I-3141, paragraph 21).
13 For the purposes of assessing whether or not a system of taxation is discriminatory, it is necessary to take into consideration not only the rate of tax but also the basis of assessment and the detailed rules for levying the various duties (see Case 55/79 Commission v Ireland [1980] ECR 481, paragraph 8).  The decisive criterion for purposes of comparison with a view to the application of Article 95 is the actual effect of each tax on domestic production, on the one hand, and on imported products, on the other.  Even where the rate is the same, the effect of the tax may vary according to the detailed rules for the assessment and collection thereof applied to domestic production and imported products.
16 It is settled case-law that the prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 95 is infringed where a tax is assessed on the value of a product if, in the case of the imported product alone, assessment criteria are taken into consideration which are likely to increase its value vis-à-vis the corresponding domestic product (Case 74/76 Iannelli v Meroni [1977] ECR 557, paragraph 21).
23 In this connection, the Court has consistently held that a benefit reserved to domestic production in the form of facilities for deferred payment involves a difference in treatment to the detriment of products imported from other Member States, which is contrary to the prohibition laid down in Article 95 of the Treaty (see Commission v Ireland, cited above).$
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 1998-06-18
18 In those circumstances, the expression `all the exclusions', used in the second subparagraph of Article 17(6), clearly comprises expenditure which is strictly business expenditure.  That provision accordingly authorises the Member States to retain national rules which deny taxable persons the right to deduct VAT on means of transport which constitute the very tool of their trade.
19 As the Advocate General has pointed out in paragraphs 14 to 16 of his Opinion, that interpretation is confirmed by the origin of Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive.  In the first place, in the explanatory memorandum accompanying its proposal for the Sixth Directive (Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 11/73, p. 1), the Commission stated that certain expenditure, even though incurred in the ordinary course of the undertaking's business, would be difficult to apportion between business use and private use.  Secondly, it is clear from a comparison of the wording of Article 17(6) proposed by the Commission and that adopted by the Council that, when the Sixth Directive was adopted, the Member States were unable to agree on the arrangements applicable specifically to expenditure on passenger transport.
Beside BV and I.M. Besselsen v Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer.
Date: 1998-06-25
27 It must be borne in mind at the outset that Article 2(a) of the Regulation, by reference to Article 1(a) of the Directive, introduced a common definition of the concept of waste and that that article is directly applicable in the Member States (Joined Cases C-304/94, C-330/94, C-342/94 and C-224/94 Tombesi and Others [1997] ECR I-3561, paragraph 46).
32 Therefore, `municipal/household waste' does not cease to be `amber waste' and therefore does not come within the green list unless it has been collected separately or properly sorted.
34 The answer to the first question must therefore be that the expression `municipal/household waste' referred to under AD 160 in the amber list in Annex III to the Regulation, as amended by Decision 94/721, includes both waste which for the most part consists of waste mentioned on the green list in Annex II to the Regulation, mixed with other categories of waste appearing on that list, and waste mentioned on the green list mixed with a small quantity of materials not referred to on that list.
The second question, part (a)
Anestis Kapasakalis, Dimitris Skiathitis and Antonis Kougiagkas v Greek State.
Date: 1998-07-02
18 It must be observed, first, that the Directive, which is based on Articles 49, 57(1) and 66 of the Treaty, aims to facilitate freedom of movement of persons and services by allowing nationals of the Member States to pursue a profession, on a self-employed or employed basis, in a Member State other than that in which they have obtained their professional qualifications.
19 Second, it is clear from the tenth recital in the preamble and the first paragraph of Article 2 that the Directive applies only to nationals of a Member State who wish to pursue, on a self-employed or employed basis, a regulated profession in a Member State other than their Member State of origin, and that it is not intended to amend the rules applicable to persons pursuing a profession in the territory of a Member State.
22 Finally, it has consistently been held that the Treaty rules governing freedom of movement and acts adopted to implement them cannot be applied to activities which have no factor linking them with any of the situations governed by Community law and which are confined in all respects within a single Member State (Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Uecker and Jacquet v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] ECR I-3171, paragraph 16; Case C-134/95 USSL No 47 di Biella v INAIL [1997] ECR I-195, paragraph 19, and Case C-332/90 Steen v Deutsche Bundespost [1992] ECR I-341, paragraph 9).
Criminal proceedings against Hermann Josef Goerres.
Date: 1998-07-14
14 It should be recalled at the outset that, in proceedings under Article 177 of the Treaty, the Court has no jurisdiction to apply the rules of Community law to a specific case. It may, however, provide the national court with an interpretation of all relevant provisions of Community law which might be useful to it in assessing the effects of its national provisions (see, inter alia, Case 37/86 Van Gastel v Rijksdienst and Rijkskas [1987] ECR 3589, paragraph 8).
17 The Court has further held in Case C-85/94 Piageme v Peeters [1995] ECR I-2955 (`Piageme II') that Article 14 of the directive precludes a Member State, having regard to the requirement of a language easily understood by purchasers, from requiring the use of the language most widely spoken in the area in which the product is offered for sale, even if the use at the same time of another language is not excluded.
20 In that respect, it is for the national court to assess, in the light of all the circumstances of each individual case, the ease with which the information supplied can be understood. That assessment must be made in respect of each of the particulars required by the directive and must take account of the fact that the directive provides for the possibility of stating the required particulars not only by using a language but also by means of other measures such as designs, symbols or pictograms  (see Piageme II, paragraph 27 et seq.)
23 On that point, it is sufficient to recall that, at paragraph 26 of its judgment in Piageme II, the Court of Justice held that consumer protection is not ensured by measures other than labelling such as, for example, information supplied at the sales point or as part of wide-ranging advertising campaigns.
24 The Court reached that conclusion on the view that the aim of Article 14 of the directive, which is to inform and protect consumers, would not be attained if they did not always have access to the compulsory particulars specified in the directive, not only at the time of purchase, but also at that of consumption.  The Court further pointed out that the ultimate consumer is not necessarily the person who purchased the foodstuffs (see Piageme II, paragraphs 23 to 25).
Aher-Waggon GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Date: 1998-07-14
16 Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider whether a Member State which, like the Federal Republic of Germany, has introduced stricter noise limits has, in exercising that power, infringed other provisions of Community law, in particular Article 30 of the Treaty.  Even though the Directive is based on Article 84(2) of the Treaty, which enables the Council to adopt appropriate provisions for air transport, it is settled case-law that that provision cannot be interpreted as excluding air transport from the general rules of the Treaty (see Case 167/73 Commission v France [1974] ECR 359, paragraph 31, and Joined Cases 209/84 to 213/84 Ministère Public v Asjes and Others [1986] ECR 1425, paragraphs 44 and 45).
17 In that regard, it is settled case-law that any measure capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade constitutes a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction (Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5).
19 Such a barrier may, however, be justified by considerations of public health and environmental protection of the kind relied upon by the German Government.  The German Government states in particular that the Federal Republic of Germany, which is a very densely populated State, attaches special importance to ensuring that its population is protected from excessive noise emissions.
20 It is also settled case-law that national legislation which restricts or is liable to restrict intra-Community trade must be proportionate to the objectives pursued and that those objectives must not be attainable by measures which are less restrictive of such trade (Joined Cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95 KO v De Agostini and TV-Shop [1997] ECR I-3843, paragraph 45, and Case C-189/95 Franzén [1997] ECR I-5909, paragraph 75).
A.G.R. Regeling v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid.
Date: 1998-07-14
19 That argument must be rejected.  Although the aim of the Directive is only partial harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the protection of employees affected by their employer's insolvency, the question referred by the national court none the less concerns the interpretation of the words `outstanding claims relating to pay for the last three months' of the contract of employment or employment relationship preceding the date of the notice mentioned in the second indent of Article 4(2) of the Directive.  Since those words apply to the actual determination of the minimum guarantee under Community law, they must be given a uniform interpretation if the harmonisation sought, even in part, at Community level is not to be rendered ineffective.
20 The guarantee institutions are required, in principle, in accordance with Article 3(1) of the Directive, to guarantee payment of employees' outstanding claims relating to pay for the period prior to a given date.  It is purely by way of derogation that Member States have the option, under Article 4(1), to limit that liability to pay to a given period fixed in accordance with the detailed rules laid down in Article 4(2). As the Advocate General observes at point 45 of his Opinion, that provision must be construed narrowly and in conformity with the social purpose of the Directive, which is to ensure a minimum level of protection for all workers.
AGS Assedic Pas-de-Calais v François Dumon and Froment, liquidator and representative of Établissements Pierre Gilson.
Date: 1998-07-16
25 It should be borne in mind that, in proceedings under Article 177 of the Treaty, which is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, any assessment of the facts in the case is a matter for the national court (see Case 104/77 Oehlschläger v Hauptzollamt Emmerich [1978] ECR 791, paragraph 4; Case 36/79 Denkavit Futtermittel v Finanzamt Warendorf [1979] ECR 3439, paragraph 12). The Court of Justice is thus empowered to rule on the interpretation or validity of Community provisions only on the basis of the facts which the national court puts before it (see Case C-30/93 AC-ATEL Electronics Vertriebs v Hauptzollamt München-Mitte [1994] ECR I-2305, paragraph 16; Case C-352/95 Phytheron International v Jean Bourdon [1997] ECR I-1729, paragraph 11).$
26 Moreover, as the Court held at paragraph 14 of its judgment in Phytheron International, cited above, to alter the substance of questions referred for a preliminary ruling would be incompatible with the Court's function under Article 177 of the Treaty and with its duty to ensure that the Governments of the Member States and the parties concerned are given the opportunity to submit observations under Article 20 of the EC Statute of the Court, bearing in mind that, under that provision, only the order of the referring court is notified to the interested parties.
30 Moreover, neither the wording nor the purpose of the provision in question provides justification for the view that Member States' non-compliance with their obligation to give prior notice in itself renders the ceilings thus adopted unlawful (in relation to an analogous provision, see Case 380/87 Enichem Base v Comune di Cinisello Balsamo [1989] ECR 2491, paragraph 22).
The Scotch Whisky Association v Compagnie financière européenne de prises de participation (Cofepp), Prisunic SA and Centrale d'achats et de services alimentaires SARL (Casal).
Date: 1998-07-16
27 The Tribunal de Grande Instance, considering that an interpretation of Regulation No 1576/89 was necessary in order to settle the dispute, stayed proceedings and sought a ruling by the Court on the following question:
`Having regard to European rules, in particular Article 5 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1576/89 of 29 May 1989, may the generic term "whisky" be included in the sales description of a spirit drink consisting entirely of whisky diluted with water, so that the alcoholic strength by volume is less than 40%?'
37 As was held in Case C-217/91 Spain v Commission [1993] ECR I-3293, paragraph 20, the prohibition, set out in Article 5(1) of Regulation No 1576/89, of the use of a name referred to in Article 1(4) to describe spirit drinks other than those referred to therein, is fully applicable, subject only to the reservation that the Council intended to permit the Commission to derogate expressly from Article 5 in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by Article 6(1).
47 Thus, whilst under Article 5(1) of Regulation No 1576/89 the term `whisky' may not appear anywhere in the sales description of a product such as Gold River, it may none the less, pursuant to Article 7(1) of Directive 79/112, appear on the label of such a product, subject to the general proviso under Article 2(1) of that directive that the labelling of a foodstuff must not be such as could mislead the purchaser as to its characteristics and, in particular, its nature and properties.  It must be pointed out, as was noted by the Advocate General at point 33 of his Opinion, that Regulation No 1576/89 is a specific legislative provision, and thus prevails over Directive 79/112.  Consequently, whilst the term `whisky' may appear without qualification in the list of ingredients, it may not, without defeating the prohibition of the use of the term `whisky' in the sales description, appear in close proximity to that sales description unless it is clearly separated and more discreet.
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
Date: 1998-07-16
10 So far as concerns Directive 94/51, it is settled case-law that a Member State cannot rely on provisions, practices or situations of its own internal legal order in order to justify its failure to respect the obligations and time-limits laid down by a directive (see, in particular, Case C-208/96 Commission v Belgium [1997] ECR I-5375, paragraph 9).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 1998-09-17
28 Furthermore, in Case 31/87 Beentjes [1988] ECR 4635, paragraphs 11 to 13, the Court, after stating that the term `the State', within the meaning of Article 1(b) of Directive 71/305 should be interpreted in functional terms, held that a local land consolidation committee fell within that definition notwithstanding the fact that it was not an integral part of the State administration in formal terms. It would be inconsistent to hold that a legislative body does not fall within the definition of the State for the purposes of the Community directives on public works contracts, when a body which is not an integral part of the State administration in formal terms has been held to fall within that definition for the purposes of the application of one of those directives.
38 Quite apart from the question of the belated nature of that plea, which the Belgian Government raised for the first time at the hearing without submitting any valid reason to explain the delay, it should be observed that the Belgian Government has not put forward anything to show that the works contracts put out to tender by the Vlaamse Raad came within one of the situations referred to in Article 4.
42 According to settled case-law, a Member State cannot rely on provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal order in order to justify its failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down by a directive (see, in particular, Case C-144/97 Commission v France [1998] ECR I-613, paragraph 8).
Kainuun Liikenne Oy and Oy Pohjolan Liikenne Ab.
Date: 1998-09-17
22 It should be recalled that, according to the Court's case-law, it is for the national court to assess the scope of the national provisions and the manner in which they must be applied (see, in particular, Case C-194/94 CIA Security International v Signalson and Securitel [1996] ECR I-2201, paragraph 20).
24 Moreover, to answer the additional questions mentioned by Kainuun Liikenne and Pohjolan Liikenne in their observations would be incompatible with the Court's function under Article 177 of the Treaty and with its duty to ensure that the Governments of the Member States and the parties concerned are given the opportunity to submit observations under Article 20 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, bearing in mind that under that provision only the order of the referring court is notified to the interested parties (see, in particular, Case C-352/95 Phytheron International v Bourdon [1997] ECR I-1729, paragraph 14).
The first question
Antonio Stinco and Ciro Panfilo v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS).
Date: 1998-09-24
8 The INPS awarded the claimants pro rata pensions in accordance with Article 46(2) of Regulation No 1408/71 calculated by reference to the notional pensions which they would have received if they had worked in Italy throughout their working life.  The amount of the notional pensions was such that, had they in fact been entitled to domestic pensions of that amount, they would have been awarded the statutory Italian pension supplement so as to reach the minimum pension level.
13 In order to reply to that question, it should be noted that, as the Court held in paragraph 24 of its judgment in Levatino (Case C-65/92 [1993] ECR I-2005), the provisions of Article 46 of Regulation No 1408/71 apply to non-contributory old-age benefits such as the income guaranteed to the elderly under Belgian law.
20 In this respect, it must be noted that, as the Court pointed out in its judgment in Browning (Case 22/81 [1981] ECR 3357, paragraphs 13 and 14), the method of calculation referred to in Article 46(2)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71, which relates to the determination of the theoretical amount of a pension, is distinct from the situation referred to in Article 50, which relates to the award of a supplementary payment in excess of the minimum payable in application of the normal rules under a particular national legal system.
22 Accordingly, the answer to the question referred is that Article 46(2)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71 must be interpreted as requiring the competent institution, in determining the theoretical amount of the pension on which the calculation of the pro rata pension is based, to take into account a supplement intended to bring the pension to the level of the statutory minimum.
Brinkmann Tabakfabriken GmbH v Skatteministeriet.
Date: 1998-09-24
18 A product of the kind at issue in the main proceedings thus falls within the scope of Article 4(1) of the Second Directive, which defines smoking tobacco.  The rolls of tobacco at issue here in fact consist of tobacco which has been cut and is capable of being smoked without further industrial processing.
20 That argument cannot be accepted.  The fact is that the expression `rolls of tobacco capable of being smoked as they are' describes a finished product.  A cigar, even one which has to be cut in order to be smoked, is a finished product.  But the same is not true of a roll of tobacco which, as in the main proceedings, has to be assembled with another product, namely a separately-marketed cigarette-paper tube, to yield a product capable of being smoked as it is.
24 First of all, it is settled case-law that the principle that a State may incur liability for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law for which it can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty (see, in particular, Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I-1029, paragraph 31; Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94 and C-188/94 to C-190/94 Dillenkofer and Others [1996] ECR I-4845, paragraph 20; and Joined Cases C-283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/94 Denkavit and Others [1996] ECR I-5063, paragraph 47).
25 In those judgments, the Court, having regard to the circumstances in each case, held that Community law confers a right to reparation where three conditions are met: the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals; the breach must be sufficiently serious; and there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the State and the damage sustained by the injured parties (judgments cited above in Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, paragraph 51; Dillenkofer and Others, paragraphs 21 and 23; and Denkavit and Others, paragraph 48).
28 It is true that failure to take any measure to transpose a directive in order to achieve the result it prescribes within the period laid down for that purpose constitutes per se a serious breach of Community law (see Dillenkofer and Others, cited above, paragraph 29).