Human Operator Zrt. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága.
Date: 2019-02-13
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In that connection, it should be noted, first of all, that, as regards Article 199 of the VAT Directive, which allows Member States to introduce a reverse charge mechanism in the situations referred to in paragraph 1(a) to (g) thereof, whereby the person liable for the payment of VAT is the taxable person who is the recipient of the transaction subject to VAT, the Court has held that that provision is an exception to the normal rules in Article 193 of that directive and must, for that reason, be strictly interpreted, which, however, must not have the result that that provision is deprived of its effectiveness (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 June 2013, Promociones y Construcciones BJ 200, C‑125/12, EU:C:2013:392, paragraphs 23 and 31 and the case-law cited, and of 26 April 2017, Farkas, C‑564/15, EU:C:2017:302, paragraph 25).
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Next, as the Implementing Decision contains no provisions fixing either the date of its entry into force or a starting date for the application of the derogation for which it provides, it is advisable to have recourse to generally recognised principles of interpretation in order to determine its effect ratione temporis, having regard both to wording of the regulation and to its objectives and general scheme (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 November 1981, Meridionale Industria Salumi and Others, 212/80 to 217/80, EU:C:1981:270, paragraph 8).
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It must be recalled that the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the general principles of EU law, requires, particularly, that rules of law be clear, precise and predictable in their effects (judgment of 18 November 2008, Förster, C‑158/07, EU:C:2008:630, paragraph 67).
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That requirement of legal certainty must be observed all the more strictly in the case of rules liable to entail financial consequences, in order that those concerned may know precisely the extent of the obligations which those rules impose on them (judgment of 29 April 2004, Sudholz, C‑17/01, EU:C:2004:242, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
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It also held that, in order to comply with principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, the basic rules of EU law must, in principle, be interpreted as applying only to situations existing after their entry into force (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 September 2002, Falck and Acciaierie di Bolzano v Commission, C‑74/00 P and C‑75/00 P, EU:C:2002:524, paragraph 119). Thus, in general, the principle of legal certainty precludes an EU measure from taking effect from a point in time before its publication or its notification, as the case may be, since the Court has ruled that it may exceptionally be otherwise, where the purpose to be achieved so demands and where the legitimate expectations of those concerned are duly respected (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 September 1982, Amylum v Council, 108/81, EU:C:1982:322, paragraph 4; of 26 April 2005, Goed Wonen, C‑376/02, EU:C:2005:251, paragraph 33 and the case law cited; and of 28 November 2006, Parliament v Council, C‑413/04, EU:C:2006:741, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).
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Furthermore, in order to give a useful answer to the referring court as to the determination of the person liable for VAT in the circumstances at issue in the main proceedings, it must be recalled that whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied on before the national courts by individuals against the State where the State has failed to transpose the directive into national law within the time limit or has transposed it incorrectly (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 February 2014, E.ON Global Commodities, C‑323/12, EU:C:2014:53, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited, and of 15 May 2014, Almos Agrárkülkereskedelmi, C‑337/13, EU:C:2014:328, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). The Court has also held that a provision of EU law is unconditional where it sets forth an obligation which is not qualified by any condition, or subject, in its implementation or effects, to the taking of any measure either by the institutions of the European Union or by the Member States (judgment of 15 May 2014, Almos Agrárkülkereskedelmi, C‑337/13, EU:C:2014:328, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).