larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Finnair Oyj v Timy Lassooy.
Date: 2012-10-04
23. That interpretation is supported by the finding that limiting the scope of ‘denied boarding’ exclusively to cases of overbooking would have the practical effect of substantially reducing the protection afforded to passengers under Regulation No 261/2004 and would therefore be contrary to the aim of that regulation — referred to in recital 1 in the preamble thereto — of ensuring a high level of protection for passengers. Consequently, a broad interpretation of the rights granted to passengers is justified (see, to that effect, Case C-344/04 IATA and ELFAA  [2006] ECR I-403, paragraph 69, and C-549/07 Wallentin-Hermann  [2008] ECR I-11061, paragraph 18).
36. In that connection, it is to be noted that, unlike Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, Articles 2(j) and 4 of that regulation do not provide that, in the event of ‘denied boarding’ owing to ‘extraordinary circumstances’ which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken, an air carrier is exempted from its obligation to compensate passengers denied boarding against their will (see, by analogy, IATA and ELFAA , paragraph 37). It follows that the EU legislature did not intend that compensation may be precluded on grounds relating to the occurrence of ‘extraordinary circumstances’.
38. Consequently, having regard to the requirement to interpret strictly the derogations from provisions granting rights to passengers, which follows from the settled case-law of the Court (see, to that effect, Wallentin-Hermann , paragraph 17 and the case-law cited), an air carrier cannot be exempted from its obligation to pay compensation in the event of ‘denied boarding’ on the ground that its flights were rescheduled as a result of ‘extraordinary circumstances’.
39. Furthermore, it must be reiterated that the discharge of obligations by air carriers pursuant to Regulation No 261/2004 is without prejudice to their rights to seek compensation from any person who has caused the ‘denied boarding’, including third parties, as Article 13 of the regulation provides. Such compensation accordingly may reduce or even remove the financial burden borne by the air carriers in consequence of those obligations ( IATA and ELFAA , paragraph 90).
Germán Rodríguez Cachafeiro and María de los Reyes Martínez-Reboredo Varela-Villamor v Iberia, Líneas Aéreas de España SA.
Date: 2012-10-04
25. That interpretation is supported by the finding that limiting the scope of ‘denied boarding’ exclusively to cases of overbooking would have the practical effect of substantially reducing the protection afforded to passengers under Regulation No 261/2004 and would therefore be contrary to the aim of that regulation — referred to in recital 1 in the preamble thereto — of ensuring a high level of protection for passengers. Consequently, a broad interpretation of the rights granted to passengers is justified (see, to that effect, Case C-344/04 IATA and ELFAA  [2006] ECR I-403, paragraph 69, and Case C-549/07 Wallentin-Hermann  [2008] ECR I-11061, paragraph 18).
PIGI — Pavleta Dimova ET v Direktor na Direktsia ‘Obzhalvane I upravlenie na izpalnenieto’ — Varna pri Tsentralno upravlenie na Natsionalnata agentsia za prihodite.
Date: 2012-10-04
21. In order to answer those questions it should be recalled at the outset that the deduction system established by the Directive is meant to relieve the operator entirely of the burden of the VAT paid or payable in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT seeks to ensure complete neutrality of taxation of all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that they are themselves subject, in principle, to VAT (see Case C-153/11 Klub [2012] ECR, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
22. It follows from Article 168 of the Directive that, in so far as the taxable person, acting as such at the time when he acquires goods, uses the goods for the purposes of his taxable transactions, he is entitled to deduct the VAT paid or payable in respect of the goods. The right to deduct arises at the time when the deductible tax becomes chargeable, namely when the goods are delivered (see Klub , paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
23. It follows that the decisive criterion for the deduction of input VAT is the actual or intended use of the goods and services concerned. That use determines the extent of the initial deduction to which the taxable person is entitled and the extent of any adjustments, which must be made under the conditions laid down in Articles 185 to 187 of the Directive (see Case C-63/04 Centralan Property  [2005] ECR I-11087, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
26. As regards the coming into existence of an obligation to make an adjustment of an input VAT deduction, Article 185(1) of the Directive establishes the principle that such an adjustment must be made inter alia when changes to factors which were taken into consideration for the determination of the amount of such a deduction occurred subsequently to the VAT return.
33. The Court has held that the Member States, in exercising a power conferred under that directive, may choose the legislative technique which they regard as the most appropriate. Thus they may, inter alia, merely incorporate into national tax legislation the approach adopted in the Directive or an equivalent expression (see, to that effect, Case C-102/08 SALIX Grundstücks-Vermietungsgesellschaft [2009] ECR I-4629, paragraph 56).
Evropaïki Dynamiki - Proigmena Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE v European Commission.
Date: 2012-10-04
21. However, it is apparent from the case-law that the Commission cannot be required to communicate to an unsuccessful tenderer, first, in addition to the reasons for rejecting its tender, a detailed summary of how each detail of its tender was taken into account when the tender was evaluated and, second, in the context of notification of the characteristics and relative advantages of the successful tender, a detailed comparative analysis of the successful tender and of the unsuccessful tender (see, to that effect, order of 29 November 2011 in Case C‑235/11 P Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission , paragraphs 50 and 51 and the case-law cited).
22. Similarly, the contracting authority is not under an obligation to provide an unsuccessful tenderer, upon written request from it, with a full copy of the evaluation report (see order of 20 September 2011 in Case C‑561/10 P Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission , paragraph 25).
23. Furthermore, it must be noted that, according to settled case-law, the statement of reasons required under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question and the nature of the reasons given (see, inter alia, Case C‑367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France  [1998] ECR I‑1719, paragraph 63, and judgment of 28 February 2008 in Case C‑17/07 P Neirinck v Commission , paragraph 52).
Hungary v Slovak Republic.
Date: 2012-10-16
40. In order to rule on the first head of complaint, it should be stated from the outset that citizenship of the Union is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States (see, inter alia, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, paragraph 31; Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449, paragraph 43; and Case C-256/11 Dereci and Others [2011] ECR I-11315, paragraph 62).
41. To that end, Article 20 TFEU confers the status of citizen of the Union on every person holding the nationality of a Member State (see, inter alia, Case C-224/98 D’Hoop  [2002] ECR I-6191, paragraph 27; Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613, paragraph 21; and Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano  [2011] ECR I-1177, paragraph 40).
43. It is true, first, that, in accordance with Article 21 TFEU, citizenship of the Union confers on each Union citizen a primary and individual right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and restrictions laid down by the Treaties and the measures adopted for their implementation (Case C-162/09 Lassal [2010] ECR I-9217, paragraph 29, and Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375, paragraph 27).
44. Second, it is necessary to note that EU law must be interpreted in the light of the relevant rules of international law, since international law is part of the European Union legal order and is binding on the institutions (see, to that effect, Racke , paragraphs 45 and 46, and Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission  [2008] ECR I-6351, paragraph 291).
58. The Court has already held that evidence of an abusive practice requires, first, a combination of objective circumstances in which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by the European Union rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved, and, second, a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage from the European Union rules by creating artificially the conditions laid down for obtaining it ( Emsland-Stärke , paragraphs 52 and 53, and Case C-515/03 Eichsfelder Schlachtbetrieb  [2005] ECR I-7355, paragraph 39).
67. In order to rule on these two heads of complaint, it must be noted that the procedure established under Article 259 TFEU is designed to obtain a declaration that the conduct of a Member State is in breach of EU law and to terminate that conduct (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 15/76 and 16/76 France v Commission  [1979] ECR 321, paragraph 27; Case C-456/05 Commi ssion v Germany  [2007] ECR I-10517, paragraph 25; and Joined Cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P Sweden and Others v API and Commission  [2010] ECR I-8533, paragraph 119).
68. Thus, as the aim of the Treaty is to achieve the practical elimination of infringements by Member States and the consequences thereof (Case 70/72 Commission v Germany  [1973] ECR 813, paragraph 13), an action under Article 259 TFEU concerning future possible infringements or limited to seeking an interpretation of EU law is inadmissible.
Staatssecretaris van Justitie v Mangat Singh.
Date: 2012-10-18
42. It must be noted that, according to settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the need for a uniform application of European Union law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of European Union law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (Joined Cases C-424/10 and C-425/10 Ziolkowski and Szeja [2011] ECR I-14035, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
44. In this respect, it must be borne in mind that the meaning and scope of terms for which European Union law provides no definition must be determined by considering, inter alia, the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they form part (see, inter alia, Case C-336/03 easyCar  [2005] ECR I-1947, paragraph 21; Case C-549/07 Wallentin-Hermann [2008] ECR I-11061, paragraph 17; Case C-151/09 UGT-FSP [2010] ECR I-7591, paragraph 39; and Case C-34/10 Brüstle [2011] ECR I-9821, paragraph 31).
45. As is apparent from recitals 4, 6 and 12 in the preamble to Directive 2003/109, the principal objective of that directive is the integration of third-country nationals who are settled on a long-term basis in the Member States (see Case C-508/10 Commission v Netherlands [2012] ECR, paragraph 66). Similarly, as is also apparent from recital 2 in the preamble thereto, the directive seeks, by granting the status of long-term resident to such third-country nationals, to approximate the legal status of third-country nationals to that of Member States’ nationals.
46. As is observed in Article 4(1) of, and recital 6 in the preamble to, Directive 2003/109, it is the duration of the legal and continuous residence of 5 years which shows that the person concerned has put down roots in the country and therefore the long-term residence of that person.
51. Thus, a formally limited residence permit within the meaning of national law, but whose formal limitation does not prevent the long-term residence of the third-country national concerned, cannot be classified as a formally limited residence permit within the meaning of Article 3(2)(e) of Directive 2003/109, as otherwise the achievement of the objectives pursued by the directive would be jeopardised and, therefore, it would be deprived of its effectiveness (see, to that effect, Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).
European Commission v Czech Republic.
Date: 2012-10-18
46. In any event, it should be recalled that the system of remedies established by the Treaty distinguishes between the actions mentioned in Articles 258 TFEU and 259 TFEU, which are aimed at a declaration that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations, and the actions mentioned in Articles 263 TFEU and 265 TFEU, which are aimed at reviewing the lawfulness of acts or failures to act of the European Union institutions. Those remedies have different objectives and are subject to different rules. In the absence of a provision of the Treaty expressly permitting it to do so, a Member State cannot therefore properly plead the unlawfulness of a decision addressed to it as a defence to an action for failure to fulfil obligations based on its failure to comply with that decision. The position could be different only if the act in question contained such particularly serious and manifest defects that it could be categorised as a non-existent act (see judgment of 1 June 2006 in Case C-207/05 Commission  v Italy , paragraphs 40 to 43, and Case C-177/06 Commission  v Spain  [2007] ECR I-7689, paragraphs 30 and 31).
49. Secondly, it is settled case-law that the seriousness of the consequences of a finding that an act of a European Union institution is non-existent means that, for reasons of legal certainty, such a finding must be reserved for altogether extreme situations (see Case C-475/01 Commission  v Greece  [2004] ECR I-8923, paragraph 20).
Észak-dunántúli Környezetvédelmi és Vízügyi Igazgatóság (Édukövízig) and Hochtief Construction AG Magyarországi Fióktelepe, now Hochtief Solutions AG Magyarországi Fióktelepe v Közbeszerzések Tanácsa Közbeszerzési Döntőbizottság.
Date: 2012-10-18
23. For the rest, it must be borne in mind that, within the framework of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts and tribunals established by Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of each case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. The Court can refuse a request submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the ruling sought by that court on the interpretation of European Union law bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose or where the problem is general or hypothetical (see, inter alia, Case C-203/09 Volvo Car Germany [2010] ECR I-10721, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
28. As to the choice of those aspects, Article 47 of Directive 2004/18 leaves a fair degree of freedom to the contracting authorities. Unlike Article 48 of the Directive which, as regards technical and professional capacity, establishes a closed system which limits the methods of assessment and verification available to those authorities and, therefore, limits their opportunities to lay down requirements (see, as regards the similar provisions in earlier directives than Directive 2004/18, Case 76/81 Transporoute et travaux [1982] ECR 417, paragraphs 8 to 10 and 15), Article 47(4) expressly authorises contracting authorities to choose the probative references which must be produced by candidates or tenderers to furnish proof of their economic and financial standing. As Article 44(2) of Directive 2004/18 refers to Article 47, the same freedom of choice exists as regards the minimum levels of economic and financial standing.
29. However, that freedom is not unlimited. Under the second subparagraph of Article 44(2) of Directive 2004/18 a minimum capacity level must be related and proportionate to the subject-matter of the contract. It follows that the aspect or aspects of the balance sheet chosen by a contracting authority to establish a minimum level of economic and financial standing must be objectively such as to provide information on such standing of an economic operator and that the threshold thus fixed must be adapted to the size of the contract concerned in that it constitutes objectively a positive indication of the existence of a sufficient economic and financial basis for the performance of that contract, without, however, going beyond what is reasonably necessary for that purpose.
Punch Graphix Prepress Belgium NV v Belgische Staat.
Date: 2012-10-18
25. It is not disputed that the main proceedings relate to a provision of domestic law which applies to a purely national context whereas Directive 90/435 applies to distributions of profits received by companies of one Member State which come from their subsidiaries in other Member States (see Case C-138/07 Cobelfret  [2009] ECR I-731, paragraph 20).
Jager & Polacek GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM).
Date: 2012-10-18
59. On that point, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that, in principle, the withdrawal of an unlawful measure is permissible, even though the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations require that the withdrawal should occur within a reasonable time and that regard be had to how far the person concerned might have been led to rely on the lawfulness of the measure (see, to that effect, Case C-508/03 Commission  v United Kingdom  [2006] ECR I-3969, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited).
66. The Court has already held that it follows from Article 62(1) of Regulation No 40/94 that, following the examination as to the merits of the appeal, the Board of Appeal is to decide on it and that, in doing so, it may ‘exercise any power within the competence of the department which was responsible for the contested decision’, that is to say, in the present case, give a decision itself on the opposition by either rejecting it or declaring it to be founded, thereby either upholding or reversing the contested decision (Case C-29/05 P OHIM v Kaul  [2007] ECR I-2213, paragraph 56).
Daimler AG and Widex A/S v Skatteverket.
Date: 2012-10-25
36. With regard to the latter question, it must, however, be borne in mind that, in its judgment in Case C-244/08 Commission  v Italy  [2009] ECR I-130, paragraphs 31 and 32, the Court held that the expression ‘fixed establishment from which business transactions are effected’ in Article 1 of the Eighth Directive and, now, in Article 3(a) of Directive 2008/9, must be interpreted as regarding a non-resident taxable person as a person who does not have a fixed establishment carrying out taxable transactions in general. The existence of active transactions in the Member State concerned therefore constitutes the determining factor for exclusion of recourse to the Eighth Directive. Similarly, the Court has held that the term ‘transactions’ used in the phrase ‘from which business transactions are effected’ can affect only output transactions.
41. The right of a taxable person established in a Member State to obtain refund of VAT paid in another Member State, in the manner governed by the Eighth Directive, is the counterpart of such a person’s right established by the VAT Directive to deduct input VAT in his own Member State ( Planzer Luxembourg , paragraph 35).
47. It argues that the Court has held, in paragraphs 26 to 29 of its judgment in DFDS , that a subsidiary which has technical and human resources and acts as a mere auxiliary of the parent company constitutes a fixed establishment of that company in the Member State where the subsidiary is situated.
Éditions Odile Jacob SAS v European Commission.
Date: 2012-11-06
48. In any event, in accordance with settled case‑law, when a measure is drafted, the institutions of the European Union are not obliged to define their position on matters which are plainly of secondary importance or to anticipate potential objections. The degree of precision of the statement of the reasons for a decision must be weighed against practical realities and the time and technical facilities available for making the decision. Thus, the Commission does not infringe its duty to state reasons if, when exercising its power to examine concentrations, it does not include in its decision appraisal of a number of aspects of the concentration which appear to it to be manifestly irrelevant or insignificant or plainly of secondary importance to the appraisal of that concentration (see Case C‑413/06 P Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America  v Impala [2008] ECR I‑4951, paragraph 167 and the case‑law cited).
European Commission and Lagardère SCA v Éditions Odile Jacob SAS.
Date: 2012-11-06
46. The Commission does not dispute the findings of the General Court concerning the trustee’s lack of independence for the reason that that is a question of fact. On the other hand, the Commission claims that the General Court erred in failing to examine whether that lack of independence actually had an effect on the contested decision or whether, without that irregularity, the content of the contested decision might have been different. According to the Commission, the trustee’s situation did not affect the objectivity of the assessment which he presented in his report on the purchaser of the Éditis assets and, consequently, the legality of the contested decision.
47. That argument of the Commission must be rejected.
48. In this case, the trustee responsible for ‘ensuring the satisfactory fulfilment’ of the commitments of the notifying party carried out tasks which were indirectly conferred on him by the Commission. Those were tasks which the Commission could, if it had possessed sufficient personnel, have carried out itself.
49. That is evident from paragraphs 52, 53, 55 and 56 of the Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 447/98 (OJ 2001 C 68, p. 3). In particular, paragraph 56 of that notice states that ‘the trustee will assume specified duties designed to ensure compliance in good faith with the commitments on behalf of the Commission’.
50. It must be recalled that paragraph 15 of its commitments required Lagardère to appoint a trustee who, among other conditions, was ‘to be independent of Lagardère and Éditis’.
51. It is therefore common ground that such a trustee must, first, be independent of the parties and, in addition, act independently of the parties, with the result that a lack of independence is sufficient ground for the annulment of a Commission decision such as the contested decision. The question of whether that trustee did act independently arises only if it has first been established that the trustee was in fact independent of the parties.
52. Given that the General Court correctly found that the trustee was not independent of the parties, it was under no obligation to examine whether that trustee actually acted in a way which was evidence of that lack of independence.
K v Bundesasylamt.
Date: 2012-11-06
27. In that regard, it should be noted that, while Article 15(1) of Regulation No 343/2003 is an optional provision which affords the Member States extensive discretion with regard to deciding to ‘bring together’ family members and other dependent relatives on humanitarian grounds based in particular on family or cultural considerations, Article 15(2) of the same article, however, restricts that power in such a way that, where the conditions laid down in that provision are satisfied, the Member States ‘normally keep together’ the asylum seeker and another member of his family.