Tonina Enza Iaia and Others v Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca and Others.
Date: 2011-05-19
7. In its judgments in Case C‑131/97 Carbonari and Others  [1999] ECR I‑1103, paragraphs 47 and 48, and in Case C‑371/97 Gozza and Others  [2000] ECR I‑7881, paragraphs 36 and 37, the Court held that the obligation to provide appropriate remuneration for periods of training in specialised medicine did not, in itself, enable national courts to determine which body was liable to pay the appropriate remuneration or the level thereof. It was, none the less, for those national courts, responsible for applying national law, and, in particular, legislative provisions which were specially introduced in order to implement Directive 82/76, to interpret that national law so far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of that directive in order to bring about the result which it sought to achieve.
8. If, the Court ruled, the result prescribed by Directive 82/76 could not be achieved by way of an interpretation in conformity with that directive, the Italian Republic would be required to make reparation for loss or damage caused to individuals by its failure to transpose that directive within the prescribed period. In that connection, the Court stated that retroactive and full application of the measures to guarantee correct implementation of Directive 82/76 would suffice, in principle, to remedy the harmful consequences of the delay in that implementation. However, if the beneficiaries established the existence of complementary loss sustained by reason of the fact that they had been unable to benefit at the appropriate time from the financial advantages guaranteed by that directive, such loss would also have to be made good (see Carbonari and Others , paragraphs 52 and 53, and Gozza and Others , paragraphs 38 and 39).
The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
16. It is settled case-law that, in the absence of EU rules in the matter, it is for the internal legal order of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding in full rights which individuals derive from EU law, provided that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of the rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (see Joined Cases C‑114/95 and C‑115/95 Texaco and Olieselskabet Danmark [1997] ECR I‑4263, paragraph 41; Case C‑62/00 Marks & Spencer [2002] ECR I‑6325, paragraph 34; and Case C‑445/06 Danske Slagterier  [2009] ECR I‑2119, paragraph 31).
17. As regards that latter principle, the Court has stated that it is compatible with EU law to lay down reasonable periods within which proceedings must be brought in the interests of legal certainty, which protects both the individual and the authorities concerned. Such periods are not by their nature liable to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by EU law, even if the expiry of those periods necessarily entails the dismissal, in whole or in part, of the action brought (see Case C‑90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I‑4085, paragraph 48; Case C‑188/95 Fantask and Others  [1997] ECR I‑6783, paragraph 48; Case C‑231/96 Edis  [1998] ECR I‑4951, paragraph 35; and Marks & Spencer , paragraph 35).
18. With regard to the point at which a limitation period starts to run, it is true that the Court had held that, until such time as a directive has been properly transposed, a defaulting Member State may not rely on an individual’s delay in initiating proceedings against it in order to protect rights conferred upon that individual by the provisions of the directive and that a period laid down by national law within which proceedings must be initiated cannot begin to run before that time ( Emmott , paragraph 23).
19. The Court has, however, subsequently acknowledged that a defaulting Member State may rely on the expiry of a limitation period as a defence against legal proceedings, even though by the date on which the actions in question were brought that Member State had not yet correctly transposed the directive in question, ruling that the solution established in Emmott  had been justified by the circumstances particular to that case, in which a time-bar had had the result of depriving the applicant in the main proceedings of any opportunity whatever to invoke her right to equal treatment under a directive (see Case C‑338/91 Steenhorst-Neerings  [1993] ECR I‑5475; Case C‑410/92 Johnson [1994] ECR I‑5483; Fantask and Others , paragraphs 50 to 52; Case C‑30/02 Recheio – Cash & Carry  [2004] ECR I‑6051; and Danske Slagterier , paragraphs 53 to 56).
20. In the case which gave rise to the judgment in Emmott , the conduct of the national authorities had, in actual fact, prevented the applicant in the main proceedings from claiming the benefit of the rights conferred by the directive at issue (paragraphs 10 to 14; see also, to that effect Steenhorst-Neerings , paragraph 20, and Johnson , paragraph 27).
21. It follows that EU law does not preclude a national authority from relying on the expiry of a reasonable limitation period unless, by its conduct, it was responsible for the delay in the application, thereby depriving the applicant in the main proceedings of the opportunity to enforce his rights under an EU directive before the national courts (see, to that effect, Edis , paragraph 48, and Case C‑228/96 April e [1998] ECR I‑7141, paragraph 43; see also, by analogy, Case C‑327/00 Santex  [2003] ECR I‑1877, paragraphs 57 to 61, and Case C‑542/08 Barth  [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 33 to 36).
22. It should also be made clear that, in accordance with settled case-law, the fact that the Court may have ruled that the breach of EU law has occurred generally does not affect the starting point of the limitation period (see, to that effect, Edis , paragraph 20; Recheio – Cash & Carry , paragraph 23; and Danske Slagterier , paragraphs 36 to 39).