WESTbahn Management GmbH v ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG.
Date: 2019-07-10
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In order to answer those questions, it should be recalled that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments of 7 October 2010, Lassal, C‑162/09, EU:C:2010:592, paragraph 49, and of 11 April 2019, Tarola, C‑483/17, EU:C:2019:309, paragraph 37).
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Finally, it is true that, as the referring court points out, the extension of the minimum access package brought about by Directive 2012/34 in order to include in it the use of the railway infrastructure has not been the subject of a specific statement of reasons in the recitals of that directive. However, that does not preclude Annex II to that directive from being interpreted as meaning that the use of passenger platforms falls within the scope of minimum access within the meaning of that annex, since it has already been clarified by settled case-law that, if an act of general application discloses the essential objective pursued by the institution, it would be excessive to require a specific statement of reasons for the various technical choices made (judgment of 7 February 2018, American Express, C‑304/16, EU:C:2018:66, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).
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In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the interpretation which the Court, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 267 TFEU, gives to a rule of EU law clarifies and defines the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be, or ought to have been, understood and applied from the time of its entry into force. It follows that the rule as thus interpreted may, and must, be applied by the courts even to legal relationships which arose and were established before judgment is delivered on the request for interpretation, provided that in other respects the conditions for bringing a dispute relating to the application of that rule before the courts having jurisdiction are satisfied (judgment of 14 March 2019, Skanska Industrial Solutions and Others, C‑724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
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It is only quite exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the EU legal order, be moved to restrict, for any person concerned, the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling into question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely that those concerned should have acted in good faith and that there should be a risk of serious difficulties (judgment of 14 March 2019, Skanska Industrial Solutions and Others, C‑724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).
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More specifically, the Court has taken that step only in quite specific circumstances, notably where there was a risk of serious economic repercussions owing in particular to the large number of legal relationships entered into in good faith on the basis of rules considered to be validly in force and where it appeared that individuals and national authorities had been led to adopt practices which did not comply with EU law by reason of objective, significant uncertainty regarding the implications of European Union provisions, to which the conduct of other Member States or the Commission may even have contributed (judgment of 14 March 2019, Skanska Industrial Solutions and Others, C‑724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).