Carbonati Apuani Srl v Comune di Carrara.
Date: 2004-09-09
10. Here it has to be pointed out that the need to provide an interpretation of Community law which will be of use to the national court makes it necessary that the national court should define the factual and legislative context of the question it is asking or, at the very least, explain the factual circumstances on which that question is based (see, inter alia, the judgment in Joined Cases C-320/90 to C-322/90 Telemarsicabruzzo and Others  [1993] ECR I-393, paragraph 6; the orders in Case C-157/92 Banchero  [1993] ECR I-1085, paragraph 4; Joined Cases C-128/97 and C-137/97 Testa and Modesti  [1998] ECR I-2181, paragraph 5, and Case C-9/98 Agostini  [1998] ECR I-4261, paragraph 4).
11. The Court has likewise held that it is essential that the national court should give at the very least some explanation of the reasons for the choice of the Community provisions which it requires to be interpreted and on the link it establishes between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the dispute (order in Case C-116/00 Laguillaumie  [2000] ECR I-4979, point 16).
17. It ought here to be borne in mind that the Court has previously held that a charge does not constitute a charge having effect equivalent to a customs duty, but internal taxation within the meaning of Article 90 EC, if it relates to a general system of internal dues applied systematically to categories of products in accordance with objective criteria irrespective of the origin or destination of the products (Case 90/79 Commission  v France  [1981] ECR 283, paragraph 14, and Case C-163/90 Legros and Others  [1992] ECR I-4625, paragraph 11).
20. As the Court has held before on many occasions, any pecuniary charge, however small, and whatever its designation and mode of application, which is imposed unilaterally on domestic or foreign goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, and which is not a customs duty in the strict sense, constitutes a charge having equivalent effect, within the meaning of Article 23 EC (see Case 158/82 Commission  v Denmark  [1983] ECR 3573, paragraph 18; Legros and Others , paragraph 13; Case C-426/92 Deutsches Milch-Kontor  [1994] ECR I-2757, paragraph 50; Joined Cases C-485/93 and C-486/93 Simitzi  [1995] ECR I-2655, paragraph 15; and Case C-347/95 UCAL  [1997] ECR I-4911, paragraph 18).
22. On this point it ought to be recalled that the justification for the prohibition of customs duties and charges having equivalent effect is that any pecuniary charges imposed on goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier constitutes an obstacle to the movement of such goods (see, in particular, Joined Cases 2/69 and 3/69 Brachfeld and Chougol  [1969] ECR 211, point 14, and Joined Cases C-363/93, C-407/93 to C-411/93 Lancry and Others  [1994] ECR I-3957, paragraph 25).  The very principle of a customs union, as provided for by Article 23 EC, requires the free movement of goods to be ensured within the union generally, not in trade between Member States alone, but more broadly throughout the territory of the customs union.  If Articles 23 EC and 25 EC make express reference only to trade between Member States, that is because the framers of the Treaty took it for granted that there were no charges exhibiting the features of a customs duty in existence within the Member States.
25. The Court has ruled to that effect before in Legros and Others , paragraph 18, Lancry and Others , paragraph 32, and Simitzi , paragraph 17, holding that a charge imposed when goods cross a territorial boundary within a Member State constitutes a charge having effect equivalent to a customs duty.
26. It must moreover be emphasised that the issue raised in the case in the main proceedings does not appear to be a situation in which all the components are wholly confined to one Member State.  Indeed, it has been established that the marble tax is imposed on all marble from Carrara that crosses that municipality’s territorial boundaries, no distinction being made between marble the final destination of which is in Italy and marble destined for other Member States.  By its nature and terms, the marble tax therefore impinges on trade between Member States (see Lancry and Others , paragraph 30; see, to the same effect, with regard to measures having effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction, Case 286/81 Oosthoek’s Uitgeversmaatchaapij  [1982] ECR 4575, paragraph 9; Joined Cases C-277/91, C-318/91 and C-319/91 Ligur Carni and Others  [1993] ECR I-6621, paragraphs 36 and 37; Case C-254/98 TK-Heimdienst  [2000] ECR I-151, paragraphs 27 to 31; and Case C-448/98 Guimont [2000] ECR I-10663, paragraphs 21 to 23).
31. The Court has held before that customs duties and charges having equivalent effect are prohibited regardless of the purpose for which they were introduced and the destination of the revenue from them (Case 24/68 Commission  v Italy  [1969] ECR 193, paragraph 7, and Simitzi , paragraph 14).  None the less, the Court has accepted that a charge which represents payment for a service actually rendered to an economic operator, of an amount in proportion to that service, does not constitute a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty (Case 63/74 Cadsky  [1975] ECR 281, paragraph 8; Case 158/82 Commission  v Denmark  [1983] ECR 3573, paragraph 19; and CRT France International , paragraph 17).
34. In any case, the fact that a tax imposed on the crossing of a frontier between States or within a State was introduced in order to compensate for a local charge applying to similar domestic products is not sufficient to exempt that tax from being classified as a charge having equivalent effect.  If it were, it would make the prohibition on charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties empty and meaningless (see, to that effect, Case 132/78 Denkavit  [1979] ECR 1923, paragraph 8, and Michaïlidis , paragraph 23).
37. It is to be observed that it is only exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the Community legal order, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying upon the provisions thus interpreted with a view to calling in question legal relationships established in good faith ( Legros and Others , paragraph 30, and Case C-104/98 Buchner and Others  [2000] ECR I-3625, paragraph 39).