larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Orange v European Commission.
Date: 2016-10-26
10


In that regard, it must be recalled that, under Article 83 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure, the Court may at any time, after hearing the Advocate General, order the opening or reopening of the oral part of the procedure, in particular if it considers that it lacks sufficient information or where a party has, after the close of that part of the procedure, submitted a new fact which is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor for the decision of the Court (judgment of 22 June 2016, DK Recycling und Roheisen v Commission, C‑540/14 P, EU:C:2016:469, paragraph 28).
38


In that regard, it is the Court’s established case-law that Article 107(1) TFEU does not distinguish between measures of State intervention by reference to their causes or their aims but defines them in relation to their effects (judgment of 9 June 2011, Comitato Venezia vuole vivere and Others v Commission, C‑71/09 P, C‑73/09 P and C‑76/09 P, EU:C:2011:368, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited).
49


According to Orange, an individual measure is selective only if it favours a specific undertaking in comparison with others which are in a comparable legal and factual situation. Orange cites, in that connection, the judgments of 29 March 2012, 3M Italia (C‑417/10, EU:C:2012:184, paragraph 40), and of 16 April 2015, Trapeza Eurobank Ergasias (C‑690/13, EU:C:2015:235, paragraph 28).
54


As those findings are, as observed by the Advocate General in points 66 to 72 of his Opinion, consistent with the Court’s case-law in this field (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 June 2015, Commission v MOL, C‑15/14 P, EU:C:2015:362, paragraph 60), they are not vitiated by any error of law and, as a result, the second part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
64


Second, it should be recalled that the Commission is required, not to establish that aid has a real effect on trade between Member States and that competition is actually being distorted, but only to examine whether the aid is liable to affect such trade and distort competition (judgment of 8 September 2011, Commission v Netherlands, C‑279/08 P, EU:C:2011:551, paragraph 13 and the case-law cited).
65


In that regard, the fact that an economic sector has been the subject of liberalisation at EU level may serve to determine that the aid in question has a real or potential effect on competition and affects trade between Member States (judgment of 30 April 2009, Commission v Italy and Wam, C‑494/06 P, EU:C:2009:272, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).
66


With regard to the requirement that competition should be distorted, it must be borne in mind in that regard that, in principle, aid intended to release an undertaking from costs which it would normally have to bear in its day-to-day management or normal activities distorts the conditions of competition (judgment of 30 April 2009, Commission v Italy and Wam, C‑494/06 P, EU:C:2009:272, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
Debonair Trading Internacional Ldª v European Union Intellectual Property Office.
Date: 2016-10-27
In accordance with the Court’s case-law, the obligation to state reasons owed by the General Court requires it to disclose
         clearly and unequivocally the reasoning followed by it, in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the
         reasons for the decision taken and the Court of Justice to exercise its power of review (see judgment of 17 October 2013,
         Isdin v Bial-Portela, C‑597/12 P, EU:C:2013:672, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 2016-10-27
39


In that regard, it should be noted that in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary, in accordance with established case-law, to consider not only its wording but also its context and the aims pursued by the legislation of which it forms part (see, inter alia, judgments of 1 April 1993, Findling Wälzlager, C‑136/91, EU:C:1993:133, paragraph 11, and 4 February 2016, Hassan, C‑163/15, EU:C:2016:71, paragraph 19). The origins of a provision of EU law may also provide information relevant to its interpretation (see judgments of 27 November 2012, Pringle, C‑370/12, EU:C:2012:756, paragraph 135, and 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 50).
40


In the present case, it is apparent from recitals 2 and 19 as well as from Article 1(1) of Directive 2007/23 that the main purpose of that directive is to counter barriers to trade within the Union that arise due to differences in the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States on the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles, which it defines, and thus guarantee the free movement of such articles in the internal market, while ensuring a high level of protection of human health and public security and the protection and safety of consumers and professional users.
41


In that regard, it should be recalled that, in accordance with the ‘new approach to technical harmonisation and standards’ referred to in recitals 8, 16 and 20 of Directive 2007/23, that directive lays down the essential safety requirements that pyrotechnic articles must meet and which are put into effect by harmonised standards as well as national implementing standards (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 October 2014, Commission v Germany, C‑100/13, not published, EU:C:2014:2293, paragraph 51).
43


Furthermore, under Article 6(1) of Directive 2007/23, Member States may not prohibit, restrict or impede the marketing of pyrotechnic articles throughout the Union, unless the measures they adopt fall within the exceptions laid down in Article 6(2) of that directive or within the market surveillance activity provided for in Article 14(6) of that directive.
53


It should further be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, a measure capable of hindering imports must be classified as an obstacle to the free movement of goods even where the hindrance is slight (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2004, Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft and S. Spitz, C‑309/02, EU:C:2004:799, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited).
Hörmann Reisen GmbH v Stadt Augsburg and Landkreis Augsburg.
Date: 2016-10-27
28


It should be borne in mind, first, that the Court has already categorised the Vergabekammer bei der Bezirksregierung Arnsberg (Public Procurement Board attached to the Arnsberg regional government, Germany) as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU (judgment of 18 September 2014, Bundesdruckerei, C‑549/13, EU:C:2014:2235, paragraphs 20 to 23).
31


As regards the applicability of Directive 2014/24, it should be noted that the contract notice at issue in the main proceedings was published on 7 March 2015, that is, before the expiry date of the period for transposition of the relevant provisions of Directive 2014/24, fixed at 18 April 2016 under Article 90(1) thereof.
32


According to settled case-law of the Court, the applicable directive is, as a rule, the one in force when the contracting authority chooses the type of procedure to be followed and decides definitively whether it is necessary for a prior call for tenders to be issued for the award of a public contract. Conversely, a directive is not applicable if the period prescribed for its transposition expired after that point in time (judgment of 7 April 2016, Partner Apelski Dariusz, C‑324/14, EU:C:2016:214, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited).
41


It follows that, for the purposes of the award of a contract for public passenger transport services by bus, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, solely the provisions of Article 5(2) to (6) of Regulation No 1370/2007 are not to be applied, whereas the other provisions of that regulation remain applicable.
44


Under the first subparagraph of Article 1(1) of that regulation, the purpose thereof ‘is to define how, in accordance with the rules of [EU] law, competent authorities may act in the field of public passenger transport to guarantee the provision of services of general interest which are among other things more numerous, safer, of a higher quality or provided at lower cost than those that market forces alone would have allowed’.
45


The fact that Regulation No 1370/2007, by its nature, seeks to provide for methods of intervention in general schemes for public contracts implies that it contains special rules in relation to such schemes.
46


In that regard, it should be noted that Directive 2004/18, as amended, is of general application, whereas Regulation No 1370/2007 applies only to public passenger transport services by rail and road.
47


In so far as both Article 4(7) of that regulation and Article 25 of Directive 2004/18, as amended, contain rules on subcontracting, the view must be taken that the first provision constitutes a special rule with respect to the rules laid down in the second provision, and, as a lex specialis, takes precedence over the latter.
Criminal proceedings against Emil Milev.
Date: 2016-10-27
26


In the second place, as regards the test for urgency, it is necessary, according to the case-law of the Court, to take into consideration the fact that the person involved in the main proceedings is currently deprived of his liberty and that the question as to whether he may continue to be held in custody depends on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings (judgment of 26 July 2016, JZ, C‑294/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:610, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited). In the present case, it is apparent from the information provided by the referring court and referred to in paragraph 17 to 20 of this judgment that Mr Milev is in custody and that the outcome of the main proceedings could lead the referring court to decide to end that custody (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 24).
30


Since that period is intended in particular to give the Member States the time necessary to adopt the transposing measures, those States cannot be reproached for not having yet adopted measures implementing it in national law (see judgments of 18 December 1998, Inter-Environnement Wallonie, C‑129/96, EU:C:1997:628, paragraph 43, and of 15 October 2009, Hochtief and Linde-Kca-Dresden, C‑138/08, EU:C:2009:627, paragraph 25).
31


The fact remains that the Member States must refrain, during the period prescribed for transposition of a directive, from taking any measures liable seriously to compromise the result prescribed by that directive (see judgments of 18 December 1997, Inter-Environnement Wallonie, C‑129/96, EU:C:1997:628, paragraph 45, and of 2 June 2016, Pizzo, C‑27/15, EU:C:2016:404, paragraph 32). In this connection it is immaterial whether or not such provisions of domestic law, adopted after the directive entered into force, are concerned with the transposition of the directive (see judgment of 4 July 2006, Adeneler and Others, C‑212/04
EU:C:2006:443, paragraph 121).
32


It follows therefrom that, from the date upon which a directive has entered into force, the authorities and courts of the Member States must refrain as far as possible from interpreting domestic law in a manner which might seriously compromise, after the period for transposition has expired, attainment of the objective pursued by that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 July 2006, Adeneler and Others, C‑212/04
EU:C:2006:443, paragraphs 122 and 123).
Davitas GmbH v Stadt Aschaffenburg.
Date: 2016-11-09
17


To answer that question, it should be noted as a preliminary point that the subject of the regulation is the placing on the market of novel foods and novel food ingredients (judgment of 9 June 2005, HLH Warenvertrieb and Orthica, C‑211/03, C‑299/03 and C‑316/03 to C‑318/03, EU:C:2005:370, paragraph 81).
18


Article 1(2) of the regulation seeks to delimit the scope of the regulation, in particular by defining what is to be understood by novel foods and food ingredients (judgments of 9 June 2005, HLH Warenvertrieb and Orthica, C‑211/03, C‑299/03 and C‑316/03 to C‑318/03, EU:C:2005:370, paragraph 82, and 15 January 2009, M-K Europa, C‑383/07, EU:C:2009:8, paragraph 15).
19


It is apparent from the very wording of that provision that, to be categorised as ‘novel’ within the meaning of Regulation No 258/97, foods or food ingredients must satisfy two cumulative conditions.
20


First, it is necessary that human consumption of those substances was not ‘significant’ within the EU before 15 May 1997, the date of entry into force of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 2005, HLH Warenvertrieb and Orthica, C‑211/03, C‑299/03 and C‑316/03 to C‑318/03, EU:C:2005:370, paragraphs 82 and 87).
21


Secondly, it is necessary that the substances also fall within one of the categories expressly described in Article 1(2)(c) to (f) of the regulation.
26


According to settled case-law, the meaning and scope of terms for which EU law provides no definition must be determined by reference to their usual meaning in everyday language, while account is also taken of the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they form part (judgment of 24 June 2015, Hotel Sava Rogaška, C‑207/14, EU:C:2015:414, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
31


As regards, secondly, the objectives pursued by Regulation No 258/97, it should be recalled that the regulation has a twofold objective not only of ensuring the functioning of the internal market in novel foods but also of protecting public health against the risks to which they may give rise (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 January 2009, M-K Europa, C‑383/07, EU:C:2009:8, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
32


For those purposes, the regulation aims to establish common standards within the EU in the field of novel foods and novel food ingredients, in particular, as stated in recital 2, by introducing a single safety assessment of those foods and food ingredients through a Community procedure before they are placed on the EU market (judgment of 15 January 2009, M-K Europa, C‑383/07, EU:C:2009:8, paragraph 23).
Sabrina Wathelet v Garage Bietheres & Fils SPRL.
Date: 2016-11-09
28


In that regard, it should be noted that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, it follows from the need for a uniform application of EU law that, in so far as a provision thereof makes no reference to the law of the Member States with regard to a particular concept, that concept must be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union which must take into account the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, to that effect, the judgments of 18 October 2011, Brüstle, C‑34/10, EU:C:2011:669, paragraph 25, and of 15 October 2015, Axa Belgium, C‑494/14, EU:C:2015:692, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
32


It should be noted that the concept of ‘seller’, so defined, is objective in nature (see, by analogy, the judgment of 3 September 2015, Costea, C‑110/14, EU:C:2015:538, paragraph 21, and the order of 19 November 2015, C 74/15, Tarcâu, EU:C:2015:772, paragraph 27) and is based on elements such as the existence of a ‘contract’, the sale of ‘consumer goods’ and the existence of a ‘trade, business or profession’.
36


In the second place, it should be noted that the teleological interpretation of Article 1(2)(c) of Directive 1999/44, in the light of the purpose thereof to ensure a high level of consumer protection (judgment of 3 October 2013, Duarte Hueros, C‑32/12, EU:C:2013:637, paragraph 25), supports the interpretation of that provision referred to in paragraph 34.
39


In that regard, for the purposes of ensuring effective protection for consumers in the context of Directive 1999/44, it is essential that that consumer be informed that the owner is a private individual. That interpretation makes it possible to give practical effect to that directive and is compatible with the Court’s case-law, according to which the system of protection introduced under that legislation is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the trader, as regards both his bargaining power and his level of knowledge (judgment of 4 June 2015, Faber, C‑497/13, EU:C:2015:357, paragraph 42).
44


It is for the competent national court to assess whether, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, a trader may be regarded as the ‘seller’, for the purposes of Article 1(2)(c) of Directive 1999/44, where he fails to duly inform the consumer that he was not the owner of the goods in question, which involves, on the part of that court, taking into consideration all of the circumstances of the case (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 June 2015, Faber, C‑497/13, EU:C:2015:357, paragraphs 38 and 39). The degree of participation and the amount of effort employed by the intermediary in the sale, the circumstances in which the goods were presented to the consumer and the latter’s behaviour may, in particular, be relevant in that regard in order to determine whether the consumer could have understood that the intermediary was acting on behalf of a private individual.
Vereniging Openbare Bibliotheken v Stichting Leenrecht.
Date: 2016-11-10
33


Consequently, it is necessary to interpret the concepts of ‘objects’ and ‘copies’, for the purposes of Directive 2006/115, in the light of the equivalent concepts in the WIPO Treaty (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 March 2012, SCF, C‑135/10, EU:C:2012:140, paragraph 55).
50


In that respect, it must be noted that, although Article 6(1) of Directive 2006/115 — as a derogation from the exclusive lending right laid down in Article 1 of that directive — must, according to the Court’s settled case-law, be interpreted strictly, the fact remains that the interpretation given must also enable the effectiveness of the exception thereby established to be safeguarded and its purpose to be observed (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 October 2011, Football Association Premier League and Others, C‑403/08 and C‑429/08, EU:C:2011:631, paragraphs 162 and 163, and of 1 December 2011, Painer, C‑145/10, EU:C:2011:798, paragraph 133).
59


The Court has already held that forms of exploitation of a protected work, such as public lending, are different in nature from a sale or any other lawful form of distribution, since the lending right remains one of the prerogatives of the author notwithstanding the sale of the physical medium containing the work. Consequently, the lending right is not exhausted by the sale or any other act of distribution, whereas the distribution right may be exhausted, but only and specifically upon the first sale in the European Union by the rightholder or with his consent (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 July 2006, Commission v Portugal, C‑53/05, EU:C:2006:448, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
69


Next, the Court has already held, with regard to the private copying exception laid down in Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29, that that exception does not cover the case of copies made from an unlawful source (judgment of 10 April 2014, ACI Adam and Others, C‑435/12, EU:C:2014:254, paragraph 41).
70


In that respect, the Court has held that copyright holders cannot be required to tolerate infringements of their rights which may accompany the making of private copies. If the Member States had the option of adopting legislation which also allowed reproductions for private use to be made from an unlawful source, it would clearly be detrimental to the proper functioning of the internal market. The application of such national legislation might unreasonably prejudice copyright holders (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 April 2014, ACI Adam and Others, C‑435/12, EU:C:2014:254, paragraphs 31, 35 and 40).
Ciclat Soc. Coop. v Consip SpA and Autorità per la Vigilanza sui Contratti Pubblici di lavori, servizi e forniture.
Date: 2016-11-10
28


In that regard, it should be noted, first, that Article 45(2) of Directive 2004/18 leaves it to the Member States to determine the period within which the persons concerned must comply with their obligations relating to the payment of social security contributions and may make subsequent regularisations, on condition that that period respects the principles of transparency and equal treatment (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 February 2006, La Cascina and Others, C‑226/04 and C‑228/04, EU:C:2006:94, paragraphs 31 and 32).
29


Secondly, although a contracting authority may request the correction or amplification of data relating to an offer, such corrections or additions may relate only to data which can be objectively shown to pre-date the deadline for applying to take part in the tendering procedure concerned and may not relate to information which must be communicated, failing which the tender will be excluded (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 October 2013, Manova, C‑336/12, EU:C:2013:647, paragraphs 39 and 40).
30


Furthermore, Article 51 of Directive 2004/18, which provides that the contracting authority may invite operators to supplement or clarify the certificates and documents submitted pursuant to Articles 45 to 50 of that directive, cannot be interpreted as permitting that authority to accept any rectification of omissions which, as expressly provided for in the contract documentation, must result in the exclusion of the tenderer (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 November 2014, Cartiera dell’Adda, C‑42/13, EU:C:2014:2345, paragraph 46).
36


It should be noted that Article 45(2) of Directive 2004/18 does not provide for uniform application at EU level of the grounds of exclusion it mentions, since the Member States may choose not to apply those grounds of exclusion at all or to incorporate them into national law with varying degrees of rigour according to legal, economic or social considerations prevailing at national level (judgment of 10 July 2014, Consorzio Stabile Libor Lavori Pubblici, C‑358/12, EU:C:2014:2063, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited). That provision does not therefore oblige the Member States to grant the contracting authority freedom of appreciation in that regard.
Eco-Emballages SA and Others v Sphère France SAS and Others and Melitta France SAS and Others v Ministre de l’Écologie, du Développement durable et de lʼÉnergie.
Date: 2016-11-10
24


It follows that, as the Court has already held, the term ‘packaging’ must be given a broad interpretation (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 April 2004, Plato Plastik Robert Frank, C‑341/01, EU:C:2004:254, paragraphs 56 and 57).
25


It must next be recalled that, in order to constitute packaging within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 94/62, an article must (i) fulfil the two conditions set out in the first and second subparagraphs of Article 3(1) of Directive 94/62 (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 April 2004, Plato Plastik Robert Frank, C‑341/01, EU:C:2004:254, paragraph 47) and (ii) meet the criteria set out in the third subparagraph of Article 3(1) of that directive.
27


As the Court has already held, the possible functions of packaging are not listed in the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Directive 94/62 in such a way as to mean that they are cumulative (judgment of 29 April 2004, Plato Plastik Robert Frank, C‑341/01, EU:C:2004:254, paragraph 49).