Krystyna Zablocka-Weyhermüller v Land Baden-Württemberg.
Date: 2008-12-04
20. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in proceedings under Article 234 EC, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C-119/05 Lucchini [2007] ECR I‑6199, paragraph 43, and Case C-162/06 International Mail Spain  [2007] ECR I‑9911, paragraph 23). The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 39; Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04 Cipolla and Others  [2006] ECR I-11421, paragraph 25; Joined Cases C‑222/05 to C‑225/05 van der Weerd and Others [2007] ECR I-4233, paragraph 22; and Case C‑379/05 Amurta [2007] ECR I-9569, paragraph 64).
21. In the case in the main proceedings, as is apparent from the order for reference, the national court has provided to the Court a detailed account of the factual and legal background to the dispute in the main proceedings and given its reasons for taking the view that a reply to the question referred is necessary to enable it to give judgment.
25. As regards the scope ratione personae  of that provision, it need merely be pointed out that, under Article 17(1) EC, every person holding the nationality of a Member State is a citizen of the Union. In addition, Article 17(2) EC attributes to citizens of the Union the rights conferred and duties imposed by the EC Treaty, including those mentioned in Artic le 18(1) EC (Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen and Tas  [2006] ECR I‑10451, paragraph 18, and Case C‑499/06 Nerkowska [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 21).
26. As a Polish national, Mrs Zablocka-Weyhermüller enjoys the status of a citizen of the Union established by Article 17(1) EC and may therefore rely if necessary on the rights conferred on those having that status, such as the rights to move freely and to reside freely laid down in Article 18(1) EC ( Nerkowska , paragraph 22).
27. Secondly, as to the scope ratione materiae  of Article 18(1) EC, it is to be noted that, as Community law now stands, a benefit such as that in issue in the main proceedings, which is intended to compensate surviving spouses of victims of war, falls within the competence of the Member States (see, to that effect, Tas‑Hagen and Tas , paragraph 21, and Nerkowska , paragraph 23).
28. However, Member States must exercise that competence in accordance with Community law, in particular with the Treaty provisions concerning the freedom accorded to every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States ( Tas-Hagen and Tas , paragraph 22, and Nerkowska , point 24).
29. In that regard, the Court has already held that situations which fall within the scope ratione materiae  of Community law include those involving the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty and those involving the exercise of the freedom, as conferred by Article 18 EC, to move and reside within the territory of the Member States (Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, paragraph 33; Case C-403/03 Schempp [2005] ECR I-6421, paragraphs 17 and 18; and Nerkowska , paragraph 26).
34. With regard to the scope of Article 18(1) EC, the Court has already held that the opportunities offered by the Treaty in relation to freedom of movement could not be fully effective if nationals of a Member State could be deterred from availing themselves of them by obstacles raised to their residence in the host Member State by the legislation of another State penalising the fact that they have used them (see, to that effect, Case C‑224/02 Pusa [2004] ECR I-5763, paragraph 19; Tas‑Hagen and Tas , paragraph 30; and Nerkowska , paragraph 31).
35. National legislation which places certain Community nationals at a disadvantage simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State is a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 18(1) EC on every citizen of the Union (see, to that effect, Case C-406/04 De Cuyper [2006] ECR I-6947, paragraph 39; Tas-Hagen and Tas , paragraph 31; and Nerkowska , paragraph 32).
37. National legislation which imposes such a restriction on the exercise of freedoms by Community nationals can be justified, under Community law, only if it is based on objective considerations of public interest independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and is proportionate to the legitimate objective of the national provisions (see, to that effect, De Cuyper , paragraph 40; Tas-Hagen and Tas , paragraph 33; and Nerkowska , paragraph 34).
40. Although the restriction found in paragraph 36 of this judgment is capable of being justified by objective considerations of public interest such as those referred to in paragraph 39 above, it must also not be disproportionate in relation the objective pursued. It follows from the case-law that a measure is proportionate if, while appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective pursued, it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective ( De Cuyper , paragraph 42, and Tas-Hagen and Tas , paragraph 35).