João Pedro Lopes Da Silva Jorge.
Date: 2012-09-05
28. It should be recalled that, as is apparent in particular from Article 1(1) and (2) of Framework Decision 2002/584 and from recitals 5 and 7 in the preamble thereto, the purpose of that decision is to replace the multilateral system of extradition between Member States with a system of surrender, as between judicial authorities, of convicted persons or suspects for the purpose of enforcing judgments or of criminal proceedings, that system of surrender being based on the principle of mutual recognition (see Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld  [2007] ECR I-3633, paragraph 28; Case C-66/08 Kozłowski  [2008] ECR I-6041, paragraphs 31 and 43; Wolzenburg , paragraph 56; and Case C-261/09 Mantello  [2010] ECR I-11477, paragraph 35).
29. That principle means that, in accordance with Article 1(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584, the Member States are as a rule obliged to act upon a European arrest warrant (see, to that effect, Case C-388/08 PPU Leymann and Pustovarov  [2008] ECR I-8983, paragraph 51; Wolzenburg , paragraph 57; and Mantello , paragraphs 36 and 37).
30. Although the system established by Framework Decision 2002/584 is based on the principle of mutual recognition, that recognition does not mean that there is an absolute obligation to execute the arrest warrant that has been issued. The system established by that framework decision, as evidenced inter alia by Article 4 thereof, makes it possible for the Member States to allow the competent judicial authorities, in specific situations, to decide that a sentence must be enforced on the territory of the executing Member State (Case C-306/09 I. B.  [2010] ECR I-10341, paragraphs 50 and 51).
32. In that regard, the Court has held that that ground for optional non-execution has in particular the objective of enabling the executing judicial authority to give particular weight to the possibility of increasing the requested person’s chances of reintegrating into society when the sentence imposed on him expires (see Kozłowski , paragraph 45; Wolzenburg , paragraphs 62 and 67, and I. B. , paragraph 52).
33. Nevertheless, when implementing that provision, the Member States have a certain margin of discretion. The Member State of execution is entitled to pursue such an objective only in respect of persons who have demonstrated a certain degree of integration in the society of that Member State (see, to that effect, Wolzenburg , paragraphs 61, 67 and 73).
34. Thus, Member States may, when implementing Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584, limit, in a manner consistent with the essential rule stated in Article 1(2) thereof, the situations in which it is possible, as an executing Member State, to refuse to surrender a person who falls within the scope of Article 4(6), by making the application of that provision, when the person requested is a national of another Member State having a right of residence on the basis of Article 21(1) TFEU, subject to the condition that that person has lawfully resided for a certain period in that Member State of execution (see, to that effect, Wolzenburg , paragraphs 62 and 74).
40. In the light of the aim pursued, in particular, by Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584, as referred to in paragraph 32 above, namely to increase the chances of reintegrating into society a person sentenced to a custodial sentence in another Member State, the nationals of the Member State of execution and the nationals of other Member States staying or resident in the Member State of execution and who are integrated into the society of that State should not, as a rule, be treated differently (see, to that, effect, Wolzenburg , paragraph 68).
42. As is apparent from paragraph 34 above, the Court has already recognised, with regard to a Member State which has implemented Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584 by laying down special conditions relating to the application of that provision, that, like a condition based on nationality for its own nationals, the condition of residence of a continuous period of five years for nationals of other Member States may be regarded as being such as to ensure that the requested person is sufficiently integrated in the Member State of execution (see Wolzenburg , paragraph 68).
43. The Court has also held that, where a Member State has implemented Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584 without, however, laying down specific conditions relating to the application of that provision, it is for the executing judicial authority – in order to determine whether, in a specific situation, there are connections between the requested person and the executing Member State which lead to the conclusion that that person ‘is staying’ or ‘resident’ within the meaning of Article 4(6) of that framework decision – to make an overall assessment of various objective factors characterising the situation of that person, which include, in particular, the length, nature and conditions of his presence and the family and economic connections which he has with the executing Member State (see, to that effect, Kozłowski , paragraphs 48 and 49, and Wolzenburg , paragraph 76).
52. It follows that, although a Member State may, in transposing Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584, decide to limit the situations in which its executing judicial authority may refuse to a surrender a person who falls within the scope of that provision – thereby reinforcing the system of surrender introduced by that framework decision in accordance with the principle of mutual recognition ( Wolzenburg , paragraphs 58 and 59) – it cannot exclude automatically and absolutely the nationals of other Member States staying or resident in its territory irrespective of their connections with it.
53. According to the case-law, although framework decisions may not, as laid down in Article 34(2)(b) EU, entail direct effect, their binding character nevertheless places on national authorities, and particularly national courts, an obligation to interpret national law in conformity (Case C-105/03 Pupino  [2005] ECR I-5285, paragraphs 33 and 34).
54. When national courts apply domestic law they are therefore bound to interpret it, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the framework decision concerned in order to achieve the result sought by it. This obligation to interpret national law in conformity with European Union law is inherent in the system of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, since it permits national courts, for matters within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of European Union law when they determine the disputes before them (see to that effect, in particular, Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer and Others  [2004] ECR I-8835, paragraphs 113 and 114, and Case C-282/10 Dominguez  [2012] ECR, paragraph 24).
55. It is true that this principle of interpreting national law in conformity with Europ ean Union law has certain limitations. Thus the obligation on a national court to refer to the content of a framework decision when interpreting and applying the relevant rules of domestic law is limited by general principles of law and it cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem  (see, to that effect, Pupino , paragraph 47, and Dominguez , paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
56. However, the fact remains that the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with European Union law also requires national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by it, with a view to ensuring that the framework decision in question is fully effective and to achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (see, to that effect, Dominguez , paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).