Čepelnik d.o.o. v Michael Vavti.
Date: 2018-11-13
20


It must be recalled that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court, before which the dispute has been brought and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (judgment of 5 June 2018, Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein, C‑210/16, EU:C:2018:388, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
21


It follows that questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its object, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin, C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
24


Furthermore, as the Austrian Government’s argument concerning the inadmissibility of the reference for a preliminary ruling is based in part on the fact that national law does not allow the referring court, in the main proceedings, to make a decision relating to the fines imposed on Čepelnik, it must be recalled that, since in proceedings of the kind provided for in Article 267 TFEU the interpretation of national law falls exclusively to the referring court (judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others, C‑62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paragraph 28), that argument cannot suffice to rebut the presumption of relevance referred to in paragraph 21 above.
27


It should be noted at the outset that, as the Advocate General observes in point 41 of his Opinion, it may be deduced from the observations submitted to the Court that Directive 2014/67, the period for the transposition of which expired on 18 June 2016 in accordance with Article 23 of the directive, was transposed into Austrian law by legislation enacted in June 2016 which entered into force on 1 January 2017. Since the facts at issue in the main proceedings took place in March 2016, Directive 2014/67 is not applicable to them, and the questions referred need not be answered in so far as they refer to that directive (see, by analogy, judgment of 3 December 2014, De Clercq and Others, C‑315/13, EU:C:2014:2408, paragraphs 49 to 51).
29


In this respect, it must be observed that, under Article 1(6) of that directive, it ‘does not affect labour law’.
30


According to that provision, the concept of ‘labour law’ within the meaning of that directive covers legal or contractual provisions concerning employment conditions, working conditions, including health and safety at work, and the relationship between employers and workers, which Member States apply in accordance with national law which respects EU law.
31


Article 1(6) of Directive 2006/123, read in the light of recital 14 of the directive, thus defines ‘labour law’ broadly.
32


That provision does not distinguish between substantive rules of labour law, on the one hand, and rules relating to the measures provided for in order to ensure compliance with those substantive rules and those intended to ensure the effectiveness of the penalties imposed in the event of non-compliance with those rules, on the other.
33


It should also be observed that, as may be seen from recital 7 of that directive, by adopting the directive the EU legislature intended to ensure that a balance was observed between the objective of eliminating obstacles to the freedom of establishment of providers and the free movement of services, on the one hand, and, on the other, the requirement of ensuring a high level of protection of objectives in the general interest, including the need to comply with labour law (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 July 2013, Femarbel, C‑57/12, EU:C:2013:517, paragraph 39).
34


The establishment by national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings of deterrent measures for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the substantive rules of labour law and with rules intended to ensure the effectiveness of penalties imposed in the event of non-compliance with those substantive rules contributes to ensuring a high level of protection of the objective in the general interest consisting in the need to comply with labour law.
35


It follows that the concept of ‘labour law’ within the meaning of Article 1(6) of Directive 2006/123 covers such national legislation.
37


It must be recalled at the outset that, according to settled case-law of the Court, all measures which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of the freedom to provide services must be regarded as restrictions of that freedom (judgment of 4 May 2017, Vanderborght, C‑339/15, EU:C:2017:335, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).
38


Moreover, according to settled case-law, Article 56 TFEU confers rights not only on the provider of services himself but also on the recipient of those services (judgments of 18 October 2012, X, C‑498/10, EU:C:2012:635, paragraph 23, and of 3 December 2014, De Clercq and Others, C‑315/13, EU:C:2014:2408, paragraph 52).
42


According to well-established case-law of the Court, national measures which are liable to restrict or to make less attractive the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the FEU Treaty may nonetheless be permitted where they serve overriding reasons in the public interest, are appropriate for attaining their objective, and do not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective (judgment of 18 May 2017, Lahorgue, C‑99/16, EU:C:2017:391, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
44


On this point, it must be observed that the social protection of workers and combating fraud, particularly social security fraud, and preventing abuse are objectives that are among the overriding reasons in the public interest capable of justifying a restriction of the freedom to provide services (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 December 2012, Commission v Belgium, C‑577/10, EU:C:2012:814, paragraph 45, and of 3 December 2014, De Clercq and Others, C‑315/13, EU:C:2014:2408, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).