Cogeco Communications Inc v Sport TV Portugal SA and Others.
Date: 2019-03-28
35


A preliminary point to make is that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU, which provides for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to decide the case before it. With that in mind, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. The fact that a national court has, formally speaking, worded a question referred for a preliminary ruling with reference to certain provisions of EU law does not prevent the Court from providing the national court with all the points of interpretation which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to them in its questions. In that regard, it is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision referring the questions, the points of EU law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of the dispute (judgment of 27 June 2017, Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania, C‑74/16, EU:C:2017:496, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
38


In that regard, it should be recalled that Article 102 TFEU produces direct effects in relations between individuals and creates rights for the individuals concerned, which the national courts must safeguard (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 June 2014, Kone and Others, C‑557/12, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
39


The full effectiveness of Article 102 TFEU and, in particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in that article would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by abusive conduct of a dominant undertaking liable to restrict or distort competition (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 June 2014, Kone and Others, C‑557/12, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
40


It follows that any person can claim compensation for the harm suffered where there is a causal relationship between that harm and an abuse of a dominant position prohibited by Article 102 TFEU (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 June 2014, Kone and Others, C‑557/12, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
41


The right of any individual to claim compensation for such a loss actually strengthens the working of the European Union competition rules and discourages abuses of a dominant position which are liable to restrict or distort competition, thereby making a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 June 2014, Kone and Others, C‑557/12, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
42


In the absence of EU rules governing the matter that are applicable ratione temporis, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to lay down the detailed rules governing the exercise of the right to claim compensation for the harm resulting from an abuse of dominant position prohibited under Article 102 TFEU, including those on limitation periods, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are observed (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 June 2014, Kone and Others, C‑557/12, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 24).
43


Accordingly, the rules applicable to actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from the direct effect of EU law must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (judgment of 5 June 2014, Kone and Others, C‑557/12, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 25).
44


In that regard, and specifically in the context of competition law, those rules must not jeopardise the effective application of Article 102 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 June 2014, Kone and Others, C‑557/12, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 26).
45


In that context, as limitation periods constitute detailed rules governing the exercise of the right to claim compensation for the harm resulting from an infringement of competition law, it is necessary, first, as the Advocate General observed in point 81 of her Opinion, to take all elements of the Portuguese rules on limitation into consideration.
46


Secondly, account must be taken of the specificities of competition law cases and in particular of the fact that the bringing of actions for damages on account of infringements of EU competition law requires, in principle, a complex factual and economic analysis.
47


In those circumstances, it must be stated that national legislation laying down the date from which the limitation period starts to run, the duration and the rules for suspension or interruption of that period must be adapted to the specificities of competition law and the objectives of the implementation of the rules of that right by the persons concerned, so as not to undermine completely the full effectiveness of Article 102 TFEU.
57


In that regard, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law of the Court, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling from a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 20 December 2017, Núñez Torreiro, C‑334/16, EU:C:2017:1007, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).