larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Annett Altmann and Others v Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht.
Date: 2014-11-12
26. It is clear from recital 2 in the preamble to Directive 2004/39 that the directive aims to provide for the degree of harmonisation needed to offer investors a high level of protection and to allow investment firms to provide services throughout the European Union, on the basis of supervision in the home Member State.
27. It is also apparent from recital 63 in the preamble to that directive that, due to increasing cross-border activity, competent authorities should provide each other with the relevant information for the exercise of their functions, so as to ensure the effective enforcement of the directive.
28. Thus, under Article 17(1) of Directive 2004/39, the Member States must ensure that the competent authorities continuously monitor the activities of investment firms so as to assess compliance with their obligations.
29. Article 50(1) and (2) of that directive provide that the competent authorities must have all supervisory and investigatory powers that are necessary for the exercise of their functions, including the rights to have access to any document and to demand information from any person.
30. Article 56(1) of Directive 2004/39 states that competent authorities are to render assistance to competent authorities of the other Member States. In particular, they must exchange information and cooperate in any investigation or supervisory activities.
31. The effective monitoring of the activities of investment firms, through supervision within a Member State and the exchanging of information by the competent authorities of several Member States, as briefly described in the preceding paragraphs, requires that both the firms monitored and the competent authorities can be sure that the confidential information provided will, in principle, remain confidential (see by analogy, judgment in Hillenius , 110/84, EU:C:1985:495, paragraph 27).
32. As the Advocate General noted in point 37 of his Opinion, and as is also clear from the last sentence of recital 63 in the preamble to Directive 2004/39, the absence of such secrecy is liable to compromise the smooth transmission of confidential information necessary for monitoring.
33. Therefore, in order to protect not only the firms directly concerned, but also the normal functioning of the markets in financial instruments of the European Union, Article 54(1) of Directive 2004/39 imposes, as a general rule, the obligation to maintain professional secrecy.
34. The specific cases in which the general prohibition on divulging confidential information covered by professional secrecy does not preclude their transmission or use are set out in detail in Article 54 of Directive 2004/39.
35. It follows that there are no exceptions to the general prohibition on divulging confidential information other than those specifically provided for in that article.
Ute Reindl v Bezirkshauptmannschaft Innsbruck.
Date: 2014-11-13
38. According to settled case-law, whilst the choice of penalties remains within their discretion, Member States must ensure that infringements of EU law are penalised under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive (see to that effect, judgment in Lidl Italia , C‑315/05, EU:C:2006:736, paragraph 58, and Berlusconi and Others , C‑387/02, C‑391/02 and C‑403/02, EU:C:2005:270, paragraphs 65 and the case-law cited).
39. In the present case, the measures imposing penalties permitted under the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings must not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by that legislation; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, judgment in Urbán , Case C‑210/10, EU:C:2012:64, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
40. In order to assess whether a penalty is consistent with the principle of proportionality, account must be taken of, inter alia, the nature and the degree of seriousness of the infringement which the penalty seeks to sanction and of the means of establishing the amount of the penalty (see judgment in Equoland , C‑272/13, EU:2014:2091, paragraph 35).
42. Even if the system of penalties in the case in the main proceedings is a system of strict liability, it must be recalled that, according to the case-law of the Court, such a system is not, in itself, disproportionate to the objectives pursued, if that system is such as to encourage the persons concerned to comply with the provisions of a regulation and where the objective pursued is a matter of public interest which may justify the introduction of such a system (see judgment in Urbán , EU:C:2012:64, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
Novo Nordisk Pharma GmbH v S.
Date: 2014-11-20
23. In that regard, the Court has consistently held that Directive 85/374 seeks to achieve, in the matters regulated by it, complete harmonisation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States (judgment in Dutrueux and caisse primaire d’assurance maladie du Jura , C‑495/10, EU:C:2011:869, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
24. However, as can be seen from the eighteenth recital thereto, Directive 85/374 does not seek exhaustively to harmonise the sphere of liability for defective products beyond the matters regulated by it (judgment in Dutrueux and caisse primaire d’assurance maladie du Jura , EU:C:2011:869, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
25. As regards the consumer’s right to obtain information on the adverse effects of a product, it should be noted that neither that right nor the scope of the information that the consumer could require the manufacturer of that product to provide are covered, as such, by Directive 85/374.
26. As regards the fact that, in accordance with Article 4 of Directive 85/374, it is for the injured person to prove ‘the damage, the defect and the causal relationship between defect and damage’, it must be ascertained whether a statutory right to information, provided for under the legislation of a Member State, is capable of undermining the allocation of the burden of proof as delimited in that provision by the EU legislature.
27. In that regard, it should be acknowledged that national legislation under which the victim has the right to obtain information on the adverse effects of the product concerned may make it easier for that person to produce the requisite evidence enabling him to establish liability on the part of the manufacturer.
28. However, such national legislation does not bring about a reversal of the burden of proof, which is for the victim to discharge, and does not introduce any change in the circumstances, listed in Article 7 of Directive 85/374, in which the manufacturer is to be exempt from liability.
29. That being so, it must be held that the consumer’s right to require the manufacturer of a product to provide him with information on the adverse effects of that product is not among the matters governed by Directive 85/374 and that, accordingly, it falls outside the scope of that directive.
30. Moreover, national legislation establishing such a right must not undermine the effectiveness of the system of liability provided for under Directive 85/374 or the objectives pursued by the EU legislature by means of that system (see, to that effect, judgment in Dutrueux and caisse primaire d’assurance maladie du Jura , EU:C:2011:869, paragraph 29).
Direction générale des douanes et droits indirects and Others v Utopia SARL.
Date: 2014-11-20
27. However, according to the Court’s settled case‑law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, judgment in Brain Products , C‑219/11, EU:C:2012:742, paragraph 13 and the case-law cited).
28. As regards the context of Article 60 of Regulation No 918/83, it should be noted that that regulation provides for a number of reliefs from customs duty, entitlement to which is expressly linked to the fulfilment by the importer of certain conditions. Thus, the duty-free import provided for in Article 2 of that regulation lays down conditions in relation to the importer as well as the nature of the imported goods, according to which the goods must be imported by a natural person transferring his normal place of residence to the customs territory of the European Union (judgment in Treimanis , C‑487/11, EU:C:2012:556, paragraphs 15 and 16).
European Parliament and European Commission v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2014-11-26
50. The adoption of the provisions referred to in Article 43(2) TFEU necessarily presupposes an assessment of whether they are ‘necessary’ for the pursuit of the objectives of the common policies governed by the FEU Treaty, with the result that it entails a policy decision that must be reserved to the EU legislature. By contrast, the adoption of measures on the fixing and allocation of fishing opportunities, in accordance with Article 43(3) TFEU, does not require such an assessment since such measures are of a primarily technical nature and are intended to be taken in order to implement provisions adopted on the basis of Article 43(2).
51. First of all, it must be noted that, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, the choice of the legal basis for an EU measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, which include the aim and content of that measure (judgments in Parliament  v Council , C‑130/10, EU:C:2012:472, paragraph 42, and United Kingdom  v Council , C‑431/11, EU:C:2013:589, paragraph 44).
83. Given that the declaration at issue, which was approved by the contested decision, is a constituent element of an international agreement (see paragraph 73 of the present judgment), that declaration falls within the scope of Article 218 TFEU. That article governs the negotiation and the conclusion of agreements between the European Union and third countries or international organisations, the expression ‘agreement’, in accordance with the case-law, being understood in a general sense to indicate any undertaking entered into by entities subject to international law which has binding force, whatever its formal designation (see, to that effect, Opinion 1/75, EU:C:1975:145, p. 1360, Opinion 2/92, EU:C:1995:83, paragraph 8, and judgment in France  v Commission , C‑327/91, EU:C:1994:305, paragraph 27).
90. In that respect, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that, on grounds of legal certainty, the effects of such an act may be maintained, in particular where the immediate effects of its annulment would give rise to serious negative consequences for the persons concerned and where the lawfulness of the act in question is contested, not because of its aim or content, but on grounds of lack of competence or infringement of an essential procedural requirement. Those grounds include, in particular, the ground that an incorrect legal basis was used for the contested act (see, to that effect, judgments in Parliament  v Council , C‑414/04, EU:C:2006:742, paragraph 59; Parliament and Denmark  v Commission , C‑14/06 and C‑295/06, EU:C:2008:176, paragraph 86; and Parliament  v Council , C‑490/10, EU:C:2012:525, paragraphs 91 and 92).
Peter Schönberger v European Parliament.
Date: 2014-12-09
13. In that respect, it must be noted that, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, the Court is required to review the legality of acts of the Parliament which are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. Acts the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, an applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position are acts which may be the subject of an action for annulment (see, inter alia, judgment in IBM  v Commission , 60/81, EU:C:1981:264).
24. By contrast, it is clear from the provisions of the TFEU and from the rules adopted by the Parliament for the organisation of the right of petition that, where the Parliament takes the view that a petition meets the conditions laid down in Article 227 TFEU, it has a broad discretion, of a political nature, as regards how that petition should be dealt with. It follows that a decision taken in that regard is not amenable to judicial review, regardless of whether, by that decision, the Parliament itself takes the appropriate measures or considers that it is unable to do so and refers the petition to the competent institution or department so that that institution or department may take those measures.
Cruz & Companhia Lda v Instituto de Financiamento da Agricultura e Pescas IP (IFAP) and Caixa Central — Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo CRL.
Date: 2014-12-11
35. As regards ‘sound and fair marketable quality’, it must be observed that Article 13 of Regulation No 3665/87 appears in Chapter 1, entitled ‘Entitlement to refund’, of Title 2, entitled ‘Exports to non-member countries’, which shows that ‘sound and fair marketable quality’ is a material condition required for the payment of refunds (see the judgment in Fleisch-Winter , C‑309/04, EU:C:2005:732, paragraph 28).
36. It follows also from Article 13 that the Member States are to check that the products exported to third countries are of sound and fair marketable quality (see, to that effect, the judgment in Germany  v Commission , C‑54/95, EU:C:1999:11, paragraph 49).
41. It follows from settled case-law that it is the exporter who must bear the consequences of non-compliance with the obligations under the system of advance financing of export refunds (see, concerning the interpretation of the second subparagraph of Article 33(1) of Regulation No 3665/87, the judgment in Groupe Limagrain Holding , C‑402/10, EU:C:2011:704, paragraph 52).
Croce Amica One Italia Srl v Azienda Regionale Emergenza Urgenza (AREU).
Date: 2014-12-11
31. It should be noted in that regard that, according to the Court’s case-law, Article 8(2) of Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts (OJ 1993 L 199, p. 54), a provision similar to Article 41(1) of Directive 2004/18, does not provide that a decision by a contracting authority not to award a public contract is to be limited to exceptional cases or has necessarily to be based on serious grounds (judgment in Fracasso and Leitschutz , Case C‑27/98, EU:C:1999:420, paragraphs 23 and 25).
32. Similarly, the Court has also held that, although Article 12(2) of Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts (OJ 1992 L 209, p. 1), a provision also similar to Article 41(1) of Directive 2004/18, requires the contracting authority to notify candidates and tenderers of the grounds for its decision if it decides to withdraw the invitation to tender for a public contract, there is no implied obligation on that authority to carry the award procedure to its conclusion (see judgment in HI , Case C‑92/00, EU:C:2002:379, paragraph 41).
39. According to the Court’s case-law, the decision to withdraw an invitation to tender for a public procurement contract is one of those ‘decisions taken by the contracting authorities’ in relation to which Member States are required, under the third subparagraph of Article 1(1) of Directive 89/665, to establish in their national law review procedures designed to ensure that the relevant substantive rules of EU law on public procurement contracts or the domestic provisions transposing those rules are complied with (see, to that effect, judgments in HI , EU:C:2002:379, paragraph 53 to 55, and in Koppensteiner , C‑15/04, EU:C:2005:345, paragraph 29).
40. Since Directive 89/665 does no more than coordinate existing mechanisms in Member States in order to ensure the full and effective application of the directives laying down substantive rules concerning public contracts, it does not expressly define the scope of the remedies which the Member States must establish for that purpose. Therefore, the question of the extent of the judicial review exercised in the context of the review procedures covered by Directive 89/665 must be examined in the light of the purpose of the latter, care being taken to ensure that its effectiveness is not undermined (judgment in HI , EU:C:2002:379, paragraphs 58 and 59).
Staatssecretaris van Financiën v X.
Date: 2014-12-18
21. Any resident of a Member State, whatever his nationality, who has a shareholding in the capital of a company established in another Member State which gives him definite influence over the company’s decisions and allows him to determine its activities falls within the scope of Article 49 TFEU (see judgment in N , C‑470/04, EU:C:2006:525, paragraph 27).
27. There could, however, be discrimination for the purposes of the Treaty between residents and non-residents only if, notwithstanding their residence in different Member States, it were established that, having regard to the purpose and content of the national provisions in question, the two categories of taxpayers are in a comparable situation (see judgment in Commission  v Estonia , C‑39/10, EU:C:2012:282, paragraph 51).
Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken and Staatssecretaris van Financiën v Q.
Date: 2014-12-18
18. The Court has already held that the tax treatment of gifts, whether they are gifts of money, immovable property or movable property, comes under the provisions of the FEU Treaty on the movement of capital, except where their constituent elements are confined within a single Member State (see judgment in Mattner , C‑510/08, EU:C:2010:216, paragraph 20).
20. The Court has already held, in relation to inheritance tax, that the fact that the grant of tax advantages is made subject to the condition that the asset transferred be situated in the national territory constitutes a restriction on the free movement of capital prohibited, in principle, by Article 63(1) TFEU (see judgment in Jäger , C‑256/06, EU:C:2008:20, paragraphs 28 to 35). Similarly, in the case of gifts, measures whose effect is to reduce the value of a gift by a resident of a Member State other than that in which the property concerned is located and which taxes the gift of that property also constitute such a restriction (see judgment in Mattner , EU:C:2010:216, paragraph 26).
22. In order for such a restriction to be deemed to be compatible with the Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital, it is, in particular, necessary that the difference in treatment relate to situations which are not objectively comparable, such comparability being required to be assessed on the basis of the object and content of the national provisions at issue in the main proceedings (see judgment in X Holding , C‑337/08, EU:C:2010:89, paragraphs 20 and 22).
International Stem Cell Corporation v Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks.
Date: 2014-12-18
12. In that regard, the Hearing Officer held that the inventions disclosed in the applications for registration related to unfertilised human ova whose division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis and that such ova were ‘capable of commencing the process of development of a human being just as an embryo created by fertilisation of an ovum can do so’, within the meaning of paragraph 36 of the judgment in Brüstle (C‑34/10, EU:C:2011:669).
22. The Court notes as a preliminary point that the purpose of Directive 98/44 is not to regulate the use of human embryos in the context of scientific research and that it is limited to the patentability of biotechnological inventions (see judgment in Brüstle , EU:C:2011:669, paragraph 40).
23. Moreover, ‘human embryo’, within the meaning of Article 6(2)(c) of that directive, must be regarded as designating an autonomous concept of EU law which must be interpreted in a uniform manner throughout the territory of the Union (see judgment in Brüstle , EU:C:2011:669, paragraph 26).
24. As regards that interpretation, the Court held, in paragraph 34 of the judgment in Brüstle  (EU:C:2011:669), that, as follows from the context and aim of Directive 98/44, the EU legislature intended to exclude any possibility of patentability where respect for human dignity could thereby be affected and that it follows that the concept of ‘human embryo’ within the meaning of Article 6(2)(c) of that directive must be understood in a wide sense.
36. It is for the referring court to determine whether or not, in the light of knowledge which is sufficiently tried and tested by international medical science (see, by analogy, judgment in Smits and Peerbooms , C‑157/99, EU:C:2001:404, paragraph 94), human parthenotes, such as those which are the subject of the applications for registration in the case in the main proceedings, have the inherent capacity of developing into a human being.
RG v SF.
Date: 2015-01-09
36. It is clear, first, that the reference for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of the Regulation, which was adopted in particular on the basis of Article 61(c) EC, now Article 67 TFEU, which is in Title V of Part Three of the FEU Treaty, relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, and consequently that reference falls within the scope of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure defined in Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure.
41. It must be recalled that the object of the Regulation is not to unify the rules of substantive law and of procedure of the different Member States. Nevertheless, it is important that the application of those national rules does not impair the Regulation’s effectiveness (see, to that effect, the judgment in Rinau , C‑195/08 PPU, EU:C:2008:406, paragraph 82).
42. In that context, it must also be pointed out that it is stated in recital 33 in the preamble to the Regulation that it recognises the fundamental rights and observes the principles of the Charter. In particular, it seeks to ensure respect for the fundamental rights of the child as set out in Article 24 of the Charter, which include the right to maintain on a regular basis personal relationships and direct contact with both of his or her parents (see, to that effect, the judgment in McB , C‑400/10 PPU, EU:C:2010:582, paragraph 60).
47. Further, it may be recalled that, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, it cannot be inferred from Article 11(7) of the Regulation that a decision on the custody of the child is a prerequisite for the adoption, where appropriate, of a decision ordering the return of the child. The purpose of the latter decision, an interim measure, is also to contribute to the achievement of the final objective of the administrative and judicial procedures, namely regularisation of the child’s situation (see, to that effect, the judgment in Povse , C‑211/10 PPU, EU:C:2010:400, paragraph 53).