Spedition Welter GmbH v Avanssur SA.
Date: 2013-10-10
17. As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, in determining the scope of a provision of European Union law, its wording, context and objectives must all be taken into account (see Case C‑85/11 Commission  v Ireland [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
18. In the present case, whilst, according to the wording of Article 21(5) of Directive 2009/103, the claims representative possesses sufficient powers to represent the insurance undertaking in relation to injured parties and to meet their claims in full, that provision, which thus lays down the purpose of that representation, does not define the exact scope of the powers granted for that purpose.
22. Indeed, as the Advocate General has pointed out in point 25 of his Opinion, it appears from the travaux préparatoires to the directives which preceded Directive 2009/103 which that directive consolidated in the field of insurance that the powers enjoyed by the representative of an insurance undertaking in the victim’s State of residence had, in the legislature’s mind, the objective of including the authority to accept service of judicial documents, albeit to a limited extent since it was not to affect the rules of private international law relating to the conferral of jurisdiction.
23. Consequently, within those limits, the claims representative’s sufficient powers must include the authority to accept service of judicial documents.
24. Excluding that authority would indeed deprive Directive 2009/103 of one of its purposes. As noted by the Advocate General at point 32 of his Opinion, the purpose of the claims representative is specifically, in accordance with Directive 2009/103’s stated aims, to make the steps to be taken by accident victims easier, in particular to allow them to make a claim in their own language. It would therefore be contrary to those objectives to deprive those victims, once the preliminary formalities have been carried out directly with the claims representative, and given that they have a direct right of action against the insurance undertaking, of the possibility of serving judicial documents on that representative in order to bring an action for compensation before the court which has international jurisdiction.
28. In that regard, it should be noted that the question whether a national provision must be disapplied in as much as it conflicts with European Union law arises only if no interpretation of that provision in conformity with EU law proves possible (Case C‑282/10 Dominguez  [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 23).
29. The Court has consistently held that when national courts apply domestic law they are bound to interpret it, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the relevant directive in order to achieve the result sought by the directive and consequently to comply with the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU. That obligation to interpret national law in a manner consistent with European Union law is inherent in the system of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, since it permits national courts, for matters within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of European Union law when they determine the disputes before them (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑397/01 to C‑403/01 Pfeiffer and Others  [2004] ECR I‑8835, paragraph 114, and Dominguez , paragraph 24).
30. The principle that national law must be interpreted in a manner consistent with European Union law also requires national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that the directive in question is fully effective and achieves an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (see, to that effect, Dominguez , paragraph 27, and Case C-42/11 Lopes Da Silva Jorge  [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 56).