Republic of Poland v European Commission.
Date: 2012-06-26
23. It must be borne in mind that, under Article 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal is limited to points of law and must be based on the grounds of lack of competence of the General Court, breach of procedure before it which adversely affects the interests of the appellant, or infringement of European Union law by the General Court (see, to that effect, Case C-136/92 P Commission  v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others  [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraph 47).
24. Thus, the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to establish the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and to assess those facts. The establishment of those facts and the evaluation of that evidence do not, save where they are distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice (see, in particular, Case C-449/99 P EIB  v Hautem  [2001] ECR I-6733, paragraph 44, and Case C-105/04 P Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied  v Commission  [2006] ECR I-8725, paragraphs 69 and 70).
25. Furthermore, it follows from Article 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and also from Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see, in particular, Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil  v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291, paragraph 34; Case C-41/00 P Interporc  v Commission  [2003] ECR I-2125, paragraph 15; and Case C-131/03 P Reynolds Tobacco and Others  v Commission  [2006] ECR I-7795, paragraph 49).
26. Thus, where an appeal merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments submitted to the General Court, including those based on facts expressly rejected by that Court (see, in particular, Interporc  v Commission , paragraph 16), it fails to satisfy the requirement to state reasons under those provisions. In reality, such an appeal amounts to no more than a request for a re-examination of the application submitted to the General Court, a matter which falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (see, inter alia, Reynolds Tobacco and Others  v Commission , paragraph 50).
27. However, provided that an appellant challenges the interpretation or application of European Union law by the General Court, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal (Case C-210/98 P Salzgitter  v Commission [2000] ECR I-5843, paragraph 43). Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the General Court, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (see, inter alia, Interporc  v Commission , paragraph 17).
38. Second, in paragraph 47 of that judgment, the General Court, with reference to Case 152/85 Misset  v Council [1987] ECR 223, paragraph 11, reiterated that the Community rules concerning procedural time-limits are to be strictly applied.
48. The European Union is a union based on the rule of law, its institutions being subject to review of the conformity of their acts, inter alia, with the Treaty and the general principles of law (see Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation  v Council and Commission  [2008] ECR I-6351, paragraph 281, and Case C-550/09 E and F  [2010] ECR I-6213, paragraph 44).
71. In that regard, in conformity with the case-law of the Court of Justice and as noted by the General Court, rightly, in paragraph 106 of the judgment under appeal, the Commission may exercise a wide discretion when exercising the powers conferred on it by the Council, or indeed those who drafted the Act of Accession, in regard to the common agricultural policy for the implementation of the rules which it lays down, with the result that the lawfulness of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate in terms of the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see Weidacher , paragraph 26 and case-law cited).
101. Thus, by referring, inter alia, to the finding already arrived at by the Court of Justice, in that regard, in paragraph 87 of Poland  v Council , the General Court explained how the situation of the traders in the new Member States was to be regarded as radically different from that of traders in the old Member States. Given that the two situations were not comparable, the introduction of a charge on surplus stocks only on traders in the new Member States did not constitute discrimination on grounds of nationality.
115. It is settled case-law that complaints directed against grounds included in a judgment of the General Court purely for the sake of completeness cannot lead to the judgment being set aside and are therefore nugatory (see, in particular, Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others  v Commission  [2005] ECR I-5425, paragraph 148).
128. In that regard, the General Court was right to reiterate the case-law which confirms that the Commission enjoys wide discretion in regard to the common agricultural policy and that, therefore, judicial review must be limited to verifying that it has not manifestly exceeded the limits of its power of assessment (see, to that effect, Case C-189/01 Jippes and Others  [2001] ECR I-5689, paragraph 80). Therefore, there is no need to adjudicate on whether the measure adopted by the Commission is the most appropriate, the purpose of judicial review being rather to establish whether it is not manifestly inappropriate.
131. With regard specifically to those provisions, the Court has already held that they introduce preferential treatment the benefit of which can be obtained only if certain formalities are completed (see, to that effect, Case C-248/09 Pakora Pluss  [2010] ECR I-7697, paragraphs 39 to 41).
152. It should finally be recalled that, according to settled case-law, where the measure was adopted in a context with which the persons concerned were familiar, summary reasons may be given (see, to that effect, Cases C-301/96 Germany  v Commission  [2003] ECR I-9919, paragraphs 89 to 93, and C-42/01 Portugal v Commission  [2004] ECR I-6079, paragraphs 69 and 70).
180. According to the Court’s settled case-law, any economic operator on whose part an institution has promoted reasonable expectations may rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. Furthermore, while the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union, economic operators are not justified in having a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by the Community institutions in the exercise of their discretionary power will be maintained, particularly in an area such as that of the common organisation of the markets, the objective of which involves constant adjustment to reflect changes in economic circumstances (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-37/02 and C-38/02 Di Lenardo and Dilexport  [2004] ECR I-6911, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).