larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v Regione autonoma della Sardegna.
Date: 2019-10-24
23


In order to ascertain whether, as the Authority claims, those provisions require the competent authority to publish or communicate as much information as is necessary in order to carry out a comparative assessment of any bids received and to carry out an effective competitive tendering procedure, it is necessary, in accordance with settled case-law, to consider not only the wording of those provisions but also their context and the objectives of the legislation of which they form part, since the origins of those provisions may also provide information relevant to their interpretation (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2019, Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, C‑631/17, EU:C:2019:381, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
33


It follows that the information published under Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1370/2007 must allow an economic operator to object, from the moment referred to in that provision, to the very principle of making a direct award as intended by the competent authority (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2018, Rudigier, C‑518/17, EU:C:2018:757, paragraphs 64 and 66). Therefore, although it is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of such a right to object, the fact remains that an objection to the very principle of the direct award of a public service contract may be made by an economic operator without requiring the competent authority, as a precondition, to publish or communicate to the interested economic operators all the information that is necessary in order to allow them to submit a serious and reasonable bid.
Aanbestedingskalender BV and Others v European Commission.
Date: 2019-11-07
In paragraph 38 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that ‘in order to determine whether TenderNed’s activities, as defined in [the decision at issue], form part of the exercise of public powers or whether they can be classified as economic activities, it must be verified whether those activities, by their nature, their aim and the rules to which they are subject, are connected with the exercise of public powers or whether they have an economic character which justifies the application of the EU competition rules (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 March 1997, Diego Cali & Figli, C‑343/95, EU:C: 1997:160, paragraphs 16, 18 and 23 and the case-law cited, and of 28 February 2013, Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas, C‑1/12, EU:C:2013:127, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited)’.
In that respect, it should be pointed out, on the one hand, that it is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that two activities can be considered not able to be separated when one of them would be rendered largely useless in the absence of the other (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 July 2012, Compass-Datenbank, C‑138/11, EU:C:2012:449, paragraph 41) or where those two activities are closely linked (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 March 2009, Selex Sistemi Integrati v Commission, C‑113/07 P, EU:C:2009:191, paragraphs 76 and 77). On the other hand, as noted in paragraph 18 of the present judgment, if an economic activity carried out by a public entity nevertheless cannot be separated from other activities connected with the exercise of public powers, the activities of that entity as a whole must be regarded as being connected with the exercise of public powers.
Alain Flausch and Others v Ypourgos Perivallontos kai Energeias and Others.
Date: 2019-11-07
55


In particular, the Court does not regard as an excessive difficulty the imposition of periods for bringing proceedings which start to run only from the date on which the person concerned was aware or at least ought to have been aware of the announcement (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 February 2003, Santex, C‑327/00, EU:C:2003:109, paragraphs 55 and 57; of 6 October 2009, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, C‑40/08, EU:C:2009:615, paragraph 45; and of 8 September 2011, Rosado Santana, C‑177/10, EU:C:2011:557, paragraph 96).
K.H.K. v B.A.C. and E.E.K.
Date: 2019-11-07
28


It should be noted that, under the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (judgment of 26 September 2019, UTEP 2006., C‑600/18, EU:C:2019:784, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited). The Court has a duty to interpret all provisions of EU law which national courts require in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court of Justice by those courts.
29


Consequently, even if, formally, the questions referred concern principally the interpretation of Article 4(10), Article 5(a) and Article 18(1) of Regulation No 655/2014, that does not prevent this Court from providing the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of EU law that may be of assistance in adjudicating in the cases in the main proceedings. In that regard, it is for the Court to extract from all of the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the order for reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of the main dispute (see, by analogy, judgments of 4 September 2014, eco cosmetics and Raiffeisenbank St Georgen, C‑119/13 and C‑120/13, EU:C:2014:2144, paragraph 33, and of 26 September 2019, UTEP 2006., C‑600/18, EU:C:2019:784, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
38


In that regard, it is the Court’s established case-law that it follows from the need for uniform application of EU law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, having regard not only to its wording but also to the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (judgment of 23 May 2019, WB, C‑658/17, EU:C:2019:444, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
Zubair Haqbin v Federaal Agentschap voor de opvang van asielzoekers.
Date: 2019-11-12
52


It should also be made clear that in the cases envisaged in Article 20(4) of Directive 2013/33, depending on the circumstances of the case and subject to the requirements set out in Article 20(5) of the directive, Member States may impose sanctions that do not have the effect of depriving the applicant of material reception conditions, such as being held in a separate part of the accommodation centre as well as being prohibited from contacting certain residents of the centre or being transferred to another accommodation centre or to other housing within the meaning of Article 18(1)(c) of the directive. Similarly, Article 20(4) and (5) of Directive 2013/33 does not preclude a measure to hold the applicant in detention pursuant to Article 8(3)(e) of the directive in so far as the conditions laid down in Articles 8 to 11 thereof are satisfied.
Organisation juive européenne and Vignoble Psagot Ltd v Ministre de l'Économie et des Finances.
Date: 2019-11-12
29


In addition, the notion of ‘State’ must itself be understood as referring to a sovereign entity exercising, within its geographical boundaries, the full range of powers recognised by international law (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2016, Council v Front Polisario, C‑104/16 P, EU:C:2016:973, paragraph 95).
31


As the Court has already held, such entities include, inter alia, geographic spaces which, whilst being under the jurisdiction or the international responsibility of a State, nevertheless have a separate and distinct status from that State under international law (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2016, Council v Front Polisario, C‑104/16 P, EU:C:2016:973, paragraphs 92 and 95, and of 27 February 2018, Western Sahara Campaign UK, C‑266/16, EU:C:2018:118, paragraphs 62 to 64).
52


That conclusion is supported by the objective of Regulation No 1169/2011, which is, as stated in Article 1(1) thereof, to ensure a high level of consumer protection in relation to food information, taking into account the differences in perception of consumers.
53


It follows from Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1169/2011, and from recitals 3 and 4 of that regulation, in the light of which that provision must be read, that the provision of information to consumers must enable them to make informed choices, with particular regard to health, economic, environmental, social and ethical considerations.
State Street Bank International GmbH v Banca d'Italia.
Date: 2019-11-14
32


In that regard, it is important to note, first, that, according to settled case-law, the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (judgment of 11 April 2019, Tarola, C‑483/17, EU:C:2019:309, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
33


Article 12(2) of Delegated Regulation 2015/63 makes no express reference to the laws of the Member States for the purpose of determining the meaning and scope of the term ‘change of status’. That term must be regarded, for the purposes of application of that delegated regulation, as an autonomous concept of EU law which must be interpreted in a uniform manner throughout the Member States.
34


Second, it should be borne in mind that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, it is necessary, when interpreting a provision of EU law, to take into account the wording of that provision in its context and the objective that it pursues (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 May 2019, PF (Prosecutor General of Lithuania), C‑509/18, EU:C:2019:457, paragraph 28).
39


Article 12(1) of Delegated Regulation 2015/63, in so far as it establishes a derogation from the general rule in Article 12(2), must be strictly interpreted and cannot be given an interpretation going beyond the one scenario expressly envisaged by that regulation (see, by analogy, judgments of 1 December 2011, Painer, C‑145/10, EU:C:2011:798, paragraph 74, and of 6 June 2019, Weil, C‑361/18, EU:C:2019:473, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
61


The answer to the third question can, therefore, be deduced only from an interpretation of Article 104 of Directive 2014/59, which relates, as the heading of that article indicates, to ‘Extraordinary ex-post contributions’. Nevertheless, neither the wording of Article 104 of that directive nor Article 103(2) and (4) to (8) thereof (applicable to ordinary contributions and referred to by Article 104) contain any indication as to the date which must be used as a reference for identifying institutions required to pay the extraordinary contribution or how to calculate its amount. It is necessary, therefore, to interpret Article 104 of that directive by reference to the context in which it occurs and to the objectives pursued by the rules of which it forms part (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 July 2019, Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände, C‑649/17, EU:C:2019:576, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
X v Belgische Staat.
Date: 2019-11-20
26


However, while EU law in no way precludes Member States from establishing implicit acceptance or authorisation schemes, such schemes must nevertheless not impair the effectiveness of EU law (judgment of 27 June 2018, Diallo, C‑246/17, EU:C:2018:499, paragraph 46).
27


In that regard, it must be noted that, although, on the one hand, the objective pursued by Directive 2003/86 is to promote family reunification (judgment of 13 March 2019, E., C‑635/17, EU:C:2019:192, paragraph 45), on the other, under Article 1 of Directive 2003/86, read in conjunction with recital 6 thereof, that directive is intended to lay down, in accordance with common criteria, the substantive conditions for the exercise of the right to family reunification by third country nationals residing lawfully in the territory of the Member States.
29


Under Article 4(1) of Directive 2003/86, Member States are to authorise the entry and residence, in accordance with that directive, of certain members of the sponsor’s family for the purpose of family reunification, including, in particular, the sponsor’s spouse. The Court has previously held that that provision imposes specific positive obligations, with corresponding clearly defined individual rights, on the Member States, since it requires them, in the cases determined by that directive, to authorise family reunification of certain members of the sponsor’s family, without being left a margin of appreciation (judgment of 27 June 2006, Parliament v Council, C‑540/03, EU:C:2006:429, paragraph 60).
35


In those circumstances, those authorities may not issue a residence permit on the basis of Directive 2003/86 to a third-country national who does not meet the requirements laid down in that directive for its allocation (see, by analogy, judgment of 27 June 2018, Diallo, C‑246/17, EU:C:2018:499, paragraph 50).
Deutsche Lufthansa AG v Land Berlin.
Date: 2019-11-21
61


However, the principle of effective judicial protection does not require it to be possible, as such, to bring a free-standing action which seeks primarily to dispute the compatibility of national provisions with EU law, provided one or more legal remedies exist, which make it possible to ensure, indirectly, respect for an individual’s rights under EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2007, Unibet, C‑432/05, EU:C:2007:163, paragraphs 47 and 53).
Procureur-Generaal bij de Hoge Raad der Nederlanden.
Date: 2019-11-21
23


It should be noted that, according to settled case-law, although Article 267 TFEU does not make the reference to the Court subject to there having been an inter partes hearing in the proceedings in the course of which the national court refers the questions for a preliminary ruling, a national court may refer a question to the Court only if there is a case pending before it and if it is called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature (judgments of 25 June 2009, Roda Golf & Beach Resort, C‑14/08, EU:C:2009:395, paragraphs 33 and 34, and of 16 June 2016, Pebros Servizi, C‑511/14, EU:C:2016:448, paragraph 24).
25


In addition, it should be noted that, although the term ‘give judgment’, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, encompasses the entire procedure leading to the referring court’s decision, that term must be interpreted broadly in order to prevent many procedural questions from being regarded as inadmissible and from being unable to be the subject of interpretation by the Court and the latter from being unable to interpret all procedural provisions of EU law that the referring court is required to apply (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 June 2015, Fahnenbrock and Others, C‑226/13, C‑245/13, C‑247/13 and C‑578/13, EU:C:2015:383, paragraph 30, and of 16 June 2016, Pebros Servizi, C‑511/14, EU:C:2016:448, paragraph 28).
31


It must be recalled that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 22 June 2016, Thomas Philipps, C‑419/15, EU:C:2016:468, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
KROL - Zakład Robót Wodno-Kanalizacyjnych Sp. z o.o., S.k. v Porr S.A.
Date: 2019-11-28
In those circumstances, the Court must determine whether it is necessary to respond to the question referred (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 July 2004, Lenz, C‑315/02, EU:C:2004:446, paragraphs 53 and 54).
The latter provision must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States may exclude from the scope of Directive 2011/7 late payments in the performance of a contract concluded before 16 March 2013, even where those late payments occur after that date (judgment of 1 June 2017, Zarski, C‑330/16, EU:C:2017:418, paragraph 34).
In accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 2(1) of Directive 2000/35, the concept of ‘commercial transactions’ is to be understood as meaning ‘transactions between undertakings or between undertakings and public authorities which lead to the delivery of goods or the provision of services for remuneration’. That provision must be read in the light of recitals 13 and 22 of the directive, from which it is clear, inter alia, that, in essence, the directive is intended to apply to all payments made as remuneration for commercial transactions, including those between undertakings and public authorities, but excluding transactions with consumers and other types of payment.
It follows that Article 1 of Directive 2000/35, read in conjunction with the first subparagraph of Article 2(1) thereof, defines the scope of that directive very broadly.  Having regard to those provisions, there is nothing to suggest that a commercial transaction financed in whole or in part by resources from the EU Structural Funds and the EU Cohesion Fund is excluded from its scope.
In the second place, it should be noted that Article 6(3) of Directive 2000/35 does allow the Member States to exclude from the scope of the national legislation transposing that directive debts that are subject to insolvency proceedings instituted against the debtor, contracts concluded prior to 8 August 2002 and claims for interest of less than EUR 5.  However, as a provision which derogates from the principle established in Article 1 of Directive 2000/35, pursuant to which that directive applies to all payments made as remuneration for commercial transactions, Article 6(3) must be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 April 2014, ACI Adam and Others, C‑435/12, EU:C:2014:254, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
Criminal proceedings against Spetsializirana prokuratura.
Date: 2019-11-28
22


In the second place, as regards the criterion relating to urgency, it is necessary, according to the case-law of the Court, to take into consideration the fact that the person involved in the main proceedings is currently deprived of his liberty and that the question as to whether he may continue to be held in custody depends on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings (judgments of 28 July 2016, JZ, C‑294/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:610, paragraph 29, and of 19 September 2018, Milev, C‑310/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:732, paragraph 35).
27


Thus, that directive applies in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, where a national court must rule on the lawfulness of the continuation of the detention on remand pending trial of a person accused of having committed a criminal offence (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2018, Milev, C‑310/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:732, paragraph 40).
28


However, it is important to recall that, in the light of the minimal degree of harmonisation pursued by that directive, it cannot be interpreted as being a complete and exhaustive instrument intended to lay down all the conditions for the adoption of decisions on detention on remand pending trial (judgment of 19 September 2018, Milev, C‑310/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:732, paragraph 47, and order of 12 February 2019, RH, C‑8/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:110, paragraph 59).
29


Admittedly, Articles 3 and 4 of that directive require that a decision that detention on remand pending trial should continue, taken by a judicial authority, does not refer to the person as being guilty (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2018, Milev, C‑310/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:732, paragraphs 43 and 44, and order of 12 February 2019, RH, C‑8/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:110, paragraph 51).
30


By contrast, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that the degree of certainty that the court called upon to adopt that decision must have concerning the perpetrator of the offence, the rules governing examination of various forms of evidence, and the extent of the statement of reasons that that court is required to provide in response to arguments made before it are not governed by Directive 2016/343 and fall solely within the remit of national law (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2018, Milev, C‑310/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:732, paragraph 48).
41


Since the allocation of the burden of proof within the context of a procedure such as that in the main proceedings is not governed by EU law, the provisions of the Charter, including Articles 6 and 47 thereof, do not apply to national rules making that allocation (see, by analogy, judgment of 7 March 2017, X and X, C‑638/16 PPU, EU:C:2017:173, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
European Commission v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 2019-12-05
16


It must be borne in mind that the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure laid down by the first paragraph of Article 258 TFEU is to give the Member State concerned an opportunity to comply with its obligations under EU law or to avail itself of its right to defend itself against the complaints made by the Commission. The proper conduct of that procedure thus constitutes an essential guarantee required by the TFEU in order to protect the rights of the Member State concerned. It is only when that guarantee is observed that the contentious procedure before the Court can enable it to determine whether the Member State has in fact failed to fulfil the obligations which the Commission alleges it has breached. More specifically, the purpose of the letter of formal notice in the pre-litigation procedure is to delimit the subject matter of the dispute and to indicate to the Member State, which is invited to submit its observations, the factors enabling it to prepare its defence (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 June 2003, Commission v Italy, C‑145/01, EU:C:2003:324, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
17


Similarly, according to the settled case-law of the Court, in order for a letter of formal notice to be issued, in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 258, a prior failure by the Member State concerned to fulfil an obligation owed by it must be capable of being legitimately alleged by the Commission (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 15 February 2001, Commission v France, C‑230/99, EU:C:2001:100, paragraph 32, and of 27 October 2005, Commission v Luxembourg, C‑23/05, EU:C:2005:660, paragraph 7).
19


Moreover, the failure to give formal notice in accordance with the requirements of Article 258 TFEU is an absolute bar to proceeding with a case, which the Court may at any time consider of its own motion (see, to that effect, order of 13 September 2000, Commission v Netherlands, C‑341/97, EU:C:2000:434, paragraph 21, and judgment of 27 October 2005, Commission v Luxembourg, C‑23/05, EU:C:2005:660, paragraphs 5 and 7).
26


Moreover, to take the opposite view would clearly jeopardise the requirements of legal certainty, which are inherent in any procedure capable of becoming contentious (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 February 2001, Commission v France, C‑230/99, EU:C:2001:100, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
Mytilinaios Anonymos Etairia – Omilos Epicheiriseon v European Commission.
Date: 2019-12-11
137


In any event, it should be noted that it follows from the phrase ‘even to consider the private investor test applicable in the very particular circumstances of the case’, in paragraph 132 of the judgment under appeal, that it was only for the sake of completeness that the General Court applied that test in paragraphs 132 to 136 of that judgment. Consequently, the argument raised by the appellant is not likely, in any event, to lead to the annulment of the judgment under appeal and must therefore be dismissed as ineffective (judgment of 2 April 2009, Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission, C‑431/07 P, EU:C:2009:223, paragraph 148 and the case-law cited).