larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Commission of the European Communities v Ireland.
Date: 2009-10-29
33. It follows from settled case-law that both Annex I to Directive 75/442 and the list of wastes included in Commission Decision 2000/532/EC of 3 May 2000 (‘the European Waste Catalogue’), adopted pursuant to Article 1 of that directive, are only indicative (see, to that effect, Case C‑9/00 Palin Granit and Vehmassalon kansanterveystyön kuntayhtymän hallitus  [2002] ECR I‑3533, paragraph 22; Case C‑1/03 Van de Walle and Others  [2004] ECR I‑7613, paragraph 42; and Thames Water Utilities , paragraph 24). It follows that the mere fact that waste waters are not included in the European Waste Catalogue does not mean that they cannot be classified as waste.
34. Moreover, the Court held in paragraph 26 of the judgment in Thames Water Utilities  that it is clear from Article 2(1)(b)(iv) of Directive 75/442 that the Community legislature intended expressly to classify waste waters as ‘waste’ within the meaning of the directive, while providing that that waste may, in certain circumstances, escape its scope and come within that of other legislation.
45. Where waste waters are already covered by other legislation Article 2(1)(b)(iv) of Directive 75/442 does not apply to them, except for waste in liquid form.
46. It follows from the very wording of that provision, just as it does from the objectives of Directive 75/442, that waste waters which must be regarded as waste fall outside the legal regime under the directive only where, and to the extent that, they are governed by ‘other legislation’ within the meaning of that directive, that is to say by Community or national legislation which contains precise provisions organising the management of waste and ensures a level of protection which is at least equivalent to that resulting from Directive 75/442 and, more particularly, from Articles 4, 8 and 15 thereof (see, to that effect, Thames Water Utilities , paragraph 34).
57. It should however be pointed out that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, among others, Case C‑64/01 Commission  v Greece  [2002] ECR I‑2523, paragraph 7, and Case C‑456/05 Commission  v Germany  [2007] ECR I‑10517, paragraph 15). Therefore, a provision which entered into force after the end of that period cannot properly be relied upon in the defence of an action for failure to fulfil obligations.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Sweden.
Date: 2009-10-29
24. The question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in that Member State as it stood at the end of that period (Case C‑103/00 Commission  v Greece  [2002] ECR I‑1147, paragraph 23, and judgment of 5 June 2008 in Case C‑395/07 Commission  v Germany , paragraph 8).
33. It must be pointed out that, even if the arrangements for transposition or the interpretation put forward by a Member State serves, or better serves, certain aims pursued by that directive, that Member State may not disregard the provisions expressly laid down in that directive (see, by analogy, Case C‑243/03 Commission  v France  [2005] ECR I‑8411, paragraph 35).
TeliaSonera Finland Oyj.
Date: 2009-11-12
34. Therefore, the obligation to negotiate laid down in Article 4(1) concerns only the interconnection of networks, to the exclusion of other forms of network access (see, to that effect, Case C‑227/07 Commission  v Poland [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 36), and applies only to operators of public communications networks with respect to other operators of public communications networks.
50. It should be observed, first of all, that the Court has held that the regulatory tasks of a national regulatory authority are set out in Articles 8 to 13 of the Framework Directive. Furthermore, the Court has interpreted Article 8 as placing on the Member States the obligation to ensure that the national regulatory authorities take all reasonable measures aimed at promoting competition in the provision of electronic communications services, ensuring that there is no distortion or restriction of competition in the electronic communications sector and removing remaining obstacles to the provision of those services at European level ( Commission  v Poland , paragraphs 62 and 63, and the case-law cited).
58. It must be observed, first, that it follows from the wording of the first subparagraph of Article 5(1) of the Access Directive that the national regulatory authorities are responsible for ensuring adequate access and interconnection and also interoperability of services by means which are not exhaustively listed there.
59. In that context, in accordance with point (a) of the second subparagraph of Article 5(1), those authorities must be able to impose ‘obligations on undertakings that control access to end-users, including in justified cases the obligation to interconnect their networks’ solely in order to ensure end-to-end connectivity.
62. It follows from the foregoing that the answer to the third part of the first question referred is that a national regulatory authority may require an undertaking which does not have significant market power but which controls access to end-users to negotiate in good faith with another undertaking for either interconnection of the two networks concerned if the undertaking which requests such access must be classified as an operator of public communications networks, or interoperability of SMS and MMS message services if that undertaking is not covered by that classification.
Costs
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2009-11-12
7. A Member State cannot however plead provisions, practices or situations prevailing in its domestic legal order to justify failure to observe obligations laid down by a directive (see, inter alia, Case C‑235/04 Commission v Spain [2007] ECR I‑5415, paragraph 55).
8. The question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must, moreover, be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C‑173/01 Commission v Greece [2002] ECR I‑6129, paragraph 7).
Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Finland.
Date: 2009-11-19
27. Under the first paragraph of Article 307 EC, the rights and obligations arising from an agreement concluded before the date of accession of a Member State between it and a third country are not affected by the provisions of the Treaty. The purpose of that provision is to make it clear, in accordance with the principles of international law, that application of the Treaty is not to affect the duty of the Member State concerned to respect the rights of third countries under a prior agreement and to perform its obligations (see, Case 812/79 Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787, paragraph 8; Case C-84/98 Commission  v Portugal [2000] ECR I-5215, paragraph 53; and Case C-216/01 Budĕjovický Budvar  [2003] ECR I-13617, paragraphs 144 and 145).
31. Accordingly, as the Court held in Case C-205/06 Commission  v Austria  [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 37, and Case C-249/06 Commission  v Sweden [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 38, those powers of the Council, which consist in the unilateral adoption of restrictive measures with regard to third countries on a matter which is identical to or connected with that covered by an earlier agreement concluded between a Member State and a third country, reveal an incompatibility with that agreement where, first, the agreement does not contain a provision allowing the Member State concerned to exercise its rights and to fulfil its obligations as a member of the Community and, second, there is also no international-law mechanism which makes that possible.
39. According to well-established case-law, an international treaty must be interpreted not solely by reference to the terms in which it is worded but also in the light of its objectives. Article 31 of the Vienna Conventions of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties and of 21 March 1986 on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations, which express, to this effect, general customary international law, stipulate in that respect that a treaty must be interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose (Case C-268/99 Jany and Others  [2001] ECR I-8615, paragraph 35, and Case C-344/04 IATA and ELFAA  [2006] ECR I-403, paragraph 40).
48. In the first place, it must be observed that a Member State may not rely on the fact that other Member States have also failed to perform their obligations in order to justify its own failure to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty. In the Community legal order established by the Treaty, the implementation of Community law by the Member States cannot be made subject to a condition of reciprocity. Articles 226 EC and 227 EC provide the appropriate remedies in cases where Member States fail to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty (see Case C-38/89 Blanguernon  [1990] ECR I-83, paragraph 7, and Case C-163/99 Portugal  v Commission  [2001] ECR I-2613, paragraph 22).
Kemikalieinspektionen v Nordiska Dental AB.
Date: 2009-11-19
20. The Court has already ruled that, in so far as Directive 93/42 constitutes a harmonisation measure adopted pursuant to Article 100a of the EEC Treaty (which became Article 100a of the EC Treaty; now, after amendment, Article 95 EC), it is intended to promote the free movement of medical devices which have been certified as being in compliance with that directive, precisely by replacing the various measures which have been taken in this field in the Member States, and which may amount to an obstacle to that free movement (Case C‑6/05 Medipac-Kazantzidis  [2007] ECR I‑4557, paragraph 51).
21. In view of that purpose, Article 4(1) of Directive 93/42, which requires Member States not to create any obstacle to the placing on the market or the putting into service within their territory of medical devices bearing the ‘CE’ marking provided for in Article 17 thereof, must be interpreted as precluding the adoption by Member States of measures liable to constitute an obstacle to the free movement of medical devices bearing that marking, such as, for example, an export prohibition.
24. In particular, Article 8(1) of Directive 93/42 places Member States which have found there to be risks, linked to medical devices which have been certified as being in compliance with that directive, to the health and/or safety of patients or users or, where applicable, other persons, under a duty to take all appropriate interim measures to withdraw those medical devices from the market, or to prohibit or restrict their being placed on the market or put into service. In those circumstances, the Member State concerned is required under that provision to notify the Commission immediately of the measures taken, indicating in particular the reasons for those measures. Under Article 8(2) of Directive 93/42, the Commission must in turn examine whether those interim measures are justified and, where that is found to be indeed the case, it must immediately inform the Member State which initiated the measures, as well as the other Member States, accordingly (see Medipac-Kazantzidis , paragraph 46).
29. The aim of Directive 93/42, on the other hand, is – as is apparent notably from the recitals in the preamble thereto – not only the protection of health stricto sensu  but also the safety of persons. Moreover, that directive does not concern only patients and users of medical devices but, more generally, ‘third parties’ or ‘other persons’.
Commission of the European Communities v Ireland.
Date: 2009-11-26
10. In that respect, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C‑194/05 Commission  v Italy  [2007] ECR I‑11661, paragraph 19 and case-law cited).
11. Furthermore, in accordance with settled case-law, a Member State cannot plead provisions, practices or situations prevailing in its domestic legal order to justify failure to observe obligations and time-limits laid down by a directive (see, inter alia, Case C‑450/00 Commission  v Luxembourg [2001] ECR I‑7069, paragraph 8, and judgment of 28 April 2005 in Case C‑375/04 Commission  v Luxembourg , paragraph 11).
Aventis Pasteur SA v OB.
Date: 2009-12-02
35. In paragraph 34 of O’Byrne , the Court held that, since Directive 85/374 does not determine the procedural mechanisms which it is appropriate to apply when an injured person brings an action for liability for a defective product and makes an error as to the identity of the producer, it is, as a rule, for national procedural law to determine the conditions in accordance with which one party may be substituted for another in the context of such an action.
36. After having observed, in paragraph 35 of O’Byrne , that, in the light of the complete harmonisation pursued by Directive 85/374 in the matters it regulates, the definition in Articles 1 and 3 of the class of liable persons against whom an injured person is entitled to bring an action under the system of liability laid down by that directive must be regarded as exhaustive, the Court pointed out, in paragraph 38 of that judgment, that a national court, when it examines the conditions governing such a procedural substitution, must nevertheless ensure that due regard is had to the personal scope of the directive, as established by Article 3 thereof.
47. It should be recalled in that regard that, according to settled case-law, the principle of legal certainty, the corollary of which is the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, requires, in particular, that the application of rules of law must be foreseeable by those subject to them, that requirement being particularly important in the case of rules liable to entail financial consequences, in order that those concerned may know precisely the extent of the obligations which those rules impose on them (see Case C-201/08 Plantanol  [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
48. It should also be added that subjective elements deriving, for example, from the wrongful attribution, by the injured person, of the status of manufacturer of the allegedly defective product to a company which is not the manufacturer, or from the injured person’s genuine intention to proceed against that manufacturer by way of its action against such other company, cannot, without infringing the objective dimension of the harmonisation rules laid down by Directive 85/374, justify the substitution, after the expiry of the 10-year period set out in Article 11 thereof, of that manufacturer in proceedings initiated during that period against another person (see, to that effect, O’Byrne , paragraph 26 and, by analogy, Case C-51/05 P Commission  v Cantina sociale di Dolianova and Others [2008] ECR I‑5341, paragraphs 59 to 63).
50. However, the Court, giving a preliminary ruling on a reference, has jurisdiction, in the light of the information in the case-file, to give clarifications to guide the referring court in giving judgment in the main proceedings (see, to that effect, Case C-366/98 Geffroy  [2000] ECR I-6579, paragraph 20, and Case C-446/07 Severi  [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 60).
Yaesu Europe BV v Bundeszentralamt für Steuern.
Date: 2009-12-03
13. After an unsuccessful objection, Yaesu Europe brought an action before the Finanzgericht (Finance Court). The Finanzgericht upheld the position of the Bundeszentralamt, holding that Paragraph 18(9) of the UStG did not infringe Articles 3 and 6 of the Eighth Directive and that the term ‘signature’ on the specimen application form set out in Annex A to that directive had of necessity to be construed as a reference to the personal signature of the taxpayer, the position being in any case that, for the purposes of implementation, the German legislature enjoys discretion in that regard under the third paragraph of Article 249 EC.
18. According to settled case-law, it follows from the need for uniform application of Community law and from the principle of equal treatment that the terms of a provision of Community law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purposes of determining its meaning and scope must as a general rule be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community; that interpretation must take into account the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, inter alia, Case 327/82 Ekro  [1984] ECR 107, paragraph 11; Case C‑287/98 Linster  [2000] ECR I-6917, paragraph 43; and Case C-5/08 Infopaq International  [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 27).
21. The aim of the Eighth Directive is thus to harmonise the arrangements relating to the right to a refund of VAT, as provided for in Article 17(3) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1) (see, inter alia, Case C-136/99 Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena  [2000] ECR I‑6109, paragraph 20, and Case C-35/05 Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken  [2007] ECR I‑2425, paragraph 26).
24. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that – according to the settled case‑law of the Court – in interpreting a provision of Community law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, Case 292/82 Merck  [1983] ECR 3781, paragraph 12; Case C-34/05 Schouten  [2007] ECR I‑1687, paragraph 25; and Case C-466/07 Klarenberg [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 37).
Evropaïki Dynamiki - Proigmena Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE v European Commission.
Date: 2009-12-03
16. In accordance with the case-law of the Court, it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value which should be attached to the items of evidence adduced before it (see Case C-136/92 P Commission  v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others  [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraph 66, and Case C-362/95 P Blackspur DIY and Others  v Council and Commission  [1997] ECR I-4775, paragraph 29).
17. The Court of First Instance cannot, subject to its obligation to observe general principles and the Rules of Procedure relating to the burden of proof and the adducing of evidence and not to distort the true sense of the evidence, be required to give express reasons for its assessment of the value of each piece of evidence presented to it, in particular where it considers that that evidence is unimportant or irrelevant to the outcome of the dispute (see Case C-237/98 P Dorsch Consult  v Council and Commission [2000] ECR I-4549, paragraph 51).
European Commission v French Republic.
Date: 2009-12-10
22. In this respect, it is settled case‑law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C‑64/01 Commission v Greece  [2002] ECR I-2523, paragraph 7, and Case C‑456/05 Commission v Germany  [2007] ECR I-10517, paragraph 15).
32. Furthermore, in paragraph 17 of CEI and Bellini , the Court made it clear that it was ruling in the light of the state of harmonisation of Community law at the time of delivery of its judgment. However, the second paragraph of Article 28 of Directive 2004/18, which had no equivalent in Directive 71/305, specifically lists the procedures which contracting authorities must apply in awarding their contracts.
41. Moreover, both the principle of equal treatment and the obligation of transparency which flows from it require the subject-matter of each contract and the criteria governing its award to be clearly defined (see, to that effect, Case C-340/02 Commission v France  [2004] ECR I-9845, paragraph 34).
43. However, marchés de définition  and marchés d’exécution  appear by their nature to have different subject‑matters, namely, first, a study and design project in which the needs of the contracting authority are defined and, second, the actual provision of supplies, services or works defined in advance. The national provisions the subject of complaint are not, however, capable of ensuring that, in all cases, the subject‑matter and award criteria of both marchés de définition  and the marché d’exécution  can be defined from the beginning of the procedure.
European Commission v United Kingdom.
Date: 2009-12-10
8. It must, however, be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation obtaining in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C‑111/00 Commission  v Austria  [2001] ECR I‑7555, paragraph 13, and Case C‑135/05 Commission  v Italy [2007] ECR I‑3475, paragraph 36).
European Commission v Kingdom of Sweden.
Date: 2009-12-15
43. According to the Court’s settled case-law, although it is for Member States to take the appropriate measures to ensure their internal and external security, it does not follow that such measures are entirely outside the scope of Community law (see Case C‑273/97 Sirdar  [1999] ECR I‑7403, paragraph 15, and Case C‑285/98 Kreil  [2000] ECR I‑69, paragraph 15). As the Court has already held, the only articles in which the Treaty expressly provides for derogations applicable in situations which may affect public safety are Articles 30 EC, 39 EC, 46 EC, 58 EC, 64 EC, 296 EC and 297 EC, which deal with exceptional and clearly defined cases. It cannot be inferred that the Treaty contains an inherent general exception excluding all measures taken for reasons of public security from the scope of Community law. The recognition of the existence of such an exception, regardless of the specific requirements laid down by the Treaty, would be liable to impair the binding nature of Community law and its uniform application (see Case C‑186/01 Dory  [2003] ECR I‑2479, paragraph 31 and case-law there cited).
44. Furthermore, the derogations provided for in Articles 296 EC and 297 EC must, in accordance with settled case-law in respect of derogations from fundamental freedoms (see, inter alia, Case C‑503/03 Commission  v Spain  [2006] ECR I‑1097, paragraph 45; Case C‑490/04 Commission  v Germany  [2007] ECR I‑6095, paragraph 86; and Case C‑141/07 Commission  v Germany  [2008] ECR I‑6935, paragraph 50), be interpreted strictly.