larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1992-01-08
9 It is common ground that in this case the Commission set the deadline at 30 November 1989. It follows that, given the necessity of finalizing the procedure for clearing the accounts, the Commission was not required to initiate a discussion with the Italian authorities on the objections set out in their note of 10 March 1990.
15 It should also be noted that the Italian Government has not produced any evidence over and above that sent to the Commission before the contested decision was adopted. If the Italian Government, without contradicting the Commission' s findings by producing evidence, merely claims that administrative checks were in fact carried out as well as on-the-spot inspections, that does not show that those findings are inaccurate (see, in particular, the judgment in Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission [1990] ECR I-2321, at paragraphs 27 and 28).
37 In its third submission, the Italian Government disputes the Commission' s power to impose a flat-rate reduction of 10% on the amount of aid paid.
38 It should be noted that, as the Court has consistently held (see, in particular, Case 327/85 Netherlands v Commission [1988] ECR 1065, at paragraphs 24 and 25), Articles 2 and 3 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 of 21 April 1970 on the financing of the common agricultural policy (Official Journal, English Special Edition 1970 (I), p. 218) enable the Commission to charge to the EAGGF only sums paid in accordance with the rules laid down in the different agricultural sectors. In cases where Community rules authorize payment of aid only on condition that certain formalities relating to proof or supervision are observed, aid paid in disregard of that condition is not in accordance with Community law and the expenditure incurred therein may not therefore be charged to the EAGGF.
39 Since it follows from the foregoing that the inspections carried out by the Italian authorities do not constitute thorough scrutiny within the meaning of Article 10(2)(b) of Regulation No 1725/79, the Commission could have disallowed charging to the EAGGF of the whole of the sums in question. Accordingly, the Italian Government cannot complain that the Commission has merely imposed a flat-rate reduction of 10%.
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 1992-01-16
19 The provisions of the abovementioned French schemes relating to early retirement and supplementary pensions were introduced under agreements concluded by the competent authorities with trade or inter-trade bodies, trade-union organizations or individual undertakings or under collective agreements concluded between both sides of industry and have not been the subject of a declaration as specified in the second paragraph of Article 1(j) of Regulation No 1408/71.
20 It must therefore be declared that those schemes do not constitute legislation within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 1(j) of Regulation No 1408/71. Article 33 does not therefore apply to them.
Belgian State v Marichal-Margrève SPRL.
Date: 1992-01-16
22 The Court has already held (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 46/82 Germany v Commission [1983] ECR 3549, paragraph 10) that the proper working of the system of MCAs is based on an effective supervision of transactions. The need for such supervision is even greater when, as in the case in point, the payment of MCAs is subject to particular rules, the aim of which is to do away with artificial trade flows brought about by the grant of MCAs.
Criminal proceedings against X.
Date: 1992-01-16
7 It should be recalled at the outset that, by a line of authority now well-established by the Court, the Member States' obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by the directive and their duty under Article 5 of the Treaty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation is binding on all the authorities of Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts, and that, in applying national law, the national court is therefore required to interpret it in the light of the wording and purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty (see Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann [1984] ECR 1891, paragraph 26, and Case C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135, paragraph 8).
12 Before embarking on such an examination, it should be emphasized that these aspects of the advertising are of great practical importance for the business of parallel car importers, and that, as the Advocate General has pointed out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of his Opinion, parallel imports enjoy a certain amount of protection in Community law because they encourage trade and help reinforce competition.
15 It is for the national court, however, to ascertain in the circumstances of the particular case and bearing in mind the consumers to which the advertising is addressed, whether the latter could be misleading in so far as, on the one hand, it seeks to conceal the fact that the cars advertised as new were registered before importation and, on the other hand, that fact would have deterred a significant number of consumers from making a purchase, had they known it.
16 On the second point, concerning the claim that the cars are cheaper, such a claim can only be held misleading if it is established that the decision to buy on the part of a significant number of consumers to whom the advertising in question is addressed was made in ignorance of the fact that the lower price of the vehicles was matched by a smaller number of accessories on the cars sold by the parallel importer.
Ingfried Hochbaum v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1992-01-17
8 It has been consistently held that the appointing authority enjoys a wide discretion regarding promotions and that the review by the Court must therefore be restricted to the question whether the appointing authority exercised its power in a manifestly erroneous manner (see the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case 52/86 Banner v European Parliament [1987] ECR 979, paragraph 9). The approach taken by the Court of First Instance was therefore within the limits of the review required of it.
9 It is true that any judicial review must also verify whether the appointing authority exercised its discretion within the self-imposed limits contained in the vacancy notice (see the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-343/87 Culin v Commission [1990] ECR I-225, paragraph 19); however, account must be taken of the finding made by the Court of First Instance in paragraph 24 of its judgment that "there is no objective indication in the documents before the Court of First Instance that, prior to performing the tasks of Head of the State Monopolies and Public Enterprises Division, Mr Waterschoot did not satisfy the conditions required for submitting his application for the post in question". This being an assessment of fact, the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to examine it further.
14 The Court of Justice has consistently held that a misuse of powers is deemed to exist only if it is proven that the appointing authority, in adopting the contested decision, was pursuing an objective other than that pursued by the rules in question (see for example the judgment in Case 135/87 Vlachou v Court of Auditors [1988] ECR 2901, paragraph 27).
Otto Pressler Weingut-Weingrosskellerei GmbH & Co. KG v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1992-01-21
12 In order to determine whether a provision of Community law, in particular in the sphere of the common organizations of the agricultural markets, is in conformity with the principle of proportionality, it should be considered whether the measures introduced by that provision exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objective pursued by the rules which have been breached. More particularly, it should be verified whether the means which the provision in question applies in order to achieve the aim pursued correspond to the importance of that aim and whether they are necessary in order to achieve it (see, in particular, the judgment in Case C-118/89 Lingenfelser [1990] ECR I-2637).
Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities.
Date: 1992-01-23
15 Of the four pleas relied on by the Commission, those based on the infringement of Article 64 of the Staff Regulations and of the principle of equality of treatment must be examined together. As the Court has consistently held, that principle underlies Articles 64 and 65 of the Staff Regulations (see to this effect, in particular, the judgments in Case 194/80 Benassi v Commission [1981] ECR 2815, at paragraph 5, and Case 7/87 Commission v Council [1988] ECR 3401, at paragraphs 3 and 25).
22 Next, it should be noted that the purpose of Articles 64 and 65 of the Staff Regulations, as the Council itself recognizes, is to ensure that all officials have equivalent purchasing power, wherever their place of employment, in accordance with the principle of equality of treatment.
23 Furthermore, it should be stated that at the end of 1987 the cost of living in Munich was 8.3% higher than in Bonn, the capital at that time. That percentage represents a considerable difference which, in the absence of a specific weighting, reduces the purchasing power of officials employed in Munich in relation to that of their colleagues working in Bonn.
24 In this respect, the Court has consistently held (judgment in Case 59/81 Commission v Council [1982] ECR 3329, at paragraph 32, and judgments in Case 158/79, at paragraph 28; Case 543/79, at paragraph 44; Joined Cases 532/79, 534/79, 567/79, 600/79, 618/79 and 660/79, at paragraph 44, all cited above) that the Council' s power under Article 65(2) of the Staff Regulations is to decide whether or not there has been a substantial increase in the cost of living and, if there has, to draw the appropriate conclusions.
Criminal proceedings against Angel López Brea and Carlos Hidalgo Palacios.
Date: 1992-01-28
5 It should be noted at the outset that the Court has consistently held that it has no jurisdiction in proceedings under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty to rule on the compatibility of a national provision with Community law. The Court may however extract from the wording of the questions formulated by the national court, and having regard to the facts stated by the latter, those elements which concern the interpretation of Community law for the purpose of enabling that court to resolve the legal problems before it (see in particular the judgement in Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò v X [1987] ECR 2545).
7 In this connection, the Court has consistently held that the Treaty provisions on the freedom of movement for persons cannot be applied to activities which are confined in all respects within a single Member State (see, for example, the judgment in Case C-41/90 Hoefner and Elser v Macrotron [1991] ECR I-1979).
Volker Steen v Deutsche Bundespost.
Date: 1992-01-28
5 Following Mr Steen' s refusal to be appointed as a civil servant, the Bundespost transferred him on 12 November 1987 to a post of manual worker in a salary group lower than that in which the post Dp A7 Pt/M was classified. Mr Steen brought an action against that decision to transfer him. He maintained that in so far as access to posts in the civil service is reserved to German nationals they alone were not able to occupy, as contractual employees, a post such as that at issue for an indefinite period and thereby suffered discrimination, within the meaning of Articles 7 and 48 of the Treaty, in relation to nationals of other Member States.
9 A problem of discrimination within the meaning of Article 48 of the Treaty arises, however, only in relation to the attitude of a Member State towards workers from other Member States who wish to pursue their activities in that State. As the Court has consistently held (see, most recently, the judgment in Case C-41/90 Hoefner and Another v Macrotron [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraph 37), the provisions of the Treaty on freedom of movement cannot be applied to activities which are confined in all respects within a single Member State and the question whether that is the case depends on findings of fact which are for the national court to make.
10 The facts, as established by the national court in its order for reference, show that the present case relates to a dispute between the German Bundespost and a German national, who has never exercised the right of freedom of movement within the Community, concerning recruitment to a post in the Federal Republic of Germany.
Finanziaria Siderurgica Finsider SpA (in liquidation), Italsider SpA (in liquidation) and Societa Acciaierie e Ferriere Lombarde Falck SpA v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1992-01-30
15 Moreover, the existence of those specific provisions of Article 34 cannot debar the undertaking concerned, if faults other than that constituted by the decision declared void have contributed to the damage relied upon, from seeking a declaration that the Community is liable on the basis of the first paragraph of Article 40 of the Treaty, under which, "without prejudice to the first paragraph of Article 34, the Court shall have jurisdiction to order pecuniary reparation from the Community, on application by the injured party, to make good any injury caused in carrying out this Treaty by a wrongful act or omission on the part of the Community in the performance of its functions".
16 The Commission claims that Article 40 of the Treaty does not make it possible to have the Community declared liable on the basis of the illegality of decisions; however, nothing in the wording of that provision or in its general structure makes it possible to restrict its field of application in that way.
20 In the first place, according to their actual wording, the aforesaid Articles 34 and 40 of the ECSC Treaty require the existence of a fault before the Community may be rendered liable, and consequently the illegality of a decision alone is not enough.
22 However, the Court, when called upon to take a decision on the question of liability on the basis of Article 40, has not based its finding merely on the existence or absence of a fault, but has specified case by case the nature of the fault required by using descriptions such as "inexcusable mistakes" (judgment in Joined Cases 14, 16, 17, 20, 24, 26 and 27/60 and 1/61 Meroni v High Authority [1961] ECR 161, at 171), "gravely neglected the duties of supervision" (judgment in Joined Cases 19/60, 21/60, 2/61 and 3/61 Fives Lille Cail v High Authority [1961] ECR 281, at 297) or "lack of care" which was "increasingly obvious" (judgment in Joined Cases 29, 31, 36, 39 to 47, 50 and 51/63 Usines de la Providence v High Authority [1965] ECR 911, at 937).
24 Thus, in order to appraise the nature of the fault required to render the Community liable, whether on the basis of Article 34 or of Article 40, neither of which, as has been stated, gives any details in that connection, it is appropriate to refer to the areas and conditions in which the Community institution acts. In that respect it is necessary to take into account in particular the complexity of the situations which the institution must regulate, the difficulties of applying the legislation and the discretion available to the institution under that legislation.
25 Lastly, Community liability does not depend solely on the existence of fault as thus defined and injury, but also on a direct causal link between that fault and that injury, the burden of proof of which lies upon the applicant (judgments in Joined Cases 9 and 12/60 Vloeberghs v High Authority [1961] ECR 197, at 217, and in Case 18/60 Worms v High Authority [1962] ECR 195, at 206).
Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 1992-01-30
6 Even though Article 171 of the EEC Treaty does not specify the period within which a judgment must be complied with, the interest in the immediate and uniform application of Community law requires that the process of compliance with a judgment must be initiated immediately and must be completed as soon as possible (see the judgment in Case 169/87 Commission v France [1988] ECR 4093, paragraph 14).
SuCrest GmbH v Oberfinanzdirektion München.
Date: 1992-01-30
10 It should be observed that the 1950 Brussels Nomenclature only excluded from Chapter 38 "mixtures of chemicals and foodstuffs". The Nomenclature Committee of the Customs Cooperation Council stated, in an explanatory note, that the term "foodstuffs" did not cover certain substances, such as sorbitol, which have nutritive value but may also be regarded as chemicals, and therefore the wording of note 1(b) was amended so as to extend the exclusion from Chapter 38 to "substances with nutritive value". That term must therefore be interpreted in the light of the circumstances which led to its adoption and, in particular, in the light of the abovementioned explanatory note, which, as the Court has held (see its judgment in Case C-265/89 Vismans Nederlands v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [ECR] I-3411), must be taken into account in interpreting the Common Customs Tariff. In those circumstances, it must be concluded that the term "substances with nutritive value" may apply to chemicals.
The Queen v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Florence Rose Smithson.
Date: 1992-02-04
9 By way of introduction, it should be remembered that the Court has consistently held that it has no jurisdiction in proceedings under Article 177 of the Treaty to rule on the conformity of national measures with Community law. The Court may, however, extract from the wording of the questions formulated by the national court, and having regard to the facts stated by the latter, those elements which concern the interpretation of Community law for the purpose of enabling that court to resolve the legal issues before it (see, inter alia, Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò [1987] ECR 2545).
12 According to Article 3(1) the directive applies to statutory schemes which provide protection against, inter alia, the risk of invalidity or old age, and to provisions concerning social assistance, in so far as they are intended to supplement the invalidity scheme. In order to fall within the scope of Directive 79/7, therefore, a benefit must constitute the whole or part of a statutory scheme providing protection against one of the specified risks or a form of social assistance having the same objective (Case 150/85 Drake [1986] ECR 1995, paragraph 21).
14 It is therefore clear that although the mode of payment is not decisive as regards the identification of a benefit as one which falls within the scope of Directive 79/7, in order to be so identified the benefit must be directly and effectively linked to the protection provided against one of the risks specified in Article 3(1) of the directive.
British Aerospace Public Ltd Company and Rover Group Holdings plc v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1992-02-04
10 The first subparagraph of Article 93(2) makes the Commission responsible for implementing, subject to review by the Court, a special procedure involving the constant review and monitoring of aid which Member States intend to introduce (see the judgment in Case C-301/87 France v Commission [1990] ECR I-307). Any finding that aid is incompatible with the common market may be made only on completion of that procedure, during which the Commission is required inter alia to give notice to the parties concerned to submit their comments.
13 If the Commission considered that the United Kingdom had paid new aid which had not been examined under the procedure leading to the adoption of Decision 89/58, it was obliged to institute the special procedure provided for by the first subparagraph of Article 93(2) and to give notice to the parties concerned to submit their comments.
14 It is true that in its judgment in Case C-261/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-4437 (at paragraph 20) the Court held that, where in such circumstances the Commission examines the compatibility of State aid with the common market, it must take into account all relevant matters, including in appropriate cases the circumstances already considered in any previous decision and any obligations which that previous decision may have imposed on the Member State. However, such an examination must be made in accordance with the procedures laid down by the Treaty.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 1992-02-06
10 It must also be stated that, according to the established case-law of the Court (see in particular Case 60/85 Luijten v Raad van Arbeid [1986] ECR 2365, paragraphs 12 and 13), the principle that a single system of legislation should apply to workers moving within the Community, which had been applied under Regulation No 3 of the Council concerning social security for migrant workers, is expressed in Title II, "Determination of the Legislation Applicable", of Regulation No 1408/71, Article 13(1) of which provides that the persons concerned are to be subject to the legislation of a single Member State only and that such legislation "shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of this Title".
11 However, that principle governs only the situations referred to in Articles 13(2) and 14 to 17 of the regulation, which determine the conflict rules which are to apply in each situation. It follows from the judgment in Case C-140/88 Noij v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1991] ECR I-387, paragraphs 9 and 10, that persons such as workers who have definitely ceased to work and who are not in one of the situations referred to in those articles may be subject simultaneously to the legislation of more than one Member State.
Bernard Leplat v Territory of French Polynesia.
Date: 1992-02-12
10 In order to answer the questions in the reference, it is appropriate first of all to consider the nature of the association which the EEC Treaty provides for the overseas countries and territories (hereinafter referred to as "the countries and territories"). That association is the subject of arrangements defined in Part Four of the Treaty (Articles 131 to 136), with the result that, failing express reference, the general provisions of the Treaty do not apply to the countries and territories. Article 131 provides that the purpose of that association "shall be to promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the Community as a whole". Article 132 defines the objectives of association, stipulating in particular that "Member States shall apply to their trade with the countries and territories the same treatment as they accord each other", while "each country or territory shall apply to its trade with Member States and with the other countries and territories the same treatment as that which it applies to the European State with which it has special relations". Article 133(1) provides that customs duties on imports into the Member States of goods originating in the countries and territories are to be completely abolished. Article 133(2) provides that customs duties on imports into each country or territory from Member States are to be progressively abolished. Article 133(3), however, provides that the countries and territories may levy customs duties which meet the needs of their development and industrialization or produce revenue for their budgets.
15 In the first place, it follows from the judgment of the Court in Joined Cases 37/73 and 38/73 Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders v N.V. Indiamex and Association de fait De Belder [1973] ECR 1609, paragraphs 10 and 13, that a measure dealing with customs duties but which does not expressly mention charges having equivalent effect may be understood as being intended also to refer to such charges.