The Queen v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Eunice Sutton.
Date: 1997-04-22
23 That interpretation cannot be adopted.  The judgment in Marshall II concerns the award of interest on amounts payable by way of reparation for loss and damage sustained as a result of discriminatory dismissal.  As the Court observed in paragraph 31 of that judgment, in such a context full compensation for the loss and damage sustained cannot leave out of account factors, such as the effluxion of time, which may in fact reduce its value.  The award of interest, in accordance with the applicable national rules, must therefore be regarded as an essential component of compensation for the purposes of restoring real equality of treatment.
24 By contrast, the main proceedings concern the right to receive interest on amounts payable by way of social security benefits.  Those benefits are paid to the person concerned by the competent bodies, which must, in particular, examine whether the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation are fulfilled.  Consequently, the amounts paid in no way constitute reparation for loss or damage sustained and the reasoning of the Court in its judgment in Marshall II cannot be applied to a situation of that kind.
25 Accordingly, although Article 6 of Directive 79/7 requires the Member States to adopt the measures necessary to enable all persons who consider themselves to have been wronged by discrimination prohibited under the directive in the context of the award of social security benefits to establish the unlawfulness of such discrimination and to obtain the benefits to which they would have been entitled in the absence of discrimination, the payment of interest on arrears of benefits cannot be regarded as an essential component of the right as so defined.
31 First of all, it should be noted that, as the Court has repeatedly held, the principle that the State is liable for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law for which the State can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty (judgments in Francovich and Others, paragraph 35; Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I-1029, paragraph 31; Case C-392/93 The Queen v HM Treasury ex parte British Telecommunications [1996] ECR I-1631, paragraph 38; Case C-5/94 Hedley Lomas [1996] ECR I-2553, paragraph 24; Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 and C-190/94 Dillenkofer and Others [1996] ECR I-0000, paragraph 20).
32 According to the abovementioned case-law, a Member State's obligation to make reparation for the loss and damage so caused is subject to three conditions: the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals; the breach must be sufficiently serious; and there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the State and the damage sustained by the injured parties (judgments in Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, paragraph 51; British Telecommunications, paragraph 39; Hedley Lomas, paragraph 25; Dillenkofer and Others, paragraph 21).  Those conditions are to be applied according to each type of situation (judgment in Dillenkofer and Others, paragraph 24).
35 The answer to the question submitted by the High Court of Justice must therefore be that Article 6 of Directive 79/7 does not require that an individual should be able to obtain interest on arrears of a social security benefit such as invalid care allowance, when the delay in payment of the benefit is the result of discrimination prohibited by Directive 79/7.  However, a Member State is required to make reparation for the loss and damage caused to an individual as a result of the breach of Community law. Where the conditions for State liability are fulfilled, it is for the national court to apply that principle.