Immo Chiaradia SPRL and Docteur De Bruyne SPRL v État belge.
Date: 2017-06-15
31


It is true that Directive 78/660 is not designed to lay down the conditions in which such accounts may or must serve as a basis for the determination by the tax authorities of the Member States of the basis for assessment and the amount of taxes, such as the corporate tax at issue in the main proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2013, GIMLE, C‑322/12, EU:C:2013:632, paragraph 28).
32


Nevertheless, that fact does not permit the conclusion that the question referred is inadmissible. It should be noted that the Court may refuse to give a ruling on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 17 March 2016, Aspiro, C-40/15, EU:C:2016:172, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
33


In that regard, it should be noted that the Court has previously held that companies’ annual accounts can be used by Member States as a reference base for tax purposes (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2013, GIMLE, C‑322/12, EU:C:2013:632, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited). It is stated in the orders for reference that, under Belgian law, failing any express derogation from the tax rules, taxable profits are determined in accordance with the accounting rules and that the relevant Belgian legislation does not contain any provision relating to the accounting method for the price of an option.
36


In that regard, it should be noted that, although the provisions of national law at issue in the main proceedings have not reproduced the provisions of Directive 78/660 verbatim, it is common ground that the aim, the principles and the provisions of that directive are complied with as regards drawing up the annual accounts of companies, so that the interpretation given by the Court of the provisions of the directive would be binding for the resolution of the actions in the main proceedings by the referring court (see, by analogy, judgment of 7 January 2003, BIAO, C‑306/99, EU:C:2003:3, paragraphs 92 and 93). In addition, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, the referring court is in such circumstances bound, as far as possible, to interpret national law in the light of EU law and, in the present cases, of Directive 78/660 (see, by analogy, judgment of 17 March 2016, Aspiro, C‑40/15, EU:C:2016:172, paragraph 18).
39


As a preliminary matter, the point must be made that Directive 78/660, according to the third recital thereof, is designed only to establish minimum conditions as to the extent of the financial information to be made available to the public (judgment of 3 October 2013, GIMLE, C‑322/12, EU:C:2013:632, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
40


As is apparent from the Court’s case-law, compliance with the principle that a true and fair view must be given is the primary objective of Directive 78/660. According to that principle, contained in Article 2(3) of that directive, annual accounts must give a true and fair view of the assets and liabilities, financial position and the profit and loss of the company (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2013, GIMLE, C‑322/12, EU:C:2013:632, paragraph 30 and the case‑law cited).
41


The Court has interpreted that principle broadly, by considering that it requires, first, that the accounts reflect the activities and transactions which they are supposed to describe and, second, that the accounting information be given in the form judged to be the soundest and most appropriate for satisfying third parties’ needs for information, without harming the interests of the company concerned (judgment of 14 September 1999, DE + ES Bauunternehmung, C‑275/97, EU:C:1999:406, paragraph 27).
42


The Court has previously had occasion to rule that the application of the principle that a true and fair view must be given must, as far as possible, be guided by the general principles contained in Article 31 of Directive 78/660, within which the principle of making valuations on a prudent basis set out in Article 31(1)(c) is of particular importance (judgment of 3 October 2013, GIMLE, C-322/12, EU:C:2013:632, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
43


In accordance with the provisions of Article 31(1)(c) of Directive 78/660, which states the principle of making valuations on a prudent basis, taking account of all elements — profits made, charges, income, liabilities and losses — which actually relate to the financial year in question ensures observance of the requirement of a true and fair view (judgment of 3 October 2013, GIMLE, C-322/12, EU:C:2013:632, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).