Asociación Española de la Industria Eléctrica (UNESA) and Others v Administración General del Estado and Others.
Date: 2019-11-07
27


In the first place, since the first, fourth and fifth questions concern the interpretation of the polluter-pays principle, as referred to in Article 191(2) TFEU, it should be observed that Article 191(2) TFEU provides that EU policy on the environment is to aim at a high level of protection and is to be based, inter alia, on the polluter pays principle. That provision thus does no more than define the general environmental objectives of the European Union, since Article 192 TFEU confers on the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, responsibility for deciding what action is to be taken in order to attain those objectives (judgment of 4 March 2015, Fipa Group and Others, C‑534/13, EU:C:2015:140, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
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Consequently, since Article 191(2) TFEU is directed at action at EU level, that provision cannot be relied on as such by individuals in order to exclude the application of national legislation likely to be in an area covered by environmental policy for which there is no EU legislation adopted on the basis of Article 192 TFEU that specifically covers the situation in question (judgment of 4 March 2015, Fipa Group and Others, C‑534/13, EU:C:2015:140, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
32


In accordance with settled case-law, the procedure provided for by Article 267 TFEU is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts and tribunals, by means of which the former provides the latter with interpretation of such EU law as is necessary for them to give judgment in cases upon which they are called to adjudicate (judgment of 5 July 2016, Ognyanov, C‑614/14, EU:C:2016:514, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).
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The requirements concerning the content of a request for a preliminary ruling are expressly set out in Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, of which the national court should, in the context of the cooperation instituted by Article 267 TFEU, be aware and which it is bound to observe scrupulously (judgment of 5 July 2016, Ognyanov, C‑614/14, EU:C:2016:514, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
38


Article 51(1) of the Charter confirms the Court’s settled case-law, which states that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (see, in particular, judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
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Thus, where a legal situation does not come within the scope of EU law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and any provisions of the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction (judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
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The Court points out that Article 3(1) enshrines, in the field of the internal market in electricity, the general principle of non-discrimination, which forms an integral part of the general principles of EU law. The Court has held that that principle is binding on Member States where the national situation at issue in the main proceedings falls within the scope of EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 July 2006, Chacón Navas, C‑13/05, EU:C:2006:456, paragraph 56, and of 19 January 2010, Kücükdeveci, C‑555/07, EU:C:2010:21, paragraphs 21 and 23)