Portmeirion Group UK Ltd v Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs.
Date: 2016-03-17
23


It is apparent from the settled case-law of the Court that the general principle which ensures that any person has the right to plead, in an action brought against a national measure which adversely affects that person, that the EU act on which that measure is based is invalid does not preclude such a right from being subject to the condition that the person concerned did not have the right to apply directly to the Courts of the European Union for annulment of that act under Article 263 TFEU. However, it is only if it can be held that a person would undoubtedly have been entitled to apply for the annulment of the act in question under the conditions laid down in that article that that person is prevented from pleading before the national court having jurisdiction that the act is invalid (see, to that effect, judgments in TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf, C‑188/92, EU:C:1994:90, paragraph 23; Valimar, C‑374/12, EU:C:2014:2231, paragraphs 28 and 29; and TMK Europe, C‑143/14, EU:C:2015:236, paragraph 18).
25


Regarding, first of all, the requirement that Portmeirion not be individually concerned by the regulation at issue, it should be borne in mind that a regulation imposing an anti-dumping duty is likely to concern individually several types of economic operator, without prejudice to the possibility that other operators may be individually concerned by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them and which differentiate them from all other persons (see, to that effect, judgments in Extramet Industrie v Council, C‑358/89, EU:C:1991:214, paragraph 16, and TMK Europe, C‑143/14, EU:C:2015:236, paragraph 22).
26


In that regard, first, the producers and exporters of the product in question which have been charged with practising dumping on the basis of information relating to their business activities may be individually concerned (see, to that effect, judgment in Valimar, C‑374/12, EU:C:2014:2231, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
27


Next, the same may be true as regards importers of that product whose resale prices were taken into account for the construction of export prices and which are consequently concerned by the findings relating to the existence of dumping (judgments in Nashua Corporation and Others v Commission and Council, C‑133/87 and C‑150/87, EU:C:1990:115, paragraph 15; Gestetner Holdings v Council and Commission, C‑156/87, EU:C:1990:116, paragraph 18; and TMK Europe, C‑143/14, EU:C:2015:236, paragraph 20).
28


Lastly, the same may also be true in the case of importers associated with exporters of the product on which anti-dumping duties have been imposed, particularly where the export price has been calculated on the basis of those importers’ resale prices on the EU market and where the anti-dumping duty itself has been calculated on the basis of those resale prices (judgments in Neotype Techmashexport v Commission and Council, C‑305/86 and C‑160/87, EU:C:1990:295, paragraphs 19 and 20, and TMK Europe, C‑143/14, EU:C:2015:236, paragraph 21).
47


In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the Court has held that, in the sphere of the common commercial policy and, most particularly, in the realm of measures to protect trade, the institutions of the European Union enjoy a broad discretion by reason of the complexity of the economic, political and legal situations which they have to examine. The judicial review of such an appraisal must therefore be limited to verifying whether the procedural rules have been complied with, whether the facts on which the contested choice is based have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error in the appraisal of those facts or a misuse of powers (judgment in Simon, Evers & Co., C‑21/13, EU:C:2014:2154, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
53


In that regard, it is apparent from the settled case-law of the Court that the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent court to exercise its power of review (judgment in Banco Privado Português and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português, C‑667/13, EU:C:2015:151, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).