Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Brașov (DGRFP) v Vasile Toma and Biroul Executorului Judecătoresc Horațiu-Vasile Cruduleci.
Date: 2016-06-30
21


In that regard, it should be observed that the question referred relates to Article 4(3) TEU, which establishes the principle of sincere cooperation, under which the Member States are to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the European Union (judgment of 12 April 2011 in DHL Express France, C‑235/09, EU:C:2011:238, paragraph 58, and Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 173), and to several provisions of the Charter.
22


As for the provisions of the Charter, it should be recalled that, in the context of a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the Court may interpret Union law only within the limits of the powers conferred upon it (judgment of 27 March 2014 in Torralbo Marcos, C‑265/13, EU:C:2014:187, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
23


However, the scope of the Charter, in so far as the action of the Member States is concerned, is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, according to which the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. That provision confirms the Court’s settled case-law, which states that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (judgments of 27 March 2014 in Torralbo Marcos, C‑265/13, EU:C:2014:187, paragraphs 28 and 29, and 6 October 2015 in Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraphs 25 and 26).
24


Thus, where a legal situation does not come within the scope of EU law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and any provisions of the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction (see judgments of 26 February 2013 in Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 22; 27 March 2014 in Torralbo Marcos, C‑265/13, EU:C:2014:187, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited; and 6 October 2015 in Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 27).
28


Thus, since the purpose of the main proceedings concerns the repayment of a tax levied in breach of Article 110 TFEU and the Member States are required, pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, to repay such a tax and the corresponding interest while ensuring effective protection of the individual’s right to repayment (see, by analogy, judgments of 27 June 2013 in Agrokonsulting-04, C‑93/12, EU:C:2013:432, paragraphs 35 and 36, and 12 December 2013 in Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation, C‑362/12, EU:C:2013:834, paragraph 31), it must be held that the legal situation at issue in the main proceedings constitutes an implementation of EU law and falls within the scope of EU law.
30


As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, in the context of the procedure established by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. With this in mind, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (judgment of 17 December 2015 in Viamar, C‑402/14, EU:C:2015:830, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
32


It should be recalled in that context, in the first place, that the right to a refund of taxes levied by a Member State in breach of rules of EU law is the consequence and complement of the rights conferred on individuals by provisions of EU law prohibiting such taxes, as interpreted by the Court. The Member States are therefore required in principle to repay charges levied in breach of EU law, together with interest (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 April 2015 in Manea, C‑76/14, EU:C:2015:216, paragraph 45, and 6 October 2015 in Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraphs 24 and 25).
33


In the absence of EU rules on the recovery of national taxes unduly levied, it is for each Member State, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions at law for safeguarding the rights which taxpayers derive from EU law (see, inter alia, judgment of 6 October 2015 in Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
34


The detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under EU law must thus be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (the principle of equivalence) and must not be framed in such a way as to render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (the principle of effectiveness) (see, inter alia, judgment of 6 October 2015 in Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
36


The Court has already stated that Article 47 of the Charter includes, as a component of the principle of effective judicial protection, the principle of equality of arms or procedural equality (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 July 2014 in Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García, C‑169/14, EU:C:2014:2099, paragraph 48). Since the latter principle constitutes a specific expression of the general principle of equality before the law found in Article 20 of the Charter, it is appropriate to examine the questions of the referring court set out in paragraph 31 of the present judgment from, in particular, the perspective of Article 47.
39


Given that the question referred for a preliminary ruling falls within the context, inter alia, of effective judicial protection, in so far as it concerns national legislation laying down exemptions from certain court costs in favour of certain categories of persons, it is necessary to examine, in the first place, the compatibility of legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings with Article 47 of the Charter, which enshrines the right to such protection (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 December 2010 in DEB, C‑279/09, EU:C:2010:811, paragraph 29).
40


In that connection, according to the explanations relating to Article 47 of the Charter, which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, have to be taken into consideration for the interpretation of the Charter, the first and second paragraphs of Article 47 of the Charter correspond to Article 6(1) and Article 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’).
41


Article 52(3) of the Charter states that, in so far as it contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights is to be the same as those laid down by that convention. According to the explanations relating to that provision, the meaning and scope of the guaranteed rights are determined not only by the text of the ECHR, but also, in particular, by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, in the light of which Article 47 of the Charter should therefore be interpreted (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 December 2010 in DEB, C‑279/09, EU:C:2010:811, paragraphs 35 and 37 and the case-law cited).
42


So far as concerns the content of Article 47, the Court has already held that the principle of effective judicial protection laid down in that provision comprises various elements: in particular, the principle of equality of arms and the right of access to a court (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 November 2012 in Otis and Others, C‑199/11, EU:C:2012:684, paragraph 48).
43


As regards the right of access to a court, the European Court of Human Rights has already held that that right, within the meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR, would be illusory if a Contracting State’s legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party; the execution of a judgment must therefore be regarded as an integral part of the ‘trial’ for the purposes of Article 6 (ECtHR, 7 May 2002, Bourdov v. Russia, CE:ECHR:2002:0507JUD005949800, § 34, and ECtHR, 6 September 2005, Săcăleanu v. Romania, CE:ECHR:2005:0906JUD007397001, § 55).
44


That said, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice and from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights that the right of access to a court is not an absolute right and that, consequently, it may involve proportionate restrictions that pursue a legitimate aim and do not adversely affect the very essence of that right, including restrictions linked to the payment of court costs (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 December 2010 in DEB, C‑279/09, EU:C:2010:811, paragraphs 45, 52 and 60, and 6 October 2015 in Orizzonte Salute, C‑61/14, EU:C:2015:655, paragraphs 72 and 79, and ECtHR, 8 June 2006, V.M. v. Bulgaria, CE:ECHR:2006:0608JUD004572399, § 41 and 42 and the case-law cited).
47


In that regard, it should be observed that the principle of equality of arms is a corollary of the very concept of a fair hearing, which implies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent, the harm caused by that imbalance having as a general rule to be proved by the person who suffered it (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 November 2012 in Otis and Others, C‑199/11, EU:C:2012:684, paragraphs 71 and 72, and 17 July 2014 in Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García, C‑169/14, EU:C:2014:2099, paragraph 49).
49


In that context, it should be observed, in the first place, that the court costs contribute, in principle, to the proper functioning of the judicial system, since such costs constitute a source of funding the judicial activities of the Member States (judgment of 6 October 2015 in Orizzonte Salute, C‑61/14, EU:C:2015:655, paragraph 73). As is apparent from Article 1(2) of OUG No 80/2013, and as the Romanian Government confirmed in its written observations, that is the objective pursued by the court stamping fees covered by the exemption established in Article 30 of that order, since those stamping fees contribute to the financing of the services provided by the courts.
57


As regards, in the second place, compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, it should be observed that there is nothing in the file available to the Court to permit a conclusion that the application of the legislation at issue in the main proceedings to disputes based on the infringement of EU law differs from its application to similar disputes based on an infringement of national law, and thus infringes the principle of equivalence (see, in respect of the content of the principle of equivalence, judgments of 12 February 2015 in Surgicare, C‑662/13, EU:C:2015:89, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited, and 6 October 2015 in Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 32).