larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Develop Baudurchführungs- und Stadtentwicklungs GmbH v Finanzlandesdirektion für Wien, Niederösterreich und Burgenland.
Date: 2002-10-17
22 It should then also be noted that the Court has held that the fact that the acquirer of those dividend certificates is not a member of the company which issued them is not such as to exclude that transaction from the scope of Directive 69/335 (see, to that effect, Solida and Tech, cited above, paragraphs 32 and 33).
24 Additional payments exceeding the nominal value of the dividend certificates, which the acquirer thereof makes to the issuing company, must be regarded as contributions made to finance the acquisition of those certificates, where such payment is an essential condition of that acquisition (see, by analogy, today's judgment in Case C-339/99 ESTAG [2002] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 30 to 33).
25 Finally, it should also be observed that it follows from paragraphs 37 and 38 of the judgment in ESTAG, cited above, that, where it is a matter of deciding whether a transaction falls within the scope of Article 4 of Directive 69/335, it is necessary to adopt an economic approach, and not a formal one based solely on the source of the contributions, by asking which person must be deemed in fact to have paid the contributions.
26 Therefore, where it is a matter of deciding whether additional payments made by the parent company of an acquirer of dividend certificates come within the scope of Article 4(1)(d) of Directive 69/335, it is appropriate to establish to what extent such payments must be deemed to have been made by that acquirer.
27 In that regard, the fact that the obligation to make such payments is imposed on the subsidiary and the fact that such payment has discharged the subsidiary's liability are indications which establish that those payments by the parent company of a subsidiary must be deemed to have been made by the subsidiary (see, to that effect, ESTAG, cited above, paragraph 39).
28 It is, however, for the national court to decide, having regard to the facts of the case before it, whether an additional payment by an acquirer of dividend certificates is made to finance that acquisition - or whether there is a necessary link with it - and, where such payment is made by the parent company of the certificates' acquirer, whether it must be deemed to have been made by the latter.
29 Having regard to the preceding considerations, the answer to the question referred must be that Article 4(1)(d) of Directive 69/335 is to be interpreted as meaning that capital duty is chargeable on payments made by a parent company to a capital company, which is increasing its assets by the issue of dividend certificates, in order to enable the acquisition of such certificates by a subsidiary of that parent company.
Solida Raiffeisen Immobilien Leasing GmbH and Tech Gate Vienna Wissenschafts- und Technologiepark GmbH v Finanzlandesdirektion für Wien, Niederösterreich und Burgenland.
Date: 2002-10-17
32 It is clear from the wording of Article 4(2)(b) of Directive 69/335 that, when the Community legislature intended to limit the scope of a provision of that directive specifying the chargeable event for capital duty to transactions carried out by members of the capital company receiving the contributions, it did so clearly by referring to members expressly.
33 However, since Article 4(1)(d) of Directive 69/335 does not provide that the contributions which it covers must come from a member of the company receiving them, an interpretation of a provision of that directive which would have the effect of reducing the scope of that article as if it contained such a condition cannot be accepted.
Isabel Parras Medina and Adelina Parras Medina v Consejería de Agricultura y Medio Ambiente de la Junta de Comunidades de Castilla-La Mancha.
Date: 2002-10-17
18 It must be borne in mind in this connection that the concept of force majeure adopted by the agricultural regulations takes into account the particular nature of the public-law relationships between traders and the national administration, as well as the objectives of those regulations (see, in particular, Case 4/68 Schwarzwaldmilch [1968] ECR 377, p. 385; Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, paragraph 23; Case 25/70 Köster [1970] ECR 1161, paragraph 38, and Case C-124/92 An Bord Bainne Cooperative and Compagnie Inter-Agra [1993] ECR I-5061, paragraph 11).
19 According to settled case-law, the concept of `force majeure' for the purposes of the agricultural regulations is not limited to absolute impossibility but must be understood in the sense of abnormal and unforeseeable circumstances, outside the control of the operator concerned, the consequences of which, in spite of the exercise of all due care, could not have been avoided (see, in particular, Schwarzwaldmilch, cited above, page 386; Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, cited above, paragraph 23; Köster, cited above, paragraph 38; An Bord Bainne Cooperative and Compagnie Inter-Agra, cited above, paragraph 11; Huygen, cited above, paragraph 31, and Case C-347/93 Boterlux [1994] ECR I-3933, paragraph 34).
Criminal proceedings against Walter Hahn.
Date: 2002-10-24
21 Since the Court has jurisdiction to provide the national court with all the criteria for the interpretation of Community law which may enable that court to decide the issue, in the case before it, of compatibility with the EC Treaty of provisions of national law (see, inter alia, Case C-42/90 Bellon [1990] ECR I-4863, paragraph 6), it is necessary, in the light of the observations submitted to the Court and the discussions which have taken place before it, to understand the question referred for a preliminary ruling as relating to whether Directive 91/493 and Decision 94/356 or, as the case may be, Articles 28 EC and 30 EC preclude the application of provisions of national law which lay down zero tolerance for the presence of Listeria monocytogenes in fish products which are not chemically preserved.
Observations submitted to the Court
34 However, although, in the absence of complete harmonisation in the field, the Member States may prescribe the standards which products intended for human consumption must satisfy in their own territories, the national provisions in question cannot be exempt from the application of Articles 28 EC and 30 EC (see Melkunie, cited above, paragraphs 9 and 10).
38 The Court has consistently held that, among the grounds which may justify derogations from Article 28 EC, the protection of the health and life of humans ranks foremost and, in so far as there are uncertainties at the present state of scientific research, it is for the Member States, within the limits imposed by the Treaty, to decide what degree of protection they wish to assure and, in particular, the stringency of the checks to be carried out (see, inter alia, to that effect, Commission v Germany, cited above, paragraph 41, and C-347/89 Eurim-Pharm [1991] ECR I-1747, paragraph 26).
39 However, national rules or practices which restrict intra-Community trade or are capable of doing so are compatible with the Treaty only to the extent to which they are necessary for the effective protection of the health and life of humans. They do not qualify for a derogation if the health and life of humans can be protected as effectively using measures which are less restrictive of intra-Community trade (see, inter alia, Eurim-Pharm, cited above, paragraph 27).
40 In addition, the existence of a risk to public health must be assessed in the light of international scientific research, in particular the work of the Community's scientific committees, and the eating habits in the Member State concerned (see, to that effect, Bellon, cited above, paragraph 17, and Commission v France, paragraph 13).
46 In that regard, national legislation seeking to ensure that the pathogen cannot be detected in 25 g of fish product, simply because, for certain products, even low concentrations of Listeria monocytogenes may constitute a risk to the health of particularly susceptible consumers, must be considered compatible with the requirements of the Treaty (see, to that effect, Melkunie, cited above, paragraph 18, and Case C-17/93 Van der Veldt [1994] ECR I-3537, paragraph 17).
Borie Manoux SARL v Directeur de l'Institut national de la propriété industrielle (INPI).
Date: 2002-10-24
18 It must be remembered at the outset that Articles 11 and 12 of Regulation No 2392/89 reveal an intention on the part of the Community legislature to adopt, in that regulation, a detailed and complete code governing the description and presentation of wines (see Case C-46/94 Voisine [1995] ECR I-1859, paragraph 22). The use of a geographical reference on a label is thus lawful only if authorised by Regulation No 2392/89.
24 In this connection it should be remembered that Article 40 of Regulation No 2392/89 is aimed primarily at prohibiting the misuse of brand names (Case C-456/93 Langguth [1995] ECR I-1737, paragraph 29). As the Court of Justice has held, in connection with Council Regulation (EEC) No 355/79 of 5 February 1979 laying down general rules for the description and presentation of wines and grape musts (OJ 1979 L 54, p. 99), subsequently repealed and replaced by Regulation No 2392/89, it is necessary to prevent in the marketing of wine all practices which are of such a nature as to create false appearances (Case 56/80 Weigand [1981] ECR 583, paragraph 18).
25 It is clear from settled case-law that, for the use of a brand name to be capable of being regarded as likely to cause confusion or mislead the persons to whom it is addressed, it must be established, having regard to the opinions or habits of the consumers concerned, that there is a real risk of their economic behaviour being affected (see, inter alia, Case C-303/97 Sektkellerei Kessler [1999] ECR I-513, paragraph 33).
26 As the Court has frequently held, it is for the national court to assess whether a brand name may be misleading taking into account the presumed expectations of an average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect (see, inter alia, Sektkellerei Kessler, cited above, paragraph 36).
Criminal proceedings against Gottfried Linhart and Hans Biffl.
Date: 2002-10-24
17 First of all, it should be borne in mind that Directive 76/768 provided exhaustively for the harmonisation of national rules on the packaging and labelling of cosmetic products (see, inter alia, Unilever, cited above, paragraph 24, and Case C-220/98 Estée Lauder [2000] ECR I-117, paragraph 23).
18 As the Court has already held, where a matter is regulated in a harmonised manner at Community level, any national measure relating thereto must be assessed in the light of the provisions of that harmonising measure and not of Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty (Case C-150/88 Parfümerie-Fabrik 4711 [1989] ECR 3891, paragraph 28, Case C-37/92 Vanacker and Lesage [1993] ECR I-4947, paragraph 9, and Case C-324/99 DaimlerChrysler [2001] ECR I-9897, paragraph 32).
19 It should also be recalled that Article 6(3) of Directive 76/768 requires Member States to take all measures necessary to ensure that, in the labelling, putting up for sale and advertising of cosmetic products, text, names, trade marks, pictures and figurative or other signs are not used to imply that those products have characteristics which they do not have.
20 The present case concerns a specific provision intended to prohibit misleading information exclusively as it relates to the characteristics of cosmetic products, which must therefore be interpreted as a special rule in relation to the general provisions on protection against fraud laid down in Directive 84/450.
25 It is settled case-law that, while it is true that Article 36 of the Treaty allows Member States to maintain restrictions on the free movement of goods, the use of that provision is nevertheless precluded where Community directives provide for harmonisation of the measures necessary to achieve the specific objective which would be furthered by recourse to Article 36 (see, inter alia, Case C-1/96 Compassion In World Farming [1998] ECR I-1251, paragraph 47, and Case C-112/97 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I-1821, paragraph 54). That prohibition also applies when the need to protect consumers is put forward (Case C-102/96 Commission v Germany [1998] ECR I-6871, paragraph 21).
26 The measures which the Member States are required to take for the implementation of Article 6(3) of Directive 76/768 must, however, observe the principle of proportionality (see, in particular, the judgments cited above in Unilever, paragraph 27, and Estée Lauder, paragraph 26).
31 In that regard, the Court has held that the criterion of the presumed expectations of an average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect also applies in the context of the marketing of cosmetic products where a mistake as to the product's characteristics cannot pose any risk to public health (Estée Lauder, cited above, paragraphs 27 and 28).
45 Accordingly, as the Court has already held, the need to obtain the authorisation laid down in Paragraph 9(3) of the LMG constitutes a wholly unjustified obstacle to the free movement of the product in question (Unilever, cited above, paragraph 34).
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 2002-11-05
18 Such a body, which is set up by a national law of a Member State and which is financed by a contribution imposed on producers, cannot, under Community law, enjoy the same freedom as regards the promotion of national production as that enjoyed by producers themselves or producers' associations of a voluntary character (see Case 222/82 Apple and Pear Development Council [1983] ECR 4083, paragraph 17). Thus it is obliged to respect the basic rules of the Treaty on the free movement of goods when it sets up a scheme, open to all undertakings of the sectors concerned, which can have effects on intra-Community trade similar to those arising under the scheme adopted by the public authorities.
22 The Court has consistently held that Article 30 of the Treaty aims to prohibit all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade (see, in particular, Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5).
23 The contested scheme has, at least potentially, restrictive effects on the free movement of goods between Member States. Such a scheme, set up in order to promote the distribution of agricultural and food products made in Germany and for which the advertising message underlines the German origin of the relevant products, may encourage consumers to buy the products with the CMA label to the exclusion of imported products (see, in that respect, Commission v Ireland, paragraph 25, and Apple and Pear Development Council, paragraph 18, cited above).
24 The fact that the use of that quality label is optional does not mean that it ceases to be an unjustified obstacle to trade if the use of that designation promotes or is likely to promote the marketing of the product concerned as compared with products which do not benefit from its use (see, in that regard, Case 13/78 Eggers [1978] ECR 1935, paragraph 26).
Eila Päivikki Maaheimo.
Date: 2002-11-07
22 In that regard, it must be observed that, according to settled case-law, a benefit can be regarded as a social security benefit only if it is granted, without any individual and discretionary assessment of personal needs, to recipients on the basis of a legally defined position (see, in this regard, Case C-78/91 Hughes [1992] ECR I-4839, paragraph 15, and Case C-85/99 Offermanns [2001] ECR I-2261).
23 A benefit such as the home child-care allowance in question in the main proceedings satisfies that condition: the provisions concerning the grant of that allowance confers on the recipients a legally defined right and care money and the care supplement are paid automatically to persons who fulfil certain objective criteria, without any individual and discretionary assessment of individual needs.
25 As the Court stated in paragraph 41 of the decision in Offermanns, above, the expression `to meet family expenses' in Article 1(u)(i) of Regulation No 1408/71 which defines `family benefits' is to be interpreted as referring, in particular, to a public contribution to a family's budget to alleviate the financial burdens involved in the maintenance of children.
32 It must be pointed out that, according to the case-law of the Court (see Case 104/80 Beeck [1981] ECR 503, paragraphs 7 and 8, Hughes, paragraph 28, Case C-245/94 and C-312/94 Hoever and Zachow [1996] ECR I-4895, paragraph 38, and Kuusijärvi, paragraph 69), Article 73 of Regulation No 1408/71 is applicable to a worker who lives with his family in a Member State other than the one whose legislation is applicable to him.
33 In such a case, the spouse of the worker is also entitled to rely on that article (see Hoever and Zachow, paragraph 38).
34 As the Court has consistently held, Article 73 of Regulation No 1408/71 is intended to prevent Member States from making entitlement to, and the amount of, family benefits dependent on residence of the members of the worker's family in the Member State providing the benefits, so that Community workers are not deterred from exercising their right to freedom of movement (see, in particular, Case C-266/95 Merino García [1997] ECR I-3279, paragraph 28). Accordingly, it is all the more at odds with the purpose of Article 73 of Regulation No 1408/71 to impose a condition of actual residence.
Peter Hirschfeldt v European Environment Agency (EEA).
Date: 2002-11-07
30 In that regard, it must be recalled that the Court may of its own motion, on a proposal from the Advocate General or at the request of the parties, order that the oral procedure be reopened in accordance with Article 61 of its Rules of Procedure, if it considers that it lacks sufficient information, or that the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties (see, inter alia, judgment of 18 June 2002 in Case C-299/99 Philips [2002] ECR I-0000, paragraph 20).
40 In that connection, it must be recalled that under Article 225 EC and Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal lies on points of law only and that therefore the Court of First Instance alone has jurisdiction to find and appraise the facts, save where the factual inaccuracy of its findings results from the documents in the case before it.  The appraisal of the facts by the Court of First Instance does not constitute, save where the clear sense of the evidence produced before it is distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (see, inter alia, Case C-449/99 P EIB v Hautem [2001] ECR I-6733, paragraph 44).
48 In that regard it should be recalled that it is settled case-law that the Court of Justice will reject outright complaints directed against grounds of a judgment of the Court of First Instance included purely for the sake of completeness since they cannot lead to the judgment being set aside and are therefore nugatory (see, inter alia, Case C-244/91 P Pincherle v Commission [1993] ECR I-6965, paragraph 25, and order in Case C-137/95 P SPO and Others v Commission [1996] ECR I-1611, paragraph 47).
Criminal proceedings against Jacques Bourrasse (C-228/01) and Jean-Marie Perchicot (C-289/01), and Union régionale syndicale des petits et moyens transporteurs du Sud-Ouest (Unostra Aquitaine) (C-228/01), Fédération générale des transports et de l'équipement CFDT (FGTE-CFDT) (C-289/01) and Inspection du travail des transports (C-228/01 and C-289/01).
Date: 2002-11-07
33 However, in order to provide a satisfactory answer to the national court which has referred a question to it, the Court of Justice may deem it necessary to consider provisions of Community law to which the national court has not referred in its question (see, inter alia, Case 35/85 Tissier [1986] ECR 1207, paragraph 9; Case C-315/88 Bagli Pennacchiotti [1990] ECR I-1323, paragraph 10; and Case C-107/98 Teckal [1999] ECR I-8121, paragraph 39).
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2002-11-07
14 According to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C-147/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2387, paragraph 26) and mere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the authorities and are not given the appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the proper fulfilment of a Member State's obligations under the Treaty (see, inter alia, Case C-394/00 Commission v Ireland [2002] ECR I-581, paragraph 11).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 2002-11-07
6 In that regard according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, in particular, Case C-147/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2387, paragraph 26).
8 Additionally, it is settled case-law that a Member State may not rely on provisions, practices or circumstances in its own legal order to justify failure to implement a directive within the prescribed period (see, in particular, Case C-276/98 Commission v Portugal [2001] ECR I-1699, paragraph 20).
Geha Naftiliaki EPE and Others v NPDD Limeniko Tameio DOD/SOU and Elliniko Dimosio.
Date: 2002-11-14
19 However, as the Commission points out, increasing harbour dues affects the price of the journey in a direct and mechanical way, so that a difference in the fees borne by passengers automatically affects the costs of the journey.  The Court has held that the application of harbour charges which differ according to whether a journey is undertaken within one Member State or between Member States constitutes an infringement of the principle of the freedom to provide services, which is prohibited under Regulation No 4055/86 (see Case C-381/93 Commission v France [1994] ECR I-5145, paragraph 21, and, in regard to airport taxes, Case C-70/99 Commission v Portugal [2001] ECR I-4845).
20 Since Regulation No 4055/86 has rendered applicable to the sphere of maritime transport between Member States the totality of the Treaty rules governing the freedom to provide services (see Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 13), it precludes the application of any national legislation whose effect is to make the provision of services between Member States more difficult than that of purely domestic services within a Member State, unless that legislation is justified by compelling reasons of public interest and the measures enacted thereby are necessary and proportionate (see Commission v Portugal, cited above, paragraph 28).
21 Since Article 1(1) of Regulation No 4055/86 has extended the principle of the freedom to provide services as regards intra-Community traffic to traffic between a Member State and a third country, the rules established in relation to the former must be applied to the latter.
28 A criterion based on the distance or geographical location of the port of destination cannot in itself justify the imposition of different harbour dues.  Such a difference may be justified only where there are objective differences in the services provided to passengers by the carriers (see to that effect Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 16, and Commission v Portugal, cited above, paragraph 36).