larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Reiner Woltmann v Hauptzollamt Potsdam.
Date: 1999-02-25
15 At the outset, it should be borne in mind that, under Article 177 of the Treaty, the Court has no power to apply rules of Community law to a particular case but may only provide a national court with information on the interpretation of Community law which may be useful to it in assessing the effects of a provision of national law (see in particular Case 100/63 Kalsbeek v Sociale Verzekeringsbank [1964] ECR 565, at 572, and Case 137/84 Ministère Public v Mutsch [1985] ECR 2681, paragraph 6).
18 It is clear from the scheme of Section IV, Title IV, Chapter 3, of the Regulation that Article 905 introduces into Community customs law a general fairness clause intended to cover exceptional situations which, in themselves, do not fall within any of the cases provided for in Articles 900 to 904 of the Regulation.
19 Where the customs authority is not in a position, on the basis of the grounds adduced, to take a decision to remit duties on the basis of Article 899 of the Regulation, it is then required to verify whether there is any evidence of the existence of a special situation within the meaning of Article 905(1) of the Regulation, which does not entail any deception or manifest negligence on the part of the person concerned and, if need be, to forward the file to the Commission, which will, on the basis of the information placed before it, consider whether a special situation exists such as to justify the remission of duties.
20 In any event, it is not for the national authority to determine whether the situation in question constitutes a special situation of the kind provided for in Article 905(1) of the Regulation justifying a remission of duties by the Commission.
21 In undertaking its examination, in the light of the objective of fairness underlying Article 239 of the Code, the customs authority must confine itself to verifying whether the circumstances relied on are liable to place the applicant in an exceptional situation as compared with other operators engaged in the same business.
22 It follows that the answer to the questions submitted must be that factors `which might constitute a special situation resulting from circumstances in which no deception or obvious negligence may be attributed to the person concerned' exist, necessitating examination of the file by the Commission, where, having regard to the objective of fairness underlying Article 239 of the Code, factors liable to place the applicant in an exceptional situation as compared with other operators engaged in the same business are found to exist and the conditions laid down in Article 900(1)(a) of the Regulation, for remission of customs duties in favour of an applicant, are not fulfilled.
Kingdom of Spain v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1999-03-02
20 The Court has consistently held that an implementing regulation adopted on the basis of an enabling provision in the basic regulation may not derogate from the provisions of that regulation, to which it is subordinate (Case 38/70 Tradax [1971] ECR 145, paragraph 10).
Manfred Trummer and Peter Mayer.
Date: 1999-03-16
20 It should be noted in that connection that the EC Treaty does not define the terms `movements of capital' and `payments'.
21 However, inasmuch as Article 73b of the EC Treaty substantially reproduces the contents of Article 1 of Directive 88/361, and even though that directive was adopted on the basis of Articles 69 and 70(1) of the EEC Treaty, which have since been replaced by Article 73b et seq. of the EC Treaty, the nomenclature in respect of movements of capital annexed to Directive 88/361 still has the same indicative value, for the purposes of defining the notion of capital movements, as it did before the entry into force of Article 73b et seq., subject to the qualification, contained in the introduction to the nomenclature, that the list set out therein is not exhaustive.
22 It is apparent from point II of Annex I to Directive 88/361, from the introduction to the nomenclature and from the explanatory notes appearing at the end of Annex I, that the liquidation of an investment in real property constitutes a movement of capital.
23 Moreover, mortgages represent the classic method of securing a loan linked to a sale of real property, which is a transaction covered by the nomenclature.  In those circumstances, a mortgage must be regarded as constituting an `other guarantee' within the meaning of point IX of the nomenclature, headed `Sureties, other guarantees and rights of pledge'.
24 A mortgage of the kind at issue in the main proceedings is inextricably linked to a capital movement - in the present case, the liquidation of an investment in real property.  In addition, it is included within point IX of the nomenclature of capital movements annexed to Directive 88/361.  Consequently, it is covered by Article 73b of the Treaty.
26 The effect of national rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings is to weaken the link between the debt to be secured, payable in the currency of another Member State, and the mortgage, whose value may, as a result of subsequent currency exchange fluctuations, come to be lower than that of the debt to be secured.  This can only reduce the effectiveness of such a security, and thus its attractiveness.  Consequently, those rules are liable to dissuade the parties concerned from denominating a debt in the currency of another Member State, and may thus deprive them of a right which constitutes a component element of the free movement of capital and payments (see, in relation to Article 106(1) of the EEC Treaty, Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro [1984] ECR 377, paragraph 28, and Case 308/86 Lambert [1988] ECR 4369, paragraph 16).
34 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to be given to the national court must be that Article 73b of the Treaty precludes the application of national rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings, requiring a mortgage securing a debt payable in the currency of another Member State to be registered in the national currency.
Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1999-03-18
37 It is sufficient to note that it is common ground that, in the present case, the deadline referred to in Article 1(3) of Regulation No 1723/72 had been set by the Commission at 28 February 1995.  Since the Italian Government has not claimed that there are any exceptional circumstances, it follows that the additional information produced after that date must be regarded as out of time (to the same effect, with regard to the communication of information after the expiry of the deadline fixed in the absence of any exceptional circumstances, see Case C-197/90 Italy v Commission [1992] ECR I-1, paragraph 9, Case C-54/91 Germany v Commission [1993] ECR I-3399, paragraph 14, and Case C-41/94 Germany v Commission [1996] ECR I-4733, paragraph 23.)
54 In that connection, the settled case-law of the Court should be borne in mind with regard to apportioning the burden of proof in actions for annulment brought by a Member State against a decision of the Commission relating to clearance of EAGGF accounts.
55 Where the Commission refuses to charge certain expenditure to the EAGGF on the ground that it was incurred as a result of breach of Community rules for which a Member State can be held responsible, it is for that State to show that the conditions for obtaining the financing refused are fulfilled (see Case 347/85 United Kingdom v Commission [1988] ECR 1749, paragraph 14, and Case C-48/91 Netherlands v Commission [1993] ECR I-5611, paragraph 16).  The Commission is not required to demonstrate that there are irregularities in the data submitted by Member States, it is sufficient for it to show that it has serious and reasonable doubts.  The reason for this mitigation of the burden of proof on the Commission is that it is the State which is best placed to collect and check the data required for the clearance of EAGGF accounts, and which is consequently required to adduce the most detailed and comprehensive evidence that its figures are accurate and, if appropriate, that the Commission's calculations are incorrect (Netherlands v Commission, cited above, paragraph 17).  In the event of a dispute, it is for the Commission to prove that the rules of the common organisation of the agricultural markets have been infringed and, once it has established such an infringement, the Member State concerned must then, if appropriate, demonstrate that the Commission committed an error as to the financial consequences to be drawn from it (Case C-281/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-347, paragraph 19, and Netherlands v Commission, cited above, paragraph 18).
Fernando Carbajo Ferrero v European Parliament.
Date: 1999-03-18
29 As regards the substance, Article 29(1) of the Staff Regulations sets out the successive stages which must be observed when a vacant post in an institution is to be filled.  Under that provision, the appointing authority must examine, in order of priority, first, the possibilities of promotion or transfer within the institution in which the vacancy arises, second, the possibility of holding competitions internal to the institution and, third, what applications for transfer have been made by officials of other institutions, before initiating a competition procedure on the basis of either qualifications or tests or of both qualifications and tests (see Case 176/73 Van Belle v Council [1974] ECR 1361, paragraphs 5 and 6).
32 The appointing authority must therefore take account of the special conditions of eligibility required of the holder of the post when drawing up the vacancy notice (see Case 188/73 Grassi v Council [1974] ECR 1099, paragraph 39).
33 If, after the event, the appointing authority finds that the conditions of eligibility laid down in the vacancy notice were more exacting than the needs of the service demanded, it is entitled to reopen the procedure after withdrawing the original vacancy notice and putting an amended one in its place (Grassi v Council, cited above, paragraph 43).
35 In Van der Stijl and Cullington v Commission, cited above, which concerned the requirement of correspondence between a vacancy notice and a notice of open competition, the Court held, in paragraph 52, that if the institutions were able to amend the conditions of participation from one stage of the procedure to another, in particular by making them less strict, Article 29 of the Staff Regulations would be deprived of its effect in that the institutions would, in fact, be at liberty to organise external recruitment procedures without having to consider internal candidates.
Henri De Compte v European Parliament.
Date: 1999-03-18
17 In that connection, it must be observed that, under Article 168a of the EC Treaty and Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, there is a right of appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law only, and the grounds on which the appeal lies include infringement of Community law by the Court of First Instance (see to that effect Case C-136/92 P Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraph 47).
18 It is also appropriate to point out that the first paragraph of Article 41 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, which was extended to proceedings before the Court of First Instance by the first paragraph of Article 46 of that Statute, provides that an application for revision of a judgment may only be made on discovery of a fact which is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor and which, when the judgment was given, was unknown to the Court and to the party claiming the revision (see Joined Cases C-199/94 P and C-200/94 P REV Inpesca v Commission [1998] ECR I-831, paragraph 15).
24 Revision presupposes the discovery of elements of a factual nature which existed prior to the judgment and which were unknown at that time to the court which delivered it as well as to the party applying for revision and which, had the court been able to take them into consideration, could have led it to a different determination of the proceedings (see the order of the Court of Justice in Case C-185/90 P REV Gill v Commission [1992] ECR I-993, paragraph 12, and Inpesca v Commission, cited above, paragraph 17).
25 The reason why those requirements are so stringent is that revision is not an appeal procedure but an exceptional review procedure which allows the authority of res judicata to be called in question (see Case 267/80 REV Riseria Modenese v Council and Others [1985] ECR 3499, paragraph 10).
37 As all the other pleas advanced by the appellant have been rejected, the plea concerning costs must, by virtue of that provision, be rejected as inadmissible (see Case C-396/93 P  Henrichs v Commission [1995] ECR I-2611, paragraphs 65 and 66, and the order in Case C-140/96 P Dimitriadis v Court of Auditors [1997] ECR I-5635, paragraph 56).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 1999-03-25
54 It must be pointed out in that regard that, according to well-established case-law, where Community directives provide for the harmonisation of the measures necessary to ensure the protection of animal and human health and establish Community procedures to check that they are observed, recourse to Article 36 is no longer justified and the appropriate checks must be carried out and the measures of protection adopted within the framework outlined by the harmonising directive (Case 5/77 Tedeschi v Denkavit [1977] ECR 1555, paragraph 35).
Försäkringsaktiebolaget Skandia (publ).
Date: 1999-04-20
46 First, the wording of such a provision does not prohibit insurance undertakings from holding, as their free assets, shares in a company carrying on business other than insurance business.
47 Second, the purpose of the prohibition preventing insurance undertakings from carrying on commercial business other than insurance business, laid down in the amended Article 8(1)(b) of Directives 73/239 and 79/267, is in particular to protect the interests of insured persons against the risks which the exercise of such business could entail for the solvency of those undertakings.  It follows that the aforesaid provision does not prevent insurance undertakings from holding shares in public limited companies carrying on commercial business other than insurance business and to the assets of which the financial risks are confined.
50 The mere fact that the competent national authorities enjoy a discretionary power to grant derogations from the 5% rule cannot render that rule compatible with Article 18(1) of Directive 73/239 and Article 21(1) of Directive 79/267 (see, to this effect, the judgment in Case 124/81 Commission v United Kingdom [1983] ECR 203, paragraph 10).
51 It is true that there is a risk that certain investments might compromise the solvency of insurance undertakings. In order to guard against such a risk, it is for the national supervisory authorities of the home Member State to maintain, in accordance with the amended Article 13 et seq. of Directive 73/239 and the amended Article 15 et seq. of Directive 79/267, financial supervision of insurance undertakings.
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 1999-04-22
27 It must be pointed out that, as the Court has held (see, in particular, Case C-360/87 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR I-791, paragraph 13), Member States must, in order to secure the full implementation of directives in law and not only in fact, establish a specific legal framework in the area in question.  In the case of the mechanism of undertakings which is at issue in the present proceedings this has not been achieved.
31 The conclusion that the method of undertakings does not meet the requirements of Community law is not affected by the United Kingdom's argument that the Commission approved the system of undertakings, particularly in a letter dated 16 May 1989.  The Court has consistently held that the Commission may not, except where such powers are expressly conferred upon it, give guarantees concerning the compatibility of specific practices with Community law.  In no circumstances does it have the power to authorise practices which are contrary to Community law (see, to this effect, Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 136).
36 On this point, it must be remembered that the letter of formal notice from the Commission to the Member State and then the reasoned opinion issued by the Commission delimit the subject-matter of the dispute, which thus cannot thereafter be extended. The opportunity for the State concerned to be able to submit its observations, even if it chooses not to avail itself thereof, constitutes an essential guarantee intended by the Treaty, adherence to which is an essential formal requirement of the procedure for finding that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations.  Consequently, the reasoned opinion and the proceedings brought by the Commission must be based on the same complaints as those set out in the letter of formal notice initiating the pre-litigation procedure (see, in particular, Case C-191/95 Commission v Germany [1998] ECR I-5449, paragraph 55).
37 Where, in particular, a directive is intended to create rights for individuals, it is indeed the case that Member States must lay down the provisions necessary to ensure that the persons entitled to exercise those rights enjoy judicial protection (see, to this effect, inter alia, Commission v Germany, cited above, paragraph 6).
Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems GmbH v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1999-04-22
65 In the present case, the Court of First Instance found that KLE and its supplier had agreed, at least implicitly, at the time of submission of the contract to the Agency, that the materials would come from the CIS, so that the parties were in a position to mention the origin of the uranium in the contract itself; consequently, it held, in paragraph 36, that later communication as provided for in Article 5 bis (c) of the Rules of the information on the country of origin was not permissible. Such a finding of fact does not, except where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, which has not been established in this case, constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice (see, inter alia, Case C-136/92 P Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraphs 47 to 49 and 66; the order of 17 September 1996 in Case C-19/95 P San Marco v Commission [1996] ECR I-4435, paragraphs 36 to 40; and Case C-7/95 P Deere v Commission [1998] ECR I-3111, paragraphs 18 to 22).
76 In this respect, it is settled case-law that an appeal which merely reiterates the pleas in law and arguments put forward at first instance in fact constitutes a request for re-examination of the application brought before the Court of First Instance, a matter which falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (see, inter alia, the order of 26 April 1993 in Case C-244/92 P Kupka-Floridi v Economic and Social Committee [1993] ECR I-2041, paragraph 10, and Deere v Commission, paragraph 20). That also applies where the pleas in law and arguments put forward at first instance are repeated purely by reference (Case C-354/92 P Eppe v Commission [1993] ECR I-7027, paragraph 8).
105 The Commission was thus entitled to find, in that respect, that there was a legal obstacle within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Treaty.
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1999-04-22
17 At paragraphs 36 and 41 of that judgment the Court stated that the decision of the Commission to issue a reasoned opinion is subject to the principle of collegiality but that the formal requirements for effective compliance with that principle vary according to the nature and legal effects of the acts adopted by that institution.
18 At paragraph 44 of that judgment the Court observed that the issue of a reasoned opinion constitutes a preliminary procedure, which does not have any binding legal effect for the addressee. It is merely a pre-litigation stage of a procedure which may lead to an action before the Court.
19 The Court therefore held, at paragraph 48, that the Commission's decision to issue a reasoned opinion must be the subject of collective deliberation by the college of Commissioners, which implies that the information on which those decisions are based must be available to the members of the college. It is not necessary, however, for the college itself formally to decide on the wording of the acts which give effect to those decisions and put them in final form.
20 At paragraphs 49 and 50 of the judgment the Court pointed out that it was not disputed that the members of the college had available to them all the information they considered would assist them for the purposes of adopting the decision when the college had decided to issue the reasoned opinion, and held that in those circumstances the rules relating to the principle of collegiality had been complied with.
27 The Court has consistently held, first, that a Member State cannot rely on provisions, practices or situations arising in its own internal legal order to justify its failure to respect the obligations and time-limits laid down by a directive (see, in particular, Case C-8/97 Commission v Greece [1998] ECR I-823, paragraph 8).
Travel Vac SL v Manuel José Antelm Sanchis.
Date: 1999-04-22
25 However, it must be observed, as the Commission points out, that, since a contract like that at issue in the main proceedings does not only concern the right to use a time-share apartment, but also concerns the provision of separate services of a value higher than that of the right to use the property, that contract is not covered by the exception provided for in Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 85/577.
CRT France International SA v Directeur régional des impôts de Bourgogne.
Date: 1999-04-22
11 It is settled case-law that the essential feature of a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty which distinguishes it from an internal tax is that the former is borne solely by an imported product as such, whilst the latter is borne by both imported and domestic products (see, in particular, Case 90/79 Commission v France [1981] ECR 283, paragraph 13).
13 The Court has also recognised that a charge borne by a product imported from another Member State, when there is no identical or similar domestic product, does not constitute a charge having equivalent effect but internal taxation within the meaning of Article 95 of the Treaty if it relates to a general system of internal dues applied systematically to categories of products in accordance with objective criteria irrespective of the origin of the products (Case 90/79 Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 14).
17 However, as the Court held in Case 158/82 Commission v Denmark [1983] ECR 3573, paragraph 19, a charge which represents payment for a service actually rendered to an importer, of an amount in proportion to that service, does not constitute a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty.
19 Moreover, according to settled case-law (see, in particular, Case C-130/93 Lamaire v NDALTP [1994] ECR I-3215, paragraph 14), a charge which is imposed on goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier may escape classification as a charge having equivalent effect as prohibited by the Treaty, if it is levied on account of inspections carried out for the purpose of fulfilling obligations imposed by Community law.
22 As regards the CB sets imported from non-member countries, it must be borne in mind that, since the introduction of the Common Customs Tariff on 1 July 1968, the levying of a customs duty or charge having equivalent effect, unilaterally introduced by a Member State in respect of goods imported directly from non-member countries, is contrary to Articles 9, 12 and 113 of the Treaty (Joined Cases 37/73 and 38/73 Diamantarbeiders v Indiamex [1973] ECR 1609, paragraph 18, and Case C-126/94 Cadi Surgelés and Others [1996] ECR I-5647, paragraph 18).