Siderúrgica Aristrain Madrid SL v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2003-10-02
40.  Moreover, as is clear from Article 32d(1) CS and Article 51 of the ECSC Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal lies on a point of law only. Therefore, the Court of First Instance has sole jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence, except where those facts and that evidence have been distorted (see, to that effect, Case C-136/92 P   Commission   v   Brazzelli Lualdi and Others   [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraphs 49 and 66; Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P, C-251/99 P, C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P   Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others   v   Commission   [2002] ECR I-8375, paragraph 194; and Case C-312/00 P   Commission   v   Camar and Tico   [2002] ECR I-11355, paragraph 69).
41.  However, the Court may examine whether the Court of First Instance has responded to the parties' pleas and given proper grounds for its judgment (see, to that effect, Case C-274/99 P   Connolly   v   Commission   [2001] ECR I-1611, paragraphs 119 to 122).
52.  It is settled case-law that the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an individual decision is based is to enable the Court to review the legality of the decision and to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the decision is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested (Case 32/86   Sisma   v   Commission   [1987] ECR 1645, paragraph 8).
56.  With regard to statements of figures relating to the calculation of fines, it is appropriate to point out that, however useful and desirable such figures may be, they are not essential to compliance with the duty to state reasons for a decision imposing fines; in any event, the Commission cannot, by mechanical recourse to arithmetical formulas alone, divest itself of its own power of assessment (Case C-291/98 P   Sarrió   v   Commission   [2000] ECR I-9991, paragraphs 75 to 77, and   Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij  , cited above, paragraph 464).
67.  As regards the second part of this limb of the ground of appeal, which relates to the statement of reasons for the refusal to grant the application for production of documents, it should be observed that it is for the Community judicature to decide, in the light of the circumstances of the case and in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Procedure on measures of inquiry, whether it is necessary for a document to be produced. With regard to the Court of First Instance, it follows from Article 49 read in conjunction with Article 65(b) of its Rules of Procedure that a request for production of documents is a measure of inquiry which the Court may order at any stage of the proceedings (see Case C-286/95 P   Commission   v   ICI   [2000] ECR I-2341, paragraphs 49 and 50).
68.  Given that a copy of the minutes, that is to say, of the document required under the Commission's Rules of Procedure as laid down in Commission Decision 93/492/Euratom, ECSC, EEC of 17 February 1993 (OJ 1993 L 230, p. 15) for the purpose of recording the course of Commission meetings, was available to the Court of First Instance, it was under no obligation whatsoever to adopt a further measure for taking evidence in order to procure other documents if it formed the view that such a measure was unnecessary to establish the truth (see, to that effect,   Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij  , paragraph 404).
81.  Difficulties in comparing the level of fines imposed on undertakings which have participated in different agreements on different markets at times which, in some cases, are separated by long intervals may also be encountered as a result of the conditions necessary for implementing an effective competition policy. As the Court of First Instance rightly pointed out in paragraph 644 of the judgment under appeal, the fact that the Commission penalised certain types of infringement in the past with fines of a particular level cannot prevent it from raising that level within the limits indicated in Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty if that is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of Community competition policy (see, by analogy, Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80   Musique Diffusion Française and Others   v   Commission   [1983] ECR 1825, paragraph 109).
93.  With respect to the fine, recital 323 of the grounds of the contested decision is worded as follows:
"In the case of the two Aristrain companies, both of which produce beams, this Decision is addressed to one of them, Siderúrgica Aristrain, Madrid SL, formerly José María Aristrain, Madrid SA. The fine imposed also takes into account the behaviour of Siderúrgica Aristrain Olaberría SL, formerly José María Aristrain SA."
94.  That recital indicates the Commission's choice as to the addressee of the contested decision but contains no reasons whatsoever for that decision.
95.  The fact that only the appellant was chosen as debtor of the fine imposed in respect of the acts of that undertaking and of Aristrain Olaberría is all the more incomprehensible since, in recital 16(b) of the grounds of the contested decision, the Commission acknowledges that they are two separate companies and since, subsequently, that decision makes no reference to specific circumstances relating to the attribution of responsibility for the infringements, thereby suggesting that those infringements are to be attributed to each company to the extent of its own involvement.
96.  However, it is settled case-law that the anti-competitive conduct of an undertaking can be attributed to another undertaking where it has not decided independently upon its own conduct on the market, but carried out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by that other undertaking, having regard in particular to the economic and legal links between them (Case C-294/98 P   Metsä-Serla and Others   v   Commission   [2000] ECR I-10065, paragraph 27).
97.  In the present case, however, the contested decision does not establish that the appellant had the power to direct the conduct of Aristrain Olaberría to the point of depriving it of any real independence in determining its own course of action on the market.
98.  The Court of First Instance was wrong to rule, in paragraph 141 of the judgment under appeal, that it is possible to impute to a company all of the acts of a group even though that company has not been identified as the legal person at the head of that group with responsibility for coordinating the group's activities.
99.  The simple fact that the share capital of two separate commercial companies is held by the same person or the same family is insufficient, in itself, to establish that those two companies are an economic unit with the result that, under Community competition law, the actions of one company can be attributed to the other and that one can be held liable to pay a fine for the other.
100.  The contested decision states no reasons in that regard and even contains an internal contradiction since it suggests that responsibility for the infringements found to have been committed must be attributed to both companies in equal measure while at the same time ordering only one of them to pay a global fine covering the acts of both.
101.  It follows that, in not censuring the failure to state reasons in the contested decision with respect to this issue and in finding, in paragraph 142 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission was justified in imposing on the two companies jointly and severally a single fine at a level calculated by reference to their combined turnover and, in paragraph 143 of that judgment, that the Commission could demand payment of that fine from the appellant alone, the Court of First Instance committed errors in law which must lead to annulment of the judgment under appeal in respect of those matters.
165.  The general principle of Community law that everyone is entitled to a fair hearing, and in particular the right to legal process within a reasonable period, is applicable in the context of proceedings brought against a Commission decision imposing fines on an undertaking for infringement of competition law (Baustahlgewebe  , cited above, paragraph 21, and   Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij  , paragraph 179).
166.  The reasonableness of a period is to be appraised in the light of the circumstances specific to each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the applicant and of the competent authorities (Baustahlgewebe  , paragraph 29, and   Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij  , paragraph 187).
167.  The Court has held in that regard that this list of criteria is not exhaustive and that the assessment of the reasonableness of a period does not require a systematic examination of the circumstances of the case in the light of each of them, where the duration of the proceedings appears justified in the light of one of them. The purpose of those criteria is to determine whether the time taken in the handling of a case is justified. Thus, the complexity of the case or the dilatory conduct of the applicant may be deemed to justify a duration which is prima facie too long. Conversely, the time taken may be regarded as longer than is reasonable in the light of just one criterion, in particular where its duration is the result of the conduct of the competent authorities. Where appropriate, the duration of a procedural stage may be regarded as reasonable from the outset if it appears to be consistent with the average time taken in handling a case of its type (Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij  , paragraph 188).