larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
LE v Transportes Aéreos Portugueses SA.
Date: 2020-06-11
35


It must be borne in mind that the EU legislature has laid down the obligations of air carriers in the event of cancellation or long delay of flights (that is, a delay equal to or in excess of three hours) in Article 5(1) of Regulation No 261/2004 (judgment of 4 April 2019, Germanwings, C‑501/17, EU:C:2019:288, paragraph 18).
36


Recitals 14 and 15 and Article 5(3) of that regulation, as interpreted by the Court, state that an air carrier is to be released from its obligation to pay passengers compensation under Article 7 of Regulation No 261/2004 if the carrier can prove that the cancellation or delay of three hours or more is caused by ‘extraordinary circumstances’ which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken and, where such circumstances do arise, that it adopted measures appropriate to the situation, deploying all its resources in terms of staff or equipment and the financial means at its disposal in order to avoid that situation from resulting in the cancellation or long delay of the flight in question, without the air carrier being required to make intolerable sacrifices in the light of the capacities of its undertaking at the relevant time (judgment of 4 April 2019, Germanwings, C‑501/17, EU:C:2019:288, paragraph 19).
37


According to settled case-law, events may be classified as ‘extraordinary circumstances’, within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, if, by their nature or origin, they are not inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned and are outside that carrier’s actual control, both conditions being cumulative (judgments of 4 April 2019, Germanwings, C‑501/17, EU:C:2019:288, paragraph 20 and of 12 March 2020, Finnair, C‑832/18, EU:C:2020:204, paragraph 38).
38


According to recital 14 of that regulation, such circumstances may, in particular, occur in the case of security risks (judgment of 22 December 2008, Wallentin-Hermann, C‑549/07, EU:C:2008:771, paragraph 21).
52


Secondly, the balancing of the interests of air passengers and air carriers which led to the adoption of Regulation 261/2004 (judgments of 19 November 2009, Sturgeon and Others, C‑402/07 and C‑432/07, EU:C:2009:716, paragraph 67, and of 23 October 2012, Nelson and Others, C‑581/10 and C‑629/10, EU:C:2012:657, paragraph 39) implies that account must be taken of the way in which aircraft are operated by air carriers and, in particular, of the fact, referred to by the interested parties who took part in these proceedings, that, at least for certain categories of flights, the same aircraft may carry out several successive flights on the same day, which means that any extraordinary circumstances affecting an aircraft on a previous flight affects the subsequent flight or flights of that aircraft.
Parsec Fondazione Parco delle Scienze e della Cultura v Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti and Autorità nazionale anticorruzione (ANAC).
Date: 2020-06-11
20


The Court has previously held, in paragraphs 47 to 49 of the judgment of 23 December 2009, CoNISMa (C‑305/08, EU:C:2009:807), with regard to national legislation that transposed into domestic law Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114), that Member States have indeed a discretion as to whether or not to allow certain categories of economic operators to provide certain services and they can, inter alia, determine whether or not entities which are non-profit-making and whose primary object is teaching and research are authorised to operate on the market, according to whether the activity in question is compatible with their objectives as an institution and those laid down in their statutes. However, if and to the extent that such entities are entitled to offer certain services on the market, national law cannot prohibit them from taking part in procurement procedures for the award of public contracts for the provision of those services.
21


That case-law of the Court was confirmed in respect of that directive (judgments of 19 December 2012, Ordine degli Ingegneri della Provincia di Lecce and Others, C‑159/11, EU:C:2012:817, paragraph 27, and of 6 October 2015, Consorci Sanitari del Maresme, C‑203/14, EU:C:2015:664, paragraph 35) as well as the directive that it replaced, namely Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts (OJ 1992 L 209, p. 1) (judgment of 18 December 2014, Data Medical Service, C‑568/13, EU:C:2014:2466, paragraph 36).
Vert Marine SAS v Premier ministre and Ministre de l'Économie et des Finances.
Date: 2020-06-11
16


In that regard, it must be recalled that, under the first subparagraph of Article 38(9) of Directive 2014/23, any economic operator which is in one of the situations referred to, inter alia, in paragraph 4 of that article may provide evidence to demonstrate that the measures it has taken are sufficient to demonstrate its reliability despite the existence of the ground for exclusion relied on and that, if that evidence is deemed sufficient, the economic operator concerned is not to be excluded from the procedure. That provision thus introduces a ‘self-cleaning’ mechanism (see, by analogy, as regards Article 57(6) of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65), which equates to Article 38(9) of Directive 2014/23, judgment of 30 January 2020, Tim, C‑395/18, EU:C:2020:58, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
17


It is apparent from the wording of the first subparagraph of Article 38(9) of Directive 2014/23 that, by providing that any economic operator may provide evidence of compliance measures taken, that provision confers on economic operators a right which the Member States must guarantee when transposing that directive, in accordance with the conditions laid down by the directive.
22


That interpretation is supported by the objective pursued in Article 38(9) of Directive 2014/23. By providing that an economic operator must be able to provide evidence of compliance measures taken, that provision seeks to underline the importance attaching to the reliability of economic operators (see, by analogy, judgment of 30 January 2020, Tim, C‑395/18, EU:C:2020:58, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited) and, accordingly, as the Greek Government stated in its written observations, to ensure an objective assessment of economic operators and to ensure effective competition. That objective would be jeopardised if the Member States were free to restrict, beyond the situation envisaged in the third subparagraph of Article 38(9) of Directive 2014/23, the right of economic operators to provide evidence of the compliance measures taken.
23


In addition, that interpretation is not called into question by the fact that the Member States must, by virtue of Article 38(10) of Directive 2014/23, specify the implementing conditions of that article and, in that regard, have some discretion (see, by analogy, judgment of 30 January 2020, Tim, C‑395/18, EU:C:2020:58, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
European Commission v Hungary.
Date: 2020-06-18
30


As is apparent from the Court’s case-law, the fact that the Commission makes the pre-litigation procedure subject to short time limits is not in itself capable of leading to the inadmissibility of the subsequent action for failure to fulfil obligations (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 January 1984, Commission v Ireland, 74/82, EU:C:1984:34, paragraphs 12 and 13). Such a finding of inadmissibility is only to be made where the Commission’s conduct made it more difficult for the Member State concerned to refute that institution’s complaints and thus infringed the rights of the defence, which it is for that Member State to prove (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 May 2005, Commission v Belgium, C‑287/03, EU:C:2005:282, paragraph 14, and of 21 January 2010, Commission v Germany, C‑546/07, EU:C:2010:25, paragraph 22).
63


Contrary to what is contended by Hungary, the place of residence or of the registered office of the natural or legal persons granting that financial support cannot, by definition, be a valid criterion for finding that there is an objective difference between the situations at issue and for consequently ruling out the existence of such indirect discrimination (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 June 2011, Commission v Austria, C‑10/10, EU:C:2011:399, paragraph 35).
77


Moreover, it is for the Member State concerned to demonstrate that these two cumulative conditions are met (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 February 2009, Commission v Italy, C‑110/05, EU:C:2009:66, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited). As regards, specifically, the condition that the provisions at issue must be justified by one of the reasons listed in Article 65 TFEU or by an overriding reason in the public interest, that Member State must prove, in a concrete manner and by reference to the circumstances of the case, that those provisions are justified (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 May 2003, ATRAL, C‑14/02, EU:C:2003:265, paragraphs 66 to 69, and of 16 July 2009, Commission v Poland, C‑165/08, EU:C:2009:473, paragraphs 53 and 57).
101


As follows from the Court’s case-law, where a Member State argues that a measure of which it is the author and which restricts a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the FEU Treaty is justified on the basis of that Treaty or by an overriding reason in the public interest recognised by EU law, such a measure must be regarded as implementing Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, such that it must comply with the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter (judgments of 21 December 2016, AGET Iraklis, C‑201/15, EU:C:2016:972, paragraphs 63 and 64, and of 21 May 2019Commission v Hungary (Rights of usufruct over agricultural land), C‑235/17, EU:C:2019:432, paragraphs 64 and 65).
European Union Satellite Centre v KF.
Date: 2020-06-25
70


It is also apparent from settled case-law concerning the admissibility of actions for annulment that it is necessary to look to the substance of the contested acts, as well as the intention of those who drafted them, in order to classify those acts. In that regard, it is, in principle, acts which definitively determine the position of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union upon the conclusion of an administrative procedure, and which are intended to have legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the applicant, which are open to challenge, and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the definitive decision or measures which are mere confirmation of an earlier measure which was not challenged within the prescribed period (judgment of 26 January 2010, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, C‑362/08 P, EU:C:2010:40, paragraph 52).
103


In accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, it follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to establish the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and, second, to assess those facts (judgment of 8 March 2016, Greece v Commission, C‑431/14 P, EU:C:2016:145, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
104


Therefore, the appraisal of the facts by the General Court does not constitute, save where the clear sense of the evidence produced before it is distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (judgment of 8 March 2016, Greece v Commission, C‑431/14 P, EU:C:2016:145, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
105


Where an appellant alleges distortion of the evidence by the General Court, that person must, under Article 256 TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure, indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and show the errors of appraisal which, in that person’s view, led to such distortion. In addition, according to the Court’s settled case-law, that distortion must be obvious from the documents in the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (judgment of 8 March 2016, Greece v Commission, C‑431/14 P, EU:C:2016:145, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
Czech Republic v European Commission.
Date: 2020-07-09
46


As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, in accordance with consistent case-law, any provisions adopted by the institutions, whatever their form, which are intended to have binding legal effects are regarded as ‘actionable measures’ for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU (judgment of 20 February 2018, Belgium v Commission, C‑16/16 P, EU:C:2018:79, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
47


In order to determine whether the contested act produces such effects, it is necessary to examine the substance of that act and to assess those effects on the basis of objective criteria, such as the content of that act, taking into account, as appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the institution which adopted the act (judgment of 20 February 2018, Belgium v Commission, C‑16/16 P, EU:C:2018:79, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
52


In that regard it must be noted, in the first place, that the General Court correctly recalled in paragraph 81 of the order under appeal that, according to the Explanations relating to the Charter (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 2) and the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, although the requirement as to binding legal effects must be interpreted in the light of the right to effective judicial protection as guaranteed in the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, that right is not intended to change the system of judicial review laid down by the Treaties, and particularly the rules relating to the admissibility of direct actions brought before the Courts of the European Union. Thus, the interpretation of the concept of ‘actionable measure’ in the light of Article 47 of the Charter cannot lead to a situation where that requirement is disregarded on pain of exceeding the jurisdiction conferred by the FEU Treaty on the Courts of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2017, Slovakia v Commission, C‑593/15 P and C‑594/15 P, EU:C:2017:800, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).
European Commission v Ireland.
Date: 2020-07-09
71


With regard to the meaning of ‘independence’, it should be noted that neither Article 8(1) of Directive 2009/18 nor any other provision of that directive defines that term. It is therefore necessary to take its usual meaning into account. Thus, as regards public bodies, independence usually refers to a status that ensures that the body in question is able to act completely freely in relation to those bodies in respect of which its independence is to be ensured, shielded from any instructions or pressure (see, by analogy, judgment of 13 June 2018, Commission v Poland, C‑530/16, EU:C:2018:430, paragraph 67).
77


Thus, contrary to what Ireland claims, a finding that the investigative body failed to act impartially in specific cases is not necessary to establish an infringement, given that the conditions for independence must be objectively satisfied, such that the MCIB is free from any direct or indirect influence from parties whose interests could conflict with the task entrusted to it (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 October 2012, Commission v Austria, C‑614/10, EU:C:2012:631, paragraph 41).
79


Furthermore, contrary to what Ireland maintains, the fact that the members concerned are a minority within the MCIB is irrelevant, given that the presence within an investigative body of even just one member who at the same time exercises responsibilities within a party whose interests could conflict with the task entrusted to that body has the consequence that the latter is not above all suspicion of partiality vis-à-vis that party (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 October 2012, Commission v Austria, C‑614/10, EU:C:2012:631, paragraph 52).
Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Volkswagen AG.
Date: 2020-07-09
22


As a preliminary point, it must be noted that, in so far as, in accordance with recital 34 of Regulation No 1215/2012, that regulation repeals and replaces Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1), which itself replaced the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36), as amended by successive conventions on the accession of new Member States to that convention (‘the Brussels Convention’), the Court’s interpretation of the provisions of the latter legal instruments also applies to Regulation No 1215/2012 whenever those provisions may be regarded as ‘equivalent’ (judgment of 29 July 2019, Tibor-Trans, C‑451/18, EU:C:2019:635, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). That is the case with point 3 of Article 5 of the Brussels Convention and Regulation No 44/2001, on the one hand, and with point 2 of Article 7 of Regulation No 1215/2012, on the other (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 May 2018, Nothartová, C‑306/17, EU:C:2018:360, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
23


As has repeatedly been held by the Court in its case-law concerning those provisions, the concept of the ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ is intended to cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it, with the result that the defendant may be sued, at the option of the applicant, in the courts for either of those places (judgments of 16 July 2009, Zuid-Chemie, C‑189/08, EU:C:2009:475, paragraph 23, and of 29 July 2019, Tibor-Trans, C‑451/18, EU:C:2019:635, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
38


That interpretation is also consistent with the objectives of proximity and of the sound administration of justice, referred to in recital 16 of Regulation No 1215/2012, in so far as, in order to determine the amount of the damage suffered, the national court may be required to assess the market conditions in the Member State where that vehicle was purchased. The courts of that Member State are likely to have best access to the evidence needed to carry out those assessments (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2019, Tibor-Trans, C‑451/18, EU:C:2019:635, paragraph 34).
HF v Finanzamt Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler.
Date: 2020-07-09
20


The adjustment mechanism provided for in Articles 184 to 187 of the VAT Directive is an integral part of the VAT deduction scheme established by that directive. It is intended to enhance the precision of deductions so as to ensure the neutrality of VAT, so that transactions effected at an earlier stage continue to give rise to the right of deduction only to the extent that they are used to make supplies subject to VAT. That mechanism thus aims to establish a close and direct relationship between the right to deduct input VAT and the use of the goods or services concerned for taxed output transactions (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 March 2019, Mydibel, C‑201/18, EU:C:2019:254, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
21


Under the common system of VAT, only the input taxes on goods or services used by a taxable person for his taxed transactions may be deducted. The deduction of input taxes is linked to the collection of output taxes. Where goods or services acquired by a taxable person are used for the purposes of transactions that are exempt or do not fall within the scope of VAT, no output tax can be collected or input tax deducted (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 April 2018, SEB bankas, C‑532/16, EU:C:2018:228, paragraph 38).
Inclusion Alliance for Europe GEIE v European Commission.
Date: 2020-07-16
According to the case-law of the General Court, cited in paragraph 90 of the order under appeal, where the EU judicature adjudicates on an action for annulment brought on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, it assesses the legality of the contested measure in the light of EU law alone, as the applicant can rely on failure to perform contractual obligations or infringement of the law applicable to the contract concerned only in the context of an action brought on the basis of Article 272 TFEU.
JE v KF.
Date: 2020-07-16
37


In accordance with settled case-law, in the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it (judgments of 23 March 2006, FCE Bank, C‑210/04, EU:C:2006:196, paragraph 21; of 8 December 2011, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, C‑157/10, EU:C:2011:813, paragraph 18; and of 25 July 2018, Dyson, C‑632/16, EU:C:2018:599, paragraph 47).
MH and NI v OJ and Novo Banco SA.
Date: 2020-07-16
17


In that regard, it should be recalled first that, according to settled case-law, the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the wording of a provision of EU law which does not expressly refer to the law of Member States in order for its meaning and scope to be determined must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union; that interpretation must take into account the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the relevant legislation (judgment of 20 October 2011, Interedil, C‑396/09, EU:C:2011:671, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
18


Thus, since Article 3(1) of Regulation 2015/848 contains no reference to the law of the Member States, the terms contained in that provision must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation. In particular, since the term ‘centre of main interests’ is specific to that regulation, it must be interpreted in a uniform way, independently of national legislation (see, by analogy, judgment of 20 October 2011, Interedil, C‑396/09, EU:C:2011:671, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
Profi Credit Polska S.A. z siedzibą w Bielsku- Białej and Others v QJ and Others.
Date: 2020-09-03
In that regard, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the relevant jurisdiction of the Court extends to the interpretation of the concept of ‘unfair term’ used in Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13 and in the annex thereto, and to the criteria which the national court may or must apply when examining a contractual term in the light of the provisions of that directive, bearing in mind that it is for that court to determine, in the light of those criteria, whether a particular contractual term is actually unfair in the circumstances of the case. It is thus clear that the Court must limit itself to providing the referring court with guidance which the latter must take into account in order to assess whether the term at issue is unfair (judgment of 14 March 2013, Aziz, C‑415/11, EU:C:2013:164, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).