larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Alfredo Grifoni v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1991-03-05
18 As the Court stated in its judgment in Joined Cases 19/60, 21/60, 2/61 and 3/61 (Fives Lille Cail v High Authority [1961] ECR 281, 295), a mere abstract statement of the grounds in the application does not alone satisfy the requirements of the Statute or the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, and the application must specify the nature of the grounds on which the application is based. It follows that Mr Grifoni' s claim in that regard is too general and imprecise to be appraised by the Court.
20 As already stated, the contractual relations between the parties described above provide no basis for such a plea. Moreover, if it were possible to understand the plea as meaning that the Community was unduly enriched at Mr Grifoni' s expense, it would constitute a new plea with, in any event, a non-contractual basis, so that it would fall outside the scope of the arbitration clause and the Court would not then be competent to consider it.
Panagiotis Giagounidis v Stadt Reutlingen.
Date: 1991-03-05
12 In replying to that question it must be borne in mind that the right of nationals of a Member State to enter the territory of another Member State and reside there for the purposes intended by the EEC Treaty is a right conferred directly by that Treaty or, as the case may be, by the provisions adopted for its implementation (see on this point the judgment in Case 249/86 Commission v Germany [1989] ECR 1263, paragraph 9).
14 Under Article 4 of Directive 68/360/EEC the Member States are obliged to issue a residence permit to any person who provides proof, by means of the appropriate documents, that he belongs to one of the categories mentioned in Article 1 of the directive (see the judgment in Case 48/75 Royer [1976] ECR 497). In particular, proof must be provided of the worker' s identity and nationality.
15 Since a national identity card contains all the information for proving the holder' s identity and nationality, it fulfils that requirement, even if it does not authorize the person concerned to leave the territory of the issuing Member State.
21 Secondly, the purpose of the abovementioned provision of Directive 68/360/EEC is to preclude the host Member State from imposing disproportionate conditions on the exercise of the right of residence and thus requiring the production of documents other than those which the worker is assumed to possess because he has already used them in order to enter the territory of that Member State.
22 It must also be considered that at the time when the worker applies for a residence permit pursuant to Directive 68/360/EEC he might no longer be in possession of the document with which he entered the territory of the host Member State. It would therefore be contrary to the principal of freedom of movement for workers if that Member State could make the issue of the residence permit conditional on production of that same document.
23 It follows from the foregoing considerations that the Member States are obliged to grant the right of residence within their territory to the workers referred to in Article 1 of Directive 68/360 who can produce either a valid identity card or a valid passport, regardless of the document with which they entered their territory.
Baywa AG v Hauptzollamt Weiden.
Date: 1991-03-07
15 That argument must also be dismissed. There is no general principle which excludes from customs valuation services provided and goods produced within the customs territory of the Community. It is sufficient to refer once again to Article 8(1)(b)(i) of the customs valuation regulation, which takes no account whatever of whether the costs involved in the production of the items incorporated in the imported goods were incurred in the Community or elsewhere.
Ann Cotter and Norah McDermott v Minister for Social Welfare and Attorney General.
Date: 1991-03-13
25 Moreover, it must be made clear that such belatedly adopted implementing measures must fully respect the rights which Article 4(1) has conferred on individuals in a Member State as from the expiry of the period allowed to the Member States for complying with it (see the judgment in Case 80/87, cited above).
Criminal proceedings against Patrice Di Pinto.
Date: 1991-03-14
15 It is necessary on this point to refer to Article 2 of the directive. It follows from that provision that the criterion for the application of protection lies in the connection between the transactions which are the subject of the canvassing and the professional activity of the trader: the latter may claim that the directive is applicable only if the transaction in respect of which he is canvassed lies outside his trade or profession. Article 2, which is drafted in general terms, does not make it possible, with regard to acts performed in the context of such a trade or profession, to draw a distinction between normal acts and those which are exceptional in nature.
21 It should be recalled in this regard that Article 8 of the directive provides that it "shall not prevent Member States from adopting or maintaining more favourable provisions to protect consumers in the field which it covers".
Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1991-03-19
10 The Greek Government admits the existence of three programme contracts, two concerning common wheat flour and one concerning pasta products. It denies, however, that a fourth programme contract concerning durum wheat meal was concluded between KYDEP and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. It also considers that KYDEP, which is a third-level cooperative, covers half of its own deficits, the remainder being covered by the producers' associations. Finally, it states that KYDEP does not operate a monopoly and that, although it does receive financial contributions from the State, it does not sell its products below cost price, so that free competition with other traders is not affected.
11 First, as regards the existence of the fourth programme contract, the Commission cites a note dated 6 June 1985, sent by KYDEP' s director-general to its board, which states that "a programme contract has already been signed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs with a view to exporting 40 000 tonnes of meal, which will dispose of 78 000 tonnes of durum wheat ...".
15 The Court has already held, in its judgment of 12 July 1990 in Case C-35/88 Commission v Greece, cited above, that by adopting budgetary measures to cover the deficit incurred by KYDEP as a result of its intervention on the market in feed grain and by enabling KYDEP to obtain loans from the Bank of Greece by virtue of a State guarantee, the Greek Government intervened, contrary to Community law, between 1 January 1981 and 26 March 1984 with regard to the conditions under which KYDEP bought and sold feed grain.
Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 1991-03-19
5 In assessing whether the application is well-founded it must be remembered first that, according to established case-law of the Court (see first the judgment in Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5), the prohibition on measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions laid down in Article 30 of the Treaty covers any trading rules of the Member States which are liable directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, to hinder intra-Community trade.
8 As is apparent from a consistent line of decisions of the Court, it is for the Member States, in the absence of harmonization at Community level, to decide on the level of protection which they wish to accord to the protection of human health, whilst taking account of the requirements of the free movement of goods within the Community (see in particular the judgment in Case 178/84 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 1227).
NV Giant v Gemeente Overijse.
Date: 1991-03-19
9 As the Court pointed out in its judgment in Case 73/85 (Kerrutt v Finanzamt Moenchengladbach-Mitte [1986] ECR 2219), it is apparent from that provision that Community law permits systems of taxation which are concurrent with value added tax. Member States may therefore introduce taxes which cannot be characterized as turnover taxes.
11 In order to decide whether a tax can be characterized as a turnover tax it is necessary, in particular, to determine, as the Court stated in its judgment in Case 295/84 (Rousseau Wilmot v Organic [1985] ECR 3759) and in Case 252/86 (Bergandi v Directeur-général des impôts [1988] ECR 1343), whether it has the effect of compromising the functioning of the common system of value added tax by levying a charge on the movement of goods and services and on commercial transactions in a way comparable to value added tax.
12 As the Court has consistently held (see, in particular, the judgments in Rousseau Wilmot and Bergandi, cited above, and in Joined Cases 93/88 and 94/88, Wisselink and Others v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1989] ECR 2671), the principle of the common system of value added tax consists, by virtue of Article 2 of the First Directive, in the application to goods and services up to the retail stage of a general tax on consumption which is exactly proportional to the price of the goods and services, irrespective of the number of transactions which take place in the production and distribution process before the stage at which the tax is charged. However, value added tax is chargeable on each transaction only after deduction of the amount of value added tax borne directly by the costs of the various price components. The procedure for deduction is so arranged by Article 17(2) of the Sixth Directive that taxable persons are authorized to deduct from the value added tax for which they are liable the value added tax which the goods have already borne.
14 In the first place, it is not a general tax, since it applies only to a limited category of goods and services. Secondly, it is not charged at each stage of the production and distribution process, since it is imposed annually on the aggregate receipts of taxable undertakings. Thirdly, it is not levied on the value added at each transaction but on the gross amount of all receipts, and it is therefore impossible to establish precisely what fraction of the tax charged on each sale or service may be regarded as having been passed on to the consumer.
Erminia Cassamali v Office national des pensions.
Date: 1991-03-20
15 In the same judgment, however, the Court stated that, in order to reduce the administrative burden which a fresh examination of the worker' s situation following every alteration of benefits would represent, Article 51(1) of Regulation No 1408/71 excluded a recalculation of benefits in accordance with Article 46 and, hence, a fresh comparison between the national system and the Community system when the alteration which affected one of the benefits resulted from events unconnected with the worker' s personal circumstances and was the consequence of the general evolution of the economic and social situation.
16 Only when the adjustment is due to an alteration of the method of determination or the rules for calculating a benefit by reason, inter alia, of a change in the worker' s personal circumstances is it necessary under Article 51(2) of Regulation No 1408/71 to carry out a recalculation of the old-age benefits.
20 In the situation under consideration, the increases occurring as a result of the general evolution of the economic and social situation prevailing in the State responsible for payment must, as the provisions of Article 51(1) themselves indicate, be applied directly to that pension. Whether it was calculated under the provisions of the national rules alone or under Article 46 of Regulation No 1408/71, the survivor' s pension must not be affected by those increases and, in particular, it must not be adjusted even in order to ensure that the national rule setting an overlapping limit continues to be observed. Such an adjustment could be made only if it is previously ensured that the survivor' s pension so adjusted remains at least as advantageous on continuing to apply the rules - of either the Member State concerned or the Community - according to which it was originally calculated as when the other rules are applied; that entails a fresh comparison of the two sets of rules, which is precisely what Article 51(1) of Regulation No 1408/71 rules out.
Siegfried Rauh v Hauptzollamt Nürnberg-Fürth.
Date: 1991-03-21
9 In those judgments the Court held, on the one hand, that a producer who has voluntarily ceased production for a certain period cannot legitimately expect to be able to resume production under the same conditions as those which previously applied and not to be subject to any rules of market or structural policy adopted in the meantime (Mulder, paragraph 23, and Von Deetzen, paragraph 12); but on the other hand, where such a producer has been encouraged by any Community measure to suspend marketing for a limited period in the general interest and against payment of a premium, he may legitimately expect not to be subject, upon the expiry of his undertaking, to restrictions which specifically affect him precisely because he availed himself of the possibilities offered by the Community provisions (Mulder, paragraph 24, and Von Deetzen, paragraph 13).
10 It was following those judgments that the Council adopted, on 20 March 1989, the abovementioned Regulation No 764/89. That Regulation inserted a new Article 3a in Regulation No 857/84 providing essentially that producers who have not, pursuant to an undertaking entered into under Regulation No 1078/77, delivered milk during the reference year are to obtain, subject to certain conditions, a special reference quantity calculated on the basis of the quantity of milk delivered or the quantity of milk equivalent sold by the producer during the twelve calendar months preceding the month in which the application for the non-marketing or conversion premium was made.
17 The Court has consistently held (see most recently the judgment in Joined Cases 201 and 202/85 Klensch v Secrétaire d' Etat à l' Agriculture et à la Viticulture [1986] ECR 3477, paragraph 21) that where it is necessary to interpret a provision of secondary Community law, preference should as far as possible be given to the interpretation which renders the provision consistent with the Treaty and the general principles of Community law.
19 Those restrictions would be maintained if Article 3a of Regulation No 857/84 were interpreted as not permitting such an heir or successor to have granted to himself, in the same way as the producer himself, a special reference quantity under the conditions laid down in Article 3a.
25 For all those reasons it should be ruled in reply to the first question that Article 3a of Council Regulation No 857/84 of 31 March 1984 adopting general rules for the application of the levy referred to in Article 5c of Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 in the milk and milk products sector, as amended by Council Regulation No 764/89 of 20 March 1989, must be interpreted as meaning that, subject to the conditions laid down therein, a special reference quantity may be granted to a producer who has taken over a holding by way of succession or a similar transaction after the expiry of a non-marketing undertaking entered into pursuant to Council Regulation No 1078/77 of 17 May 1977 by his predecessor in title.
Question 2
SAFA Srl v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato.
Date: 1991-03-21
16 In this connection reference should be made to the case-law of the Court (see in particular the judgment in Joined Cases 279, 280, 285 and 286/84 Rau v Commission [1987] ECR 1069, at paragraph 14), in which the Court held that, since the Commission alone is in a position constantly to keep a close watch on agricultural market trends and to act quickly when necessary, the Council may confer on it wide powers of discretion and action in this sphere. When it does so, the limits of those powers must be determined in the light of the essential general aims of the market organization.
Upjohn Company and Upjohn NV v Farzoo Inc. and J. Kortmann.
Date: 1991-04-16
16 As the Court held in Case 227/82 van Bennekom [1983] ECR 3883, the "presentation" criterion used in the first subparagraph of Article 1(2) is designed to catch not only medicinal products having a genuine therapeutic or medical effect but also those which are not sufficiently effective or which do not have the effect which their presentation might lead to expect, in order to preserve consumers not only from harmful or toxic medicinal products as such but also from a variety of products used instead of the proper remedies. The concept of the "presentation" of a product must therefore be broadly construed.
17 The second definition, however, refers to the function of medicinal products; it covers all products which are intended to restore, correct or modify physiological functions and which may thus have an effect on health in general.
18 Those two definitions cannot, however, be viewed as rigorously distinct. As the Court stated in paragraph 22 of its judgment in van Bennekom, a substance which is endowed with properties "for treating or preventing disease in human beings or animals" within the meaning of the first part of the Community definition, but which is not presented as such, falls within the scope of the second part of the Community definition of a medicinal product.
19 But products which alter physiological functions in the absence of disease, such as contraceptive substances, also fall within the scope of that definition.
21 As regards the meaning of "restoring, correcting or modifying physiological functions", it is clear from the aim of health protection pursued by the Community legislature that the phrase must be given a sufficiently broad interpretation to cover all substances capable of having an effect on the actual functioning of the body.
22 However, that criterion does not serve to include substances such as certain cosmetics which, while having an effect on the human body, do not significantly affect the metabolism and thus do not strictly modify the way in which it functions.
23 It is for the national courts to determine on a case-by-case basis the classification of each product having regard to its pharmacological properties as they may be ascertained in the current state of scientific knowledge, to the way in which it is used, to the extent to which it is sold and to consumers' familiarity with it.
33 The answer to the national court' s second question must therefore be that any product satisfying either of the sets of criteria laid down in Article 1(2) of Directive 65/65 is a medicinal product and must, if it is a proprietary medicinal product, be subject to the corresponding legal rules, to the exclusion of those governing cosmetic products.
Freistaat Bayern v Eurim-Pharm GmbH.
Date: 1991-04-16
16 The Bundesverwaltungsgericht held, as has already been mentioned, that medicinal products not provided with packaging and a package leaflet satisfying the requirements of the AMG were nevertheless "finished medicinal products" subject to the authorization provided for in Paragraph 73 and that, in the case of such medicinal products, neither that authorization nor a certificate to the effect that authorization had been obtained could be lawfully issued. However, as the Court has consistently held, in proceedings under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, it may not rule on the interpretation of national laws or regulations (Case 16/83 Prantl [1984] ECR 1299 and Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435) or assess whether questions referred to it by a national court are relevant (see, in particular, Case 52/77 Cayrol v Rivoira [1977] ECR 2261).
26 On the one hand, the Court has consistently held that the health and the life of humans rank foremost among the property or interests protected by Article 36 and it is for the Member States, within the limits imposed by the Treaty, to decide what degree of protection they intend to assure and in particular how strict the checks to be carried out are to be. On the other hand, Article 36 remains applicable where harmonization of national legislation on the manufacture and marketing of proprietary medicinal products has not been fully achieved (judgment in Case 215/87 Schumacher [1989] ECR 617, paragraph 15).
27 However, it follows from Article 36 that national rules or practices which restrict imports of pharmaceutical products or are capable of doing so are compatible with the Treaty only to the extent to which they are necessary for the effective protection of the health and life of humans. National rules or practices do not qualify for a derogation under Article 36 if the health and life of humans can be protected as effectively using measures which are less restrictive of intra-Community trade.
Les Assurances du Crédit SA and Compagnie Belge d'Assurance Crédit SA v Council of the European Communities and Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1991-04-18
11 It is because of that difficulty in particular that the competent Community institutions must be recognized as enjoying a discretion in relation to the stages in which harmonization is to take place, having regard to the particular nature of the field subject to coordination, as the Court of Justice has, moreover, already ruled in relation to harmonizing directives adopted on the basis of other provisions of the Treaty (see the judgment in Case 37/83, REWE-Zentrale v Landwirtschaftskammer Rheinland, [1984] ECR 1229, paragraph 20).
19 Finally, the wish to impose only those obligations which were necessary for the protection of insured and third parties also led the Council to exclude from the scope of the directive, and thus to exempt from the guarantees which it prescribes, certain mutual associations which, by virtue of their legal status, fulfil appropriate conditions as to security and financial guarantees (fourth recital in the preamble and Article 3 of the directive). To that same end, the Second Council Directive (88/357/EEC) of 22 June 1988 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance and laying down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 73/239/EEC (Official Journal 1988 L 172, p. 1) grants to policy-holders who, by virtue of their status, their size or the nature of the risk to be insured, do not require special protection in the State in which the risk is situated, complete freedom to avail themselves of the widest possible insurance market, and guarantees adequate protection to other policy-holders (fifth recital in the preamble).
Brown Boveri & Cie AG v Hauptzollamt Mannheim.
Date: 1991-04-18
21 BBC is correct in arguing that software is not, as such, "goods" within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the regulation on customs value but is intangible property not subject to the Common Customs Tariff. However, when such property is embodied in an item of goods, the cost of acquiring that intangible property must be regarded as an integral part of the price paid or payable for the goods, and hence of the transaction value. In the case before the Bundesfinanzhof, the value of the software must therefore be regarded as an integral part of the customs value of the imported goods.
Wesergold GmbH & Co. KG v Oberfinanzdirektion München.
Date: 1991-04-18
9 That argument cannot be accepted. First, it is clear from the case-law cited above that the intended use of a product can only be taken into account for the purpose of its tariff classification if the wording of the heading, or the note referring to it, makes an express reference to that criterion (see, on this point, the judgment in Case 38/76 Luma [1976] ECR 2027). As that is not the case with heading No 2009, reference cannot be made to that criterion for the purpose of classifying an orange juice such as the one which is at issue in the main proceedings. Furthermore, since it is described in the binding tariff ruling issued by the Oberfinanzdirektion as a yellow-coloured liquid which has the smell and taste of an orange juice, the product must be considered to have retained its original character of fruit juice.