larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
European Parliament v Council of the European Union.
Date: 1996-03-07
15. In those circumstances, any unlawfulness attaching to the choice which it made between those two legal bases would be a purely formal defect which could not make the decisions void.  The Council refers in this connection to Case 165/87  Commission  v  Council  [1988] ECR 5545, paragraph 19.
17. The Court points out  in limine  that, as it has consistently held (see, in particular, Case C-187/93  Parliament  v  Council  [1994] ECR I-2857, paragraph 14), an action for annulment brought by the Parliament against an act of the Council or the Commission is admissible provided that the action seeks only to safeguard its prerogatives and that it is founded only on submissions alleging their infringement.
23. The Court has consistently held that, in the context of the organization of the powers of the Community, the choice of the legal basis for a measure must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review.  Those factors include in particular the aim and content of the measures (see, in particular, Case C-187/93  Parliament  v  Council , cited above, paragraph 17).
30. Since the types of service provision covered both by Decision 93/323, by which the Agreement was approved, and by Decision 93/324, by which the benefit of the provisions of Directive 90/531 was extended to the public procurement contracts covered by the Agreement, cannot be reduced to the sole hypothesis of a trans-frontier supply involving no movement of persons, but relate also to supplies made thanks to a commercial presence or the presence of natural persons on the territory of the other Contracting Party, it must be held that Decisions 93/323 and 93/324 should not have been based on Article 113 of the Treaty alone.
El Corte Inglés SA v Cristina Blázquez Rivero.
Date: 1996-03-07
10. Shortly after this question was referred, the Court gave judgment in Case C-91/92  Faccini Dori  [1994] ECR I-3325, in which it reaffirmed its case-law according to which directives do not have any horizontal direct effect.  The Court forwarded a copy of that judgment to the national court and asked it whether, in the light of that judgment, it wished to maintain its question.
11. The national court considered that the judgment in  Faccini Dori  provided a clear answer to the question of the horizontal direct effect of unimplemented directives, but observed that, unlike in the case of the dispute before it,  Faccini Dori  was concerned with facts antedating the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union.  That Treaty introduced a new consumer protection provision, Article 129a.
15. As the Court has consistently held (see, in particular, Case 152/84  Marshall I  [1986] ECR 723, paragraph 48), a directive may not of itself impose obligations on an individual and may therefore not be relied upon as such against such a person.
16. As for the case-law on when directives may be relied upon against State entities, it is based on the binding nature of directives, which applies only with regard to the Member States to which they are addressed, and seeks to prevent a State from taking advantage of its own failure to comply with Community law (see  Marshall I , paragraphs 48 and 49).
17. The effect of extending that case-law to the sphere of relations between individuals would be to recognize a power in the Community to enact obligations for individuals with immediate effect, whereas it has competence to do so only where it is empowered to adopt regulations or decisions (see  Faccini Dori , paragraph 24).
22. Moreover, if the result prescribed by the directive cannot be achieved by way of interpretation, it should also be borne in mind that, in terms of the judgment in Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90  Francovich and Others  v  Italy  [1991] ECR I-5357, paragraph 39, Community law requires the Member States to make good damage caused to individuals through failure to transpose a directive, provided that three conditions are fulfilled.  First, the purpose of the directive must be to grant rights to individuals.  Second, it must be possible to identify the content of those rights on the basis of the provisions of the directive.  Finally, there must be a causal link between the breach of the State ' s obligation and the damage suffered ( Faccini Dori , paragraph 27).
Peter de Vos v Stadt Bielefeld.
Date: 1996-03-14
20. The Court has already held that   " social advantages"  should be understood to mean all those advantages which, whether or not linked to a contract of employment, are generally granted to national workers because of their objective status as workers or by virtue of the mere fact of their residence on the national territory and the extension of which to workers who are nationals of other Member States therefore seems likely to facilitate their mobility within the Community (Case 207/78  Ministère Public  v  Even  [1979] ECR 2019, paragraph 22, and Case C-310/91  Schmid  v  Belgian State  [1993] ECR I-3011, paragraph 18).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 1996-03-14
7. The Court has consistently held (see, in particular, the judgment in Case C-259/95  Commission  v  Greece  [1995] ECR I-1947, paragraph 5), that a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down by a directive.
Dominique Bruyère and others v Belgian State.
Date: 1996-03-21
19. With regard to any medicinal products not covered by Directive 81/851 to which Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty should be applied, it should be recalled that it is solely for the national courts before which actions are brought, and which must bear the responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular facts of each case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which they submit to the Court (see, in particular, Case C-472/93  Spano and Others  v  Fiat Geotech and Fiat Hitachi Excavators  [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraph 15), and that the parties cannot alter the wording of those questions (Case 5/72  Grassi  v  Italian Finance Administration  [1972] ECR 443, paragraph 4).
Hans Walter Mrozek and Bernhard Jäger.
Date: 1996-03-21
9. Article 4 of the regulation lists certain categories of transport which are excluded from its scope.  Being thus a derogation from the general scheme, Article 4 may not be interpreted in such a way as to extend its effects beyond what is necessary to safeguard the interests which it seeks to secure.  Furthermore, the scope of the derogations which it lays down must be determined in the light of the aims pursued by the regulation (see Case C-116/91  Licensing Authority South Eastern Traffic Area  v  British Gas  [1992] ECR I-4071, paragraph 12).
10. With regard to the interests which Article 4(6) of the regulation seeks to safeguard, the derogations provided for in that provision are based on the nature of the services in connection with which the vehicles are used.  In that respect it is apparent from the list in Article 4(6) that the services envisaged by that provision are all general services performed in the public interest (see  Licensing Authority South Eastern Traffic Area  v  British Gas , cited above, paragraph 13).
11. The purpose of the regulation, as the first recital in its preamble states, is to harmonize conditions of competition and to improve working conditions and road safety.
12. In the light of those objectives, and primarily that relating to the improvement of road safety, the term   " refuse collection"  should be interpreted as applying only to the collection of refuse from a place where it has been deposited.  Vehicles used for that activity travel over a limited distance and for a short period, and the transport remains ancillary to the collection.  Refuse transport which does not have those features cannot fall within the exemption.  It is for the national court to determine in each case before it whether that is so.
14. Within the limits thus defined, the movement of vehicles when empty and when preparing to carry out such transportation also falls within Article 4(6) of the regulation.
15. Finally, the vehicles in question do not have to be used by the public authorities directly in order to benefit from the exemption.  Regulation No 3820/85 is intended to make more flexible the provisions of Council Regulation (EEC) No 543/69 on the harmonization of certain social legislation relating to road transport (OJ, English Special Edition 1969 (I), p. 170).  Unlike the provision it replaces, namely Article 4(4) of Regulation No 543/69, as amended by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2827/77 of 12 December 1977 amending Regulation (EEC) No 543/69 (OJ 1977 L 334, p. 1), Article 4(6) of Regulation No 3820/85 no longer refers to   " vehicles which are used by other public authorities for public services" .  The result of that amendment in the wording is that the derogation may benefit not only the public authorities but also private undertakings which provide a general service in the public interest under their control.
Criminal proceedings against Pierre Goupil.
Date: 1996-03-21
8. Article 4 of the regulation lists certain categories of transport which are excluded from its scope.  Being thus a derogation from the general scheme, Article 4 may not be interpreted in such a way as to extend its effects beyond what is necessary to safeguard the interests which it seeks to secure.  Furthermore, the scope of the derogations which it lays down must be determined in the light of the aims pursued by the regulation (see Case C-116/91  Licensing Authority South Eastern Traffic Area  v  British Gas  [1992] ECR I-4071, paragraph 12).
9. With regard to the interests which Article 4(6) of the regulation seeks to safeguard, the derogations provided for in that provision are based on the nature of the services in connection with which the vehicles are used.  In that respect it is apparent from the list in Article 4(6) that the services envisaged by that provision are all general services performed in the public interest (see  Licensing Authority South Eastern Traffic Area  v  British Gas , cited above, paragraph 13).
10. The purpose of the regulation, as the first recital in its preamble states, is to harmonize conditions of competition and to improve working conditions and road safety.
José García and others v Mutuelle de Prévoyance Sociale d'Aquitaine and others.
Date: 1996-03-26
10. That provision quite clearly excludes from the scope of the directive not merely social security organizations ( " undertakings or institutions" ) but also the types of insurance and operations which they provide in that capacity.
14. Finally, as the Court stressed in Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91  Poucet and Pistre  v  Assurances Générales de France and Others  [1993] ECR I-637, paragraph 13, social security schemes such as those in issue in the main proceedings, which are based on the principle of solidarity, require compulsory contributions in order to ensure that the principle of solidarity is applied and that their financial equilibrium is maintained.  If Article 2(2) of Directive 92/49/EEC were to be interpreted in the manner contemplated by the national tribunal, the obligation to contribute would be removed and the schemes in question would thus be unable to survive.
15. The Court has also pointed out that Member States retain their powers to organize their social security systems (see  Poucet and Pistre , paragraph 6, and Case 238/82  Duphar  v  Netherlands  [1984] ECR 523, paragraph 16).
Robert Birkenbeul GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Koblenz.
Date: 1996-03-28
12. First of all, the Court has consistently held that in interpreting a provision of Community law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it forms part (see in particular Case C-136/91  Findling Wälzlager Handelsgesellschaft  v  Hauptzollamt Karlsruhe  [1993] ECR I-1793, paragraph 11).
15. Furthermore, Rule 2(a) of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the Nomenclature of the Common Customs Tariff, which provides that reference in a heading of the  Common Customs Tariff to an article is to be taken to include a reference to that article even if incomplete or unfinished, provided that it has the essential characteristics of the complete or finished article, does not necessarily apply in an anti-dumping case where the relevant rules refer to such a heading.  As the Court noted in respect of another regulation imposing an anti-dumping duty (see the judgment in Case C-90/92  Dr Tretter  v  Hauptzollamt Stuttgart-Ost  [1993] ECR I-3569, paragraph 13), the actual wording of Article 2(1) of the provisional regulation and Article 1(1) of the definitive regulation, in particular the expression   " falling within subheading ex 85.01 B I (b) of the Common Customs Tariff" , supports the conclusion that a product is not automatically subject to anti-dumping duty pursuant to those provisions merely because it is classified under that tariff heading.
17. As regards the context and purpose of the legislation in question, it is apparent from paragraph 35 of the recitals in the preamble to the provisional regulation and paragraph 38 of the recitals in the preamble to the definitive regulation that the Community authorities decided, in the interests of transparency and efficiency and in order to induce exporters to raise their prices, to impose a variable duty calculated according to the difference between a minimum price and the price to the first independent buyer.  In addition, the Court has held that in taking that action, the authorities did not exceed the limits of their discretionary power since, in particular, a variable duty is generally more favourable to the traders in question than an  ad valorem  duty, on account of the fact that it makes it possible to avoid anti-dumping duties, provided that the imports are effected at prices above the minimum price fixed (judgment in Joined Cases C-305/86 and C-160/87  Neotype Techmashexport  v  Commission and Council  [1990] ECR I-2945, paragraph 60).
Alejandro Rincón Moreno v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit.
Date: 1996-03-28
16. The Court has stated on numerous occasions that a benefit may be regarded as a social security benefit in so far as it is granted, without any individual and discretionary assessment of personal needs, to recipients on the basis of a legally defined position and provided that it concerns one of the risks expressly listed in Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1408/71 (see,  inter alia , Case C-66/92  Acciardi  v  Commissie Beroepszaken Administratieve Geschillen in de Provincie Noord-Holland  [1993] ECR I-4567, paragraph 14; Case C-111/91  Commission  v  Luxembourg  [1993] ECR I-817, paragraph 29; Case C-78/91  Hughes  v  Chief Adjudication Officer  [1992] ECR I-4839, paragraph 15, and Joined Cases 379/85, 380/85, 381/85 and 93/86  Caisse Régionale d ' Assurance Maladie Rhône-Alpes and Others  v  Giletti and Others  [1987] ECR 955, paragraph 11).
Criminal proceedings against Michel Guiot and Climatec SA, as employer liable at civil law.
Date: 1996-03-28
10. Article 59 of the Treaty requires not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of nationality against providers of services who are established in another Member State but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less advantageous the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar services (see, in this respect, Case C-76/90  Säger  v  Dennemeyer  [1991] ECR I-4221, paragraph 12, and Case C-43/93  Vander Elst  v  Office des Migrations Internationales  [1994] ECR I-3803, paragraph 14).
11. Even if there is no harmonization in the field, the freedom to provide services, as one of the fundamental principles of the Treaty, may be restricted only by rules justified by overriding requirements of public interest and applicable to all persons and undertakings operating in the territory of the State where the service is provided, in so far as that interest is not safeguarded by the rules to which the provider of such a service is subject in the Member State where he is established (see, in particular, Case C-180/89  Commission  v  Italy  [1991] ECR I-709, paragraph 17, Case C-198/89  Commission  v  Greece  [1991] ECR I-727, paragraph 18, and  Vander Elst , referred to above, paragraph 16).
12. In this respect, the Court held in Case C-113/89  Rush Portuguesa  ([1990] ECR I-1417, paragraph 18), that Community law does not preclude Member States from extending their legislation, or collective labour agreements entered into by both sides of industry, relating to minimum wages, to any person who is employed, even temporarily, within their territory, regardless of the country in which the employer is established; Community law also does not prohibit Member States from enforcing those rules by appropriate means.
13. In the circumstances, the questions to be considered are, first, whether the requirements imposed by the Belgian legislation have a restrictive effect on the freedom to provide services; second, if so, whether overriding requirements of the public interest in that area justify such restrictions on the freedom to provide services; and third, if so, whether that interest is already protected by the rules of the State where the service provider is established and whether the same result can be achieved by less restrictive rules.
16. The public interest relating to the social protection of workers in the construction industry may however, because of conditions specific to that sector, constitute an overriding requirement justifying such a restriction on the freedom to provide services.
17. However, that is not the case where the workers in question enjoy the same protection, or essentially similar protection, by virtue of employer ' s contributions already paid by the employer in the Member State of establishment.
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1996-03-28
13. The Court has held in this regard that the provisions of Article 9 of Directive 71/305, which authorize derogations from the rules intended to ensure the effectiveness of the rights conferred by the Treaty in relation to public works contracts, must be interpreted strictly and that the burden of proving the existence of exceptional circumstances justifying a derogation lies on the person seeking to rely on those circumstances (Case C-57/94  Commission  v  Italy  [1995] ECR I-1249, paragraph 23).
14. The Court has also held that, according to Article 9(d) of Directive 71/305, the derogation for which it provides, namely exemption from the obligation to publish a notice of a call for tenders, is available only if three conditions are fulfilled concurrently.  That derogation requires the existence of an unforeseeable event, extreme urgency, rendering the observance of time-limits laid down by other procedures impossible, and, finally, a causal link between the unforeseeable event and the extreme urgency resulting therefrom (Case C-107/92  Commission  v  Italy  [1993] ECR I-4655, paragraph 12).  If one of those conditions is not satisfied, use of the negotiated procedure will not be justified.
18. The possibility that a body which must approve a project might, before expiry of the period laid down for this purpose, raise objections for reasons which it is entitled to put forward is, consequently, something which is foreseeable in plan approval procedure.
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 1996-04-25
11 On this point, it should be noted that the Court has consistently held (see, in particular, its judgment in Case C-296/92 Commission v Italy [1994] ECR I-1, paragraph 11) that the scope of an action brought under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty is delimited by the pre-litigation procedure provided for by that article. The possibility for the State concerned to be able to submit its observations constitutes a fundamental guarantee under the Treaty and an essential requirement for the proper conduct of the procedure for establishing a Member State' s breach of obligations. Consequently, an Article 169 action may not be founded on grounds other than those set out in the reasoned opinion (see also the judgments in Case C-157/91 Commission v Netherlands [1992] ECR I-5899, paragraph 17, and Case C-306/91 Commission v Italy [1993] ECR I-2133, paragraph 22).
Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank v J.M. Cabanis-Issarte.
Date: 1996-04-30
21 Article 2(1) of Regulation No 1408/71, which defines the persons covered by the regulation, refers to two clearly distinct categories of persons: workers, on the one hand, and members of their families and their survivors, on the other. In order to fall within the scope of the regulation, the former must be nationals of a Member State, or stateless persons or refugees residing within the territory of one of the Member States. There is on the other hand no nationality requirement for application of the regulation to the family members or survivors of workers who are themselves Community nationals.
23 Thus, the spouse of a Community worker cannot rely on his or her status as a member of the worker' s family in order to claim application of Articles 67 to 71 of Regulation No 1408/71, the main purpose of which is coordination of rights to unemployment benefits provided by virtue of the national legislation of the Member States for employed persons who are nationals of a Member State and not for members of their families.
34 Since, therefore, the distinction drawn between rights in person and derived rights renders the fundamental rule of equal treatment inapplicable to the surviving spouse of a migrant worker, the rule in Kermaschek should be limited to the circumstances described in paragraphs 23 and 24 above.
39 Next, as regards the application of national social security laws to workers and members of their families, Article 51 of the Treaty entrusts the Council with the task of adopting such measures in the field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers (see, in particular, the judgments in Cases C-481/93 Moscato v Bestuur van de Nieuwe Algemene Bedrijfsvereniging [1995] ECR I-3525, paragraph 27, and Case C-482/93 Klaus v Bestuur van de Nieuwe Algemene Bedrijfsvereniging [1995] ECR I-3551, paragraph 21).
P v S and Cornwall County Council.
Date: 1996-04-30
19 Moreover, as the Court has repeatedly held, the right not to be discriminated against on grounds of sex is one of the fundamental human rights whose observance the Court has a duty to ensure (see, to that effect, Case 149/77 Defrenne v Sabena [1978] ECR 1365, paragraphs 26 and 27, and Joined Cases 75/82 and 117/82 Razzouk and Beydoun v Commission [1984] ECR 1509, paragraph 16).
20 Accordingly, the scope of the directive cannot be confined simply to discrimination based on the fact that a person is of one or other sex. In view of its purpose and the nature of the rights which it seeks to safeguard, the scope of the directive is also such as to apply to discrimination arising, as in this case, from the gender reassignment of the person concerned.
21 Such discrimination is based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the person concerned. Where a person is dismissed on the ground that he or she intends to undergo, or has undergone, gender reassignment, he or she is treated unfavourably by comparison with persons of the sex to which he or she was deemed to belong before undergoing gender reassignment.
22 To tolerate such discrimination would be tantamount, as regards such a person, to a failure to respect the dignity and freedom to which he or she is entitled, and which the Court has a duty to safeguard.