Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 2003-01-16
55.  In that regard, it should be noted that the Court has consistently held that, in interpreting a provision of Community law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the aims of the rules of which it forms part (see,   inter alia  , Case C-156/98   Germany   v   Commission   [2000] ECR I-6857, paragraph 50, and Case C-191/99   Kvaerner   [2001] ECR I-4447, paragraph 30).
70.  The preceding analysis makes clear that, in contrast to the argument put forward by the Spanish Government, cocoa and chocolate products containing fats not referred to in point 7(a) of Annex I to the directive but whose manufacture and marketing under the name   "chocolate"   are authorised in certain Member States, in compliance with that directive, cannot be deprived of the benefit of free movement of goods guaranteed by Article 30 of the Treaty solely on the ground that other Member States require within their territory that cocoa and chocolate products be manufactured according to the common rule regarding composition provided for in point 7(a) of Annex I to the directive (see, by analogy, Case C-3/99   Ruwet   [2000] ECR I-8749, paragraph 44).
71.  The Court has consistently held that Article 30 of the Treaty aims to prohibit all rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade (Case 8/74   Dassonville   [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5).
72.  In accordance with the judgment in Case 120/78   Rewe-Zentral   [1979] ECR 649,   "Cassis de Dijon "  , Article 30 of the Treaty prohibits obstacles to the free movement of goods, in the absence of harmonisation of national laws, which are the consequence of applying to goods coming from other Member States, where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, rules that lay down requirements to be met by those goods (such as those relating to their name, form, size, weight, composition, presentation, labelling and packaging), even if those rules apply to national and imported products alike (see,   inter alia  ,   Keck and Mithouard  , cited above, paragraph 15; Case C-470/93   Mars   [1995] ECR I-1923, paragraph 12; and   Ruwet  , cited above, paragraph 46).
73.  Accordingly, that prohibition also applies to obstacles to the marketing of products whose manufacture is not subject to comprehensive harmonisation but which are manufactured in conformity with national rules which are explicitly permitted by the harmonising directive.  In such a case, a contrary interpretation would be tantamount to authorising the Member States to partition their national markets in regard to products not covered by the Community's harmonisation rules, contrary to the objective of free movement pursued by the Treaty (see, by analogy,   Ruwet  , cited above, paragraph 47).
75.  In that regard, it must be noted that in paragraph 16 of   Keck and Mithouard   the Court pointed out that the application to products from other Member States of national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States within the meaning of the   Dassonville   judgment, so long as those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States.
76.  However, the need to alter the packaging or the labelling of imported products prevents such requirements from being selling arrangements within the meaning of the judgment in   Keck and Mithouard   (Case C-33/97   Colim   [1999] ECR I-3175, paragraph 37).
79.  In that regard, it must be noted that, as the Court has consistently held, while a prohibition such as that under the Spanish legislation, which entails the obligation to use a sales name other than that used in the Member State of production, does not absolutely preclude the importation into the Member State concerned of products originating in other Member States, it is nevertheless likely to make their marketing more difficult and thus impede trade between Member States (see, to that effect,   inter alia  , Case 182/84   Miro   [1985] ECR 3731, paragraph 22; Case 298/87   Smanor   [1988] ECR 4489, paragraph 12; Case 286/86   Deserbais   [1988] ECR 4907, paragraph 12; and Case C-448/98   Guimont   [2000] ECR I-10663, paragraph 26).
80.  In the present case, the prohibition on the use of the sales name   "chocolate"   under which cocoa and chocolate products containing vegetable fats other than cocoa butter are lawfully manufactured in the Member State of production may compel the traders concerned to adjust the presentation of their products according to the place where they are to be marketed and consequently to incur additional packaging costs.  It is therefore liable to obstruct intra-Community trade (see, to that effect,   Mars  , paragraph 13, and   Ruwet  , paragraph 48, both cited above).
82.  The Court has consistently held that the requirement for producers to use designations which are unknown to or less highly regarded by consumers is likely to make the marketing of the products in question more difficult and thus impede trade between Member States (see, to that effect,   Miro  , paragraph 22;   Smanor  , paragraphs 12 and 13; and   Guimont  , paragraph 26).
83.  As to whether such legislation may nevertheless comply with Community law, it is settled case-law that obstacles to intra-Community trade resulting from disparities between provisions of national law must be accepted in so far as such provisions are applicable to domestic and imported products alike and may be justified as being necessary in order to satisfy overriding requirements relating   inter alia   to consumer protection.  However, in order to be permissible, such provisions must be proportionate to the objective pursued and that objective must not be capable of being achieved by measures which are less restrictive of intra-Community trade (see,   inter alia  ,   Mars  , paragraph 15; Case C-313/94   Graffione   [1996] ECR I-6039, paragraph 17;   Ruwet  , paragraph 50; and   Guimont  , paragraph 27).
84.  In that context, the Court has already held that it is legitimate for a Member State to ensure that consumers are properly informed about the products which are offered to them, thus giving them the possibility of making their choice on the basis of that information (see,   inter alia  , Case 216/84   Commission   v   France   [1988] ECR 793, paragraph 11, and   Smanor  , paragraph 18).
85.  In particular, the Court has consistently held that Member States may, for the purpose of protecting consumers, require those concerned to alter the description of a foodstuff where a product offered for sale under a particular name is so different, in terms of its composition or production, from the products generally understood as falling within that description within the Community that it cannot be regarded as falling within the same category (see,   inter alia  ,   Deserbais  , paragraph 13, Case C-366/98   Geffroy   [2000] ECR I-6579, paragraph 22, and   Guimont  , paragraph 30).
86.  However, where the difference is of minor importance, appropriate labelling should be sufficient to provide the purchaser or consumer with the necessary information (see,   inter alia  , Case C-269/89   Bonfait   [1990] ECR I-4169, paragraph 15; Case C-383/97   van der Laan   [1999] ECR I-731, paragraph 24;   Geffroy  , paragraph 23; and   Guimont  , paragraph 31).
92.  Therefore, the addition of vegetable fats other than cocoa butter to cocoa and chocolate products which satisfy the minimum contents required by Directive 73/241 cannot substantially alter the nature of those products to the point where they are transformed into different products.
93.  It follows that the inclusion in the label of a neutral and objective statement informing consumers of the presence in the product of vegetable fats other than cocoa butter would be sufficient to ensure that consumers are given correct information.
97.  The Court has consistently held that a rule of secondary legislation, such as Article 8 of Directive 2000/36, cannot be interpreted as authorising the Member States to impose or to maintain conditions contrary to the Treaty rules on the free movement of goods (Case C-47/90   Delhaize et Le Lion   [1992] ECR I-3669, paragraph 26; Case C-315/92   Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb   [1994] ECR I-317,   "Clinique "  , paragraph 12; and Joined Cases C-427/93, C-429/93 and C-436/93   Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others   [1996] ECR I-3457, paragraph 27).