Blackspur DIY Ltd, Steven Kellar, J.M.A. Glancy and Ronald Cohen v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1997-09-16
16 Before examining the appellants' pleas, it should be noted that, in accordance with Article 168a of the EC Treaty and the first paragraph of Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal may rely only on grounds relating to the infringement of rules of law by the Court of First Instance, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts (judgment in Case C-283/90 P Vidrányi v Commission [1991] ECR I-4339, paragraph 12; order in Case C-19/95 P San Marco v Commission [1996] ECR I-4435, paragraphs 39 and 40).
The nature of the damage taken into account in assessing the causal link
23 In those circumstances, the plea alleging erroneous attribution to the applicants, in paragraph 41 of the judgment, of the assertion that half of Blackspur's turnover consisted in sales of Chinese brushes cannot affect the result.  Even assuming it to be established, that plea relates to supplementary grounds set out in the contested judgment for the sake of completeness and cannot call into question the finding on which the Court of First Instance based its dismissal of the claim for compensation, namely that the appellants had not adduced any evidence to establish a causal link between the financial losses, estimated by the appellants at UKL 586 000, and the cessation of sales of brushes originating in China (see, in particular, the judgment in Case C-137/95 P SPO and Others v Commission [1996] ECR I-1611, paragraph 47).
28 In that regard, it is sufficient to point out that paragraph 27 of the contested judgment refers to the report contained in Annex 1 to the application, which was produced by the appellants in support of the evaluation of the damage claimed, as being taken into account in the assessment of the causal link.  Moreover, paragraph 45 of the judgment refers to Annex 22 to the reply and paragraph 46 refers to the `documents in the case'.  That being so, the appellants cannot validly maintain that, in analysing the causal link, the Court of First Instance took only one piece of evidence into consideration, namely the letter from the firm of chartered accountants referred to in paragraph 44.
29 In any event, as the Court of Justice has repeatedly held, it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value which should be attached to the items of evidence adduced before it (judgment in Case C-136/92 P Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraph 66; order in San Marco v Commission, cited above, paragraph 40).   That appraisal does not, therefore, save where the sense of the evidence has been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (judgment in Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-667, paragraph 42).
31 Moreover, it is first and foremost for the party seeking to establish the Community's liability to adduce conclusive proof as to the existence or extent of the damage he alleges and to establish the causal link between that damage and the conduct complained of on the part of the Community institutions (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 26/74 Roquette Frères v Commission [1976] ECR 677, paragraphs 22 and 23).
42 The Court cannot accept the applicants' contentions that the sales of cheap brushes from China represented half of Blackspur's turnover and that the loss of this commercial outlet was the principal cause of the poor financial results which it recorded and which led to its liquidation
43 The Court first points out in this regard that, in reply to its request that they produce balance sheets for Blackspur for the years 1988/1989 and 1989/1990, in order to establish whether those contentions were well founded, the applicants stated that "the relevant documentation concerning Blackspur's turnover is not in the possession of any of the applicants".  The Court takes the view that, while the directors and associates of Blackspur may possibly be in a position to argue that they are no longer in possession of the relevant documents concerning Blackspur's turnover for the years in question, in view of the appointment of receivers and the institution of liquidation proceedings, the same cannot apply with regard to the applicant Blackspur.  The Court notes that, in a letter of 25 March 1993, the firm handling the company's liquidation consented to Blackspur's lawyers introducing the present action on its behalf as liquidator of the company.  In this event, it cannot be accepted that the liquidator of the applicant Blackspur was not in a position to produce the documents concerning Blackspur's financial position, and it is not for the Court to substitute itself for Blackspur by ordering production of such evidence.