Evropaïki Dynamiki — Proigmena Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE v European Commission.
Date: 2012-11-08
33. The length of the limitation period thus provided for was determined by taking into account, in particular, the time that the party which has allegedly suffered harm needs to gather the appropriate information for the purpose of a possible action and to verify the facts likely to provide the basis of that action (order in Case C‑136/01 P Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi  v Commission  [2002] ECR I‑6565, paragraph 28).
34. In accordance with settled case‑law, that period begins to run once the requirements governing the obligation to provide compensation for damage are satisfied and, in particular, once the damage to be made good has materialised (Joined Cases 256/80, 257/80, 265/80, 267/80 and 5/81 Birra Wührer and Others v Council and Commission [1982] ECR 85, paragraph 10; Case C‑282/05 P Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission [2007] ECR I‑2941, paragraph 29; and Case C‑51/05 P Commission  v Cantina sociale di Dolianova and Others [2008] ECR I‑5341, paragraph 54).
35. It is, admittedly, appropriate to interpret Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice as meaning that limitation cannot constitute a valid defence to a claim by a person who has suffered damage in the case where that person only belatedly became aware of the event giving rise to it and thus could not have had a reasonable time in which to submit his application before the expiry of the limitation period (Case 145/83 Adams  v Commission  [1985] ECR 3539, paragraph 50).
36. However, the conditions to which the obligation to pay compensation for damage referred to in the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU is subject and, therefore, the rules on limitation periods which govern actions relating to that compensation for such damage may be based only on strictly objective criteria (see Commission  v Cantina sociale di Dolianova and Others , paragraph 59).
37. Thus, exact and detailed knowledge of the facts of the cause is not one of the conditions which must be met in order for the limitation period to begin running (order in Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi  v Commission , paragraph 31, and judgment in Commission  v Cantina sociale di Dolianova and Others , paragraph 61). Similarly, the subjective appraisal of the reality of the damage by the victim cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the moment at which the limitation period begins to run in proceedings brought against the European Union for non-contractual liability ( Commission  v Cantina sociale di Dolianova and Others , paragraph 61).
38. In the case of disputes arising from individual measures, the limitation period begins to run as soon as the decision has produced its effects vis-à-vis the persons concerned by it (Case C‑282/05 P Holcim (Deutschland)  v Commission , paragraph 30, and judgment of 11 June 2009 in Case C‑335/08 P Transports Schiocchet – Excursions  v Commission , paragraph 33).
42. In that context, it is also not relevant that the decision of 15 September 2004 was annulled on 10 September 2008 by the judgment of the General Court in Case T‑465/04 Evropaïki Dynamiki  v Commission  on the ground of deficient reasoning. It is in fact immaterial, as regards the starting point of the period of limitation, whether the European Union’s unlawful conduct has been established by a judicial decision (judgment in Case C‑282/05 P Holcim (Deutschland)  v Commission , paragraph 31).
48. Under Article 102(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, extensions on account of distance apply to procedural time-limits and are intended to take account of the difficulties faced by parties owing to the fact that they may be a fairly long way away from the seat of the Court of Justice (see, to that effect, Case C‑137/92 P Commission  v BASF  [1994] ECR I‑2555, paragraph 40).
50. Procedural time-limits are laid down with a view to ensuring due administration of justice, clarity and legal certainty (see, to that effect, Case 227/83 Moussis  v Commission  [1984] ECR 3133, paragraph 12, and Case 191/84 Barcella and Others  v Commission  [1986] ECR 1541, paragraph 12). Thus, in particular, periods prescribed for bringing proceedings, such as that laid down in the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, and for bringing appeals, such as that laid down in the first paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, are intended to ensure that administrative decisions and decisions of the courts become final and so to protect public interests. In consequence, periods prescribed for bringing proceedings are a matter of public policy and are therefore not within the discretion of the parties or the court, since compliance with them is to be examined by the European Union Court of its own motion (see, to that effect, Case C‑246/95 Coen  [1997] ECR I‑403, paragraph 21 and the case‑law cited).
51. By contrast, the Court has already held that compliance with the limitation period may not be raised by a European Union Court of its own motion but must be raised by the party affected (see, to that effect, Case 20/88 Roquette frères  v Commission  [1989] ECR 1553, paragraph 12).
53. Furthermore, the limitation period laid down in the first paragraph of Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice has the function, inter alia, firstly, of ensuring protection of the rights of the aggrieved person, who must have sufficient time in which to gather the appropriate information with a view to a possible action, and, secondly, of preventing the aggrieved person from being able to delay indefinitely the exercise of his right to damages. That period thus definitively protects the aggrieved person and the person responsible for the harm.
54. Limitation therefore constitutes an objection to admissibility which, unlike procedural time-limits, is not absolute, but extinguishes the action for liability solely at the request of the defendant.
56. Furthermore, the calculation of the limitation period cannot, in accordance with the case‑law cited in paragraph 36 of the present judgment, be based on criteria which are anything other than strictly objective nor, as the General Court has rightly pointed out, can that calculation differ according to whether the interruption of that period is caused by the bringing of an action or the making of a prior application. Application of the extension on account of distance to the limitation period would have the consequence that limitation would occur at the end of a different period depending on whether the aggrieved party has chosen to bring the matter directly before the General Court or to make a prior application to the competent European Union institution, something which would be at variance with the requirement of legal certainty necessary for the application of limitation periods ( Commission  v Cantina sociale di Dolianova and Others , paragraph 60).