Teresa Zabala Erasun, Elvira Encabo Terrazos and Francisco Casquero Carrillo v Instituto Nacional de Empleo.
Date: 1995-06-15
13 According to the case-law of the Court (see the judgment in Case 126/80 Salonia v Poidomani and Giglio [1981] ECR 1563, at paragraph 6), Article 177 of the Treaty, which is based on a clear separation of functions between national courts and the Court of Justice, does not allow the latter to criticize the reasons for the reference.
14 It is only for national courts before which actions have been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judgment, to assess, in the light of the circumstances of each case, both the necessity for a preliminary ruling in order to be able to give their judgment and the relevance of the questions they refer to the Court (see, for example, the judgment in Case C-369/89 Piageme [1991] ECR I-2971, at paragraph 10).
15 However, in exercising that power of appraisal the national court, in collaboration with the Court of Justice, fulfils a duty entrusted to them both of ensuring that in the interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is observed. Accordingly the problems which may be entailed in the exercise of its power of appraisal by the national court and the relations which it maintains within the framework of Article 177 with the Court of Justice are governed exclusively by the provisions of Community law (see the judgment in Case 244/80 Foglia v Novello [1981] ECR 3045, at paragraph 16).
16 Whilst the Court of Justice must be able to place as much reliance as possible upon the assessment by the national court of the extent to which the questions submitted are necessary, it must be in a position to make any assessment inherent in the performance of its own duties in particular in order to determine, as all courts must, whether it has jurisdiction (ibid., at paragraph 19).
17 Furthermore, whilst Article 177 makes it a matter for the national court to assess the need to obtain a preliminary ruling on the questions of interpretation raised, regard being had to the circumstances of fact and of law involved in the main action, it is nevertheless for the Court of Justice, in order to confirm its own jurisdiction, to examine, where necessary, the conditions in which the case has been referred to it by the national court (ibid., at paragraph 21).
27 It should be noted that those two points of reasoning do not fall under national law, but relate to the interpretation of Article 177 of the Treaty, the provisions of which are absolutely binding on the national court (see the judgment in Case 166/73 Rheinmuehlen v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle Getreide [1974] ECR 33, at paragraph 3).
28 On the first point, it is clear both from the wording and the scheme of Article 177 of the Treaty and Article 20 of the Statute of the Court of Justice that a national court or tribunal is not empowered to bring a matter before the Court of Justice by way of a reference for a preliminary ruling unless a case is pending before it (see the judgment in Case 338/85 Pardini [1988] ECR 2041, at paragraph 11). Where a case is referred for a preliminary ruling, only the request for interpretation or a decision on validity is addressed to the Court; the case itself is not transferred. Consequently, the national court remains seised of the case, which is still pending before it. Only the procedure before that court is suspended until the Court has delivered its ruling on the reference.
29 On the second point in the reasoning, it must be observed that the justification for a preliminary reference, and hence for the jurisdiction of the Court, is not that it enables advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions to be delivered (see the judgment in Foglia v Novello, cited above, at paragraph 18), but rather that it is necessary for the effective resolution of a dispute.