Vasiliki Balazs v Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Cluj and Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Cluj v Attila Balazs.
Date: 2015-01-22
30. In accordance with settled case-law, although new legislation is generally valid only for the future, it also applies, according to a generally recognised principle, in the absence of a provision to the contrary, to the future effects of situations which arose during the period of validity of the old law (see judgment in Duchon , C‑290/00, EU:C:2002:234, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
31. In order to enable Regulation No 1408/71 to apply to the future effects of situations arising during the period of validity of the old law, Article 94 lays down in particular, in paragraph 2, the obligation to take into consideration, for the purposes of determining rights to benefit, all periods of insurance, employment or residence completed under the legislation of any Member State before 1 October 1972 or before the date of the regulation’s application in the territory of that Member State (see judgment in Duchon , EU:C:2002:234, paragraph 23).
34. Indeed, it is clear from Article 6 of Regulation No 1408/71 that the latter, as regards persons and matters which it covers, and subject to certain provisos, replaces the provisions of any social security convention which binds two or more Member States. That replacement is mandatory in nature and does not allow of exceptions save for the cases set out in the regulation (see, by analogy, judgments in Walder , 82/72, EU:C:1973:62, paragraphs 6 and 7; Thévenon , C‑475/93, EU:C:1995:371, paragraph 15; and Rönfeldt , C‑227/89, EU:C:1991:52, paragraph 22).
35. The exceptions provided for by Regulation No 1408/71 include the exception in Article 7(2)(c), according to which the provisions of the social security conventions mentioned in Annex III to the regulation continue to apply notwithstanding Article 6 of the regulation (judgments in Habelt and Others , C‑396/05, EU:C:2007:810, paragraph 87, and Wencel , C‑589/10, EU:C:2013:303, paragraph 35), provided that those conventions are more favourable to the beneficiaries or they arise from specific historical circumstances and their effect is limited in time.
41. Second, the principles established in the judgment in Rönfeldt (EU:C:1991:52) are derived from the notion that the person concerned was entitled to entertain a legitimate expectation that he would be able to benefit from the provisions of a bilateral convention which alone was applicable to him on the date when he decided to move to another Member State (see, to this effect, judgment in Kaske , C‑277/99, EU:C:2002:74, paragraph 27).
49. In that connection, regard must be had to the settled case-law of the Court to the effect that the interpretation which, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 267 TFEU, the Court gives to a rule of EU law clarifies and defines the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be or ought to have been understood and applied from the date of its entry into force. It follows that the rule as thus interpreted may, and must, be applied by the courts even to legal relationships which arose and were established before the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation, provided that in other respects the conditions for bringing a dispute relating to the application of that rule before the courts having jurisdiction are satisfied (see judgment in Santander Asset Management SGIIC and Others , C‑338/11 to C‑347/11, EU:C:2012:286, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).
50. It is only quite exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the EU legal order, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling into question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely that those concerned should have acted in good faith and that there should be a risk of serious difficulties (see judgment in Santander Asset Management SGIIC and Others , EU:C:2012:286, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
51. More specifically, the Court has taken that step only in quite specific circumstances, notably where there was a risk of serious economic repercussions owing in particular to the large number of legal relationships entered into in good faith on the basis of rules considered to be validly in force and where it appeared that individuals and national authorities had been led to adopt practices which did not comply with EU law by reason of objective, significant uncertainty regarding the implications of EU provisions, to which the conduct of other Member States or the Commission may even have contributed (see judgment in Santander Asset Management SGIIC and Others , EU:C:2012:286, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).
52. As the Advocate General has observed in points 98 and 99 of his Opinion, the Romanian Government has not established that there is a risk of serious difficulties. Whilst the Romanian Government refers to 800 applications similar to those of Mr and Mrs Balazs, it does not mention at all the total number of persons in a position comparable to theirs. Nor has the Romanian Government specified whether the sum of RON 38 560 683 also covers the 800 similar applications that are currently pending. These applications would in any event not be affected by a limitation of the temporal effects of the judgment (see, to this effect, judgment in Bosman , C‑415/93, EU:C:1995:463, paragraph 144).