Criminal proceedings against Max Rombi and Arkopharma SA, the party liable at civil law, and Union fédérale des consommateurs "Que Choisir ?" and Organisation générale des consommateurs (Orgeco), Union départementale O6.
Date: 2000-05-18
22 That argument cannot be accepted. The Court has consistently held that it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (see, inter alia, Case C-387/93 Banchero [1995] ECR I-4663, paragraph 15, and Case C-105/94 Celestini v Saar-Sektkellerei Faber [1997] ECR I-2971, paragraph 21). Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59).
23 The Court has also consistently held that, when applying national law, whether the provisions in question were adopted before or after a directive, the national court called on to interpret the directive is required to do so as far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the directive and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 189 of the EC Treaty (now the third paragraph of Article 249 EC) (see, in particular, Case C-106/89 Marleasing v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación [1990] ECR I-4135, paragraph 8, and Case C-355/96 Silhouette International Schmied v Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft [1998] ECR I-4799, paragraph 36).
27 In so far as the first question raises the issue, in particular, of whether Directive 89/398/EEC has been correctly transposed into national law, it must be noted that the Court cannot, in proceedings under Article 177 of the Treaty, rule on the validity of a measure of national law from the point of view of Community law, as it might in proceedings under Article 169 of the EC Treaty (now Article 226 EC) (see Joined Cases C-74/95 and C-129/95 X [1996] ECR I-6609, paragraph 21).
29 Although the Court has consistently held that it does not have jurisdiction within the framework of Article 177 of the EC Treaty to rule on the compatibility of a provision of national law with Community law, it may nonetheless provide the national court with all the criteria of interpretation of Community law which may enable the national court to assess that compatibility for the purposes of deciding the case before it (see Case C-241/89 SARPP v Chambre Syndicale des Raffineurs et Conditionneurs de Sucre de France and Others [1990] ECR I-4695, paragraph 8).
53 First, it must be borne in mind that national rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings must be interpreted, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter (see, inter alia, Marleasing, paragraph 8, and Case C-63/97 Bayerische Motorenwerke (BMW) and BMW Nederland v Deenik [1999] ECR I-905, paragraph 22).
65 The Court has consistently held that the requirements flowing from the protection of general principles recognised in the Community legal order, including the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, are also binding on Member States when they implement Community rules, and that consequently they are bound, as far as possible, to apply the rules in accordance with those requirements. Where national rules fall within the scope of Community law and reference is made to the Court for a preliminary ruling, the Court must provide all the criteria of interpretation needed by the national court to determine whether those rules are compatible with the general principles the observance of which is ensured by the Court (see, on fundamental rights falling within those general principles, Case C-2/92 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Bostock [1994] ECR I-955, paragraph 16).
66 It is true that, as Arkopharma has observed, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is the corollary of the principle of legal certainty which requires that legal rules be clear and precise, and aims to ensure that situations and legal relationships governed by Community law remain foreseeable (see Case C-63/93 Duff and Others v Minister for Agriculture and Food, Ireland, and the Attorney General [1996] ECR I-569, paragraph 20).
67 However, according to the case-law of the Court, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations may be relied on in order to challenge Community rules only to the extent that the Community itself has previously created a situation which can give rise to a legitimate expectation (see, for example, Case C-22/94 Irish Farmers Association and Others v Minister for Agriculture, Food and Forestry, Ireland and the Attorney General [1997] ECR I-1809, paragraph 19). In the case of foodstuffs intended for particular nutritional uses, Community rules have not previously created a situation which might give rise, on the part of Arkopharma, to a legitimate expectation on which Arkopharma could rely.
72 However, in the present case, it is not apparent from the documents in the main proceedings that the activity carried on by Arkopharma involved either exporting or importing the products concerned. In such circumstances the Court is not in a position to determine whether the rules and principles relating to the free movement of goods apply to an activity of the kind at issue in the main proceedings. That decision therefore falls to the national court, which alone has jurisdiction to determine and evaluate the facts in the proceedings pending before it.