larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Empresa Nacional de Urânio SA v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1993-02-16
10 As the Court has held with regard to Article 175 of the EEC Treaty, the wording of which is identical to that of Article 148 of the EAEC Treaty, the remedy for a failure to act is founded on the premiss that the unlawful inaction on the part of the Council or the Commission enables the other institutions and the Member States and, in certain circumstances, private persons to bring the matter before the Court in order to obtain a declaration that the failure to act is contrary to the Treaty, in so far as it has not been repaired by the institution concerned (judgments in Case 377/87 Parliament v Council [1988] ECR 4017, paragraph 9, and in Case 383/87 Commission v Council [1988] ECR 4051, paragraph 9). A reply given by the institutions to a request to act need not necessarily correspond with the action sought by the applicants in order to put an end to the failure. A failure to act, for the purposes of Article 175, means a failure to take a decision or to take a position, and not the adoption of a measure different from that south or considered necessary by the persons concerned (judgment in Case 8/71 Deutscher Komponistenverband v Commission [1971] ECR 705).
16 It must be pointed out that the decision requested by ENU was meant to provide a solution for the specific problem which it had submitted to the Agency and the Commission. That decision ought to have been taken, according to the applicant, under the second paragraph of Article 53 of the Treaty, which entitles the parties concerned to refer to the Commission an act performed by the Agency and to obtain a decision from the Commission.
34 On the other hand, in so far as the Commission is formally requested, "in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 53 ... of the EAEC Treaty", in particular to order the Agency to take "special action" enabling an immediate solution to be found for the problem encountered by ENU in disposing of its uranium, the letter at issue must be understood as referring to the Commission the implied act of the Agency refusing to exercise its right of option in respect of the applicant' s uranium production.
Christian Poucet v Assurances Générales de France and Caisse Mutuelle Régionale du Languedoc-Roussillon.
Date: 1993-02-17
6 As the Court held in Case 238/82 Duphar v Netherlands [1984] ECR 523, paragraph 16, Community law does not detract from the powers of the Member States to organize their social security systems.
12 Finally, there is solidarity between the various social security schemes, in that those in surplus contribute to the financing of those with structural financial difficulties.
13 It follows that the social security schemes, as described, are based on a system of compulsory contribution, which is indispensable for application of the principle of solidarity and the financial equilibrium of those schemes.
15 In the discharge of their duties, the funds apply the law and thus cannot influence the amount of the contributions, the use of assets and the fixing of the level of benefits. For management of the sickness and maternity scheme, the regional sickness funds may entrust to certain organizations, such as those that are governed in France by the Code de la Mutualité (Code governing mutual societies) or the Code des Assurances (Insurance Code), the task of collecting contributions and paying out benefits. However, it does not appear that those organizations, which, in the performance of that task, act only as agents of the sickness funds, are referred to by the judgments of the national court.
17 The Court has held (in particular in Case C-41/90 Hoefner v Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraph 21) that in the context of competition law the concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed.
18 Sickness funds, and the organizations involved in the management of the public social security system, fulfil an exclusively social function. That activity is based on the principle of national solidarity and is entirely non-profit-making. The benefits paid are statutory benefits bearing no relation to the amount of the contributions.
19 Accordingly, that activity is not an economic activity and, therefore, the organizations to which it is entrusted are not undertakings within the meaning of Articles 85 and 96 of the Treaty.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 1993-02-17
13 As is apparent from the case-law of the Court, the concept of pay within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 119 comprises any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, whether immediate or future, provided that the worker receives it, albeit indirectly, in respect of his employment from his employer. The fact that certain benefits are paid after the termination of the employment relationship does not prevent them from being in the nature of pay within the meaning of Article 119 of the Treaty (see, in particular, the judgment in Case C-262/88 Barber [1990] ECR I-1889, paragraph 12).
14 On the other hand, that definition of "pay" cannot cover social security schemes or benefits such as, for example, retirement pensions, which are governed by statute without any element of negotiation within the undertaking or branch of activity concerned, and which apply compulsorily to general categories of workers. Such schemes provide workers with the benefit of a statutory system to the financing of which the workers, the employers and, in some cases, the public authorities contribute to an extent determined less by the employment relationship between the employer and the worker than by considerations of social policy (judgment in Case 80/70 Defrenne [1971] ECR 445, paragraphs 7 and 8).
17 It is also apparent that the additional payment is contractual since it is the result of negotiations between employers and employees. The fact that it was subsequently made compulsory erga omnes by legislation cannot therefore detract from its contractual nature. In any event, as the Court held in Barber (paragraph 16), a redundancy payment made by the employer cannot cease to constitute a form of pay on the sole ground that, rather than deriving from the contract of employment, it is a statutory or ex gratia payment.
21 Finally, as the Court held in Barber (paragraph 18), provided that the worker is entitled to receive a benefit from his employer by reason of the existence of the employment relationship, the fact that that benefit is in the nature of pay cannot be called in question merely because it can also be regarded as reflecting considerations of social policy.
Miriam Gobbis v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben.
Date: 1993-02-18
12 It must further be recalled that, according to settled case-law (see, most recently, the judgment in Case C-188/90 Doriguzzi-Zordanin [1992] ECR I-2039, paragraph 14), benefits under Regulation No 1408/71 in respect of the orphaned child of a migrant worker must be calculated in such a way that, where the amount of the benefits actually received in the Member State of residence is lower than that of the benefits provided for under the legislation of another Member State, the orphan is entitled to receive from the competent institution of the latter State a benefit supplement equal to the difference between the two amounts.
13 It follows from that case-law that an orphaned child of a migrant worker cannot be deprived of an entitlement to higher benefits available to him under the legislation of a Member State other than that in which he resides. However, he cannot be allowed rights greater than those he would be able to claim under the legislation of that other Member State if he were resident there. Such a result can be brought about only if the institution of the latter Member State can set off against the benefits it must provide all the benefits paid in the other Member State of residence for the maintenance of the orphan, regardless of their nature or designation (see Case C-188/90, paragraph 15).
15 In view of the fact that systems of assistance for orphans vary considerably from one Member State to another and in order to avoid arbitrary differences according to the national systems applicable, the Court has held that the term "benefits" for orphans in Article 78(1) of Regulation No 1408/71 must be interpreted as referring to all benefits intended under the applicable national system for the maintenance of orphans, whatever the character and designation of those benefits may be (see Case C-188/90, paragraph 16).
16 Consequently, the amount of the benefit supplement for orphans must be calculated by comparing all the benefits intended for the maintenance of the orphan in question, actually provided in the Member State of residence, with all the benefits intended for the maintenance of the said orphan which he would be entitled to if resident in the other Member State (see Case C-188/90, paragraph 17).
Fioravante Luigi Bogana v Union Nationale des Mutualités Socialistes and Institut National d'Assurance Maladie-Invalidité.
Date: 1993-02-18
17 As the Court has consistently held (see, mutatis mutandis, the judgment in Joined Cases C-90/91 and C-91/91 Di Crescenzo and Casagrande [1992] ECR I-3851, paragraph 17), in order to calculate the amount of an invalidity benefit due under Community law to a worker who has been subject to the legislation of two or more Member States, the competent institution in each of those States must effect a comparison between the amount due under its national legislation alone, including the rules against overlapping, and the amount due under Article 46 of Regulation No 1408/71, including the rule against overlapping set out in Article 46(3). For the purposes of the payment of the benefit, the worker must benefit by whichever of the two sets of rules is more favourable to him.
General Milk Products GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas.
Date: 1993-03-03
21 As stated by the plaintiff company in the main proceedings and the Commission, the position would be different only if it could be shown that the importation and re-exportation of that cheese were not realised as bona fide commercial transactions but only in order wrongfully to benefit from the grant of monetary compensatory amounts (see, by analogy, the judgment in Case 250/80 Anklagemyndigheden v Toepfer [1981] ECR 2465). The bona fide nature of those transactions is a question of fact to be decided by the national court.
Finanzamt Kassel-Goethestrasse v Viessmann KG.
Date: 1993-03-18
12 In answering that question, it should be borne in mind that the directive harmonizes both the structure and the rate of indirect taxes on the raising of capital within the Community and that Article 4 of the directive lists the transactions which the Member States may or must, according to the category, subject to capital duty.
17 It is the Court' s duty to interpret all provisions of Community law which national courts need in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court of Justice by those courts.
21 Accordingly, it should be stated in reply to the question put by the national court that the transfer by a member with unlimited liability for the debts of a capital company of part of his shareholding to a member whose liability in that company is limited cannot be subject to capital duty by virtue of Article 4 of Council Directive 69/335/EEC of 17 July 1969 concerning indirect taxes on the raising of capital. Nor may such a transaction be taxed by virtue of Article 6 of that directive in the Member States which have elected to exempt contributions subscribed by members with unlimited liability, where the shares transferred have already been subjected to capital tax at the time of their creation.
European Parliament v Erik Dan Frederiksen.
Date: 1993-03-18
13 In considering the merits of that argument, it must be borne in mind that it is settled law (see, for example, the judgments in Case 188/73 Grassi v Council [1974] ECR 1099, paragraph 38, and Case C-343/87 Culin v Commission [1990] ECR I-225, paragraph 19) that although the appointing authority has wide discretion in comparing the candidates' merits and reports, especially with a view to the post to be filled, it must exercise it within the self-imposed limits set by the vacancy notice.
14 The purpose of the vacancy notice is to give those interested the most accurate information possible about the conditions of eligibility for the post to enable them to judge for themselves whether they should apply for it (Grassi, paragraph 40).
15 Thus, the latitude available to the appointing authority regarding appointment or promotion presupposes careful examination of the file and meticulous regard to the requirements laid down in the vacancy notice, so that the appointing authority is required to reject any candidate who does not meet those requirements (Grassi). Moreover, in its judgment in Case C-269/90 Technische Universitaet Muenchen [1991] ECR I-5469, paragraph 14, the Court observed, in general terms, that the power of appraisal available to a Community authority is tempered by the obligation to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case.
31 In that regard, reference need merely be made to the finding in paragraph 20 of this judgment that the Court of First Instance was right to hold that the appointing authority had clearly exceeded the bounds of its power of appraisal by promoting Mrs X, whose knowledge did not meet the conditions laid down in the vacancy notice. That is in itself sufficient reason to justify the annulment on legal grounds of the decision promoting Mrs X. In those circumstances, such defects as might vitiate the other finding of the Court of First Instance as to the comparison of the merits of candidates do not in any event affect the operative part of the contested judgment. The Parliament' s plea directed against the latter finding is therefore ineffective and must be rejected.
Beate Weber v European Parliament.
Date: 1993-03-23
8 As regards the admissibility of the claim for annulment, the Court observes that the European Economic Community is based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty, which established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court of Justice to review the legality of measures adopted by the institutions (see Case 294/83 Les Verts v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, paragraph 23, Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199, paragraph 16, Case C-2/88 Imm. Zwartfeld and Others [1990] ECR I-3365, paragraph 16, and Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, paragraph 21).
11 In the light of those criteria, rules on an end-of-service allowance for Members of Parliament and individual measures applying those rules have legal effects going beyond the internal organization of the work of that institution in so far as they affect the financial situation of Members of Parliament when they cease to serve in that capacity.
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 1993-03-23
6 It must be pointed out that, even if Article 171 of the Treaty does not specify the period within which a judgment must be complied with, the common interest attaching to the immediate and uniform application of Community law requires that the process of complying with a judgment be initiated at once and completed as soon as possible (see the judgment in Case 169/87 Commission v France [1988] ECR 4093, paragraph 14).
Christos Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig - Standesamt and Landratsamt Calw - Ordnungsamt.
Date: 1993-03-30
12 In answering that question, it must first be borne in mind that, as the Court has stated on numerous occasions, Article 52 of the Treaty constitutes one of the fundamental legal provisions of the Community. By prohibiting any discrimination on grounds of nationality resulting from national laws, regulations or practices, that article seeks to ensure that, as regards the right of establishment, a Member State accords to nationals of other Member States the same treatment as it accords to its own nationals (judgment in Case 197/84 Steinhauser v City of Biarritz [1985] ECR 1819, paragraph 14).
13 It must therefore be determined whether national rules relating to the transcription in Roman characters of the name of a Greek national in the registers of civil status of the Member State in which he is established are capable of placing him at a disadvantage in law or in fact, in comparison with the way in which a national of that Member State would be treated in the same circumstances.
15 Rules of that kind are to be regarded as incompatible with Article 52 of the Treaty only in so far as their application causes a Greek national such a degree of inconvenience as in fact to interfere with his freedom to exercise the right of establishment enshrined in that article.
Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank v A. de Wit.
Date: 1993-03-30
16 In that regard, it should first be pointed out that, as the Court held in Case 284/84 Spruyt [1986] ECR 685 and Case C-293/88 Winter-Lutzins [1990] ECR I-1623, the provisions of Regulation No 1408/71 and in particular those of Annex VI thereto were adopted to implement Article 51 of the Treaty and must be interpreted in the light of the objective of Article 51, which is to contribute to the establishment of the greatest possible freedom of movement for migrant workers, which is one of the foundations of the Community.
19 Although, having regard to that context, the Court held in the aforementioned judgments that section 2(a) of Annex VI to Regulation No 1408/71, together with what is now section 2(e), can, in the case of persons who resided during the six years following their 59th birthday in one or more other Member States (and as long as they reside there), make taking into account periods before the entry into force of the AOW dependent on fulfilling a supplementary condition to the effect that during the relevant periods the person in question resided in the Netherlands or pursued an activity as an employed person in that country, even though that supplementary condition is not required to be fulfilled by persons who were resident for the six years in question in the Netherlands (and who continue to be resident in that country at the time when they claim entitlement to the pension), it should however be noted that the Court considered that such periods provide a sufficient link with the Netherlands for them to be treated as periods of insurance under the AOW (see the judgment in Winter-Lutzins, paragraph 18).
20 It should further be observed that the purpose of the provision in question of Annex VI to Regulation No 1408/71 is to prevent the obstacles which might arise from the transitional AOW rules from impeding the freedom of movement of those persons who, having resided or worked in the Netherlands, wish to move to another Member State (see the judgment in Spruyt, paragraph 22). Accordingly, the provision must be given a broad interpretation in order that the restrictive effects which it is susceptible of having on the free movement of such persons are limited to the utmost and do not go beyond that which is necessary in order to take account of the particular features of a general old-age insurance scheme, such as the AOW, under which, it is recalled, the mere fact of residing in the Netherlands is sufficient in order to be insured.
Pierre Corbiau v Administration des contributions.
Date: 1993-03-30
15 It must be remembered that the expression "court or tribunal" is a concept of Community law, which, by its very nature, can only mean an authority acting as a third party in relation to the authority which adopted the decision forming the subject-matter of the proceedings.
16 In this instance, the Directeur des Contributions does not act as such a third party. Being at the head of the Direction des Contributions Directes et des Accises (Direct Taxes and Excise Duties Directorate), he has a clear organizational link with the departments which made the disputed tax assessment, against which the complaint submitted to him is directed. This is confirmed, moreover, by the fact that, if the matter were to come before the Conseil d' État on appeal, the Directeur des Contributions would be a party to the proceedings.
Christof Oorburg and Serge van Messem v Wasser- und Schiffahrtsdirektion Nordwest, Aurich.
Date: 1993-03-31
12 In replying to the question from the national court, it must be borne in mind that Article 76 of the Treaty contains a standstill clause. It is clear from Case C-195/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-3141, paragraph 20, that that provision is intended to prevent the introduction by the Council of a common transport policy from being rendered more difficult, or from being obstructed, by the adoption, without the Council' s agreement, of national measures the direct or indirect effect of which is to alter unfavourably the situation in a Member State of carriers from other Member States in relation to national carriers.
Möllmann-Fleisch GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas.
Date: 1993-03-31
13 It should be pointed out that, as the Court has already held in Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v Dimex, at paragraph 11, concerning Regulation (EEC) No 192/75 of the Commission of 17 January 1975 laying down detailed rules for the application of export refunds in respect of agricultural products (OJ 1975 L 25, p. 1), the fact that the third subparagraph of Article 11(1) of that regulation permits the competent authorities to require other documents where they consider, in view of the particular circumstances in the country of destination, that proof of completion of customs formalities is insufficient shows that such proof amounts only to rebuttable evidence that the objective of the variable export refunds has in fact been attained.
14 However, just like the provision at issue in Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v Dimex, Article 20(4) of Regulation 2730/79 provides that other documents may be produced where the documents specified in paragraph 3 are considered inadequate. It follows that, although the customs entry certificate constitutes a more important piece of evidence than the documents listed in Article 20(4) of Regulation No 2730/79 to the effect that importation took place, none the less it does not amount to irrebuttable proof.
15 The probative force which normally attaches to the customs entry certificate may as a result be disregarded where there is reason to doubt the actual access of the goods to the market of the territory of destination in order to be marketed there. Otherwise the objective of the variable export refunds might be jeopardized. As the Court held in paragraph 16 of Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v Dimex, in view of the objectives of the system of variable refunds, it is essential that products subsidized by such refunds should actually reach the market of destination and be marketed there.
Pesqueras Echebastar SA v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1993-04-01
12 In that respect, it is irrelevant that the position thus defined by the Commission does not satisfy Echebastar. According to the Court' s case-law, Article 175 of the Treaty relates to a failure to act in the sense of failure to take a decision or to define a position and not to the adoption of a measure different from that desired or considered necessary by the persons concerned (see the judgment in Joined Cases C-15/91 and 108/91 Josef Buckl & Soehne and Others v Commission [1992] ECR I-6061, paragraphs 16 and 17).