larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Athinaïki Chartopoïïa AE v L. Panagiotidis and Others
Date: 2007-02-15
23. According to the Court’s case-law, the concept of ‘establishment’, which is not defined in that directive, is a term of Community law and cannot be defined by reference to the laws of the Member States (Case C‑449/93 Rockfon  [1995] ECR I‑4291, paragraphs 23 and 25). It must, a ccordingly, be interpreted in an autonomous and uniform manner in the Community legal order.
24. The Court has also held that the terms used in the various language versions of Directive 98/59 to refer to the concept of ‘establishment’ are somewhat different and have different connotations, signifying, according to the version in question, establishment, undertaking, work centre, local unit or place of work (see Rockfon , paragraphs 26 and 27).
25. In the light of those considerations and the purpose of that directive which, as evidenced by the second recital in the preamble thereto, seeks inter alia to promote greater protection for workers in the event of collective redundancies, the Court has interpreted the concept of ‘establishment’ in Directive 98/59, in particular in Article 1(1)(a), as designating, depending on the circumstances, the unit to which the workers made redundant are assigned to carry out their duties ( Rockfon , paragraphs 31 and 32, and case-law cited).
26. In so doing, the Court has defined the term ‘establishment’ very broadly, in order to limit as far as possible cases of collective redundancies which are not subject to Directive 98/59 because of the legal definition of that term at national level (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑187/05 to C‑190/05 Agorastoudis and Others  [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 37). However, given the general nature of that definition, it cannot by itself be decisive for the appraisal of the specific circumstances of the case at issue in the main proceedings.
27. Thus, for the purposes of the application of Directive 98/59, an ‘establishment’, in the context of an undertaking, may consist of a distinct entity, having a certain degree of permanence and stability, which is assigned to perform one or more given tasks and which has a workforce, technical means and a certain organisational structure allowing for the accomplishment of those tasks.
28. Given that the objective pursued by Directive 98/59 concerns, in particular, the socio‑economic effects which collective redundancies may have in a given local context and social environment, the entity in question need not have any legal autonomy, nor need it have economic, financial, administrative or technological autonomy, in order to be regarded as an ‘establishment’.
29. It is, moreover, in this spirit that the Court has held that it is not essential, in order for there to be an ‘establishment’, for the unit in question to be endowed with a management which can independently effect collective redundancies ( Rockfon , paragraph 34, and point 2 of the operative part). Nor must there be a geographical separation from the other units and facilities of the undertaking.
RUMA GmbH v Oberfinanzdirektion Nürnberg.
Date: 2007-02-15
27. It should be noted at the outset that it is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be found in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the combined nomenclature and of the notes to the sections or chapters (see, inter alia, Case C-396/02 DFDS  [2004] ECR I-8439, paragraph 27; Case C-495/03 Intermodal Transports  [2005] ECR I-8151, paragraph 47; and Case C-445/04 Possehl Erzkontor  [2005] ECR I-10721, paragraph 19).
31. It must be borne in mind that the term ‘part’ implies a whole for the operation of which the part is essential ( Peacock , paragraph 21, and Case C-276/00 Turbon International  [2002] ECR I-1389, paragraph 30).
32. In this connection, it must be noted that the assembling of the keypad membrane at issue in the main proceedings with the other components of a mobile telephone serves to ensure that it is a functional unit. The term ‘functional unit’, as defined by the case-law of the Court, applies where a machine or appliance consists of separate components which are designed to contribute together to a single clearly defined function (Case 223/84 Telefunken Fernseh und Rundfunk  [1985] ECR 3335, paragraph 29).
34. On the other hand, a mobile telephone keypad is not a functional unit which is distinct from the piece of apparatus into which it is incorporated inasmuch as it cannot be used independently or for a function other than that which may be performed by the telephone as a whole (see, inter alia, to that effect, Telefunken Fernseh und Rundfunk , paragraph 31).
36. The intended use of a product may also constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (see Case C-459/93 Thyssen Haniel Logistic [1995] ECR I-1381, paragraph 13).
Maatschap J. en G.P. en A.C. Schouten v Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit.
Date: 2007-03-01
25. It is settled case-law that, in interpreting a provision of Community law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, Case C‑294/01 Granarolo  [2003] ECR I-13429, paragraph 34, and Case C-306/05 SGAE  [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraph 34).
28. That interpretation is borne out by the objectives pursued by Regulation No 1254/1999. In fact, as recital 13 in the preamble thereto shows, one of the aims of that regulation is to halt the trend towards intensification of beef and veal production, whereby producers carry ever-increasing numbers of bovine animals on their holdings without increasing the area of the latter so that it is insufficient to feed the animals.
Länsstyrelsen i Norrbottens län v Lapin liitto.
Date: 2007-03-08
20. Although the Finnish version of that provision contains no reference to the requirement that overheads be allocated ‘pro rata’ to the operation in question, that fact is of no consequence, since it follows from settled case-law that Community provisions must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all the Community languages and since, in this case, the language versions other than the Finnish expressly refer to the requirement that overheads be allocated pro rata or proportionally to the operation in question (see by analogy, in particular, Case C‑219/95 P Ferriere Nord  v Commission  [1997] ECR I-4411, paragraph 15).
23. So far as the first requirement for eligibility is concerned, it is sufficient to observe, as the Commission puts it, that overheads are based on real costs if they were actually paid out by final beneficiaries and are supported by receipted invoices or accounting documents of equal probative value within the meaning of the first and third subparagraphs of Article 32(1) of Regulation No 1260/1999.
Gerlach und Co. mbH v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt (Oder).
Date: 2007-03-08
33. However, the Court has already held that it follows from the very wording of Article 11a(2) of Regulation No 1062/87, as well as from the substantially identical provisions which succeeded it, namely Article 49(2) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1214/92 of 21 April 1992 on provision for the implementation of the Community transit procedure and for certain simplifications of that procedure (OJ 1992 L 132, p. 1) and Article 379(2) of Regulation No 2454/93, that notification by the office of departure to the principal of the time-limit by which the proof requested must be furnished is mandatory and must precede recovery of the customs debt (see, to that effect, Case C‑460/01 Commission v Netherlands [2005] ECR I‑2613, paragraphs 62 and 80).
34. The Court, moreover, has emphasised that this time-limit is intended to protect the interests of the principal by allowing it three months in which to furnish, where appropriate, proof of the regularity of the transit operation or of the place where the offence or irregularity was actually committed (see Case C‑112/01 SPKR  [2002] ECR I-10655, paragraph 38, and Honeywell Aerospace , paragraph 24).
35. It follows that the Member State to which the office of departure belongs can proceed to recovery of import duties only if it has first informed the principal that it has available a period of three months to provide the requested proof and if such proof has not been provided within that period (see to that effect Lensing & Brockhausen , paragraph 29, and Honeywell Aerospace , paragraph 23).
38. Respect for this right is a fundamental principle of the Community legal order which must be maintained in all proceedings, including those of Community transit, which are commenced against a person and which are likely to lead to a measure adversely affecting that person (see, to that effect, C‑32/95 P Commission v Lisrestal and Others  [1996] ECR I-5373, paragraphs 21 and 30; Case C‑462/98 P Mediocurso v Commission  [2000] ECR I-7183, paragraph 36; and Case C‑287/02 Spain v Commission  [2005] ECR I-5093, paragraph 37).
Campina GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt (Oder).
Date: 2007-03-08
30. In the procedure laid down by Article 234 EC providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (Case C-286/05 Haug  [2006] ECR I-4121, paragraph 17 and the case‑law cited).
31. Moreover, it must be recalled that the Court has a duty to interpret all provi sions of Community law which national courts need in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court of Justice by those courts (Case C-42/96 Immobiliare SIF [1997] ECR I-7089, paragraph 28 and the case‑law cited).
32. It must be noted that the principle of the retroactive application of the more lenient penalty forms part of the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and, accordingly, must be considered to be one of the general principles of Community law, which the Court ensures are respected and which national courts are required to abide by (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02 Berlusconi and Others  [2005] ECR I-3565, paragraphs 67 to 69).
33. That principle is more specifically laid down in the second sentence of Article 2(2) of Regulation No 2988/95, according to which the competent authorities are obliged to apply retroactively penalties provided for by sectoral rules to practices on the ground that those penalties are less severe (see, to that effect, Case C‑295/02 Gerken  [2004] ECR I‑6369, paragraph 61).
36. As set out in Article 5(3) of Regulation No 1392/2001, the financial penalty for a failure to observe the deadline of 15 May such as that at issue in the main proceedings is, first, set at an amount equal to the levy due for a 0.01% overrun for each calendar day of delay of the reference quantity for direct sales which the purchaser has at his disposal and, second, may not be less than EUR 100 nor more than EUR 100 000.
37. By contrast, pursuant to the first indent of the second subparagraph of Regulation No 536/93, the financial penalty for a failure to respect the deadline of 15 May such as that at issue in the main proceedings, first, corresponds to 0.1% of the quantities of milk and milk equivalent delivered to the purchaser by the producers and, second, may not be less than ECU 500 nor more than ECU 20 000.
38. It therefore follows, as the Commission has rightly pointed out in its observations, that in the case of a slight delay in observing the deadline of 15 May, such as in the case at issue, the system of financial penalties under Article 5(3) of Regulation No 1392/2001 is less severe than that provided for by the first indent of the second subparagraph of Article 3(2) of Regulation No 536/93.
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2007-03-29
45. Even if the Commission could, under the procedure laid down in Article 226 EC, have taken action against the United Kingdom on the basis of other provisions of Community law in respect of the system for issuing new fishing licences, as the Advocate General observed in point 45 of her Opinion, it is common ground that the breach of such provisions does not constitute the subject-matter of the failure to fulfil obligations complained of (see Case C‑6/04 Commission  v United Kingdom  [2005] ECR I‑9017, paragraphs 58 to 60; Case C‑225/04 Commission  v France  [2006] ECR I‑5251, paragraph 24; and Case C‑34/04 Commission  v Netherlands  [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 53).
UAB Profisa v Muitinės departamentas prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos.
Date: 2007-04-19
13. According to settled case-law, the need for a uniform interpretation of the provisions of Community law makes it impossible for the text of a provision to be considered in isolation, but requires, on the contrary, that it be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages (Case 26/69 Stauder v Ulm  [1969] ECR 419, paragraph 3; Case 55/87 Moksel [1988] ECR 3845, paragraph 15; and Case C-296/95 EMU Tabac and Others  [1998] ECR I-1605, paragraph 36).
14. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of a Community text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (Case 30/77 Bouchereau  [1977] ECR 1999, paragraph 14; Case C-482/98 Italy v Commission  [2000] ECR I-10861, paragraph 49; and Case C-1/02 Borgmann  [2004] ECR I-3219, paragraph 25).
17. Furthermore, the objective pursued by the exemptions contained in Directive 92/83 is, in particular, to neutralise the impact of excise duties on alcohol used as an intermediate product in other commercial or industrial products ( Italy v Commission , paragraph 4).
18. Moreover, exemption of products covered by Article 27(1) of Directive 92/83 is the rule and refusal is the exception. The power granted to Member States by Article 27(1) of Directive 92/83 to lay down conditions ‘for the purpose of ensuring the correct and straightforward application of such exemptions and of preventing any evasion, avoidance or abuse’ cannot detract from the unconditional nature of the obligation imposed by that provision to grant exemption ( Italy v Commission , paragraph 50).
Sunshine Deutschland Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Hauptzollamt Kiel.
Date: 2007-04-19
26. It is first necessary to point out that it is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and the section and chapter notes (see, inter alia, Case C-42/99 Eru Portuguesa [2000] ECR I-7691, paragraph 13; Case C-495/03 Intermodal Transports  [2005] ECR I-8151, paragraph 47; Case C-445/04 Possehl Erzkontor [2005] ECR I-10721, paragraph 19; and Case C-500/04 Proxxon [2006] ECR I-1545, paragraph 21).
27. Second, the Court has already held that the explanatory notes to the CN and those to the HS are, for their part, an important aid for interpreting the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force. The wording of those notes must therefore be consistent with the provisions of the CN and cannot alter their scope (see Intermodal Transports , paragraph 48; Possehl Erzkontor , paragraph 20; and Proxxon , paragraph 22).
28. Finally, it must be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s case-law, the intended use of a product may constitute an objective criterion in relation to tariff classification if it is inherent in the product, and such inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (see, inter alia, Case C-201/99 Deutsche Nichimen  [2001] ECR I-2701, paragraph 20; Case C-130/02 Krings  [2004] ECR I-2121, paragraph 30; and Case C-467/03 Ikegami [2005] ECR I-2389, paragraph 23; and Proxxon , paragraph 31).
30. As the Commission has observed, it is apparent from the wording of heading 1209 (‘Seeds, fruits and spores, of a kind used for sowing’) that this heading relates only to plant matter having the ability to germinate and create a new plant. By contrast, heading 1212, which covers, inter alia, ‘fruit stones and kernels and other vegetable products …, of a kind used primarily for human consumption, not elsewhere specified or included’, is a residual category covering plant seeds which are intended, not to be sown, but for human consumption.
31. Therefore, the explanatory notes to the CN, which exclude pumpkin seeds from subheading 1212 99 80 and place them under heading 1209, can only be understood as meaning that those pumpkin seeds of a kind used for sowing alone are excluded, and not seeds, such as those in the present case, which have been shelled and have lost their ability to germinate. There is otherwise no need to take account of those explanatory notes, which include under subheading 1209 91 90 pumpkin seeds intended for human consumption or for the food industry.
32. In light of those considerations, the reply to the question referred must be that subheading 1212 99 80 of the CN must be interpreted as meaning that shelled pumpkin seeds which have lost their ability to germinate and which are intended for use in the baking industry come under that subheading.
Costs
Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Finland.
Date: 2007-04-26
18. In this regard, although it is true that the subject-matter of proceedings brought under Article 226 EC is circumscribed by the pre-litigation procedure provided for in that provision and that, consequently, the Commission’s reasoned opinion and the application must be based on the same objections, that requirement cannot go so far as to mean that in every case exactly the same wording must be used in both, where the subject-matter of the proceedings has not been extended or altered but simply narrowed (see, in particular, Case C‑229/00 Commission  v Finland  [2003] ECR I-5727, paragraphs 44 and 46, Case C-433/03 Commission  v Germany  [2005] ECR I-6985, paragraph 28, and Case C-150/04 Commission  v Denmark  [2007] ECR I-0000, paragraph 67). Accordingly, in its application the Commission may clarify its initial grounds of objection provided, however, that it does not alter the subject-matter of the dispute (Case C-67/99 Commission  v Ireland  [2001] ECR I-5757, paragraph 23, judgment of 12 October 2004 in Case C-328/02 Commission  v Greece , not published in the ECR, paragraph 32, and Case C-494/01 Commission  v Ireland  [2005] ECR I-3331, paragraph 38).
21. However, the Court may of its own motion examine whether the conditions laid down in Article 226 EC for bringing an action for failure to fulfil obligations are satisfied (Case C-362/90 Commission  v Italy [1992] ECR I-2353, paragraph 8, Case C-439/99 Commission  v Italy [2002] ECR I-305, paragraph 8, and Case C‑98/04 Commission  v United Kingdom  [2006] ECR I-4003, paragraph 16).
22. It is clear from Article 38(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, and from the case-law relating to that provision, that an application must state the subject-matter of the proceedings and a summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based, and that that statement must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the application. It is therefore necessary for the essential points of law and of fact on which a case is based to be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself (Case C‑178/00 Italy  v Commission  [2003] ECR I-303, paragraph 6, judgment of 14 October 2004 in Case C‑55/03 Commission  v Spain , not published in the ECR, paragraph 23, and Case C‑199/03 Ireland  v Commission  [2005] ECR I‑8027, paragraph 50) and for the heads of claim to be set out unambiguously so that the Court does not rule ultra petita  or indeed fail to rule on an objection (Case C‑296/01 Commission v France  [2003] ECR I‑13909, paragraph 121, and Case C‑255/04 Commission  v France [2006] ECR I‑5251, paragraph 24).
32. In those circumstances, the Court does not have sufficient evidence to enable it to appreciate exactly the scope of the infringement of Community law imputed to the Republic of Finland and thus to determine whether there is a breach of obligations as alleged by the Commission (see, to that effect, Commission  v United Kingdom , cited above, paragraph 18).
Ypourgos Oikonomikon and Proïstamenos DOY Amfissas v Charilaos Georgakis.
Date: 2007-05-10
28. Article 2(1) of Directive 89/592 prohibits any person who, by virtue, in particular, of his membership of administrative bodies or by virtue of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties, pos sesses inside information, relating to one or more transferable securities, from taking advantage of that information by acquiring or disposing of those transferable securities (see Case C-384/02 Grøngaard and Bang  [2005] ECR I-9939, paragraph 23).
37. The second to the fifth recitals in the preamble to Directive 89/592 state that it is intended to ensure the proper functioning of the secondary market in transferable securities and to protect investors’ confidence, which depends, in particular, on their being placed on an equal footing and protected against the improper use of inside information ( Grøngaard and Bang , paragraph 33).
38. Consequently, the purpose of the prohibition laid down by Article 2 of Directive 89/592 is to ensure equality between the contracting parties in stock-market transactions by preventing one of them who possesses inside information and who is, therefore, in an advantageous position vis‑à‑vis the other investors, from profiting from that information, to the detriment of the other party who is unaware of it.
Řízení Letového Provozu ČR, s. p. v Bundesamt für Finanzen.
Date: 2007-06-07
16. As regards the influence which an international agreement to which the Community is party, such as the GATS, is capable of having on a provision of secondary law, it is settled case-law that the primacy of international agreements concluded by the Community over secondary Community legislation requires that the latter be interpreted, in so far as is possible, in conformity with those agreements (Case C-61/94 Commission  v Germany  [1996] ECR I-3989, paragraph 52; Case C‑286/02 Bellio F.lli  [2004] ECR I-3465, paragraph 33; Case C-311/04 Algemene Scheeps Agentuur Dordrecht  [2006] ECR I-609, paragraph 25; and Joined Cases C-447/05 and C-448/05 Thomson and Vestel France  [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 30).
Carp Snc di L. Moleri e V. Corsi v Ecorad Srl.
Date: 2007-06-07
20. In that context, without it being necessary first to examine the validity of Decision 1999/93, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied upon as such against an individual. It follows that even a clear, precise and unconditional provision of a directive seeking to confer rights or impose obligations on individuals cannot of itself apply in proceedings exclusively between private parties (Case 152/84 Marshall  [1986] ECR 723, paragraph 48; Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori [1994] ECR I-3325, paragraph 20; Case C-192/94 El Corte Inglés [1996] ECR I-1281, paragraphs 16 and 17; Case C-201/02 Wells [2004] ECR I-723, paragraph 56; and Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer and Others [2004] ECR I-8835, paragraphs 108 and 109).