Christiane Adam, épouse Urbing v Administration de l'enregistrement et des domaines.
Date: 2001-10-11
23 With regard to that argument, it should remembered that it is settled law that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts provided for by Article 234 EC, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 38).
24 Nevertheless, the Court has also stated that, in exceptional circumstances, it can examine the conditions in which the case was referred to it by the national court, in order to assess whether it has jurisdiction. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal information necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, PreussenElektra, cited above, paragraph 39).
25 In this case, it is true that the questions referred involve the interpretation of the concept of liberal profession in a provision of the Sixth Directive relating to VAT exemptions, whereas, in the main proceedings, the meaning of that concept must be established, not with a view to deciding on a VAT exemption, but so as to determine the rate of VAT applicable to the activity of managing agent, which is more a matter for the Luxembourg legislation relating to VAT.
26 However, those circumstances do not of themselves lead to the conclusion that the interpretation requested by the national court bears no relation to the main proceedings and that, therefore, the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to answer the questions referred.
27 It follows from the case-law of the Court that where, in regulating internal situations, domestic legislation adopts the same solutions as those adopted in Community law so as to provide for a single procedure in comparable situations, it is clearly in the Community interest that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, provisions or concepts taken from Community law should be interpreted uniformly, irrespective of the circumstances in which they are to apply (see, inter alia, Case C-130/95 Giloy [1997] ECR I-4291, paragraph 28, and Case C-1/99 Kofisa Italia [2001] ECR I-207, paragraph 32).
28 That reasoning applies even more when the national legislation which uses a concept in a provision of Community law has been adopted with a view to the transposition into internal law of the directive of which the said provision forms part.
29 It follows that, in such a situation, the fact that the concept of Community law whose interpretation is requested is to be applied, in the context of national law, in circumstances different from those envisaged by the corresponding Community provision does not of itself exclude all links between the interpretation sought and the subject-matter of the main proceedings.
36 Nonetheless, in exercising that power, the Member States must respect the principle of fiscal neutrality. That principle precludes in particular treating similar goods and supplies of services, which are thus in competition with each other, differently for VAT purposes, so that those goods or supplies must be subjected to a uniform rate (see, to that effect, Case C-481/98 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-3369, paragraph 22).
39 However, with a view to providing guidance to the referring court, certain factors which characterise the liberal professions, within the meaning of Annex F(2) to the Sixth Directive, should be emphasised. As the Commission has pointed out in its written observations, the liberal professions mentioned in that provision are activities which, inter alia, are of a marked intellectual character, require a high- level qualification and are usually subject to clear and strict professional regulation. In the exercise of such an activity, the personal element is of special importance and such exercise always involves a large measure of independence in the accomplishment of the professional activities.