Viscas Corp. v European Commission.
Date: 2019-12-19
In so far as the appellant argues that that reasoning is flawed, it must be recalled that the obligation to state reasons provided for in Article 296 TFEU constitutes an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well founded, which goes to the substantive legality of the measure at issue (judgment of 14 September 2016, Trafilerie Meridionali v Commission, C‑519/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:682, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
As regards substance, it must be borne in mind that the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EU law enshrined in Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, that principle requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, inter alia, judgment of 12 November 2014, Guardian Industries and Guardian Europe v Commission, C‑580/12 P, EU:C:2014:2363, paragraph 51).
However, although the application of the method provided for in point 18 of the 2006 Guidelines did not allow the Commission to take into account the respective weight in the cartel of,  on the one hand, the European producers and,  on the other hand, the Japanese and South Korean producers, nothing prevented the Commission from taking it into account at another stage of the calculation, particularly when adjusting the basic amount in the light of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, or in the context of determining the value of sales to be used in calculating the basic amount of the fine, in order to ensure respect of the principle of equal treatment (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 January 2017, Zucchetti Rubinetteria v Commission, C‑618/13 P, EU:C:2017:48, paragraph 56). It follows that it is possible to take into consideration different situations as regards the participation of an undertaking in an infringement of EU competition law at various stages of the calculation of the fine and not necessarily only at the stage at which the value of sales is determined.
That consideration is not called into question by the case-law established in the judgment of 12 November 2014, Guardian Industries and Guardian Europe v Commission (C‑580/12 P, EU:C:2014:2363), relied on by the appellant. In the case that gave rise to that judgment, the Commission had calculated the basic amount of the fines on the basis of the method provided for in point 13 of the 2006 Guidelines. As the Court of Justice later clarified, the judgment under appeal in the context of that case was vitiated by an error of law in so far as the General Court had decided that the Commission had been fully entitled to exclude from that calculation the sales made with entities belonging to the same undertaking, thereby misapplying the method that the Commission had itself chosen in order to determine the amount of the fine (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 September 2017, LG Electronics and Koninklijke Philips Electronics v Commission, C‑588/15 P and C‑622/15 P, EU:C:2017:679, paragraph 95). By contrast, in the present case the appellant criticises the Commission not for a misapplication of the method provided for in point 18 of the 2006 Guidelines but for having made an error in applying that method in the same way as regards all the undertakings that participated in the cartel. It follows that, contrary to what the appellant submits, the claims it makes against the Commission in support of the present appeal are not analogous to those which gave rise to the judgment of 12 November 2014, Guardian Industries and Guardian Europe v Commission (C‑580/12 P, EU:C:2014:2363).