Petrotub SA and Republica SA v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2003-01-09
28.  In that regard, it is sufficient to observe that, as may be seen from paragraphs 15 to 25 of the present judgment, Petrotub clearly identified, in accordance with Article 225 EC, the first paragraph of Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure, the aspects of the contested judgment which are criticised and the legal arguments which specifically support its appeal, so that the fact that the arguments developed by Petrotub in support of its plea were also raised at first instance cannot entail their inadmissibility (see, in particular, the order in Case C-338/93 P   De Hoe   v   Commission   [1994] ECR I-819, paragraph 18, and Case C-386/96 P   Dreyfus   v   Commission   [1998] ECR I-2309, paragraph 38).
53.  It is true that it is settled case-law of the Court of Justice that, having regard to their nature and structure, the WTO Agreement and the agreements and understandings annexed to it are not in principle among the rules in the light of which the Court is to review the legality of measures adopted by the Community institutions, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 230 EC (see Case C-149/96   Portugal   v   Council   [1999] ECR I-8395, paragraph 47, and the order in Case C-307/99   OGT  Fruchthandelsgesellschaft   [2001] ECR I-3159, paragraph 24).
54.  However, where the Community intended to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the Community measure refers expressly to precise provisions of the agreements and understandings contained in the annexes to the WTO Agreement, it is for the Court to review the legality of the Community measure in question in the light of the WTO rules (see, in particular,   Portugal   v   Council  , paragraph 49).
55.  The preamble to the basic regulation, and more specifically the fifth recital therein, shows that the purpose of that regulation is,   inter alia  , to transpose into Community law as far as possible the new and detailed rules contained in the 1994 Anti-dumping Code, which include, in particular, those relating to the calculation  of the dumping margin, so as to ensure a proper and transparent application of those rules.
56.  It is therefore established that the Community adopted the basic regulation in order to satisfy its obligations arising from the 1994 Anti-dumping Code and that, by means of Article 2(11) of that regulation, it intended to implement the particular obligations laid down by Article 2.4.2 of that code.  To that extent, as is clear from the case-law cited in paragraph 54 of the present judgment, it is for the Court to review the legality of the Community measure in question in the light of the last-mentioned provision.
57.  In that regard, it should be recalled that Community legislation must, so far as possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with international law, in particular where its provisions are intended specifically to give effect to an international agreement concluded by the Community (see, in particular, Case C-341/95Bettati   [1998] ECR I-4355, paragraph 20).
81.  In that regard, it is settled case-law that the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community court to exercise its power of review.  The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations.  It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 190 must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, in particular, Case C-367/95 P   Commission   v   Sytraval and Brink's France   [1998] ECR I-1719, paragraph 63, and the case-law cited).
85.  It therefore follows from the first and third subparagraphs of Article 2(1) of the basic regulation that, in principle, prices between parties which have a compensatory arrangement with each other may not be taken into account in determining normal value, and that there is no exception to this, unless it is determined that those prices are unaffected by the relationship.
87.  Such a peremptory statement, which amounts to no more than a reference to the provisions of Community law, does not contain any explanatory element of such a kind as to enlighten the parties concerned and the Community judicature as to the reasons which led the Council to consider that the prices charged in connection with those sales made using compensation had not been affected by the relationship (see, to similar effect, Case 185/85   Usinor   v   Commission   [1986] ECR 2079, paragraph 21).