Konstantinos Maïstrellis v Ypourgos Dikaiosynis, Diafaneias kai Anthropinon Dikaiomaton.
Date: 2015-07-16
26. However, it must be noted that, according to settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance (judgments in Melki and Abdeli , C‑188/10 and C‑189/10, EU:C:2010:363, paragraph 27, and in Stanley International Betting and Stanleybet Malta , C‑463/13, EU:C:2015:25, paragraph 26).
27. In particular, it must be noted in that regard that it is not for the Court to rule on the interpretation of national provisions, as such an interpretation falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national courts. Thus, the Court, when a question is referred to it by a national court, must base itself on the interpretation of national law as described to it by that court (judgment in ČEZ , C‑115/08, EU:C:2009:660, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
29. It should be noted at the outset that Directive 96/34 and the Framework Agreement are intended to apply to public officials (see judgment in Chatzi , C‑149/10, EU:C:2010:534, paragraphs 27 to 30).
30. According to the settled case-law of the Court, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see judgments in Adidas , C‑223/98, EU:C:1999:500, paragraph 23; SGAE , C‑306/05, EU:C:2006:764, paragraph 34; and Hoštická and Others , C‑561/13, EU:C:2014:2287, paragraph 29).
33. It follows from those provisions that each of the child’s parents is entitled, individually, to parental leave for at least three months (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission v Luxembourg , C‑519/03, EU:C:2005:234, paragraph 33).
38. The Framework Agreement is designed, according to clause 1.1 thereof, to facilitate the reconciliation of parental and professional responsibilities for working parents, an objective set, as paragraph 4 of the general considerations in the Framework Agreement recalls, by point 16 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (judgment in Chatzi , C‑149/10, EU:C:2010:534, paragraph 36).
39. It was with the same objective that the right to parental leave was included, in Article 33(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, among the fundamental social rights grouped together in Title IV under the heading ‘Solidarity’ (judgment in Chatzi , C‑149/10, EU:C:2010:534, paragraph 37). That provision states that, in order to reconcile family and professional life, everyone has the right, inter alia, to parental leave following the birth or adoption of a child.
42. At the outset, it should be noted, first, as is stated in recital 2 of Directive 2006/54, that the principle of equal treatment between men and women implemented by that directive has general application. Furthermore, that directive, as is apparent in particular from Article 14(1) thereof, and the case-law of the Court, applies to employment relationships in the public or private sectors (see, to that effect, judgment in Napoli , C‑595/12, EU:C:2014:128, paragraph 39).
47. In that regard, it should be noted that the situation of a male employee parent and that of a female employee parent are comparable as regards the bringing-up of children (see judgments in Commission v France , 312/86, EU:C:1988:485, paragraph 14; Griesmar , C‑366/99, EU:C:2001:648, paragraph 56; and Commission v Greece , C‑559/07, EU:C:2009:198, paragraph 69).
49. It follows that, under national law, mothers who are civil servants are always entitled to parental leave, whereas fathers who are civil servant are entitled to it only if the mother of their child works or exercises a profession. Thus, the mere fact of being a parent is not sufficient for male civil servants to gain entitlement to that leave, whereas it is for women with an identical status (see, by analogy, judgment in Roca Álvarez , C‑104/09, EU:C:2010:561, paragraph 23).
50. Furthermore, having regard to Article 3 of Directive 2006/54, a provision such as the one at issue in the main proceedings, far from ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in working life, is liable to perpetuate a traditional distribution of the roles of men and women by keeping men in a role subsidiary to that of women in relation to the exercise of their parental duties (see, to that effect, judgments in Lommers , C‑476/99, EU:C:2002:183, paragraph 41, and Roca Álvarez , C‑104/09, EU:C:2010:561, paragraph 36).