larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Skarb Pánstwa Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej – Generalny Dyrektor Dróg Krajowych i Autostrad v Stephan Riel, en qualité d’administrateur judiciaire de Alpine Bau GmbH.
Date: 2019-09-18
33


In that regard, it should be recalled that the Court has held that Regulations No 1215/2012 and No 1346/2000 must be interpreted in such a way as to avoid any overlap between the rules of law laid down by those instruments and any legal vacuum. Accordingly, actions excluded, under Article 1(2)(b) of Regulation No 1215/2012, from the scope of that regulation in so far as they come under ‘bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings’ fall within the scope of Regulation No 1346/2000. Correspondingly, actions which fall outside the scope of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1346/2000 fall within the scope of Regulation No 1215/2012 (judgments of 20 December 2017, Valach and Others, C‑649/16, EU:C:2017:986, paragraph 24, and of 4 October 2018, Feniks, C‑337/17, EU:C:2018:805, paragraph 30).
34


It follows that the respective scopes of those two regulations are clearly defined and that an action which derives directly from insolvency proceedings and is closely connected with them falls outside the scope of Regulation No 1215/2012, but rather falls within the scope of Regulation No 1346/2000 (judgment of 14 November 2018, Wiemer & Trachte, C‑296/17, EU:C:2018:902, paragraph 31).
35


In that context, the Court took into consideration the fact that the various types of action which it had had to hear were brought in connection with insolvency proceedings. Moreover, it focuses above all on determining each time whether the action in question derived from insolvency law or other rules (judgments of 4 September 2014, Nickel & Goeldner Spedition, C‑157/13, EU:C:2014:2145, paragraph 26, and of 4 December 2014, H, C‑295/13, EU:C:2014:2410, paragraph 18).
36


In particular, the decisive factor used by the Court to identify the area within which an action falls is the legal basis of that action. In accordance with that approach, it must be determined whether the right or the obligation which forms the basis of the action has its source in the ordinary rules of civil and commercial law or in derogating rules specific to insolvency proceedings (judgments of 4 September 2014, Nickel & Goeldner Spedition, C‑157/13, EU:C:2014:2145, paragraph 27; of 11 June 2015, Comité d’entreprise de Nortel Networks and Others, C‑649/13, EU:C:2015:384, paragraph 28; of 9 November 2017, Tünkers France and Tünkers Maschinenbau, C‑641/16, EU:C:2017:847, paragraph 22; and of 20 December 2017, Valach and Others, C‑649/16, EU:C:2017:986, paragraph 29).
José Manuel Ortiz Mesonero v UTE Luz Madrid Centro (integrada por las mercantiles SICE SA, URBALUX SA IMESAPI SA EXTRALUX SA y CITELUM IBÉRICA SA).
Date: 2019-09-18
29


In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law of the Court, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is bound, in principle, to give a ruling (judgment of 2 May 2019, Asendia Spain, C‑259/18, EU:C:2019:346, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited).
30


Thus, the need to provide an interpretation of EU law which will be of use to the referring court requires that court to define the factual and legislative context of the questions it is asking or, at the very least, to explain the factual circumstances on which those questions are based. The Court is empowered to rule on the interpretation of EU provisions only on the basis of the facts which the national court puts before it (judgment of 2 May 2019, Asendia Spain, C‑259/18, EU:C:2019:346, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
31


The referring court must also set out the precise reasons why it is unsure as to the interpretation of certain provisions of EU law and why it considers it necessary to refer questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling. It is also essential that the national court should provide at the very least some explanation of the reasons for the choice of the provisions of EU law which it seeks to have interpreted and of the link which it establishes between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the proceedings pending before it (judgment of 2 May 2019, Asendia Spain, C‑259/18, EU:C:2019:346, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
50


In that regard, it follows from the Court’s consistent case-law that, where a legal situation does not come within the scope of EU law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and any provisions of the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction (judgment of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 22, and order of 15 May 2019, Corte dei Conti and Others, C‑789/18 and C‑790/18, not published, EU:C:2019:417, paragraph 28).
Criminal proceedings against EP.
Date: 2019-09-19
42


Since Article 6 of the Charter, concerning the right to liberty and security, guarantees rights corresponding to those guaranteed by Article 5 ECHR, which concerns the same right, Article 52(3) of the Charter requires that Article 6 be given the same meaning and scope as that given to Article 5 ECHR, as interpreted by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. Account must therefore be taken of Article 5(1) ECHR for the purpose of interpreting Article 6 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2019, TC, C‑492/18 PPU, EU:C:2019:108, paragraph 57).
59


According to the Court’s settled case-law, the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by the directive and their duty under Article 4(3) TEU and Article 288 TFEU to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation, is binding on all the authorities of Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (judgment of 7 August 2018, Smith, C‑122/17, EU:C:2018:631, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
60


To fulfil that obligation, the principle of interpretation in conformity with EU law requires the national authorities to do everything within their power, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that EU law is fully effective and achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 October 2004, Pfeiffer and Others, C‑397/01 to C‑403/01, EU:C:2004:584, paragraph 117, and of 8 May 2019, Praxair MRC, C‑486/18, EU:C:2019:379, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
61


However, the principle of interpretation of national law in conformity with EU law has certain limits. Thus the obligation on a national court to refer to EU law when interpreting and applying the relevant rules of domestic law is limited by general principles of law and cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law that is contra legem (judgment of 7 August 2018, Smith, C‑122/17, EU:C:2018:631, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
Gesamtverband Autoteile-Handel e.V. v KIA Motors Corporation.
Date: 2019-09-19
30


However, the Court has consistently held that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, judgment of 17 April 2018, Egenberger, C‑414/16, EU:C:2018:257, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited). The origins of a provision of EU law may also provide information relevant to its interpretation (judgment of 10 December 2018, Wightman and Others, C‑621/18, EU:C:2018:999, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
UTEP 2006. SRL v Vas Megyei Kormányhivatal Hatósági Főosztály, Hatósági, Építésügyi és Oktatási Osztály.
Date: 2019-09-26
17


As to the first argument put forward by that government, it should be observed that, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (judgment of 27 June 2018, Turbogás, C‑90/17, EU:C:2018:498, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
18


Consequently, even if, formally speaking, the referring court has limited its question to the interpretation of a particular provision of EU law, that does not preclude the Court from providing the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of EU law which may be of assistance in adjudicating in the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to them in its question. In that regard, it is for the Court to extract from all of the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the order for reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of the main dispute (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 September 2016, Essent Belgium, C‑492/14, EU:C:2016:732, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
Proceedings brought by Kauno miesto savivaldybė and Kauno miesto savivaldybės administracija.
Date: 2019-10-03
31


As is apparent from settled case-law, the directive applicable to a public contract is, as a rule, the one in force at the time when the contracting authority chooses the type of procedure to be followed and decides definitively whether a prior call for competition needs to be issued for the award of a public contract (see, inter alia, judgments of 10 July 2014, Impresa Pizzarotti, C‑213/13, EU:C:2014:2067, paragraph 31, and of 7 April 2016, Partner Apelski Dariusz, C‑324/14, EU:C:2016:214, paragraph 83).
48


The freedom of the Member States as to the choice of the management method that they judge to be most appropriate for the performance of works or the provision of services cannot however be unlimited. That freedom must, on the contrary, be exercised with due regard to the fundamental rules of the FEU Treaty, in particular the free movement of goods, the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services as well as the principles deriving therefrom, such as equal treatment, non-discrimination, mutual recognition, proportionality and transparency (see, by analogy, judgments of 9 July 1987, CEI and Bellini, 27/86 to 29/86, EU:C:1987:355, paragraph 15; of 7 December 2000, Telaustria and Telefonadress, C‑324/98, EU:C:2000:669, paragraph 60; and of 10 September 2009, Sea, C‑573/07, EU:C:2009:532, paragraph 38).
55


The principle of transparency requires, like the principle of legal certainty, that the conditions to which the Member States subject the conclusion of in-house transactions should be made known by means of rules that are sufficiently accessible, precise and predictable in their application to avoid any risk of arbitrariness.
Fonds du Logement de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale SCRL v Institut des Comptes nationaux (ICN).
Date: 2019-10-03
48


In that regard, it should be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law of the Court, in the context of the procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU, which is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, the latter does not have jurisdiction to interpret national law and only the national courts may establish and assess the facts of the dispute in the main proceedings and determine the exact scope of national laws, regulations or administrative provisions (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 April 2010, Bressol and Others, C‑73/08, EU:C:2010:181, paragraph 64, and of 21 June 2017, W and Others, C‑621/15, EU:C:2017:484, paragraph 49).
49


However, the Court, which is called on to provide answers of use to the national court, may provide guidance based on the documents relating to the main proceedings and on the written and oral observations which have been submitted to it, in order to enable the national court to give judgment (judgment of 13 April 2010, Bressol and Others, C‑73/08, EU:C:2010:181, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).
BGL BNP Paribas SA v TeamBank AG Nürnberg.
Date: 2019-10-09
25


It is appropriate to bear in mind, next, that, with regard to the interpretation of a provision of EU law, it is necessary, in accordance with settled case-law, to take into account not only its terms, but also the context in which it is set and the objectives pursued by the act of which it forms part. The legislative history of a provision of EU law may also reveal elements relevant to its interpretation (judgment of 10 December 2018, Wightman and Others, C‑621/18, EU:C:2018:999, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
C GmbH & Co. KG and C-eG v Finanzamt Z.
Date: 2019-10-09
29


According to that rule, the taxable amount for the supply of goods or the provision of a service is formed by the consideration actually received by the taxable person ‘from the purchaser, the customer or a third party … including subsidies directly linked to the price of such supplies’(judgment of 20 January 2005, Hotel Scandic Gåsabäck, C‑412/03, EU:C:2005:47, paragraph 28).
30


By providing that the taxable amount for VAT encompasses, in the cases specified by it, subsidies paid to taxable persons, Article 11A(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive is intended to subject the full value of goods or services to VAT and hence to prevent payment of a subsidy entailing a lower return from the tax (judgment of 15 July 2004, Commission v Germany, C‑144/02, EU:C:2004:444, paragraph 26).
31


In accordance with its terms, that provision applies where the subsidy is directly linked to the price of the transaction in question. For that to be the case, the subsidy must first be paid specifically to the subsidised operator to enable it to supply particular goods or services. Only in that case can the subsidy be regarded as consideration for the supply of goods or services and therefore be taxable (judgment of 15 July 2004, Commission v Germany, C‑144/02, EU:C:2004:444, paragraphs 27 and 28).
32


Moreover, it is also necessary to verify that the purchasers of the goods or services benefit from the subsidy granted to the beneficiary. The price payable by the purchaser must be fixed in such a way that it diminishes in proportion to the subsidy granted to the seller or supplier of the goods or services, which therefore constitutes an element in determining the price demanded by the latter. It must also be ascertained whether, objectively, the fact that a subsidy is paid to the seller or supplier allows the latter to sell the goods or supply the services at a price lower than he would have to demand in the absence of subsidy (judgment of 15 July 2004, Commission v Germany, C‑144/02, EU:C:2004:444, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
33


The consideration represented by the subsidy must, at the very least, be identifiable (judgment of 15 July 2004, Commission v Germany, C‑144/02, EU:C:2004:444, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
34


Accordingly, ‘subsidies directly linked to the price’ for the purposes of Article 11A(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive include only subsidies which constitute the whole or part of the consideration for a supply of goods or services and which are paid by a third party to the seller or supplier (judgment of 15 July 2004, Commission v Germany, C‑144/02, EU:C:2004:444, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
Michael Winterhoff v Finanzamt Ulm and Jochen Eisenbeisvv Bundeszentralamt für Steuern.
Date: 2019-10-16
36


It follows that questions relating to EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 5 March 2019, Eesti Pagar, C‑349/17, EU:C:2019:172, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
43


The exemptions laid down in Article 132 of Directive 2006/112 have their own independent meaning in EU law and must therefore be given a uniform EU law definition (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 May 2005, Kingscrest Associates and Montecello, C‑498/03, EU:C:2005:322, paragraph 22, and of 21 January 2016, Les Jardins de Jouvence, C‑335/14, EU:C:2016:36, paragraph 47).
45


Moreover, according to settled case-law of the Court, the terms used to specify an exemption, such as those provided for in Article 132 of Directive 2006/112, are to be interpreted strictly, since an exemption constitutes an exception to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person. Nevertheless, the interpretation of those terms must be consistent with the objectives pursued by those exemptions and comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT. Therefore, that rule of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify those exemptions referred to in Article 132 should be construed in such a way as to deprive them of their intended effects (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 September 2017, Aviva, C‑605/15, EU:C:2017:718, paragraph 30, and of 26 October 2017, The English Bridge Union, C‑90/16, EU:C:2017:814, paragraph 20).
Argenta Spaarbank NV v Belgische Staat.
Date: 2019-10-17
30


In that respect, it should be recalled that, as regards the interpretation of provisions of national law, the Court is in principle required to base its consideration on the description given in the order for reference. It is settled case-law that the Court does not have jurisdiction to interpret the internal law of a Member State (judgment of 17 March 2011, Naftiliaki Etaireia Thasou and Amaltheia I Naftiki Etaireia, C‑128/10 and C‑129/10, EU:C:2011:163, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
34


Freedom of establishment, which Article 49 TFEU grants to EU nationals, includes, in accordance with Article 54 TFEU, for companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the European Union, the right to exercise their activity in other Member States through a subsidiary, branch or agency (judgment of 12 June 2018, Bevola and Jens W. Trock, C‑650/16, EU:C:2018:424, paragraph 15).
35


Even though, according to their wording, the provisions of EU law on freedom of establishment are aimed at ensuring that foreign nationals are treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that State, they also prohibit the Member State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under its legislation (judgments of 4 July 2013, Argenta Spaarbank, C‑350/11, EU:C:2013:447, paragraph 20, and of 12 June 2018, Bevola and Jens W. Trock, C‑650/16, EU:C:2018:424, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).
36


Those considerations also apply where a company established in one Member State carries on business in another Member State through a permanent establishment (judgments of 15 May 2008, Lidl Belgium, C‑414/06, EU:C:2008:278, paragraph 20; of 4 July 2013, Argenta Spaarbank, C‑350/11, EU:C:2013:447, paragraph 21; and of 12 June 2018, Bevola and Jens W. Trock, C‑650/16, EU:C:2018:424, paragraph 17).
38


The Court has already held, in that context, that the taking into account of the assets of a permanent establishment in order to calculate the deduction for risk capital of a company subject to corporation tax in Belgium also constitutes a tax advantage, since taking them into account helps to reduce the effective rate of the corporation tax that such a company must pay in that Member State (judgment of 4 July 2013, Argenta Spaarbank, C‑350/11, EU:C:2013:447, paragraph 24).
Ministère public and Ministre des Finances du Royaume de Belgique v QC and Comida paralela 12.
Date: 2019-10-17
18


In this regard, it should first be recalled that questions referred to the Court enjoy a presumption of relevance (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 December 2018, Wightman and Others, C‑621/18, EU:C:2018:999, paragraph 27). Indeed, where such questions concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 February 2019, Escribano Vindel, C‑49/18, EU:C:2019:106, paragraph 24).
19


Thus, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order for it to deliver judgment, and the relevance of the questions submitted to the Court. (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 February 2019, Escribano Vindel, C‑49/18, EU:C:2019:106, paragraph 24).
20


However, where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it, it may reject the request for a preliminary ruling as inadmissible (judgment of 10 December 2018, Wightman and Others, C‑621/18, EU:C:2018:999, paragraph 27).
21


Furthermore, in view of the spirit of judicial cooperation which governs relations between national courts and the Court of Justice in the context of preliminary-ruling proceedings, the fact that the referring court did not make certain initial findings does not necessarily mean that the request for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible if, in spite of those deficiencies, the Court, in the light of the information contained in the case file, considers that it is in a position to provide a useful answer to the referring court (judgment of 27 October 2016, Audace and Others, C‑114/15, EU:C:2016:813, paragraph 38).
22


It should also be stated that the Court does not, of course, have jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling where it is obvious that the provision of EU law referred to it for interpretation is incapable of applying (see, in particular, judgment of 1 October 2009, Woningstichting Sint Servatius, C‑567/07, EU:C:2009:593, paragraph 43). Nonetheless, with a view to giving a useful answer to the referring court, the Court may decide to take into consideration rules of EU law to which the national court has made no reference in the wording of its question (judgments of 13 October 2016, M. and S., C‑303/15, EU:C:2016:771, paragraph 16, and of 16 May 2019, Plessers, C‑509/17, EU:C:2019:424, paragraph 32).
29


Accordingly, in order to give a useful answer to the national court, it is necessary for the Court to reformulate the question referred (see, to this effect, judgment of 16 May 2019, Plessers, C‑509/17, EU:C:2019:424, paragraph 32).