Oscar Orlando Arango Jaramillo and Others v European Investment Bank (EIB).
Date: 2013-02-28
5. On 20 April 1960 the Board of Directors of the EIB adopted the Staff Regulations of the EIB, which have since undergone several changes. Article 42 of those regulations, concerning means of obtaining redress, establishes the jurisdiction of the Courts of the European Union to hear and determine actions relating to disputes between the EIB and its members of staff, but does not specify the period of time within which such actions must be brought.
Background to the case for review
Facts giving rise to the dispute
28. It is apparent from that case-law that, where the duration of a procedure is not set by a provision of European Union law, the ‘reasonableness’ of the period of time taken by the institution to adopt a measure at issue is to be appraised in the light of all of the circumstances specific to each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the parties to the case (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission  [2002] ECR I-8375, paragraph 187).
29. The Court observed, in paragraph 192 of that judgment, that the reasonableness of a period cannot be determined by reference to a precise maximum limit determined in an abstract manner but, rather, must be appraised in the light of the specific circumstances of each case.
30. The duty on the institutions and the bodies of the European Union, in the context of administrative procedures, to allow for reasonable periods of time, which cannot be determined by reference to precise maximum limits determined in an abstract manner, has been confirmed subsequently by the Court (see, inter alia, Case C-293/05 Commission v Italy  [2006] ECR I-122, paragraph 25 and case-law cited and Case C-321/09 P Greece v Commission  [2011] ECR I-51, paragraphs 33 and 34).
40. As regards, lastly, the question whether the General Court undermined the right to an effective remedy by ruling that the consequence of exceeding the reasonable period within which the members of staff are to bring an action is that the action is time-barred, it should be recalled that the principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of European Union law to which expression is now given by Article 47 of the Charter (see Case C-389/10 P KME Germany and Others v Commission [2011] ECR I-13125, paragraph 119 and case-law cited).
42. According to the explanations relating to that article, which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, have to be taken into consideration for the interpretation of the Charter, the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter is based on Article 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, the ‘ECHR’), and the second paragraph of Article 47 corresponds to Article 6(1) of the ECHR.
50. First, the judgment of 19 June 2012 is the first decision of the General Court whereby it has dismissed an appeal against an order of the Civil Service Tribunal which itself dismissed an action for annulment brought after the expiry of a time-limit as being inadmissible by reason of its being out of time, but has failed to take account of all the circumstances of the case. It could therefore constitute a precedent for future cases (see, by analogy, Case C-197/09 RX-II Review M  v EMEA [2009] ECR I-12033, paragraph 62).
57. It follows that the Court cannot confine itself to finding that the unity or consistency of European Union law is affected without stating the implications of that finding as regards the dispute in question. In the circumstances of this case, for the reasons set out in paragraph 54 above, the judgment of 19 June 2012 must be set aside.