Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav d.d.
Date: 2014-09-04
30. Furthermore, as regards the criticisms made of the Advocate General’s Opinion, it must be borne in mind, firstly, that the Statute of the Court and the Rules of Procedure of the Court make no provision for interested parties to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion (order Emesa Sugar , C‑17/98, EU:C:2000:69, paragraph 2, and Döhler Neuenkirchen , C‑262/10, EU:C:2012:559, paragraph 29).
31. Secondly, under the second paragraph of Article 252 TFEU, it is the duty of the Advocate General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court, require the Advocate General’s involvement. In this regard, the Court is not bound either by the conclusion reached by the Advocate General or by the reasoning which led to that conclusion. Consequently, a party’s disagreement with the Opinion of the Advocate General, irrespective of the questions that he examines in his Opinion, cannot in itself constitute grounds justifying the reopening of the oral procedure ( Hogan Lovells International , C‑229/09, EU:C:2010:673, paragraph 26; E.ON Energie  v Commission , C‑89/11 P, EU:C:2012:738, paragraph 62; and Weber , C‑438/12, EU:C:2014:212, paragraph 30).
38. Clearly, a tractor to which a trailer is attached satisfies that definition. In that regard, it is important to point out that that definition is unconnected with the use which is made or may be made of the vehicle in question. Consequently, the fact that a tractor, possibly with a trailer attached, may, in certain circumstances, by used as an agricultural machine has no effect on the finding that such a vehicle corresponds to the concept of ‘vehicle’ in Article 1(1) of the First Directive.
41. As regards whether the manoeuvre of a tractor in the courtyard of a farm in order to bring the trailer attached to that tractor into a barn is to be regarded as being covered by the concept of ‘use of vehicles’ referred to in that provision, it must be pointed out at the outset that that concept cannot be left to the assessment of each Member State.
42. Indeed neither Article 1 of the First Directive, Article 3(1) of that directive nor any other provision of that directive or of the other directives relating to compulsory insurance refer to the law of the Member States as regards that concept. According to the Court’s settled case-law, the need for a uniform application of European Union law and the principle of equality require the terms of a provision of European Union law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope normally to be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union; that interpretation must take into account not only its wording but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, Omejc , C‑536/09, EU:C:2011:398, paragraphs 19 and 21 and the case-law cited).
46. According to settled case-law, a purely literal interpretation of one or more language versions of a multilingual text of European Union law, to the exclusion of the others, cannot, however, prevail since the uniform application of European Union rules requires that they be interpreted, inter alia, in the light of the versions drawn up in all the languages (see, to that effect, Jany and Others , C‑268/99, EU:C:2001:616, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited, and Commission  v Spain , C‑189/11, EU:C:2013:587, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited). Where there is divergence between the language versions of a European Union text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and purpose of the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, ZVK , C‑300/05, EU:C:2006:735, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited; Haasová , C‑22/12, EU:C:2013:692, paragraph 48; and Drozdovs , C‑277/12, EU:C:2013:685, paragraph 39).
50. The First Directive is therefore part of a series of directives which came progressively to define the obligations of Member States concerning civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles. Although the Court has repeatedly held that it is apparent from the recitals in the preambles to the First and Second Directives that the aim of those directives is to ensure the free movement of vehicles normally based on European Union territory and of persons travelling in those vehicles, it has also repeatedly held that they also have the objective of guaranteeing that the victims of accidents caused by those vehicles receive comparable treatment irrespective of where in the European Union the accident occurred (see, inter alia, to that effect Ruiz Bernáldez , C‑129/94, EU:C:1996:143, paragraph 13, and Csonka and Others , C‑409/11, EU:C:2013:512, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
51. Although it is apparent, inter alia, from the fifth to seventh recitals in the preamble to the First Directive that that directive sought to liberalise the rules regarding the movement of persons and motor vehicles between Member States with a view to the creation of an internal market, by abolishing the checks on green cards which were carried out at the borders of Member States, it pursued equally the objective of protecting victims (see, to that effect, Ruiz Bernáldez , EU:C:1996:143, paragraph 18).
52. Furthermore, the development of the European Union legislation concerning compulsory insurance shows that that objective of protecting the victims of accidents caused by vehicles has continuously been pursued and reinforced by the European Union legislature.
53. That is apparent, in particular, firstly from Articles 1 to 3 of the Second Directive. Accordingly, Article 1 of the Second Directive required the insurance referred to in Article 3(1) of the First Directive to cover both damage to property and personal injuries. It also required the Member States to set up bodies with the task of providing compensation for damage caused by unidentified vehicles or vehicles for which the insurance obligation had not been satisfied and established the minimum amounts of compensation to be guaranteed. Article 2 of that directive restricted the scope of certain exclusion clauses provided for by legislation or in contracts in respect of claims by third parties who were victims of an accident caused as a result of the use or driving of the insured vehicle by certain persons. Article 3 of that directive extended the benefit of insurance in respect of personal injuries to the members of the family of the insured person, driver or any other person who is liable for the accident.
54. Secondly, the Third Directive, through Article 1, inter alia extended insurance cover to personal injuries to all passengers, other than the driver and the Fourth motor insurance Directive, among other things, introduced in its Article 3 a direct right of action by injured parties against the insurance undertaking covering the responsible person against civil liability.
55. Lastly, Directive 2005/14, through Articles 2 and 4, which amended respectively the Second and Third Directives, inter alia, adjusted the minimum amounts of compensation to be guaranteed and provided for their regular review, extended the scope of the payment of compensation by the body established by the Second Directive and extended the insurance cover referred to in Article 3(1) of the First Directive to personal injuries and damage to property suffered by pedestrians, cyclists and other non-motorised users of the roads. It also inserted a new restriction on the possibility of applying certain exclusion clauses to the insurance cover and prohibited excesses from being relied on against the injured party to an accident as far as the insurance referred to in Article 3(1) of the First Directive is concerned.
59. Accordingly, in the light of all of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred is that Article 3(1) of the First Directive must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘use of vehicles’ in that article covers any use of a vehicle that is consistent with the normal function of that vehicle. That concept may therefore cover the manoeuvre of a tractor in the courtyard of a farm in order to bring the trailer attached to that tractor into a barn, as in the case in the main proceedings, which is a matter for the referring court to determine.
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