larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Douane Advies Bureau Rietveld v Hauptzollamt Hannover.
Date: 2014-10-09
18. It should be observed as a preliminary point that, according to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU, providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. With this in mind, the Court of Justice may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (judgment in Lukoyl Neftohim Burgas , C‑330/13, EU:C:2014:1757, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
21. It is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes. The Explanatory Notes drawn up by the European Commission, as regards the CN, and by the WCO, as regards the HS, may be an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force (judgment in Sysmex Europe , C‑480/13, EU:C:2014:2097, paragraphs 29 and 30 and the case-law cited).
22. It must also be noted that the intended use of a product may also constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (judgment in Sysmex Europe , EU:C:2014:2097, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
26. As regards diagnostic reagents, it is clear from those notes that diagnostic reagents are used in the evaluation of physical, biophysical or biochemical processes and states in animals and humans and that their function is based upon a measurable or observable change in their constituent biological or chemical substances (see, to that effect, judgment in Sysmex Europe , EU:C:2014:2097, paragraph 34).
Kingdom of Denmark v European Commission.
Date: 2014-10-15
74. It is, moreover, settled case-law that the obligation on the General Court to state reasons does not require it to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case and that the Court’s reasoning may therefore be implicit on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the General Court has not upheld their arguments and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (judgment in Edwin  v OHIM , C‑263/09 P, EU:C:2011:452, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).
80. It is the Member State which is best placed to collect and verify the data required for the clearance of EAGGF accounts (judgment in Greece  v Commission , EU:C:2005:103, paragraph 36).
81. As observed by the General Court in paragraph 57 of the judgment under appeal, in order to prove that there has been infringement of the rules on the common organisation of the agricultural markets, the Commission is required not to show exhaustively that the checks carried out by the national authorities were inadequate or that the figures they have transmitted are irregular, but to produce evidence of its serious and reasonable doubt regarding such checks or figures (see judgments in Germany  v Commission , C‑54/95, EU:C:1999:11, paragraph 35, and Greece  v Commission , EU:C:2005:103, paragraph 34).
82. The Member State, for its part, cannot rebut the Commission’s findings by mere assertions which are not substantiated by evidence of a reliable and operational supervisory system. If it is not able to show that they are inaccurate, the Commission’s findings can give rise to serious doubts as to the existence of an adequate and effective series of supervisory measures and inspection procedures (judgments in Italy  v Commission , C‑253/97, EU:C:1999:527, paragraph 7, and Greece  v Commission , EU:C:2005:103, paragraph 35).
83. Consequently, it is for the Member State to adduce the most detailed and comprehensive evidence that its checks have been carried out and its figures are accurate and, if appropriate, that the Commission’s assertions are incorrect (judgment in Greece  v Commission , EU:C:2005:103, paragraph 36).
European Parliament v European Commission.
Date: 2014-10-15
43. In this connection, it is important to note, first, that the implementing power conferred on the Commission is delimited by both Article 291(2) TFEU and the provisions of Regulation No 492/2001. The Court has held that when an implementing power is conferred on the Commission on the basis of Article 291(2) TFEU, the Commission is called on to provide further detail in relation to the content of the legislative act, in order to ensure that it is implemented under uniform conditions in all Member States (judgment in Commission  v Parliament and Council , EU:C:2014:170, paragraph 39).
44. Next, it is settled case-law that, within the framework of the Commission’s implementing power, the limits of which must be determined by reference amongst other things to the essential general aims of the legislative act in question, the Commission is authorised to adopt all the measures which are necessary or appropriate for the implementation of that act, provided that they are not contrary to it (judgments in Netherlands  v Commission , C‑478/93, EU:C:1995:324, paragraphs 30 and 31; Portugal  v Commission , C‑159/96, EU:C:1998:550, paragraphs 40 and 41; Parliament  v Commission , C‑403/05, EU:C:2007:624, paragraph 51; and Parliament and Denmark  v Commission , C‑14/06 and C‑295/06, EU:C:2008:176, paragraph 52).
45. Furthermore, it follows from Article 290(1) TFEU in conjunction with Article 291(2) TFEU that in exercising an implementing power, the Commission may neither amend nor supplement the legislative act, even as to its non-essential elements.
60. That line of argument cannot be upheld. Article 38 of Regulation No 492/2011 must be construed in the light of Article 291 TFEU. In those circumstances, the reference to measures [for the implementation of Regulation No 492/2011] in Article 38 of that regulation, concerns the need to ensure that that regulation is implemented under uniform conditions in all Member States (see judgment in Commission  v Parliament and Council , EU:C:2014:170, paragraph 39) but it does not affect the scope of the implementing power which the Commission has under the framework established by Chapter II of Regulation No 492/2011.
Teresa Mascellani v Ministero della Giustizia.
Date: 2014-10-15
19. It must be recalled that the objective of Directive 97/81 and the Framework Agreement is, first, to promote part-time work and, second, to eliminate discrimination between part-time workers and full-time workers (see, to that effect, judgments in Bruno and Others , C‑395/08 and C‑396/08, EU:C:2010:329, paragraphs 24 and 77, and Michaeler and Others , C‑55/07 and C‑56/07, EU:C:2008:248, paragraph 21).
Hoštická a.s. and Others v Česká republika — Ministerstvo zemědělství.
Date: 2014-10-15
24. As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that Regulation No 1782/2003 establishes, inter alia, pursuant to Article 1 thereof, common rules on the subject of direct payments under financial support schemes relating to the CAP, income aid to farmers (single payment scheme) and simplified and transitory income aid for farmers of the new Member States which acceded to the European Union in 2004 and 2007, listed in Article 2(g) of that regulation (‘the new Member States’), (single area payment scheme). In accordance with Articles 143a and 143b of that regulation, direct payments or, if appropriate, the single area payment scheme are to be progressively introduced in the new Member States (see, to that effect, judgment in Bábolna , C‑115/10, EU:C:2011:376, paragraphs 33 and 34, and order in Brunovskis , C‑650/11, EU:C:2013:7, paragraph 15).
26. It follows that Regulation No 1782/2003 gives those Member States a certain measure of discretion in granting the SSP as part of the reform of the common agricultural policy. However, when exercising their discretion, those Member States must satisfy two conditions. Firstly, new Member States must apply objective and non-discriminatory criteria when granting an SSP (see, to that effect, judgment in Uzonyi , C‑133/09, EU:C:2010:563, paragraph 29). Secondly, before 30 April 2006, the new Member States must also choose the representative period or periods to be taken into account for the grant of that payment, from the marketing years listed in Article 143ba(1) of that regulation, namely marketing years 2004/2005, 2005/2006 and 2006/2007.
29. It is settled case-law that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment in Maatschap Schonewille-Prins , C‑45/05, EU:C:2007:296, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
30. With regard, first of all to the objective pursued by Regulation No 1782/2003, the Court has previously held that it sought to facilitate the progressive transition from production aid to producer aid by, inter alia, the introduction of a decoupled income support scheme for each farm (see, to that effect, judgment in Panellinios Sindesmos Viomikanion Metapiisis Kapnou , C‑373/11, EU:C:2013:567, paragraph 17). It is clear from recital 2 in the preamble to Regulation No 73/2009 that it pursues the same objective.
Kingdom of Spain v European Commission.
Date: 2014-10-22
29. However, it follows from paragraphs 56 to 89 and paragraph 93 of the judgments in Spain  v Commission (C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156) and Spain  v Commission (C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157) that, as from 2000, the Commission is obliged to comply with a time-limit for adopting a decision on financial corrections.
31. It is apparent from the second paragraph of Article 108 of Regulation No 1083/2006 that Article 100 is to apply as from 1 January 2007, including programmes for the period 2007 to 2013.
34. In addition, it is the Court’s settled case-law that failure to comply with the procedural rules relating to the adoption of an act adversely affecting an individual, such as failure by the Commission to adopt the decision at issue within the time-limit laid down by the Union legislature, constitutes an infringement of essential procedural requirements (see judgments in United Kingdom  v Council , 68/86, EU:C:1988:85, paragraphs 48 and 49; Spain  v Commission , EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 103; and Spain  v Commission , EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 103), and that if the Union judicature finds, on examining the act in question, that it was not adopted as required it must raise the matter of infringement of procedural requirements of its own motion and, in consequence, annul the act so vitiated (see judgment in Commission  v ICI , C‑286/95 P, EU:C:2000:188, paragraph 51; Commission  v Solvay , C‑287/95 P and C‑288/95 P, EU:C:2000:189, paragraph 55; Spain  v Commission , EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 103; and Spain  v Commission , EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 103).
British Telecommunications plc v European Commission.
Date: 2014-10-22
29. Second, it must be emphasised that the General Court has the freedom to structure and to expound its reasoning in whatever way it deems necessary for the purposes of responding to the pleas raised before it. Accordingly, the way in which the General Court chooses to structure and reason its response are not open to challenge, in the context of an appeal, through claims seeking to establish that the General Court should have undertaken its analysis in the manner expected by the applicant.
55. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in the context of an appeal, the purpose of review by the Court of Justice is, primarily, to examine to what extent the General Court took into consideration, in a legally correct manner, all the arguments relied upon at first instance by the appellant (judgment in France Télécom  v Commission , C‑202/07 P, EU:C:2009:214, paragraph 41 and the case‑law cited).
56. Nevertheless, acc ording to settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the duty incumbent upon the General Court under Article 36 and the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union to state reasons for its judgments does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to understand the grounds of the General Court’s judgment and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient evidence to exercise its powers of review on appeal (judgment in France  v Commission , C‑559/12 P, EU:C:2014:217, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited).
Alexandra Schulz v Technische Werke Schussental GmbH und Co. KG and Josef Egbringhoff v Stadtwerke Ahaus GmbH.
Date: 2014-10-23
39. At the outset, it should be noted that the aim of those directives is to improve the operation of the internal market in electricity and gas. Non-discriminatory, transparent and fairly priced network access is necessary for competition to function and of paramount importance in completing the internal electricity and gas market (see, to that effect, Sabatauskas and Others , C‑239/07, EU:C:2008:551, paragraph 31).
40. Consumer protection concerns underpin the provisions of Directives 2003/54 and 2003/55 (see, to that effect, Enel Produzione , C‑242/10, EU:C:2011:861, paragraphs 39, 54 and 56). Those concerns are closely linked both to the liberalisation of the markets in question and to the objective, also pursued by those directives, of ensuring a stable electricity and gas supply (see, to that effect, Essent and Others , C‑105/12 to C‑107/12, EU:C:2013:677, paragraphs 59 to 65).
45. Secondly, with regard more specifically to the rights of customers, Article 3(3) of Directive 2003/55 — as was held in relation to that directive in paragraph 45 of the judgment in RWE Vertrieb , C‑92/11, EU:C:2013:180 — requires Member States to ensure a high level of consumer protection in relation to the transparency of the contract terms and conditions. That finding applies also to Article 3(5) of Directive 2003/54.
57. In that regard, it should be noted that it is only exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the legal order of the European Union, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling in question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely that those concerned should have acted in good faith and that there should be a risk of serious difficulties ( RWE Vertrieb , EU:C:2013:180, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
58. More precisely, the Court has taken that step only in quite specific circumstances, where there was a risk of serious economic repercussions owing in particular to the large number of legal relationships entered into in good faith on the basis of rules considered to be validly in force and where it appeared that individuals and national authorities had been led to adopt practices incompatible with EU legislation by reason of objective, significant uncertainty regarding the implications of provisions of EU law (see Emerging Markets Series of DFA Investment Trust Company , C‑190/12, EU:C:2014:249, paragraph 110 and the case-law cited).
Herbaria Kräuterparadies GmbH v Freistaat Bayern.
Date: 2014-11-05
28. It should be borne in mind that neither the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union nor its Rules of Procedure make provision for the parties to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion (see judgments in Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Others , C‑266/09, EU:C:2010:779, paragraph 28, and Commission  v Portugal , C‑335/12, EU:C:2014:2084, paragraph 45).
50. The referring court has failed to refer any question on the point, however, and the order for reference does not provide in this regard any of the information required under Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure. The Court accordingly need not rule on this point (see, to that effect, judgment in X and X , C‑319/10 and C‑320/10, EU:C:2011:720, paragraph 28).
O. Tümer v Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen.
Date: 2014-11-05
42. Furthermore, according to the case-law of the Court, the first subparagraph of Article 2(2) of Directive 80/987 must be interpreted in the light of the social objective of that directive, which is to guarantee employees a minimum of protection at EU level in the event of the employer’s insolvency through payment of outstanding claims resulting from contracts of employment or employment relationships and relating to pay for a specific period. Member States therefore cannot define at will the term ‘employee’ in such a way as to undermine the social objective of that directive (see, by analogy, judgment in van Ardennen , C‑435/10, EU:C:2011:751, paragraphs 27 and 34).
43. The discretion enjoyed by Member States under the first subparagraph of Article 2(2) of Directive 80/987 to define the term ‘employee’, referred to in paragraph 35 above, is thus circumscribed by the social objective of Directive 80/987, which the Member States are required to respect.
Cypra Ltd v Kypriaki Dimokratia.
Date: 2014-11-05
23. In that regard, in accordance with the general principles on which the European Union is based and which govern relations between it and the Member States, it is for the latter, under Article 5 of the EU Treaty, to ensure that EU rules are implemented within their territories. In so far as EU law, including its general principles, does not include common rules to that effect, the national authorities when implementing such regulations act in accordance with the procedural and substantive rules of their own national law (see, inter alia, judgments in Dominikanerinnen-Kloster Altenhohenau , C‑285/93, EU:C:1995:398, paragraph 26; Karlsson and Others , C‑292/97, EU:C:2000:202, paragraph 27, and Azienda Agricola Giorgio, Giovanni and Luciano Visentin and Others , C‑495/00, EU:C:2004:180, paragraph 39).
26. Nevertheless, when adopting measures to implement EU legislation, Member States must exercise their discretion in compliance with the general principles of EU law (see, to that effect, judgments in Mulligan and Others , C‑313/99, EU:C:2002:386, paragraph 35, and Azienda Agricola Giorgio, Giovanni and Luciano Visentin and Others , EU:C:2004:180, paragraph 40), which include the principles of legal certainty, the protection of legitimate expectations, proportionality and non-discrimination (judgment in Kurt und Thomas Etling and Others , C‑230/09 and C‑231/09, EU:C:2011:271, paragraph 74).
Robin John Feakins v The Scottish Ministers.
Date: 2014-11-06
35. In order to interpret the provision at issue, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objects of the rules of which it forms part (see, inter alia, Germany  v Commission , C‑156/98, EU:C:2000:467, paragraph 50, and Chatzi , C‑149/10, EU:C:2010:534, paragraph 42).
47. With regard to the validity of the provision at issue in the main proceedings in the light of the principle of equal treatment, it must be noted that that principle requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated alike unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, inter alia, Elbertsen , C‑449/08, EU:C:2009:652, paragraph 41, and Franz Egenberger , C‑313/04, EU:C:2006:454, paragraph 33).
49. A breach of the principle of equal treatment as a result of differing treatment presupposes, however, that the situations concerned are comparable, having regard to all the elements which characterise them (see, to that effect, IBV & Cie , C‑195/12, EU:C:2013:598, paragraph 51).
51. In that regard, it must be noted that the elements that characterise different situations and their comparability must in particular be determined and assessed in the light of the subject-matter and purpose of the European Union act that makes the distinction in question (see, to that effect, Szatmári Malom , C‑135/13, EU:C:2014:327, paragraph 67). The principles and objectives of the field to which the act relates must also be taken into account ( Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others , C‑127/07, EU:C:2008:728, paragraph 26).
56. First of all, it must be noted that, although the Community legislature has a broad discretion with regard to the common agricultural policy, it is obliged to base its choices on objective criteria that are appropriate to the aim pursued by the legislation in question (see, to that effect, Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others , EU:C:2008:728, paragraph 58, and Panellinios Syndesmos Viomichanion Metapoiisis Kapnou , C‑373/11, EU:C:2013:567, paragraph 34).
58. In that regard, it must be noted that the mechanism provided for by those latter provisions constitutes a means of safeguarding the financial balance of the single payment scheme while observing the principle of equal treatment (see, by analogy, Spagl , C‑189/89, EU:C:1990:450, paragraph 28, and Pastätter , C‑217/89, EU:C:1990:451, paragraph 19). The objective of avoiding the application of that mechanism cannot therefore justify an infringement of that principle.
European Commission v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 2014-11-06
31. It must be stated, at the outset, that Article 3(1) of the Directive imposes an obligation to achieve a specific result, drafted in a clear and unequivocal manner, that, by 31 December 2005 at the latest, all urban waste waters originating from agglomerations with a p.e. of between 2 000 and 15 000 had to enter a collecting system for urban waste water (see, by analogy, judgments in Commission  v Spain , EU:C:2007:223, paragraph 25, and in Commission  v Greece , EU:C:2007:642, paragraph 25).
32. That being so, the Commission alone is competent to decide whether it is appropriate to bring proceedings against a Member State for failure to fulfil its obligations and to determine the conduct or omission attributable to the Member State on the basis of which those proceedings should be brought (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission  v Germany , C‑431/92, EU:C:1995:260, paragraph 22; Commission  v Germany , C‑476/98, EU:C:2002:631, paragraph 38; and Commission  v Greece , C‑394/02, EU:C:2005:336, paragraph 28).
39. In any event, it is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see judgments in Commission  v Italy , C‑525/03, EU:C:2005:648, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited, and in Commission  v Ireland , C‑279/11, EU:C:2012:834, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
41. Therefore, in accordance with the case-law of the Court, the obligation to ensure that all discharges are subject to secondary treatment or equivalent, laid down in Article 4(1) of the Directive, was likewise not fulfilled (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission  v Greece , C‑440/06, EU:C:2007:642, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
51. It should be noted that the EU legislature, conscious of the scope of the infrastructure work required for the application of the Directive and the costs of its full implementation, granted the Member States a period of several years to carry out their obligations, which in this case expired on 31 December 2005. In any event, according to settled case-law, a Member State cannot plead difficulties in its domestic legal order to justify a failure to observe obligations arising under EU law (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission  v Greece , C‑407/09, EU:C:2011:196, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited, and in Commission  v Ireland , EU:C:2012:834, paragraph 71).