Czech Republic v European Commission.
Date: 2018-09-06
24


In this respect, it should be recalled that according to settled case-law an appellant is entitled to lodge an appeal relying on grounds which arise from the judgment under appeal itself and seek to criticise, in law, its correctness (see, to that effect, judgments of 29 November 2007, Stadtwerke Schwäbisch Hall and Others v Commission, C‑176/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:730, paragraph 17, and of 16 June 2016, Evonik Degussa and AlzChem v Commission, C‑155/14 P, EU:C:2016:446, paragraph 55).
25


It also follows from settled case-law that an argument which was not raised at first instance does not constitute a new plea that is inadmissible at the appeal stage if it is simply an amplification of an argument already developed in the context of a plea set out in the application before the General Court (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 19 December 2013, Siemens and Others v Commission, C‑239/11 P, C‑489/11 P and C‑498/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:866, paragraph 287, and of 10 April 2014, Areva and Others v Commission, C‑247/11 P and C‑253/11 P, EU:C:2014:257, paragraph 114).
43


It follows from the need for uniform application of EU law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, having regard not only to its wording but also to the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, inter alia, judgments of 18 January 1984, Ekro, 327/82, EU:C:1984:11, paragraph 11, and of 18 May 2017, Hummel Holding, C‑617/15, EU:C:2017:390, paragraph 22).
45


Where, as in the present case, a provision of EU law is ambiguous and hence open to several interpretations, preference must be given to the interpretation which ensures that the provision retains its effectiveness by interpreting it to that end in the light of the purposes of the legislation of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 June 1980, Roudolff, 803/79, EU:C:1980:166, paragraph 7, and of 24 February 2000, Commission v France, C‑434/97, EU:C:2000:98, paragraph 21).
58


As the Advocate General states in point 65 of her Opinion, the principle of legal certainty requires that rules must enable those concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations imposed on them, in particular where there is a risk of financial consequences. The Commission thus cannot choose, at the time of the clearance of EAGF accounts, an interpretation which departs from the usual meaning of the words used and is not necessary (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 October 1998, Ireland v Commission, C‑238/96, EU:C:1998:451, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited). It follows from the considerations set out in paragraphs 42 to 52 above that the Commission’s interpretation in the present case departs from the usual meaning of the words of Article 11(3) of Regulation No 479/2008, in so far as the Commission considered that the contested protection measure was not permitted in connection with the programme inter alia of restructuring of vineyards.