Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte: Royal Society for the Protection of Birds.
Date: 1996-07-11
19 That recital is formally reflected in Articles 3 and 4 of the directive. In paragraph 23 of its judgment in Case C-355/90 Commission v Spain [1993] ECR I-4221 (hereinafter "Santoña Marshes") the Court pointed out that the first of those provisions imposes obligations of a general character, namely the obligation to ensure a sufficient diversity and area of habitats for all the birds referred to in the directive, while the second contains specific obligations with regard to the species of birds listed in Annex I and the migratory species not listed in that annex.
23 It must be noted first that Article 4 of the Birds Directive lays down a protection regime which is specifically targeted and reinforced both for the species listed in Annex I and for migratory species, an approach justified by the fact that they are, respectively, the most endangered species and the species constituting a common heritage of the Community (see Case C-169/89 Van den Burg [1990] ECR I-2143, paragraph 11).
25 Consequently, having regard to the aim of special protection pursued by Article 4 and the fact that, according to settled case-law (see in particular Case C-435/92 APAS v Préfets de Maine-et-Loire and de la Loire Atlantique [1994] ECR I-67, paragraph 20), Article 2 does not constitute an autonomous derogation from the general system of protection established by the directive, it must be held (see paragraphs 17 and 18 of Santoña Marshes) ° that the ecological requirements laid down by the former provision do not have to be balanced against the interests listed in the latter, in particular economic requirements.
26 It is the criteria laid down in paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 4 which are to guide the Member States in designating and defining the boundaries of SPAs. It is clear from paragraphs 26 and 27 of Santoña Marshes that, notwithstanding the divergences between the various language versions of the last subparagraph of Article 4(1), the criteria in question are ornithological criteria.
27 In view of the foregoing, the answer to the first question must be that Article 4(1) or (2) of the Birds Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that a Member State is not authorized to take account of the economic requirements mentioned in Article 2 thereof when designating an SPA and defining its boundaries.
The second question
The first part of the second question
29 In its judgment in Case C-57/89 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-883, paragraphs 21 and 22 (hereinafter "Leybucht Dykes"), the Court held that the Member States may, in the context of Article 4(4) of the Birds Directive, reduce the extent of a SPA only on exceptional grounds, being grounds corresponding to a general interest superior to the general interest represented by the ecological objective of the directive. It was held that economic requirements cannot be invoked in that context.
30 It is also clear from paragraph 19 of Santoña Marshes that, in the context of Article 4 of that directive, considered as a whole, economic requirements cannot on any view correspond to a general interest superior to that represented by the ecological objective of the directive.
31 Accordingly, without its being necessary to rule on the possible relevance of the grounds corresponding to a superior general interest for the purpose of classifying an SPA, the answer to the first part of the second question must be that Article 4(1) or (2) of the Birds Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may not, when designating an SPA and defining its boundaries, take account of economic requirements as constituting a general interest superior to that represented by the ecological objective of that directive.
The second part of the second question
34 It is well settled that it is for the national courts alone, before which the proceedings are pending and which will be responsible for the eventual judgment, to determine, having regard to the particular features of each case, both the need for a preliminary ruling to enable them to give judgment and the relevance of the questions which they refer to the Court. A request for a preliminary ruling from a national court may be rejected only if it is clear that the interpretation of Community law requested bears no relation to the true nature of the case or the subject-matter of the main action (see in particular Case C-129/94 Ruiz Barnáldez [1996] ECR I-0000, paragraph 7). That is, however, not the case in the main proceedings.
42 The answer to the second part of the second question must therefore be that Article 4(1) or (2) of the Birds Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may not, when designating an SPA and defining its boundaries, take account of economic requirements which may constitute imperative reasons of overriding public interest of the kind referred to in Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive.