larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Katia Beckmann v Dynamco Whichloe Macfarlane Ltd
Date: 2002-06-04
5 Article 3 of the Directive reads as follows:
1. The transferor's rights and obligations arising from a contract of employment or from an employment relationship existing on the date of a transfer within the meaning of Article 1(1) shall, by reason of such transfer, be transferred to the transferee.
Member States may provide that, after the date of transfer within the meaning of Article 1(1) and in addition to the transferee, the transferor shall continue to be liable in respect of obligations which arose from a contract of employment or an employment relationship.
2. Following the transfer within the meaning of Article 1(1), the transferee shall continue to observe the terms and conditions agreed in any collective agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor under that agreement, until the date of termination or expiry of the collective agreement or the entry into force or application of another collective agreement.
Member States may limit the period for observing such terms and conditions, with the provision that it shall not be less than one year.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not cover employees' rights to old-age, invalidity or survivors' benefits under supplementary company or inter-company pension schemes outside the statutory social security schemes in Member States.
Member States shall adopt the measures necessary to protect the interests of employees and of persons no longer employed in the transferor's business at the time of the transfer within the meaning of Article 1(1) in respect of rights conferring on them immediate or prospective entitlement to old-age benefits, including survivors' benefits, under supplementary schemes referred to in the first subparagraph.
National law
The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981
27 As a preliminary point, it is to be noted that there is no dispute between the parties to the main proceedings and the United Kingdom Government that, although the NHS belongs to the public sector, NHS employees are covered by national employment law and are, therefore, eligible to benefit from the provisions of the Directive (see Case C-343/98 Collino and Chiappero [2000] ECR I-6659, paragraph 41).
29 Given the general objective of safeguarding the rights of employees in the event of transfers of undertakings pursued by the Directive when it provides, in Article 3(1) and (2), for transfer to the transferee of the transferor's rights and obligations arising from a contract of employment, from an employment relationship or collective agreement, the exception to that rule provided for by Article 3(3) must be interpreted strictly.
37 Apart from the exceptions under Article 3(3) of the Directive relating to old-age, invalidity or survivors' benefits, no exception to those rules is provided for by the Directive and the existence of such a specific clause leads to the conclusion that Article 3(1) and (2) relates to all the rights of employees mentioned therein which are not covered by those exceptions (see Case 135/83 Abels [1985] EC 469, paragraph 37).
Italian Leather SpA v WECO Polstermöbel GmbH & Co.
Date: 2002-06-06
39 By way of preliminary point, the Court proceeds on the assumption that, the court competent to adjudicate on the substance being the Tribunale di Bari, the Landgericht Koblenz did not by its judgment of 17 November 1998 exceed the limits, as interpreted by the Court, of the jurisdiction which it derived from Article 24 of the Brussels Convention (see Case C-391/95 Van Uden [1998] ECR I-7091, paragraphs 37 to 47, and Case C-99/96 Mietz [1999] ECR I-2277, paragraphs 42, 46 and 47).
40 First, it is clear from the Court's case-law that, in order to ascertain whether two judgments are irreconcilable within the meaning of Article 27(3) of the Brussels Convention, it should be examined whether they entail legal consequences that are mutually exclusive (Case 145/86 Hoffmann [1988] ECR 645, paragraph 22).
43 The object of the Brussels Convention is not to unify the procedural rules of the Contracting States, but to determine which court has jurisdiction in disputes concerning civil and commercial matters in intra-Community relations and to facilitate the enforcement of judgments (see Case C-365/88 Hagen [1990] ECR I-1845, paragraph 17, and Case C-68/93 Shevill and Others [1995] ECR I-415, paragraph 35).
44 Moreover, as follows from paragraph 22 of the judgment in Hoffmann, cited above, irreconcilability lies in the effects of judgments. It does not concern the requirements governing admissibility and procedure which determine whether judgment can be given and which may vary from one Contracting State to another.
51 Finally, it would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty, which the Court has repeatedly held to be one of the objectives of the Brussels Convention (see Case 38/81 Effer [1982] ECR 825, paragraph 6, Case C-440/97 GIE Groupe Concorde and Others [1999] ECR I-6307, paragraph 23, and Case C-256/00 Besix [2002] ECR I-0000, paragraph 24), to interpret Article 27(3) as conferring on the court of the State in which recognition is sought the power to authorise recognition of a foreign judgment when it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in that Contracting State.
Land Hessen v G. Ricordi & Co. Bühnen- und Musikverlag GmbH.
Date: 2002-06-06
24 First of all, it must be recalled that, by reason in particular of their effects on intra-Community trade in goods and services, copyright and related rights fall within the scope of application of the EC Treaty (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-92/92 and C-326/92 Phil Collins and Others [1993] ECR I-5145, paragraph 27).
26 Copyright may be relied on not only by an author, but also by those claiming under him (see Phil Collins and Others, cited above, paragraph 35). It is not disputed that the copyright concerned in the main proceedings was still producing its effects as regards the persons claiming under Giacomo Puccini when the EEC Treaty entered into force (see Case C-162/00 Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer [2002] ECR I-1049, paragraphs 49 and 50).
31 Although it is undisputed that the first paragraph of Article 6 of the EC Treaty is not concerned with any disparities in treatment or the distortions which may result, for the persons and undertakings subject to the jurisdiction of the Community, from divergences existing between the laws of the various Member States, so long as those laws affect all the persons subject to them, in accordance with objective criteria and without direct or indirect regard to nationality, it does prohibit any discrimination on grounds of nationality. Consequently, that provision requires each Member State to ensure that nationals of other Member States in a situation governed by Community law are placed on a completely equal footing with its own nationals (see, to that effect, Phil Collins and Others, cited above, paragraphs 30 and 32).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 2002-06-06
26 In that regard, it is appropriate to recall that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, among others, Case C-384/99 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I-10633, paragraph 16). When the two month period imposed by the reasoned opinion of 1 August 2000 expired, the Royal Decree, which the Belgian Government had announced and whose purpose to complete the transposition of Directive 90/641 it acknowledged, had, at all events, not yet been adopted.
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2002-06-06
13 In that regard, it should be pointed out that it is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-315/98 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I-8001, paragraph 11).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 2002-06-06
8 In that connection, it should be stressed that it is settled case-law that a Member State cannot rely on provisions, practices or circumstances in its own legal order to justify failure to implement a directive within the prescribed period (see, in particular, Case C-276/98 Commission v Portugal [2001] ECR I-1699, paragraph 20).
Commission of the European Communities v Ireland.
Date: 2002-06-13
15 Article 3 of the Birds Directive requires Member States to take the requisite measures to preserve, maintain or re-establish a sufficient diversity and area of habitats for all the species of birds covered by the directive. The case-law of the Court of Justice shows that the obligations on Member States arising under Article 3 therefore exist before any reduction is observed in the number of birds or any risk of a protected species becoming extinct has materialised (see Case C-355/90 Commission v Spain [1993] ECR I-4221, paragraph 15).
24 First of all, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C-166/97 Commission v France [1999] ECR I-1719, paragraph 18, and Case C-374/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-10799, paragraph 14). Thus, in the present case, measures adopted by Ireland after 8 June 1998 cannot be taken into account.
25 Secondly, it is important to note that it is undisputed that the Owenduff-Nephin Beg Complex has been classified as an SPA since October 1996. In so far as concerns land classified as an SPA, Article 7 of the Habitats Directive provides that the obligations arising under the first sentence of Article 4(4) of the Birds Directive are replaced, inter alia, by the obligations arising under Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive as from the date of implementation of the Habitats Directive or the date of classification under the Birds Directive, where the latter date is later. It follows that, in the present case, Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive, rather than the first sentence of Article 4(4) of the Birds Directive, has applied to the Owenduff-Nephin Beg Complex SPA since October 1996. That being so, the Commission's plea must be dismissed in so far as it is based on infringement of the first sentence of Article 4(4) of the Birds Directive and the Court must confine itself to considering whether there has been an infringement of Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive.
26 Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive, like the first sentence of Article 4(4) of the Birds Directive, requires Member States to take appropriate steps to avoid, inter alia, deterioration of habitats in the SPAs classified pursuant to Article 4(1) (see Case C-96/98 Commission v France [1999] ECR I-8531, paragraph 35).
Grand Duchy of Luxemburg v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2002-06-13
23 The detailed rules for the application of Regulation No 729/70, and, in particular, the procedures for decisions refusing financing mentioned in Article 5(2)(c) thereof, are set out in Regulation No 1663/95. The Court has noted that the first subparagraph of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1663/95 specifies what the written communication by which the Commission notifies the results of its checks to Member States must contain (see Case C-170/00 Finland v Commission [2002] ECR I-1007, paragraph 26). Under that article, that communication is to state the corrective measures to be taken to ensure future compliance, to include an evaluation of any expenditure which the Commission may propose to exclude and to make reference to Regulation No 1663/95. The Member State must be given two months to reply to it.
24 In accordance with the Court's case-law, the Commission is bound, in its relations with the Member States, to respect the conditions it has imposed on itself by implementing regulations (see Case C-170/00 Finland v Commission, cited above, paragraph 34). A failure to observe those conditions may, depending on its significance, deprive of its efficacy the procedural guarantee accorded to Member States by Article 5(2)(c) of Regulation No 729/70, which limits the period for which expenditure can be refused financing by the EAGGF.
Keeping Newcastle Warm Limited v Commissioners of Customs and Excise.
Date: 2002-06-13
23 Article 11A(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive deals, inter alia, with situations where three parties are involved: the authority which grants the subsidy, the body which benefits from it and the purchaser of the goods or services delivered or supplied by the subsidised body (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 November 2001 Case C-184/00 Office des produits wallons [2001] ECR I-9115, paragraph 10).
25 In any event it must be noted that the taxable amount in respect of a supply of services is everything which makes up the consideration for the service (see, inter alia, Tolsma, cited above, paragraph 13).
Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 2002-06-13
12 It is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-394/00 Commission v Ireland [2002] ECR I-581, paragraph 12).
13 On the expiry of the period laid down in the supplementary reasoned opinion, two months after 11 August 1999, the Hellenic Republic had not sent the Commission all the information required under Article 8(3) of Directive 91/689.
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2002-06-13
11 It must be pointed out that, in accordance with consistent case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C-279/00 Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I-1425, paragraph 10).
13 Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly held that a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or situations in its internal legal order in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-423/00 Commission v Belgium [2002] ECR I-593, paragraph 16).
Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2002-06-18
27 It should be noted at the outset that, in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by Articles 87 EC and 88 EC, the Commission may adopt guidelines designed to indicate how it intends, under those articles, to exercise its discretion in regard to new aid or in regard to existing systems of aid.
28 When they are based on Article 88(1) EC, those guidelines constitute one element of the regular and periodic cooperation under which the Commission, in conjunction with the Member States, must keep under constant review existing systems of aid and propose to them any appropriate measures required by the progressive development or by the functioning of the common market (Case C-311/94 IJssel-Vliet [1996] ECR I-5023, paragraphs 36 and 37, and Case C-288/96 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-8237, paragraphs 62 to 65). In so far as these proposals for appropriate measures are accepted by a Member State, they are binding on that Member State (IJssel-Vliet, cited above, paragraphs 42 and 43).
35 That being so, those decisions should be construed as forming an integral part of the guidelines on regional aid and as having, in themselves, binding force only on condition that they have been accepted by the Member States (see IJssel-Vliet, paragraphs 42 and 43).
Kingdom of Spain v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2002-06-18
21 In that regard it must be emphasised that the probative value of a fax depends both on the degree of formality that the applicable provisions require for the act in question and the conditions governing the use of the fax transmission process, bearing in mind that, as a rule, the binding legal effects of the act are in no way affected by the fact that it is sent by fax (see, to that effect, Case C-170/89 BEUC v Commission [1991] ECR I-5709, paragraphs 9 to 11).
33 Article 4(6) of Regulation No 659/1999, which relates to decisions taken by the Commission within a period of 15 working days following receipt of the notice, cannot therefore be interpreted as meaning that the mere adoption of such decisions interrupts that period, irrespective of when they are notified. That is borne out by Article 25 of the Regulation, which provides that decisions taken by the Commission under the Regulation are to be taken without delay, and by the reference, in recital 21 in the preamble to the Regulation, to the principle that decisions in State aid cases are addressed to the Member State concerned in the interests of transparency and legal certainty. That is the reason why failure to notify alone can in certain circumstances justify the annulment of an act of a Community institution (see, to that effect, Case C-227/92 P Hoechst v Commission [1999] ECR I-4443, paragraph 68).
34 It follows from the foregoing that the contested decision taken on 17 August 2000 but not notified to the Spanish authorities until 23 August 2000 was adopted after the period of 15 working days referred to in Article 4(6) of Regulation No 659/1999. As from 21 August 2000, the date on which that period expired, the notified aid therefore became existing aid. The Commission was accordingly not entitled to found the contested decision on Article 88(3) EC, which applies only to new aid, and thus prevent implementation of the planned aid to Santana Motor SA (see, to that effect, Case C-99/98 Austria v Commission [2001] ECR I-1101, paragraphs 68 to 78 and, for facts that arose after the entry into force of Regulation No 659/99, Case C-400/99 Italy v Commission [2001] ECR I-7303, paragraph 48).
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 2002-06-20
11 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C-394/00 Commission v Ireland [2002] ECR I-581, paragraph 12). The Court has also consistently held that the object of an action for failure to comply with Treaty obligations is established by the Commission's reasoned opinion and, even when the default has been remedied after the time-limit prescribed by that opinion, pursuit of the action still has an object. That object may consist in particular in establishing the basis of the liability that a Member State could incur towards those who acquire rights as a result of its default (see, inter alia, Case 154/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2717, paragraph 6).
Criminal proceedings against Dante Bigi, third party: Consorzio del Formaggio Parmigiano Reggiano.
Date: 2002-06-25
18 It is settled case-law that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts established by Article 234 EC, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, for example, Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59).
19 However, the Court has also stated that, in exceptional circumstances, it can examine the conditions in which the case was referred to it by the national court, in order to assess whether it has jurisdiction. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, for example, Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital [2002] I-607, paragraph 19).
20 However, in the present case it is far from clear that the designation parmesan has become generic. It is contended by all the governments which have submitted written observations in this case, apart from the German Government and, to a certain extent, the Austrian Government, and by the Commission that the French designation parmesan is the correct translation of the PDO Parmigiano Reggiano.
28 However, as that recital also makes clear, such a transitional period should apply only to names registered under Article 17 of that regulation, that is to say to names, such as that in issue here, which have been registered under the simplified procedure. That procedure presupposes, inter alia, that the name which a Member State seeks to register should be legally protected in that Member State or, in Member States where there is no system of protection, validated through use.
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic.
Date: 2002-06-27
53 Finally, while it is true that the Member States have been granted a wide discretion in the identification of waters referred to in Article 3(1) of the Directive, because of the complexity of the assessments which they are called upon to carry out in that context (see Case C-293/97 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Standley and Others [1999] ECR I-2603, paragraphs 37 and 39), it nevertheless remains the case that when they carry out that identification, they are obliged to respect the objectives of the Directive, namely, the reduction of water pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources.
64 It should be noted at the outset that, in the written pleadings which it submitted to the Court, the French Government admits that there is, in the Seine bay, both enrichment by nitrogen compounds, which it does not deny are of agricultural origin, and accelerated growth of algae and of higher forms of plant life. In addition, it admits that it cannot be excluded that the persistence of certain phenomena which can be characterised as a disturbance to the balance of organisms present in the water or to the quality of the water makes it possible to consider that the Seine bay fulfils certain criteria for eutrophication.