Stefano Liberato v Luminita Luisa Grigorescu.
Date: 2019-01-16
35


As the Court has already held, while, in accordance with the wording of Article 19(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003, in matrimonial matters the proceedings must involve the same parties, they may have a different cause of action, provided that they concern judicial separation, divorce or marriage annulment. The Court thus infers that lis pendens or dependent actions may arise, within the meaning of Article 19 of Regulation No 2201/2003, where two courts of different Member States are seised of legal separation proceedings in one case and divorce proceedings in the other. In such circumstances and where the parties are the same, the court second seised is of its own motion to stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established (judgment of 6 October 2015, A, C‑489/14, EU:C:2015:654, paragraphs 33 and 34).
39


In order to answer the questions from the referring court, it must be observed that Article 19 of Regulation No 2201/2003 is drafted in terms similar to those used in Article 27 of Regulation No 44/2001 and establishes a mechanism for dealing with cases of lis pendens that is equivalent to that provided for by the latter article. Therefore, account must be taken of the findings of the Court with regard to Regulation No 44/2001 for the interpretation of Regulation No 2201/2003 (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, A, C‑489/14, EU:C:2015:654, paragraph 27).
41


That regulation is based on judicial cooperation and mutual trust, which lead to mutual recognition of judicial decisions, the cornerstone for the creation of a genuine judicial area (judgment of 15 February 2017, W and V, C‑499/15, EU:C:2017:118, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
43


As the Court has previously held, in the interests of the sound administration of justice within the European Union, those rules are intended to prevent parallel proceedings before the courts of different Member States and to avoid conflicts between decisions which might result therefrom. For that purpose, the EU legislature intended to put in place a mechanism which is clear and effective in order to resolve situations of lis pendens, based on the chronological order in which the courts are seised (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, A, C‑489/14, EU:C:2015:654, paragraphs 29 and 30 and the case-law cited, and, by analogy, as regards Regulation No 44/2001, judgment of 27 February 2014, Cartier parfums-lunettes and Axa Corporate Solutions assurances, C‑1/13, EU:C:2014:109, paragraph 40).
44


In order to ensure the effective implementation of Regulation No 2201/2003 and in accordance with the principle of mutual trust on which it is based, it must be stated, first, as the Advocate General observed in point 59 of his Opinion, that it is for each court, in accordance with Article 17 thereof, to examine whether it has jurisdiction (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 July 2010, Purrucker, C‑256/09, EU:C:2010:437, paragraph 73; of 12 November 2014, L, C‑656/13, EU:C:2014:2364, paragraph 58; and of 15 February 2017, W and V, C‑499/15, EU:C:2017:118, paragraph 54).
45


Second, under Article 24 of Regulation No 2201/2003, the jurisdiction of the court of the Member State of origin may not be reviewed (judgment of 9 November 2010, Purrucker, C‑296/10, EU:C:2010:665, paragraph 85). The same is true under Regulation No 44/2001, in accordance with Article 35(3) thereof.
46


Third, in accordance with recital 21 of Regulation No 2201/2003, that regulation is based on the idea that the recognition and enforcement of judgments given in a Member State should be based on the principle of mutual trust and the grounds for non-recognition should be kept to the minimum required (judgment of 19 November 2015, P, C‑455/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:763, paragraph 35).
52


Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the prohibition laid down in Article 24 of Regulation No 2201/2003 does not contain any express reference to Article 19 thereof, an alleged breach of Article 19 does not allow the court first seised — if it is not to review the jurisdiction of the court second seised — to refuse recognition of a judgment issued by the latter contrary to the rules of lis pendens in that provision (see, by analogy, as regards Article 15 of Regulation No 2201/2003, judgment of 19 November 2015, P, C‑455/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:763, paragraph 45).
54


It must be added that the court of the State in which recognition is sought may not, without challenging the aim of Regulations No 2201/2003 and No 44/2001, refuse recognition of a judgment emanating from another Member State solely on the ground that it considers that national or EU law was misapplied in that judgment (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 July 2015, Diageo Brands, C‑681/13, EU:C:2015:471, paragraph 49, and of 19 November 2015, P, C‑455/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:763, paragraph 46).
55


That analysis is confirmed by the fact that the grounds for non-recognition of a decision on the ground that it is manifestly contrary to public policy, laid down in Article 22(a) and Article 23(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 and Article 34 of Regulation No 44/2001, must be interpreted strictly, in so far as it is an obstacle to the attainment of one of the fundamental objectives of those regulations, as recalled in paragraph 46 of this judgment (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 November 2015, P, C‑455/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:763, paragraph 36).