Maria Simitzi v Dimos Kos.
Date: 1995-09-14
11 In its judgment in Case C-163/90 Legros and Others [1992] ECR I-4625, the Court ruled that a charge proportional to the customs value of goods, levied by one Member State on goods imported from another Member State by reason of their entry into a region of the territory of the first Member State, constituted a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty on imports, notwithstanding the fact that the charge was also imposed on goods entering that region from another part of the same State.
12 However, the Hellenic Republic maintains that a distinction must be drawn between the charge at issue in the main proceedings and that involved in the Legros case. In the latter case, the dock dues were imposed solely on imported goods and their purpose was to limit imports in order to encourage local production. In the present cases, on the other hand, the communal tax is imposed not only on imports but also on exports from the Dodecanese, including exports of local products. That difference shows that the aim of the communal tax was solely to provide the local administrative authorities with financial resources. Consequently, the tax does not constitute a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty on imports or exports.
14 First of all, the Court has consistently held that it follows from the customs union system provided for by the Treaty, in particular Articles 9, 12, 13 and 16, and from the general and absolute nature of the prohibition of all customs duties applicable to goods moving between Member States that customs duties are prohibited regardless of the purpose for which they were introduced and the destination of the revenue from them (judgment in Case 24/68 Commission v Italy [1969] ECR 193, paragraph 7).
15 Second, any pecuniary charge which is imposed unilaterally on domestic or foreign goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, and which is not a customs duty in the strict sense, constitutes a charge having equivalent effect, within the meaning of Articles 9, 12, 13 and 16 of the Treaty, even if it is not imposed for the benefit of the State and is not discriminatory or protective in effect (Commission v Italy, paragraph 9).
16 Lastly, it does not matter, for the purposes of the Treaty, whether a charge is treated as a general charge or two distinct charges, one on exports and the other on imports. As it is imposed on all goods crossing the frontier, the charge in question hampers the interpenetration sought by the Treaty and thus has an effect on the free circulation of goods equivalent to that of a customs duty (Commission v Italy, paragraph 14).
17 Accordingly, it should be stated in reply to the national courts' first question that an ad valorem charge levied by a Member State on goods imported from another Member State by reason of their entry into a region of the first Member State' s territory constitutes a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty on imports, notwithstanding the fact that it is also levied on goods entering that region from another part of the same State' s territory, and notwithstanding the fact that an ad valorem charge is also levied on goods exported from the region in question.
The second question
21 A charge levied at a regional frontier by reason of the despatch of goods from one region of a Member State to other regions of the same State constitutes an obstacle to the free movement of goods which is at least as serious as a charge levied at the national frontier by reason of the export of goods from all the territory of a Member State (see, by analogy, the judgment in Legros and Others, paragraph 16).
26 The same reasoning must apply in the case of a charge levied on goods despatched from one region to other regions of the same State.
27 Accordingly, it should be stated in reply to the national courts' fourth question that ad valorem charges levied by a Member State on goods entering a region of its territory solely from other regions of the same State and on goods despatched from one region solely to other regions of the same State constitute charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties on imports and exports respectively.
The fifth question
29 In its oral observations the Greek Government suggested that, if the Court were to consider a charge such as the duty in question to be incompatible with the relevant provisions of the Treaty, it could limit the temporal effects of this judgment. It pointed out, first, the uncertainty which existed about the actual scope of the prohibition of charges having equivalent effect before the judgments in the Legros and Lancry cases were delivered and, second, the serious financial consequences which would ensue for local administrative authorities from a judgment declaring the duty in question to be incompatible with Community law.
30 In its judgment in Legros, the Court found that, owing to overriding considerations of legal certainty, the Treaty provisions relating to charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties on imports could not be relied on in support of claims for refunds of charges such as dock dues paid before the date of that judgment (16 July 1992), except by claimants who had, before that date, initiated legal proceedings or raised an equivalent claim.
31 The duty in question must be treated as a charge of the same kind as the dock dues at issue in the Legros case. Until 16 July 1992, therefore, the Hellenic Republic could reasonably believe that the duty in question was in conformity with Community law.
32 The same considerations of legal certainty must therefore apply here and consequently the temporal limitation set by the Court in the Legros case must also be held to apply to claims for refunds of sums levied by way of the contested duty.
33 On the other hand, to limit the effects of this judgment in respect of the period after 16 July 1992, the date of the Legros judgment, would not be appropriate. After that date, the Greek Government must have been aware that the contested duty was incompatible with Community law.