larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Michael Timmel v Aviso Zeta AG.
Date: 2014-05-15
62. In this regard, it is to be recalled that a text which, by reason of divergences between the various language versions, does not lend itself to a clear and uniform interpretation must be interpreted by reference to both its purpose and its general scheme (see, inter alia, Case 30/77 Bouchereau  EU:C:1977:172, paragraph 14, and Case C‑1/02 Borgmann  EU:C:2004:202, paragraph 25).
63. The necessity for uniform application and, accordingly, for uniform interpretation of an EU measure makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in isolation, but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim the latter seeks to achieve, in the light, in particular, of the versions in all languages (see Case C‑569/08 Internetportal und Marketing EU:C:2010:311, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
1. garantovaná a.s. v European Commission.
Date: 2014-05-15
15. In determining the preceding business year, the Commission must assess, in each specific case and in the light of both its context and the objectives pursued by the scheme of penalties created by the regulation, the intended impact on the undertaking in question, taking into account in particular a turnover which reflects the undertaking’s real economic situation during the period in which the infringement was committed (see Case C‑76/06 P Britannia Alloys & Chemicals  v Commission  EU:C:2007:326, paragraph 25).
17. In such a situation, and as the Court made clear in paragraph 30 of Britannia Alloys & Chemicals  v Commission  (EU:C:2007:326), the Commission is entitled to refer to another business year in order to be able to make a correct assessment of the financial resources of that undertaking and to ensure that the fine has a sufficient and proportionate deterrent effect.
18. 1. garantovaná’s argument as to the ‘mandatory nature’ of Article 23(2) of the regulation must be dismissed at the outset, since the Court has by no means treated that provision as having such a nature. The argument that the Commission may not ‘derogate’ from that provision must likewise be dismissed. The issue is not that of a power to derogate, but the determination of the relevant business year in the light of the factual circumstances of the case (see, to that effect, Britannia Alloys & Chemicals  v Commission  EU:C:2007:326, paragraphs 25, 29 and 30).
Plásticos Españoles SA (ASPLA) v European Commission.
Date: 2014-05-22
22. Contrary to what is maintained by ASPLA, such an appraisal of the evidence is compatible with a well-established line of authority which has accepted that the existence of unlawful conduct may be inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, may, in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of the competition rules (Joined Cases C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P Aalborg Portland and Others  v Commission  EU:C:2004:6, paragraph 57, and Joined Cases C‑403/04 P and C‑405/04 P Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel  v Commission  EU:C:2007:52, paragraph 51).
23. In so far as ASPLA seeks to show that the evidence examined by the General Court is ambiguous and insufficiently precise or consistent to substantiate the conclusions reached by that Court, it should be observed that the appraisal by the General Court of the probative value of the documents submitted to it cannot, save where the rules on the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have not been observed or the evidence has been distorted, be challenged before the Court of Justice (Case C‑238/12 P FLSmidth  v Commission  EU:C:2014:284, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
34. In the present case, an examination of the documents in the file shows that, in its application, ASPLA put forward, under the headings mentioned in the preceding paragraph, a number of specific arguments concerning the calculation of the fine imposed on it by the Commission, but did not, however, challenge the fact that its market share had been calculated by attributing to it both its own sales and those made by Armando Álvarez. The taking into account of market share, in relation to the effective economic capacity of entities which infringe EU law to cause significant damage to competition, is an essential element of the method of setting the fine; therefore, if ASPLA sought to challenge that method, this had to be specifically stated before the General Court at the stage of the application (see, to that effect, Case C‑564/08 P SGL Carbon  v Commission EU:C:2009:703, paragraph 31).
39. Since the argument concerning such a difference in treatment must be regarded as new, it cannot be examined at the stage of the appeal. In an appeal the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is in principle confined to review of the findings of law on the pleas argued at first instance ( FLSmidth  v Commission EU:C:2014:284, paragraph 42). Accordingly, both limbs of the second plea must be rejected.
Armando Álvarez SA v European Commission.
Date: 2014-05-22
16. It should be noted, in this regard, that, in the present case, the Commission referred expressly, in recital 580 to the decision at issue, to the presumption that a parent company in fact exercises decisive influence over a subsidiary in which it owns all the shares, before stating, in recital 584 to that decision, that that approach must be applied on a case-by-case basis for each undertaking concerned (see Kendrion  v Commission  EU:C:2013:771, paragraph 28).
31. In so far as Armando Álvarez submits, in the context of its alternative plea, that the General Court breached its obligation to state the reasons in failing to address each of the arguments which Armando Álvarez had put forward to rebut the presumption of actual exercise of decisive influence, it should be observed that, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the obligation on the General Court, under Article 36 and the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, to state the reasons on which its judgments are based does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case ( Groupe Gascogne  v Commission  EU:C:2013:770, paragraph 37).
33. In so far as Armando Álvarez seeks to challenge the General Court’s appraisal of the facts and of the evidence produced before it, suffice it to observe that, save where the rules on the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have not been observed or the evidence has been distorted, such an appraisal does not constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (Case C‑238/12 P FLSmidth  v Commission EU:C:2014:284, paragraph 31 and the case‑law cited).
X BV and TBG Limited v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.
Date: 2014-06-05
45. The existence of the special arrangements between the European Union and OCTs results in the general provisions of the EC Treaty, namely those which are not referred to in Part Four of that treaty, not being applicable to OCTs in the absence of an express reference (Case C‑260/90 Leplat  EU:C:1992:66, paragraph 10; Case C‑300/04 Eman and Sevinger  EU:C:2006:545, paragraph 46; and Prunus  EU:C:2011:276, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
48. By referring to balance of payments and by prohibiting, first, all restrictions on payments in freely convertible currency on the current account of that balance and, second, restrictions on the movement of capital linked to investments in companies and which concern transactions on the capital account of that balance, Article 47(1) of the OCT Decision has a particularly wide scope, close to the scope of Article 56 EC in the relations between Member States and third countries (see, to that effect and concerning Article 63 TFEU, Prunus  EU:C:2011:276, paragraphs 29 to 31).
European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria.
Date: 2014-06-05
15. It is settled case-law that the letter of formal notice from the Commission to the Member State concerned and then the reasoned opinion issued by it delimit the subject-matter of the dispute, with the result that that subject-matter cannot subsequently be extended. Consequently, the reasoned opinion and the application must be based on the same complaints (see, inter alia, Case C‑191/95 Commission  v Germany  EU:C:1998:441, paragraph 55, and Case C‑67/12 Commission  v Spain  EU:C:2014:5, paragraph 52).
16. However, that requirement cannot be carried so far as to mean that in every case the statement of complaints in the letter of formal notice, the operative part of the reasoned opinion and the form of order sought in the application must be exactly the same, provided that the subject‑matter of the proceedings has not been extended or altered but simply limited (see, inter alia, Commission  v Germany  EU:C:1998:441, paragraph 56, and Commission  v Spain  EU:C:2014:5, paragraph 53).
35. Nevertheless, the Commission maintains that such an obligation is implied by those provisions. In that regard, it is necessary to bear in the mind the Court’s case-law according to which, as the Advocate General has noted in point 46 of his Opinion, the Court may not, in the face of clear and precise wording of an EU legislative act, interpret the provision with the intention of correcting it and thereby extending the obligations of the Member States relating to it (see, to that effect, Case C‑582/08 Commission  v United Kingdom  EU:C:2010:429, paragraph 51).
M.
Date: 2014-06-05
28. In order to determine whether a judicial decision constitutes a decision finally disposing of the case against a person, within the meaning of that article, it is necessary to be satisfied that that decision was given after a determination had been made as to the merits of the case (see, to that effect, Case C‑469/03 Miraglia  EU:C:2005:156, paragraph 30).
29. In this respect, the Court has held that a decision of the judicial authorities of a Contracting State by which an accused person is definitively acquitted because of the inadequacy of the evidence must be considered to be based on such a determination (see, to that effect, Case C‑150/05 van Straaten  EU:C:2006:614, paragraph 60).
31. In that respect, it is apparent from the settled case-law of the Court that, for a person to be regarded as someone whose trial has been ‘finally disposed of’ in relation to the acts which he is alleged to have committed, for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA, further prosecution must have been definitively barred, with the result that the decision at issue leads, in the Contracting State in which it was adopted, to the protection granted by the ne bis in idem  principle (see, to that effect, Case C‑491/07 Turanský  EU:C:2008:768, paragraphs 32 and 35 and the case-law cited).
32. A decision which does not, under the law of the Contracting State which instituted criminal proceedings against a person, definitively bar further prosecution at national level cannot, in principle, constitute a procedural obstacle to the opening or continuation of criminal proceedings in respect of the same acts against that person in another Contracting State ( Turanský  EU:C:2008:768, paragraph 36).
35. Furthermore, it should be noted that, since the right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence is also set out in Article 50 of the Charter, Article 54 of the CISA must be interpreted in the light of that provision.
36. In this respect, it must be noted, first, that the assessment of the ‘final’ nature of the criminal ruling at issue must be carried out on the basis of the law of the Member State in which that ruling was made.
37. Second, it must be noted that, according to the explanations relating to Article 50 of the Charter, which have to be taken into consideration for the purpose of interpreting it (judgment in Case C‑617/10 Åkerberg Fransson  EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited), ‘[a]s regards the situations referred to by Article 4 of Protocol No 7, namely the application of the [ ne bis in idem ] principle within the same Member State, the guaranteed right has the same meaning and the same scope as the corresponding right in the ECHR’. Given that Article 54 of the CISA makes the final nature of a judicial decision dependent, for the purposes of application of the ne bis in idem  principle to possible prosecutions by another Contracting State, on whether or not that decision is final in the Contracting State in which it was made, that point in the explanations is relevant in the present case.
P.J. Vonk Noordegraaf v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken.
Date: 2014-06-05
50. Finally, it must be presumed that a farmer in Mr Vonk Noordegraaf’s situation was not able reasonably to have detected the errors in the establishment of the area of his parcels since they were the direct result of the method then used by the competent national authorities.
Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd v Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd and Others.
Date: 2014-06-05
23. According to the case-law of the Court, the conditions set out above must be interpreted strictly, because Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/29 is a derogation from the general rule established by that directive that the copyright holder must authorise any reproduction of his protected work (Case C‑5/08 Infopaq International , EU:C:2009:465, paragraphs 56 and 57, and Joined Cases C‑403/08 and C‑429/08 Football Association Premier League and Others , EU:C:2011:631, paragraph 162).
24. None the less, it is apparent from that same case-law that the exemption provided for in that provision must allow and ensure the development and operation of new technologies, and safeguard a fair balance between the rights and interests of rights holders and of users of protected works who wish to avail themselves of those technologies (see Football Association Premier League and Others , EU:C:2011:631, paragraph 164).
Whether the conditions laid down in Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/29 are satisfied
28. Under the third condition, which it is appropriate to examine in second place, the acts of reproduction in question must be an integral and essential part of a technological process. That condition requires that two criteria both be fulfilled, namely that, first, the acts of reproduction are carried out entirely in the context of the implementation of a technological process and, secondly, the completion of those acts of reproduction is necessary, in that the technological process could not function correctly and efficiently without those acts (see Infopaq International , EU:C:2009:465, paragraph 61, and order in Case C‑302/10 Infopaq International , EU:C:2012:16, paragraph 30).
40. As regards the first of the two criteria, it should be recalled that an act will be held to be ‘transient’, in the light of the technological process used, if its duration is limited to what is necessary for that process to work properly, it being understood that that process must be automated inasmuch as it deletes such an act automatically, without human intervention, once its function of enabling the completion of such a process has come to an end (see, to that effect, Infopaq International , EU:C:2009:465, paragraph 64).
53. Nevertheless, in order for it to be possible to rely on the exception laid down in that provision, as interpreted in paragraph 52 above, those copies must also satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 5(5) of Directive 2001/29 (see, to that effect, Football Association Premier League and Others , EU:C:2011:631, paragraph 181).
Whether the conditions laid down in Article 5(5) of Directive 2001/29 are satisfied
Deltafina SpA v European Commission.
Date: 2014-06-12
59. In that regard, firstly, contrary to the Commission’s submissions, the fact that Deltafina did not raise any objection at the hearing does not have the effect of rendering the second ground of appeal inadmissible (see, to that effect, Case C‑199/99 P Corus UK  v Commission EU:C:2003:531, paragraphs 32 and 35).
67. It is settled case-law that the General Court is the sole judge of any need to supplement the information available to it in respect of the cases before it. Whether or not the evidence before it is sufficient is a matter to be appraised by it alone and is not subject to review by the Court of Justice on appeal, except where that evidence has been distorted or the substantive inaccuracy of the findings of the General Court is apparent from the documents in the case (Case C‑385/07 P Der Grüne Punkt — Duales System Deutschland  v Commission , EU:C:2009:456, paragraph 163 and the case-law cited).
80. It must be borne in mind that a failure to adjudicate within a reasonable time must, as a procedural irregularity constituting the breach of a fundamental right, give rise to an entitlement of the party concerned to an effective remedy granting him appropriate relief (Case C‑40/12 P Gascogne Sack Deutschland  v Commission EU:C:2013:768, point 80).
88. In that regard, it must be recalled that, in an action for damages based on a breach by the General Court of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, in that it failed to have regard to the requirement that the case be dealt with within a reasonable time, which breach constitutes a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals (see, inter alia, Case C‑198/03 P Commission  v CEVA and Pfizer  EU:C:2005:445, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited), it is for the General Court, in its assessment of that breach, to take account of the circumstances specific to each case, such as the complexity of the case and the conduct of the parties, the fundamental requirement of legal certainty on which economic operators must be able to rely and the aim of ensuring that competition is not distorted, as is clear from paragraphs 91 to 95 of the judgment in Gascogne Sack Deutschland  v Commission  EU:C:2013:768.
90. That being the case, since it is clear in the present case, without its being necessary for the parties to produce evidence in that regard, that the General Court has sufficiently seriously breached its duty to adjudicate within a reasonable period, the Court can so find.
Užsienio reikalų ministerija and Finansinių nusikaltimų tyrimo tarnyba v Vladimir Peftiev and Others.
Date: 2014-06-12
24. It should be borne in mind that, when deciding on a request for release of frozen funds pursuant to Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation No 765/2006, the competent national authority implements EU law. It follows that that authority is required to observe the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), as provided for in Article 51(1) thereof.
28. The requirement imposed by Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice is based on a view of the lawyer’s role as collaborating in the administration of justice and as being required to provide, in full independence and in the overriding interests of that cause, such legal assistance as the client needs (see, to that effect, Case 155/79 AM & S Europe v Commission  EU:C:1982:157, paragraph 24; Case C‑550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals  v Commission EU:C:2010:512, paragraph 42; and Joined Cases C‑422/11 P and C‑423/11 P Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej and Poland  v Commission  EU:C:2012:553, paragraph 23). Moreover, the Court has held previously that, as no provision is made in the Statute or Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice for a derogation from or exception to that obligation, an application signed by the applicant himself is insufficient for the purposes of instituting proceedings (see order in Case C‑502/06 P Correia de Matos  v Parliament EU:C:2007:696, paragraph 12).
Commune de Millau and Société d’économie mixte d’équipement de l’Aveyron (SEMEA) v European Commission.
Date: 2014-06-19
55. According to Article 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, there is a right of appeal on points of law only and it must be based on grounds alleging lack of competence of the General Court, a breach of procedure before it which adversely affects the interests of the appellant and the infringement of EU law by the General Court (see, to that effect, Case C‑136/92 P Commission  v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others  EU:C:1994:211, paragraph 47).
56. The General Court therefore has exclusive jurisdiction to establish the facts except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and to assess the evidence accepted. The establishment of those facts and the assessment of that evidence do not, save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑449/99 P EIB v Hautem  EU:C:2001:502, paragraph 44, and Case C‑105/04 P Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission  EU:C:2006:592, paragraphs 69 and 70).
TDC A/S v Teleklagenævnet.
Date: 2014-06-19
39. Thus, Article 8(1) of the Framework Directive provides that, in carrying out their regulatory tasks specified in the Framework Directive and in the specific directives, and therefore, in particular, in the Access Directive, the NRAs are to take all reasonable measures which are aimed at achieving the objectives set out in that article, which are to promote competition in the provision of electronic communications networks and services, to contribute to the development of the internal market and to promote the interests of the citizens of the European Union.
41. With regard to Article 5(1) of the Access Directive, the Court has held that it is apparent from its wording that the NRAs are responsible for ensuring adequate access and interconnection and also interoperability of services by means which are not exhaustively listed there ( TeliaSonera Finland , C‑192/08, EU:C:2009:696, paragraph 58).