larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Apple and Pear Australia Ltd and Star Fruits Diffusion v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).
Date: 2016-07-21
51


Moreover, attention should be drawn to the importance, both in the legal order of the European Union and in national legal systems, of the principle of res judicata. In order to ensure both stability of the law and legal relations and the sound administration of justice, it is important that decisions of courts or tribunals which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the time-limits provided for in that connection can no longer be called into question (judgments of 10 July 2014 in Impresa Pizzarotti, C‑213/13, EU:C:2014:2067, paragraph 58, and 6 October 2015 in Târșia, C‑69/14, EU:C:2015:662, paragraph 28).
52


In that regard, it should be noted that, although Regulation No 207/2009 does not explicitly define the concept of ‘res judicata’, it follows, in particular, from Article 56(3) and Article 100(2) of that regulation that, in order that decisions of a court of a Member State or EUIPO which have become final are res judicata and can therefore be binding on such a court or EUIPO, it is required that parallel proceedings before them have the same parties, the same subject matter and the same cause of action.
61


It should be noted, moreover, that the Court of Justice has already distinguished, although in a different factual context, between the subject matter of infringement proceedings, actions for a declaration of invalidity and proceedings concerning registration, under Regulation No 207/2009, to the effect that the possibility for the proprietor of an earlier EU trade mark to bring infringement proceedings against the proprietor of a later registered EU trade mark cannot render either the bringing of an application for a declaration of invalidity before EUIPO or the mechanisms for prior control available under the procedure for registering EU trade marks devoid of all purpose (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 February 2013 in Fédération Cynologique Internationale, C‑561/11, EU:C:2013:91, paragraph 48).
63


Accordingly, it must be stated that the subject matter of the proceedings before the tribunal de commerce de Bruxelles (Commercial Court, Brussels) and of those before EUIPO was different and, consequently, the General Court did not err in law by making such a finding. Since the conditions relating to the identity of the parties, the subject matter and cause of action are cumulative, such a finding is sufficient to conclude that the judgment of the Tribunal de commerce de Bruxelles (Commercial Court, Brussels) of 28 June 2012 was not res judicata with regard to the contested decision.
67


As the General Court noted in paragraph 56 of the judgment under appeal, its power to alter decisions does not have the effect of conferring on it the power to substitute its own assessment for that of a Board of Appeal of EUIPO, or of carrying out an assessment on which that Board of Appeal has not yet adopted a position (judgment of 5 July 2011 in Edwin v OHIM, C‑263/09 P, EU:C:2011:452, paragraph 72).
Masterrind GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas.
Date: 2016-07-28
25


Furthermore, recalling the wording of paragraph 15 of the judgment of 9 October 2008 in Interboves (C‑277/06, EU:C:2008:548), as well as point 18 of the Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Interboves (C‑277/06, EU:C:2008:162), the referring court is of the opinion that that provision lays down an intermediate rest period which must be of at least one hour, but which may exceed that length of time. It takes the view that the general rule enshrined in point (a) of the second paragraph of Article 3 of Regulation No 1/2005, that all necessary arrangements must be made in advance of the journey to minimise the length of the journey and meet the animals needs during the journey, was made specific by the EU legislator, as regards the transport by road of cattle, in the rule laid down by Annex I, Chapter V, point 1.4(d) to that regulation, which provides for an intermediate rest period of at least one hour, and not of one hour as recommended by the Commission.
47


In the second place, the Court points out that, ruling, within the framework of the legislation previously in force, as regards the opposite situation in which the entry added by the official veterinarian at the exit point contained a positive assessment as regards adherence to the relevant provisions of the legislation on the transport of live animals, the it held that the finding made by the veterinarian did not constitute irrefutable proof in that respect, so that that finding did not bind the authority competent for the payment of the export refund in relation to the export of cattle due to objective and specific evidence leading to the opposite conclusion (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 March 2008 in Viamex Agrar Handel, C‑96/06, EU:C:2008:158, paragraphs 34, 35, 37 and 41, and 25 November 2008 in Heemskerk and Schaap, C‑455/06, EU:C:2008:650, paragraphs 25 and 30).
Robert Fuchs AG v Hauptzollamt Lörrach.
Date: 2016-07-28
38


In the present case, and in the light of the fact that the referring court referred the question for the purpose of the application of Article 558(1) of the Implementing Regulation, which lays down the conditions governing total relief from import duties for the temporary importation of means of transport, it is also useful to interpret that provision.
European Federation for Cosmetic Ingredients v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and Attorney General.
Date: 2016-09-21
22


It should be borne in mind that the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice make no provision for the interested parties referred to in Article 23 of that Statute to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion (see, inter alia, judgment of 9 June 2016, Pesce and Others, C‑78/16 and C‑79/16, EU:C:2016:428, paragraph 24).
23


Under the second paragraph of Article 252 TFEU, it is to be the duty of the Advocate-General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make reasoned submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, require his involvement. The Court is not bound either by the Advocate General’s Opinion or by the reasoning on which it is based (judgment of 9 June 2016, Pesce and Others, C‑78/16 and C‑79/16, EU:C:2016:428, paragraph 24).
24


Consequently, a party’s disagreement with the Opinion of the Advocate General, irrespective of the questions which he examines in his Opinion, cannot in itself constitute a ground justifying the reopening of the oral procedure (judgment of 9 June 2016, Pesce and Others, C‑78/16 and C‑79/16, EU:C:2016:428, paragraph 24).
31


However, it is settled case-law that, when a provision of EU law is interpreted, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, judgment of 10 July 2014, D. and G., C‑358/13 and C‑181/14, EU:C:2014:2060, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
33


As regards the rules ensuring a high level of protection of human health, it is clear from Articles 3, 10 and 11 of that regulation that such a product is to be safe for human health, that its safety must be assessed on the basis of the relevant information and that the safety report must be drafted and included in the cosmetic product information file.
European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Date: 2016-09-21
41


According to the Court’s settled case-law, it is necessary, in order to ascertain the meaning and scope of a provision, to interpret it by taking into account the wording of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, A, C‑184/14, EU:C:2015:479, paragraph 32 and the case‑law cited).
47


Note (3) constitutes a derogation from the general rule provided for under Part A of Annex VI and must therefore, in accordance with the Court’s established case‑law, be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 September 2015, Nannoka Vulcanus Industries, C‑81/14, EU:C:2015:575, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).
52


Third, the United Kingdom’s argument that it is principally due to economic constraints that arrangements have not been made to improve the environmental performance of that plant and to comply with the requirements of Note (3) must be rejected. It is clear from the Court’s case-law that the United Kingdom cannot validly invoke, in the present case, reasons of a purely economic nature in order to dispute the failure of which it is accused (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 December 2007, Commission v France, C‑265/95, EU:C:1997:595, paragraph 62, and of 21 January 2016, Commission v Cyprus, C‑515/14, EU:C:2016:30, paragraph 53).
Breitsamer und Ulrich GmbH & Co. KG v Landeshauptstadt München.
Date: 2016-09-22
33


In that regard, according to settled case-law of the Court, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see judgments of 5 December 2006, Cipolla and Others, C‑94/04 and C‑202/04, EU:C:2006:758, paragraph 25, and of 7 April 2016, KA Finanz, C‑483/14, EU:C:2016:205, paragraph 41).
34


That presumption of relevance cannot be rebutted by the simple fact that one of the parties to the main proceedings contests certain facts, the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine and on which the delimitation of the subject matter of those proceedings depends (see judgments of 5 December 2006, Cipolla and Others, C‑94/04 and C‑202/04, EU:C:2006:758, paragraph 26, and of 14 April 2016, Polkomtel, C‑397/14, EU:C:2016:256, paragraph 38).
58


According to the Court’s settled case-law, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision or be given priority over the other language versions in that regard. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all EU languages. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgments of 27 March 1990, Cricket St Thomas, C‑372/88, EU:C:1990:140, paragraphs 18 and 19; of 15 November 2012, Kurcums Metal, C‑558/11, EU:C:2012:721, paragraph 48; and of 17 March 2016, Kødbranchens Fællesråd, C‑112/15, EU:C:2016:185, paragraph 36).
67


It appears both from recital 6 and Article 2 of the directive that its aim is to inform and protect the ultimate consumer of foodstuffs, in particular as regards the nature, identity, properties, composition, quantity, durability, origin or provenance and method of manufacture or production of those products (judgment of 23 November 2006, Lidl Italia, C‑315/05, EU:C:2006:736, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
69


Accordingly, that directive requires that the consumer have correct, neutral and objective information that does not mislead him (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 June 2015, Teekanne, C‑195/14, EU:C:2015:361, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG v Accord Healthcare OÜ.
Date: 2016-10-05
30


As regards a provision such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the Court has already held that adjustments set out in an annex to an Act of Accession are to be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State and that they do not constitute an act of an institution, but are provisions of primary law which may not be suspended, amended or repealed otherwise than by means of the procedures laid down for the revision of the original Treaties (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 April 1988, LAISA and CPC España v Council, 31/86 and 35/86, EU:C:1988:211, paragraph 12).
31


It should be specified in that respect that the difference in treatment resulting from the foregoing is not arbitrary, but is merely the consequence of the respective procedures chosen for the purpose of adoption of those provisions. Whereas some of those provisions are adopted pursuant to acts of the institutions, which are subject as such to the general rules on the review of legality provided for in the FEU Treaty, the provisions resulting directly from an Act of Accession do not constitute acts of institutions and are not therefore open to such review (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 April 1988, LAISA and CPC España v Council, 31/86 and 35/86, EU:C:1988:211, paragraph 17).
43


Lastly, it should be pointed out, on the one hand, that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, new rules falling within the substantive rules of European Union law apply immediately to the future effects of a situation which arose under the old rules. Furthermore, from the date of accession of a new Member State, the provisions of European Union law are to apply under the conditions laid down in the original Treaties and in the relevant Act of Accession (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 September 2013, Kuso, C‑614/11, EU:C:2013:544, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
Marjan Kostanjevec v F&S Leasing, GmbH.
Date: 2016-10-12
37


It should be noted here that it is in the interests of the sound administration of justice that the special jurisdiction for counterclaims enables the parties, in the same proceedings and before the same court, to litigate all their claims against each other that have a common origin. Unnecessary multiple proceedings are thus avoided.
38


In circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, the counterclaim for reimbursement on the ground of unjust enrichment must be regarded as arising from the leasing contract from which the lessor’s original action originated. The alleged enrichment in the amount of the sum paid in enforcement of the judgment that has since been set aside would not have taken place without that contract.
Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej and Petrotel sp. z o.o. w Płocku v Polkomtel sp. z o.o.
Date: 2016-10-13
16


In that regard, it should be observed that, according to settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 16 April 2016, Polkomtel, C‑397/14, EU:C:2016:256, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
20


It must be recalled at the outset that the Court has already held that Article 4 of the Framework Directive is an expression of the principle of effective judicial protection safeguarded by Article 47 of the Charter, pursuant to which it is for the courts of the Member States to ensure judicial protection of an individual’s rights under EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 January 2015, T-Mobile Austria, C‑282/13, EU:C:2015:24, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
23


In the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it is, generally, for the Member States, in the exercise of their procedural autonomy and subject to compliance with the requirements arising from the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, to lay down the procedural rules applicable to an appeal such as that at issue in the main proceedings (see, by analogy, judgments of 18 March 2010, Alassini and Others, C‑317/08 to C‑320/08, EU:C:2010:146, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited, and of 27 June 2013, Agrokonsulting, C‑93/12, EU:C:2013:432, paragraph 35).
24


Nevertheless, as is clear from paragraph 20 of the present judgment, Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive, which lays down the requirement to ensure that an effective appeal mechanism exists, is an expression of the principle, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, of effective judicial protection of an individual’s rights under EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2007, Unibet, C‑432/05, EU:C:2007:163, paragraph 44); that principle must be respected in every case.
29


It should be recalled in that regard that the principle of legal certainty, the corollary of which is the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, requires, on the one hand, that rules of law must be clear and precise and, on the other, that their application must be foreseeable by those subject to them (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 September 2009, Plantanol, C‑201/08, EU:C:2009:539, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited, and of 11 June 2015, Berlington Hungary and Others, C‑98/14, EU:C:2015:386, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).
Servoprax GmbH v Roche Diagnostics Deutschland GmbH.
Date: 2016-10-13
37


It therefore follows from those provisions that in vitro diagnostic devices the conformity of which with the essential requirements of Directive 98/79 has been certified and which bear a CE marking must be allowed to move freely throughout the European Union, and no Member State can impose a requirement that such a product should undergo a further conformity assessment procedure (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 June 2007, Medipac-Kazantzidis, C‑6/05, EU:C:2007:337, paragraph 42). That is why Directive 98/79 makes no provision for any mechanism for the review of conformity that is additional to or that supplements the mechanisms provided for in Article 9 of that directive.
Republik Griechenland v Grigorios Nikiforidis.
Date: 2016-10-18
28


That point having been clarified, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, it follows from the need for uniform application of EU law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 July 2008, Kozłowski, C‑66/08, EU:C:2008:437, paragraph 42, and of 24 May 2016, Dworzecki, C‑108/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:346, paragraph 28).
41


According to Article 9(1) of the Rome I Regulation, overriding mandatory provisions are provisions respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law applicable to the contract under that regulation. Article 9(2) provides that the Rome I Regulation does not preclude the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the State of the forum. Article 9(3) states that the court of the forum may give effect to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed, in so far as those overriding mandatory provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful. It is added in Article 9(3) that, before deciding to give effect to the latter provisions, the court of the forum is to have regard to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-application.
44


As a derogating measure, Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation must be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, judgment of 17 October 2013, Unamar, C‑184/12, EU:C:2013:663, paragraph 49).
48


Finally, to accord the court of the forum the power to apply, by virtue of the law applicable to the contract, overriding mandatory provisions other than those referred to in Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation could affect the objective pursued by Article 8 thereof, which is intended to ensure, as far as possible, compliance with the provisions protecting the employee that are laid down by the law of the State in which he carries out his work (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 March 2011, Koelzsch, C‑29/10, EU:C:2011:151, paragraph 42).
54


Examination of the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU does not enable a different conclusion to be reached. That principle does not authorise a Member State to circumvent the obligations that are imposed upon it by EU law and accordingly is not capable of permitting the referring court to disregard the fact that the list of overriding mandatory provisions to which effect may be given, as set out in Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation, is exhaustive, in order to give effect, as legal rules, to the Greek overriding mandatory provisions at issue in the main proceedings (see, by analogy, judgment of 23 January 2014, Manzi and Compagnia Naviera Orchestra, C‑537/11, EU:C:2014:19, paragraph 40).
SCI Senior Home v Gemeinde Wedemark and Hannoversche Volksbank eG.
Date: 2016-10-26
18


More specifically, as regards Article 5(1) of Regulation No 1346/2000, which stipulates that the opening of insolvency proceedings has no effect on the right in rem of a creditor or a third party over the debtor’s assets which are located at the time the proceedings were opened in the territory of another Member State, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that the basis, validity and extent of such a right in rem must normally be determined according to the law of the place where the asset concerned is situated. As a consequence, Article 5(1) of that regulation, by derogating from the rule of the law of the Member State of the opening of the proceedings, allows the law of the Member State on whose territory the asset concerned is situated to be applied to the right in rem of a creditor or a third party in respect of certain assets belonging to the debtor (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 July 2012, ERSTE Bank Hungary, C‑527/10, EU:C:2012:417, paragraphs 40 to 42, and of 16 April 2015, Lutz, C‑557/13, EU:C:2015:227, paragraph 27).
20


In that respect, it is clear from the decision to refer that the charges at issue in the main proceedings are rights which may be enforced in rem, since the owner of the encumbered property must accept enforcement of the instrument recording that tax debt against that property. In any event, it is a matter for the referring court to find and assess the facts in the case before it and to interpret and apply national law (judgment of 8 June 2016, Hünnebeck, C‑479/14, EU:C:2016:412, paragraph 36) in order to determine whether the real property tax debt at issue in the main proceedings may be regarded as a right in rem under German law.
25


Although in accordance with settled case-law a derogation must be interpreted strictly, it is nonetheless appropriate to ensure that the exception is not deprived of its effectiveness (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 December 2012, BLV Wohn- und Gewerbebau, C‑395/11, EU:C:2012:799, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).