larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Latchways plc and Eurosafe Solutions BV v Kedge Safety Systems BV and Consolidated Nederland BV.
Date: 2010-10-21
31. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in the context of the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to products, giving rise, inter alia, to Directives 89/106 and 89/686, the institutions of the European Union are to adopt directives defining the basic requirements to be satisfied by the products which fall within their scope. The Commission goes on to give a mandate to European standards organisations, in accordance with the procedure laid down by Directive 83/189, to draw up technical specifications specifying the basic requirements set out in those directives. Once the standards have been established by those organisations, the Commission publishes the references of those standards in the Official Journal of the European Union. Such publication has the effect of conferring on products which are covered by a technical harmonisation directive, and which satisfy the technical requirements defined in the harmonised standards relating to those products, the benefit of a presumption of conformity with the basic requirements of the directive concerned.
57. That conclusion is not called into question by the fact that, in its Dutch-language version, point 4 of Annex I to Directive 89/106 does not cover activities carried out on/to the exterior of construction works or, therefore, activities carried out on roofs. According to settled case-law, the need for a uniform interpretation of European Union acts makes it impossible in case of doubt for the text of a provision to be considered in isolation but requires, on the contrary, that it should be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages (see, to that effect, Case C‑375/07 Heuschen & Schrouff Oriëntal Foods Trading  [2008] ECR I‑8691, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited). The other language versions, such as the German, English and French versions, do not in any way distinguish between activities carried out internally or externally on a construction work.
63. In those circumstances, the CE marking is to be affixed only to products to which its affixing is provided for by the relevant specific harmonisation legislation of the European Union, and is not to be affixed to any other product. Any other assessment would have the effect of giving rise to a likelihood of confusion as to the meaning of that marking. It is, moreover, in order to guard against the risks associated with such confusion that Article 30(2) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 (OJ 2008 L 218, p. 30), applicable with effect from 1 January 2010, states that the CE marking is to be affixed only to products to which its affixing is provided for by the relevant specific harmonisation legislation of the European Union, and is not to be affixed to any other product.
Symvoulio Apochetefseon Lefkosias v Anatheoritiki Archi Prosforon.
Date: 2010-10-21
30. Therefore, the rationale of Directive 89/665 is to allow, by the establishment of appropriate review procedures, the effective application of the substantive provisions of European Union law on public contracts, which seek to ensure, for traders established in the Member States, the opening-up to competition which is undistorted and as wide as possible (see, to that effect, Case C‑337/06 Bayerischer Rundfunk and Others [2007] ECR I‑11173, paragraphs 38 and 39 and case-law cited).
Criminal proceedings against Emil Eredics and Mária Vassné Sápi.
Date: 2010-10-21
25. As the Hungarian, French and Italian Governments and the Commission of the European Communities rightly stated, the Court has already ruled that, having regard to the wording and the general structure of the Framework Decision, the concept of ‘victim’ for the purposes of the Framework Decision, as defined in Article 1 thereof, applies only to natural persons (see, to that effect, in particular, Dell’Orto , paragraphs 53 to 56).
26. The Court ruled, in paragraph 53 of Dell’Orto , that it follows from the very wording of Article 1(a) of the Framework Decision, which, for the purposes of that Framework Decision, defines a victim as a ‘natural’ person who has suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering or economic loss, directly caused by acts or omissions that are in violation of the criminal law of a Member State, that that provision of the Framework Decision applies only to natural persons who have suffered such harm.
33. In accordance with settled case-law, the Court has jurisdiction to provide a ruling, even where the facts of the main proceedings are outside the scope of European Union law, provided that the domestic legislation has adopted the same solutions as those adopted in European Union law and applies those solutions to a situation which is not covered by European Union law. According to the Court’s case-law, the legal order of the European Union clearly has an interest in ensuring that, to forestall future divergences of interpretation, any provision of European Union law should be interpreted uniformly, irrespective of the circumstances in which the provision is to apply (see, to that effect, in particular, Case C‑130/95 Giloy  [1997] ECR I‑4291, paragraphs 19 to 28; Case C‑267/99 Adam  [2001] ECR I‑7467, paragraphs 23 to 29; Case C‑43/00 Andersen og Jensen  [2002] ECR I‑0379, paragraphs 15 to 19, or Case C‑3/04 Poseidon Chartering  [2006] ECR I‑2505, paragraphs 14 to 19).
37. In that regard, it must be observed that, in addition to the fact that Article 34 EU leaves to national authorities the choice of form and methods necessary to achieve the desired result of Framework Decisions, Article 10 of the Framework Decision does no more than require Member States to seek to promote mediation in criminal cases for offences which they ‘consider[s] appropriate’, and consequently the choice of the offences for which mediation is to be available is for the Member States to determine.
38. It follows from the very wording of Article 10 and from the large measure of discretion which the Framework Decision leaves to national authorities with regard to the specific means by which they implement its objectives (see Case C‑404/07 Katz  [2008] ECR I‑7607, paragraph 46) that, in deciding to enable the mediation procedure to be applied solely in cases of offences against the person, transport safety or offences against property, a choice which essentially rests on grounds of legal policy, the Hungarian legislature has not exceeded its discretion.
Albron Catering BV v FNV Bondgenoten and John Roest.
Date: 2010-10-21
35. According to settled case-law, the interpretation which the Court, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 267 TFEU, gives to a rule of Union law clarifies and where necessary defines the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be, or ought to have been, understood and applied from the time of its coming into force.  It follows that the rule as thus interpreted can, and must, be applied by the courts even to legal relationships arising and established before the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation, provided that in other respects the conditions for bringing before the courts having jurisdiction an action relating to the application of that rule are satisfied (see, inter alia, Case 24/86 Blaizot and Others  [1988] ECR 379, paragraph 27; Case C‑415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I‑4921, paragraph 141; and Case C‑402/03 Skov and Bilka [2006] ECR I‑199, paragraph 50).
36. Accordingly, it is only exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the legal order of the Union, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling in question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely that those concerned should have acted in good faith and that there should be a risk of serious difficulties (see, inter alia, Case C‑313/05 Brzeziński  [2007] ECR I-513, paragraph 56, and Case C‑73/08 Bressol and Others  [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 91).
37. More specifically, the Court has taken that step only in quite specific circumstances, where there was a risk of serious economic repercussions owing in particular to the large number of legal relationships entered into in good faith on the basis of rules considered to be validly in force and where it appeared that individuals and national authorities had been led to adopt practices which did not comply with Union legislation by reason of objective, significant uncertainty regarding the implications of Union provisions, to which the conduct of other Member States or the Commission may even have contributed (see, inter alia, Case C‑423/04 Richards [2006] ECR I‑3585, paragraph 42, and Brzeziński , paragraph 57).
I.B.
Date: 2010-10-21
47. Third, it should be noted that the referring court proceeds on the assumption that the request submitted to it was for execution of a judgment rendered in absentia  within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584. It is for that court, as appropriate, to make use of the possibilities offered to it in Article 15(2) of that framework decision in order to check that point. In any case, it is for the Court of Justice to rule on the matter in the light of the factual and legal considerations set out in the order for reference.
First and second questions
49. In order to reply to those questions, it must be noted that the European arrest warrant may, under Article 1(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, apply to two situations. Thus, that arrest warrant may be issued, on the one hand, for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or, on the other hand, for the purposes of executing a custodial sentence or detention order.
50. While the system established by Framework Decision 2002/584 is based on the principle of mutual recognition, that recognition does not, as is clear from Articles 3 to 5 of the framework decision, mean that there is an absolute obligation to execute the arrest warrant that has been issued.
51. The system established by the framework decision, as evidenced inter alia by the provisions of those articles, makes it possible for the Member States to allow the competent judicial authorities, in specific situations, to decide that a sentence must be executed on the territory of the executing Member State.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2010-10-26
45. The Court has held that, analogy with what applies in relation to the choice of the legal basis of a European Union measure, the classification of such a measure as a proposal or initiative to build upon the Schengen acquis  within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 5(1) of the Schengen Protocol must rest on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review, including in particular the aim and the content of the measure (see Case C-77/05 United Kingdom  v Council [2007] ECR I‑11459, paragraph 77).
47. The system of closer cooperation under the Schengen acquis  applies to only some of the Member States and requires that all proposals and initiatives to build upon that acquis  within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 5(1) of the Schengen Protocol must be consistent with the provisions they implement or develop, so that they presupposes the acceptance both of those provisions and of the principles on which those provisions are based ( United Kingdom  v Council , paragraph 61).
49. Thus, it must be pointed out in particular that the coherence of the Schengen acquis  and of future developments thereof means that the States which take part in that acquis  are not obliged, when they develop it and deepen the closer cooperation which they have been authorised to establish by Article 1 of the Schengen Protocol, to provide for special adaptation measures for the other Member States which have not taken part in the adoption of the measures relating to earlier stages of the acquis ’ evolution.
61. The participation of a Member State in the adoption of a measure adopted pursuant to Article 5(1) of the Schengen Protocol is conceivable, in light of the system of closer cooperation applicable to the Schengen acquis  as described in paragraph 47 of the present judgment, only to the extent that that State has accepted the area of the Schengen acquis  which is the context of the measure or of which it is a development ( United Kingdom  v Council , paragraph 62).
65. According to the Court’s settled case-law, the choice of legal basis for a European Union measure must rest on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review, including in particular the aim and the content of the measure (see Case C-440/05 Commission  v Council [2007] ECR I‑9097, paragraph 61, and Case C-301/06 Ireland  v Parliament and Council  [2009] ECR I-593, paragraph 60).
European Commission v Republic of Malta.
Date: 2010-10-28
16. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that it is clear from Article 38(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and from the case-law relating to that provision that an application must state the subject-matter of the proceedings and a summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based, and that that statement must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare his defence and the Court to rule on the application. It is therefore necessary for the essential points of law and of fact on which a case is based to be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself and for the heads of claim to be set out unambiguously so that the Court does not rule ultra petita  or indeed fail to rule on an objection (see Case C‑412/04 Commission  v Italy  [2008] ECR I‑619, paragraph 103, and Case C‑211/08 Commission  v Spain  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 32 and case-law cited).
20. As regards the subject-matter of the infringement as set out in the Commission’s application, it must be observed that, pursuant to Article 2 of the Act of Accession, Regulation No 3577/92 was applicable to the Republic of Malta, as the Commission acknowledges, only as from 1 May 2004, the date of the accession of that State to the European Union (see, by analogy, Case C-168/08 Hadadi [2009] ECR I‑6871, paragraph 26).
21. In those circumstances, as the Advocate General stated at point 57 of her Opinion, the Commission’s action could succeed only if Regulation No 3577/92 nevertheless required the Republic of Malta to comply with certain obligations before that date. In the context of the present case, such obligations would require, in particular, that the Member States refrain from concluding a public service contract in a manner inconsistent with Articles 1 and 4 of Regulation No 3577/92 during the period before which that regulation was applicable to them.
European Commission v Republic of Poland.
Date: 2010-10-28
44. It should be noted, in that regard, that the principle of the common system of VAT is the application to goods and services, up to and including the retail trade stage, of a general tax on consumption exactly proportional to the price of the goods and services, whatever the number of transactions which take place in the production and distribution process before the stage at which tax is charged. However, VAT is chargeable on each transaction only after deduction of the amount of VAT borne directly by the costs of the various price components. The procedure for deduction is so arranged that taxable persons are authorised to deduct from the VAT for which they are liable the input VAT already charged on the goods or services and that the tax is charged, at each stage, only on the added value and is ultimately borne by the final consumer (see Case C‑475/03 Banca popolare di Cremona  [2006] ECR I‑9373, paragraphs 21 and 22).
47. In the present case, as regards the second essential characteristic of VAT, it must be observed that, whereas VAT is levied on individual transactions at the marketing stage and its amount must be proportional to the price of the goods or services supplied ( KÖGÁZ and Others , paragraph 39), it is apparent from Articles 4 and 5 of the Law of 16 December 1972 that the Polish tax in force at 1 January 1991 was, by contrast, based on the gross turnover made by the taxable person during a given period.
Volvo Car Germany GmbH v Autohof Weidensdorf GmbH.
Date: 2010-10-28
23. Regarding, first, the Court’s jurisdiction to provide an answer to the questions referred, it must be borne in mind that, within the framework of the cooperation between the Court and national courts and tribunals established by Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. The Court can refuse a request submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the ruling sought by that court on the interpretation of European Union law bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose or where the problem is general or hypothetical (see, inter alia, Case C‑3/04 Poseidon Chartering  [2006] ECR I‑2505, paragraph 14).
24. Consequently, where questions submitted by national courts concern the interpretation of a provision of European Union law, the Court remains, in principle, obliged to give a ruling. Neither the wording of Article 267 TFEU nor the aim of the procedure established by that article indicates that the framers of the Treaty intended to exclude from the jurisdiction of the Court requests for a preliminary ruling on a European Union provision where the domestic law of a Member State refers to that provision in order to determine the rules applicable to a situation which is purely internal to that State  (see Poseidon Chartering , paragraph 15).
25. Where domestic legislation adopts the same solutions as those adopted in European Union law in order, in particular, to avoid discrimination against foreign nationals or any distortion of competition, it is clearly in the European Union interest that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, provisions or concepts taken from European Union law should be interpreted uniformly, irrespective of the circumstances in which they are to apply ( Poseidon Chartering , paragraph 16).
26. In the present case, although the questions concern a dealership agreement and not a commercial agency contract and the Directive does not therefore directly govern the situation in issue, the fact remains that German law treats those two types of contract in the same way (see, to that effect, Poseidon Chartering , paragraph 17).
42. Moreover, as an exception to the agent’s entitlement to an indemnity, Article 18(a) of the Directive must be interpreted restrictively. That provision cannot, therefore, be interpreted in a way which amounts to adding a ground for exclusion of the indemnity where no express provision is made to that effect.
44. It is nevertheless appropriate to add that, under the second indent of Article 17(2)(a) of the Directive, the commercial agent is to be entitled to an indemnity if and to the extent that the payment of that indemnity is equitable having regard to all the circumstances. The possibility cannot, therefore, be ruled out that that agent’s conduct may be taken into account in the assessment made to determine the fairness of his indemnity.
Staatssecretaris van Financiën v X BV.
Date: 2010-10-28
14. As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, when the Court is requested to give a preliminary ruling on a matter of tariff classification, its task is to provide the national court with guidance on the criteria which will enable the latter to classify the products at issue correctly in the CN, rather than to effect that classification itself, a fortiori  since the Court does not necessarily have available to it all the information which is essential in that regard. In any event, the national court is in a better position to do so (Case C‑196/05 Sachsenmilch  [2006] ECR I‑5161, paragraph 19 and the case‑law cited).
15. It is settled case‑law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, inter alia, Case C‑376/07 Kamino International Logistics  [2009] ECR I‑1167, paragraph 31, and Case C‑370/08 Data I/O  [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 29).
16. The explanatory notes drawn up by the European Commission as regards the CN and by the World Customs Organisation as regards the HS are an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force (Case C‑250/05 Turbon International  [2006] ECR I‑10531, paragraph 16, and Data I/O , paragraph 30).
24. Furthermore, in that judgment, the Court held that the characteristics of the berries which had been subjected to the freezing process underwent certain irreversible changes as a result of that very process, in particular changes to the structure of the flesh, with the result that they were no longer in the natural state, even after they had started to thaw or had thawed out (see Riemer , paragraph 4).
34. However, it must also be held that headings 0703 and 0712 of the CN do not include any reference to preservation as a classification criterion, from which it must be concluded that the length of time for which a product is preserved has itself no effect on its classification for customs purposes (see, by analogy, Case 40/88 Weber [1989] ECR 1395, paragraph 16).