Érsekcsanádi Mezőgazdasági Zrt v Bács-Kiskun Megyei Kormányhivatal.
Date: 2014-05-22
36. In that regard it is settled case-law that the Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra  EU:C:2001:160, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
48. In any event, it should be observed that the Court has previously held that the EU legislature may consider, in the context of its broad discretion in the field of agricultural policy, that full or partial compensation is appropriate for owners of farms on which animals have been destroyed and slaughtered. None the less, the existence, in EU law, of a general principle requiring compensation to be paid in all circumstances cannot be inferred from that fact (see Joined Cases C‑20/00 and C‑64/00 Booker Aquaculture and Hydro Seafood  EU:C:2003:397, paragraph 85).
53. In that regard it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the preliminary ruling procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU is based on a clear separation of functions between national courts and tribunals and the Court of Justice, and the latter is empowered only to rule on the interpretation or the validity of the acts of EU law referred to in that provision. In that context, it is not for the Court to rule on the interpretation of provisions of national law or to decide whether the referring court’s interpretation of them is correct (Case C‑418/11 Texdata Software  EU:C:2013:588, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
54. Furthermore, under Article 51(1) of the Charter, which governs its field of application, the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law. That provision confirms the Court’s settled case-law, according to which the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but cannot be applied outside such situations. Where a legal situation does not come within the scope of EU law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and any provisions of the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction (see, to that effect, Case C‑617/10 Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105, paragraphs 17, 19 and 22, and the order in Case C‑258/13 Sociedade Agrícola e Imobiliária da Quinta de S. Paio  EU:C:2013:810, paragraphs 18 to 20).
61. So far as the principle of equivalence is concerned, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that observance of that principle requires that the national rule at issue be applied without distinction, whether the action is based on rights which individuals derive from EU law or whether it is based on an infringement of national law, where the purpose and cause of action are similar. It is for the national court, which has direct knowledge of the applicable procedural rules, to ascertain whether the actions concerned are similar as regards their purpose, cause of action and essential characteristics (see Case C‑93/12 Agrokonsulting-04 EU:C:2013:432, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).