Criminal proceedings against I.
Date: 2017-10-26
32


In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, for the purposes of interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also its context and the objectives of the rules of which it is part (judgment of 11 May 2017, Krijgsman, C‑302/16, EU:C:2017:359, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
34


According to the Court’s settled case-law, that provision provides for the mutual recognition, without any formality, of driving licences issued by Member States (see, to that effect, judgments of 1 March 2012, Akyüz, C‑467/10, EU:C:2012:112, paragraph 40; of 26 April 2012, Hofmann, C‑419/10, EU:C:2012:240, paragraphs 43 and 44; and of 23 April 2015, Aykul, C‑260/13, EU:C:2015:257, paragraph 45).
39


The directive lays down a single Community model driving licence designed to replace the various driving licences in existence in the Member States (judgments of 26 April 2012, Hofmann, C‑419/10, EU:C:2012:240, paragraph 40, and of 26 April 2017, Popescu, C‑632/15, EU:C:2017:303, paragraph 36).
44


That harmonisation of the requirements for obtaining a driving licence aims, as the Advocate General stated in points 58 and 59 of his Opinion, in particular to lay down necessary preconditions for the mutual recognition of such licences (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 November 1978, Choquet, 16/78, EU:C:1978:210, paragraph 7).
45


In that context, it should be recalled that the Court has held that Article 2(1) of Directive 2006/126 imposes on the Member States a clear and precise obligation for the mutual recognition, without any formality, of driving licences, which leaves no room for discretion as to the measures to be adopted in order to comply with it (see, to that effect, judgments of 1 March 2012, Akyüz, C‑467/10, EU:C:2012:112, paragraph 40; of 26 April 2012, Hofmann, C‑419/10, EU:C:2012:240, paragraphs 43 and 44; and of 23 April 2015, Aykul, C‑260/13, EU:C:2015:257, paragraph 45).
46


The Court has repeatedly held that it is for the issuing Member State to investigate whether the minimum conditions imposed by EU law, particularly those relating to residence and fitness to drive laid down in Article 7(1) of Directive 91/439, now reproduced in Article 7(1) of Directive 2006/126 have been satisfied and, therefore, whether the issuing of a driving licence is justified (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 February 2009, Schwarz, C‑321/07, EU:C:2009:104, paragraph 76, and of 23 April 2015, Aykul, C‑260/13, EU:C:2015:257, paragraph 46).
47


The Court has held in that regard that once the authorities of one Member State have issued a driving licence in accordance with Article 1(1) of Directive 2006/126, the other Member States are not entitled to investigate whether the conditions for issue laid down by that directive have been met, since the possession of a driving licence issued by one Member State has to be regarded as constituting proof that its holder satisfied those conditions on the day on which that licence was issued (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 April 2012, Hofmann, C‑419/10, EU:C:2012:240, paragraphs 46 and 47, and of 23 April 2015, Aykul, C‑260/13, EU:C:2015:257, paragraph 47).
48


In the light of that case-law, a literal interpretation of Article 2(1) of Directive 2006/126 and the general scheme of that directive, it therefore appears that that provision, which provides for the mutual recognition of ‘driving licences’, refers to driving licences as documents evidencing the existence of a right to drive issued in accordance with the provisions of that directive. The only qualification in that regard concerns driving licences issued by the Member States before the entry into force of Article 1(1) of the directive, that is, under Article 16 thereof, before 19 January 2013, and for which Article 13 of Directive 2006/126 is designed to govern the question of equivalences between rights acquired before the implementation of that directive and the various categories of driving licence defined by the latter (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 April 2012, Hofmann, C‑419/10, EU:C:2012:240, paragraph 41, and of 26 April 2017, Popescu, C‑632/15, EU:C:2017:303, paragraph 37).
56


In accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, any national measure in an area which has been the subject of exhaustive harmonisation at the level of the European Union must be assessed in the light of the provisions of that harmonising measure, and not in the light of the provisions of primary law (judgment of 12 November 2015, Visnapuu, C‑198/14, EU:C:2015:751, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
57


In the present case, whilst Directive 2006/126 provides only for a minimum degree of harmonisation of the national provisions relating to the conditions under which a driving licence may be issued (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 March 2012, Akyüz, C‑467/10, EU:C:2012:112, paragraph 53), that directive does, however, bring about exhaustive harmonisation of documents proving the existence of a right to drive which must be recognised by the Member States pursuant to Article 2(1) thereof.
58


Furthermore, as stated by the Commission, it must be found that, although Directive 2006/126 lays down the minimum conditions for issuing a driving licence, it does not govern the administrative procedure for issuing such licences. It is therefore for the Member States to establish that procedure, in particular, to determine the date on which the driving licence must be issued to an applicant who has satisfied the minimum requirements.
62


The difference in treatment of applicants for a driving licence residing in Germany and France, which follows from the fact that, according to the information provided by the referring court, applicants for a driving licence residing in Germany generally receive a driving licence in that Member State immediately after having passed the practical driving test, whereas, as a general rule, a transitional period applies to applicants for a driving licence residing in France, during which they have only a certificate subject to temporal and territorial limitations evidencing their right to drive, before being issued with a driving licence in conformity with the requirements of the model driving licence of Directive 2006/126, is not the result of discriminatory practices in either of the two Member States, but that of the existence of different rules of administrative procedure in those Member States in a non-harmonised context (see, by analogy, judgments of 12 July 2005, Schempp, C‑403/03, EU:C:2005:446, paragraph 45, and of 29 November 2011, National Grid Indus, C‑371/10,EU:C:2011:785, paragraph 62). As stated in paragraphs 43, 44 and 57 above, as EU law currently stands, Directive 2006/126 provides only for minimum harmonisation of certain substantive conditions under which the driving licence provided for in Article 1 of that directive is issued.
68


It follows that, in the absence of EU rules governing the matter, the Member States, in principle, remain competent to impose penalties for breach of the obligation to present a driving licence in conformity with the requirements of the model driving licence of Directive 2006/126, which they are free to impose on persons driving a motor vehicle in their territory (see, to that effect, judgments of 29 February 1996, Skanavi and Chryssanthakopoulos, C‑193/94, EU:C:1996:70, paragraph 36, and of 29 October 1998, Awoyemi, C‑230/97, EU:C:1998:521, paragraph 25).
69


However, Member States may not impose a penalty in this area which would undermine the right to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States, conferred on citizens of the Union by Article 21 TFEU and of which Directive 2006/126 is designed to facilitate the exercise (see, to that effect, judgments of 29 February 1996, Skanavi and Chryssanthakopoulos, C‑193/94, EU:C:1996:70, paragraph 36; of 29 October 1998, Awoyemi, C‑230/97, EU:C:1998:521, paragraph 26; and of 26 April 2012, Hofmann, C‑419/10, EU:C:2012:240, paragraph 77); or the fundamental freedoms under Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU.
70


As regards Article 18 TFEU, also mentioned by the referring court, it must be borne in mind that that provision, which lays down the principle of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, applies independently only to situations governed by EU law in respect of which the TFEU lays down no specific prohibitions of discrimination (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 May 1998, Gilly, C‑336/96, EU:C:1998:221, paragraph 37, and of 18 July 2017, Erzberger, C‑566/15, EU:C:2017:562, paragraph 25).
75


The penalty imposed must, however, not be disproportionate to the seriousness of the facts at issue in the main proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 February 1996, Skanavi and Chryssanthakopoulos, C‑193/94, EU:C:1996:70, paragraphs 36 and 38).
77


Accordingly, for a Member State to impose a severe penalty, whether criminal or administrative, such as a custodial sentence or a heavy fine, on a driver, such as I, who had the right to drive in another Member State, but who had not yet been issued with a driving licence conforming to the requirements of the model driving licence of Directive 2006/126, would be disproportionate to the seriousness of the facts at issue in the main proceedings and thus undermine the right of that driver to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States, conferred on citizens of the Union by Article 21 TFEU, or the fundamental freedoms under Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU. By contrast, to impose a minor penalty, such as an administrative fine in a reasonable amount would not be disproportionate.