Q-Beef NV (C-89/10) v Belgische Staat and Frans Bosschaert (C-96/10) v Belgische Staat, Vleesgroothandel Georges Goossens en Zonen NV and Slachthuizen Goossens NV.
Date: 2011-09-08
32. It is settled case-law that, in the absence of EU rules in the field, it is for the national legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law, provided that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar national actions (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (see, in particular, Case C-452/09 Iaia and Others  [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 16 and case-law cited).
The first question in Cases C‑89/10 and C‑96/10
34. In that regard, it is important to note that, in the absence of harmonised rules governing the reimbursement of charges imposed in breach of EU law, the Member States retain the right to apply procedural rules provided for under their national legal system, in particular concerning limitation periods, subject to observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
36. As regards the principle of effectiveness, the Court has stated that it is compatible with EU law to lay down reasonable time-limits for bringing proceedings in the interests of legal certainty which protects both the taxpayer and the authorities concerned. Such periods are not by their nature liable to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by EU law, even if the expiry of those periods necessarily entails the dismissal, in whole or in part, of the action brought (see Iaia and Others , paragraph 17 and the case-law cited). In that regard, by way of example, a time-limit of three years under national law was considered reasonable (see, to that effect, Case C‑542/08 Barth  [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 29).
41. In this context, it should also be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law of the Court of Justice, EU law does not prohibit a Member State from resisting actions for repayment of charges levied in breach of Community law by relying on a time-limit under national law of three years, by way of derogation from the ordinary rules governing actions between private individuals for the recovery of sums paid but not due, for which the period allowed is more favourable, provided that that time-limit applies in the same way to actions based on EU law for repayment of such charges as to those based on national law (see Case C-231/96 Edis  [1998] ECR I-4951, paragraph 39, and Case C‑260/96 Spac [1998] ECR I‑4997, paragraph 23, and Joined Cases C‑216/99 and C‑222/99 Prisco and CASER  [2002] ECR I‑6761, paragraph 70).
42. Furthermore, in general, limitation periods fulfil the function of ensuring legal certainty, which simultaneously protects both the taxpayer and the administration concerned (see, to that effect, Edis , paragraph 35 and Case C-367/09 SGS Belgium and Others  [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 68). The Court has also held that the principle of effectiveness is not infringed in the case of a national limitation period allegedly more advantageous for the tax authorities than the limitation period in force for individuals (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-95/07 and C‑96/07 Ecotrade [2008] ECR I-3457, paragraphs 49 to 54).
43. On the other hand, the principle of effectiveness would be infringed if the Goossens companies had neither the right to obtain reimbursement of the charge concerned during the five-year period, nor, in pursuance of an action for recovery of undue payment brought after expiry of that period by Mr Bosschaert against those companies, the possibility of bringing proceedings against the State, so that the charges paid but not due to the State were solely paid by those intermediary companies.
47. First, it should be pointed out, as the Advocate General has observed in paragraph 55 of his Opinion, that the question of determining the starting point of the limitation period in principle comes under national law. It is settled case-law that the fact that the Court may have ruled that the breach of EU law has occurred generally does not affect the starting point of the limitation period (see Iaia and Others , paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
48. Second, contrary to what the applicants in the main proceedings claim and according to settled case-law, a preliminary ruling does not create or alter the law, but is purely declaratory, with the consequence that in principle it takes effect from the date on which the rule interpreted entered into force (see Case C-2/06 Kempter [2008] ECR I‑411, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
49. With regard to the point at which a limitation period starts to run, it is true that the Court has held that, until such time as a directive has been properly transposed, a defaulting Member State may not rely on an individual’s delay in initiating proceedings against it in order to protect rights conferred upon that individual by the provisions of the directive and that a period laid down by national law within which proceedings must be initiated cannot begin to run before that time (see Case C‑208/90 Emmott  [1991] ECR I-4269, paragraph 23).
50. According to settled case-law following Emmott , however, the Court has acknowledged that a defaulting Member State may rely on the expiry of a limitation period as a defence against legal proceedings, even though by the date on which the actions in question were brought that Member State had not yet correctly transposed the directive in question, ruling that the solution established in Emmott had been justified by the circumstances particular to that case, in which a time-bar had had the result of depriving the applicant in the main proceedings of any opportunity whatever to invoke her right to equal treatment under a directive (see Iaia and Others , paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
51. In that regard, the Court has held that EU law does not preclude a national authority from relying on the expiry of a reasonable limitation period unless the conduct of the national authorities combined with the existence of a limitation period result in totally depriving a person of the opportunity to enforce his rights before the national courts (see, to that effect, Barth , paragraph 33 and Iaia and Others , paragraph 21).