larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Pfotenhilfe-Ungarn e.V. v Ministerium für Energiewende, Landwirtschaft, Umwelt und ländliche Räume des Landes Schleswig-Holstein.
Date: 2015-12-03
24. In that connection, it should be noted at the outset that Regulation No 1/2005 does not define the scope of the concept of ‘economic activity’. In the absence of a definition of such as concept of EU law, it must be interpreted inter alia, in the light of its context and the objectives pursued by the EU legislature (see, to that effect, judgment in Szatmari Malom , C‑135/13, EU:C:2013:327, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
29. The legal basis for that regulation is Article 37 EC (now Article 43 TFEU) and it therefore falls within internal market policy. According to the Court’s settled case-law, the importation of goods or the provision of services for remuneration are to be regarded as ‘economic activities’ within the meaning of the Treaty (see to that effect, judgments in Schindler , C‑275/92, EU:C:1994:119, paragraph 19; Meca-Medina and Majcen  v Commission , C‑519/04 P, EU:C:2006:492, paragraphs 22 and 23; and Olympic Lyonnais , C‑325/08, EU:C:2010:143, paragraphs 27 and 28). The decisive factor which enables an activity to be regarded as having an economic character, is the fact that the activity must not be provided for nothing (see, to that effect, judgment in Jundt, C‑281/06, EU:C:2007:816, paragraph 32).
30. However, for an activity to be classified as economic, it is not necessary that it is carried out for profit (see to that effect, judgments in Smits and Peerbooms , C‑157/99, EU:C:2001:404, paragraphs 50 and 52, and Jundt, C‑281/06, EU:C:2007:815, paragraph 33).
33. Second, that interpretation is confirmed by the objectives pursued by Regulation No 1/2005, namely the protection of animals during transport, which is the main objective of that regulation, the elimination of technical barriers to trade in live animals and the smooth operation of market organisations, set out in recital 2 in the preamble thereto (see, to that effect, judgment in Danske Svineproducenter , C‑316/10, EU:C:2011:863, paragraph 44).
47. The Court has consistently held that ‘goods’ for the purposes of that provision means goods which can be valued in money and which are capable, as such, of forming the subject of commercial transactions (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission  v Italy , 7/66, EU:C:1968:51, p. 428). That definition includes animals (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission  v Belgium , C‑100/08, EU;C:2009:537, paragraph 83). As the Advocate General noted in point 63 of her Opinion, the provisions of the FEU Treaty on free movement of goods apply irrespective of whether the goods concerned are being transported across national frontiers for the purposes of sale or resale, or rather for personal use or consumption (see, to that effect, judgment in Schumacher , 215/87, EU:C:1989:111, paragraph 23).
Florin Lazar, représenté légalement par Luigi Erculeo v Allianz SpA.
Date: 2015-12-10
21. As a preliminary point, it must be noted, first, that, as regards the interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation, the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment in in Kásler and Káslerné Rábai , C‑26/13, EU:C:2014:282, paragraph 37). In accordance with settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment in Lanigan , C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
24. In the event of physical injuries caused to a person or the damage caused to goods, the EU legislature stated, in recital 17 in the preamble to the Rome II Regulation, that the county of the place where the direct damage occurs is the country of the place where the injuries were suffered or the goods were damaged.
TSI GmbH v Hauptzollamt Aachen.
Date: 2015-12-10
24. It should be recalled that it is settled case-law of the Court that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties, as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and of the notes to the sections or chapters (see, inter alia, judgment in Kyowa Hakko Europe , C‑344/14, EU:C:2015:615, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
25. It is also settled case-law that the Explanatory Notes, drawn up by the Commission as regards the CN and by the WCO as regards the HS, are an important aid for interpreting the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force (see, inter alia, judgment in Kyowa Hakko Europe , C‑344/14, EU:C:2015:615, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
European Parliament and European Commission v Council of the European Union.
Date: 2015-12-15
76. It follows that, in the absence of detail in that respect, the scope of an act of secondary legislation must, as the French Government in particular has submitted, be determined on the basis of Articles 52 TEU and 355 TFEU.
77. Indeed, the Court has already had occasion to state that secondary legislation applies in principle to the same area as the Treaties themselves and applies automatically in that area (see, to this effect, judgments in Commission  v Ireland , 61/77, EU:C:1978:29, paragraph 46, and Hansen & Balle , 148/77, EU:C:1978:173, paragraph 11).
Imtech Marine Belgium NV v Radio Hellenic SA.
Date: 2015-12-17
46. By contrast, the actual certification itself requires a judicial examination of the conditions laid down by Regulation No 805/2004.
47. The legal qualifications of a judge are essential to the correct assessment — in a context of uncertainty as to the observance of the minimum requirements intended to safeguard the debtor’s rights of defence and the right to a fair trial — of the remedies under national law in accordance with paragraphs 38 to 40 of the present judgment. Moreover, only a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU is capable of ensuring, by means of a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice, that the minimum requirements laid down by Regulation No 805/2004 are interpreted and applied uniformly throughout the European Union.
Gergely Szemerey v Miniszterelnökséget vezető miniszter.
Date: 2015-12-17
30. In that regard, it must be recalled that in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. The Court has a duty to interpret all provisions of EU law which national courts require in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court of Justice by those courts (judgment in Fuß , C‑243/09, EU:C:2010:609, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).
31. Consequently, even if, formally, the referring court has limited its questions to the interpretation of the recitals of Regulations Nos 796/2004 and 1122/2009, that does not prevent the Court from providing the referring court with a ruling on the interpretation of EU law which may be of assistance to the referring court in adjudicating in the case pending before it, whether or not the referring court has referred to them in the wording of its questions. It is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision to make the reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject-matter of the dispute (see, by analogy, judgment in Fuß , C‑243/09, EU:C:2010:609, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
42. However, the measures taken by Member States within their discretion cannot adversely affect the practical effect of the provisions of Regulations Nos 1698/2005, 1975/2006 and 1122/2009 and the general principles of EU law, in particular, the principle of proportionality (see, by analogy, judgment in Bonn Fleisch , C‑1/06, EU:C:2007:396, paragraph 40) and that of legal certainty (see, by analogy, judgment in Dél-Zempléni Nektár Leader Nonprofit , C‑24/13, EU:C:2014:40, paragraphs 31 and 32).
58. As the question whether the failure to fulfil obligations alleged against the applicant in the main proceedings is caused by force majeure , and whether, therefore, the applicant could avoid the penalty laid down in the third paragraph of Article 23(1) of Regulation No 1122/2009 entails an assessment of facts, it is for the referring court to determine whether that failure to fulfil obligations is the result of abnormal and unforeseeable circumstances, outside the control of the operator concerned, the consequences of which, in spite of the exercise of all due care, could not have been avoided (see, to that effect, judgment in Parras Medina , C‑208/01, EU:C:2002:593, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
Rüdiger Hobohm v Benedikt Kampik Ltd & Co. KG and Others.
Date: 2015-12-23
24. In that regard, the Court has held that Article 15(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 applies if three conditions are met: first, a party to a contract is a consumer who is acting in a context which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession; second, the contract between such a consumer and a professional has actually been concluded; and, third, such a contract falls within one of the categories referred to in Article 15(1)(a) to (c). All of those conditions must be fulfilled, with the result that, if one of those three conditions is not met, jurisdiction cannot be determined under the rules relating to consumer contracts (judgment in Kolassa , C‑375/13, EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
25. It is apparent from the order for reference that the first condition mentioned in the preceding paragraph is satisfied in the present case, since Mr and Mrs Hobohm acted, not for purposes which can be regarded as being within their trade or professional activities, but as private final consumers (see, to that effect, judgment in Vapenik , C‑508/12, EU:C:2013:790, paragraph 28).
31. With regard to consumer protection, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court on the special rules introduced by the provisions of the Brussels Convention, transposable to the equivalent provisions of Regulation No 44/2001, that those rules serve to ensure adequate protection for the consumer, as the party deemed to be economically weaker and less experienced in legal matters than the other, professional, party to the contract (see, to that effect, judgments in Česká spořitelna, C‑419/11, EU:C:2013:165, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited, and in Kolassa , C‑375/13, EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
32. However, it must also be recalled that Article 15(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 constitutes a derogation both from the general rule of jurisdiction laid down in Article 2(1) of that regulation, which confers jurisdiction upon the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled, and from the rule of special jurisdiction for contracts, set out in Article 5(1) of that regulation, under which jurisdiction lies with the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question. Thus, that provision must necessarily be interpreted strictly (judgment in Kolassa , C‑375/13, EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 28 and case-law cited). It further follows from the Court’s case-law that, even though the aim of Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation No 44/2001 is to protect consumers, that does not imply that that protection is absolute (see judgment in Mühlleitner , C‑190/11, EU:C:2012:542, paragraph 33).
38. Those elements must be taken into account by the national court in order to decide whether Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation No 44/2001 is applicable to the transaction‑management contract (see, by analogy, judgment in Emrek , C‑218/12, EU:C:2013:666, paragraph 31).
Vodafone GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Date: 2016-01-14
40


It is therefore necessary, in order to interpret that concept, to consider not only the wording of its terms, but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, judgments in The Number (UK) and Conduit Enterprises, C‑16/10, EU:C:2011:92, paragraph 28, and KPN, C‑85/14, EU:C:2015:610, paragraph 33).
52


In that regard, the Court has previously held that it is not the nature of the procedure ongoing before the NRA, but on the actual subject-matter of the measure which the NRA intends to adopt and the effect that it may have on trade between Member States which is decisive in order to assess whether that measure is covered by the procedure laid down in Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive (see, to that effect, judgment in Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej and Telefonia Dialog, C‑3/14, EU:C:2015:232, paragraph 34).
55


Secondly, as regards whether the issue of a mobile call termination fees authorisation would affect trade between the Member States within the meaning of Article 7(3)(b) of the Framework Directive, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with the case-law of the Court, a measure proposed by an NRA has such an effect on trade between Member States, within the meaning of that provision, if it may have, other than in an insignificant manner, an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on that trade (see, to that effect, judgment in Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej and Telefonia Dialog, C‑3/14, EU:C:2015:232, paragraphs 49 to 54 and 59). Recital 38 in the preamble to the Framework Directive states, moreover, that measures which may affect trade between Member States include, inter alia, measures which affect prices for users in other Member States.
Valsts ieņēmumu dienests v Artūrs Stretinskis.
Date: 2016-01-21
15


The Court points out, at the outset, that, under Article 29(1) of that code, the customs value of imported goods is, in principle, to be made up of their transaction value, that is, the price actually paid or payable for them when sold for export to the customs territory of the European Union.
22


In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law of the Court, the objective of the EU legislation on customs valuation is to introduce a fair, uniform and neutral system excluding the use of arbitrary or fictitious customs values (judgment in Christodoulou and Others, C‑116/12, EU:C:2013:825, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
23


It should also be noted that, in accordance with Article 29 of the Customs Code, the customs value of imported goods is, in principle, to be made up of their transaction value, Article 29(1)(d) and (2) have the objective of ensuring that the customs value reflects the real economic value of imported goods and is not determined arbitrarily or fictitiously (see, to that effect, judgments in Mitsui & Co. Deutschland, C‑256/07, EU:C:2009:167, paragraph 20, and Christodoulou and Others, C‑116/12, EU:C:2013:825, paragraphs 39 and 40). To that end, customs authorities are entitled to examine the price indicated by the person making the declaration and to reject it if they consider that the latter has been influenced by the relationships which exist between the parties to the transaction (judgment in Carboni e derivati, C‑263/06, EU:C:2008:128, paragraph 37).
Vorarlberger Gebietskrankenkasse and Alfred Knauer v Landeshauptmann von Vorarlberg and Rudolf Mathis.
Date: 2016-01-21
23


As a preliminary point, the Court notes, first, that, when old-age benefits have been mentioned in a declaration under Article 9 of Regulation No 883/2004, they fall within the scope of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgments in Mora Romero, C‑131/96, EU:C:1997:317, paragraph 25, and Pérez García and Others, C‑225/10, EU:C:2011:678, paragraph 36).
27


According to settled case-law of the Court, in determining the scope of a provision of EU law, in this case Article 5(a) of Regulation No 883/2004, its wording, context and objectives must all be taken into account (see, inter alia, judgment in Angerer, C‑477/13, EU:C:2015:239, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
33


Next, as regards more particularly old-age benefits such as those at issue in the main proceedings and in view of the case-law of the Court to which the EU legislature refers in recital 9 of Regulation No 883/2004, the concept of ‘equivalent benefits’ within the meaning of Article 5(a) of that regulation must be interpreted as referring, in essence, to two old-age benefits that are comparable (see, to that effect, judgment in Klöppel, C‑507/06, EU:C:2008:110, paragraph 19).
34


As regards the comparability of such old-age benefits, account must be taken of the aim pursued by those benefits and by the legislation which established them (see, by analogy, judgment in O, C‑432/14, EU:C:2015:643, paragraph 33).
Kurt Hesse v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM).
Date: 2016-01-21
21


In that regard, it must be noted at the outset that, as the General Court rightly held in paragraph 36 of the judgment under appeal, in order to assess the similarity of goods or services, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account. Those factors include, in particular, their nature, their intended purpose, their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary (see, in particular, judgments in Sunrider v OHIM, C‑416/04 P, EU:C:2006:310, paragraph 85, and Éditions Albert René v OHIM, C‑16/06 P, EU:C:2008:739, paragraph 65).
24


Third, it is settled case-law of the Court of Justice that the General Court cannot — subject to the obligation (i) to observe the general principles and the rules of procedure relating to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence and (ii) not to distort the clear sense of the evidence — be required to give express reasons for its assessment of the value of each piece of evidence presented to it, in particular where it considers that that evidence is unimportant or irrelevant to the outcome of the dispute (judgment in Dorsch Consult v Council and Commission, C‑237/98 P, EU:C:2000:321, paragraph 51).
29


To the extent that, by this ground of appeal, Mr Hesse seeks to demonstrate that the General Court wrongly confirmed that the earlier marks had acquired a reputation within the meaning of Article 8(5) of Regulation No 40/94, it must be noted that that finding is part of the assessment of the facts by the General Court which, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice referred to in paragraph 24 of the present judgment, cannot be the subject of an appeal, save where the facts and evidence submitted to the General Court are distorted.
30


In this respect, it must be recalled that, as also follows from settled case-law, such a distortion must be obvious from the documents in the case, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (see, in particular judgment in Waterford Wedgwood v Assembled Investments (Proprietary), C‑398/07 P, EU:C:2009:288, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
BP Europa SE v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt.
Date: 2016-01-28
22


Under Article 17(1)(a)(i) of Directive 2008/118, excise goods may be moved under a duty suspension arrangement within the territory of the EU, in particular, as in the main proceedings, from a tax warehouse in one Member State to a tax warehouse in another Member State. It is a feature of that arrangement that the excise duty on the products covered by it is not yet payable, although the chargeable event for taxation purposes has already taken place (see, to that effect, judgment in Cipriani, C‑395/00, EU:C:2002:751, paragraph 42). Consequently, as regards the products subject to excise duty, that arrangement postpones the chargeability of excise duty until one of the conditions of chargeability is met (see, to that effect, judgment in Dansk Transport og Logistik, C‑230/08, EU:C:2010:231, paragraph 78).
23


The departure of such goods, including irregular departure, from a duty suspension arrangement is considered as a release for consumption pursuant to Article 7(2)(a) of Directive 2008/118.
28


Since Directive 2008/118 does not define what is to be understood by the expression ‘the consignee takes delivery of the excise goods’, it must be borne in mind, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, that, when interpreting a provision of EU law, account must be taken of its wording, its context and its aims (see, inter alia, judgment in Spain v Parliament and Council, C‑44/14, EU:C:2015:554, paragraph 44).
41


However, the Court has consistently held that, when national courts apply domestic law, they are bound to interpret it, to the fullest extent possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive concerned in order to achieve the result sought by the directive and consequently comply with the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU. This obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law is inherent in the system of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, since it permits national courts, for the matters within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law when they determine the disputes before them (see, inter alia, judgment in Dominguez, C‑282/10, EU:C:2012:33, paragraph 24).