Thierry Delvigne v Commune de Lesparre Médoc and Préfet de la Gironde.
Date: 2015-10-06
25. It should be recalled that the Charter’s field of application so far as concerns action of the Member States is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, according to which the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law (judgment in Åkerberg Fransson , C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 17).
26. Article 51(1) of the Charter confirms the Court’s settled case-law, which states that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (see judgments in Åkerberg Fransson , C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 19, and Torralbo Marcos , C‑265/13, EU:C:2014:187, paragraph 29).
27. Thus, where a legal situation does not come within the scope of EU law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and any provisions of the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction (see judgments in Åkerberg Fransson , C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 22, and Torralbo Marcos , C‑265/13, EU:C:2014:187, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
31. Admittedly, as regards the beneficiaries of the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament, the Court has held in its judgments in Spain  v United Kingdom  (C‑145/04, EU:C:2006:543, paragraphs 70 and 78) and Eman and Sevinger  (C‑300/04, EU:C:2006:545, paragraphs 43 and 45) that Articles 1(3) and 8 of the 1976 Act do not define expressly and precisely who are to be entitled to that right, and that therefore, as EU law currently stands, the definition of the persons entitled to exercise that right falls within the competence of each Member State in compliance with EU law.
36. It must be borne in mind in this regard that, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see, in particular, judgments in Kamberaj , C‑571/10, EU:C:2012:233, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited, and Gauweiler and Others , C‑62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paragraph 24).
37. Thus, a reference from a national court may be refused only if it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or to its purpose, or where the problem is hypothetical or the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see judgments in Kamberaj , C‑571/10, EU:C:2012:233, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited, and Gauweiler and Others , C‑62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paragraph 25).
42. As regards Article 20(2)(b) TFEU, the Court has already held that that provision is confined to applying the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality to the exercise of the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament, by providing that every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national is to have the right to vote in those elections in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State (see, to that effect, judgment in Spain  v United Kingdom , C‑145/04, EU:C:2006:543, paragraph 66).
46. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that Article 52(1) of the Charter accepts that limitations may be imposed on the exercise of rights such as those set forth in Article 39(2) of the Charter, as long as the limitations are provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and, subject to the principle of proportionality, are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others (see, to that effect, judgments in Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert , C‑92/09 and C‑93/09, EU:C:2010:662, paragraph 50, and Lanigan , C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 55).
47. In the context of the main proceedings, since the deprivation of the right to vote at issue stems from the application of the combined provisions of the Electoral Code and the Criminal Code, it must be held that it is provided for by law.