larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Regina Virginia Hepple v Adjudication Officer and Adjudication Officer v Anna Stec.
Date: 2000-05-23
23 In that connection, it should be made clear that the temporary maintenance of different retirement ages according to sex may necessitate the subsequent adoption, after expiry of the period prescribed for transposition of the Directive, of measures indissociable from that derogation and also amendments to such measures.
24 To prohibit a Member State which has set different retirement ages for men and women from adopting or subsequently amending, after expiry of the period prescribed for transposition of the Directive, measures linked to that age difference would be tantamount to depriving the derogation for which Article 7(1)(a) of the Directive provides of its practical effect.
25 According to settled case-law, where, pursuant to Article 7(1)(a) of the Directive, a Member State prescribes different pensionable ages for men and women for the purposes of granting old-age and retirement pensions, the scope of the permitted derogation, defined by the words possible consequences thereof for other benefits, contained in Article 7(1)(a), is limited to the forms of discrimination existing under other benefit schemes which are necessarily and objectively linked to the difference in pensionable age (see, in particular, Thomas and Others, cited above, paragraph 20, Case C-92/94 Secretary of State for Social Security and Chief Adjudication Officer v Graham and Others [1995] ECR I-2521, paragraph 11, and Case C-139/95 Balestra v INPS [1997] ECR I-549, paragraph 33).
26 That will be the position where such forms of discrimination are objectively necessary in order to avoid disturbing the financial equilibrium of the social-security system or to ensure coherence between the retirement-pension scheme and other benefit schemes (see Thomas and Others, paragraph 12, Graham and Others, paragraph 12, and Balestra, paragraph 35).
27 As regards, first, the requirement of preserving financial equilibrium of the social-security system, it must be borne in mind that the Court has already held that the grant of benefits under non-contributory schemes to persons in respect of whom certain risks have materialised, regardless of the entitlement of such persons to an old-age pension by virtue of contribution periods completed by them, has no direct influence on the financial equilibrium of contributory pension schemes (see Thomas and Others, paragraph 14).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2000-05-23
17 It is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in the Member State as it stood at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C-289/94 Commission v Italy [1996] ECR I-4405, paragraph 20, and Case C-302/95 Commission v Italy [1996] ECR I-6765, paragraph 13).
Max Kögler v Court of Justice of the European Communities.
Date: 2000-05-25
33 In that regard, the Court of First Instance was right to note at paragraph 34 of the contested order that an official cannot plead infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations if the administration has not given him precise assurances.
47 As regards first of all the appellant's argument that his action is directed against an omission on the part of the appointing authority, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, a salary statement may constitute a measure adversely affecting an official within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, and may therefore be the subject of a complaint and possibly an action (see in particular Case 264/83 Delhez and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 2179, paragraph 20). Therefore, since the monthly pension slips for the period from 1 July 1991 to 30 June 1994 adversely affecting the appellant were sent to him individually, he had an opportunity to submit a complaint under Article 90 of the Staff Regulations against each one of those pension slips within three months of receiving it.
Hans-Josef Schlebusch v Hauptzollamt Trier.
Date: 2000-05-25
22 It should be borne in mind that it is not for the Court of Justice but for the national court to ascertain the facts which have given rise to the dispute and to establish the consequences which they have for the judgment which it is required to deliver (see, for example, Case C-435/97 World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Others v Autonome Provinz Bozen and Others [1999] ECR I-5613, paragraph 32). Similarly, it is not for the Court to assess whether questions referred to it by the national court are relevant (see, for example, Case C-347/89 Freistaat Bayern v Eurim-Pharm [1991] ECR I-1747, paragraph 16).
28 That interpretation of the provision at issue cannot be affected by the judgment in Wehrs. In the presence of a complex system such as that of reference quantities, the state of the law relevant to the case in the main proceedings, as it was following the ruling in Wehrs that the anti-accumulation rule was invalid but before Regulation No 2055/93 was adopted, did not of itself, that is to say without readjustment of the system, permit the allocation of a special reference quantity to a producer (Case C-127/94 R v MAFF, ex parte Ecroyd [1996] ECR I-2731, paragraph 59).
38 That interpretation of the special reference quantity rules is borne out by settled case-law, according to which SLOM producers cannot expect to have conferred on them a commercial advantage in the form of a special reference quantity which does not derive from their occupational activity (Case C-44/89 Von Deetzen v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg [1991] ECR I-5119, paragraph 21, Von Deetzen II). Such an advantage would be conferred, at least indirectly, on producers if, where they received both an original reference quantity and a special reference quantity, they were permitted to produce on their own holdings only the special reference quantity, especially when that quantity alone cannot guarantee the viability of the holding, which is the situation in the case in the main proceedings, as Mr Schlebusch himself has stated.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 2000-05-25
28 It must be borne in mind that, according to the second indent of Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 76/160, bathing water means all running or still fresh waters, or parts thereof, and sea water in which bathing is not prohibited and is traditionally practised by a large number of bathers. That definition must be interpreted in the light of the directive's underlying purpose as set out in the first two recitals in the preamble thereto, which state that, in order to protect the environment and public health, it is necessary to reduce the pollution of bathing water and to protect such water against further deterioration and that surveillance of bathing water is necessary in order to attain, within the framework of the operation of the common market, the Community's objectives as regards the improvement of living conditions, the harmonious development of economic activities throughout the Community and continuous and balanced expansion (Case C-56/90 Commission v United Kingdom [1993] ECR I-4109, paragraph 33).
48 It must be pointed out, first of all, that Article 4(1) of Directive 76/160 requires the Member States to take all necessary measures to ensure that bathing waters conform to the limit values set in accordance with Article 3 of that directive within a period of 10 years after notification thereof, which is longer than that laid down for transposition of the Directive, in order to enable the Member States to satisfy such a requirement (Commission v United Kingdom, cited above, paragraph 42, and Case C-198/97 Commission v Germany [1999] ECR I-3257, paragraph 35).
49 Directive 76/160 therefore requires the Member States to ensure that certain results are achieved and, apart from the derogations provided for, does not allow them to rely on particular circumstances to justify a failure to fulfil that obligation (Commission v United Kingdom, cited above, paragraph 43, Case C-92/96 Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-505, paragraph 28, and Commission v Germany, cited above, paragraph 35).
51 In those circumstances, the fact that, in relation to the Flemish Region, the necessary measures may have been taken to bring about the requisite improvements in the quality of bathing water cannot justify the failure to achieve the results prescribed by Directive 76/160 (see, to that effect, Commission v United Kingdom, paragraph 44, and Commission v Germany, paragraph 35, both cited above).
54 Finally, even if, under Directive 76/160, the absolute impossibility of fulfilling the obligations arising from the directive could justify a failure to comply with it, the Belgian authorities have not succeeded in proving absolute impossibility in this case (Commission v Germany, cited above, paragraph 41).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2000-05-25
35 The fact remains, however, that when exercising their powers in this area Member States must ensure both the basic freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty and the effectiveness of directives containing measures to abolish obstacles to the free movement of persons between those States, so that the exercise by citizens of the European Union and members of their family of the right to reside in the territory of any Member State may be facilitated (see Joined Cases C-193/97 and C-194/97 De Castro Freitas and Escallier v Ministre des Classes Moyennes et du Tourisme [1998] ECR I-6747, paragraph 23).
44 It is evident from the wording of Article 1 of Directive 93/96 that the conditions for obtaining a right of residence do not include any requirement to have resources of a specific amount, evidenced by specific documents. The article refers merely to a declaration, or such alternative means as are at least equivalent, which enables the student to assure the national authority concerned that he has, for himself and, in appropriate cases, for his spouse and dependent children, resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their stay. However, that provision makes recognition of the right of residence conditional upon the student being enrolled at a recognised establishment for the principal purpose of following a vocational training course and being covered by sickness insurance in respect of all risks in the host Member State.
45 The differences in the wording of Directive 93/96 by comparison with that of Directives 90/364 and 90/365 are explained by the reasons mentioned by the Commission in its action and referred to in paragraph 40 of this judgment.
Criminal proceedings against Giovanni Carra and Others.
Date: 2000-06-08
11 It suffices to point out in that regard that it is clear from the case-law of the Court that, even within the framework of Article 90, Article 86 has direct effect and confers on individuals rights which the national courts must protect (see, in particular, Case C-179/90 Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova [1991] ECR I-5889, paragraph 23; Case C-242/95 GT-Link [1997] ECR I-4449, paragraph 57; and Case C-22/98 Becu and Others [1999] ECR I-5665, paragraph 21).
13 In that regard, it suffices to refer to paragraph 38 of the judgment in Job Centre II, where the Court held that public placement offices are subject to the prohibition contained in Article 86 of the Treaty, so long as application of that provision does not obstruct the performance of the particular task assigned to them. A Member State which prohibits any activity as an intermediary between supply and demand on the employment market, unless carried on by those offices, is in breach of Article 90(1) of the Treaty where it creates a situation in which those offices cannot avoid infringing Article 86 of the Treaty. That is the case, in particular, in the following circumstances:
- the public placement offices are manifestly unable to satisfy demand on the market for all types of activity; and
- the actual placement of employees by private companies is rendered impossible by the maintenance in force of statutory provisions under which such activities are prohibited and non-observance of that prohibition gives rise to penal and administrative sanctions; and
- the placement activities in question could extend to the nationals or to the territory of other Member States.
16 In that regard, it is settled law that a national court which is called upon, within the limits of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of Community law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, even if adopted subsequently, and it is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior setting aside of such provisions by legislative or other constitutional means (see judgment in Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 24).
20 The second question must therefore be declared inadmissible (Case 244/80 Foglia [1981] ECR 3045, paragraph 17; Joined Cases 98/85, 165/85 and 258/85 Bertini and Others [1986] ECR 1885, paragraph 6; and Case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries [1994] ECR I-1783, paragraph 14).
Commission of the European Communities v Portuguese Republic.
Date: 2000-06-08
12 In that connection, it must be observed that in an action under Article 169 of the Treaty, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C-327/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-0000, paragraph 28).
Commission of the European Communities v Ireland.
Date: 2000-06-08
11 It should be pointed out in this regard that, in an action under Article 226 EC, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, the judgment of 23 March 2000 in Case C-327/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-1851, paragraph 28).
Brinkmann Tabakfabriken GmbH v Hauptzollamt Bielefeld.
Date: 2000-06-15
32 Second, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it would be incompatible with the binding effect conferred on directives by Article 189 of the EC Treaty (now Article 249 EC) for the possibility for those concerned to rely on the obligation which directives impose to be excluded in principle. Particularly where the Community authorities have, by directive, imposed on Member States the obligation to pursue a particular course of conduct, the effectiveness of such an act would be diminished if individuals were prevented from relying on it in legal proceedings and if national courts were prevented from taking it into consideration as a matter of Community law in determining whether the national legislature, in exercising its choice as to the form and methods for implementing the directive, had kept within the limits of its discretion as defined by the directive (see Case 51/76 Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1977] ECR 113, paragraphs 22 to 24; Case C-72/95 Kraaijeveld and Others v Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland [1996] ECR I-5403, paragraph 56; and Case C-435/97 WWF and Others v Bozen and Others [1999] ECR I-5613, paragraph 69).
40 However, it must be borne in mind that, as the Court has consistently held, the Member States' obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by the directive and their duty under Article 5 of the EC Treaty (now Article 10 EC) to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, is binding on all the authorities of Member States, including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891, paragraph 26; Case C-106/89 Marleasing v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación [1990] ECR I-4135, paragraph 8; and Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori v Recreb [1994] ECR I-3325, paragraph 26). When applying national law, whether adopted before or after the directive, the national court which has to interpret that law must do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive so as to achieve the result it has in view and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty (Marleasing, paragraph 8; Case C-334/92 Wagner Miret v Fondo de Garantía Salarial [1993] ECR I-6911, paragraph 20; and Faccini Dori, paragraph 26).
Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 2000-06-15
11 In that regard, it must be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-326/97 Commission v Belgium [1998] ECR I-6107, paragraph 7).
TEAM Srl v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2000-06-15
35 It should be recalled, first, that, according to Article 168a of the EC Treaty (now Article 225 EC) and the first paragraph of Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal is to be limited to points of law. The latter provision states that such an appeal must be based on grounds of lack of competence of the Court of First Instance, breach of procedure before it which adversely affects the interests of the appellant and infringement of Community law by that Court (Case C-7/95 P Deere v Commission [1998] ECR I-3111, paragraph 18, and Case C-8/95 P New Holland Ford v Commission [1998] ECR I-3175, paragraph 22).
36 Thus, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to verify whether a breach of procedure adversely affecting the appellant's interests was committed before the Court of First Instance and must satisfy itself that the general principles of Community law and the Rules of Procedure applicable to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been complied with (see, in particular, Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, paragraph 19).
48 It should be recalled in that regard that the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to find the facts or, in principle, to examine the evidence which the Court of First Instance accepted in support of those facts. Provided that the evidence has been properly obtained and the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value to be attached to the evidence produced before it. That appraisal does not therefore constitute, save where the clear sense of that evidence has been distorted, a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (Baustahlgewebe v Commission, cited above, paragraph 24).
49 However, the question whether the grounds of a judgment of the Court of First Instance are contradictory or inadequate is a question of law which is amenable, as such, to judicial review on appeal (see, in particular, Baustahlgewebe v Commission, paragraph 25).
63 It is clear from Article 168a of the Treaty and Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice that an appeal may be based only on grounds relating to the infringement of rules of law, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts. The Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to establish the facts except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it and, second, to assess those facts (see, in particular, Deere v Commission, cited above, paragraph 21, and New Holland Ford v Commission, cited above, paragraph 25).
Kingdom of the Netherlands v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2000-06-22
25 As regards the merits of the Commission's objection of inadmissibility, it should be observed at the outset that the Court has consistently held that only a measure whose legal effects are binding on the applicant and are capable of affecting his interests is an act or decision which may be the subject of an action for annulment under Article 173 of the Treaty (see, inter alia, the orders in Cases C-66/91 and C-66/91 R Emerald Meats v Commission [1991] ECR I-1143, paragraph 26, and in Case C-50/90 Sunzest v Commission [1991] ECR I-2917, paragraph 12, and the judgment in Case C-308/95 Netherlands v Commission [1999] ECR I-6513, paragraph 26).
26 It is also settled case-law that, in the case of acts adopted by a procedure involving several stages, and particularly where they are the culmination of an internal procedure, it is in principle only those measures which definitively determine the position of the Commission or the Council upon the conclusion of that procedure which are open to challenge and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the final decision (see Case 60/81 IBM v Commission ECR 2639, paragraph 10). Furthermore, according to the same case-law, an act which is neither capable of producing nor intended to produce any legal effects cannot form the basis of an action for annulment (see, inter alia, Case 133/79 Sucrimex and Westzucker v Commission [1980] ECR 1299, the order in Case 151/88 Italy v Commission [1989] ECR 1255, paragraph 22, and Netherlands v Commission, cited above, paragraph 27).
27 In order to ascertain whether or not a measure which has been challenged produces such effects it is necessary to look to its substance (see IBM v Commission, cited above, paragraph 9).
35 That being the case, it must be held that the letter at issue amounts to no more than a preparatory step and, accordingly, is neither capable of producing legal effects nor intended to produce such effects. It does not, therefore, constitute a definitive decision challengeable by way of an action for annulment. It is only after the veterinary committee has given its opinion that a definitive decision can be adopted.
French Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2000-06-22
31 According to settled case-law, the aim of Article 93(3) of the Treaty is to prevent implementation of aid contrary to the Treaty (Case 120/73 Lorenz v Germany [1973] ECR 1471, point 4). The Court has further stressed on several occasions that the final sentence of Article 93(3) is the means of safeguarding the machinery for review laid down by that article which, in turn, is essential to ensure the proper functioning of the common market. It follows from that case-law that, even if the Member State takes the view that the aid measure is compatible with the common market, that fact cannot entitle it to defy the clear provisions of Article 93 of the Treaty (see orders in Cases 31/77 R and 53/77 R Commission v United Kingdom [1977] ECR 921, paragraphs 17 and 18, and Case 171/83 R Commission v France [1983] ECR 2621, paragraph 12).
32 It follows that the purpose served by the provision introduced by Article 93(3) of the Treaty is not a mere obligation to notify but an obligation of prior notification which, as such, necessarily implies the suspensory effect required by the final sentence of Article 93(3). That provision does not therefore, contrary to the French Government's argument, have the effect of disjoining the obligations laid down therein, that is to say, the obligation to notify any new aid and the obligation to suspend temporarily the implementation of that aid. The primary plea in law must for that reason be rejected.
33 That conclusion is particularly evident where, as in the present case, the aid was at no time notified to the Commission. Even if the disjunction advocated by the applicant existed in law - a submission rejected in the preceding paragraph of this judgment - it would not, in the absence of notification, have justified a finding that Community law had not been infringed.