Caviro Distillerie Srl and Others v European Commission.
Date: 2019-07-10
As a preliminary point it should be noted, in the first place, that, by reason of the settled case-law of the Court, in the sphere of the common commercial policy and, most particularly, in the realm of measures to protect trade, the EU institutions enjoy a broad discretion by reason of the complexity of the economic and political situations which they have to examine (judgment of 18 October 2018, Gul Ahmed Textile Mills v Council, C‑100/17 P, EU:C:2018:842, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).
This broad discretion covers, inter alia, the determination of the existence of injury caused to the Union industry in the context of an anti-dumping proceeding. The judicial review of such an appraisal must therefore be limited to verifying whether relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the facts relied on have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error in the appraisal of those facts or a misuse of powers. That is particularly the case as regards the determination of the factors injuring the Union industry in an anti-dumping investigation (judgment of 10 September 2015, Bricmate, C‑569/13, EU:C:2015:572, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
The Court of Justice has also held that the General Court’s review of the evidence on which the EU institutions based their findings does not constitute a new assessment of the facts replacing that made by the institutions. That review does not encroach on the broad discretion of those institutions in the field of commercial policy, but is restricted to showing whether that evidence was able to support the conclusions reached by the institutions. The General Court must therefore not only establish whether the evidence put forward is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also ascertain whether that evidence contained all the relevant information which had to be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it was capable of substantiating the conclusions reached (see, in particular, judgment of 18 October 2018, Gul Ahmed Textile Mills v Council, C‑100/17 P, EU:C:2018:842, paragraph 64).
Moreover, in reviewing the legality of acts under Article 263 TFEU, the Court of Justice and the General Court cannot under any circumstances substitute their own reasoning for that of the author of the contested act (see, in particular, judgment of 10 April 2014, Areva and Others v Commission, C‑247/11 P and C‑253/11 P, EU:C:2014:257, paragraph 56).
The objective examination regarding the determination of injury caused to the Union industry, provided for in Article 3(2) of the basic regulation, must relate, first, to the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the Union market for like products, and, second, to the consequent impact of those imports on the Union industry (judgment of 10 September 2015, Bricmate, C‑569/13, EU:C:2015:572, paragraph 52).
Thus, as regards the determination of that volume or those prices, Article 3(3) of the basic regulation sets out the factors to be taken into account in that examination, while specifying that one or more of those factors cannot in themselves give decisive guidance (judgment of 10 September 2015, Bricmate, C‑569/13, EU:C:2015:572, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).
The same is true with respect to the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry. It follows from Article 3(5) of the basic regulation that the EU institutions have the task of evaluating all relevant economic factors and indices which have a bearing on the state of that industry, and one or more of those factors does not necessarily give decisive guidance. That provision thus gives those institutions discretion in the examination and evaluation of the various items of evidence (judgment of 10 September 2015, Bricmate, C‑569/13, EU:C:2015:572, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
Finally, with respect to the causal link, under Article 3(6) of the basic regulation the EU institutions must demonstrate that the volume and/or price levels identified pursuant to Article 3(3) are responsible for an impact on the Union industry as provided for in Article 3(5) and that that impact exists to a degree which enables it to be classified as material (judgment of 10 September 2015, Bricmate, C‑569/13, EU:C:2015:572, paragraph 55).
In that regard, paragraph 112  of the judgment under appeal must be understood as meaning that the Commission’s error in recital 148 of the decision at issue with regard to the evaluation of the Union industry’s market share cannot call into question the overall conclusion reached by the Commission, following an examination of all the economic indicators, with the result that the Commission was entitled to conclude that there was no injury to the Union industry (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 September 2015, Bricmate, C‑569/13, EU:C:2015:572, paragraphs 64 and 69).
In that regard, it is apparent from the settled case-law of the Court that, if any distortion of facts and evidence is relied on by the appellant, the distortion must be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of those matters (see, in particular, judgment of 18 October 2018, Gul Ahmed Textile Mills v Council, C‑100/17 P, EU:C:2018:842, paragraph 62).
There is distortion where, without recourse to new evidence, the assessment of the existing evidence is clearly incorrect. It is for the appellant relying on distortion to indicate precisely the evidence which has been distorted and show the errors of appraisal which have allegedly been made (judgment of 26 September 2018, Philips and Philips France v Commission, C‑98/17 P, not published, EU:C:2018:774, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).
It should be recalled that, under Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal is to be limited to points of law. The General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence. The appraisal of those facts and evidence does not, therefore, save where they have been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (judgment of 26 September 2018, Philips and Philips France v Commission, C‑98/17 P, not published, EU:C:2018:774, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
The Court of Justice has consistently held that the statement of the reasons on which a judgment of the General Court is based must clearly and unequivocally disclose that court’s reasoning in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the decision taken and the Court of Justice to exercise its power of review (judgment of 10 April 2014, Areva and Others v Commission, C‑247/11 P and C‑253/11 P, EU:C:2014:257, paragraph 54).
However, the obligation to state reasons does not require the General Court to provide an account which responds exhaustively and one by one to all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the General Court has not upheld their arguments and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (judgment of 10 April 2014, Areva and Others v Commission, C‑247/11 P and C‑253/11 P, EU:C:2014:257, paragraph 55).