The Queen, on the application of M and Others v Her Majesty’s Treasury.
Date: 2010-04-29
44. In this regard, it is to be borne in mind that it is settled case-law that the different language versions of a text of European Union law must be given a uniform interpretation and hence, in the case of divergence between the language versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part (Case C‑341/01 Plato Plastik Robert Frank  [2004] ECR I‑4883, paragraph 64 and case-law cited).
45. In addition, for the purpose of interpreting Regulation No 881/2002, account must also be taken of the wording and purpose of Resolution 1390 (2002) which that regulation, according to the fourth recital in the preamble thereto, is designed to implement (see, in particular, Joined Cases C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation  v Council and Commission  [2008] ECR I‑6351, paragraph 297 and case-law cited).
49. In view of the divergences thus established between the language versions of both Article 2(2) of Regulation No 881/2002 and Resolution 1390 (2002), Article 2(2) of Regulation No 881/2002 must, in the light of what has been stated in paragraphs 44 and 45 above, be construed in terms of the purpose and general scheme of the legislation of which it forms part and account must in this regard be taken of the substance of Resolution 1390 (2002).
52. So far as Regulation No 881/2002 is concerned, the Court has held that its objective is to prevent designated persons from having at their disposal any financial or economic resources, in order to impede the financing of terrorist activities (Case C‑117/06 Möllendorf and Möllendorf-Niehuus  [2007] ECR I‑8361, paragraph 63).
53. Likewise, the Court has stated that the essential purpose and object of that regulation is to combat international terrorism, in particular to cut it off from its financial resources by freezing the economic funds and resources of persons or entities suspected of involvement in activities linked to terrorism ( Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation  v Council and Commission , paragraph 169).
57. It is true that neither the definition of funds in Article 1(1) of Regulation No 881/2002 nor the measure prohibiting the making available of funds provided for in Article 2(2) of that regulation contains such a qualification.  None the less, that absence can be explained by the fact that those provisions refer specifically to funds which, if made available, directly or indirectly, to a designated person, entail in themselves a danger that they may be diverted in order to support terrorist activities.
64. In addition, it is to be borne in mind that, in construing a provision of secondary European Union law, preference should as far as possible be given to the interpretation which renders the provision consistent with the general principles of European Union law and, more specifically, with the principle of legal certainty (C‑1/02 Borgmann  [2004] ECR I‑3219, paragraph 30 and case-law cited).
65. That principle requires legislation, such as Regulation No 881/2002, which imposes restrictive measures having considerable impact on the rights and freedoms of designated persons ( Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation  v Council and Commission , paragraph 375) and which, as provided in Article 10 of that regulation, in domestic law involves penalties, in this instance criminal penalties, for infringement of those measures, to be clear and precise so that the persons concerned, including third parties such as the social security bodies involved in the main proceedings, may know unambiguously their rights and duties and take measures accordingly.