larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Epifanio Viscido (C-52/97), Mauro Scandella and Others (C-53/97) and Massimiliano Terragnolo and Others (C-54/97) v Ente Poste Italiane.
Date: 1998-05-07
13 In that connection, it should be pointed out that only advantages granted directly or indirectly through State resources are to be considered as aid within the meaning of Article 92(1). The distinction made in that provision between `aid granted by a Member State' and aid granted `through State resources' does not signify that all advantages granted by a State, whether financed through State resources or not, constitute aid but is intended merely to bring within that definition both advantages which are granted directly by the State and those granted by a public or private body designated or established by the State (see Case 82/77 Openbaar Ministerie of the Netherlands v Van Tiggele [1978] ECR 25, paragraphs 24 and 25, Case C-72/91 Sloman Neptun v Bodo Ziesemer [1993] ECR I-887, paragraph 19, and Case C-189/91 Kirsammer-Hack v Sidal [1993] ECR I-6185, paragraph 16).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium.
Date: 1998-05-07
10 First, Articles 12, 13 and 23 of the contested decree contain technical regulations within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 8(1), which should thus have been communicated to the Commission immediately.
12 As the Court made clear in its judgment in Case C-279/94 Commission v Italy [1997] ECR I-4743, paragraph 40, the aim of that provision is to enable the Commission to have as much information as possible on any draft technical regulation with respect to its content, scope and general context in order to enable it to exercise as effectively as possible the powers conferred on it by the Directive.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 1998-05-12
22 It is also clear from the Court's case-law (see, to that effect, in particular, Joined Cases 87/77, 130/77, 22/83, 9/84 and 10/84 Salerno and Others v Commission and Council [1985] ECR 2523, paragraph 56; Case 294/83 Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, paragraph 28; Case 242/87 Commission v Council [1989] ECR 1425, paragraph 18; and Case 16/88 Commission v Council [1989] ECR 3457, paragraphs 15 to 19) that, in the system of the Treaty, any implementation of expenditure by the Commission in principle presupposes, in addition to the entry of the relevant appropriation in the budget, an act of secondary legislation (commonly called the `basic act') from which the expenditure derives.
28 However, the requirement that a basic act must be adopted before an appropriation is implemented derives directly from the scheme of the Treaty, in accordance with which the conditions governing the exercise of legislative powers and budgetary powers are not the same (Case 242/87, cited above, paragraph 18).
41 Thus, important considerations of legal certainty, comparable with those arising where certain regulations are annulled, justify the Court in exercising the power conferred on it by the second paragraph of Article 174 of the Treaty when it annuls a regulation and in stating which of the effects of the decision annulled must be preserved (with regard to a directive, see, for example, Case C-21/94 Parliament v Council [1995] ECR I-1827, paragraph 31).
Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union.
Date: 1998-05-12
16 It is therefore the task of the Court to ensure that acts which, according to the Council, fall within the scope of Article K.3(2) of the Treaty on European Union do not encroach upon the powers conferred by the EC Treaty on the Community.
Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Österreichische Kreditversicherungs AG.
Date: 1998-05-14
18 It must be borne in mind first of all that the purpose of Article 7 is to protect consumers against the risks arising from the insolvency of the package holiday or tour organiser.  As the French Government has pointed out, those risks, which are inherent in the contract concluded between the purchaser and the package holiday organiser, stem from the payment in advance of the price of the package and from the spread of liability between the travel organiser and the various providers of the services which, in combination, make up the package.  Consequently, the result prescribed by Article 7 of the Directive entails the grant to package travellers of rights guaranteeing the refund of money that they have paid over and their repatriation in the event of the organiser's insolvency (see Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94 to C-190/94 Dillenkofer and Others v Federal Republic of Germany [1996] ECR I-4845, paragraph 42).
Drouot assurances SA v Consolidated metallurgical industries (CMI industrial sites), Protea assurance and Groupement d'intérêt économique (GIE) Réunion européenne.
Date: 1998-05-19
16 According to consistent case-law, the terms used in Article 21 of the Convention in order to determine whether a situation of lis pendens arises must be regarded as independent (Case C-406/92 The `Tatry' [1994] ECR I-5439, paragraph 30).
17 In the `Tatry' judgment, cited above, at paragraph 32, the Court stressed that Article 21, together with Article 22 on related actions, is contained in Section 8 of Title II of the Convention, a section intended, in the interests of the proper administration of justice within the Community, to prevent parallel proceedings before the courts of different Contracting States and to avoid conflicts between decisions which might result therefrom. Those rules are therefore designed to preclude, in so far as is possible, the possibility of a situation arising such as that referred to in Article 27(3), that is to say the non-recognition of a judgment on account of its irreconcilability with a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the State in which recognition is sought.
18 In that same judgment, at paragraph 33, the Court held that, in the light of the wording of Article 21 of the Convention and the objective set out above, that article must be understood as requiring, as a condition of the obligation of the second court seised to decline jurisdiction, that the parties to the two actions be identical.
European Parliament v Council of the European Union.
Date: 1998-05-28
22 It should be noted in limine that, according to settled case-law, the use of Article 235 of the Treaty as the legal basis for a measure is justified only where no other provision of the Treaty gives the Community institutions the necessary power to adopt the measure in question (see, in particular, Case 45/86 Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493, paragraph 13, the Edicom judgment, cited above, paragraph 13, and Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council [1996] ECR I-6177, paragraph 21).
23 It should also be noted that, in the context of the organisation of the powers of the Community, the choice of the legal basis for a measure must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review.  Those factors include in particular the aim and content of the measure (see Case C-300/89 Commission v Council [1991] ECR I-2867, paragraph 10, the Edicom judgment, cited above, paragraph 14, and Portugal v Council, cited above, paragraph 22).
36 Although the establishment and development of trans-European telecommunications networks between administrations entail, in themselves, the interconnection and interoperability of national networks as well as access to such networks, the content of the contested decision shows that it covers measures falling specifically within the second indent of Article 129c(1).
41 It appears from the information provided by the Commission that, in order to avoid discontinuity in the measures commenced, and for important reasons of legal certainty, the effects of the measures already taken to implement the contested decision and based thereon should be maintained.  By contrast, as regards the other effects of the decision, neither the Council nor the Commission has explained the difficulties which annulment of the contested decision would entail in that regard.  In the absence of such explanation, the Court is unable to assess the degree and extent of those difficulties and to accede to that aspect of the request.  Furthermore, it should be noted that, under Article 6, the contested decision was to apply until 31 December 1997.
42 In view of the particular circumstances of the case and for reasons of legal certainty, comparable to those which arise where certain regulations are annulled, there appears to be justification for the Court to exercise the power expressly conferred upon it by the second paragraph of Article 174 of the EC Treaty where a regulation is annulled and to state the effects of the annulled decision which must be maintained.  Consequently, the effects of the implementing measures already taken by the Commission on the basis of the contested decision should be maintained.
Criminal proceedings against John Charles Goodwin and Edward Thomas Unstead.
Date: 1998-05-28
9 It should be borne in mind at the outset that, according to established case-law, the Sixth Directive, whose purpose is to achieve widespread harmonisation in the area of VAT, is based on the principle of fiscal neutrality.  As regards the levying of VAT, that principle precludes a generalised differentiation between lawful and unlawful transactions, except where, because of the special characteristics of certain products, all competition between a lawful economic sector and an unlawful sector is precluded (see inter alia Case C-111/92 Lange v Finanzamt Fürstenfeldbruck [1993] ECR I-4677, paragraph 16).
11 In Einberger, Mol and Happy Family, the Court ruled that no turnover tax arises upon the unlawful importation into the Community of drugs or upon the unlawful supply of similar products effected for consideration within a Member State, in so far as the products in question are not confined within economic channels strictly controlled by the competent authorities for use for medical and scientific purposes.  In paragraph 20 of Witzemann, the Court held that its reasoning in relation to the illegal importation of drugs applies a fortiori to imports of counterfeit currency.
12 In those four judgments, the Court added that unlawful imports or supplies of goods such as those at issue in those cases, release of which into the economic and commercial channels of the Community is by definition absolutely precluded and which can give rise only to penalties under the criminal law, are wholly alien to the provisions of the Sixth Directive (Einberger, paragraphs 19 and 20; Mol, paragraph 15; Happy Family, paragraph 17; and Witzemann, paragraph 19).  That line of case-law thus concerns goods which, because of their special characteristics, may not be placed on the market or incorporated into economic channels.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain.
Date: 1998-05-28
6 On 21 October 1996 the Commission sent a reasoned opinion to the Kingdom of Spain to the effect that the latter had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 6 of the Directive.
14 According to settled case-law, a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-107/96 Commission v Spain [1997] ECR I-3193, paragraph 10).
16 In that regard, incomplete practical measures and fragmentary legislation cannot discharge the obligation of a Member State to draw up a comprehensive programme with a view to attaining certain objectives, as required by Article 6 of the Directive.
Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.
Date: 1998-06-11
11 On 25 May 1993 the Commission sent the Luxembourg Government a reasoned opinion stating its view that, by failing to adopt programmes for the reduction of pollution including quality objectives in respect of the 99 dangerous substances listed in the annex thereto, alternatively, by failing to communicate to the Commission summaries of those programmes and the results of their implementation, contrary to Article 7 of the Directive, and by failing, contrary to Article 5 of the EC Treaty, to provide the Commission with the information requested in that regard, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg had failed to fulfil its obligations under the EC Treaty.  The applicant requested the defendant State to take the necessary steps to comply with the reasoned opinion within two months.  That reasoned opinion also elicited no response.
Admissibility of the application
13 According to settled case-law (Case C-96/95 Commission v Germany [1997] ECR I-1653, paragraph 22), the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is to give the Member State concerned an opportunity, on the one hand, to comply with its obligations under Community law and, on the other, to avail itself of its right to defend itself against the complaints made by the Commission.  The subject-matter of an action brought under Article 169 of the Treaty is therefore delimited by the pre-litigation procedure provided for by that article.  Consequently, the action cannot be founded on any complaints other than those formulated in the reasoned opinion (Commission v Germany, cited above, paragraph 23).
20 It must be observed, first, that the programmes referred to in Article 7(1) of the Directive are intended to reduce water pollution.  Article 1(2)(e) of the Directive defines pollution as `the discharge by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the aquatic environment, the results of which are such as to cause hazards to human health, harm to living resources and to aquatic ecosystems, damage to amenities or interference with other legitimate uses of water'.  Consequently, the obligation to establish programmes as provided for in Article 7(1) extends to cover waters affected by such waste.  The Luxembourg Government and the Commission are agreed on that point.
Société générale des grandes sources d'eaux minérales françaises v Bundesamt für Finanzen.
Date: 1998-06-11
27 Those provisions of the Eighth Directive differ from Article 18(1)(a) and Article 22(3) of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes - Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1), according to which exercise of the right to deduct input tax is normally dependent on possession of the original of the invoice or of the document which, under the criteria determined by the Member State in question, may be considered to serve as an invoice, as the Court held in Reisdorf, cited above, at paragraph 22.
28 The different wording reflects the general purpose of the Eighth Directive, which is stated in the sixth recital in the preamble as being that of preventing `certain forms of tax evasion or avoidance' and the aim pursued in particular by Article 7(3) of the directive of preventing undertakings not established in the Member State concerned from re-using the invoice or import document to make further applications for a refund.
29 Nevertheless, Article 3(a) of the Eighth Directive cannot be interpreted as precluding Member States from accepting such an application for a refund in exceptional circumstances where there is no doubt that the transaction which led to the application for a refund occurred, where the loss of the invoice or import document is not attributable to the taxpayer and where it is established that, in view of the circumstances, there is no risk of further applications for a refund.
30 In that connection the Court has held that secondary law must comply with the general principles of law, and in particular the principle of proportionality (Case 114/76 Bela-Mühle v Grows-Farm [1977] ECR 1211, paragraphs 5 to 7). Exclusion of the possibility mentioned is not necessary in this case to prevent fraud or tax evasion.
34 Furthermore, in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination set out in Article 6 of the EC Treaty, the fifth recital in the preamble to the Eighth Directive expressly records that the directive `must not lead to the treatment of taxable persons differing according to the Member State in the territory of which they are established'. However, it is settled law that discrimination can arise only through the application of different rules to comparable situations or the application of the same rule to different situations (see inter alia Case C-279/93 Schumacker [1995] ECR I-225, paragraph 30).
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium and Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
Date: 1998-06-11
36 Second, as the defendant governments have themselves acknowledged, that Agreement, which is binding on both the Kingdom of Belgium and on the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, contains, in Articles 2, 3 and 16, cargo-sharing arrangements which, in the absence of an authorisation granted under Article 5(1) of the Regulation, are contrary to that provision.
Hermès International (a partnership limited by shares) v FHT Marketing Choice BV.
Date: 1998-06-16
28 It is true that the measures envisaged by Article 99 and the relevant procedural rules are those provided for by the domestic law of the Member State concerned for the purposes of the national trade mark.  However, since the Community is a party to the TRIPs Agreement and since that agreement applies to the Community trade mark, the courts referred to in Article 99 of Regulation No 40/94, when called upon to apply national rules with a view to ordering provisional measures for the protection of rights arising under a Community trade mark, are required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of Article 50 of the TRIPs Agreement (see, by analogy, Case C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR I-6019, paragraph 9, and Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-3989, paragraph 52).
29 It follows that the Court has, in any event, jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 of the TRIPs Agreement.
31 First, it is solely for the national court hearing the dispute, which must assume responsibility for the order to be made, to assess the need for a preliminary ruling so as to enable it to give its judgment.  Consequently, where the question referred to it concerns a provision which it has jurisdiction to interpret, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 Dzodzi [1990] ECR I-3763, paragraphs 34 and 35, and Case C-231/89 Gmurzynska-Bscher [1990] ECR I-4003, paragraphs 19 and 20).
32 Second, where a provision can apply both to situations falling within the scope of national law and to situations falling within the scope of Community law, it is clearly in the Community interest that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, that provision should be interpreted uniformly, whatever the circumstances in which it is to apply (see, to that effect, Case C-130/95 Giloy v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Ost [1997] ECR I-4291, paragraph 28, and Case C-28/95 Leur-Bloem v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst/Ondernemingen [1997] ECR I-4161, paragraph 34).  In the present case, as has been pointed out in paragraph 28 above, Article 50 of the TRIPs Agreement applies to Community trade marks as well as to national trade marks.
33 The Court therefore has jurisdiction to rule on the question submitted by the national court.
The question referred for a preliminary ruling
Criminal proceedings against Johannes Martinus Lemmens.
Date: 1998-06-16
19 Those arguments cannot be accepted.  Although in principle criminal legislation and the rules of criminal procedure are matters for which the Member States are responsible, it does not follow that this branch of the law cannot be affected by Community law (see, to that effect, Case 186/87 Cowan [1989] ECR 195, paragraph 19, and Case 203/80 Casati [1981] ECR 2595, paragraph 27).
20 In this case, there is nothing in the Directive to suggest that technical regulations within the meaning of Article 1 thereof are excluded from the notification requirement because they fall within the scope of criminal law, or that the scope of the Directive is limited to products intended to be used otherwise than in connection with the exercise of public authority.  As the Court has already stated in Case C-13/96 Bic Benelux [1997] ECR I-1753, paragraph 19, a directive applies to technical regulations irrespective of the grounds on which they were adopted.
32 In that regard, it should be noted that, in paragraph 40 of its judgment in CIA Security International, cited above, the Court emphasised that the Directive is designed to protect, by means of preventive control, freedom of movement for goods, which is one of the foundations of the Community.  This control serves a useful purpose in that technical regulations covered by the Directive may constitute obstacles to trade in goods between Member States, such obstacles being permissible only if they are necessary to satisfy compelling requirements relating to the public interest.
33 In paragraphs 48 and 54 of that judgment, the Court pointed out that the obligation to notify is essential for achieving such Community control and went on to state that the effectiveness of such control will be that much greater if the Directive is interpreted as meaning that breach of the obligation to notify constitutes a substantial procedural defect such as to render the technical regulations in question inapplicable, and thus unenforceable against individuals.
34 In criminal proceedings such as those in the main action, the regulations applied to the accused are those which, on the one hand, prohibit and penalise driving while under the influence of alcohol and, on the other, require a driver to exhale his breath into an apparatus designed to measure the alcohol content, the result of that test constituting evidence in criminal proceedings.  Such regulations differ from those which, not having been notified to the Commission in accordance with the Directive, are unenforceable against individuals.
35 While failure to notify technical regulations, which constitutes a procedural defect in their adoption, renders such regulations inapplicable inasmuch as they hinder the use or marketing of a product which is not in conformity therewith, it does not have the effect of rendering unlawful any use of a product which is in conformity with regulations which have not been notified.