Pula Parking d.o.o. v Sven Klaus Tederahn.
Date: 2017-03-09
24


Since Mr Tederahn has pleaded that Regulation No 1215/2012 is inapplicable ratione temporis because the contract relating to the use of the parking space was concluded before the Republic of Croatia acceded to the European Union, on 1 July 2013, it must be observed at the outset that the Act of Accession of a new Member State is based essentially on the general principle that the provisions of EU law apply ab initio and in toto to that State, derogations being allowed only in so far as they are expressly laid down by transitional provisions (judgment of 28 April 2009, Apostolides, C‑420/07, EU:C:2009:271, paragraph 33).
28


The finding in paragraph 26 of this judgment is also supported by the case-law of the Court of Justice under the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, whose continuity, as is apparent from recital 34 of Regulation No 1215/2012, should be ensured as regards the interpretation of Article 66(1) of that regulation, according to which the only necessary and sufficient condition for the scheme of that regulation to be applicable to litigation relating to legal relationships created before its entry into force is that the judicial proceedings should have been instituted subsequently to that date (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 November 1979, Sanicentral, 25/79, EU:C:1979:255, paragraph 6).
31


As a preliminary point, in so far as Regulation No 1215/2012 has now replaced Regulation No 44/2001, it should be observed that the Court’s interpretation of the provisions of the latter regulation also applies to Regulation No 1215/2012, whenever the provisions of the two instruments of EU law may be regarded as equivalent (judgment of 16 November 2016, Schmidt, C‑417/15, EU:C:2016:881, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
33


In accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, in order to ensure, as far as possible, that the rights and obligations which derive from that regulation for the Member States and the persons to whom it applies are equal and uniform, the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ should not be interpreted as a mere reference to the internal law of one or other of the States concerned. That concept must be regarded as an autonomous concept to be interpreted by reference, first, to the objectives and scheme of that regulation and, second, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2015, Aannemingsbedrijf Aertssen and Aertssen Terrassements, C‑523/14, EU:C:2015:722, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
34


In order to determine whether a matter falls within the scope of Regulation No 1215/2012, it is necessary to identify the legal relationship between the parties to the dispute and to examine the basis and the detailed rules governing the bringing of the action (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 April 2013, Sapir and Others, C‑645/11, EU:C:2013:228, paragraph 34, and of 12 September 2013, Sunico and Others, C‑49/12, EU:C:2013:545, paragraph 35).
37


Moreover, nor does it appear that, by issuing a parking ticket to the persons concerned, Pula Parking grants itself the power to issue an enforcement order, in derogation from the general rules of law, since after it has issued such a ticket, Pula Parking is merely able, in the same way as the issuer of an invoice, to rely on an authentic document capable of enabling it to initiate proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Enforcement (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 September 2013, Sunico and Others, C‑49/12, EU:C:2013:545, paragraph 39).
42


As is clear from the settled case-law of the Court, in the absence of reference to the law of the Member States, the provisions of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted autonomously, taking into account the overall scheme, the objectives and the origin of that instrument of EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 July 2016, Hőszig, C‑222/15, EU:C:2016:525, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
47


Moreover, in its settled case-law concerning notaries’ functions, the Court has consistently held that there are fundamental differences between judicial and notarial functions (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 May 2011, Commission v Austria, C‑53/08, EU:C:2011:338, paragraph 103; of 1 October 2015, ERSTE Bank Hungary, C‑32/14, EU:C:2015:637, paragraph 47, and of 1 February 2017, Commission v Hungary, C‑392/15, EU:C:2017:73, paragraph 111).
48


It should also be noted that, unlike, for example, Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession (OJ 2012 L 201, p. 107), whose Article 3(2) specifies that the term ‘court’, for the purposes of that regulation, encompasses not only the judicial authorities, but also any authority competent in that area which exercises judicial functions and which satisfies certain conditions listed in that provision, Regulation No 1215/2012 does not include any general provision having such an effect.
51


According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, both the principle of mutual trust between the Member States and the principle of mutual recognition are, in EU law, of fundamental importance given that they allow an area without internal borders to be created and maintained (judgment of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
53


Regulation No 1215/2012, the legal basis of which is Article 67(4) TFEU aimed at facilitating access to justice, in particular through the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions, thus seeks, in the field of cooperation in civil or commercial matters, to strengthen the simplified and efficient system for rules of conflict, recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions, a system established by the legal instruments of which that regulation forms a continuation, in order to facilitate judicial cooperation with a view to contributing to the attainment of the objective set for the European Union to become an area of freedom, security and justice, founded on the high level of confidence which should exist between the Member States (see, by analogy, in the field of cooperation in civil or commercial matters, the judgment of 1 June 2016, Bob-Dogi, C‑241/15, EU:C:2016:385, paragraph 32).