larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Commissioners of Customs & Excise v Cantor Fitzgerald International.
Date: 2001-10-09
17 It must be borne in mind that, under Article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive, a supply of goods or services effected for consideration within the territory of the country by a taxable person acting as such is subject to VAT.  That is why it is necessary in every case to consider which party supplied the goods or services and which party provided the consideration. It is supplies of goods or services which are subject to VAT, rather than payments made by way of consideration for such supplies.
21 The letting of immovable property for the purposes of Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive essentially involves the landlord of property assigning to the tenant, in return for rent and for an agreed period, the right to occupy his property and to exclude other persons from it (see, to that effect, Case C-358/97 Commission v Ireland [2000] ECR I-6301, paragraphs 52 to 57, Case C-359/97 Commission v United Kingdom [2000] ECR I-6355, paragraphs 64 to 69; and Case C-326/99 Goed Wonen [2001] ECR I-0000, paragraph 55).
25 The broad interpretation advocated by CFI is at variance with the settled case-law of the Court, according to which the terms used to specify the exemptions provided for by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive, and in particular `the leasing or letting of immovable property', are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, inter alia, Case 348/87 Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties [1989] ECR 1737, paragraph 13; Case C-453/93 Bulthuis-Griffioen [1995] ECR I-2341, paragraph 19; Case C-2/95 SDC [1997] ECR I-3017, paragraph 20; and Case C-216/97 Gregg [1999] ECR I-4947, paragraph 12).
33 An approach of that kind would be contrary to the VAT system's objectives of ensuring legal certainty and a correct and coherent application of the exemptions provided for in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive.  The Court observes in that connection that, to facilitate the application of VAT, it is necessary to have regard, save in exceptional cases, to the objective character of the transaction in question (see Case C-4/94 BLP Group [1995] ECR I-983, paragraph 24). A taxable person who, for the purposes of achieving a particular economic goal, has a choice between exempt transactions and taxable transactions must therefore, in his own interest, duly take his decision while bearing in mind the neutral system of VAT (see, to that effect, BLP Group, cited above, paragraphs 25 and 26). The principle of the neutrality of VAT does not mean that a taxable person with a choice between two transactions may choose one of them and avail himself of the effects of the other.
Mervett Khalil (C-95/99), Issa Chaaban (C-96/99) and Hassan Osseili (C-97/99) v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit and Mohamad Nasser (C-98/99) v Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart and Meriem Addou (C-180/99) v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen.
Date: 2001-10-11
40 Article 7 of the EEC Treaty, which prohibits discrimination against Community nationals on the ground of nationality (see Case C-45/93 Commission v Spain [1994] ECR I-911, paragraph 10), is not relevant to the present case.
55 Article 51 of the EEC Treaty provides for that purpose for recourse to the technique of coordinating the national social security schemes. Coordination would not be effective if it were necessary to limit its application solely to workers moving within the Community for the purpose of their employment. As the Court has held in relation to Regulation No 3, Regulation No 1408/71 is applicable to any worker, within the meaning of Article 1 thereof, who has the nationality of a Member State and finds himself in one of the situations involving international elements as provided for in the said regulation, as to members of his family (Case 27/69 Compagnie belge d'assurances générales sur la vie et contre les accidents [1969] ECR 405, paragraph 4; see also Singer, p. 971; and Case 61/65 Vaassen-Göbbels [1966] ECR 261, 277).
67 On the other hand, it is clear from the Court's case-law that the essential object of Regulation No 1408/71 is to ensure that social security schemes governing workers in each Member State moving within the Community are applied in accordance with uniform Community criteria. To this end it lays down a whole set of rules founded in particular upon the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality or residence and upon the maintenance by a worker of his rights acquired by virtue of one or more social security schemes which are or have been applicable to him (see Case 69/79 Jordens-Vosters [1980] ECR 75, paragraph 11).
69 However, the Court has since made clear that the Treaty rules governing freedom of movement for persons and measures adopted to implement them cannot be applied to activities which have no factor linking them with any of the situations governed by Community law and which are confined in all relevant respects within a single Member State (see, in particular, Petit, paragraph 8; Joined Cases C-225/95 to C-227/95 Kapasakalis and Others [1998] ECR I-4239, paragraph 22; and Case C-18/95 Terhoeve [1999] ECR I-345, paragraph 26).
70 As regards social security, the Court has concluded that Article 51 of the EEC Treaty and Regulation No 1408/71, in particular Article 3 thereof, do not apply to situations which are confined in all respects within a single Member State (see Petit, paragraph 10).
71 Such is in particular the case where the situation of a worker has factors linking it solely with a non-member country and one single Member State (see, to that effect, Case C-297/92 Baglieri [1993] ECR I-5211, paragraph 18; and Case C-60/93 Aldewereld [1994] ECR I-2991, paragraph 14).
Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Austria.
Date: 2001-10-11
12 In that connection, it should be recalled that, according to the Court's settled case-law, a Member State may not plead situations in its internal legal order, including those resulting from its federal organisation, in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-298/95 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-6747, paragraph 18, and Case C-236/99 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I-5657, paragraph 23).
13 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in the Member State as it stood at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and that the Court may not take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-435/99 Commission v Portugal [2000] ECR I-11179, paragraph 16, and Case C-266/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-1981, paragraph 38).
Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Austria.
Date: 2001-10-11
12 In that connection, it should be recalled that, according to the Court's settled case-law, a Member State may not plead situations in its internal legal order, including those resulting from its federal organisation, in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-298/95 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-6747, paragraph 18, and Case C-236/99 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I-5657, paragraph 23).
13 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in the Member State as it stood at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and that the Court may not take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-435/99 Commission v Portugal [2000] ECR I-11179, paragraph 16, and Case C-266/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-1981, paragraph 38).
14 It is apparent from the documents before the Court that the Republic of Austria admits that it had not adopted, prior to the expiry of the period of two months set by the reasoned opinion, the measures necessary to implement the directive fully in national law. In accordance with the case-law cited in the previous paragraph, the various measures which, the Republic of Austria states, were adopted after the expiry of that period, even if they constitute proper implementation of the directive, are not relevant in the context of the present action.
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Date: 2001-10-11
7 As regards the argument of the Netherlands Government that Directive 95/47 is already observed in the Netherlands in practice although it has not yet been fully implemented in Netherlands law, suffice it to observe that mere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the authorities and are not given the appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the proper fulfilment of a Member State's obligations under the Treaty (see, in particular, Case C-159/99 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-4007, paragraph 32). This is all the more true of mere practices of economic operators.
Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 2001-10-16
25 It is appropriate to bear in mind that Directive 96/2 is intended to establish a legislative framework enabling the potential of mobile and personal communications to be exploited by abolishing, as early as possible, exclusive and special rights by removing, for operators of mobile networks, (i) restrictions on the freedom to operate and develop their networks for the purpose of carrying out the activities authorised by their licences or authorisations and (ii) distortions of competition and by allowing those operators control over their cost base.
26 In accordance with that objective, Article 2(1) of Directive 96/2 requires Member States, from 1 January 1998, to refrain from refusing to allocate licences for operating mobile systems according to the DCS 1800 standard and Article 2(2) imposes the same requirement in relation to DECT licences from 15 February 1996.
31 Finally, as regards Order No 78574, relied upon by the Greek Government, the Court must reiterate that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in the Member State as it stood at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-69/99 Commission v United Kingdom [2000] ECR I-10979, paragraph 22; and Case C-266/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-1981, paragraph 38).
Commission of the European Communities v Ireland.
Date: 2001-10-18
27 In that regard it must be observed that, according to settled case-law, each Member State is bound to implement the provisions of directives in a manner that fully meets the requirements of clarity and certainty in legal situations imposed by the Community legislature, in the interests of the persons concerned established in the Member States. To that end, the provisions of a directive must be implemented with unquestionable legal certainty and with the requisite specificity, precision and clarity (see Case C-207/96 Commission v Italy [1997] ECR I-6869, paragraph 26).
28 Thus, mere administrative practices, which by their nature can be changed as and when the authorities please and which are not publicised widely enough cannot be regarded as a proper fulfilment of the obligation imposed on Member States to which the directives are addressed (see, inter alia, Case 102/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 1473, paragraph 11).
34 In addition, regarding the Irish Government's argument that the vast majority of the animals used for experimental purposes in Ireland are reared for that purpose in authorised establishments and are put to death painlessly at the end of the experiment, it is important to remember that, since failure to comply with an obligation imposed by a rule of Community law is itself sufficient to constitute a breach, the fact that such a failure had no adverse effects is irrelevant (see Case C-333/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-1025, paragraph 37).
45 First, it is settled case-law that whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C-119/00 Commission v Luxembourg [2001] ECR I-4745, paragraph 14).
46 Secondly, it should be noted that where a Community regulation does not specifically provide for any penalty for an infringement or refers for that purpose to national laws, regulations and administrative provisions, Article 5 of the Treaty requires the Member States to take all measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law. For that purpose, while the choice of penalties remains within their discretion, they must ensure in particular that infringements of Community law are penalised under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive (Case 68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965, paragraphs 23 and 24; Case C-213/99 de Andrade [2000] ECR I-11083, paragraph 19).
Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 2001-10-25
22 Article 30 of the Treaty is designed to prohibit all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, of hindering intra-Community trade (see Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5).
28 As for the question whether the system in question may nevertheless be justified, as the Greek Government claims, under Article 36 of the Treaty, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, national rules adopted in order to achieve one of the objectives referred to in that provision are compatible with the Treaty only in so far as they do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the desired objective (see Case C-128/89 Commission v Italy [1990] ECR I-3239, paragraph 18).
29 The Greek Government cites the objective of maintaining a stock of petroleum products on Greek territory for reasons of public security. It is true that the maintenance on national territory of a stock of petroleum products allowing continuity of supplies to be guaranteed constitutes a public security objective within the meaning of Article 36 of the Treaty (see Case 72/83 Campus Oil and Others [1984] ECR 2727, paragraph 35).
Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities.
Date: 2001-10-25
24 The purpose of the procedure is therefore, as the Advocate General pointed out at point 42 of his Opinion, to bring about a change in behaviour on the part of the recalcitrant State, and not to record in abstracto that a failure existed in the past (see, as regards the procedure for failure to fulfil obligations under Article 226 EC, Case C-362/90 Commission v Italy [1992] ECR I-2353, paragraphs 9 to 13).
32 Furthermore, the Commission has not pointed to an imminent risk that the Federal Republic of Germany may repeat the infringement, or to other specific reasons for which the recording of an infringement may, exceptionally, be necessary. Nor has the Commission indicated the reasons for which it could not have acted in good time in order to prevent, by means of the procedures available to it, the infringement complained of from producing its effects (see, as regards similar obligations of the Commission in the context of the infringement procedure under Article 226 EC, Commission v Italy, cited above, paragraph 12).
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 2001-10-25
18 Since contracting out workers constitutes a provision of services within the meaning of the Treaty (see Case 279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305, paragraph 9), it is not disputed that the requirement to have an establishment in the territory of the Member State in which services are to be provided, laid down by the legislation at issue, constitutes an obstacle to exercise of the freedom to provide services.
19 As the Court has repeatedly held, the requirement of a permanent establishment is the very negation of the fundamental freedom to provide services in that it results in depriving Article 59 of the Treaty of all effectiveness, a provision whose very purpose is to abolish restrictions on the freedom to provide services of persons who are not established in the State in which their services are to be provided. If such a requirement is to be accepted, it must therefore be shown that it constitutes a condition indispensable for attaining the objective pursued (see, in particular, Case C-222/95 Parodi [1997] ECR I-3899, paragraph 31).
20 It is true that the social protection of workers in the construction industry is one of the overriding reasons of public interest capable of justifying a restriction on the freedom to provide services (see Case C-272/94 Guiot [1996] ECR I-1905, paragraph 16). It is also true that, according to the case-law of the Court, overriding reasons of public interest which justify the substantive provisions of a Member State's legislation may also justify measures necessary to check compliance with it (see, to that effect, Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-1417, paragraph 18).
21 However, the Court has always emphasised that considerations of a purely administrative nature cannot make lawful a restriction of the freedom to provide services (see, to this effect, in particular, Case C-18/95 Terhoeve [1999] ECR I-345, paragraph 45). The Court has thus held that the Member State in which services are provided may not require an undertaking to keep documents specific to that State if that undertaking is already subject, in the Member State in which it is established, to obligations comparable, as regards their objective of safeguarding the interests of workers, in respect of the same workers and the same periods of activity, to those laid down by the legislation of the first Member State (see, in particular, Arblade and Others, cited above, paragraph 80).
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.
Date: 2001-10-25
28 Article 17 of the Sixth Directive provides that taxable persons are entitled to deduct the VAT they have already paid, on goods purchased and services received as inputs, from the VAT which they are liable to pay. This right to deduct is, according to settled case-law, a fundamental principle of the common system of VAT established by the relevant Community legislation (see, in particular, Molenheide, cited above, paragraph 47).
30 As the Court has consistently held, the characteristics of the common system of VAT set out above show that the deduction system is meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of VAT payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT consequently ensures that all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that they are themselves subject to VAT, are taxed in a wholly neutral way. In the absence of any provision empowering the Member States to limit the right of deduction granted to taxable persons, that right must be exercised immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on transactions relating to inputs (see, in particular, Case 50/87 Commission v France [1988] ECR 4797, paragraphs 15 and 16).
32 It appears from the express terms of Article 18(4) of the Sixth Directive, and in particular from the phrase according to conditions which they shall determine, that the Member States have a certain freedom to manoeuvre in determining the conditions for the refund of excess VAT.
33 Nevertheless, since the refund of excess VAT is one of the fundamental factors ensuring the application of the principle of neutrality of the common system of VAT, the conditions determined by the Member States cannot undermine that principle by making the taxable person, in whole or in part, bear the burden of the VAT.
34 It follows that the conditions for the refund of excess VAT that a Member State sets must enable the taxable person, in appropriate conditions, to recover the entirety of the credit arising from that excess VAT. This implies that the refund is carried out within a reasonable period of time by a payment in liquid funds or equivalent means. In any case, the method of refund adopted must not entail any financial risk for the taxable person.
38 Furthermore, the problem raised by the Italian Government, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for it to comply with Community law if the Court considers that the national rules in question infringe the provisions of the Sixth Directive, also has no bearing on the outcome of the dispute. In accordance with settled case-law, a Member State may not seek to rely on provisions, practices or circumstances in its internal legal order in order to justify failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, in particular, Case C-473/99 Commission v Austria [2001] ECR I-4527, paragraph 12).
Urszula Ruhr v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit.
Date: 2001-10-25
11 It is clear from paragraph 7 of the judgment in Kermaschek that under Article 2(1) of Regulation No 1408/71 the members of a worker's family can avail themselves of the regulation only in relation to derived rights, that is to say those acquired through their status as a member of the family of a worker.
12 In Case C-308/93 Cabanis-Issarte [1996] ECR I-2097, the Court nevertheless limited the scope of that restriction to those provisions of Regulation No 1408/71 which are applicable solely to workers. Thus, the spouse of a Community worker cannot rely on his or her status as a member of the worker's family in order to claim rights under the provisions of Title III, Chapter 6, of Regulation No 1408/71 (Unemployment Benefits), the main purpose of which is merely to coordinate rights to unemployment benefits provided by virtue of the national legislation of the Member States for employed persons who are nationals of a Member State and not for members of their families (see Cabanis-Issarte, paragraph 23, and Joined Cases C-245/94 and C-312/94 Hoever and Zachow [1996] ECR I-4895, paragraph 32).
Observations submitted to the Court
19 Article 2(1) of Regulation No 1408/71, which defines the persons covered by the regulation, refers to two clearly distinct categories of persons: workers, on the one hand, and members of their families and their survivors, on the other. In order to fall within the scope of the regulation, the former must be nationals of a Member State, or stateless persons or refugees residing within the territory of one of the Member States. There is, on the other hand, no nationality requirement for application of the regulation to the family members or survivors of workers who are themselves Community nationals (Cabanis-Issarte, paragraph 21).
Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic.
Date: 2001-10-25
10 In that regard, it must be pointed out that, in accordance with settled case-law, a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (see, inter alia, Case C-470/98 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-4657, paragraph 11, and Case C-423/99 Commission v Italy [2000] ECR I-11167, paragraph 10).