larimo/cjeu-paragraph-retrieval huggingface dataset:
Jamina Hakelbracht and Others v WTG Retail BVBA.
Date: 2019-06-20
32


The latter provision is a specific expression, in the context of that directive, of the principle of effective judicial protection, which underlies the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 September 1998, Coote, C‑185/97, EU:C:1998:424, paragraph 21), that principle having, since then, been reaffirmed in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
33


As regards Council Directive 76/207/EEC, of 9 February 1976, on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions (OJ 1976 L 39, p. 40), which preceded Directive 2006/54, the Court has already held that the principle of effective judicial control would be deprived of an essential part of its effectiveness if the protection it provides did not cover measures which an employer might take as a reaction to legal proceedings brought by an employee with the aim of enforcing compliance with the principle of equal treatment. Fear of such measures, where no legal remedy is available against them, might deter workers who considered themselves the victims of discrimination from pursuing their claims by judicial process, and would consequently be liable seriously to jeopardise implementation of the aim pursued by the Directive (judgment of 22 September 1998, Coote, C‑185/97, EU:C:1998:424, paragraph 24).
RD v SC.
Date: 2019-06-27
25


The purpose of those minimum standards is to ensure, in accordance with recital 12 of that regulation, that the debtor is informed, first, about the court action against him, the requirements for his active participation in the proceedings to contest the claim and, secondly, the consequences of his non-participation in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence. In the specific case of a decision delivered in default, for the purposes of point (b) of the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 805/2004, those minimum procedural standards seek to ensure the existence of adequate guarantees of respect for the rights of the defence (judgment of 16 June 2016, Pebros Servizi, C‑511/14, EU:C:2016:448, paragraph 44).
26


The Court observed that, in the light of Article 14(2) of Regulation No 805/2004 and the objectives and scheme of that regulation, a judgment by default issued in circumstances where it is impossible to ascertain the domicile of the defendant cannot be certified as a European Enforcement Order (judgment of 15 March 2012, G, C‑292/10, EU:C:2012:142, paragraph 64).
European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany.
Date: 2019-07-04
64


It follows, in particular, that, while it is true that it is for a Member State which relies on an overriding reason in the public interest as justification for a requirement within the meaning of Article 15 to demonstrate that its legislation is appropriate and necessary to attain the legitimate objective being pursued, that burden of proof cannot be so extensive as to require the Member State to prove, positively, that no other conceivable measure could enable that objective to be attained under the same conditions (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 April 2009, Commission v Italy, C‑518/06, EU:C:2009:270, paragraph 84 and the case‑law cited; of 24 March 2011, Commission v Spain, C‑400/08, EU:C:2011:172, paragraph 123; and of 23 December 2015, Scotch Whisky Association and Others, C‑333/14, EU:C:2015:845, paragraph 55). Such a requirement would amount, in practice, to depriving the Member State concerned of its regulatory competence in the field concerned.
74


In that regard, a Member State which, like the Federal Republic of Germany in this case, relies on an overriding reason relating to the public interest in order to justify a measure that it has adopted must submit specific evidence substantiating its arguments (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 January 2014, Commission v Belgium, C‑296/12, EU:C:2014:24, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände - Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V. v Amazon EU Sàrl.
Date: 2019-07-10
37


It is therefore necessary to interpret that provision by reference to the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, by analogy, judgments of 24 January 2019, Balandin and Others, C‑477/17, EU:C:2019:60, paragraph 31, and of 26 February 2019, Rimšēvičs and ECB v Latvia, C‑202/18 and C‑238/18, EU:C:2019:139, paragraph 45).
40


Directive 2011/83 seeks to afford consumers extensive protection by conferring on them a number of rights in relation to, inter alia, distance and off-premises contracts (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 January 2019, Walbusch Walter Busch, C‑430/17, EU:C:2019:47, paragraph 35).
43


With this in mind, Article 6(1) of Directive 2011/83 seeks to ensure the communication to consumers, before the conclusion of a contract, both of information concerning the contractual terms and the consequences of that conclusion, allowing consumers to decide whether they wish to be contractually bound to a trader (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 January 2019, Walbusch Walter Busch, C‑430/17, EU:C:2019:47, paragraph 36), and of information necessary for proper performance of that contract and, in particular, for the exercise of their rights, in particular the right of withdrawal (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 July 2012, Content Services, C‑49/11, EU:C:2012:419, paragraph 34).
44


In that regard, although it is true that the possibility for consumers to contact traders quickly and to communicate efficiently with them, as provided for by Article 6(1)(c) of Directive 2011/83, is of crucial importance for protecting their rights, as has been noted in paragraph 41 of the present judgment, the fact remains that, in interpreting that provision, it is necessary to ensure the right balance between a high level of consumer protection and the competitiveness of undertakings, as is stated in recital 4 of that directive, while respecting the undertaking’s freedom to conduct a business, as set out in Article 16 of the Charter (see, by analogy, judgment of 23 January 2019, Walbusch Walter Busch, C‑430/17, EU:C:2019:47, paragraphs 41 and 42).
46


It follows from the foregoing that although Article 6(1)(c) of Directive 2011/83 does not determine the precise nature of the means of communication which must be established by traders, that provision necessarily requires traders to put at the disposal of all consumers a means of communication which allows the latter to contact them quickly and to communicate with them efficiently.
48


Moreover, an unconditional obligation to provide consumers, in all circumstances, with a telephone number, or even to put in place a telephone or fax line, or to create a new email address in order to allow consumers to contact traders seems to be disproportionate, in particular in the economic context of the functioning of certain undertakings, in particular small undertakings, which might seek to reduce their operating costs by organising sales or the provision of services at a distance or off-premises.
HQ and Others v Aegean Airlines SA.
Date: 2019-07-10
29


As regards the question whether passengers who have the right to hold their tour organiser liable for reimbursement of the cost of their air tickets are also entitled to seek reimbursement of the cost of their tickets from the air carrier, the Court notes, first, that, in accordance with Article 8(1)(a) of Regulation No 261/2004, read in conjunction with Article 5(1)(a) of that regulation, the onus is on the air carrier, in the event of cancellation of a flight, to offer assistance to the passengers concerned in the form of offering them, inter alia, reimbursement of their ticket (see judgment of 12 September 2018, Harms, C‑601/17, EU:C:2018:702, paragraph 12).
41


The Court has held that Article 7 of Directive 90/314 imposes an obligation of result, namely to guarantee package travelers the refund of money paid over in the event of the travel organiser’s bankruptcy, and that that guarantee is specifically aimed at arming consumers against the consequences of the bankruptcy, whatever the causes of it may be (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 June 1999, Rechberger and Others, C‑140/97, EU:C:1999:306, paragraph 74, and order of 16 January 2014, Baradics and Others, C‑430/13, EU:C:2014:32, paragraph 35).
42


The Court has also considered that national legislation properly transposes the obligations under Article 7 of the directive only if, whatever the detailed rules laid down in that legislation may be, it achieves the result of providing the consumer with an effective guarantee of the refund of all money paid over in the event of the travel organiser’s insolvency (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 June 1999, Rechberger and Others, C‑140/97, EU:C:1999:306, paragraph 64, and order of 16 January 2014, Baradics and Others, C‑430/13, EU:C:2014:32, paragraph 38).
43


Failing that, as is apparent from settled case-law of the Court, the traveller concerned is entitled, in any event, to bring an action for damages against the Member Sate concerned for the loss incurred by him as a result of an infringement of EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 November 2010, Fuß, C‑429/09, EU:C:2010:717, paragraphs 45 to 48 and the case‑law cited).
CS and Others v České aerolinie a.s.
Date: 2019-07-11
16


As a preliminary point, it must be recalled, in the first place, that a flight with one or more connections which is the subject of a single reservation constitutes a whole for the purposes of the right of passengers to compensation provided for in Regulation No 261/2004 (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 May 2018, Wegener, C‑537/17, EU:C:2018:361, paragraphs 18 and 19 and the case-law cited), implying that the applicability of Regulation No 261/2004 is to be assessed with regard to the place of a flight’s initial departure and the place of its final destination (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 May 2018, Wegener, C‑537/17, EU:C:2018:361, paragraph 25).
19


In the second place, the Court has held that passengers whose flights are delayed must be regarded as being entitled to the compensation provided for in Article 5(1)(c) of Regulation No 261/2004, read together with Article 7(1) of that regulation, where they suffer, on arrival at their final destination, a loss of time equal to or in excess of 3 hours (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 November 2009, Sturgeon and Others, C‑402/07 and C‑432/07, EU:C:2009:716, paragraph 61, and of 23 October 2012, Nelson and Others, C‑581/10 and C‑629/10, EU:C:2012:657, paragraph 38).
23


Accordingly, that definition sets out two cumulative conditions which must be satisfied if an air carrier is to be regarded as an ‘operating air carrier’, relating, first, to the performance of the flight in question and, second, to the existence of a contract with a passenger (judgment of 4 July 2018, Wirth and Others, C‑532/17, EU:C:2018:527, paragraph 18).
31


Last, it must be recalled that, under Article 13 of Regulation No 261/2004, the discharge of obligations by the operating air carrier pursuant to that regulation is without prejudice to its right to seek compensation, under the applicable national law, from any person who caused the air carrier to fail to fulfil its obligations, including third parties (judgment of 11 May 2017, Krijgsman, C‑302/16, EU:C:2017:359, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
Funke Medien NRW GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Date: 2019-07-29
57


As follows from recitals 3 and 31 of Directive 2001/29, the harmonisation effected by that directive aims to safeguard, in particular in the electronic environment, a fair balance between, on the one hand, the interest of the holders of copyright and related rights in the protection of their intellectual property rights guaranteed by Article 17(2) of the Charter and, on the other hand, the protection of the interests and fundamental rights of users of protected subject matter, in particular their freedom of expression and information guaranteed by Article 11 of the Charter, as well as of the public interest (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 August 2018, Renckhoff, C‑161/17, EU:C:2018:634, paragraph 41).
Massimo Gambino and Shpetim Hyka v Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Bari and Others.
Date: 2019-07-29
23


In that regard, the referring court notes that, as regards the interpretation of the Council Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 (2001/220/JHA) on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings (OJ 2001 L 82, p. 1), which was replaced by Directive 2012/29, the Court of Justice, in paragraph 56 of the judgment of 16 June 2005, Pupino (C‑105/03, EU:C:2005:386), held that achievement of the aims pursued by that framework decision requires that a national court should be able, in respect of particularly vulnerable victims, to use a special procedure, such as the special inquiry for early gathering of evidence provided for in the law of a Member State, and the special arrangements for hearing testimony for which provision is also made, if that procedure best corresponds to the situation of those victims and is necessary in order to prevent the loss of evidence, to reduce the repetition of questioning to a minimum, and to prevent the damaging consequences for those victims of their giving testimony at the trial.
39


In so far as the Charter contains rights corresponding to rights guaranteed under the ECHR, Article 52(3) of the Charter is intended to ensure the necessary consistency between the rights contained in the Charter and the corresponding rights guaranteed under the ECHR, without thereby adversely affecting the autonomy of EU law and that of the Court of Justice of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 March 2018, Menci, C‑524/15, EU:C:2018:197, paragraph 23). According to the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17), the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter corresponds to Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Article 48 of the Charter is the same as Article 6(2) and (3) of the ECHR. The Court must, accordingly, ensure that its interpretation of the second paragraph of Article 47 and of Article 48 of the Charter ensures a level of protection which does not disregard that guaranteed by Article 6 of the ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 September 2018, Belastingdienst v Toeslagen (suspensory effect of the appeal), C‑175/17, EU:C:2018:776, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
40


To the same effect, as regards Framework Decision 2001/220, which was replaced by Directive 2012/29, the Court has held that the former must be interpreted in such a way that fundamental rights, including in particular the right to a fair trial as set out in Article 6 of the ECHR, and interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, are respected (judgments of 16 June 2005, Pupino, C‑105/03, EU:C:2005:386, paragraph 59, and of 9 October 2008, Katz, C‑404/07, EU:C:2008:553, paragraph 48).
Red Bull GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office.
Date: 2019-07-29
36


As regards the first part of the second ground of appeal, it must be noted that, according to the Court’s settled case-law on Regulation No 40/94 and Regulation No 207/2009, a sign may be registered as a mark only if the applicant for the mark provides a graphic representation in accordance with the requirement in Article 4 of those regulations, to the effect that the subject matter and scope of the protection sought are clearly and precisely determined (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 March 2019, Hartwall, C‑578/17, EU:C:2019:261, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
37


Where the application is accompanied by a verbal description of the sign, that description must serve to clarify the subject matter and scope of the protection sought under trade mark law and such a description cannot be inconsistent with the graphic representation of a trade mark or give rise to doubts as to the subject matter and scope of that graphic representation (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 March 2019, Hartwall, C‑578/17, EU:C:2019:261, paragraphs 39 and 40).
65


By referring in that regard to ‘the requirement of the colours’ availability’ in the course of trade, the General Court correctly applied the Court’s settled case-law to the effect that, in the examination that occurs when registering a sign consisting of a combination of colours, particular attention must be paid not to unduly restrict the availability of colours for the other traders who offer for sale goods or services of the same type as those in respect of which registration is sought (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 May 2003, Libertel, C‑104/01, EU:C:2003:244, paragraphs 54 to 56, and of 24 June 2004, Heidelberger Bauchemie, C‑49/02, EU:C:2004:384, paragraph 41).
79


As regards the second part of the third ground of appeal, which it is appropriate to examine first, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the right to rely on the principle of legitimate expectations extends to any person with regard to whom an institution has given rise to justified hopes. A person may not plead infringement of the principle unless he has been given precise, unconditional and consistent assurances by a competent authority of the European Union (judgments of 22 September 2011, Bell & Ross v OHIM, C‑426/10 P, EU:C:2011:612, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited, and of 14 June 2016, Marchiani v Parliament, C‑566/14 P, EU:C:2016:437, paragraph 77).
Radu Lucian Rusu and Oana Maria Rusu v SC Blue Air - Airline Management Solutions SRL.
Date: 2019-07-29
26


It should be noted, as a preliminary point, that Regulation No 261/2004 seeks to ensure a high level of protection for air passengers regardless of whether they are denied boarding or whether their flight is cancelled or delayed, since they are all caused similar serious trouble and inconvenience connected with air transport (judgment of 19 November 2009, Sturgeon and Others, C‑402/07, EU:C:2009:716, paragraph 44).
28


With regard to the amounts set by Article 7(1) of Regulation No 261/2004, they are intended to compensate, in a standardised and immediate manner, for the damage that is constituted by the inconvenience that, inter alia, as is the case in the main proceedings, denied boarding in the carriage of passengers by air causes, without the passengers having to suffer the inconvenience inherent in the bringing of actions for damages before the courts having jurisdiction (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 January 2006, IATA and ELFAA, C‑344/04, EU:C:2006:10, paragraph 45).
30


Such fixed amounts are intended to provide compensation only for the damage that is almost identical for every passenger concerned (see, by analogy, judgments of 10 January 2006, IATA and ELFAA, C‑344/04, EU:C:2006:10, paragraph 43, and of 23 October 2012, Nelson and Others, C‑581/10 and C‑629/10, EU:C:2012:657, paragraph 52).
31


However, neither Article 7(1) of Regulation No 261/2004 nor that regulation taken as whole provides for the compensation of individual damage, inherent in the reason for travelling of the passengers concerned, redress for which requires a case-by-case assessment of the extent of the damage caused and can consequently only be the subject of compensation granted subsequently on an individual basis (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 January 2006, IATA and ELFAA, C‑344/04, EU:C:2006:10, paragraph 43).
Alessandro Salvoni v Anna Maria Fiermonte.
Date: 2019-09-04
26


According to the Court’s settled case-law, although Article 267 TFEU does not make the reference to the Court subject to there having been an inter partes hearing in the proceedings in the course of which the national court refers the questions for a preliminary ruling, a national court may refer a question to the Court only if there is a case pending before it and if it is called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature (judgment of 16 June 2016, Pebros Servizi, C‑511/14, EU:C:2016:448, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Deutsche Bahn AG.
Date: 2019-09-05
25


However, the Court of Justice has consistently held that, in interpreting provisions of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only their wording but also the context in which they occur and the objectives pursued by the rules of which they are part (judgment of 17 October 2018, Günter Hartmann Tabakvertrieb, C‑425/17, EU:C:2018:830, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
Lombardi Srl v Comune di Auletta and Others.
Date: 2019-09-05
31


The judgment of 21 December 2016, Bietergemeinschaft Technische Gebäudebetreuung und Caverion Österreich (C‑355/15, EU:C:2016:988), cited by the referring court, is not incompatible with such an interpretation. Although it is true that in paragraphs 13 to 16, 31 and 36 of that judgment, the Court held that the tenderer whose bid had been excluded by the contracting authority from a public procurement procedure could be refused access to a review of the decision awarding the public contract, in the case giving rise to that judgment, the decision to exclude that tenderer had been confirmed by a decision that had acquired the force of res judicata before the court hearing the review of the contract award decision gave its decision, so that that tenderer had to be regarded as definitively excluded from the public procurement procedure at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 May 2017, Archus and Gama, C‑131/16, EU:C:2017:358, paragraph 57).
32


In the main proceedings, none of the tenderers who have brought an action to have the other party excluded have been definitively excluded from the procurement process. Therefore, that judgment in no way undermines the legal principle referred to in the preceding point.
Criminal proceedings against AH and Others.
Date: 2019-09-05
38


In that context, it should be stated that the purpose of Directive 2016/343 is, as is clear from Article 1 and recital 9 thereof, to lay down common minimum rules concerning certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and the right to be present at the trial (judgment of 19 September 2018, Milev, C‑310/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:732, paragraph 45).
41


In that regard, it should be noted that the presumption of innocence is enshrined in Article 48 of the Charter, which corresponds to Article 6(2) and (3) of the ECHR, as is apparent from the explanations to the Charter. It follows, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, that it is necessary to take account of Article 6(2) and (3) of the ECHR for the purposes of interpreting Article 48 of the Charter, as a minimum threshold of protection (see, by analogy, as regards Article 17 of the Charter, judgment of 21 May 2019, Commission v Hungary (Rights of usufruct over agricultural land), C‑235/17, EU:C:2019:432, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).