page_title: Schlachtgeschwader 1
section_title: Kursk and Kutuzov
hierarchical_section_title: Schlachtgeschwader 1 / War service / Kursk and Kutuzov
caption_attribution_description: A captured German Henschel Hs 129B (Wk.Nr. 0385) at Freeman Army Airfield, Indiana, in 1946. It was allotted for storage at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona (USA) but had to be force-landed at Gallatin, Tennessee, on 24 July 1946 while being ferried to Davis-Monthan. The aircraft ran out of fuel due to suspected tank leakage and was slightly damaged during the subsequent forced landing. It was taken to No. 803 Special Depot (Orchard Place) on 5 August 1946. When the storage depot was required for other purposed during the Korean War, FE-4600 was put up for disposal as scrap. Only the nose section was saved from a scrap yard.
context_page_description: Schlachtgeschwader 1 was a German Luftwaffe wing during World War II. It operated the Henschel Hs 123, Henschel Hs 129, Focke-Wulf Fw 190, and the Messerschmitt Bf 109.
context_section_description: On 5 July, Operation Citadel began, beginning the Battle of Kursk. Action for Schl.G. 1 came on the second day. The German XXXXVIII Panzer Corps was bogged down, but the II SS Panzer Corps made more ground. The 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, at the tip of the advance, prepared to meet a counter-attack from the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. With support from JG 51's Panzerjägerstaffel, I./Schl.G 1 and 4.(Pz)/Schl.G 1 dived down up the Soviet armour; the Hs 129s of the panzer staffel attacked tanks while Fw 190s dropped SD-2 anti-personnel bombs with devastating effect on infantry. The last mission was flown as dusk was falling. The battle so badly damaged the 2nd Guards, that the 5th Guards Tank Corps carried out the second phase of the attack alone; and failed.
  Hauptmann Bruno Meyer spotted another attempt by the 2nd Guards Tanks Corps to attack the Waffen SS division on 8 July. In exactly the same way, this time without JG 51, the wing attacked the tank and infantry. The infantry hid in nearby forests but purportedly suffered heavy casualties. German fighters allowed Schl.G. 1 freedom of action and German airmen noted poor Soviet responses to air attacks, presenting Hs 129s with easy targets. The wing suffered heavy anti-aircraft fire and most aircraft were at least hit. Soviet prisoners from the unit told German intelligence officers just how effective the attacks had been. The 2nd Tanks Corps lost 50 tanks to Schl.G. 1 and an unknown number of soldiers in exchange for two aircraft; one pilot was killed and one wounded. With the 2nd Guards removed from the line for a second time, the 10th Tank Corps attacked the SS Corps alone and failed.
  Schl.G. 1 and the tank-busting staffel of JG 51 played an important role at the Battle of Prokhorovka on 12 July as the SS sought a breakthrough. The 5th Guards Tank Army advanced over 1.5 kilometres of open ground to meet German forces. The SS Panzer Corps air liaison officers directed the Schlacht aircraft, which played a greater role than the weakened dive-bomber groups, to attack the tanks and infantry with cannon-equipped Hs 129s and Fw 190s. Schl.G. 1 and JG 51's staffel flew 248 sorties against the dense groups of armour. The Soviet 31st Tank Brigade complained about the absence of their own fighters. A report from the 5th Guards said, "the enemy's aircraft literally hung above our combat formations throughout the entire battle."
  The VVS had concentrated on the Fourth Panzer Army's flanks leaving Fliegerkorps VIII in control over Prokhorovka. Schl.G. 1 lost 11 of the 19 aircraft lost by the air corps including six Hs 129s—all were lost to ground-fire.
  The wing supported fruitless attacks in the southern sector until 15 July. On this date, the tank-hunting staffeln, 4 and 8, with I./Schl.G 1, 4./SG 2 and the tank-hunting staffel from JG 51, were ordered to Orel. Operation Kutuzov countered Citadel in the north and threatened to destroyed the 9th Army and the Second Panzer Army through encirclement after cutting the Bryansk-Orel highway and rail line at Khotynets. 
  The Hs 129 tank-hunting units were miss-used in the ensuing battle. Instead of attacking armour as it broke through the front over open ground, they were often asked to attack vehicles concealed in forests, carry out reconnaissance orientation in areas where Soviet fighter aviation was strong. The Schlacht aircraft flew 103 sorties, and shared 19 tanks, 70 lorries destroyed. From the 14 to 25 July, 30% of Hs 129s were lost; four per day. Bruno Meyer, commanding the Panzerjägdkommando/Schl.G. 1 recalled that Soviet fighter units were experienced; often concentrating on the leader of a German formation. Meyer stated his unit lost eight aircraft in a week.
  On 17 July, 17 Panzerjäger and 40 Schlacht sorties were flown. On 19 July, Schl.G. 1 played an important role as the Luftwaffe alone prevented the breakthrough at Orel. The 1st Tank Corps arrived north of Khotynets on the evening of the 18th but were spotted by reconnaissance. The following morning 4.(Pz)/Schl.G. 1 claimed 50 tanks without loss. The Sovi
caption: Hs 129. Schl.G 1 was the first unit to operate the type.
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