page_title: German Radio Intelligence Operations during World War II
section_title: Büffelbewegung (Buffalo Movement)
hierarchical_section_title: German Radio Intelligence Operations during World War II / Intercept operations during World War II / Soviet Front 1941–1945 / Büffelbewegung (Buffalo Movement)
context_page_description: German Radio Intelligence Operation were signals intelligence operations that were undertaken by German Axis forces in Europe during World War II. In keeping with German signals practice since 1942, the term communication intelligence had been used when intercept units were assigned to observe both enemy radio and wire communication. When the observation of only enemy radio communication was undertaken, the term was radio intelligence. The term intercept service was also used up until 1942.
context_section_description: In March 1943 the German 129th Infantry Division, withdrew from the Volga near Rzhev to the Smolensk-Moscow highway near Yartsevo, during the course of the so-called Buffalo Movement (German: Büffelbewegung) of the Ninth Army. Every day the division's RI team reported the approach of enemy troops to the successive German delaying positions as well as the enemy's organisation and strength, physical condition after exhausting night marches, intended rest periods, logistical problems, the Russians' estimate of the German situation, and their plans in general. In the light of this reliable first-hand information intercepted from enemy sources, the Germans were able to examine their dispositions, reinforce their units at crucial points, place their reserves at the right points, and, above all, concentrate their fire on the most vulnerable targets the enemy so carelessly revealed to them, and make the proper distribution of the available ammunition on a day-to-day basis.
  In February 1944 the 23rd Panzer Division was given the mission of stopping heavy Russian attacks on Jassy. On that occasion some T-34's broke through the German lines and concealed themselves in the close terrain. They sent such messages as "our tracks are broken" or "turret damaged," whereupon the German RI team inquired: What is your location?  As soon as they indicated their location, the tanks were destroyed by the Germans.
  The Germans occasionally attempted to get a reply from Russian stations and usually succeeded in their deception. However, they refrained from intruding in enemy nets handling routine traffic in order not to arouse the suspicion of the other party. Any such action would have compromised future intelligence results. It was a different matter, however, when, in the heat of combat, the enemy asked for assistance without getting reply to his calls.
  In September 1944, a Russian corps was in a precarious situation northeast of Grosswardein. The RI team of the 23rd Panzer Division intercepted a poorly encrypted message ordering a Russian-Romanian regimental combat team to attempt to break out along a certain road. Elements of the division thereupon prepared an ambush in the forest on both sides of the road and completely wiped out the breakout force.
  Along the entire Russian front the reports from communication intelligence were considered as information from reliable sources.
  In the autumn of 1943 Albert Praun, then chief signal officer at the headquarters of Army Group Centre, received every day intercepts of CW and voice transmissions from which it was clearly evident that in hundreds of instances German prisoners were being murdered within a short time after their capture. In each instance a Soviet (Russian) regimental or division staff officer complained that no prisoners had been turned over to headquarters and requested that at least one man should be spared from being shot or otherwise murdered so that he could be interrogated. A truly shocking picture of the Asiatic combat methods used by the Russians.
  When, in the autumn of 1943, German forces encircled near Cherkassy succeeded in breaking out of the pocket, their overjoyed commander carelessly told propaganda officials about the tremendous help he had received from communication intelligence both while in the pocket and when breaking out of it, inasmuch as he was able to direct movements and conduct operations on the basis of intercepted Russian orders. Although this statement was publicized in the press and radio in the same imprudent manner, it did not have the disastrous consequences which had been feared for a time. Up to the end of the war the intercepts made by the RI teams on the Soviet (Russian) front remained an important source of information for the tactical commanders.
  Strategic radio intelligence directed against the Russian war production effort provided a wealth of information for the evaluation of Russia's military potential. Owing to the general dearth of long-distance telephone and teletype land circuits, radio communication assumed an especially important role in
caption: Soviet Operation Bagration offensive 22 June 1943 – 19 August 1944
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