page_title: Hezbollah armed strength
section_title: Command structure
hierarchical_section_title: Hezbollah armed strength / Command structure
caption_attribution_description: August 10, 2006 An aerial snapshot used by Hezbollah in which the terror group documented the data they collected regarding IDF deployment on the northern border.
context_page_description: Hezbollah has the armed strength of a medium-sized army. Hezbollah is generally considered the most powerful non-state actor in the world, and to be stronger than the Lebanese Army. A hybrid force, the group maintains "robust conventional and unconventional military capabilities." The party's fighting strength has grown substantially since the 2006 Lebanon War.
  Hezbollah does not reveal its manpower and estimates vary widely. In 2017, Jane's assessed that Hezbollah had more than 25,000 full-time fighters and perhaps 20,000–30,000 reservists. They are financed in part by Iran and trained by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Hezbollah's military budget runs about one billion dollars per year.
  Hezbollah's military strength is somewhat based on the quantity and quality of the rockets they possess, which they use against their primary enemy, Israel. The group's strategy against Israel uses rockets as offensive weaponry combined with light infantry and anti-armor units to defend their firing positions in southern Lebanon. Estimates of Hezbollah's total rocket count range from 40,000 to 150,000, which is considerably more than most countries.
context_section_description: Hezbollah is structured like a normal military organization. It has a hierarchical structure and centralized planning and decentralized execution, as is typical, though it has a greater degree of compartmentalization than is normal. "Hezbollah's military wing is hierarchically organized, but operates in  a cellular manner with good operational and communications  security to avoid  detection from Israeli sensors and aerial  attack. Hezbollah has flexible tactics and they do not have a tall hierarchical chain of command, instead delegating more authority to local commanders. Autonomous infantry cells with "considerable independence," including choosing when to attack, comprise most of the organization's fighters. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah explained in a 2013 interview that during the 2006 war they had delegated "freedom of assessment" down to the village level, and that several villages had decided to stand and fight. On the other hand, the Hezbollah high command asserts "firm operational control" over its strategic missile force. The Hezbollah headquarters in Beirut maintains direct control over long range missiles, with control of short and possibly medium range missiles devolved to regional commanders. In the Lebanon war, the Hezbollah high command had enough top down control to completely stop or start rocket attacks.  Hezbollah's concept of operations centered around continued short-range rocket attacks against Israel. "Hezbollah proved to be a highly dedicated and professional fighting force... Hezbollah successfully embraced a new doctrine, transforming itself from a predominantly guerilla force into a formidable quasi-conventional fighting force." In general, little is known about Hezbollah's decision making process.  The party has made significant investments in its command-and-control infrastructure since 2006.
  A 2009 review described Hezbollah in summary as "capable of tactical actions that are much more complex than a typical non-state belligerent. They show sophistication and the clear ability to conduct major combat operations." Analysts widely consider the group an "exceptionally capable organization" and one of the world's most innovative armed non-state actors. Hezbollah is considered to be more capable than Palestinian groups in terms of training, discipline, and central command. In the 2006 war, Hezbollah was able to execute mission-type orders, which improved its combat effectiveness, but was still severely outmatched by the IDF in one-on-one fighting. In the 2006 war, fighters had the autonomy to operate without direct orders in case they got cut off.  However, it appears that this was not necessary, as a chain of command was maintained throughout the war. Although Hezbollah's mission command enabled local leaders to take the initiative and be flexible, it also meant that Hezbollah units were not able to support each other in battle. Hezbollah squads generally, but not always, comprised about seven to ten men. They had a great deal of autonomy and self-sufficiency, but also had a chain of command up to Beirut. Hezbollah's use of stockpiles, instead of a logistics train, and the "high degree of autonomy given to junior leaders" differentiate it from normal Arab armies. Hezbollah practices decentralized mission command where top leadership is responsible for long-term planning but not generally for tactics or operations. In 2006, Hezbollah's style of mission command and high autonomy resulted in the organization behaving on the battlefield similarly to the IDF. Hezbollah's command and control is effective but "low-tech". It is composed of wire, fiber optic, runners, signals, and the civilian communication network. Hezbollah rarely emits radio-electronic spectrum. Hezbollah is very pliant to Iranian interests, but does not seem to be controlled directly by Iran. Hezbollah's status as a Lebanese nationalist movement, and its need to maintain cross-confessional support, is possibly its biggest constraint to growth. Hezbollah is expanding from a powerful, localized asymmetrical actor into a regional
caption: An aerial snapshot of northern Israel used in a Hezbollah command center to monitor IDF troop movement.
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