page_title: Capture of Wytschaete
section_title: British preparations
hierarchical_section_title: Capture of Wytschaete / Prelude / British preparations
caption_attribution_description: English: A Howitzer in the act of firing in the Battle of Messines Ridge
context_page_description: The Capture of Wytschaete was a tactical incident in the Battle of Messines on the Western Front during the First World War. On 7 June, the ridge was attacked by the British Second Army; the 36th Division and the 16th Division of IX Corps captured the fortified village of Wytschaete on the plateau of Messines Ridge, which had been held by the German 4th Army since the First Battle of Ypres.
  In April 1917, the senior German commanders in Flanders were willing to contemplate a retirement from the Messines salient but the local Gruppe and divisional commanders objected. The convex slope of the eastern side of the ridge would obstruct artillery observation and the proximity of the Ypres–Comines Canal and the river Lys would hamper the assembly of reserves. The Germans had spent two years fortifying the defences and the local commanders had been assured that British mining attempts had been defeated.
  The British attack at Messines was set for 7 June and the plan included the detonation of deep mines that had been laid under the German front position since 1915.
context_section_description: The British had begun to mine under Messines Ridge in 1916; sappers tunnelled into a layer of blue clay 80–120 ft (24–37 m) below the surface, then drifted galleries to points deep underneath the German front position.   Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and British miners laid 26 mines with 447 long tons (454 t) of ammonal explosive. On the right flank of the 36th (Ulster) Division the 107th Brigade faced three mines at Kruisstraat and 800 yd (730 m) north was the larger Spanbroekmolen mine. The mine close to Peckham House was opposite the 109th Brigade on the left flank. The 47th Brigade of the 16th (Irish) Division was to advance into the area of the Maedelstede mine and the 49th Brigade past two at Petit Bois. On the left of the 16th (Irish) Division, the 19th (Western) Division was also to advance with the assistance of mines north of Wytschaete.
  The Second Army devised a centralised artillery plan of great sophistication, using field survey, gun calibration, weather data and a new and highly accurate 1:10,000 scale map, to increase the accuracy of British artillery. Wire cutting bombardments had to destroy about 280 mi (450 km) of barbed wire and using the new methods, all German guns within 9,000 yd (5.1 mi; 8.2 km) of the attack front were to be neutralised. Methodical target-finding with new sound-ranging equipment, better organisation of flash-spotting and the centralisation of command at a new Army Report Centre, based at Locre Château were introduced. Second Army counter-battery artillery bombardments increased from twelve in the week ending 19 April, to 438 in the last ten days before the attack. IX Corps arranged four counter-battery groups, each with one heavy artillery group and five bombardment groups, one for each of its three attacking divisions and two (with the heaviest howitzers) in reserve. A Heavy Artillery Group Commander was attached to each divisional artillery headquarters, to command the heavy artillery once the infantry attack began. The IX Corps field artillery groups and sub-groups were formed to have an artillery liaison officer for every infantry brigade, with two sub-groups, one with six 18-pounder batteries and one with six 4.5-inch howitzer batteries.
  Surplus field artillery brigade headquarters planned forward moves for the guns and were kept ready to replace casualties. It was expected that much of the artillery would need to switch rapidly from bombardment to engaging German counter-attacks and divisional Forward Observation Officers (FOOs) were to control the artillery which had remained in place. The reserve divisions due to advance to the Oosttaverne Line would control artillery hidden close to the front line and the guns moved forward into no man's land. Two thirds of the 18-pounders were to fire a creeping barrage of shrapnel immediately ahead of the advance, while the remainder of the field guns and 4.5-inch howitzers were to fire a standing barrage, 700 yards (640 m) further ahead on German positions and lift to the next target, when the infantry came within 400 yards (370 m) of the barrage. Each division was given four extra batteries of field artillery, which could be withdrawn from the barrage at the divisional commander's discretion to engage local targets. The field batteries of the three reserve divisions were placed in camouflaged positions, close to the British front line. As each objective was taken by the infantry, the creeping barrage was to pause 150–300 yd (140–270 m) ahead and become a standing barrage, while the infantry consolidated. During this time the pace of fire was to slacken to one round per-gun per-minute, allowing the gun-crews a respite, before resuming full intensity as the barrage moved on.
  The heavy and super-heavy artillery was to fire on German artillery positions and rear areas and 700 machine-guns were to fire a barrage over the heads of the advancing troops. In the week up to 7 June, 2,230 guns and howitzers bombarded the German trenches, cut wire, destroyed strong-points and conducted counter-battery fire against the 630 German guns opposit
caption: A British 8-inch howitzer firing during the battle
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