page_title: Inverted spectrum
section_title: Overview
hierarchical_section_title: Inverted spectrum / Overview
caption_attribution_description: English: inverted qualia of colour.日本語: 色の反転クオリア。この画像を作るのにコモンズの二つの画像を使わせて頂きました。
context_page_description: The inverted spectrum is the hypothetical concept of two people sharing their color vocabulary and discriminations, although the colors one sees—one's qualia—are systematically different from the colors the other person sees.
context_section_description: The concept dates back to John Locke. It invites us to imagine that we wake up one morning, and find that for some unknown reason all the colors in the world have been inverted, i.e. swapped to the hue on the opposite side of a color wheel. Furthermore, we discover that no physical changes have occurred in our brains or bodies that would explain this phenomenon. Supporters of the hypothesis of qualia as non-physical entities argue that, since we can imagine this happening without contradiction, it follows that we are imagining a change in a property that determines the way things look to us, but that has no physical basis. In more detail:
  Metaphysical identity holds of necessity
  If something is possibly false, it is not necessary
  It is conceivable that qualia could have a different relationship to physical brain-states
  If it is conceivable, then it is possible
  Since it is possible for qualia to have a different relationship with physical brain-states, they cannot be identical to brain states (by 1).
  Therefore, qualia are non-physical.
  The argument thus states that if we find the inverted spectrum plausible, we must admit that qualia exist (and are non physical). Some philosophers find it absurd that an "armchair argument" can prove something to exist, and the detailed argument does involve many assumptions about conceivability and possibility, which are open to criticism. Perhaps it is not possible for a given brain state to produce anything other than a given quale in our universe, and that is all that matters. The question, however, can arise how these critical philosopher's, using the same armchair technique that they are criticizing, refute the robust argumentation of the Inverted spectrum experiment?
  C. L. Hardin criticizes the idea that an inverted spectrum would be undetectable on scientific grounds:
  ...there are more perceptually distinguishable shades between red and blue than there are between green and yellow, which would make red-green inversion behaviorally detectable. And there are yet further asymmetries. Dark yellow is brown (qualitatively different from yellow), whereas dark blue is blue[...] Similarly, desaturated bluish-red is pink (qualitatively different from saturated bluish-red), whereas desaturated greenish-yellow is similar to saturated greenish-yellow. Again, red is a "warm" color, whereas blue is "cool"—and perhaps this is not a matter of learned associations with temperature.
  Paul Churchland using the Hurvich–Jameson (H–J) opponent process criticizes the inverted spectrum on scientific grounds:
  If the Hurvich–Jameson account of our color experiences is correct, then it is empirically impossible to change the profile of our subjective color responses to the world without changing in some way the response profile of our opponent cell activation vectors, as outlined, for example, in the preceding paragraph. From this reductive perspective, sundry ‘‘qualia inversions’’ are indeed possible, but not without the appropriate rewirings within the entirely physical H–J net that embodies and sustains all of our color experience. If we wish to resist this deliberately reductive account—as some will—then let us endeavor to find in it some real empirical failing. Imaginary failings simply don’t matter.
  Inverted spectrum arguments have applications to behavioralism, physicalism, representationalism, functionalism, skepticism and the hard problem of consciousness.
  Vincent Conitzer has illustrated the possibility of an inverted spectrum using the following scenario. Someone is observing a simulated reality through a VR headset, and is not aware that he is wearing a headset or that what he is observing is a simulation.  Conitzer argues that the code responsible for the physics of the simulation can be separated from the code that determines in which colors the simulation is displayed by the headset (as well as determining which perspective in the simulation to display).  So, it would be possible to change that additional code, inverting the displayed colors, without changing anything about the simulated physics
caption: Inverted qualia
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