page_title: American logistics in the Northern France campaign
section_title: Motor transport
hierarchical_section_title: American logistics in the Northern France campaign / Motor transport
caption_attribution_description: Deutsch: Ein Red-Ball-Konvoi mit einem verunglückten LKW English: Red Ball Express - Convoy with accidental truck - 1944
context_page_description: American logistics in the Northern France campaign played a key role in the success of Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of northwest Europe during World War II that commenced on D-Day, 6 June 1944.
  In the first seven weeks after D-Day, the Allied advance was slower than anticipated because the well-handled and determined German opposition exploited the defensive value of the Normandy hedgerow country. On 25 July, the First United States Army began Operation Cobra, the breakout from Normandy. The subsequent advance was much faster than expected and the rapid increase in the length of the line of communications threw up unanticipated logistical challenges. The logistical plan lacked the flexibility needed to cope with the rapidly changing operational situation, and the rehabilitation of railways and construction of pipelines could not keep up with the pace of the advance, and air supply had limited capacity. Major shortages developed, particularly of petrol, oil and lubricants.
context_section_description: With the railways and pipelines unable to keep up with the pace of the advance, the breakout and pursuit from Normandy placed a heavy burden on ADSEC's Motor Transport Brigade. Yet even before Operation Cobra began, COMZ estimated that there would be a shortage of 127 truck companies by D plus 90. This was a consequence of decisions made in the planning stages of Overlord. COMZ had estimated that 240 truck companies were required, but only 160 were approved in November 1943. ETOUSA was only partly responsible for this. In peacetime, the vaunted American motor vehicle industry had produced about 600 heavy-duty trucks (defined as 4-ton vehicles or greater) a month, but in July 1943, the Army Service Forces ordered 67,000 to be produced in 1944. The Truman Committee considered this wasteful, unnecessarily reducing the number of civilian trucks that could be built. Despite the adverse political pressure, the Army pressed on with the production program, but only 2,788 heavy-duty trucks came off the assembly lines in January 1944, half the required rate. There was a shortage of forgings and castings for heavy duty axles, engines and transmissions, and it took time for new producers to tool up. 
  Ross wanted two-thirds of the ETO's requested 160 companies equipped with the 10-ton semi-trailer, which was especially suitable for long-distance haulage, with the rest equipped with 2½-ton 6x6 trucks for shorter inter-depot movements and clearance of railheads, but by the end of March 1944, ETO had only 66 10-ton semi-trailers instead of the 7,194 it had requested, and none of the 4,167 4- or 5-ton truck tractors. In April, the War Department attempted to meet the requirements by taking hundreds of trucks of miscellaneous types from the ASF, Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces in the United States, and ASF diverted 1,750 4- and 5-ton truck tractors and 3,500 5-ton semi-trailers earmarked for the Ledo Road project in Burma to the ETO.
  The tardy delivery of vehicles affected the training of motor transport unit personnel. As with many other service units, the ETO had been compelled to accept partially trained units in the hope they would be able to complete their training in the UK. The late arrival of vehicles meant that this training could not get under way until May 1944. In August 1943 the Transportation Corps recommended that each truck company be allocated an additional 36 drivers, bringing them up to two per vehicle and 96 per company, thereby allowing the trucks to be operated around the clock. ETOUSA disapproved this, which it regarded as unnecessary, but nonetheless the Transportation Corps persisted, and in early 1944 Lee had approved the proposal.
  But by this time the War Department had established a troop ceiling for the ETO, and would not provide the additional personnel without corresponding cuts elsewhere, so the 5,600 men to provide an additional 40 drivers for 140 companies had to be obtained from other SOS units. Lee sternly warned that he would not countenance this being used as an excuse to rid units of undesirables. Whether this admonition worked is debatable, but insufficient numbers of personnel were provided, so in May 1944, fourteen African-American truck companies had their personnel transferred to other African-American units. The US Army was racially segrated, so the intention was to replace them with Caucasian personnel, but the numbers were not made available. Instead, two engineer general service regiments were temporarily converted to truck units. The cost of inadequate training of truck drivers would be paid in avoidable damage to vehicles through accidents and poor maintenance.
  On 10 August, two companies of 45-ton tank transporters were converted to cargo carriers. A few days later, the 55 truck companies equipped with 2½-ton 6x6 trucks were each given ten additional trucks, and three British truck companies were borrowed from the 21st Army Group. The situation became acute with the decision to continue the pursuit across the Seine. COMZ estimated that this would require 100,000 long tons (100,000 
caption: Red Ball Express Convoy passes a broken-down vehicle
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