page_title: Thomas S. Power
section_title: Cold War and Strategic Air Command
hierarchical_section_title: Thomas S. Power / Cold War and Strategic Air Command
caption_attribution_description: English: Commanders-in-Chief of The Strategic Air Command General Thomas S. Power flying a Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker.
context_page_description: General Thomas Sarsfield Power was commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command and an active military flier for more than 30 years.
context_section_description: During Operation Crossroads, the 1946 atomic bomb tests at Bikini Atoll, Power was assigned as assistant deputy task force commander for air on Admiral William H. P. Blandy's staff. Then came assignments as deputy assistant chief of air staff for operations in Washington and a period of air attaché duty in London, prior to his transfer to the Strategic Air Command as vice commander in 1948. During the next six years, Power assisted General Curtis E. LeMay, then commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command, in building up SAC. He was then appointed commander of the Air Research and Development Command in 1954, a position he held for three years.
  When General LeMay was named vice chief of staff of the Air Force in 1957, Power became commander in chief of SAC and was promoted to four-star rank.
  Power was the architect of the Operation Chrome Dome airborne alert program of SAC that ensured that a proportion of the nuclear-armed strategic bombers were always aloft so as to survive a first strike.
  When RAND proposed a counterforce strategy, which would require SAC to restrain itself from striking Soviet cities at the beginning of a war, Power countered with: 
  Restraint? Why are you so concerned with saving their lives? The whole idea is to kill the bastards. At the end of the war if there are two Americans and one Russian left alive, we win!
  Professor William Kaufmann from the RAND Corporation, losing his patience, noted: "Well, you'd better make sure that they're a man and a woman." At that point, Power stalked out of the room. The briefing was over. Having been briefed by another famous member of the RAND Corporation, Herman Kahn, on the genetic effects of nuclear weapons, Power replied: "You know, it's not yet been proved to me that two heads aren't better than one."
  On October 24, 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, SAC was ordered to "Defcon 2," one step short of nuclear war. Although authorized to increase his alert level, Power took the unprecedented – and unauthorized – action of broadcasting that message to global Strategic Air Command (SAC) nuclear forces "in the clear" (on non-scrambled, open radio channels), presumably in an attempt to scare the Soviets into complying with American demands.
  Raymond Garthoff, who was a participant in the crisis, noted that: 
  ...the Soviet political and military leaders must have been puzzled and alarmed at this flaunting of the American strategic superiority, so great that the United States could afford to ignore normal operational security in order to drive home the extent of its power. Equally extraordinary, and not known in Moscow, was that this remarkable display of American power was unauthorized by and unknown to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the EXCOMM as they so carefully calibrated and controlled action in the intensifying confrontation. The decision for this bold action was taken by General Thomas Powers [sic], commander-in-chief of SAC, on his own initiative. He had been ordered to go on full alert, and he did so. No one had told him how to do it, and he decided to 'rub it in.'
  Garthoff gives as his source:  
  I was first told about this action soon after the crisis by Major General (then Colonel) George J. Keegan Jr., then SAC chief of intelligence, who was present when General Powers [sic] gave the order and it was executed.
  
  The question becomes a bit murkier when new material uncovered by Stanford's Prof. Scott Sagan led him to write:
  In addition, it is revealing that on October 24, shortly after DEFCON 2 was declared, General Power also sent the following special message to all SAC wings, in a clear (uncoded) voice transmission, emphasizing the need for safety and caution in the dangerous operation:
  This is General Power speaking. I am addressing you for the purpose of reemphasizing the seriousness of the situation the nation faces. We are in an advanced state of readiness to meet any emergencies, and I feel that we are well prepared. I expect each of you to maintain strict security and use calm judgement during this tense
caption: General Thomas S. Power flying a Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker during his tenure as Commanders-in-Chief of The Strategic Air Command.
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