page_title: Article 14 of the Constitution of Singapore
section_title: Restrictions premised on necessity or expediency
hierarchical_section_title: Article 14 of the Constitution of Singapore / Restrictions on the rights / Restrictions premised on necessity or expediency
caption_attribution_description: English: A table illustrating the grounds specified in Article 14(2) of the Constitution of Singapore on which the rights to freedom of speech and expression, assembly and association guaranteed by Article 14(1) can be restricted by Parliament if it is necessary or expedient to do so.
context_page_description: Article 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, specifically Article 14, guarantees to Singapore citizens the rights to freedom of speech and expression, peaceful assembly without arms, and association. However, the enjoyment of these rights may be restricted by laws imposed by the Parliament of Singapore on the grounds stated in Article 14 of the Constitution.
  There are two types of grounds. For the first type, it must be shown that restricting the rights is "necessary or expedient in the interest" of the grounds. The grounds are the security of Singapore and public order, morality, and friendly relations with other countries. In a 2005 judgment, the High Court expressed the view that the phrase necessary or expedient confers upon Parliament "an extremely wide discretionary power and remit that permits a multifarious and multifaceted approach towards achieving any of the purposes specified in Art 14 of the Constitution". It is unnecessary for the courts to determine whether a legislative restriction of a right is reasonable.
context_section_description: Parliament may restrict the rights to free speech, assembly and association on the grounds set out in the table below if it is "necessary or expedient in the interest" of them:
  In Chee Siok Chin, the High Court interpreted the phrase necessary or expedient as conferring upon Parliament "an extremely wide discretionary power and remit that permits a multifarious and multifaceted approach towards achieving any of the purposes specified in Art 14(2) of the Constitution". The Court emphasized the fact that, unlike Article 19(3) of the Constitution of India which provides that the right to fetter the freedom of speech and assembly is subject to the touchstone of reasonableness, Singapore's Article 14(2) does not contain the word reasonable. However, despite the broad power that Article 19(3) accords to the Indian courts, they have been "most reluctant" to invalidate legislation purportedly infringing the rights to free speech or assembly. There exists a strong presumption of legislative constitutionality, as the Supreme Court of India has expressed a need for "judicial self-restraint and extreme caution" when determining whether legislation unreasonably restricts a constitutional right. It has been noted that the Indian courts have thus been used to exemplify how much more deference Singapore courts should give to the Government, and that the Article 14(2) derogation clause was said to confer upon Parliament a great amount of discretionary power.
  The High Court also rejected the use of a proportionality analysis when determining the extent of Parliament's powers to impose restrictions on individual rights. The analysis enables the judiciary to assess if an interference with rights is proportionate to a legitimate and important aim of the legislation in question. A court will inquire into whether relevant and sufficient reasons justify the statutory interference, and may substitute its own judgment for that of Parliament. The High Court concluded: "Needless to say, the notion of proportionality has never been part of the common law in relation to the judicial review of the exercise of a legislative and/or an administrative power or discretion. Nor has it ever been part of Singapore law."
  Bearing in mind these restraints, the court's only task is to ascertain whether an impugned law is within the purview of any of the permissible restrictions. Hence, all that needs to be established is a nexus between the object of the law in question and one of the permissible subjects stipulated in Article 14(2). In doing so, the Government must merely satisfy the court that there is a factual basis on which Parliament has considered it "necessary or expedient" to restrict one's individual right to freedom of speech, assembly or association.
  When determining whether legislative restrictions are "in the interest of" the relevant purposes specified in Article 14(2), the courts may examine the impugned statute, relevant parliamentary material and contemporary speeches and documents, and will adopt a "generous and not a pedantic interpretation". Moreover, the term in the interest of, when contrasted with the maintenance of, grants "a much wider legislative remit that allows Parliament to take a prophylactic approach" and includes "laws that are not purely designed or crafted for the immediate or direct maintenance" of the Article 14(2) grounds.
caption: Grounds on which Article 14(1) rights may be restricted if it is "necessary or expedient" to do so (SG is an abbreviation for Singapore)
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