page_title: Air Resupply And Communications Service
section_title: Detachment 2, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron
hierarchical_section_title: Air Resupply And Communications Service / History / Korean War / Detachment 2, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron
caption_attribution_description: English: USAF and Army officers coordinating a "Special Air Mission" with their South Korean counterparts during the Korean War, 1951
context_page_description: The Air Resupply And Communications Service is an inactive United States Air Force organization. It was assigned to Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. Established during the Korean War, the mission of ARCS was providing the Air Force an unconventional warfare capability during the 1950s. It was inactivated in 1954, but elements continued to operate until the reactivation of air commando units by the Kennedy Administration in 1962.
context_section_description: Beginning in the fall of 1950, two organizations began conducting "Special Air Missions" in South Korea shortly after the invasion of the South by North Korea. The Far East Air Forces 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, 315th Air Division flew C-47 Skytrain transports, based out of whatever front line airstrip its aircraft found itself at the end of each day. Within the squadron was an innocuously-named "Detachment 2", whose mission was to perform unconventional warfare missions.   Following the September 1950 breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, the detachment moved north to Seoul's Kimpo Airport (K-14). From there, Detachment 2's aircraft would soon become active far behind enemy lines as far north as Manchuria.   Det. 2 supported Far East Command (FECOM) Technical Intelligence, Fifth Air Force, the CIA, and varied United States and South Korean irregular partisan units.   Seldom numbering more than half-a-dozen C-47s, Det. 2's pilots coordinated and flew special operations missions for all these individual groups. One of the more hazardous missions carried out by Det. 2. was long-range low-level penetration missions to insert Korean partisans at night behind communist lines.
  Flying single-aircraft, 8-hour missions in Korea's mountains, the Detachment became proficient in night operations. To ensure maximum communications and operations security for their missions, FECOM Intelligence gave the code-name "Rabbits" to these highly valued HUMINT agents. They knew that once dropped behind enemy lines, there was only one way back, to walk. Behind the lines, Rabbits used SCR-300 infantry radios to request resupply and to relay intelligence through Det 2 aircraft flying overhead with a long co-axian reception antennae trailing behind the aircraft. It worked, assuming that anti-aircraft fire, weather, or a collision with fog-shrouded mountains had not terminated the mission.
  Special female agents were also dropped with orders to attach themselves to the highest Chinese or North Korean officer and travel with him as far as possible toward the front lines. Unarmed, even without radios, their survival was totally dependent on their individual ability to deceive enemy officers they were sent out to approach. These female agents proved remarkably effective. Once near the lines, they would allow themselves to be captured by Allied forces. From detention camps, a pre-arranged signal from them would lead to their release and immediate debriefing of intelligence gathered during their mission.  Approximately 1,000 Rabbits were dropped into enemy territory between September 1950 and June 1951.  Amazingly, more than 70 percent returned to friendly territory, providing key intelligence into North Korean activities.
  Det 2. also developed a C-47 "Bomber". The unit modified some of its aircraft with container racks and bomb shackles and slung two 75-gallon napalm bombs under the transport's belly. Once the Rabbit was dropped by parachute, the "bomber" crews were free to take the war to the enemy. With the aid of moonlight, Det. 2 crews soon became adept at locating truck convoys moving south under cover of darkness to avoid allied airstrikes. By attacking at extremely low altitudes, their accuracy against convoys was phenomenal. From these attacks, it was learned that communist commanders were ordered to avoid detection at all costs, even after being fired upon. Thus the convoy attacks were usually met without any response. Many of these missions were flown by Major (later Brigadier General) Harry C. Aderholt.
  The November 1950 Communist Chinese intervention into the Korean War was first detected by Det. 2 aircraft, when it saw thousands of troops, trucks, on the ground in Manchuria, on the Chinese side of the Yalu River. This intelligence, however, was not taken seriously and, as history shows, the massive Chinese attack took the UN Command in Korea by surprise. Also, Det 2's "bomber" operations were ordered to be immediately shut down when UN headquarters was made aware of a plan to attack the headquarters of the Soviet Advisory staff in North Korea.
caption: USAF and Army officers coordinating a "Special Air Mission" with their South Korean counterparts during the Korean War, 1951. Major Harry C. Aderholt is second from right, in the fur-collared flight jacket.
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