page_title: Order of battle
section_title: United States Army
hierarchical_section_title: Order of battle / Historical approaches / United States Army
caption_attribution_description: English: US Army 1st Infantry Division Structure in 1989
context_page_description: In modern use, the order of battle of an armed force participating in a military operation or campaign shows the hierarchical organization, command structure, strength, disposition of personnel, and equipment of units and formations of the armed force. Various abbreviations are in use, including OOB, O/B, or OB, while ORBAT remains the most common in the United Kingdom. An order of battle is distinct from a table of organisation, which is the intended composition of a given unit or formation according to the military doctrine of its armed force. Historically, an order of battle was the order in which troops were positioned relative to the position of the army commander or the chronological order in which ships were deployed in naval situations.
  As combat operations develop during a campaign, orders of battle may be revised and altered in response to the military needs and challenges. Also the known details of an order of battle may change during the course of executing the commanders' after action reports and/or other accounting methods as combat assessment is conducted.
context_section_description: In United States Army standing operating procedures, an order of battle to be used for operations planning should relate what an Army unit might be expected to encounter while deployed in the field. The templating of the OoB during maneuvers is typically the responsibility of a battalion or brigade commander, conducted through their Headquarters S-2 (intelligence) sections. Observations about enemy troop movements may be gathered by various military intelligence resources from all echelons, including the employment of any attached special forces units (such as Rangers or LRS teams) as well as Cavalry RSTA squadrons.
  From such intelligence data, the OOB section staff compiles a likely order of battle for a planning document or operations order by assessing the following factors:
  Enemy's Composition, Disposition, Strength (often mnemonicized with SALUTE: Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment):
  Composition: the command structure and organisation of headquarters and subunits
  Disposition: geographical locations of unit headquarters and subunits
  Strength expressed in units and weight of fire delivered by its weapon systems
  Enemy capabilities and limitations (often mnemonicized with DRAWD: Defend, Reinforce, Attack, Withdraw, Delay):
  Personnel training
  Logistics: how the enemy unit obtains its supplies and lines of communication
  Combat Effectiveness using complex algorithms and combat modelling applications
  Electronic Technical Data used to provide data for the combat modelling applications
  Enemy's Most Likely Course of Action (EMLCOA):
  Tactics used by the enemy unit
  Miscellaneous data related to specific task, mission or operations
  Personalities (known enemy personnel and their behaviour, often based on communications intelligence analysis)
  Unit history used to judge expected performance based on its past performance
  Uniforms and insignia to enable confirmation of the above data
  A general rule in American military doctrine is that each unit should keep track of enemy subunits two echelons below its own: that is, a division should monitor enemy units confronting it down to the battalion, a brigade should monitor enemy units down to companies, and a battalion should monitor enemy forces down to platoons. General George S. Patton was one of the first to recommend this practice.
  The United States military's intelligence capabilities in the 21st century have allowed for monitoring even further than two echelons down the chain of command.  It is quite common for US forces at the battalion level to be able to identify the location and activities of not only enemy forces at the squad level but even individual vehicles.  This situational awareness provides a more complete picture of the battlespace for both combatant commanders and tactical commanders.
  Up until the end of the Cold War, determining realistic orders of battle was generally an orderly but extremely frustrating process for NATO. Although the Warsaw Pact nations had well known doctrines, tactics, techniques and procedures; the characteristics of Soviet forces fluctuated often, significantly, and changes often went undetected for years at below-division levels. The intelligence situation for Western militaries has been exacerbated today as they continue to be become engaged in operations against non-traditional enemies (insurgents, guerrillas, etc.) and compiling orders of battle for irregular forces becomes very difficult; the equivalent military intelligence output requiring an increase in acquired data and analysis effort to provide an accurate and timely picture to the commander.
caption: US 1st Infantry Division ORBAT in 1989
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