page_title: Attorney General for Quebec v. Queen Insurance Company
section_title: Decision of the Judicial Committee
hierarchical_section_title: Attorney General for Quebec v. Queen Insurance Company / Decision of the Judicial Committee
caption_attribution_description: English: Portrait of Sir George Jessel, seated three-quarter-length in a wig and the robes of Master of the Rolls, holding a book.
context_page_description: Attorney General for Quebec v. Queen Insurance Company is a Canadian constitutional law decision dealing with the taxation and licensing powers of the provinces under the federal-provincial division of powers.
  The case concerned a Quebec statute which imposed a licence fee on insurance companies. The issue was whether the fee exceeded provincial authority under the British North America Act, 1867. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Britain, at that time the court of last resort for Canada within the British Empire, held that the statute was unconstitutional.
  This was the first case where the Judicial Committee considered the scope of provincial taxation powers and licensing powers under the Constitution Act, 1867. It was also the first case where the Judicial Committee held that a provincial statute was unconstitutional under the division of powers.
context_section_description: The Attorney General for Quebec then appealed the case to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Britain, the court of last resort for Canada within the British Empire.  (At that time, appeals could go to the Judicial Committee directly from the provincial courts, bypassing the Supreme Court of Canada.)  Judah P. Benjamin, QC and John Rigby were counsel for the Attorney General, while the insurance company was represented by Mr Kay, QC and R.W. Gibbs.
  The Judicial Committee dismissed the appeal from the bench, without calling on counsel for the insurance company.   Sir George Jessell, Master of the Rolls, gave the decision for the Committee. He agreed with the Quebec courts that the province did not have the power to impose the fee.  Reviewing the Act, he concluded that it was not really a licensing act at all, as there was no penalty for not taking out a licence, and no prohibition on carrying on business without a licence. The policies issued by an unlicensed insurance company were valid, provided they had a stamp on them.  He concluded that the only purpose of the Act was to raise a revenue.  The province therefore could not rely on s. 92(9) of the Constitution Act, 1867 in support of the Act.
  The sole question was whether the fee under the Act was direct or indirect taxation, as s. 92(2) provides that the provinces can only impose direct taxes.   Jessel concluded that there was ample authority to conclude that a stamp fee of this type was a form of indirect taxation.  It was therefore beyond the provincial power to enact, and the Act was unconstitutional.
  Since the case could be decided on the basis that the Act exceeded provincial jurisdiction, the Committee did not need to consider the interplay between provincial powers under s. 92 and federal powers under s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
caption: Sir George Jessel, Master of the Rolls, who wrote the decision that the Act was unconstitutional
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