page_title: American logistics in the Normandy campaign
section_title: Shipping
hierarchical_section_title: American logistics in the Normandy campaign / Build-up / Shipping
caption_attribution_description: English: Crane transferring cargo from a DUKW
context_page_description: American logistics in the Normandy campaign played a key role in the success of Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of northwest Europe during World War II that commenced on D-Day, 6 June 1944. The Services of Supply was formed in May 1942 under the command of Major General John C. H. Lee to provide logistical support. From February 1944 on, SOS was increasingly referred to as the Communications Zone. Between May 1942 and May 1944, Operation Bolero, the buildup of American troops and supplies in the UK, proceeded fitfully, and by June 1944 1,526,965 US troops were in the UK, of whom 459,511 were part of the COMZ.
  The Overlord plan called for the early capture of Cherbourg, and a rapid American advance to secure the Brittany ports and Quiberon Bay. Crucially, the logistical plan called for a one-month pause at the Seine River, which was expected to be reached by D plus 90, before advancing further. The expectation of an advance at a proscribed rate, while necessary for planning purposes, built inflexibility into a logistics plan that already had little margin for error. Staff studies confirmed that Overlord could be supported if everything went according to plan.
context_section_description: Build up priority lists had been drawn up months in advance that specified in what order units were to embark for Normandy during the first ninety days. To regulate the movement of ships and landing craft with maximum economy, a special organization was established called Build Up Control (BUCO). This operated under the tactical commanders, the First Army in the US case, on the British committee system, with representatives of the Allied Naval Commander, Ministry of War Transport and War Shipping Administration. BUCO was chaired by British Brigadier G. C. Blacker, with Lieutenant Colonel Eli Stevens as the head of the US Zone Staff. It had three subordinate agencies: Movement Control (MOVCO), which issued orders for unit movements; Turnaround Control (TURCO), which liaised with the Navy and engineer special brigades; and Embarkation Control (EMBARCO), which handled the location of units and the availability of space in the marshaling areas.
  The detailed shipping plan soon fell apart. Very little cargo was landed on the first day, putting Overlord behind schedule from the start. By midnight on 8 June, only 6,614 measurement tons (7,492 m³) of the planned 24,850 long tons (25,250 t) had been discharged, just 26.6 percent of the planned total. This rose to 28,100 long tons (28,600 t) of the planned 60,250 long tons (61,220 t), or 46 percent of the planned total by midnight on 10 June. Emergency beach dumps were established by the engineer special brigades on 7 and 8 June, and the planned inland dumps were opened over the next few days. The dumps were under sniper fire, and on 10 June artillery ammunition was taken from its boxes and carried by hand to the batteries. A consolidated ammunition dump was established at Formigny on 12 June, and the First Army immediate took change of it. The following day it assumed control of all dumps from the engineer special brigades.
  The standard cargo vessel, the Liberty ship, carried up to 11,000 long tons (11,000 t) of cargo. It had five hatches; two had 50-long-ton (51 t) booms, and three with smaller 6-to-9-long-ton (6.1 to 9.1 t) booms. In their haste to unload the ships, the crews overloaded the booms, occasionally resulting in breakages. Cargo was not containerized, but transported in bulk in bags, boxes, crates and barrels. Cargo nets were spread out on the deck, and cargo piled on them. They were then lifted over the side on the ship's boom, and deposited in a waiting craft.
  One of the most useful unloading craft was the Rhino ferry, a powered barge constructed from pontons. The other mainstay of the unloading effort was the 2.5-measurement-ton (2.8 m³) amphibious truck known as the DUKW (and pronounced "duck"). DUKWs were supposed to land on D-Day, but most were held offshore and arrived the following day. The Omaha and Utah beaches remained under sporadic artillery and sniper fire for several days, and as a result the naval officer in charge would not permit ships to anchor close to shore on the first two days. Some were as much as 12 to 15 miles (19 to 24 km) offshore. This increased turnaround time for the unloading craft, especially the DUKWs, which were slow in the water. In some cases, DUKWs ran out of fuel. When this happened, their pumps failed, and they sank.
  The unloading craft were frequently overloaded, increasing wear and tear, and occasionally causing them to capsize. Ideally, a DUKW reaching the shore would be met by a mobile crane that could transfer the load to a waiting truck that could take it to the dump, but there were shortages of both trucks and cranes in the early weeks, and DUKWs had to take cargo to the dumps themselves. Insufficient personnel at the dumps for unloading further slowed turnaround, as did the practice of crews whose priority was getting the ship unloaded, of unloading more than one category of supply at once, resulting in a trip to more than one dump. This was resolved only when ships started being loaded with one category of supply only. Cargo was deposited on the beach at low tide, and if not swiftly cleared was likely to be swamped by t
caption: Crane transferring cargo from a DUKW
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