page_title: Lesley J. McNair
section_title: Hawaiian Department
hierarchical_section_title: Lesley J. McNair / Post-World War I / Hawaiian Department
caption_attribution_description: English: Lesley J. McNair testimony at 1925 Billy Mitchell court-martial
context_page_description: Lesley James McNair was a senior United States Army officer who served during World War I and World War II. He attained the rank of lieutenant general during his life; he was killed in action during World War II, and received a posthumous promotion to general.
  A Minnesota native and 1904 graduate of the United States Military Academy, McNair was a Field Artillery officer with a background in the Ordnance Department. A veteran of the Veracruz occupation and Pancho Villa Expedition, during World War I he served as assistant chief of staff for training with the 1st Division, and then chief of artillery training on the staff at the American Expeditionary Forces headquarters. His outstanding performance resulted in his promotion to temporary brigadier general; at age 35, he was the Army's youngest general officer.
  McNair's experience of more than 30 years with equipment and weapons design and testing, his administrative skills, and his success in the areas of military education and training led to his World War II assignment as commander of Army Ground Forces. In this position, McNair became the "unsung architect of the U.S.
context_section_description: In 1921, McNair was posted to Fort Shafter and assigned as assistant chief of staff for operations (G-3) at the headquarters of the Army's Hawaiian Department.  While in Hawaii, he became a participant in the Army's ongoing debate over the best methods for providing coastal defense, which engaged proponents of the Coast Artillery branch and Army Air Service.  Assigned to the project by Hawaiian Department commander Major General Charles Pelot Summerall because of his reputation for objectivity in carrying out analysis and experimentation with military weapons and equipment, McNair created a committee made up of himself, two coast artillery officers, and an aviation officer to investigate the strengths and weaknesses of the two branches, especially with regard to defending Army and Navy bases on Oahu, and make recommendations on the best way to employ coast artillery and military aircraft.
  The McNair board carried out numerous tests of coast artillery and bomber aircraft in a variety of conditions, and compiled tables and charts to depict the results.  The panel concluded that coastal artillery was sufficient for shore defense, provided that adequate listening and lighting equipment for detecting and illuminating enemy ships and planes was available, and that bombers were less accurate, but more effective at destroying enemy ships at longer distances from shore, provided they could overcome obstacles including inclement weather.
  In addition to his work on the coastal defense problem, McNair was also responsible for directing a review of War Plan Orange, the Army and Navy joint defense plan for countering an attack on Hawaii by Japan. This possibility was a major concern of U.S. military leaders during the years between World War I and World War II.  Among McNair's contributions to updating this plan was the creation of several contingency plans ("branches and sequels" in Army parlance) to augment the main war plan.  These contingency plans included: using chemical weapons to defend against a Japanese attack, declaring martial law in Hawaii, and determining how to maintain a defense against Japanese invaders while waiting for reinforcements from the U.S. mainland.
  In 1924 and 1925, McNair and Summerall defended McNair's work when it was criticized during the continuing debate about the future of the Army Air Service.  The head of the Air Service, Major General Mason Patrick, argued that the McNair board's findings underestimated the capabilities of bomber aircraft, and that the data the board had compiled was inaccurate.  In response, Major General Frank W. Coe, the chief of the Coast Artillery Corps, pointed out that McNair's panel included both Coast Artillery and Air Service officers, and that experiments with aircraft had included coast artillery officers as observers.  In addition, the aircrews that participated in the McNair board experiments had the opportunity to provide input and voice concern over the board's methods and conclusions.  Coe concluded his argument by recommending that the McNair board's findings be approved by the Army as its official position on the issue of coastal artillery versus bombers for shore defense.  Coe's recommendation was not followed; subsequent panels and committees continued to investigate and debate the issue.  In addition, the debate continued on the larger question of whether the Air Service should remain a component of the Army or become a separate branch of the military.
  McNair's involvement in the issue continued during the 1925 court-martial of Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, whose zealous advocacy of creating a separate Air Force resulted in accusations of insubordination.  Mitchell based his public assertions about non-aviation officers being ignorant of aviation matters on events he falsely claimed to have witnessed in Hawaii during the McNair board's experiments.  Summerall was so incensed at the questioning of his and McNair's integrity that he attempted to be appointed as president of the court-martial.  During Mitchell's trial, Major General Robert Courtney Davis, th
caption: Newspaper account of McNair testimony at Billy Mitchell's 1925 court-martial
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