page_title: Strategic bombing
section_title: World War II
hierarchical_section_title: Strategic bombing / History and origins / World War II
caption_attribution_description: For documentary purposes the German Federal Archive often retained the original image captions, which may be erroneous, biased, obsolete or politically extreme. Warschau, Luftaufnahme, Zerstörungen II. Weltkrieg 1939-45 Polen, Warschau, Ende Sept. 1939 Zerstörungen durch deutsche Luftangriffe Reproduktionsrechte durch Artur Grimm, Foto-Express Information added by Wikimedia users.English: Warsaw during World War II: destroyed townhouses between Zielna (top) and Marszałkowska streets (bottom). In bottom right corner building Marszałkowska 156 on the corner with Królewskia street, also visible Bloch Palace at Marszałkowska 154. Polski: Warszawa z czasów okupacji: zniszczone kamienice pomiędzy Zielną (góra) a Marszałkowską (dół). W dolnym prawym rogu Marszałkowska 156 róg Królewskiej, dalej Pałac Blocha Marszałkowska 154.
context_page_description: Strategic bombing is a military strategy used in total war with the goal of defeating the enemy by destroying its morale, its economic ability to produce and transport materiel to the theatres of military operations, or both. It is a systematically organized and executed attack from the air which can utilize strategic bombers, long- or medium-range missiles, or nuclear-armed fighter-bomber aircraft to attack targets deemed vital to the enemy's war-making capability.
  One of the strategies of war is to demoralize the enemy, so that peace or surrender becomes preferable to continuing the conflict. Strategic bombing has been used to this end. The phrase "terror bombing" entered the English lexicon towards the end of World War II and many strategic bombing campaigns and individual raids have been described as terror bombing by commentators and historians. Because the term has pejorative connotations, some, including the Allies of World War II, have preferred to use euphemisms such as "will to resist" and "morale bombings".
  The theoretical distinction between tactical and strategic air warfare was developed between the two world wars.
context_section_description: The strategic bombing conducted in World War II was unlike any other previous cases. The campaigns conducted in Europe and Asia could involve aircraft dropping thousands of tons of conventional bombs or a nuclear weapon over a single city.
  The practice of area bombardment came to prominence during World War II with the use of large numbers of unguided gravity bombs, often with a high proportion of incendiary devices, to effect indiscriminate bombing of the target region—either to kill war workers and/or destroy materiel, or as a means to demoralize the enemy. This, in high enough concentration was capable of producing a firestorm effect. The high explosive bombs were often on timers and used to intimidate or kill firemen putting out the fires caused by the incendiaries.
  Initially, this was effected by multiple aircraft, often returning to the target in waves. Nowadays, a large bomber or missile can be used to create the same effect on a small area (an airfield, for example) by releasing a relatively large number of smaller bombs.
  Strategic bombing campaigns were conducted in Europe and Asia. The Germans and Japanese made use of mostly twin-engined bombers with a payload generally less than 5,000 pounds (2,300 kg), and never produced larger craft to any great extent. By comparison, the British and Americans (who started the war with predominantly similarly sized bombers) developed their strategic force based upon much larger four-engined bombers for their strategic campaigns. The payload carried by these planes ranged from 4,000 lb (1,800 kg) for the B-17 Flying Fortress on long-range missions, to 8,000 lb (3,600 kg) for the B-24 Liberator, 14,000 lb (6,400 kg) for the Avro Lancaster, and 20,000 lb (9,000 kg) B-29 Superfortress, with some specialized aircraft, such as the 'Special B' Avro Lancaster carrying (22,000 lb (10,000 kg)) Grand Slam.
  During the first year of the war in Europe, strategic bombing was developed through trial and error. The Luftwaffe had been attacking both civilian and military targets from the very first day of the war, when Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. A strategic-bombing campaign was launched by the Germans as a precursor to the invasion of the United Kingdom to force the RAF to engage the Luftwaffe and so be destroyed either on the ground or in the air. That tactic failed, and the RAF began bombing German cities on 11 May 1940. After the Battle of Britain, the Germans launched their night time Blitz hoping to break British morale and to have the British be cowed into making peace.
  Initially, the Luftwaffe raids took place in daylight, then changed to night bombing attacks when losses became unsustainable. The RAF, initially espousing a precision-bombing doctrine, also switched to night bombing, also due to excessive losses. Before the Rotterdam Blitz on 14 May 1940 the British restricted themselves to tactical bombing west of the Rhine and naval installations. The day after the Rotterdam Blitz a new directive was issued to the RAF to attack targets in the Ruhr, including oil plants and other civilian industrial targets which aided the German war effort, such as blast furnaces that at night were self-illuminating. After the Butt Report (released in September 1941) proved the inadequacy of RAF Bomber Command training methods and equipment, the RAF adopted an area-attack strategy, by which it hoped to detrimentally affect Germany's war production, her powers of resistance (by destroying resources and forcing Germany to divert resources from her front lines to defend her air space), and her morale. The RAF dramatically improved its navigation so that on average its bombs hit closer to target. Accuracy never exceeded a 3 mi (4.8 km) radius from point of aim in any case.
  The United States Army Air Forces adopted a policy of daylight precision bombing for greater accuracy as, for example, during the Schweinfurt raids. That doctrine, based on the erroneous supposition that bombers could adequately defend themselves against air attack, entailed much higher American losses until long-range 
caption: Destroyed townhouses in Warsaw after the German Luftwaffe bombing of the city, September 1939
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