page_title: Unification Decree (Spain, 1937)
section_title: Immediate aftermath
hierarchical_section_title: Unification Decree (Spain, 1937) / Immediate aftermath
caption_attribution_description: Español: Fotografía que muestra la entrada de los vencedores en San Sebastián en 1939. Se distingue en primera fila a Ramón Serrano Suñer y Pilar Primo de Rivera, primero y segunda por la derecha.
context_page_description: The Unification Decree was a political measure adopted by Francisco Franco in his capacity of Head of State of Nationalist Spain on April 19, 1937. The decree merged two existing political groupings, the Falangists and the Carlists, into a new party - the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista. As all other parties were declared dissolved at the same time, the FET became the only legal party in Nationalist Spain. It was defined in the decree as a link between state and society and was intended to form the basis for an eventual totalitarian regime. The head of state – Franco himself – was proclaimed party leader, to be assisted by the Junta Política and Consejo Nacional. A set of decrees which followed shortly after appointed members to the new executive.
  The merger was imposed upon the Falange Española de las JONS and the Carlist Comunión Tradicionalista.
context_section_description: Terms of the unification came as unpleasant if not nasty surprise to most Falangist and Carlist politicians, especially that they differed from earlier sketchy plans presented by Franco to Hedilla and Rodezno. The Falangists might have been satisfied with their apparent predominance in terms of program and symbols, yet except Hedilla none of their heavyweights was appointed to Junta Política. The “legitimists” – Dávila, Aznar, Moreno – were in prison following the Salamanca events of April 16–17; Hedilla himself, misled by Franco that he would be appointed the leader, was shocked to find himself just one of 10 Junta members and on April 23 he refused to take his seat. He was almost immediately arrested, trialed, sentenced to death on inflated charges of treason, commuted and placed in prison. To Rodezno the terms came as a bucket of cold water. In few days he and his men visited Franco to voice their unease, yet they remained tractable and did not mount explicit protest or opposition. Some key Carlist politicians resigned, including the requeté head Zamanillo; the Carlist tycoons from the onset skeptical about the merger welcomed the decree with deafening silence.
  Among local leaders and the rank-and-file the prevailing mood was this of disorientation. Many tended to view the news as introduction of some vague bureaucratic structure above the existing Falangist and Carlist organizations. Most did not realize the arbitrary nature of unification and believed that it was fully agreed and endorsed by their respective leaders, especially that the official propaganda and censorship clearly advanced such a narrative. In Falangist ranks – which consisted in overwhelming majority of new recruits unrelated to pre-war revolutionary syndicalism – the unification was viewed simply as absorption of Carlism and adoption of new leadership, though a number of Falangist public demonstrations against the unification took place in several cities. In Carlist ranks the mood differed from sheer enthusiasm to protest; some requeté units considered abandoning their frontline positions. Many settled for what they perceived a truce comparable to that offered by Carlos VII to the Madrid government in course of the Spanish–American War. Most other politicians complied; Gil-Robles ordered dissolution of Acción Popular while Yanguas and Goicoechea declared their total support; it was only the JAP commander Luciano de la Calzada who protested and was condemned to internal exile. Many party papers demonstrated perhaps genuine enthusiasm, while various juntas, alcaldias and other groups flooded the Franco Salamanca headquarters with messages of adhesion. 
  First steps to consolidate the new party were taken in late April and May 1937, though their mechanism is not entirely clear; it remains obscure whether they were engineered by administration or by the Junta. Franco initially attended its weekly meetings but soon ceased doing so; it was Serrano who served as a link between him and the party executive. The post of temporary secretary went to López Bassa; other most active figures in the Junta turned out to be Fernando González Vélez (a Falangist old-shirt appointed in place of Hedilla) and Gimenez Caballero. Top provincial party posts were filled with a Carlist and a Falangist alternating as delegado and secretario; 22 provincial jefaturas went to the Falangists and 9 to the Carlists. The Carlist and pre-unification Falange press departments were told to stop party propaganda. By May 9. provincial jefes were demanded to submit inventory of pre-unification party assets and in mid-May the new party started to take over their bank accounts. Also in mid-May specialized sections of the new party started to emerge with personal appointments made, again with visible Falangist predominance, be it Sección Femenina or Milicia Nacional. Civil governors organized rallies supposed to demonstrate fraternization of the unified parties. Official propaganda kept exalting the unification as glorious end to a centuries-old historical process. The first task, given to the n
caption: Carlist and Falangist leaders on common parade
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