page_title: German Radio Intelligence Operations during World War II
section_title: July 1942
hierarchical_section_title: German Radio Intelligence Operations during World War II / Intercept operations during World War II / Soviet Front 1941–1945 / July 1942
context_page_description: German Radio Intelligence Operation were signals intelligence operations that were undertaken by German Axis forces in Europe during World War II. In keeping with German signals practice since 1942, the term communication intelligence had been used when intercept units were assigned to observe both enemy radio and wire communication. When the observation of only enemy radio communication was undertaken, the term was radio intelligence. The term intercept service was also used up until 1942.
context_section_description: Radio intelligence produced hardly any results during the German attack (Eastern Front, Don, Volga, and Caucasus: Summer 1942) across the Donets in July 1942, the objective or which was to reach the Don between Rostov and Voronezh. The Russian divisions appeared to be withdrawing, during the course of which movement radio silence was maintained. At that time it was not even possible to identify the stations in the higher-echelon command belt, the observation of which had always yielded good results. Soviet radio traffic on the northern Don front seemed to be under the supervision of a particularly capable individual.
  The Sixth Army was making preparations for an offensive against the corridor between the Don and Volga River in the direction of Stalingrad (Volgograd), while the 17th Army was pulled out of the front and assigned to the newly arrived headquarters of Army Group A under Field Marshal Wilhelm List. This army group was supposed to seize the Caucasus. That zone of the Don front which had previously been held by the 17th Army, was taken over by the Hungarian Second Army in the north, the Italian 8th Army in the centre, and the Romanian Third Army in the south. The three mentioned armies had weak long-range Radio Intercept units, whose efficiency varied. The Hungarians were capable of performing limited independent missions, whereas the Romanians could not be entrusted with any such missions.
  The Romanian 4th Army adjacent to the right wing of the German 6th Army had no communication intelligence unit whatever. The Hungarians, Italians, and Romanians were unfamiliar with short-range operations and lacked any understanding of inter-army co-operation in the pursuit of radio intelligence missions.  The Italians were inclined to theorize about radio intelligence results instead of subjecting them to careful analysis. Characteristic of their methods was the fact that they made it a practice to use Soviet prisoners of war as radio intercept operators.
  To achieve greater security the 57th Long-Range RI Company was stationed behind the Hungarian and Italian Armies in Novy Oskol, with a D/F base line along the upper Don. The 3rd Long-Range RI Company was moved up to the vicinity of Kamianske (Kamenskaya) and ordered to cover the area in the path of the German 6th Army and the Romanian Fourth and Third Armies. The 7th Long-Range RI Company was moved close to the new headquarters of Army Group South in Starobilsk. Its mission was to cover either the northern or the southern zone of advance, according to how the enemy radio picture developed. As the result of repeated requests, the 26th Long-Range RI Company, which had so far been held at the disposal of OKH finally arrived at Mariupol and Taganrog, from where it was to cover the Kuban and Caucasus areas exclusively. The newly organised short-range companies were committed in the German 6th Army sector.
  The new mission was in accordance with the orders issued in July and August 1942 by the two army group headquarters, which did not limit the depth of the intercept area. As soon as Army Group A assumed command in the south, the Commander of Communications Intelligence (six) was to take charge of the 3rd and 26th Long-Range Companies, as well as of the short-range RI company of the 17th Army.
caption: Map of the Eastern Front, 5 May 1941 to  5 May 1942
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