page_title: Hans Jeschonnek
section_title: War on the Soviet Union
hierarchical_section_title: Hans Jeschonnek / World War II / War on the Soviet Union
caption_attribution_description: Русский: Аэрофотосъёмка города Горького с указанием целей для бомбардировок: A — Железобетонный (Плашкоутный) мост (5 опор, расстояние между опорами ~120м, длина 740м, ширина 21м); B - Кремль (1 - Дом Советов, 2 - Военная школа, 3 - Арсенал); С - Ярмарка (1 - Главный Дом, 2 - Биржа). Мельница обведена белой сплошной линией. English: Aerial photography of the Gorky city with targets for the bombing: A — Reinforced (pontoon) bridge (5 poles, the distance between the supports ~ 120m, length 740m, width 21m); B - Kremlin (1 - Government House, 2 - Military school, 3 - Arsenal); С - Fair (1 - Main House, 2 - Exchange). Mill - white solid line. Deutsch: Luftaufnahmen der Stadt Gorki mit Zielvorgaben für die Bombardierung: A — EisenbetonBrücke (Paschkoutnyj-Most) (5 Pfeiler, Pfeilerabstand ca 120m, Länge 740m, Breite 21m); B - Kreml (1 - Freiheitspalast, 2 - Militärschule, 3 - Arsenal); С - Messestadt (1 - Hauptgebäude, 2 - Hauptgebäude). Dampfmühle - eine feste weiße Linie.
context_page_description: Hans Jeschonnek was a German military aviator in the Luftstreitkräfte during World War I, a general staff officer in the Reichswehr in the inter–war period and Generaloberst and a Chief of the General Staff in the Luftwaffe, the aerial warfare branch of the Wehrmacht during World War II.
  He was born in 1899 and joined the military as a cadet 1909. Training as an officer at a military academy eventually in 1914 he was granted his commission and served in the infantry on the Western Front. In 1916 he transferred to the Luftstreitkräfte, trained as a fighter pilot. Jeschonnek shot down two enemy aircraft by the time of the German defeat in November 1918 earning the Iron Cross 2nd and 1st class.
  Jeschonnek remained in the military, joining the Reichswehr, the Weimar Republic armed forces. He fought in the Silesian Uprisings in 1919 and then served as a junior general staff officer in the 1920s. In 1933 the National Socialists seized power in Germany under the leadership of Adolf Hitler.
context_section_description: On 22 June 1941 the Wehrmacht commenced Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union. Before the campaign began, Jeschonnek remarked, "at last a proper war!" The chief of the general staff had paid minimal attention to the attrition that had taken place in the Battle of Britain and preceding Battle of France. The decision to attack the largest nation in the world with an air force that quantitatively was the same size as it had been the previous year and that was weaker in crew experience and training, was to prove a grave error. On 27 February 1941, Jeschonnek informed Franz Halder that the aircraft to airspace ratio was low and that only essential areas could be guaranteed air support. In turn, the OKW warned the army field commanders to expect greater exposure to enemy air attacks than in future campaigns.
  The campaign opened with successes. The Red Air Force suffered debilitating losses, and the German army advanced to the outskirts of Leningrad, Rostov and Moscow. By the end of 1941 it was clear Barbarossa had failed. Luftwaffe combat strength was precarious. In bombing power the Luftwaffe had hardly any capability left. In December 1941, the bomber force possessed only 47.1 percent of its authorized strength; only 51 percent of that force was in commission. Thus, from an authorised strength of 1,950 bombers, the Luftwaffe had only 468 in commission on 6 December 1941, or 24 percent of authorised aircraft. Overall strength fell from 3,451 in June to 2,749 in December 1941. Udet, Göring and Jeschonnek all shared a proportion of the blame.
  Milch's 1942 production program, the "Göring program," was predicated on a Soviet defeat. The army's failure at Moscow created difficulties in increasing aircraft production. Hitler ordered industry to abandon the plan as army losses and operations continued on the Eastern Front. Milch told Jeschonnek this signalled a reduction in productive capability in the aircraft industry; and more difficulties in finding labour and raw materials.
  Milch replaced Udet after the latter's suicide and strove to increase production. In the OKL, there remained considerable scepticism as to the size of the plan. In March 1942, Jeschonnek objected to Milch's call for increases in fighter production. Jeschonnek purportedly said, "I do not know what I should do with more than 360 fighters!" By June 1942, Jeschonnek had modified his view and agreed on a need for a monthly production of at least 900 fighters by the winter of 1943/44. One historian wrote, "in view of the attrition rates of 1940 and 1941, Jeschonnek's March comment can only be described as remarkable." Jeschonnek maintained the Luftwaffe was an offensive weapon and though he sympathised with Adolf Galland, General der Jagdflieger, he continued to build assault units and develop ground-attack pilots at the expense of the Jadgwaffe. Jeschonnek was firmly of the view that the defeat of the Soviet Union, not air defence, was the prerequisite to a successful prosecution of the war. Hitler and Göring supported the dominance of the bomber over fighter production. 
  Through 1942, the size of the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front diminished. In mid-November the Battle of Stalingrad headed towards disaster when several Axis armies were encircled. In an attempt to regain lost prestige, Göring assured Hitler the armies could be supplied by air. Jeschonnek and the general staff agreed to the airlift with scarcely a comment. On the 24 November Richthofen noted a series of conversations in which he urged an immediate breakout. Jeschonnek apparently had no opinion. His silence ensured the OKH received no air staff support in its effort to persuade Hitler to abandon Stalingrad and left the air arm with an impossible task of re-supplying the army in the pocket.
  It transpired that Hitler and Jeschonnek had met at the Berghof days before to discuss the matter. Jeschonnek assured Hitler that the Demyansk pocket could be repeated with adequate aircraft and airfields. Hitler preferred to keep the army in Stalingrad and order Manstein to break into the city, 
caption: German photograph of Gorki, 13 June 1943
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