page_title: Hezbollah armed strength
section_title: Launch sites
hierarchical_section_title: Hezbollah armed strength / Infrastructure / Launch sites
caption_attribution_description: August 26, 2006 IDF forces operating in the Western Sector of southern Lebanon found a stockpile of weaponry, including anti-tank missiles and launchers. Pictured: A rocket launcher hidden underground
context_page_description: Hezbollah has the armed strength of a medium-sized army. Hezbollah is generally considered the most powerful non-state actor in the world, and to be stronger than the Lebanese Army. A hybrid force, the group maintains "robust conventional and unconventional military capabilities." The party's fighting strength has grown substantially since the 2006 Lebanon War.
  Hezbollah does not reveal its manpower and estimates vary widely. In 2017, Jane's assessed that Hezbollah had more than 25,000 full-time fighters and perhaps 20,000–30,000 reservists. They are financed in part by Iran and trained by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Hezbollah's military budget runs about one billion dollars per year.
  Hezbollah's military strength is somewhat based on the quantity and quality of the rockets they possess, which they use against their primary enemy, Israel. The group's strategy against Israel uses rockets as offensive weaponry combined with light infantry and anti-armor units to defend their firing positions in southern Lebanon. Estimates of Hezbollah's total rocket count range from 40,000 to 150,000, which is considerably more than most countries.
context_section_description: Hezbollah has hundreds of launch sites for its rockets throughout southern Lebanon, an increase from 200 to 300 launch sites in 2006. Spare rockets and equipment are stored in civilian houses and bunkers. Most rockets are moved from storage to firing position by one team, and fired by another. Hezbollah rocket teams were given giving simple mission-type instructions to maintain rocket fire on Israel and often operated independently for the duration of the 2006 war. Tactically, Hezbollah managed to fire Katyusha rockets as regularly as they had planned, and their rocket teams were determined and had good logistics. However, the rockets failed to have a coercive strategic effect on Israel, and did not end the war.
  Hezbollah sappers have built large numbers of presurveyed and prepared launching positions for rockets to use in war. A skeleton crew quickly moves rockets into position and fires them singly or in bulk with minimal logistical support. Some rockets are hidden underground with pneumatic lifts to raise and fire them or launched from trucks. Although Israel can target the launch sites within minutes of a launch, the IDF in 2006 could generally not destroy launch sites before use and therefore could not stop the rain of rocket attacks.
caption: An underground Katyusha rocket launcher in southern Lebanon, camouflaged by dense brush.
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