page_title: Rif War
section_title: Spanish forces
hierarchical_section_title: Rif War / Forces involved / Spanish forces
caption_attribution_description: Español: El general Manuel Fernández Silvestre junto con otros oficiales del Ejército Español en las proximidades de Melilla
context_page_description: The Rif War was an armed conflict fought from 1920 to 1927 between the colonial power Spain and the Berber tribes of the Rif mountainous region of Morocco. Led by Abd el-Krim, the Riffians at first inflicted several defeats on the Spanish forces by using guerrilla tactics and captured European weapons. After France's military intervention against Abd el-Krim's forces and the major landing of Spanish troops at Al Hoceima, considered the first amphibious landing in history to involve the use of tanks and aircraft, Abd el-Krim surrendered to the French and was taken into exile.
  In July 1909 Spanish workers constructing a rail-bridge providing access to iron mines near Melilla were attacked by Rifian tribesmen. This incident led to the summoning of reinforcements from Spain itself. A series of skirmishes over the following weeks cost the Spanish over a thousand casualties. By September the Spanish Army had 40,000 troops in Northern Morocco and had occupied the tribal regions to the south and southeast of Melilla.
  The military operations in Jebala, in the Moroccan West, began in 1911 with the Larache Landing.
context_section_description: Initially, the Spanish forces in Morocco were largely composed of conscripts and reservists from Spain itself. These "Peninsular" troops were poorly supplied and prepared, few had marksmanship skills and proper battle training, and widespread corruption was reported amongst the officer corps, reducing supplies and morale. Of the Spanish troops in Morocco in 1921, well over half were completely illiterate conscripts from the poorest elements of Spanish society who had been sent to Morocco with minimal training. Despite Silvestre's assurances that his equipment was sufficient to defeat the Rifians, in fact about three-quarters of the rifles at the Melilla arsenal were in shoddy condition due to poor maintenance, and a report from late 1920, which Silvestre had never bothered to read, warned that many of the rifles held there were either unusable or more of a danger to the soldier firing them than to the enemy.
  
  The average Spanish soldier in Morocco in 1921 was paid the equivalent of thirty-four US cents per day, and lived on a simple diet of coffee, bread, beans, rice and the odd piece of meat. Many soldiers bartered their rifles and ammunition at the local markets in exchange for fresh vegetables. The barracks that the soldiers lived in were unsanitary and medical care at the few hospitals very poor. Up in the mountains, Spanish soldiers lived in small outposts known as blocaos, which the American historian Stanley Payne observed: "Many of these lacked any sort of toilet, and the soldier who ventured out of the filthy bunker risked exposure to the fire of lurking tribesmen". 
   Continuing a practice first begun in Cuba, corruption flourished amongst the venal Spanish officer corps, with goods meant for the troops being sold on the black market and the funds intended to build roads and railroads in Morocco ending up in the pockets of senior officers. A high number of Spanish officers could not read maps, which explains why Spanish units so frequently got lost in the Rif mountains. In general, studying war was not considered to be a good use of an officer's time, and most officers devoted their time in Melilla in words of the American journalist James Perry to "gambling and whoring, sometimes molesting the native Moorish women". Morale in the Army was extremely poor and most Spanish soldiers just wanted to go home and leave Morocco forever. Because of the prostitutes from Spain, who attached themselves in great number to the Spanish bases in Morocco, venereal diseases were rampant in the Spanish Army. Silvestre was well aware of the poor morale of his soldiers, but he did not regard this as a problem, believing that his enemy was so inferior that the problems afflicting his troops were not an issue.
  Even with their numerical superiority, the "Peninsular" troops proved no match for the highly skilled and motivated Rifian forces. Accordingly, much reliance came to be placed on the mainly professional units comprising Spain's Army of Africa. Since 1911, these had included regiments of Moroccan Regulares, who proved to be excellent soldiers. 
  
  The initiative was unpopular in parts of Spain as well. In 1909, during early conflicts with the Rif tribesmen, an attempt by the Spanish government to call up reservists led to a working class uprising in Barcelona known as Tragic Week. The Catalan trade unions, many led by anarchists, argued that the working class of Barcelona had no quarrel with the people of the Rif.
   After the Tragic Week of 1909, the Spanish government starting in 1911 tried to raise as many Regular units as possible to avoid further working class resistance to colonial wars as much of the Spanish working class had no desire to see their sons sent to Morocco, beginning a policy of what the Spanish historian Jose Alvarez called "Moroccanizing" the conquest of the Rif. Following the difficulties and setbacks that it had experienced in 1909-11, the Spanish army began to adopt much in organization and tactics from the French North African forces garrisoning most of Morocco and neighboring Algeria. Particular attention w
caption: General Silvestre in Melilla, 1921.
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