page_title: John Fisher, 1st Baron Fisher
section_title: Mediterranean Fleet
hierarchical_section_title: John Fisher, 1st Baron Fisher / Admiral (1890–1902) / Mediterranean Fleet
caption_attribution_description: English: Phograph of Jackie Fisher as C-in-C Portsmouth, 1904 (according to caption.)
context_page_description: John Arbuthnot Fisher, 1st Baron Fisher, GCB, OM, GCVO, commonly known as Jacky or Jackie Fisher, was a British Admiral of the Fleet known for his efforts at naval reform. He had a huge influence on the Royal Navy in a career spanning more than 60 years, starting in a navy of wooden sailing ships armed with muzzle-loading cannon and ending in one of steel-hulled battlecruisers, submarines and the first aircraft carriers. The argumentative, energetic, reform-minded Fisher is often considered the second most important figure in British naval history, after Lord Nelson.
  Fisher is primarily celebrated as an innovator, strategist and developer of the navy rather than a seagoing admiral involved in major battles, although in his career he experienced all these things. When appointed First Sea Lord in 1904, he removed 150 ships then on active service which were no longer useful and set about constructing modern replacements, creating a modern fleet prepared to meet Germany during the First World War.
context_section_description: Unlike the North Atlantic station, the Mediterranean Fleet was a vital British command operating from Malta and Gibraltar. The important shipping route between India and Britain passed through the Suez Canal, and was considered threatened by France. France was concerned with the route north–south to its colonies in Northern Africa. Fisher retained his flagship from the North American Squadron, HMS Renown, rather than choosing a more powerful but slower traditional battleship, despite criticism from other officers.
  His strategy emphasised the importance of striking the first blow, but with an awareness that sunk ships could not easily be replaced, and would replace any officer who could not keep up with the standards he demanded. He gave lectures on naval strategy to which all officers were invited and once again encouraged his officers to bring ideas to him. He offered prizes for essays on tactics and maintained a large tabletop map room with models of all ships in the fleet, where all officers could come to develop tactics. A particular concern was the threat of torpedoes, which Germany had boasted would dispose of the British fleet, and the numerous French torpedo boats. Fisher's innovations were not universally approved, with some senior officers resenting the attention he paid to their juniors, or the pressure he placed on all to improve efficiency.
  A programme of realistic exercises was adopted including simulated French raids, defensive manoeuvres, night attacks and blockades, all carried out at maximum speed. He introduced a gold cup for the ship which performed best at gunnery, and insisted upon shooting at greater range and from battle formations. He found that he too was learning some of the complications and difficulties of controlling a large fleet in complex situations, and immensely enjoyed it.
  Notes from his lectures indicate that, at the start of his time in the Mediterranean, useful working ranges for heavy guns without telescopic sights were considered to be only 2000 yards, or 3000–4000 yards with such sights, whereas by the end of his time discussion centred on how to shoot effectively at 5000 yards. This was driven by the increasing range of the torpedo, which had now risen to 3000–4000 yards, necessitating ships fighting effectively at greater ranges. At this time he advocated relatively small main armaments on capital ships (some had 15 inch or greater), because the improved technical design of the relatively small (10 inch) modern guns allowed a much greater firing rate and greater overall weight of broadside. The potentially much greater ranges of large guns was not an issue, because no one knew how to aim them effectively at such ranges. He argued that "the design of fighting ships must follow the mode of fighting instead of fighting being subsidiary to and dependent on the design of ships." As regards how officers needed to behave, he commented, " Think and act for yourself is the motto for the future, not Let us wait for orders."
  Lord Hankey, then a marine serving under Fisher, later commented, "It is difficult for anyone who had not lived under the previous regime to realize what a change Fisher brought about in the Mediterranean fleet. ... Before his arrival, the topics and arguments of the officers messes ... were mainly confined to such matters as the cleaning of paint and brasswork. ... These were forgotten and replaced by incessant controversies on tactics, strategy, gunnery, torpedo warfare, blockade, etc. It was a veritable renaissance and affected every officer in the navy." Charles Beresford, later to become a severe critic of Fisher, gave up a plan to return to Britain and enter parliament, because he had "learnt more in the last week than in the last forty years."
  Fisher implemented a program of banquets and balls for important dignitaries to improve diplomatic relations. The fleet visited Constantinople, where he had three meetings with the sultan and was awarded the Grand Cordon, Order of Osmanieh in November 1900, and the following year he was promoted to full Admiral on 5 Novem
caption: Fisher as commander of the Mediterranean Fleet 1901
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