page_title: Ernest N. Harmon
section_title: North Africa
hierarchical_section_title: Ernest N. Harmon / World War II / North Africa
caption_attribution_description: English: Major General Ernest N. Harmon. U.S. military personnel in course of his official duties, ineligible for copyright
context_page_description: Major General Ernest Nason Harmon was a senior officer of the United States Army. He served in both World War I and World War II, is best known for his actions in reorganizing the 1st Armored Division after the debacle in February 1943 at Battle of Kasserine Pass during the Tunisia Campaign.
context_section_description: Elements of the 2nd Armored Division began to arrive in Algeria, French North Africa, in November 1942, as part of Operation Torch. Upon landing in Algiers, Harmon was delegated by General Dwight D. "Ike" Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in North Africa, to travel to the front to report on the deteriorating Allied situation in Tunisia and Algeria, and to assist where needed. His on-site reporting and interventions during the Kasserine Pass battles in February 1943 helped stabilize and reorganize the U.S. II Corps, which had been thrown into disorder after the initial German attack.
  During the fighting, Harmon had opportunity to observe Major General Lloyd Fredendall, commander of II Corps, as well as his superior, the British Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson, commander of the British First Army. Anderson was in overall control of the Allied front in eastern Algeria, commanding British, American, and French forces. Harmon noticed that the two generals rarely saw each other, and failed to properly coordinate and integrate forces under their command. Fredendall was barely on speaking terms with his 1st Armored Division commander, Major General Orlando Ward, who had repeatedly complained to his superiors of the dangers of separating his division into weaker combat commands for use in various sectors of the front. Harmon also noticed that Fredendall rarely left his command headquarters, a huge fortified bunker constructed a full 70 miles behind the front lines (the bunker took two hundred Army engineers three weeks to excavate, using hundreds of pounds of explosive to blast rooms out of solid rock). Allied forces were bereft of air support during critical attacks, and were frequently positioned by the senior command in positions where they could not offer mutual support to each other. Subordinates would later recall their utter confusion at being handed conflicting orders, not knowing which general to obey–Anderson, or Fredendall. While interviewing field commanders, Harmon received an earful of criticism over what many Allied officers viewed as a cowardly, confused, and out-of-touch command. Noting that Fredendall seemed out-of-touch (and at one point, intoxicated), he requested and received permission to go to the front and intervene where necessary to shore up Allied defenses.
  While Harmon attributed the lion's share of the blame for the catastrophe to Fredendall, he also began to question Anderson's leadership abilities with respect to a large command. Anderson was partly to blame for the weakness of II Corps in southern area of the front. When Fredendall asked to retire to a defensible line after the initial assault in order to regroup his forces, Anderson rejected the request, allowing German panzer forces to overrun many of the American positions in the south. Anderson also weakened II Corps by parceling out portions of the 1st Armored Division into various combat commands sent to other sectors over the vehement objections of its commander, Major General Ward.
  Major General Harmon had been in Thala on the Algerian border, witnessing the stubborn resistance of the British Nickforce, which held the vital road leading into the Kasserine Pass against the heavy pressure of the German 10th Panzer Division, which was under Rommel's direct command.  Commanding the British Nickforce was Brigadier Cameron Nicholson, an effective combat leader who kept his remaining forces steady under relentless German hammering. When the U.S. 9th Infantry Division's attached artillery arrived in Thala after a four-day, 800-mile march, it seemed like a godsend to Harmon. Inexplicably, the 9th was ordered by Anderson to abandon Thala to the enemy and head for the village of Le Kef, 50 miles away, to defend against an expected German attack. Nicholson pleaded with the American artillery commander, Brigadier General Stafford LeRoy Irwin, to ignore Anderson's order and stay. Harmon agreed with Nicholson and commanded, "Irwin, you stay right here!" The 9th's artillery stayed, and with its 48 guns raining a whole year's worth of a (peacetim
caption: Harmon, pictured here in 1944.
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