page_title: Engineering disasters
section_title: Columbia disaster (2003)
hierarchical_section_title: Engineering disasters / Infamous disasters in engineering / Aeronautics / Columbia disaster (2003)
caption_attribution_description: English: The crew of the final ill-fated flight of the Space Shuttle Columbia, mission STS-107, in October 2001. This is the official crew photograph from mission STS-107 on the Space Shuttle Columbia. From left to right are mission specialist David Brown, commander Rick Husband, mission specialist Laurel Clark, mission specialist Kalpana Chawla, mission specialist Michael Anderson, pilot William McCool, and Israeli payload specialist Ilan Ramon. All were killed when the shuttle disintegrated over Texas in February 2003.
context_page_description: Shortcuts in engineering design can lead to engineering disasters. Engineering is the science and technology used to meet the needs and demands of society. These demands include buildings, aircraft, vessels, and computer software. In order to meet society’s demands, the creation of newer technology and infrastructure must be met efficiently and cost-effectively. To accomplish this, managers and engineers have to have a mutual approach to the specified demand at hand. This can lead to shortcuts in engineering design to reduce costs of construction and fabrication. Occasionally, these shortcuts can lead to unexpected design failures.
context_section_description: The Space Shuttle Columbia (OV-102) disaster occurred on February 1, 2003 during the final leg of STS-107. While reentering Earth's atmosphere over Louisiana and Texas the shuttle unexpectedly disintegrated, resulting in the deaths of all seven astronauts on board. The cause was later discovered to be damage to thermal shielding tiles from impact with a falling piece of foam insulation from an external tank during the January 16 launch. It was the seventh known instance of this particular piece breaking free during launch. As the shuttle re-entered Earth's atmosphere at a speed of Mach 23, the wing experienced temperatures of 2,800 °F (1,540 °C). The damage from the insulation strike experienced during launch proved fatal as the shuttle disintegrated during the mission return. NASA's investigation team found melted aluminum on the thermal tiles and inside edges of the left wing of the spacecraft, supporting the notion that the Columbia's destruction was due to hot gases that penetrated the damaged spot on the wing.
  Roger L. M. Dunbar of New York University and Raghu Garud of Pennsylvania State University procured a case description of what missteps NASA had taken that led to the Columbia spacecraft catastrophe. Mission control deemed that foam shedding was a not a safety factor prior to launch, believed damage of the shuttle panels were not a significant issue which in turn delayed analysis on damages as of January 17, 2003, and denied mission action request between January 18 and 19. It was not until January 24, 2003, that mission control had classified the damage as a problematic issue. These missteps in communication between mission control and the debris assessment team inhibited a proper examination of the damages to the spacecraft.
caption: The crew of the STS-107 mission.
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