page_title: Turkish Airlines Flight 981
section_title: Aftermath
hierarchical_section_title: Turkish Airlines Flight 981 / Aftermath
caption_attribution_description: English: Monument to the 346 victims of the 3 March 1974 crash of Turkish Airlines Flight 981 in Parcel 144 in the centre of the forest Français&#160;: Monument en commémoration des 346 victimes du crash aérien du Vol 981 Turkish Airlines du 3 mars 1974 en ce lieu, parcelle 144 au centre de la forêt. 日本語: トルコ航空DC-10パリ墜落事故現場に建てられた犠牲者の慰霊碑 Türkçe: Kaza kurbanlarının anısına yapılan anıt (Türk Hava Yolları'nın 981 sefer sayılı uçuşu) - Ermenonville Ormanı
context_page_description: Turkish Airlines Flight 981 was a scheduled flight from Istanbul Yesilköy Airport to London Heathrow Airport, with an intermediate stop at Orly Airport in Paris. On 3 March 1974, the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 operating the flight crashed into the Ermenonville Forest, outside Paris, killing all 346 people on board. The crash was also known as the Ermenonville air disaster. At the time, Flight 981 was the deadliest plane crash in aviation history until 27 March 1977, when 583 people perished in the collision of two Boeing 747s in Tenerife. It remained the deadliest single-aircraft accident until the crash of Japan Airlines Flight 123 on 12 August 1985, and the deadliest aviation accident without survivors until the Charkhi Dadri mid-air collision on 12 November 1996. It remains the deadliest single-aircraft accident without survivors. It is also the first fatal and deadliest crash involving the McDonnell Douglas DC-10, as well as the deadliest aviation accident to occur in France.
  The crash occurred when an incorrectly secured cargo door at the rear of the plane burst open and broke off, causing an explosive decompression that severed critical cables necessary to control the aircraft.
context_section_description: Issues related to the latch of the DC-10 include human factors, interface design and engineering responsibility. The control cables for the rear control surfaces of the DC-10 were routed under the floor; therefore, a failure of the hatch resulting in a collapse of the floor could impair the controls. If the hatch were to fail for any reason, there was a high probability the plane would be lost. In addition, Douglas had chosen a new type of latch to seal the cargo hatch. This possibility of catastrophic failure as a result of this overall design was first discovered in 1969 and actually occurred in 1970 in a ground test, both of which McDonnell-Douglas knew about. This information, and the 1972 “Applegate Memo”, came to light in the material supplied to the litigants after the 1974 crash. McDonnell-Douglas had ignored these concerns, because rectification of what Douglas considered to be a small problem with a low probability of occurrence would have seriously disrupted the delivery schedule of the aircraft, likely causing Douglas to lose sales.
  McDonnell-Douglas subsequently faced multiple lawsuits for the crash of Flight 981 by the families of the victims and others. In its defense during pretrial proceedings, McDonnell-Douglas attempted to blame the FAA for not issuing an airworthiness directive, Turkish Airlines for modification of the cargo door locking pins, and General Dynamics for an incorrect cargo door design. When it became clear that its defenses were unlikely to prevent a finding of liability, McDonnell-Douglas and Turkish Arlines and other associated parties settled out-of-court for an estimated $100 million (equivalent to $475 million in 2019), including $80 million from McDonnell-Douglas, of which $18 million was paid by its insurer, Lloyd's of London.
  After the crash of Flight 981, the latching system was completely redesigned to prevent them from moving into the wrong position. The locking system was mechanically upgraded to prevent the handle from being forced into the closed position without the pins actually being in place, and the vent door was altered to be operated by the pins, thereby indicating that the pins themselves, rather than the handle, were in the locked position. Additionally, the FAA ordered further changes to all aircraft with outward-opening doors, including the DC-10, Lockheed L-1011, and Boeing 747.  These changes included requiring vents be cut into the cabin floor to allow pressures to equalize in the event of a blown-out door, thus preventing a catastrophic collapse of the aircraft's cabin floor and other structures that could damage the control cables for the engine, rudder, and elevators.
caption: Monument to the crash victims in Ermenonville Forest
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