page_title: Battle of Pusan Perimeter
section_title: North Korean logistics
hierarchical_section_title: Battle of Pusan Perimeter / Prelude / Logistics / North Korean logistics
caption_attribution_description: US Aircraft attack a North Korean train with rockets and Napalm, 1950
context_page_description: The Battle of the Pusan Perimeter was a large-scale battle between United Nations Command and North Korean forces lasting from August 4 to September 18, 1950. It was one of the first major engagements of the Korean War. An army of 140,000 UN troops, having been pushed to the brink of defeat, were rallied to make a final stand against the invading Korean People's Army, 98,000 men strong.
  UN forces, having been repeatedly defeated by the advancing KPA, were forced back to the "Pusan Perimeter", a 140-mile defensive line around an area on the southeastern tip of South Korea that included the port of Busan. The UN troops, consisting mostly of forces from the Republic of Korea Army, United States, and United Kingdom, mounted a last stand around the perimeter, fighting off repeated KPA attacks for six weeks as they were engaged around the cities of Daegu, Masan, and Pohang and the Nakdong River. The massive KPA assaults were unsuccessful in forcing the UN troops back further from the perimeter, despite two major pushes in August and September.
context_section_description: The North Koreans relied on a logistical system which was very lean and substantially smaller than the UN system. This logistics network was therefore capable of moving far fewer supplies, and this caused considerable difficulty for front-line troops. Based on the efficient Soviet Army model, this ground-based network relied primarily on railroads to transport supplies to the front while troops transported those items to the individual units on foot, trucks, or carts. This second effort, though more versatile, was also a substantial disadvantage because it was less efficient and often too slow to follow the moving front-line units.
  North Korea's lack of large airstrips and aircraft meant it conducted only minimal air resupply, mostly critical items being imported from China. Other than this, however, aircraft played almost no role in North Korean logistics. The North Koreans were also unable to effectively use sea transport. Ports in Wonsan and Hungnam could be used for the transport of some troops and supplies, but they remained far too underdeveloped to support any large-scale logistical movements, and the port of Inchon in the south was difficult to navigate with large numbers of ships.
  In mid-July, the UN Far East Air Force Bomber Command began a steady and increasing campaign against strategic North Korean logistics targets. The first of these targets was Wonsan on the east coast. Wonsan was important as a communications center that linked Vladivostok, Siberia, with North Korea by rail and sea. From it, rail lines ran to all the KPA build-up centers. The great bulk of Russian supplies for North Korea in the early part of the war came in at Wonsan, and from the beginning it was considered a major military target. By July 27, the FEAF Bomber Command had a comprehensive rail interdiction plan ready. This plan sought to cut the flow of KPA troops and materiel from North Korea to the combat area. Two cut points, the Pyongyang railroad bridge and marshaling yards and the Hamhung bridge and Hamhung and Wonsan marshaling yards, would almost completely sever North Korea's rail logistics network. Destruction of the rail bridges over the Han River near Seoul would cut rail communication to the Pusan Perimeter area. On August 4, FEAF began B-29 interdiction attacks against all key bridges north of the 37th Parallel in Korea and, on August 15, light bombers and fighter-bombers joined in the interdiction campaign.
  The supremacy of the Fifth Air Force in the skies over Korea forced the North Koreans in the first month of the war to resort to night movement of supplies to the battle area. They relied primarily on railroads to move supplies to the front, however a shortage of trucks posed the most serious problem of getting supplies from the trains to individual units, forcing them to rely on carts and pack animals. The KPA was able to maintain transport to its front lines over long lines of communications despite heavy and constant air attacks. The UN air effort failed to completely halt military rail transport. Ammunition and motor fuel, which took precedence over all other types of supply, continued to arrive at the front, though in smaller amounts than before. At best there were rations for only one or two meals a day. Most units had to live at least partially off the South Korean populace, scavenging for food and supplies at night. By September 1 the food situation was so bad in the KPA at the front that most of the soldiers showed a loss of stamina with resulting impaired combat effectiveness.
  The inefficiency of its logistics remained a fatal weakness of the KPA, costing it crucial defeats after an initial success with combat forces. The KPA's communications and supply were not capable of exploiting a breakthrough and of supporting a continuing attack in the face of massive air, armor, and artillery fire that could be concentrated against its troops at critical points.
caption: US aircraft attack a North Korean train with rockets and napalm, 1950.
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