page_title: 1994 Black Hawk shootdown incident
section_title: Air Force accident investigation
hierarchical_section_title: 1994 Black Hawk shootdown incident / Air Force accident investigation
context_page_description: The 1994 Black Hawk shootdown incident, sometimes referred to as the Black Hawk Incident, was a friendly fire incident over northern Iraq that occurred on 14 April 1994 during Operation Provide Comfort. The pilots of two United States Air Force F-15 fighter aircraft, operating under the control of a USAF airborne warning and control system aircraft, misidentified two United States Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters as Iraqi Mil Mi-24 "Hind" helicopters. The F-15 pilots fired on and destroyed both helicopters, killing all 26 military and civilians aboard, including personnel from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and the Kurdish community.
  A subsequent USAF investigation blamed the accident on several factors. The F-15 pilots were faulted for misidentifying the helicopters as hostile. Also, the crew members of the AWACS aircraft were blamed for their inaction in failing to exercise appropriate control and for not intervening in the situation. In addition, the identification friend or foe systems had not functioned to identify the helicopters to the F-15 pilots. Furthermore, USAF leaders had failed to adequately integrate U.S.
context_section_description: By 13:15 local time, Kurdish civilians notified the MCC they had witnessed the two Black Hawks being shot down 40 miles (64 km) north of Arbil and that there were no survivors. The news was quickly picked up by the media and broadcast by CNN.
  Within hours, U.S. President Bill Clinton was briefed on the shootdown and called the heads of government of the United Kingdom and France, John Major and François Mitterrand, to express regret and sympathy for the deaths of their citizens in the incident. Clinton appeared a few hours later in a televised news conference in which he said he had directed the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to lead an inquiry into the accident. Clinton further stated, "We will get the facts, and we will make them available to the American people and to the people of Britain, France, and Turkey, our partners in Operation Provide Comfort."
  General Robert C. Oaks, USAF, Commander of United States Air Forces in Europe, immediately appointed an Air Force Regulation (AFR) 110-14 accident investigation board composed of a board president, eleven board members from the USAF and U.S. Army, three associate members from France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, four legal advisers, and thirteen technical advisers. The board president was Major General James G. Andrus, USAF. An AFR 110-14 investigation's findings are publicly released and the testimony of witnesses in the investigation can be used against them in military disciplinary proceedings. For this reason, after serious mishaps the USAF usually also conducts a separate safety investigation, in which the results are not publicly released and witness testimony is immune from prosecution. In this case, however, for unknown reasons the USAF decided not to conduct a safety investigation.
  After interviewing 137 witnesses and conducting numerous tests, the 27-volume, 3,630-page AFR 110-14 investigation report was publicly released on 13 July 1994, although some report's details had been leaked to the media by unknown defense officials two weeks earlier. The board made seven general findings about what they believed caused the shootdown to occur:
  1.  Wickson misidentified the Black Hawk helicopters and May failed to notify Wickson that he had been unable to confirm the identity of the helicopters.
  2.  The IFF transponders on the F-15s and/or the Black Hawks did not operate correctly for unknown reasons.
  3.  Misunderstandings existed throughout the OPC forces as to how coalition air operations procedures and responsibilities applied to MCC helicopter operations.
  4.  The AWACS crew commander, Lawrence Tracy, was not currently qualified in accordance with USAF regulations and he and the other AWACS crewmembers committed mistakes.
  5.  OPC personnel in general were not properly trained in the rules of engagement for the northern Iraq no fly zone.
  6.  The Black Hawks were not equipped with more modern radios which would have allowed them to communicate with the F-15s.
  7.  The shootdown "was caused by a chain of events which began with the breakdown of clear guidance from the Provide Comfort Combined Task Force to its component organizations."
  The board report stated that, "There is no indication that the AWACS Senior Director (Wang), the Mission Crew Commander (Tracy) and/or the DUKE (Martin) made any radio calls throughout the intercept, or that they issued any guidance to either the AWACS crew or the F-15 pilots." Although the OPC ROE did task the AWACS with controlling and monitoring helicopter operations in the TAOR, the board found that the AWACS crew believed they had no responsibility for controlling U.S. Army Black Hawks or ensuring that other coalition aircraft were aware of Black Hawks operating in the TAOR. When questioned by board investigators as to who was responsible for tracking the helicopters, Tracy said, "I cannot tell you that. I honestly don't know." When Wang was asked the same question by the investigators, he replied, "No one is responsible." When the investigators asked Martin what action he took when the F-15s called a visual identification on 
caption: A U.S. Army Black Hawk flies over a small village in the Kurdish occupied security zone in Northern Iraq during OPC
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