page_title: Sino-Soviet split
section_title: Discontents of de-Stalinization
hierarchical_section_title: Sino-Soviet split / Origins / Discontents of de-Stalinization
caption_attribution_description: For documentary purposes the German Federal Archive often retained the original image captions, which may be erroneous, biased, obsolete or politically extreme. Zentralbild-Junge 28.6.1963 70. Geburtstag Walter Ulbrichts N.S. Chruschtschow in Berlin eingetroffen Der erste Sekretär des ZK der KPdSU und Vorsitzende des Ministerrates der UdSSR, N.S. Chruschtschow, ist anlässlich des 70. Geburtstages des Ersten Sekretärs des ZK der SED und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR, Walter Ulbricht, am 28. Juni 1963 zu einem Freundschaftsbesuch in der DDR auf dem Flughafen Berlin-Schönefeld eingetroffen. UBz.: N.S. Chruschtschow bei seiner Begrüßungsansprache auf dem Flugplatz.
context_page_description: The Sino-Soviet split was the breaking of political relations between the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, caused by doctrinal divergences that arose from their different interpretations and practical applications of Marxism–Leninism, as influenced by their respective geopolitics during the Cold War. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Sino-Soviet debates about the interpretation of orthodox Marxism became specific disputes about the USSR's policies of national de-Stalinization and international peaceful coexistence with the Western world, which Mao decried as Marxist revisionism. Against that ideological background, China took a belligerent stance towards the West, and publicly rejected the USSR's policy of peaceful coexistence between the Eastern bloc and the Western bloc. In addition, China resented the closer Soviet ties with India, and Moscow feared Mao was too nonchalant about the horrors of nuclear war.
  In 1956, Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin and Stalinism in the speech On the Cult of Personality and its Consequences and began the de-Stalinization of the USSR.
context_section_description: In early 1956, Sino-Soviet relations began deteriorating consequent to Khrushchev's de-Stalinization of the USSR, which he initiated with the speech On the Cult of Personality and its Consequences that criticized Stalin and Stalinism, especially the Great Purge (1936–1938) of Soviet society, of the rank-and-file of the armed forces, and of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In light of de-Stalinization, the CPSU's changed ideological orientation – from Stalin's confrontation of the West to Khrushchev's coexistence with the West – posed problems of ideological credibility and political authority for Mao, who had emulated Stalin's style of leadership and practical application of Marxism–Leninism in the development of Socialism with Chinese characteristics and the PRC as a country.
  The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 against the rule of Moscow was a serious political concern for Mao, because it had required military intervention to suppress, and its occurrence denied the political legitimacy of the communist party to be in government. In response to that discontent among the European members of the Eastern Bloc, the CPC denounced the USSR's de-Stalinization as Marxist revisionism, and reaffirmed the Stalinist ideology, policies, and practices of Mao's government as the correct course for achieving socialism in China. In the event, such Sino-Soviet divergences of Marxist–Leninist praxis and interpretation began fracturing "monolithic communism" — the Western misperception of absolute ideological unity in the Eastern Bloc.
  From Mao's perspective, the success of the Soviet foreign policy of peaceful coexistence with the West would geopolitically isolate the PRC; whilst the Hungarian Revolution indicated the possibility of anti-communist revolt in the PRC, and in China's sphere of influence. To thwart such discontent, Mao launched the Hundred Flowers Campaign (1956) of political liberalization – the freedom of speech to publicly criticize government, the bureaucracy, and the CPC; but the campaign proved too-successful when blunt criticism of Mao, as head-of-state and party chairman, was voiced. Consequent to the relative freedoms of the de-Stalinized Soviet Union, Mao retained the Stalinist model of Marxist–Leninist economy, government, and society for the People's Republic of China.
caption: The Sino-Soviet split (1956–1966) arose from the ideological clash between Premier Khrushchev's policies of De-Stalinisation and peaceful coexistence and Mao Zedong's bellicose and Stalinist policies.
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