page_title: German Radio Intelligence Operations during World War II
section_title: Theoretical second landing
hierarchical_section_title: German Radio Intelligence Operations during World War II / Intercept operations during World War II / Defense of Western Europe 1944–1945 / Theoretical second landing
caption_attribution_description: Carte routière de la région Basse-Normandie Légende&#160;:
context_page_description: German Radio Intelligence Operation were signals intelligence operations that were undertaken by German Axis forces in Europe during World War II. In keeping with German signals practice since 1942, the term communication intelligence had been used when intercept units were assigned to observe both enemy radio and wire communication. When the observation of only enemy radio communication was undertaken, the term was radio intelligence. The term intercept service was also used up until 1942.
context_section_description: The postwar press gave much attention to the opinion expressed by General Alfred Jodl, the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, who said that a second landing was expected north of the Seine and that therefore the German reserves and the Fifteenth Army stationed in that area were not immediately committed in a counterattack. The information obtained by communication intelligence did not support this assumption. The chief of the control centre of Communication Intelligence West was asked to express his personal opinion on this matter during a conference of the
  Western Intelligence Branch. He said that a comparison of the number of units already recognized with those previously identified in Great Britain
  permitted the conclusion that most of the Allied forces had already been landed and that the remaining ones were insufficient for a second landing. Any still uncommitted units would be needed to feed the current battle. This opinion was shared by the Western Intelligence Branch, but was in contradiction to that of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. The estimate of the situation was given some validity by the fact that a short time after the beginning of the invasion, a British landing craft had been captured near Boulogne. However, it seemed obvious that this enemy craft had lost its way.
  When, during the first few days after the beginning of the invasion, the Allies created the impression of a second airborne landing by dropping
  dummy paratroops over Brittany at night (Operation Titanic), communication intelligence offered evidence to the contrary because of the complete absence of enemy radio traffic in the alleged landing area.
caption: Map of the Operation Titanic area Seine-Maritime in the east, Manche in the west and Caen in the centre
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