page_title: Causes of the Franco-Prussian War
section_title: The Hohenzollern crisis and the Ems Dispatch
hierarchical_section_title: Causes of the Franco-Prussian War / Monarchial crises / The Hohenzollern crisis and the Ems Dispatch
context_page_description: The causes of the Franco-Prussian War are deeply rooted in the events surrounding the German unification. In the aftermath of the Austro-Prussian War, Prussia had annexed numerous territories and formed the North German Confederation. Prussia then turned its attention towards the south of Germany, where it sought to expand its influence.
  France was strongly opposed to the annexation of the Southern German States, which would have created too powerful a country next to its border. In Prussia, a war against France was deemed necessary to arouse German nationalism in those States that would allow the unification of a great German empire. This aim was epitomized by Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's quote: "I knew that a Franco-Prussian War must take place before a united Germany was formed." Bismarck also knew that France should be the aggressor in the conflict to bring the Southern German States to side with Prussia, hence giving Germans numerical superiority.
  The immediate cause of the war resided in the candidacy of a Prussian prince to the throne of Spain – France feared encirclement by an alliance between Prussia and Spain.
context_section_description: On 2 July 1870, "Marshall Prim [who held power in Spain] announced in Madrid that the Spanish government had offered the crown of Spain to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern."
  
  Fearing that a Hohenzollern king in Prussia and another one in Spain would put France into a two-front situation, France this time was determined to stand up to the expansion of Prussian influence. Napoleon III at this time was suffering the most unbearable pain from his stones, and the Empress Eugénie was essentially charged with countering the designs of Prussia. She had a vital interest in the crisis as she was of Spanish blood and a member of the royal line. The secretary of foreign affairs, Duc Antoine de Gramont, was directed by the Empress to be the principal instrument by which France would press for war should Leopold ascend the throne. Gramont delivered a speech in front of the Chambre législative, proclaiming that "We shall know how to fulfill our duty without hesitation and without weakness." The fatal mistake would soon come as a result of Gramont's inexperience, for he counted on alliances that only existed in his mind.
  The French press immediately protested the prospect of a Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne, and on 6 July the new Foreign Minister, the Duc de Gramont [...] told the Chamber that France would not permit Prince Leopold to become King of Spain. [The French Premier Emile] Ollivier added that he had no doubt that Prussia would yield in the face of French firmness, but that 'if war be necessary, the government will not enter upon it without the consent of the Legislative Body.' Gramont's statement and Ollivier's mention of war were greeted with great enthusiasm by the deputies, and in the public galleries the ladies rose to their feet and waved their handkerchiefs as they joined in the wild applause. Next day the Paris press called for war with Prussia, and on 8 July their language was even more violent. The government instructed [Comte Vincente] Benedetti, the French ambassador to Prussia, to demand that King William should publicly refuse his consent to Prince Leopold's acceptance of the throne of Spain.
  On 11 July, Benedetti spoke to King William at the watering spa at Ems, and asked him to refuse his consent to Prince Leopold's candidature; Bismarck was on holiday at his estates in East Prussia. King William agreed to order Prince Leopold to withdraw. Ollivier announced the Prussian surrender in the Chamber on 12 July and hailed it as a French triumph and a Prussian humiliation. Bismarck thought the same and considered resigning as Prime Minister. Gramont and Ollivier did not conceal their regret that the Prussians had given in; and the deputies and most of the press were disappointed that that there was to be no war. [...] Louis Napoleon sensed the public regret that there would be no war. 'The country will be disappointed,' he cabled to Ollivier on 12 July; 'but what can we do?' He was in complete agreement with the decision which was taken by the Cabinet on the same day to ask for further guarantees from Prussia and to require King William to give an undertaking that he would never in the future allow Prince Leopold to accept the crown of Spain. When Benedetti confronted King William on the promenade at Ems on the afternoon of 13 July and asked him to give this undertaking, the King was annoyed, refused to do so, and walked away a little abruptly.
  Following this direct confrontation, which had bypassed diplomatic protocols, King Wilhelm then sent a message to Berlin reporting this event with the French ambassador, and Bismarck shrewdly edited it to make it "like a red tag to the bull" for the French government. The dispatch was edited as follows (with the words sent in bold):
  Count Benedetti spoke to me on the promenade, in order to demand from me, finally in a very importunate manner, that I should authorize him to telegraph at once that I bound myself for all future time never again to give my consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew their candidature. I refused at last somewhat sternly, as it is neither right nor p
caption: Wilhelm I of Germany at his desk
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