page_title: Glorious Revolution
section_title: English defensive strategy
hierarchical_section_title: Glorious Revolution / English defensive strategy
caption_attribution_description: Thomas Osborne, 1st Duke of Leeds (1631–1712)
context_page_description: The Glorious Revolution, or Revolution of 1688, was the deposition and replacement of James II and VII as ruler of England, Scotland and Ireland by his daughter Mary II and his Dutch nephew and Mary's husband, William III of Orange, which took place between November 1688 and May 1689. The outcome of events in all three kingdoms and Europe, the Revolution was quick and relatively bloodless, though establishing the new regime took much longer and led to significant casualties. The term was first used by John Hampden in late 1689.
  Despite his Catholicism, James became king in February 1685 with widespread support because many feared excluding him would lead to a repetition of the 1638–1651 Wars of the Three Kingdoms. His religion was seen as a short-term issue because his Protestant daughter Mary was heir presumptive, he was 52 and his second marriage remained childless after 11 years. The birth of his son, James Francis Edward, on 10 June 1688 changed this by the male-preference, automatic change of that heir presumptive, thus raising the prospect of a Catholic dynasty.
context_section_description: The primary concern for James was to avoid war. He and Sunderland interpreted efforts by Louis to intimidate the Dutch and provide intelligence on William's plans as attempts to drag him into an unwanted French alliance. As a former naval commander, James appreciated the difficulties of a successful invasion, even in good weather; as they neared the end of September, the likelihood seemed to diminish. He refused to believe the States would allow William to make the attempt and even if they did, considered the English army and navy strong enough to defeat it.
  Reasonable in theory, in reality each assumption was deeply flawed, one of the most fundamental being the loyalty and efficiency of his army and navy. In July, the fleet nearly mutinied when Catholic Mass was held on one of the ships, only averted when James went in person to pacify the sailors. Despite efforts to fill the army with Catholics, it remained overwhelmingly Protestant and enthusiastically celebrated the acquittal of the bishops. Officers in one of his most reliable units, commanded by his illegitimate son, the Duke of Berwick, refused to accept Catholic recruits. When they were dismissed, most of their colleagues resigned in sympathy and the episode further undermined the army's morale.
  With a paper strength of 34,000, the army looked impressive but in comparison to the veterans of William's invasion force, many were untrained or lacked weapons. It also had to fill policing roles previously delegated to the militia, which had been deliberately allowed to decay; most of the 4,000 regular troops brought from Scotland were stationed in London to keep order. In October, attempts were made to restore the militia but many members were reportedly so angry at the changes made to local corporations, James was advised it was better not to raise them.
  This was particularly apparent in Yorkshire and South-West England, the two landing places identified by William. One of the key army conspirators along with Churchill was Charles Trelawny, a West Country Tory whose brother was one of the Seven Bishops. His commitment confirmed support from a powerful and well-connected bloc, allowing access to the ports of Plymouth and Torbay. In the north, Lord Danby prepared to seize York, the most important city in Northern England, and Hull, its largest port.
  Dartmouth replaced Herbert as commander of the fleet when he defected in June but many captains owed him their appointments and were of doubtful loyalty. Dartmouth suspected Berkeley and Grafton of plotting to overthrow him; he placed their ships next to his to monitor them, while minimising contact between the other vessels to prevent conspiracy. Lack of money severely impacted capability; exclusive of fireships and light scouting vessels, Admiralty returns show only 16 warships available in early October, all third rates or fourth rates, short of both men and supplies.
  The Downs was the best place to intercept a cross-Channel attack but it was also vulnerable to a surprise assault, even for ships fully manned and adequately provisioned. Instead, the fleet was positioned in front of the Medway, near Chatham Dockyard, although it risked being confined to the Thames estuary by the same easterly winds that would allow the Dutch to cross. Since James believed the Dutch would seek to destroy the English fleet prior to an invasion, it would be advantageous to refuse battle, a strategic concept known as the fleet in being. This was indeed the original Dutch plan – though they too, to lower the cost of the invasion, had not activated any heavier ships – but as they moved into autumn, conditions deteriorated rapidly for those on the transports; they therefore decided to sail in convoy and avoid battle.
  The English fleet was outnumbered 2:1 by the Dutch, undermanned, in poor condition and the wrong location. Key landing locations in the South-West and Yorkshire had been secured by sympathisers, while both army and navy were led by officers whose loyalty was questionable. William claimed to be ensuring the rights of Parliament and Jam
caption: Lord Danby; one of the Immortal Seven and William's agent in Northern England
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