page_title: Fliegerführer Atlantik
section_title: British countermeasures
hierarchical_section_title: Fliegerführer Atlantik / Combat operations / British countermeasures
caption_attribution_description: English: A German Focke-Wulf Fw 200 shot down over the Atlantic Ocean in 1941 west of Ireland. The aircraft was shot down by a Bristol Beaufighter IC (s/n T3250, PN-A) of No. 252 Squadron, RAF.
context_page_description: Fliegerführer Atlantik was a World War II Luftwaffe naval air command dedicated to maritime patrol, and maritime interdiction. The air command fought exclusively in the Battle of the Atlantic.
  At the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, the Luftwaffe had few specialised naval aviation units and aircraft. By 1940, the Wehrmacht occupied much of Western Europe and Scandinavia. The Kriegsmarine and its commander-in-chief Erich Raeder saw this as an opportunity to destroy the sea communications of the United Kingdom, Germany's last significant opponent in Europe.
  In February 1941, the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe was ordered by Adolf Hitler to form a naval air command to support the Kriegsmarine's U-boat operations in the Battle of the Atlantic. Commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Göring, agreed to the formation of the specialised naval command which remained under the operational control of the Luftwaffe and was subordinated to Luftflotte 3, commanded by Hugo Sperrle. The command had jurisdiction over all Luftwaffe operations in the Atlantic Ocean, English Channel and Irish Sea. The organisation's first commanding officer was Martin Harlinghausen.
context_section_description: On 2 August the British catapult concept was validated. From the CAM ship SS Maplin, Lieutenant Bob Everett took off in a Hawker Hurricane and succeeded in downing a Condor shadowing SL 81 KG 40 had some revenge when a Condor sank a freighter, and a U-Boat attack sank five more ships from the 20-strong convoy on 5 August. British defences forced the Fw 200s to revert to reconnaissance. However, a major battle developed over several separate convoys; Convoy HG 73 and HG.74 in September. HG 73 was composed of 25 merchantmen and 11 escorts including HMS Springbank, a catapult ship. A Fairey Fulmar launched but coul not fire. Without air cover the convoy was subjected to attack by sea and air. The Condors guided the submarines in and the U-Boats sank 10 ships, including Springbank. Simultaneously, the battle for HG 74 began. This convoy had 26 ships and ten escorts including the first escort carrier to be built—HMS Audacity. A Fw 200 sank a ship picking up survivors from a U-Boat attack (Walmer Castle). The attack alerted two fighters, which dispatched the Condor. Remaining Condors kept their distance. They soon picked up OG 75. Despite poor weather and improved defences, the Condors shadowed OG 75 eight days. But the strong escort limited the attacks to one loss. HG 74 made it to Liverpool from Gibraltar without loss. Convoy OG 69 and Convoy OG 71 were also savaged by a combined air and submarine attack. The cooperation accounted for 45 percent of the tonnage sunk by U-boats from July to October.
  The Fw 200s proceeded with caution after the Audacity battle. Four U-boats had been lost and the effectiveness of fighter defences improved. Successes declined and losses rose to 13 aircraft—10 to British defences. Production failures placed increased strain on pilots. They were ordered not to ditch but to fly home and save the damaged aircraft. One pilot flew across neutral Ireland to reach Brest. New aircraft were collected from the factories immediately upon completion. Decreasing sparse forces further, Harlinghausen sent Condors and their pilots on torpedo bomber courses, which failed to yield positive results. The power of ship-based anti-aircraft fire and escorts forced the Condors to fly higher. The introduction of carrier fighters forced them to operate with extreme caution. 
  In October, Martin Harlinghausen himself was wounded. Although unusual for a commander, he took part in operations to experience combat conditions for himself. In an attack on shipping in the Bristol Channel, he was wounded. His deputy Ulrich Kessler temporarily took command. Kessler had not held high rank before now, an indicator of how unimportant the OKL viewed Luftwaffe operations over the Atlantic.
  On 6 November, the units of Fliegerführer Atlantik engaged OG 76 in a month-long battle, which lasted until 16 December. The convoy had left Liverpool bound for Gibraltar on 28 October. Sighted by KG 40 on 6 November, six Fw 200s were to shadow and direct U-Boats to it. HMS Audacity was present, and launched her fighters against the Condors, downing one Fw 200. Five U-Boats were guided in, but were repulsed by the escorts and the convoy which made it to Gibraltar unscathed. On 14 December it returned to Liverpool. By 16 December, KG 40 had picked it up. The U-Boats were repulsed again, and the Fw 200s were forced to retreat under fighter attack on 18 December. On 19 December, two Condors were lost to Audacity's fighters. With the Condors out of the battle, the U-Boats tried on their own, sinking one destroyer and two merchant ships. On 21 December, Audacity was spotted outside the convoy and was sunk in ten minutes. Five of her six fighter pilots from No. 802 Squadron FAA were saved. With the carrier gone, the Condors returned. They noted the presence of an RAF B-24 Liberator, but no engagement is known.
  The British responded to German submarine operations by attacking them as the transited the Bay of Biscay. Five out of six U-boats took this route, and passed within range of RAF air bases. Coastal Command resolved to interdict these routes. From June t
caption: A Condor sinking. Airmen are exiting the aircraft, 26 July 1941—54° 00' N., 13∘ 35' W.[75]
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