page_title: Battle of Five Forks
section_title: V Corps and Mackenzie's division join Sheridan
hierarchical_section_title: Battle of Five Forks / Battle / V Corps and Mackenzie's division join Sheridan
caption_attribution_description: English: Map of the Siege of Petersburg of the American Civil War, actions March 29-31, 1865
context_page_description: The Battle of Five Forks was fought on April 1, 1865, southwest of Petersburg, Virginia, around the road junction of Five Forks, Dinwiddie County, at the end of the Siege of Petersburg, near the conclusion of the American Civil War.
  The Union Army commanded by Major General Philip Sheridan defeated a Confederate force from the Army of Northern Virginia commanded by Major General George Pickett. The Union force inflicted over 1,000 casualties on the Confederates and took up to 4,000 prisoners while seizing Five Forks, the key to control of the South Side Railroad, a vital supply line and evacuation route.
  After the Battle of Dinwiddie Court House at about 10:00 pm, V Corps infantry began to arrive near the battlefield to reinforce Sheridan's cavalry. Pickett's orders from his commander General Robert E. Lee were to defend Five Forks "at all hazards" because of its strategic importance.
  At about 1:00 pm, Sheridan pinned down the front and right flank of the Confederate line with small arms fire, while the massed V Corps of infantry, commanded by Major General Gouverneur K. Warren, attacked the left flank soon afterwards.
context_section_description: Early in the evening of March 31, 1865, Union V Corps commander, Major General Gouverneur K. Warren, recognized from the sound of battle that Sheridan's cavalry was being pushed back at Dinwiddie Court House and sent Brigadier General Joseph J. Bartlett's brigade to reinforce Sheridan. Moving cross country, Bartlett's men drove Confederate pickets from Dr. Boisseau's farm, just east of Crump Road. Since the Gravelly Run bridge on the Boydton Plank Road had been wrecked by the Confederates, Pearson was delayed. At about 8:20 pm, Warren told Meade about the needed bridge repair and possible delay but Meade did not pass the information to Sheridan.
  Meade told Warren to have his entire force ready to move. By 9:17 pm, Warren was ordered to withdraw from the line and send a division to Sheridan at once. At 9:45 pm, Meade first advised Grant of Bartlett's forward location at Dr. Boisseau's farm and inquired of Grant whether Warren's entire corps should go to help Sheridan. Meade did not tell Grant that the plan to move Warren's entire corps to Sheridan's aid was Warren's idea.
  When Grant then notified Sheridan that the V Corps and Ranald Mackenzie's division from the Union Army of the James had been ordered to his support, he gratuitously and without any basis said that Warren should reach him "by 12 tonight." It was impossible for the tired V Corps soldiers to cover about 6 miles (9.7 km) on dark, muddy roads with a bridge out over Gravelly Run along the way in about an hour. Through the night, no one gave Sheridan accurate and complete information about Warren's dispositions, logistical situation and when he received his orders. Nonetheless, Warren's supposed failure to meet his schedule was something for which Sheridan would hold Warren to account.
  When Mackenzie's division reached Dinwiddie Court House about dawn, Sheridan ordered them to rest since they had been on the road since 3:30 am.
  Meade's further order to send Griffin's division down the Boydton Plank Road and Ayres's and Crawford's divisions to join Bartlett at Dr. Boisseau's farm so they could attack the rear of the Confederate force did not acknowledge the large Confederate force at Dr. Boisseau's farm and the needed repair of the Gravelly Run bridge. Meade learned of the Gravelly Run bridge problem when the telegraph was restored at about 11:45 pm. Warren also received information from a staffer that a Confederate cavalry force under Brigadier General William P. Roberts held the junction of Crump Road and White Oak Road, threatening to hold up or stop a direct move by the V Corps to Dinwiddie Court House or Five Forks.
  Warren rejected Meade's suggestion to consider alternate routes because it would take too long to move his corps, even considering the existing delays. Ayres had received Warren's order to move to the Boydton Plank Road at about 10:00 pm. This required him to move over about two miles of rough country and cross a branch Gravelly Run. Warren allowed Crawford's and Griffin's men to rest where they were until he learned that Ayres's division had made contact with Sheridan's cavalry.
  Warren was told that the new Gravelly Run bridge was completed at 2:05 am. Ayres's division arrived at Sheridan's position near dawn. As predicted by Warren, the effect of Bartlett's appearance threatening Pickett's flank was enough for Pickett to withdraw to Five Forks, which the Confederates had done by the time Ayres reach Dinwiddie Court House. One of Sheridan's staff officers met Ayres and told him that his division should have turned on to Brooks Road, a mile back. Ayres returned to Brooks Road, where a lone Confederate picket promptly fled as the division approached and, after Sheridan rode up for a brief meeting with Ayres, Ayres's men settled down for a rest until 2:00 pm.
  At 4:50 am, Warren received Sheridan's 3:00 a.m. message to cooperate with the cavalry by hitting Pickett's retreating men in the flank and rear. This was similar to the plan Warren had proposed earlier in the evening but which had been given no consideration by Grant and Meade at that time. 
caption: Actions at Petersburg before and during the Battle of Five Forks
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