page_title: Military activity of ISIL
section_title: Tactics
hierarchical_section_title: Military activity of ISIL / Tactics
caption_attribution_description: Français&#160;: Char de l'Etat islamique à Raqqa en 2014. 1
context_page_description: The military of ISIL is the fighting force of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. The total force size has been estimated from tens of thousands to over two hundred thousand. ISIL's armed forces grew quickly during its territorial expansion in 2014. The ISIL military, including groups incorporated into it in 2014, openly operates and controls territory in multiple cities in Libya and Nigeria. In October 2016, it conquered the city of Qandala in Puntland, Somalia. It conquered much of eastern Syria and western Iraq in 2014, territory it lost finally only in 2019. It also has had border clashes with and made incursions into Lebanon, Iran, and Jordan. ISIL-linked groups operate in Algeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, and in West Africa. In January 2015, ISIL was also confirmed to have a military presence in Afghanistan and in Yemen.
  The Islamic State's military is based on light infantry mobile units using vehicles such as gun-equipped pick-up trucks, motorbikes and buses for fast advances. They have also used artillery, tanks and armored vehicles, much of which they captured from the Iraqi and Syrian Armies.
context_section_description: The military of ISIL is organized like a mixture of an irregular insurgent force and a conventional army, with the latter's tappings used to defend its territorial holdings. In Syria and Iraq, ISIL organized professional units for specialised tasks, with the "Tank Battalion", the "Artillery Battalion", and the "Platoons of Special Tasks" being among the most important. The first one employed ISIL's heavy armoured fighting vehicles, the second its heavy artillery, while the last one was used as rapid intervention force. The three regularly worked in tandem for breakthrough and important defense operations which was made possible by ISIL's highly competent logistics system that kept operating even under regular bombardments by anti-ISIL forces.
  In contrast to these elite forces, ISIL's use of less trained or valuable troops was much more unsophisticated. Most notably, ISIL stood in sharp contrast to some other jihadist organizations such as the Caucasus Emirate which generally attempted to minimize their own casualties, as the proto-state is known for its willingness to sacrifice as many of its ordinary fighters as necessary to achieve its objectives. This is especially true in regard to ISIL's callous use of new recruits. When the militant organization still held large swaths in Syria and Iraq and had ample access to native as well as foreign volunteers, it usually barely trained new recruits. Instead of focusing on preparing for combat, training camps mostly indoctrinated new fighters into following orders and being willing for sacrifice one's life for ISIL. The organization's high command then used the inexperienced recruits for swarming and human wave tactics, often resulting in extremely high casualties. One high-ranking ISIL commander best known for this approach was Abu Omar al-Shishani who successfully employed swarming tactics during the Siege of Menagh Air Base and Battle of Al-Tabqa airbase. According to his reasoning, the enemy would eventually be overwhelmed or run out of ammunition regardless of the casualties among ISIL fighters. Regional expert Joanna Paraszuk sarcastically remarked that al-Shishani's tactics were based on the belief that "everyone want[s] to be a Shahid" (martyr). Though some ISIL frontline commanders did not espouse this readiness to sacrifice troops, the organization's high-command appears to care little about its common fighters.
  Following the Siege of Kobanî which resulted in large losses among its veterans and commanders (including 2,000 militants killed), ISIL was forced to promote several inexperienced commanders and to rely even more than before on new recruits. As result, the tactics of ISIL's armed wing became even more crude and uncaring about its own forces. Paraszuk noted that the jihadists' strategies and tactics sometimes broke down completely due to this. For example, some troops were essentially ordered to "just run towards the [enemy] and fight or whatever" during the 2015 Battle of Hasakah, even though they were targeted by massive aerial bombardments and their attacks had no apparent strategic value.
  Technicals play an important role for ISIL in a variety of combat purposes, ranging from quick-reaction forces to tank equivalents to self-defendable car bombs that can attack heavily defended targets.
  In addition to suicide bomber attacks, ISIL also employs the use of special units called Inghimasi (Arabic for "become immersed"), who utilise both conventional firearms and suicide bombs, attacking enemy positions with their firearms, detonating their suicide bombs when they run out of ammunition or believe they are trapped. Their goal is specifically to inflict as many casualties as they can upon the enemy before dying, acting as form of shock troops. Inghimasi are also deployed against civilians, such as in the November 2015 Paris attacks. Inghimasi may sometimes be deployed en masse but are usually deployed in small teams.
caption: ISIL tank in Raqqa in 2014.
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