page_title: NLF and PAVN strategy, organization and structure
section_title: Mastery of the war's tempo
hierarchical_section_title: NLF and PAVN strategy, organization and structure / NLF and PAVN strategy / Strategy disputes and shifts in the Communist high command / The "other war:" the population base, tempo and strategy / Mastery of the war's tempo
caption_attribution_description: English: Mao in 1938 Bân-lâm-gú: 1938-nî ê Môo Ti̍k-tong. 中文: 1938年春，在陕西延安一间简陋的窑洞里，毛泽东在撰写《论持久战》。
context_page_description: During the Second Indochina War, better known as the Vietnam War, a distinctive land warfare strategy and organization was used by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam or better known as the Viet Cong in the West, and the People's Army of Vietnam or North Vietnamese Army to defeat their American and South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam opponents. These methods involved closely integrated political and military strategy – what was called dau tranh. The National Liberation Front, was an umbrella of front groups, sympathizers and allies set up by the rulers of North Vietnam to conduct the insurgency in South Vietnam. The NLF also included fully armed formations- regional and local guerrillas, and the People's Liberation Armed Forces. The PLAF was the "Main Force" – the Chu Luc or full-time soldiers of the NLF's military wing. Many histories lump both the NLF and the armed formations under the term "Viet Cong" or "VC" in common usage. Both were tightly interwoven and were in turn controlled by the North. Others consider the Viet Cong or "VC" to primarily refer to the armed elements.
context_section_description: The VC/PAVN strategy also involved controlling the initiative of the struggle, when and where they would fight, and thus how many casualties they would take at various times and places. Initiative also meant controlling the size and composition of forces introduced to the battlefield, and thus the quantities of supplies needed. Material requirements were comparatively light, and much was procured inside South Vietnam itself. Additional PAVN troops could be introduced at will, more than matching American or GVN increases. The initiative factor, made the American attrition approach, and its elusive search for a "crossover" point (where communist losses would be more than available replacements) unworkable. Massive US troop sweeps and interdiction efforts while causing substantial pain to communist forces at different times and places, foundered on these realities.
  The flexible shifting of tempo and styles however was not without cost. Tens of thousands of VC and PAVN regulars were required and on several occasions when attempts were made at confrontation in remote areas, such as at the Ia Drang in 1965 and in the 1967 border battles, heavy losses were suffered from US firepower.
caption: Mao Zedong's Protracted War model[84] was modified by Hanoi's war directors, to incorporate more flexible shifting and the notion of a "General Uprising."[74]
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