page_title: Airborne Launch Control System
section_title: Inception
hierarchical_section_title: Airborne Launch Control System / Inception
caption_attribution_description: Image of Mobile Minuteman missile train
context_page_description: The Airborne Launch Control System provides a survivable launch capability for the United States Air Force's LGM-30G Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile force. The ALCS is operated by airborne missileers from Air Force Global Strike Command's 625th Strategic Operations Squadron and United States Strategic Command. The weapon system is located on board the United States Navy's E-6B Mercury, which serves as USSTRATCOM's "Looking Glass" Airborne Command Post. The ALCS crew is integrated into the ABNCP battle staff and is on alert around-the-clock.
context_section_description: In 1962, when the Minuteman ICBM was  first placed on alert, the Soviet Union did not have the number of weapons, accuracy, nor significant nuclear yield to completely destroy the Minuteman ICBM force during an attack. However, Strategic Air Command (SAC) planners knew it was only a matter of time before the Soviets could have such capability. Early on, the Air Force experimented with using trains to make the Minuteman ICBMs mobile, and therefore more survivable. However, the Air Force decided to scrap the mobile Minuteman ICBM concept and emplace Minuteman in 1000 missile silos along with their 100 associated LCCs. Each facility was spread out several miles apart from each other so that the Soviets could not destroy multiple sites with just one nuclear warhead.
  Starting in the mid-1960s, the Soviets began to gain parity with the US and now had the potential capability to target and successfully attack the Minuteman force with an increased number of ICBMs that had greater yields and accuracy than were previously available. Studying the problem even more, SAC realized that in order to prevent the US from launching all 1000 Minuteman ICBMs, the Soviets did not have to target all 1000 Minuteman missile silos. The Soviets only needed to launch a disarming decapitation strike against the 100 Minuteman LCCs – the command and control sites – in order to prevent the launch of all Minuteman ICBMs. Even though the Minuteman ICBMs would have been left unscathed in their missile silos following an LCC decapitation strike, the Minuteman missiles could not be launched without a command and control capability. In other words, the Soviets only needed 100 warheads to fully eliminate command and control of the Minuteman ICBMs. Even if the Soviets chose to expend two to three warheads per LCC for assured damage expectancy, the Soviets would only have had to expend up to 300 warheads to disable the Minuteman ICBM force – far less than the total number of Minuteman silos. The Soviets could have then used the remaining warheads to strike other targets they chose.
  Faced with only a few Minuteman LCC targets, the Soviets could have concluded that the odds of being successful in a Minuteman LCC decapitation strike were higher with less risk than it would have been having to face the almost insurmountable task of successfully attacking and destroying 1000 Minuteman silos and 100 Minuteman LCCs to ensure Minuteman was disabled. This theory motivated SAC to design a survivable means to launch Minuteman, even if all the ground-based command and control sites were destroyed.
caption: Train-mobile Minuteman ICBM testing underway.
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