page_title: Operation Catechism
section_title: Historiography
hierarchical_section_title: Operation Catechism / Assessments / Historiography
caption_attribution_description: English: Royal Air Force Bomber Command, 1942-1945. The German battleship TIRPITZ, lying capsized in in Tromso fjord, attended by a salvage vessel. The already damaged ship was finally sunk in a combined daylight attack by Nos. 9 and 617 Squadrons RAF on 12 November 1944, (Operation CATECHISM). The hole in the hull by the starboard propeller shaft was cut by the Germans to allow access to salvage crews.
context_page_description: Operation Catechism was a British air raid of World War II that destroyed the German battleship Tirpitz. It was conducted on 12 November 1944 by 29 Royal Air Force heavy bombers that attacked the battleship at its anchorage near the Norwegian city of Tromsø. The ship capsized after being hit by at least two bombs and damaged by the explosions of others, killing between 940 and 1,204 members of the crew; the British suffered no casualties.
  The attack ended a long-running series of air and naval operations against Tirpitz that sought to eliminate the threat she posed to Allied shipping. The battleship had been moved to the Tromsø area in October 1944 after being crippled on 15 September during Operation Paravane. This attack had been carried out by the RAF's elite Nos. 9 and 617 Squadrons, who unsuccessfully attempted to strike Tirpitz again at Tromsø on 29 October during Operation Obviate.
  Operation Catechism re-used the plans for Operation Obviate, and was conducted by the same squadrons. The aircraft departed from bases in northern Scotland and, due to clear weather conditions, the Commonwealth airmen were able to accurately target and bomb the battleship.
context_section_description: Historians hold differing views over whether the final attacks on Tirpitz were necessary. Angus Konstam has written that the battleship posed no threat to Allied shipping from April 1944 due to the damage inflicted in Operations Source and Tungsten. He argued that the subsequent attacks were motivated by Churchill and other members of the War Cabinet having an "obsession" with destroying Tirpitz, and that Operations Obviate and Catechism were mainly undertaken for propaganda purposes. Patrick Bishop has observed that "the zeal of the pursuit, whipped on by Churchill, seems excessive now, but wartime created its own dynamic", and that Operation Catechism contributed little towards ending the war. Similarly, Niklas Zetterling and Michael Tamelander have judged that although "the British were not fully aware that the Germans had written off Tirpitz as an offensive weapon in autumn 1944, their final efforts appear almost overzealous". The official history of British intelligence in World War II states that Dönitz's use of the battleship to tie down Allied resources was successful, and "in her last days she briefly excelled" in this role.
  Other historians believe that the attacks were justified. Sweetman has written that while the Allied intelligence services erred in believing that Tirpitz could be repaired and returned to service following Operation Paravane, the British leadership acted correctly on the information available to them by ordering further attacks. John Ellis reached a similar conclusion, and also argued that Operations Obviate and Catechism were justified as they contributed to sustaining the Fortitude North deception campaign that had led the Germans to maintain powerful ground forces in Norway in the mistaken belief that the Allies were planning amphibious landings there. The retired United States Navy Rear Admiral William H. Langenberg judged that "because of her strategic importance, all the Allied attempts to disable or sink Tirpitz were justified".
  There is consensus that the engagement was well executed by the Allied forces while the German forces failed. Konstam noted that Operations Paravane, Obviate and Catechism were "well-planned and conducted" and "provided a neat ending to what had been a long and often tortuous aerial campaign". Sweetman wrote that while the Royal Navy's aircraft and bombs could have destroyed Tirpitz "with luck", the combination of the highly-capable Lancaster bomber and the powerful Tallboy bomb was better suited to this task as it removed "any element of luck, provided accuracy could be obtained". Bishop stated that while Tirpitz's crew "did their duty and defended their ship to the last", the Luftwaffe failed. Jan Forsgren observed that the lack of attention given to the battleship's defence by the German high command was "quite remarkable" in light of the previous British attacks.
caption: The wreck of Tirpitz after the war
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