page_title: Battle of Buna–Gona: Allied forces and order of battle
section_title: Role of armour
hierarchical_section_title: Battle of Buna–Gona: Allied forces and order of battle / Fire support / Role of armour
caption_attribution_description: English: 1943-01-07. PAPUA, GIROPA POINT. MEMBERS OF 2/12TH INFANTRY BATTALION ADVANCE AS GENERAL STUART M3 LIGHT TANKS MANNED BY B SQUADRON, 2/6TH ARMOURED REGIMENT, BLAST JAPANESE PILLBOXES IN THE FINAL ASSAULT ON BUNA. NOTE MACHINE GUN ON TANK CLEARING TREETOPS OF SNIPERS BY SYSTEMATIC SPRAYING OF TREES AS THE INFANTRY MOVES FORWARD. THIS TANK, IN ONE MORNING'S FIGHTING, FIRED 10,000 ROUNDS OF MACHINE GUN AMMUNITION. THE PHOTOGRAPH WAS TAKEN DURING ACTUAL FIGHTING. NEAREST THE TANK IS CORPORAL G. G. FLETCHER, AND NEXT TO THE TREE (CENTRE) CORPORAL M. D. CROKER. (NEGATIVE BY GEORGE SILK).
context_page_description: The Battle of Buna–Gona was part of the New Guinea campaign in the Pacific Theatre during World War II. It followed the conclusion of the Kokoda Track campaign and lasted from 16 November 1942 until 22 January 1943. The battle was conducted by Australian and United States forces against the Japanese beachheads at Buna, Sanananda and Gona. The Allied advance on the Japanese positions at Buna–Gona was made by the 16th and 25th Brigades of the Australian 7th Division and the 126th and 128th Infantry Regiments of the US 32nd Infantry Division. During the course of the battle, a further four infantry brigades, two infantry regiments and an armoured squadron of 19 M3 Stuart tanks were deployed.
  Significant criticism has been levelled at the combat effectiveness of US troops and specifically the 32nd Division, both within the US command and in subsequent histories. A lack of training is most often cited in defence of their performance. Several historians have also commented on the lack of training afforded Australian militia units engaged in the battle although some had the benefit of a "stiffening" of experienced junior officers posted to them from the Australian Imperial Force.
context_section_description: Artillery and air power were unable to provide sufficiently effective close support to the infantry. Commanders looked to the tank to break the stalemate that had developed.  Although the expectation of Australian commanders had generally been similar to the American view that resistance in the Buna area would be light, provision had been made to support the operation with tanks. On 13 November, orders were given to dispatch a troop of the 2/6th Armoured Regiment, equipped with M3 Stuart tanks, from Milne Bay. When the first tank was loaded onto the only available craft, a captured barge, both barge and tank sank. There was no immediate prospect of moving the tanks. As a temporary measure, a platoon of Bren carriers were sent instead.
  The carriers had been designed for reconnaissance and the rapid transport of troops and weapons across bullet-swept ground.  Their light armour was intended to stop small-arms fire but not from close range.  They were not provided with overhead protection.  Doctrine was that carriers were not tanks and, "should not, indeed could not, be used as such." Each was armed with two Bren guns.  One fired forward through a simple firing slit. The second was unmounted.  Five carriers were brought forward from Porlock Harbour to participate in the attack on the morning of 5 December. These were manned by crews from the 2/5th Battalion and the 2/7th Battalion. This was a general attack by Warren force, at the eastern end of the Buna position.  The carriers were assigned to the left flank at Duropa plantation, by the water's edge. They were to support the III/128th Battalion. One carrier was hit by a mortar round but fought on until its engine failed.  The others became bellied on fallen logs.  The crews were attacked by tree-top snipers or with grenades tossed into their carrier's open top. The five vehicles had been immobilized within half an hour. The losses only served to confirm doctrine: that carriers were no substitute for tanks. Attacking troops were pinned down by heavy fire and withdrew to their original positions.
  Eight Stuart tanks of the 2/6th Armoured Regiment were transported in two lifts by the Karsik, from Milne Bay. This was immediately preceding commencement of Operation Lilliput. Their arrival coincided with that of 18th Brigade. The M3 Stuart was a light tank intended for the cavalry roles of reconnaissance and exploitation. The tank was only lightly armoured.  Its strengths were speed and mobility. The tank's cross-country performance was severely limited in close country or boggy conditions. It was armed with a relatively light 37 mm high velocity gun. It had a .30 calibre machine gun co-axially mounted and a second, ball mounted in the front of the hull. A third was provided for an external anti-aircraft mount. By conventional wisdom, it was ill-suited as an infantry support tank and not designed to operate in this role. Infantry tanks were more heavily armoured and relatively slow. For these reasons, the M3s were likened to "race horses harnessed to heavy ploughs". It lacked an external phone for communication with supporting infantry and the crews were not trained for combined arms operations.
  The Stuarts were committed in much the same location as the Bren carriers. They were to support the attack by the 2/9th Battalion on 18 December.  Operational orders were issued prior to the battle outlining some basic visual signals for infantry to use to communicate with the tanks. However, signals were often missed by the crews because the tanks had poor visibility. No time was given for rehearsal or liaison between the tank crews and supporting infantry. Much was left to the ingenuity of the crews and the infantry as the battle developed. Communications between infantry and tanks, and between the tanks themselves, was very difficult. The wireless sets in the tanks were practically useless in combat. American hand-held wirelesses were tried but the operators drew too much fire from Japanese snipers. Targets were identified by firing flares or by getting the attention of the tank crew b
caption: An M3 of the 2/6th Armoured Regiment supports infantry advancing through a coconut grove at Buna. Note the machine gun which is firing upward into the trees against snipers. AWM014008
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