page_title: Kursk submarine disaster
section_title: Rescue response
hierarchical_section_title: Kursk submarine disaster / Rescue response
context_page_description: The nuclear-powered Oscar-class submarine Kursk sank in an accident on 12 August 2000 in the Barents Sea, during the first major Russian naval exercise in more than ten years, and all 118 personnel on board were killed. The crews of nearby ships felt the initial explosion and a second, much larger, explosion; yet the Russian Navy did not realise that an accident had occurred and did not initiate a search for the sub for more than six hours. Because the submarine's emergency rescue buoy had been intentionally disabled during an earlier mission, it took more than 16 hours to locate the sunken boat.
  Over four days, the Russian Navy repeatedly failed in its attempts to attach four different diving bells and submersibles to the escape hatch of the submarine. Its response was criticised as slow and inept. Officials misled and manipulated the public and news media, and refused help from other governments. President Vladimir Putin initially continued his vacation at a seaside resort; he authorised the Russian Navy to accept British and Norwegian offers of assistance after five days had passed since the accident.
context_section_description: The crew of the submarine Karelia detected the explosion but the captain assumed that it was part of the exercise. Aboard Pyotr Velikiy, the target of the practice launch, the crew detected a hydro-acoustic signal characteristic of an underwater explosion and felt their hull shudder. They reported the phenomena to fleet headquarters but their report was ignored.
  The scheduled time period for Kursk to complete the practice torpedo firing expired at 13:30 without any contact from the sub. Accustomed to the frequent failure of communications equipment, Fleet Commander Admiral Vyacheslav Alekseyevich Popov aboard Pyotr Velikiy was not initially alarmed. The ship dispatched a helicopter to look for Kursk but it was unable to locate the sub on the surface; this was reported to Popov.
  The Northern Fleet duty officer notified the head of the fleet's search and rescue forces, Captain Alexander Teslenko, to stand by for orders. Teslenko's primary rescue ship was a 20-year-old former lumber carrier, Mikhail Rudnitsky, which had been converted to support submersible rescue operations. Teslenko notified the ship's captain to be ready to depart on one hour's notice. Berthed at the primary Northern Fleet base at Severomorsk, the ship was equipped with two AS-32 and AS-34 Priz-class deep-submergence rescue vehicle, a diving bell, underwater video cameras, lifting cranes, and other specialised gear. But she was not equipped with stabilisers capable of keeping the vessel in position during stormy weather and could lower her rescue vessels only in calm seas. The Russian Navy had previously operated two India-class submarines, each of which carried a pair of Poseidon class DSRVs that could reach a depth of 693 metres (2,274 ft), but due to a lack of funds, the vessels had been held since 1994 in a St. Petersburg yard for pending repairs.
  At 17:00, an Ilyushin 38 aircraft was dispatched. The crew spent three hours unsuccessfully searching for Kursk. At 18:00, more than six hours after the initial explosion, Kursk failed to complete a scheduled communication check. The Northern Fleet command became concerned and tried to contact the boat. After repeated failures, at 18:30 they began a search and rescue operation, dispatching additional aircraft to locate the submarine, which again failed to locate the boat on the surface. At 22:30, the Northern Fleet declared an emergency, and the exercise was stopped. Between fifteen and twenty-two vessels of the Northern Fleet, including about 3,000 sailors, began searching for the submarine. The Mikhail Rudnitsky left port at 00:30.
caption: Russian sailors on the surface aboard the DSRV AS-28 Priz
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