page_title: Jungle warfare
section_title: Conventional jungle warfare
hierarchical_section_title: Jungle warfare / History / Conventional jungle warfare
caption_attribution_description: English: AWM: Malaya: Johore, Muar Area, Bakri . A two pounder Anti-Tank Gun of the 4th Anti-Tank Regiment, 8th Australian Division, AIF, directed by VX38874 Sergeant (Sgt) en:Charles James Parsons, of Moonee Ponds, Vic, in action at a road block at en:Bakri on the Muar-Parit Sulong Road. In the background is a destroyed Japanese en:Type 95 Ha-Go Medium Tank. The Anti-Tank Gun was known as the rear gun because of its position in the defence layout of the area. Sgt Parsons was later awarded the en:Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM) for his and his crew's part in destroying six of the nine Japanese tanks during this engagement. This photograph also appears as negative no 068592. IWM: An Australian 2-pdr anti-tank gun of the 2/4th Australian Anti-Tank Regiment, commanded by Sgt Charles Parsons (left), firing on Japanese Type 95 Ha-Go tanks as they try to pass trees felled across the Muar - Parit Sulong road, near Bakri in Malaya, 18 January 1942. Nine tanks were destroyed by two 2-pdrs in this engagement, part of the battle of Muar, which took place around the Gemensah bridge and the Muar River in Johore. It was the last major engagement of the campaign.
context_page_description: Jungle warfare is a term used to cover the special techniques needed for military units to survive and fight in jungle terrain.
  It has been the topic of extensive study by military strategists, and was an important part of the planning for both sides in many conflicts, including World War II and the Vietnam War.
  The jungle has a variety of effects on military operations. Dense vegetation can limit lines of sight and arcs of fire, but can also provide ample opportunity for camouflage and plenty of material with which to build fortifications.
  Jungle terrain, often without good roads, can be inaccessible to vehicles and so makes logistical supply and transport difficult, which in turn places a premium on air mobility. The problems of transport make engineering resources important as they are needed to improve roads, build bridges and airfields, and improve water supplies.
  Jungle environments can also be inherently unhealthy, with various tropical diseases that have to be prevented or treated by medical services. Likewise the terrain can make it difficult to deploy armoured forces, or any other kind of forces on any large scale.
context_section_description: At the start of Pacific War in the Far East, the Japanese Imperial Forces were able to advance on all fronts. In the Malayan Campaign, time and again they infiltrated through the jungle to bypass static British positions based on road blocks so that they could cut the British supply line and attack their defences from all sides.
  In early 1942, the fighting in Burma at the start of the Burma Campaign took on a similar aspect and resulted in one of the longest retreats in British military history. Most members of the British Indian Army left Burma with the belief that the Japanese were unstoppable in the jungle.
  The Chindits were a special force of 3,500 which in February 1942 launched a deep penetration raid, (code-named Operation Longcloth) into Japanese occupied Burma. They went in on foot using mules to carry supplies. The operation was not a military success, but was a propaganda boost for the Allies, because it showed that Allied forces could successfully move and fight in jungle terrain well away from roads. On the back of the propaganda success, Orde Wingate, the eccentric commander of the Chindits, was given the resources to increase his command to divisional size and the USAAF supplied the 1st Air Commando Group to support his operations. The availability of air transport revolutionized Wingate's operational choices. In February 1944 Operation Thursday was launched, and air transport support supplied 1st Air to allow the Chindits to set up air supplied bases deep behind enemy lines from which aggressive combat patrols could be sent out to interdict Japanese supply lines and disrupt rear echelon forces. This in turn forced the Japanese 18th Division to pull front-line troops from the battle against X Force which was advancing through Northern Burma to protect the men building the Ledo Road. When the Japanese closed on a base and got within artillery range the base could be abandoned and then set up in another remote location. The ability to sustain the bases that relied totally on air power in the coming decades would prove a template for many similar operations.
  After the first Chindits expedition, thanks to the training the regular forces were receiving and the example of the Chindits and new divisional tactics, the regular units of the Fourteenth Army started to get the measure of both the jungle and the enemy. When the Japanese launched their late 1943 Arakan offensive they infiltrated Allied lines to attack the 7th Indian Infantry Division from the rear, overrunning the divisional HQ. Unlike previous occasions on which this had happened, the Allied forces stood firm against the attack and supplies were dropped to them by parachute. In the Battle of the Admin Box from 5 February to 23 February, the Japanese were unable to break through the heavily defended perimeter of the box. The Japanese switched their attack to the central front but again the British fell back into defensive box of Imphal, and the Kohima redoubt. In falling back to the defensive positions around Imphal the leading British formations found their retreat cut by Japanese forces, but unlike previously, they took that attitude that if the Japanese were behind them then they were just as cut off as the British. The situation maps of the fighting along the roads leading to Imphal resembled a slice of marble cake as both sides used the jungle to outflank each other. Another major change by the British was that use of air support both as an offensive weapon to replace artillery, and as a logistical tool to transport men and equipment. For example, the 5th Indian Infantry Division was airlifted straight from the now quieter Arakan front up to the central front and were in action within days of arriving. By the end of the campaigning season both Kohima and Imphal had been relieved and the Japanese were in full retreat.
  The lessons learnt in Burma of how to fight in the jungle and how to use air transport to move troops around would lay the foundations of how to conduct large scale jungle campaigns in future wars.
caption: Australian 2-pounder anti-tank gunners firing on Japanese tanks at the Muar-Parit Sulong Road.
exif: {}