page_title: Battle of Transylvania
section_title: Aftermath
hierarchical_section_title: Battle of Transylvania / Aftermath
caption_attribution_description: Deutsch: Oesterreichische 30,5-cm - Mörser-Batterie in Stellung am Roten-Turin-Paß. An der Straße eben eingebrachte rumänische Gefangene. English: Austro-Hungarian 30.5 cm artillery and Rumanian prisoners
context_page_description: The Battle of Transylvania was the first major operation of the Romanian forces Campaign during World War I, beginning on 27 August 1916. It started as an attempt by the Romanian Army to seize Transylvania, and potentially knock Austria-Hungary out of the war. Although initially successful, the offensive was brought to a halt after Bulgaria's attack on Dobruja. Coupled with a successful German and Austro-Hungarian counterattack which started in mid-September, the Romanian Army was eventually forced to retreat back to the Carpathians by mid-October. The Romanian armies however managed to escape the Central Powers' attempts to completely destroy them. The Battle of Transylvania also caused the replacement of the Chief of Staff of the German Army and the shifting of German attention to the region, causing German offensive operations at Verdun to cease.
context_section_description: The Romanian invasion caused the sacking of Erich von Falkenhayn as the Chief of Staff of the Imperial German Army. He was replaced by Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff. Falkehnayn's dismissal made him "the first German casualty of the campaign". Stopping the Romanian advance into Transylvania became the top German priority, meaning that the offensive at Verdun had to be ended. The German 9th Army was created on 6 September specifically to deal with the situation in Transylvania, and it was commanded by Falkenhayn. Several of its units were moved to Transylvania from various fronts: two Reserve Corps headquarters from the Baltic Front, the 187th Infantry Division from Alsace, the 89th Infantry Division from Galicia, and the 3rd Cavalry Division from Russia. Although commanders from all fronts begged Ludendorff for reinforcements, the latter made his priorities clear: "Hold on to all our positions along the Western, Eastern, Italian and Macedonian Fronts; [and] deploy any and all available forces for the decisive blow against the Romanians.". The Austrians moved mountain brigades from the Italian Front to Transylvania, while the Germans redeployed the Alpine Corps from Verdun and the 76th Reserve Division from Riga. 
  Before the counter-offensive of the Central Powers, it was established that Germany would be in charge. On 28 August, the Austrians - unable to muster resistance at any level - reluctantly agreed to a unified Central Powers command for the Eastern Front. This essentially meant handing control of all military operations to the Germans. Due to the Austro-Hungarians being initially outnumbered more than 10 to 1, Romania could be defeated only through the joint effort of all four Central Powers, but this would have been possible only under a unified command. During September the Central Powers ratified agreements making the German emperor their supreme commander, a concession which gave Hindenburg and Ludendorff control over the Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian and Ottoman armies. Politically, the new unified command under the German Kaiser was created on 7 September. It not only cemented German ascendancy in the Berlin-Vienna alliance, but also limited the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic initiative. The Central Powers chain of command during the battle was clear: the Austro-Hungarian General Arz was the one taking orders from the German General Falkenhayn, not the other way around. An example of this can be found towards the end of the battle, when Falkenhayn ordered Arz to pursue the retreating enemy.
  The German 9th Army defeated and drove back across the Transylvanian border two Romanian armies, but failed to destroy them. The bulk of the Romanian 1st Army managed to escape through the Red Tower Pass, leaving behind only 3,000 prisoners. The Romanian 2nd Army left behind even fewer prisoners during its retreat across the border, just 1,175. The German 89th Division failed to "stay glued to the retreating enemy", as Falkenhayn had ordered. Instead, its tired soldiers set up camp. The amount of Romanian prisoners was small compared to comparable battles against the Russians. Falkenhayn attributed this to the ability of the Romanians to fade away into the mountains, but the speed of the Romanian withdrawal also played a part. Other factors for the "disappointing" number of prisoners include determined Romanian counterattacks which - combined with the ruggedness of the terrain - left the Germans too tired to conduct immediate pursuits, as well as determined rearguard actions which forced Falkenhayn's units to exercise caution. Nonetheless, the Germans did their absolute best, with Falkenhayn himself stating: "with the best will in the world it was not possible to increase our efforts".  
  The Austro-Hungarian 1st Army performed much poorer than its German ally. Despite stubborn resistance, it continued to be pushed back by the Romanian North Army as late as October. When the North Army was ordered to retreat in early October, the exhausted Austrians moved slowly and gave their enemies an uncontested run to the border
caption: Austrian mortar battery at Turnu Roșu Pass, with a column of Romanian prisoners of war in the background
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