page_title: Second Battle of Bull Run
section_title: August 30: Longstreet counterattack, Union retreat
hierarchical_section_title: Second Battle of Bull Run / Battle / August 30: Longstreet counterattack, Union retreat
caption_attribution_description: English: Identifier: photographichist02mill (find matches) Title: The photographic history of the Civil War&#160;: thousands of scenes photographed 1861-65, with text by many special authorities Year: 1911 (1910s) Authors: Miller, Francis Trevelyan, 1877-1959 Lanier, Robert S. (Robert Sampson), 1880- Subjects: United States -- History Civil War, 1861-1865 Pictorial works United States -- History Civil War, 1861-1865 Publisher: New York&#160;: Review of Reviews Co. Contributing Library: New York Public Library Digitizing Sponsor: MSN View Book Page: Book Viewer About This Book: Catalog Entry View All Images: All Images From Book Click here to view book online to see this illustration in context in a browseable online version of this book. Text Appearing Before Image: ' Text Appearing After Image: COPTRIGmT 9* PATRIOT PUB. CO. THE ADVANCE THAT BECAME A RETREAT The Stone Bridge across Bull Run. When the Federal army silently put Bull Run between itself and Leeon the night of August 30, 1862, Popes attempt to capture Richmond was turned into a Confederate ad-vance upon Washington. Lee, on discovering Popes position at Centreville on the next day, sent Stone-wall Jackson to turn the Federal right. Crossing Bull Run at Sudley Ford, Jackson advanced along acountry road till he reached the Little River Turnpike, on which the troops bivouacked for the night. OnSeptember 1st he was met near Chantilly by Reno and Kearney, who had been sent by Pope to intercepthim. A fierce encounter followed in a drenching rainstorm. The brilliant bayonet charge by Birney, incommand of the division of General Phili)) Kearney, who had just fallen, drove back the Confederates,and Birney held the field that night. The next morning orders came from General Halleck for the brokenand demoralized army of Pope Note About Images Please note that these images are extracted from scanned page images that may have been digitally enhanced for readability - coloration and appearance of these illustrations may not perfectly resemble the original work.
context_page_description: The Second Battle of Bull Run or Battle of Second Manassas was fought August 29–30, 1862, in Prince William County, Virginia, as part of the American Civil War. It was the culmination of the Northern Virginia Campaign waged by Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia against Union Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of Virginia, and a battle of much larger scale and numbers than the First Battle of Bull Run fought on July 21, 1861 on the same ground.
  Following a wide-ranging flanking march, Confederate Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson captured the Union supply depot at Manassas Junction, threatening Pope's line of communications with Washington, D.C. Withdrawing a few miles to the northwest, Jackson took up strong concealed defensive positions on Stony Ridge and awaited the arrival of the wing of Lee's army commanded by Maj. Gen. James Longstreet. On August 28, 1862, Jackson attacked a Union column just east of Gainesville, at Brawner's Farm, resulting in a stalemate but successfully getting Pope's attention. On that same day, Longstreet broke through light Union resistance in the Battle of Thoroughfare Gap and approached the battlefield.
context_section_description: The final element of Longstreet's command, the division of Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, marched 17 miles (27 km) and arrived on the battlefield at 3 a.m., August 30. Exhausted and unfamiliar with the area, they halted on a ridge east of Groveton. At dawn, they realized they were in an isolated position too close to the enemy and fell back. Pope's belief that the Confederate army was in retreat was reinforced by this movement, which came after the withdrawal of Hood's troops the night before.
  Pope thus directed McDowell to move his entire corps up the Sudley Road and hit the Confederate right flank. McDowell however protested this order, stating that he had no idea what was happening down on the Confederate left and he would much prefer to have his troops on Chinn Ridge. He then said that it would make more sense to attack the Confederate right with Heintzelman's troops, since they were closer to this area. Pope gave in, but decided to detach King's division to support Heintzelman.
  At an 8 a.m. council of war at Pope's headquarters, his subordinates attempted to convince their commander to move cautiously. Probes of the Confederate line on Stony Ridge around 10 a.m. indicated that Stonewall Jackson's men were still firmly in their defensive positions. John F. Reynolds indicated that the Confederates were in great strength south of the turnpike. Fitz John Porter arrived later with similar intelligence. However, Heintzelman and McDowell conducted a personal reconnaissance that somehow failed to find Jackson's defensive line, and Pope finally made up his mind to attack the retreating Southerners.
  While Porter was bringing his corps up, a further mix-up in orders resulted in the loss of two brigades. Abram Sanders Piatt's small brigade, which had been detached from the defenses of Washington D.C. and temporarily attached to the V Corps, and Charles Griffin's brigade both pulled out of Porter's main column, marched back down to Manassas Junction, and then up to Centreville. Morell, using an outdated set of orders from a day earlier, had assumed Pope was at Centreville and he was expected to join him there. Piatt eventually realized that something was amiss and turned back around towards the battlefield, arriving on Henry House Hill at about 4 p.m. Griffin and his division commander Maj. Gen George W. Morell however stayed at Centreville despite their discovery that Pope was not there. Eventually, at 4 p.m., Griffin began moving his brigade towards the action, but by this point, Pope's army was in full retreat and a mass of wagons and stragglers were blocking the roadway, in addition the bridge over Cub Run was broken, making it impossible for him to move any further west.
  As Ricketts's division approached the Confederate lines, it became clear that the enemy was still there in force and was showing no sign of retreating. Pope, unnerved by these reports, contemplated waiting for McClellan to arrive with the II and VI Corps, but then worried that McClellan would take credit for any victory in the battle, so he decided to attack immediately rather than wait. Shortly after noon, Pope issued orders for Porter's corps, supported by Hatch and Reynolds, to advance west along the turnpike. At the same time, Ricketts, Kearny, and Hooker were to advance on the Confederate right. This dual movement would potentially crush the retreating Confederates. But the Confederates were not retreating, and were in fact hoping to be attacked. Lee was still waiting for an opportunity to counterattack with Longstreet's force. Although he was not certain that Pope would attack that day, Lee positioned 18 artillery pieces under Col. Stephen D. Lee on high ground northeast of the Brawner Farm, ideally situated to bombard the open fields in front of Jackson's position.
  Porter's corps was actually not in position to pursue west on the turnpike, but was in the woods north of the turnpike near Groveton. It took about two hours to prepare the assault on Jackson's line, ten brigades numbering roughly 10,000 men, with 28 artillery pieces on Dogan Ridge to supp
caption: Bridge crossed by the Union troops retreating to Centreville
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