page_title: 159th Combat Aviation Brigade
section_title: COP Keating
hierarchical_section_title: 159th Combat Aviation Brigade / Post 9/11 / 2008 Afghanistan deployment / COP Keating
caption_attribution_description: Chinook helicopter above Combat Outpost Keating, Nuristan, Afghanistan Original caption: " A Chinook helicopter lands at Combat Outpost Keating, Afghanistan, in this March 2007, file photo. A military investigation of a Taliban attack last fall on the remote U.S. army outpost that left eight American soldiers dead and 22 wounded has resulted in administrative punishments for two commanders blamed for "inadequate measures taken by the chain of command." (Sgt. Amber Robinson/U.S. Army)
context_page_description: The 159th Combat Aviation Brigade formerly supported the 101st Airborne Division, and was stationed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. While active, 159th CAB made the 101st Airborne Division the only US Army Division with two organic aviation brigades, and currently the 101st Combat Aviation Brigade is the only CAB supporting the unit at Fort Campbell. The 159th Combat Aviation Brigade was inactivated on 15 May 2015.
  The lineage of the 159th Aviation Brigade is separate from that of the Vietnam-era 159th Aviation Battalion and the later 159th Aviation Regiment.
context_section_description: As we came over the mountain, all we could see was a big column of smoke coming from Keating. We were looking at Keating, and it was just a massive fire. Everything was burning down.
  — Chief Warrant Officer 3 Ross D. Lewallen, 159th CAB Apache Pilot
  159th CAB Aviators from Task Force Pale Horse (7-17 Cavalry) provided direct air support to the ground troops during the attack on COP Keating on 3 October 2009. COP Keating was located in a depression, surrounded by mountains. Because of the extremely small size of the one-hundred meter outpost, the landing zone was located 'outside the wire' - a common expression for being outside the defensive perimeter in an unsecure area. The landing zone had only enough room for one Chinook or two Blackhawks to land at one time. This would greatly complicate support and reinforcement efforts before, during, and after the Battle of Kamdesh.
  Observation Post Fritsche was located on top of a nearby mountain, overlooking COP Keating and a significant liability were it overrun. The Blackhawks quickly left accompanied by two Apaches, with a load of approximately thirty infantry to fortify OP Fritsche. Upon arriving at the site, the Blackhawks began receiving heavy ground fire from what would later be assessed as a 300-strong element of enemy fighters. More troublingly, OP Fritsche could offer no support to neighboring COP Keating as the force was cut off by heavy enemy machine gun and RPG fire from within the valley. This constituted a problem for the helicopter teams since the regular avenue of approach to COP Keating was through the low-lying terrain of said valley. 
  In an attempt to conceal their approach, the aircraft took a non-traditional approach by flying directly over the mountain ridge. After multiple turns in the area while under fire, the two Blackhawks were able to insert more than 100 Soldiers to reinforce the outpost. Meanwhile, the Apaches remained overhead providing support to the battered U.S. force at COP Keating. The Apache crews had been verbally told that the COP was taking heavy fire from small arms and RPGs prior to departure, however the situation was unstable and the Apache crews were worried of accidentally firing upon friendly troops. Via radio contact with the ground force within COP Keating, the crews were told to consider anyone outside the wire perimeter to be hostile. As a result, the attack aircraft engaged some thirty armed individuals just outside a large visible breach in the defensive works of COP Keating. Just after this time MEDEVAC aircraft attempted to extract wounded, but were forced to turn back due to heavy ground fire. The Apaches remained on-station for approximately 90 minutes taking repeated damage from small arms fire and eventually running out of ammunition.
  As a result of small arms damage, the Apache crews were forced to switch aircraft upon returning to FOB Bostick rather than simply rearming and refueling. This had the fortunate side-effect of allowing the crews several minutes to return to the nearby unit TOC, exchange maps and information of the situation, and learn of the most recent real-time intelligence regarding events on the ground. The Apaches returned to COP Keating and began engaging a mixed group of 25 enemy fighters in and around the nearby police station and mosque. Overcast weather from an incoming thunder storm allowed the pilots to clearly see muzzle flashes from small arms and DShK heavy machine guns directed at them and friendly ground forces. The impending thunderstorm was both a blessing and a curse, as the Apaches were forced again to return to FOB Bostick due to severe weather. After approximately a one-hour weather hold, 159th CAB aircraft returned to the area one final time that day to further support ground forces with Apache fire and conduct one further reinforcement of OP Fritsche.
  As a result of heroism in the face of enemy fire, 3-101 Apache pilots Captain Matthew J. Kaplan, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Ross D. Lewallen, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Randy L. Huff, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Christopher N. Wright and Chief
caption: Image of COP Keating showing small size of the Helicopter Landing Zone (HLZ) and proximity to occupied buildings.
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