page_title: Hapag-Lloyd Flight 3378
section_title: Incident
hierarchical_section_title: Hapag-Lloyd Flight 3378 / Incident
context_page_description: Hapag-Lloyd Flight 3378 was a passenger service operated by Hapag-Lloyd Flug from Chania, on the island of Crete, Greece, to Hannover, Germany. On 12 July 2000, the aircraft flying the route, an Airbus A310-304, registration D-AHLB, with 143 passengers and 8 crew on board, set off for Hannover leaving the landing gear fully extended, as a precaution, since a malfunction had prevented its proper retraction after take-off. The plane eventually ran out of fuel while attempting a diversion to Vienna, crash-landing just short of runway 34. No fatalities resulted, although the aircraft was written off.
context_section_description: Captain Wolfgang Arminger (56) was the pilot-in-command. The flight departed at 10:59 CEDT, shortly after which it was found to be impossible to fully retract the landing gear, as indicated by both the red "gear unsafe" lamp and the yellow "gear door open" lamp. After a total of four retraction attempts, the gear was left in the fully extended condition where all lights indicated a valid condition with the doors trimmed for cruise airspeed.  The flight continued towards Germany, as fuel must be burned before landing in any case. The crew had to cope with a heavier cockpit workload that was aggravated by the unavailability of the airline HF radio station for technical consultation, forcing the first officer to spend almost an hour establishing alternative communications with the airline through ACARS and Stockholm Radio. Using the Flight Management System (FMS), the crew estimated the aircraft's fuel consumption, and the captain in consultation with dispatch decided to shorten the flight and divert to Munich, where another A310 would be ready to take the passengers to their final destination. However, the captain ignored the fact that the FMS was not designed to take into account the extra drag produced by the extended landing gear. In fact, Munich was not within range, as eventually became clear from the unexpectedly rapid fall in fuel reserves.  At about 12:00 CEDT, this led the captain to decide to divert to Vienna-Schwechat Airport.
  Shortly thereafter, the first officer noted and reported to the captain that they had already consumed half of their initial fuel load, although they had progressed to only their last waypoint "YNN" still inside Greece (about a third of the total distance to Vienna).  At 12:34, the FMS prediction for fuel remaining upon arrival at Vienna fell to 1.9 t.  Under such conditions, the airline rules require immediate diversion to the nearest suitable airport, which would have been Zagreb, 10 minutes away.  The investigation report states "there was no evidence of immediate crew response to this situation." While contact with Zagreb ATC was made 9 minutes later, the crew pressed on towards Vienna, requesting the most direct access to a runway.  At 12:53, the crew notified Vienna ATC that if direct runway access were not available, they would prefer to divert to closer Graz. This prompted Vienna ATC to inquire and finally learn that the flight was short of fuel, but the pilots declared no emergency, still anticipating a normal landing. When the fuel gauges fell through 1.9 t remaining, the first officer twice urged the captain to declare an emergency, but the captain postponed such action.  At 13:01, the "LT-Fuel low level" warning indicated remaining fuel of 1340 kg, which automatically generates an ACARS message. At this time, the aircraft was 42 nautical miles (78 km) northeast of Zagreb, 85 nautical miles (157 km) south-east from Graz, and 131 nautical miles (243 km) from the destination Vienna. At 11:07 UTC, the crew finally declared an emergency due to lack of fuel, while still stating that they expected to reach Vienna.
  At this point, the crew was still debating a possible diversion to Graz, but discovered that the approach chart for that airport was missing from the aircraft map collection.  At 11:12 UTC, the crew still debated the contribution of the FMS to their plight; the first officer (correctly) distrusted its performance with gear down, while the captain still defended it.  The captain instructed the first officer to request no emergency services for post-landing, and to defer deployment of the flaps, especially if the engines flamed out.  At 11:26 UTC, the pressure dropped at the inlet of the right external fuel pump, but the pump was left running.  Both engines flamed out 12 nautical miles (22 km) from the runway, although the first officer was able to restart them for a few more minutes of thrust.  As there was no time for the final checklist, the "Land Recovery" switch was neglected, resulting in limited operation of inboard ailerons needed for stability control at low speeds.  
caption: D-AHLB, the aircraft involved in the accident in 1992.
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