page_title: Chadian–Libyan conflict
section_title: Libyan escalation
hierarchical_section_title: Chadian–Libyan conflict / Conflict / Libyan escalation
caption_attribution_description: English: LARAF MiG-23MS with empty missile rails rolling along the runway at Faya Largeau AB in northern Chad, sometime in mid-1980s. Notice also the radome of an Il-76MD in the foreground left. Faya Largeau was the main Libyan base in northern Chad, until the building of Ouadi Doum. Français&#160;: MiG-23MS de l'armée de l'air libyenne roulant sur la piste de la base aérienne de Faya Largeau au Tchad au milieu des années 1980
context_page_description: The Chadian–Libyan conflict was a series of military campaigns in Chad between 1978 and 1987, fought between Libyan and allied Chadian forces against Chadian groups supported by France, with the occasional involvement of other foreign countries and factions. Libya had been involved in Chad's internal affairs prior to 1978 and before Muammar Gaddafi's rise to power in Libya in 1969, beginning with the extension of the Chadian Civil War to northern Chad in 1968. The conflict was marked by a series of four separate Libyan interventions in Chad, taking place in 1978, 1979, 1980–1981 and 1983–1987. In all of these occasions Gaddafi had the support of a number of factions participating in the civil war, while Libya's opponents found the support of the French government, which intervened militarily to support the Chadian government in 1978, 1983 and 1986.
  The pattern of the war delineated itself in 1978, with the Libyans providing armour, artillery and air support and their Chadian allies the infantry, which assumed the bulk of the scouting and fighting.
context_section_description: The Malloum-Habré accord was perceived by Gaddafi as a serious threat to his influence in Chad, and he increased the level of Libyan involvement. For the first time with the active participation of Libyan ground units, Goukouni's FAP unleashed the Ibrahim Abatcha offensive on 29 January 1978 against the last outposts held by the government in northern Chad: Faya-Largeau, Fada and Ounianga Kébir. The attacks were successful, and Oueddei and the Libyans assumed control of the BET Prefecture.
  The decisive confrontation between the Libyan-FAP forces and the Chadian regular forces took place at Faya-Largeau, the capital of the BET. The city, defended by 5,000 Chadian soldiers, fell on 18 February after sharp fighting to a force of 2,500 rebels, supported by possibly as many as 4,000 Libyan troops. The Libyans do not seem to have directly participated in the fighting; in a pattern that was to repeat itself in the future, the Libyans provided armor, artillery and air support. The rebels also were much better armed than before, displaying Strela-2 surface-to-air missiles.
  Oueddei captured about 2,500 prisoners in 1977 and 1978; as a result, the Chadian Armed Forces lost at least 20% of its manpower. In particular, the National and Nomadic Guard (GNN) was decimated by the fall of Fada and Faya. Oueddei used these victories to strengthen his position in the FROLINAT: during a Libyan-sponsored congress held in March in Faya-Largeau, the insurgency's main factions reunited themselves and nominated Oueddei as the secretary-general.
  Malloum's reaction to the Goukouni–Gaddafi offensive was to sever diplomatic relations with Libya on 6 February and bring before the UN Security Council the issue of Libyan involvement. He raised again the question of Libya's occupation of the Aouzou Strip; on 19 February, however, after the fall of Faya-Largeau, Malloum was forced to accept a ceasefire and withdraw the protest. Gaddafi halted the advance of Oueddei because of pressure from France, then an important supplier of Libya's weapons.
  Malloum and Gaddafi restored diplomatic relations on 24 February in Sabha, Libya, where an international peace conference was held which included as mediators Niger's President, Seyni Kountché, and Sudan's Vice-President, Abu al-Gasim Mohamed Ibrahim. Under severe pressure from France, Sudan and Zaire, Malloum was forced to sign the Benghazi Accord, which recognized the FROLINAT and agreed on a new ceasefire, on 27 March. The agreement called for the creation of a joint Libya–Niger military committee tasked with implementation; through this committee, Chad legitimized Libyan intervention in its territory. The accord also contained a condition dear to Libya: the termination of all French military presence in Chad. The stillborn accord was for Gaddafi nothing more than a strategy to strengthen his protégé Oueddei; it also weakened considerably Malloum's prestige among southern Chadians, who saw his concessions as a proof of his weak leadership.
  On 15 April, only a few days after signing the ceasefire, Oueddei left Faya-Largeau, leaving there a Libyan garrison of 800 men. Relying on Libyan armor and air power, Goukouni's forces conquered a small FAT garrison and turned towards N'Djamena.
  Against Oueddei stood freshly arrived French forces. Already in 1977, after Oueddei first offensives, Malloum had asked for a French military return in Chad, but President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was at first reluctant to commit himself before the 1978 legislative elections; also, France was afraid of damaging its profitable commercial and diplomatic relations with Libya. However, the rapid deterioration of the situation in Chad resolved the President on 20 February 1978 to start Opération Tacaud, which by April brought 2,500 troops to Chad to secure the capital from the rebels.
  The decisive battle took place at Ati, a town 430 kilometres northeast of N'Djamena. The town's garrison of 1,500 soldiers was attacked on 19 May by the FROLINAT insurgents, equipped with artillery and modern weapons. The garrison was relieved by the arrival o
caption: MiG-23 M's with empty missile rails rolling along the runway at Faya Largeau Airbase, some time in the mid-1980s
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