page_title: Julian's Persian War
section_title: Ctesiphon
hierarchical_section_title: Julian's Persian War / Progress of the war / Ctesiphon
caption_attribution_description: English: Julian II near Ctesifon (363); from IX century book with orations of Gregory the Great Русский: Юлиан II под стенами Ктесифона, миниатюра из рукописи IX века с речами Григория Назианзенского.
context_page_description: Julian's Persian War, or the Perso-Roman War of 363, was the last undertaking of the Roman emperor Julian, begun in March 363. It was an aggressive war against the Sasanian Empire ruled by Shapur II.
  Aiming for the Sasanian capital Ctesiphon, Julian assembled a large army. In order to mislead the opponent and carry out a pincer attack, he sent a detachment to join with his ally Arshak II of Arsacid Armenia and to take the Tigris route from the north. Meanwhile, with his main army and a large fleet he advanced rapidly down the Euphrates relatively unopposed, destroyed several fortified cities, and reached the walls of the Sasanian capital, where a large force was assembled to defend it.
  The Romans won a victory outside Ctesiphon, but the northern army failed to arrive and the fortified capital seemed impregnable. Thus, Julian did not attempt to besiege the city and instead, burned the Roman fleet of supplies and marched into Persia's interior. Shapur II's army, however, still avoided a full-scale battle and used scorched earth tactics; as a result, Julian's army soon faced supply problems and had to retreat to the north.
context_section_description: After destroying the private residence, palaces and gardens of the Persian monarchy north of Ctesiphon (including an extensive menagerie), and securing his position by improvised fortifications, Julian turned his attention to the city itself. 
  The twin cities of Ctesiphon and Seleucia (rebuilt as Veh-Ardashir) lay before Julian to the south. In order to invest the place on both sides, Julian first dug a canal between the Euphrates and Tigris, allowing his fleet to enter the latter river, and by this means ferried his army to the further bank. A large Persian army had assembled in Ctesiphon, which was the appointed place of rendezvous for Shapur's army at the outset of the campaign; this was arrayed along the eastern bank in strong defensive positions, and it required the advantages of night-time and surprise, and subsequently a prolonged struggle on the escarpment, reportedly lasting twelve hours, to gain the passage of the river. But in the contest victory lay ultimately with the Romans, and the Persians were driven back within the city walls after sustaining losses of twenty-five hundred men; Julian's casualties are given at no more than 70.
  Though Julian had brought with him through Assyria a large train of siege engines and offensive weapons, and he was supplied by an active fleet which possessed the undisputed navigation of the river, the Romans appear to have been at some difficulty in putting Ctesiphon to the siege. Although it had fallen on several previous occasions to the Romans, the city was definitely better fortified than in the second century.
  Confronted with the difficulty to capture the city, Julian called a council of war, at which it was decided not to besiege the city and march into Persia's interior instead—a turning point of the campaign. Apparently, it met with resistance within the army. The reasons for this decision are uncertain; according to Ammianus, it was due to the fear of a two-front war, since Shapur II's army was apparently nearby. According to Libanios, Shapur II sent an emissary to Julian, who refused it. After abandoning the siege, Julian burned his fleet of provisions to avoid its fall into the Sasanians' hands, which was a logical decision as Julian's army now had to move upstream the river. Another theory is that Julian was deceived by Sasanian deserters. Julian was possibly still hoping to join up with the reinforcements from Armenia and then defeat Shapur II's army in a regular battle.
  It is possible the intention was justified by the hope of destroying the army of Shapur before the latter should join with the already numerous garrison of Ctesiphon to besiege the camp of the besiegers. More inexplicable is the burning of the fleet, and most of the provisions, which had been transported the whole course of the Euphrates with such monumental cost. Although ancient and modern historians have censured the rashness of the deed, Edward Gibbon palliates the folly by observing that Julian expected a plentiful supply from the harvests of the fertile territory by which he was to march, and, with regard to the fleet, that it was not navigable up the river, and must be taken by the Persians if abandoned intact.  Meanwhile, if he retreated northward with the entire army immediately, his already considerable achievements would be undone, and his prestige irreparably damaged, as one who had obtained success by stratagem and fled upon the resurgence of the foe. There were therefore no negligible reasons for his abandonment of the siege, the fleet, and the safe familiarity of the river bank.
caption: 9th-century painting of Julian near Ctesiphon
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