page_title: Manstein Plan
section_title: Analysis
hierarchical_section_title: Manstein Plan / Aftermath / Analysis
caption_attribution_description: For documentary purposes the German Federal Archive often retained the original image captions, which may be erroneous, biased, obsolete or politically extreme. Hitler im Hauptquartier des Oberbefehlshabers des Heeres Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch. Vlnr am Kartentisch: Generalfeldmarschall [Wilhelm] Keitel, Generalfeldmarschall [Walther] v. Brauchitsch, [Adolf] Hitler, Gen. Oberst [Franz] Halder
context_page_description: The Manstein Plan is one of the names used to describe the war plan of the German Army during the Battle of France in 1940. The original invasion plan was an awkward compromise devised by General Franz Halder, the chief of Oberkommando des Heeres staff and satisfied no one. Documents with details of the plan fell into Belgian hands during the Mechelen incident of 10 January 1940 and the plan was revised several times, each giving more emphasis to an attack by Army Group A through the Ardennes, which progressively reduced the offensive by Army Group B through the Low Countries to a diversion.
  In the final version of the plan, the main effort of the German invasion was made against the Ardennes, which by coincidence, was the weakest part of the Allied line, where the defence was left to second-rate French divisions in the Second Army and the Ninth Army, on the assumption that the difficulty of moving masses of men and equipment would give the French plenty of time to send reinforcements if the area was attacked.
context_section_description: The success of the German invasion surprised everyone; the Germans had hardly dared hope for such a result. Most generals had vehemently opposed the plan as being much too risky; even those supporting it had mainly done so out of desperation because the geostrategic position of Germany seemed so hopeless. Two of the most prominent were Hitler and Halder; Hitler had not liked Halder's original plans and had suggested many alternatives, some of them bearing a resemblance to the Manstein Plan, the closest being a proposal made by him on 25 October 1939. Soon, Nazi propaganda began to claim that the victory was a result of Hitler's military genius; Hitler said,
  Of all the generals with whom I spoke about the new attack plan in the West, Manstein was the only one who understood me!
  After the war, Halder claimed he was the main instigator of the German plan, supporting this with the fact that he had begun to consider changing the main axis to Sedan as early as September 1939 and that Manstein's original proposal was too traditional.
  The Manstein Plan is often seen as either the result of or the cause of a mid-20th century Revolution in military affairs. In the former hypothesis, expounded by J. F. C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart immediately after the events, the Manstein Plan is presented as a result of the evolution of German military thinking since the First World War by Hans von Seeckt and Guderian, adopting the ideas of Fuller or Liddell Hart. If true, an explicit Blitzkrieg doctrine would have been established by 1939 and been the basis of the plan for the Invasion of Poland; the Manstein Plan would have been its most spectacular implementation. Blitzkrieg theory would have been reflected in the organisation and equipment of the army and Luftwaffe and would have been radically different from those of France, Britain and the Soviet Union, except for the contributions of individuals like Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Charles de Gaulle, Fuller and Liddell Hart. That the earliest plans by Halder or Manstein and the final plan by Halder did not conform to this doctrine is an anomaly, to be explained by circumstances.
  In the latter hypothesis, favoured by Robert Doughty and Karl-Heinz Frieser, the Manstein Plan was a return to the principles of 19th century Bewegungskrieg (war of manoeuvre), adapted to modern technology by a sudden and unexpected departure from established German thinking, through the Blitzkrieg elements provided and executed by Guderian. The influence of Fuller and Liddell Hart in Germany was limited and exaggerated by them after the war; no explicit Blitzkrieg doctrine can be found in pre-war German army records. German tank production had no priority and plans for the German war economy were based on the premise of a long war, not a swift victory. The hypothesis allows for a gradual adoption during the thirties of technologically-advanced military equipment and integration into existing Bewegungskrieg thought, familiar to all the great powers prior to 1940, differences being variations on a theme. The invasion of Poland was not "Blitzkrieg but an annihilation battle fought according to Vernichtungsgedanke" (annihilation theory). The lack of Blitzkrieg elements in the plans for Fall Gelb is seen as unremarkable; only after the crossings of the Meuse, the sudden success of the break-out and the insubordination of Guderian and other tank commanders during the rush down the Somme valley, would "Blitzkrieg" have been adopted as an explicit theory, in this view making Operation Barbarossa the first and only Blitzkrieg campaign.
  Guderian presented the situation in his postwar book Erinnerungen eines Soldaten Memories of a Soldier 1950 (published in English as Panzer Leader) according to the second hypothesis, posing as a lone voice against the reactionary German officer corps. In 2006, Adam Tooze wrote that the quick victory in France was not the consequence of a logical strategic synthesis but a "risky improvisation" to cope with strategic dilemmas that Hitler and the German military leaders had been unable to overcome b
caption: Keitel, Brauchitsch, Hitler and Halder (from l. to r.) studying a map of France during the 1940 campaign
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