Document:

Exhibit

PERFORMANCE-BASED BONUS PLAN
(As Adopted on February 18, 2016) 

1.    Purpose.  The purpose of the Gentex Corporation Performance-Based Bonus Plan is to further emphasize performance-based compensation that increasingly provides executive officers, officers, and/or other key employees of the Corporation with appropriate incentives concerning corporate and individual performance, enhancing the alignment between such key employees and shareholders.

2.    Definitions.  The following terms are defined for use herein as follows:

a.    "Board" means the Board of Directors of the Corporation.

b.    "Committee" means the Compensation Committee of the Board.

c.    "Corporation" means Gentex Corporation.

d.    "Participant" means an employee eligible to participate in the Plan under the terms and conditions of the Plan.

e.    "Plan" means this Performance-Based Bonus Plan as in effect from time to time.
        
3.    Administration.

a.    The Plan shall be administered by the Committee.  The Committee shall, in its discretion, determine the employees to participate in this Plan.  The Committee shall have full power and authority to interpret the provisions of the Plan, to supervise the administration of the Plan, and to adopt forms and procedures for the administration of the Plan.  All determinations made by the Committee with respect to the Plan shall be final and conclusive.

b.    Participation in this Plan shall be entirely within the discretion of the Committee.  Nothing herein contained shall be construed to give any employee any right to employment or to participate in this Plan.

4.    Eligibility.  Only employees of the Corporation shall be eligible to participate in the Plan.  

5.     Terms of Participation.  

a.    Participation.  Any executive officer, officer, or other key employee designated by the Committee shall be eligible to participate in the Plan.

b.    Elements.  The following performance-based pay elements shall apply to Participants in the Plan:

        
(i)    Additional Profit-Sharing Bonus – In addition to participation in the Profit-Sharing Bonus Plan of the Corporation (in which all employees participate), an Additional Profit-Sharing Bonus shall be available to Participants.  For each year during which this Plan is made effective by the Committee, each Participant shall receive a ten percent (10%) increase in the Profit-Sharing Bonus percentage (on a weighted average basis) that was used to calculate the Profit-Sharing Bonuses paid to  all employees for such year (without regard to this Plan) for each one percent (1%) by which net sales in such year exceed net sales in the prior year.  The Participant’s total bonus paid pursuant to the Additional Profit-Sharing Bonus is calculated as the weighted average Profit-Sharing Bonus percentage for the year, plus the Additional Profit-Sharing Bonus percentage determined above, multiplied by the closing annual base pay rate of the Participant, less the accumulated Profit-Sharing Bonus paid to the Participant for the preceding calendar year. 

(ii)    Performance Bonus – Performance bonuses shall be available to Participants based on the achievement of the following performance metrics:

(a)    EBITDA, which will have a 33.33% weighting;

(b)    Diluted Earnings per Share, which will have a 33.33% weighting; and

(c)    Quality, which will have a 33.33% weighting.

For purposes of determining such performance bonuses, the Committee will annually establish a threshold and a target for each applicable performance metric.  No performance bonus will be paid with respect to any performance metric unless the threshold established by the Compensation Committee is exceeded.  A maximum of up to ten percent (10%) of  the closing annual base pay rate of a Participant will be paid to each Participant as a performance bonus provided that the targets for all performance metrics which the Committee has established are met or exceeded.  To the extent performance exceeds the established threshold, but does not meet the established target, a pro rata portion of the maximum bonus payable will be paid as a performance bonus (based on the percentage of the target achieved in excess of the threshold).  The Quality metric is based on a combination of parts per million and overall Corporation cost of Quality.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, based on any criteria it establishes, the Committee reserves the right to increase a 

2

performance bonus for personal goal achievement up to twenty-five percent (25%) of such bonus and to continue to pay bonuses for personal goal achievement to any non-CEO Participants of up to twenty-five percent (25%) of base compensation.

(iii)    Payment of Bonuses – Any and all bonuses under this Plan shall be payable in accordance with policies and procedures established by the Committee from time to time, and payment shall only occur after the Committee has calculated and verified that such bonuses are payable.

6.    Effective Date of Plan, Termination and Amendment.  The Plan shall become effective as of the date of adoption of the Plan by the Board, provided the Plan can, in the discretion of the Committee, be applied to the year prior to Plan adoption.  Unless previously terminated by the Board, the Plan shall terminate on the date ten (10) years subsequent to the date of adoption.  The Board may terminate the Plan at any time, or may from time to time amend the Plan as it deems proper and in the best interest of the Corporation.

CERTIFICATION

The foregoing Plan was duly adopted by the Board of Directors, effective February 18, 2016.

/s/ Scott Ryan                                     
Scott Ryan, Corporate Secretary
Gentex Corporation

10210292

3EX-4.3

 Exhibit 4.3 

 
 

 
 STRICTLY PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL 
 Mr Jean Marc Huet 
 3 March 2015 
 Dear Jean Marc, 
 Your reward package effective 1 January 2015 

This letter is to confirm your reward package as from 1st January 2015 as approved by the Compensation Committee (the ‘Committee’ and previously known as the
Compensation and Management Resources Committee). 
 2015 Base Salary 
 Your annual base salary has remained unchanged at £714,000. The Committee wanted you to receive a salary increase of 2.5% to £731,850 for 2015. 

2014 Annual Bonus 
 In respect of
2014, your annual gross bonus award is £628,320 (88% of salary i.e. 100% of salary (target bonus) x 110% (individual multiplier) x 80% (business differentiation factor). 
 The cash portion of your annual bonus is payable in the March 2015 payroll. 

2015 Annual Bonus 
 Your target
bonus for 2015 will continue to be 100% of base salary and your maximum bonus continues to be 150% of your base salary. 
 The performance
measures for 2015 for the annual bonus plan are: 
  

					
	 Performance Measure
	  	Weighting	 
	 Underlying Sales Growth
	  	 	1/3	  
	 Free Cash Flow
	  	 	1/3	  
	 Core Operating Margin (vs PY)
	  	 	1/3	  

 Details of the performance targets for the annual bonus plan as approved by the Committee will be communicated to you
separately. The Committee will assess Unilever’s 2015 business performance not only against these performance targets but also relative to the overall quality and competitiveness of our performance delivery. 

Your personal bonus will then be based both on the Committee’s assessment of overall business performance and your personal achievement against your
stretching, ambitious, and output oriented ‘3+1’ goals. 

  
 Page 1 of 5

 2015 Long-Term Incentives 
 For executive directors, our long term incentive program consists of two vehicles: 
  

	•	 	 The Management Co-Investment Plan (MCIP), and 

  

	•	 	 The Global Share Incentive Plan (GSIP). 

 2015 MCIP 
 Under this plan, 25% of your gross annual bonus will be invested in Unilever
shares, although you may elect to invest up to 60% of your earned bonus. 
 The invested shares must be held for a period of three years and
Unilever will match this investment with an award of an equal number of performance shares. The vesting of these matching performance shares will be between 0% – 150% contingent on the achievement of the same 3 year performance targets as exist
under our GSIP. The value of this award may be further enhanced by earning dividends / dividend equivalents during the vesting period. 

2015 GSIP 
 Under the 2015 GSIP, you have
been made a conditional award of shares worth £1,249,500 (175% of your 2015 base salary) which will vest between 0% and 200% three years from the award date based on company performance. 

The performance measures for the Unilever Leadership Executive team, as from 2015, are: 

 

					
	 Performance Measure
	  	Weighting	 
	 Underlying Sales Growth (USG)
	  	 	25%	  
	 Core Operating Margin (vs PY) (COM)
	  	 	25%	  
	 Operating Cash Flow (Cumulative)
	  	 	25%	  
	 Relative Total Shareholder Return
	  	 	25%	  

 The minimum of the performance range for USG and COM must be reached before any shares subject to either metric can vest.
Details of the performance targets for the 2015 MCIP and GSIP awards as approved by the Committee will be communicated to you separately. 

Fixed Allowance in lieu of perquisites and benefits 
 Your Fixed Allowance was GBP 260,000 for 2014, which included GBP 40,000 for housing. This housing element began to be reduced by GBP 40,000 per annum starting in 2012 and it has been removed
altogether from 2015. 
 For 2015 your gross annual Fixed Allowance will be GBP 220,000. 

You also receive medical cover for you and your family via the Allianz International medical arrangement. You will continue to receive life insurance
cover at 3 x the salary used to calculate your pension benefit. 
 Pension 

You are no longer a member of the Unilever’s International Pension Plan (IPP). The Fixed Allowance is paid to you in lieu of pension and you may
choose to become a member of the IPP to invest some of that Fixed Allowance through the IPP. 

  
 Page 2 of 5

 Malus and Clawback 
 Going forward, all performance-related remuneration awarded to you, including but not limited to your annual bonuses and awards granted under the MCIP and GSIP, will be subject to Malus and Clawback as
set out below and subject to the rules of both the MCIP and the GSIP where applicable. 
 Malus 

If the Committee considers: 
  

	 	(i)	there is a significant downward restatement of the financial results of Unilever; and/or 

 

	 	(ii)	there is reasonable evidence of gross misconduct or gross negligence by you; and/or 

 

	 	(iii)	there is reasonable evidence of material breach by you of Unilever’s Code of Business Principles or Code Policies; and/or 

 

	 	(iv)	there is reasonable evidence of conduct by you which results in significant losses or reputational damage to Unilever, 

the Committee may, in its discretion, at any time prior to your performance-related remuneration vesting or being paid, decide that some or all of your
performance-related remuneration (which is subject to this Malus and Clawback provision) will be reduced, lapsed, will not vest or will only vest in part. 
 Clawback 
 If the Committee considers there is a significant downward restatement of the
financial results of Unilever, it may in its discretion, within two years of your performance-related remuneration being paid or vesting: 
  

	 	(i)	require you to repay to Unilever (or as Unilever directs) an amount equal to the after-tax value of some or all of any cash bonus you were paid (as determined by the
Commitee); and/or 

  

	 	(ii)	require you to transfer to Unilever (or as Unilever directs) for nil consideration, some or all of the after-tax number of Unilever shares which have previously vested,
or pay to Unilever (or as Unilever directs) an amount equal to the value of those shares (as determined by the Committee); and/or 

  

	 	(iii)	require Unilever to withhold from, or offset against, any other remuneration to which you may be or become entitled in connection with your employment with Unilever
such an amount as the Committee considers appropriate. 

 Where you are notified you must transfer shares or pay an amount in
accordance with this Clawback provision, any shares or cash must be transferred or paid (in the manner directed by Unilever) within 30 days of the notification. 
 For the avoidance of doubt, in exercising its powers under this Malus and Clawback provision, the Committee, in its discretion, may apply different treatments to: (i) different employees; and/or
(ii) different remuneration, and may apply such different treatment in combination. 
 Personal Shareholding Requirement

 As previously communicated, you are required to build and maintain a personal shareholding in Unilever of at least three times your
base salary within 5 years from the later of 2010 or when you were granted your first GSIP award to attain your shareholding requirement. I’m delighted to note that you appear already to have exceeded this within a shorter time than required.

 As Executive Director you are required to hold shares to the value of 100% of your minimum shareholding requirement for 12 months post
cessation of your employment at Unilever and 50% of these shares for 24 months post cessation of your employment with Unilever. 

  
 Page 3 of 5

 You will be deemed to have accepted the terms and conditions of this letter, including
the operation of Clawback and Malus, and consent to any repayments, withholdings or deductions made in accordance with it, unless you provide written notice to Doug Baillie, Chief Human Resources Officer no later than 15th March 2015, that you do not accept such terms. Such
notice must be addressed to Doug Baillie at doug.baillie@unilever.com. 
  

	
	With kind regards
	
	Paul Polman
	Chief Executive Officer

  
 Page 4 of 5

 Appendix – Application of Personal Shareholding Requirement 

Personal Shareholding Requirement 
 As
part of Unilever’s long-term incentive arrangements, it is a requirement that Board members and certain other managers build up a personal shareholding in Unilever. The following principles on shareholding have been agreed: 

Date of Commencement: 
 The personal
shareholding must be built up over a period of five years commencing from the individual’s first grant from the Global Share Incentive Plan (GSIP). Once the required level of personal shareholding has been achieved, this shareholding must be
maintained (and increased, as necessary, as Base Salary levels increase or where shares are clawed back). 
 Qualifying Shares:

 Shares in either Unilever PLC or Unilever NV (or a combination of both) will qualify provided they are personally owned by the Director or
by a member of his/her (immediate) family. 
 Shares purchased from the Annual Bonus (Variable Pay) programme will qualify as from the moment of
purchase. Shares acquired under a Restricted Share/Stock arrangement will qualify on a net of tax basis. 
 Shares awarded on a conditional
basis by way of the GSIP, including those by way of the MCIP, will not qualify until the moment of vesting (i.e. once the precise number of shares is fixed after the three-year vesting period has elapsed). 

Share options will not qualify until the shares in question have eventually been acquired (and retained) following the exercise of the option.

 Value of Shares to be taken into Account: 
 The shares will be valued on the date of measurement, or if that outcome fails the personal shareholding test, on the date of acquisition. The share price for the relevant measurement date will be based
on the average closing share prices and the euro/sterling/US dollar exchange rates from the 60 calendar days prior to the measurement date. 

Salary on which Shareholding Requirement to be based: 
 The level of Base Salary at the date of measurement shall be used to assess the level of personal shareholding. 
 Level of Personal Shareholding: 
 The level of personal shareholding for you is 4 times Base
Salary. 
 As Executive Director you are required to hold shares to the value of 100% of your minimum shareholding requirement for 12 months
post cessation of your employment at Unilever and 50% of these shares for 24 months post cessation of your employment with Unilever. 

Monitoring of Personal Shareholding Target: 
 Global Reward will monitor the level of personal shareholding. 
 The consequence of not having
achieved the required shareholding will be that no awards under the GSIP will be made until the necessary shareholding has been built up. 

Other Matters: 
 It is not permitted to
trade in options or derivatives over Unilever shares as this would be in conflict with our Share Dealing Standard. 

  
 Page 5 of 5

 

 
 STRICTLY PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL 
 Mr Paul Polman 
 3 March 2015 
 Dear Paul, 
 Your reward package effective 1 January 2015 

This letter is to confirm your reward package as from 1st January 2015 as approved by the Compensation Committee (the ‘Committee’ and previously known as the
Compensation and Management Resources Committee). 
 Base Salary 
 At your request, your annual base salary has remained unchanged at £1,010,000. The Committee wanted you to receive a salary increase of 5% to £1,060,500 for 2015. 

2014 Annual Bonus 
 In respect of
2014, your annual gross bonus award is £1,333,200 (132% of salary i.e. 120% of salary (target bonus) x 137.5% (individual multiplier) x 80% (business differentiation factor). 
 The cash portion of your annual bonus is payable in the March 2015 payroll. 

2015 Annual Bonus 
 Your target
bonus for 2015 will continue to be 120% of base salary and your maximum bonus continues to be 200% of your base salary. 
 The performance
measures for 2015 for the annual bonus plan are: 
  

					
	 Performance Measure
	  	Weighting	 
	 Underlying Sales Growth
	  	 	1/3	  
	 Free Cash Flow
	  	 	1/3	  
	 Core Operating Margin (vs PY)
	  	 	1/3	  

 Details of the performance targets for the annual bonus plan as approved by the Committee will be communicated to you
separately. The Committee will assess Unilever’s 2015 business performance not only against these performance targets but also relative to the overall quality and competitiveness of our performance delivery. 

Your personal bonus will then be based both on the Committee’s assessment of overall business performance and your personal achievement against your
stretching, ambitious, and output oriented ‘3+1’ goals. 

  
 Page 1 of 5

 2015 Long-Term Incentives 
 For executive directors, our long term incentive program consists of two vehicles: 
  

	•	 	 The Management Co-Investment Plan (MCIP), and 

  

	•	 	 The Global Share Incentive Plan (GSIP). 

 2015 MCIP 
 Under this plan, 25% of your gross annual bonus will be invested in Unilever
shares, although you may elect to invest up to 60% of your earned bonus. 
 The invested shares must be held for a period of three years and
Unilever will match this investment with an award of an equal number of performance shares. The vesting of these matching performance shares will be between 0% – 150% contingent on the achievement of the same 3 year performance targets as exist
under our GSIP. The value of this award may be further enhanced by earning dividends / dividend equivalents during the vesting period. 

2015 GSIP 
 Under the 2015 GSIP, you have
been made a conditional award of shares worth £2,020,000 (200% of your base salary) which will vest between 0% and 200% three years from the award date based on company performance. 
 The performance measures for the Executive Team, as from 2015, are: 
  

					
	 Performance Measure
	  	Weighting	 
	 Underlying Sales Growth (USG)
	  	 	25%	  
	 Core Operating Margin (vs PY) (COM)
	  	 	25%	  
	 Operating Cash Flow (Cumulative)
	  	 	25%	  
	 Relative Total Shareholder Return
	  	 	25%	  

 The minimum of the performance range for USG and COM must be reached before any shares subject to either metric can vest.
Details of the performance targets for the 2015 MCIP and GSIP awards as approved by the Committee will be communicated to you separately. 

Fixed allowance in lieu of perquisites and benefits 
 Your annual Fixed Allowance of GBP 250,000 will continue to be paid to you in lieu of car allowance, partner travel, entertainment allowance and company pension contribution. 

The company will continue to accrue on your behalf the supplemental conditional pension provision of 12% salary, with investment
returns replicating those of the International Pension Plan. Accordingly, with effect from 1st January 2015, the base salary for this provision remains unchanged at GBP 976,025 along with the corresponding maximum annual contribution of GBP 117,123. 

You also receive medical cover for you and your family via the Allianz International medical arrangement when you and your family are outside of
Switzerland. You will be covered by the Swiss Sanitas scheme when resident in Switzerland. You will also continue to receive life insurance cover at 3 x the salary used to calculate your pension benefit. 

Malus and Clawback 
 Going
forward, all performance-related remuneration awarded to you, including but not limited to your annual bonuses and awards granted under the MCIP and GSIP, will be subject to Malus and Clawback as set out below and subject to the rules of both the
MCIP and the GSIP where applicable. 

  
 Page 2 of 5

 Malus 
 If the Committee considers: 
  

	 	(i)	there is a significant downward restatement of the financial results of Unilever; and/or 

 

	 	(ii)	there is reasonable evidence of gross misconduct or gross negligence by you; and/or 

 

	 	(iii)	there is reasonable evidence of material breach by you of Unilever’s Code of Business Principles or Code Policies; and/or 

 

	 	(iv)	there is reasonable evidence of conduct by you which results in significant losses or reputational damage to Unilever, 

the Committee may, in its discretion, at any time prior to your performance-related remuneration vesting or being paid, decide that some or all of your
performance-related remuneration (which is subject to this Malus and Clawback provision) will be reduced, lapsed, will not vest or will only vest in part. 
 Clawback 
 If the Committee considers there is a significant downward restatement of the
financial results of Unilever, it may in its discretion, within two years of your performance-related remuneration being paid or vesting: 
  

	 	(i)	require you to repay to Unilever (or as Unilever directs) an amount equal to the after-tax value of some or all of any cash bonus you were paid (as determined by the
Commitee); and/or 

  

	 	(ii)	require you to transfer to Unilever (or as Unilever directs) for nil consideration, some or all of the after-tax number of Unilever shares which have previously vested,
or pay to Unilever (or as Unilever directs) an amount equal to the value of those shares (as determined by the Committee); and/or 

  

	 	(iii)	require Unilever to withhold from, or offset against, any other remuneration to which you may be or become entitled in connection with your employment with Unilever
such an amount as the Committee considers appropriate. 

 Where you are notified you must transfer shares or pay an amount in
accordance with this Clawback provision, any shares or cash must be transferred or paid (in the manner directed by Unilever) within 30 days of the notification. 
 For the avoidance of doubt, in exercising its powers under this Malus and Clawback provision, the Committee, in its discretion, may apply different treatments to: (i) different employees; and/or
(ii) different remuneration, and may apply such different treatment in combination. 
 Personal Shareholding Requirement

 As previously communicated, you are required to build and maintain a personal shareholding in Unilever of at least four times your
base salary within 5 years from the later of 2010 or when you were granted your first GSIP award to attain your shareholding requirement. I’m delighted to note that you appear already to have exceeded this within a shorter time than required.

 As Executive Director you are required to hold shares to the value of 100% of your minimum shareholding requirement for 12 months post
cessation of your employment at Unilever and 50% of these shares for 24 months post cessation of your employment with Unilever. 

  
 Page 3 of 5

 You will be deemed to have accepted the terms and conditions of this letter, including
the operation of Clawback and Malus, and consent to any repayments, withholdings or deductions made in accordance with it, unless you provide written notice to Doug Baillie, Chief Human Resources Officer no later than 15th March 2015, that you do not accept such terms. Such
notice must be addressed to Doug Baillie at doug.baillie@unilever.com. 
  

	
	With kind regards
	
	Michael Treschow
	Chairman

  
 Page 4 of 5

 Appendix – Application of Personal Shareholding Requirement 

Personal Shareholding Requirement 
 As
part of Unilever’s long-term incentive arrangements, it is a requirement that Board members and certain other managers build up a personal shareholding in Unilever. The following principles on shareholding have been agreed: 

Date of Commencement: 
 The personal
shareholding must be built up over a period of five years commencing from the individual’s first grant from the Global Share Incentive Plan (GSIP). Once the required level of personal shareholding has been achieved, this shareholding must be
maintained (and increased, as necessary, as Base Salary levels increase or where shares are clawed back). 
 Qualifying Shares:

 Shares in either Unilever PLC or Unilever NV (or a combination of both) will qualify provided they are personally owned by the Director or
by a member of his/her (immediate) family. 
 Shares purchased from the Annual Bonus (Variable Pay) programme will qualify as from the moment of
purchase. Shares acquired under a Restricted Share/Stock arrangement will qualify on a net of tax basis. 
 Shares awarded on a conditional
basis by way of the GSIP, including those by way of the MCIP, will not qualify until the moment of vesting (i.e. once the precise number of shares is fixed after the three-year vesting period has elapsed). 

Share options will not qualify until the shares in question have eventually been acquired (and retained) following the exercise of the option.

 Value of Shares to be taken into Account: 
 The shares will be valued on the date of measurement, or if that outcome fails the personal shareholding test, on the date of acquisition. The share price for the relevant measurement date wil be based on
the average closing share prices and the euro/sterling/US dollar exchange rates from the 60 calendar days prior to the measurement date. 

Salary on which Shareholding Requirement to be based: 
 The level of Base Salary at the date of measurement shall be used to assess the level of personal shareholding. 
 Level of Personal Shareholding: 
 The level of personal shareholding for you is 4 times Base
Salary. 
 As Executive Director you are required to hold shares to the value of 100% of your minimum shareholding requirement for 12 months
post cessation of your employment at Unilever and 50% of these shares for 24 months post cessation of your employment with Unilever. 

Monitoring of Personal Shareholding Target: 
 Global Reward will monitor the level of personal shareholding. 
 The consequence of not having
achieved the required shareholding will be that no awards under the GSIP will be made until the necessary shareholding has been built up. 

Other Matters: 
 It is not permitted to
trade in options or derivatives over Unilever shares as this would be in conflict with our Share Dealing Standard. 

  
 Page 5 of 5

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