Document:

Exhibit 4.3

 

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN AND
FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

 

	
  CME
  GROUP INC, a Delaware Corporation, as

  successor
  by merger to CBOT HOLDINGS, INC., a

  Delaware
  corporation; THE BOARD OF TRADE

  OF
  THE CITY OF CHICAGO, INC., a Delaware

  corporation;
  and MICHAEL FLOODSTRAND and

  THOMAS
  J. WARD and All Others Similarly

  Situated,

   

   

                                                                 Plaintiffs,

   

   

                                 v.

   

  CHICAGO
  BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE,

  INC.,
  a Delaware non-stock corporation,

  WILLIAM
  J. BRODSKY, JOHN E. SMOLLEN,

  ROBERT
  J. BIRNBAUM, JAMES R. BORIS,

  MARK
  F. DUFFY, DAVID FISHER, JONATHAN

  G.
  FLATOW, JANET P. FROETSCHER,

  BRADLEY
  G. GRIFFITH, PAUL J. JIGANTI,

  PAUL
  KEPES, STUART K. KIPNES, DUANE R.

  KULLBERG,
  JAMES P. MacGILVRAY,

  ANTHONY
  D. McCORMICK, R. EDEN

  MARTIN,
  KEVIN MURPHY, RODERICK

  PALMORE,
  THOMAS H. PATRICK, JR., SUSAN

  M.
  PHILLIPS, WILLIAM R. POWER, SAMUEL

  K.
  SKINNER, CAROLE E. STONE, HOWARD L.

  STONE,
  and EUGENE S. SUNSHINE,

   

                                                                  Defendants.

  	
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                                       Civil
  Action No. 2369-VCN

   

  

 

STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT

 

The parties to the
above-captioned class action (the “Action”), by and through their respective
attorneys, have entered into the following Stipulation of Settlement (the “Stipulation”),
dated as of August 20, 2008, subject to the approval of the Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware (the “Court”).  The settlement contemplated by this
Stipulation is referred to herein as the “Settlement.”

 

 

BACKGROUND

 

1.             The Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated (“CBOE,”
as more fully defined below) is a national securities exchange that is
regulated by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).

 

2.             CBOE was established and initially funded by the Board
of Trade of the City of Chicago, Inc. (“Board of Trade” or “CBOT”).  As a result, in 1972, the Board of Trade
included a right in Article Fifth(b) (“Article Fifth(b)”) of
CBOE’s Certificate of Incorporation (the “Charter”) — known as the “Exercise
Right” — that allows a Board of Trade “member” to become a member of CBOE
without separately paying for that membership. 
Specifically, Article Fifth(b) provides that:

 

[E]very present and future
member of [the] Board of Trade who applies for membership in the [CBOE] and who
otherwise qualifies shall, so long as he remains a member of [the] Board of
Trade, be entitled to be a member of the [CBOE] . . . without the necessity of
acquiring such membership for consideration or value from [CBOE].

 

Board of Trade members who became CBOE members
pursuant to Article Fifth(b) were known as “Exerciser Members.”

 

3.             As a provision of CBOE’s Charter, Article Fifth(b) is
an exchange rule under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange
Act”).  As an exchange rule, any
interpretation of Article Fifth(b) by CBOE must be approved by the
SEC to become effective.  In response to
various organizational changes at the CBOT over the years, CBOE interpreted Article Fifth(b) for
purposes of defining CBOT “members” under Article Fifth(b) in light
of those changed circumstances.  On each
such occasion, CBOE submitted its interpretation, to which CBOT sometimes
agreed, to the SEC and those interpretations became effective upon approval by
the SEC.

 

2

 

4.             One of those interpretations of Article Fifth(b) occurred
in 1992 and is embodied in an agreement between CBOE and the Board of Trade
dated September 1, 1992, that reflected the parties’ shared interpretation
of Article Fifth(b) under certain scenarios (the “1992 Agreement”).  The interpretation reflected in the 1992
Agreement was approved by the SEC in June 1993.

 

5.             In 2000, the Board of Trade announced its intention to
demutualize.  Under CBOE’s initial
interpretation, the Board of Trade’s then-proposed demutualization plan would
have eliminated Board of Trade “members” as contemplated by Article Fifth(b) and
would therefore have eliminated Exercise Right eligibility.  The Board of Trade challenged CBOE’s initial
interpretation and filed an action in Illinois state court.  CBOE and the Board of Trade thereafter
entered into an agreement, dated August 7, 2001, and subsequently amended
by letter agreements dated September 13, 2002, October 7, 2004 and February 14,
2005 (collectively the “2001 Agreement”), reflecting the parties’ shared
interpretation that Exercise Right eligibility under Article Fifth(b) would
survive the Board of Trade’s demutualization under certain specified
conditions.

 

6.             On September 14, 2005, CBOE announced that it
intended to demutualize and convert its members’ interests into shares in a
stock corporation.  In July 2006, CBOE’s Board of
Directors (the “CBOE Board”) established a Special Committee of four
independent directors to value, for purposes of the contemplated
demutualization, the relative interests of Exerciser Members and CBOE members
who paid for their memberships (“CBOE Seat Owners”).

 

7.             On August 23, 2006, CBOT Holdings, Inc. (“CBOT
Holdings”), its wholly-owned subsidiary, the Board of Trade, and two
individuals — Michael Floodstrand and Thomas Ward (the “Individual Plaintiffs”),
representing a proposed class of certain Board of Trade 

 

3

 

members — filed this Action against CBOE and the CBOE
Board regarding CBOE’s planned demutualization (CBOT Holdings and its successor
CME Group (as defined below), the Board of Trade, and the Individual Plaintiffs
are referred to collectively herein as “Plaintiffs”).  In their original Complaint, Plaintiffs
sought, among other things, a declaratory judgment that CBOE was required by Article Fifth(b) and
the 1992 Agreement to treat Exerciser Members of CBOE and CBOE Seat Owners
equally in the demutualization.

 

8.             On October 17, 2006, CBOT Holdings and Chicago
Mercantile Exchange Holdings, Inc., now known as CME Group Inc. (“CME
Group”), announced a transaction whereby CME Group would merge with CBOT
Holdings, and CME Group would survive the merger (the “CME Transaction”).  The Board of Trade, a wholly-owned subsidiary
of CBOT Holdings before the CME Transaction, would become a wholly-owned
subsidiary of CME Group after the CME Transaction.

 

9.             On December 12, 2006, the CBOE Board met to
consider how to interpret Article Fifth(b) in light of the
anticipated CME Transaction, and it unanimously concluded that the CME
Transaction would extinguish the eligibility of the Individual Plaintiffs and
their putative class under Article Fifth(b) to become members of CBOE
pursuant to the Exercise Right.

 

10.           On December 12, 2006, CBOE filed
its interpretation of Article Fifth(b) with the SEC pursuant to the
Exchange Act.  In rule filing
SR-CBOE-2006-106, CBOE sought the SEC’s approval of that interpretation (CBOE’s
December 12, 2006 SEC filing, as amended, will be referred to as the “Eligibility
Rule Filing”).  Specifically, in the
Eligibility Rule Filing, CBOE sought the SEC’s approval of its
interpretation of Article Fifth(b) that, upon consummation of the CME
Transaction, no persons any longer would qualify as “members” of the Board of
Trade as that term is used in Article Fifth(b) and that, as a result,
no person would be eligible to be an 

 

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Exerciser Member of CBOE.  In response to the Eligibility Rule Filing,
CBOT Holdings, the Board of Trade and counsel for the putative class submitted
several separate filings to the SEC arguing that CBOE’s interpretation of Article Fifth(b) constituted
a breach of several governing contractual provisions, as well as a breach of
fiduciary duty, and therefore should not be approved by the SEC.  These filings urged the SEC to disapprove the
Eligibility Rule Filing, or alternatively, to defer ruling until the Court  had decided the issues presented in this Action.

 

11.           On January 4, 2007, Plaintiffs
filed their Second Amended Complaint.  In
the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs added claims challenging the CBOE
Board’s decision to approve the interpretation of Article Fifth(b) embodied
in the Eligibility Rule Filing as being a breach of contract and a
violation of the CBOE Board’s fiduciary duties under Delaware law.

 

12.           On January 25, 2007, the CBOE
Board approved a plan of demutualization. 
That plan of demutualization assumed that the CME Transaction would be
completed prior to CBOE’s demutualization and that the SEC would approve the
Eligibility Rule Filing.  As a
result, CBOE’s demutualization plan did not provide for the conversion of any
interest held by those who claimed to be, or to have the right to become,
Exerciser Members into shares of stock as part of CBOE’s proposed
demutualization.

 

13.           On June 6, 2007, CME Group and
CBOT Holdings announced that the vote to approve the CME Transaction would take
place on July 9, 2007 and that, if approved, the CME Transaction would be
consummated immediately thereafter.  On June 29,
2007, to address that situation, the CBOE Board approved an interpretation of
CBOE Rule 3.19 (the “Continued Membership Interpretation”), which provided
that persons who were Exerciser Members in good standing before the
consummation of the CME Transaction would temporarily retain their CBOE
membership status until the SEC ruled on the Eligibility Rule Filing
(persons who temporarily 

 

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retained their CBOE membership status pursuant to the
Continued Membership Interpretation and the Transition Rule Filing (as
defined below) are referred to herein as “CBOE Temporary Members”).  The Continued Membership Interpretation was
filed with the SEC on July 2, 2007 pursuant to rule filing
SR-CBOE-2007-77 and was immediately effective.

 

14.           On July 9, 2007, the
shareholders of CME Group and CBOT Holdings and members of the Board of Trade
voted to approve the CME Transaction.  On
July 12, 2007, the CME Transaction was consummated, and the Board of Trade
became a wholly-owned subsidiary of CME Group.

 

15.           On August 3, 2007, the Court
denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order enjoining CBOE and
the CBOE Board from implementing or enforcing the Continued Membership
Interpretation.  On the same date, the
Court issued a separate Memorandum Opinion staying the Action pending final
action by the SEC on the Eligibility Rule Filing.

 

16.           On August 28, 2007, the CBOE
Board approved a second interpretation of CBOE Rule 3.19, which provided
that the membership status of CBOE Temporary Members would continue after the
SEC approved the Eligibility Rule Filing until other specified events
occurred (the “Transition Rule Filing”). 
The Transition Rule Filing was filed with the SEC on September 10,
2007 in rule filing SR-CBOE-2007-107 and was effective on filing.

 

17.           On January 15, 2008, in
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-57159 (Jan. 15, 2008),
reprinted at 73 FR 3769 (Jan. 22, 2008), the SEC issued an order approving
the interpretation in the Eligibility Rule Filing that no person qualifies
to become or remain an Exerciser Member of CBOE pursuant to Article Fifth(b) following
the CME Transaction (the “SEC Approval Order”). 
The SEC Approval Order further stated that the SEC was not deciding 

 

6

 

issues that solely involved matters of state law, that
the Court had jurisdiction to decide those state law issues, and that if the
Court disagreed with the assumptions upon which the SEC Approval Order was
based with respect to those state law issues, CBOE might be required to amend
the Eligibility Rule Filing to conform with the Court’s ruling or,
alternatively, the SEC could exercise its authority and amend the Eligibility Rule Filing
sua sponte.

 

18.           On February 6, 2008, Plaintiffs
filed their Third Amended Complaint (the “Amended Complaint”) against CBOE and
the following current or former CBOE directors: William J. Brodsky, John E.
Smollen, Robert J. Birnbaum, James R. Boris, Mark F. Duffy, David Fisher,
Jonathan G. Flatow, Janet P. Froetscher, Bradley G. Griffith, Paul J. Jiganti,
Paul Kepes, Stuart K. Kipnes, Duane R. Kullberg, James P. MacGilvray, Anthony
D. McCormick, R. Eden Martin, Kevin Murphy, Roderick Palmore, Thomas H. Patrick, Jr.,
Susan M. Phillips, William R. Power, Samuel K. Skinner, Carole E. Stone, Howard
L. Stone, and Eugene S. Sunshine (the “CBOE Director Defendants”) (CBOE and the
CBOE Director Defendants will be referred to herein collectively as the “Defendants”).  In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seek,
among other things, an injunction barring CBOE and its directors from (i) “terminating
the Exercise Right” following the completion of the CME Group Transaction, (ii) “limiting
or eliminating” the rights, including trading rights, of Exerciser Members upon
completion of the CME Group Transaction, and (iii) issuing any stock to
CBOE Seat Owners as part of the demutualization transaction unless Exerciser
Members receive the same stock and other consideration.  In addition, the Amended Complaint seeks a
judicial declaration that CBOE (i) breached the 1992 Agreement by
determining that the putative class does not have the right to participate in
the demutualization on the same terms as CBOE Seat Owners, (ii) breached Article Fifth(b),
the 1992 Agreement and the 2001 Agreement by seeking to “unilaterally
extinguish” 

 

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the Exercise Rights of the putative class upon the
consummation of the CME Group Transaction, (iii) would be in breach of the
1992 Agreement if CBOE does not give CBOT full members at least 90 days notice
of any CBOE demutualization transaction so that CBOT full members who had not
yet exercised the Exercise Right would have an opportunity to do so, and (iv) would
be in breach of its Certificate of Incorporation if it issued any stock to CBOE
Seat Owners without allowing Exerciser Members to participate equally in any
stock issuance or distribution.  With
regard to CBOE’s directors, Plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration that CBOE’s
directors breached their fiduciary duties and the “express language of the
Charter” by “limiting the access rights” of the putative class when they
approved the Eligibility Rule Filing, the Continued Membership
Interpretation and the Transition Rule Filing.  The Amended Complaint also sought an order
requiring that the Defendants pay damages to Plaintiffs as a result of their
alleged wrongful conduct.  Finally, the
Amended Complaint substituted CME Group as a plaintiff for CBOT Holdings.

 

19.           On February 7, 2008, the
Defendants moved for summary judgment and, on April 21, 2008, the
Defendants filed an amended motion for partial summary judgment.  On March 19, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a
renewed motion for summary judgment regarding their breach of contract and
equal treatment claims.  The parties’
cross-motions for summary judgment were fully briefed and oral argument was
scheduled for June 4, 2008.

 

20.           On March 14, 2008, the Board of
Trade, Michael Floodstrand and Thomas J. Ward filed a Petition for Review in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Case No. 08-1116,
seeking review of the SEC Approval Order (the “Federal Appeal”).  The Federal Appeal is currently stayed.

 

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21.           After the filing of the Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs began conducting limited discovery related to the issues
raised in the Defendants’ amended motion for partial summary judgment,
including by serving document requests and interrogatories on the Defendants
and obtaining documents and interrogatory responses.

 

22.           Throughout the Action, and in
connection with the proceedings before the SEC regarding the Eligibility Rule Filing,
the Continued Membership Interpretation and the Transition Rule Filing,
the Defendants have (i) denied all allegations of wrongdoing, (ii) asserted
that the Plaintiffs and the putative class are entitled to no relief
whatsoever, and (iii) vigorously litigated all issues.

 

23.           Following extensive negotiations, the
parties reached an agreement in principle regarding Settlement terms on June 2,
2008.

 

24.           Plaintiffs entered into this
Stipulation after taking into account, among other things: (i) the
substantial benefits to the Participating Class Members (as defined below)
from the Settlement, including the distribution of Settlement Consideration (as
defined below) provided for herein, (ii) the risks of continued litigation
in this Action, (iii) the conclusion of Plaintiffs and their counsel that
the terms and conditions of this Settlement are substantively and procedurally
fair, reasonable, adequate and in the best interests of Plaintiffs and the
Settlement Class Members.

 

25.           The parties to this Stipulation
recognize that the Action was filed by Plaintiffs and defended by Defendants in
good faith and that the Action is being voluntarily settled after advice of
counsel.

 

26.           This Stipulation shall not be
construed or deemed to be a concession by Plaintiffs of any infirmity asserted
in the Action, nor shall it be construed or deemed to be evidence of or 

 

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an admission or concession on the part of any of the
Defendants with respect to any claim or allegation or of any fault or liability
or wrongdoing or damage whatsoever, or of any infirmity in the defenses that
any of the Defendants have asserted.

 

27.           Defendants have denied, and continue
to deny, any liability or wrongdoing with respect to any and all claims alleged
in this Action or otherwise by Plaintiffs. 
While denying any fault or wrongdoing, and without conceding any
infirmity in their defenses against the claims alleged in this Action,
Defendants consider it desirable that this Action be dismissed, subject to the
terms and conditions herein, because the Settlement will eliminate the
substantial burden, expense, inconvenience, and distraction of continued
litigation and will dispel any uncertainty that may exist as a result of the
pendency of this Action.

 

28.           No motion for class certification has
been presented to the Court, and the Court has not yet made any rulings on
whether the putative class described in this Stipulation should be certified.

 

THE SETTLEMENT

 

29.           It is stipulated and agreed, subject
to entry of the Order of Approval and Final Judgment (as defined below) by the
Court pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 23 and subject to the provisions
of paragraph 48 hereof, for the good and valuable Settlement Consideration (as
defined below) set forth herein and conferred on the named Individual
Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class Members (as such terms are defined
below) (as preliminarily certified by the Court in its Scheduling Order), that
all of the Settled Claims (as defined below) are completely, fully, finally,
and forever compromised, settled, released, discharged, extinguished, and
dismissed with prejudice, as against the Released Parties (as defined below),
upon and subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein.

 

10

 

30.           For purposes of this Stipulation:

 

30A.     “B-1 Membership” means a Series B-1
membership of the CBOT.

 

30B.     “CBOE” means (1) prior to the
completion of the CBOE Demutualization Transaction, Chicago Board Options
Exchange, Incorporated, a Delaware non-stock corporation, and (2) after
the completion of the CBOE Demutualization Transaction, Chicago Board Options
Exchange, Incorporated, a Delaware stock corporation.

 

30C.     “CBOE Conversion Event” means (i) any
consolidation, combination or merger of CBOE with another entity, other than
the CBOE Demutualization Transaction, regardless of which entity is the
surviving entity, in connection with which CBOE Seat Owners shall be entitled
to receive securities, cash, assets, rights or other property or things of value
(or any combination thereof) in respect of their memberships, (ii) the
sale, lease, transfer, license or other disposition, in a single transaction or
series of transactions, of all or substantially all of the assets of CBOE, (iii) any
liquidation, dissolution, or winding up of CBOE or (iv) any
recapitalization, reorganization or other transaction or event, or series of
transactions or events, other than the CBOE Demutualization Transaction, upon
the effectiveness of which CBOE Seat Owners shall be entitled to receive
securities, cash, assets, rights or other property or things of value (or any
combination thereof) upon conversion, sale or other disposition of, or in
exchange for, their memberships.

 

30D.     “CBOE Conversion Event Date” means the date
on which a CBOE Conversion Event is effective.

 

30E.      “CBOE Demutualization Date” means the date
on which the CBOE Demutualization Transaction is effective.

 

11

 

30F.      “CBOE Demutualization Entity” means CBOE
Holdings, Inc., a Delaware stock corporation, or such other Delaware stock
corporation, including CBOE, if applicable, the common stock of which is issued
to CBOE Seat Owners and Participating Group A Settlement Class Members in
the CBOE Demutualization Transaction.

 

30G.     “CBOE Demutualization Transaction” means
the transaction in which the memberships held by CBOE Seat Owners will be
converted into or exchanged for Class A Common Stock of the CBOE
Demutualization Entity.

 

30H.     “CBOT Common Stock” means the Class A
common stock, par value $0.001 per share, of CBOT Holdings.

 

30I.       “Class A Common Stock of the CBOE
Demutualization Entity” means the Class A common stock of the CBOE
Demutualization Entity to be issued to CBOE Seat Owners in connection with the
CBOE Demutualization Transaction.

 

30J.      “Class B Common Stock of the CBOE
Demutualization Entity” means the Class B common stock of the CBOE
Demutualization Entity to be issued to Participating Group A Settlement Class Members
in connection with the CBOE Demutualization Transaction pursuant to this
Settlement.

 

30K.     “Class Counsel” shall be the counsel
of record for the Group A Settlement Class and the Group B
Settlement Class.  Counsel of record for
the Group A Settlement Class is Gordon B. Nash, Jr. and Scott C.
Lascari of Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP and Andre G. Bouchard of
Bouchard, Margules & Friedlander, P.A. 
Counsel of record for the Group B Settlement Class is Peter B.
Carey of the Law Offices of Peter B. Carey and Kenneth J. Nachbar of Morris,
Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP.

 

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30L.      “CME Group Common Stock” means the Class A
common stock, par value $0.01 per share, of CME Group.

 

30M.    “Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization
Entity” means the Class A Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity
and the Class B Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity.  The powers, designations, preferences and
relative, participating, optional and other special rights, if any, and the
qualifications, limitations and restrictions (collectively, the “Rights”) of
the Class A Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity and the Class B
Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity shall be identical in all
respects at all times prior to an Initial Public Offering, except that the Class B
Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity shall have no voting rights or
privileges of any kind; provided, however that the holders of Class B
Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity shall be entitled to vote as a
separate class (i) as required by the Delaware General Corporation Law and
(ii) on any proposed consolidation or merger of the CBOE Demutualization
Entity with another entity, but only if such consolidation or merger would
result in either (x) the consideration per share received by the holders
of the Class A Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity in
connection with such consolidation or merger being different than the
consideration per share received by the holders of the Class B Common
Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity in connection with such consolidation
or merger, or (y) an amendment to the certificate of incorporation of the
CBOE Demutualization Entity that affects the Rights of the Class B Common
Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity differently than such amendment
affects the Rights of the Class A Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization
Entity.  Until completion of an Initial
Public Offering and the conversion of all shares of Class B Common Stock
of the CBOE Demutualization Entity into shares of Class A Common Stock of
the CBOE Demutualization 

 

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Entity, the CBOE Demutualization Entity shall not (a) purchase
or redeem (or permit a subsidiary to purchase or redeem) any shares of its capital
stock other than offers to purchase or redeem that are made to holders of the Class A
Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity and holders of the Class B
Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity on identical terms, except that
the number of shares subject to such offers shall be pro rata based on the
number of outstanding shares of Class A Common Stock of the CBOE
Demutualization Entity and Class B Common Stock of the CBOE
Demutualization Entity, (b) declare or pay any dividend, including a
dividend paid in additional shares of capital stock, or make any payment or
distribution of any kind on the shares of Class A Common Stock of the CBOE
Demutualization Entity unless an identical dividend, payment or distribution is
concurrently paid on the shares of Class B Common Stock of the CBOE
Demutualization Entity, or (c) effect any stock split or reverse stock
split with respect to the Class A Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization
Entity unless an identical stock split or reverse stock split is concurrently
made with respect to the Class B Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization
Entity.

 

30N.     “Eligibility Date” means 5:00 p.m.,
Chicago time, on the 45th day following the entry of the Scheduling
Order; provided, however, that if that date falls on a weekend or holiday, the
Eligibility Date will be on the next business day.

 

30O.     “Exercise Right Privilege” means the
privilege that, together with a B-1 Membership and 27,338 shares of CBOT Common
Stock (which in the CME Transaction became 10,251.75 shares of CME Group Common
Stock) constituted an Exercise Right, whether or not unbundled from a B-1
Membership.

 

30P.      “Final Approval” means the occurrence of
all of the following events: (a) this Stipulation is approved in all
respects by the Court or is modified by the parties and 

 

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approved by the Court, (b) the Court enters an
Order of Approval and Final Judgment substantially in the form attached hereto
as Exhibit A (“Order of Approval and Final Judgment”), and (c) the
time to appeal or seek permission to appeal from the Order of Approval and
Final Judgment has expired without an appeal being filed or, if an appeal is
taken from the Order of Approval and Final Judgment, the Order of Approval and
Final Judgment has been affirmed in its entirety by the court of last resort to
which such appeal has been taken and such affirmance has become no longer
subject to further appeal or review.

 

30Q.     A “Group A Settlement Unit” shall consist
of the following interests: (i) one B-1 Membership; (ii) one Exercise
Right Privilege; and (iii) at least 10,251.75 shares of CME Group Common
Stock; provided that (A) in the event of any stock split, reverse stock
split, stock dividend (including a dividend payable in securities convertible
into or exercisable or exchangeable for CME Group Common Stock)
recapitalization, combination, reclassification or similar change in the
capital structure of the CME Group on or after the date of this Stipulation,
the number of shares of CME Group Common Stock required to constitute a Group A
Settlement Unit shall be proportionally adjusted to take into account such
action; and (B) in the event that, on or after the date of this
Stipulation, either (x) the CME Group shall consolidate with, or merge
with and into, any other entity in a transaction or series of related
transactions in which the CME Group is not the continuing or surviving
corporation of such merger or consolidation, or (y) any entity shall
consolidate with the CME Group, or merge with and into the CME Group, and the
CME Group shall be the continuing or surviving corporation of such merger or
consolidation and, in connection with such merger or consolidation, all or part
of the CME Group Common Stock shall be changed into or exchanged for
securities, cash, assets or other property (or any combination thereof), then
the requirement that a Group A Settlement Unit include at least 

 

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10,251.75 shares of CME Group Common Stock will be
replaced with a requirement that the Group A Settlement Unit include the
securities, cash, assets or other property issued in respect of 10,251.75
shares of CME Group Common Stock (as adjusted pursuant to clause (A), if
applicable) in connection with such transaction.  No Participating Group A Settlement Class Member
shall be deemed to own a number of Group A Settlement Units in excess of the
maximum number of packages of the Three Parts simultaneously beneficially owned
or possessed by delegation by such Group A Settlement Class Member at any
time prior to June 2, 2008.  No
Exercise Right Privileges that have been acquired at any time by CBOE may be
used by a Group A Settlement Class Member to constitute a Group A
Settlement Unit.

 

30R.     A “Group B Settlement Unit” shall consist
of one Exercise Right Privilege.  An
individual Exercise Right Privilege may be used either (a) as one of the
Three Parts to constitute a Group A Settlement Unit or (b) to constitute a
Group B Settlement Unit, but not both. 
No Exercise Right Privileges that have been acquired at any time by CBOE
may be used by a Group B Settlement Class Member to constitute a Group B
Settlement Unit.

 

30S.      “Initial Public Offering” means an
underwritten public offering of the Class A Common Stock of the CBOE
Demutualization Entity.

 

30T.     “Participating Group A Settlement Class Member”
means a Group A Settlement Class Member who the Court determines satisfies
the following conditions:

 

(1)           Such
Group A Settlement Class Member is either a natural person or a
corporation, partnership, limited liability company, trust, estate or other
entity not formed for the purpose of participating in the Settlement.

 

(2)           Such
Group A Settlement Class Member is the record owner of the Three Parts
that comprise at least one Group A Settlement Unit as of 5:00 p.m.,
Chicago time, on the Eligibility Date, and continues to be the record owner of
at least one Group A Settlement Unit throughout the Settlement Period.

 

16

 

(3)           If
such Group A Settlement Class Member is a natural person, the requirement
to be the record owner of at least 10,251.75 shares of CME Group Common Stock
for each Group A Settlement Unit shall be deemed to be satisfied if such shares
are owned of record by (i) such Group A Settlement Class Member
together with such Group A Settlement Class Member’s spouse as joint
tenants, tenants in common or tenants by the entireties, (ii) such Group A
Settlement Class Member as custodian for a family member under the Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act or (iii) one or more trusts for the benefit of such
Group A Settlement Class Member or such Group A Settlement Class Member’s
spouse, children, stepchildren or grandchildren (including adoptive relationships)
not formed for the
purpose of participating in the Settlement (“Permitted Owners”).

 

(4)           If
such Group A Settlement Class Member is a trust, the legal owner (i.e.,
the trust) may participate as a Group A Settlement Class Member.

 

(5)           If such Group A
Settlement Class Member is a natural person who dies or becomes disabled,
the requirement that the Group A Settlement Class Member be the record
owner of the Three Parts shall be deemed to be satisfied if the Three Parts are
owned by the representative of that person or that person’s estate as that term
is used in 755 ILCS § 5/1-2.15.

 

(6)           No
Group A Settlement Unit, nor any portion thereof, may be subject to any
encumbrance or lien, including without limitation a pledge, repurchase
agreement or stock loan or borrowing agreement (collectively, “Liens”), during
the Settlement Period, other than Liens expressly permitted by or arising under
the Board of Trade’s Rules and Regulations.

 

(7)           By
5:00 p.m., Chicago time, on the Eligibility Date, and throughout the
Settlement Period:

 

(a)           all
shares of CME Group Common Stock included within such Group A Settlement Unit(s) must
be registered in such Group A Settlement Class Member’s name (or the name
of a Permitted Owner) in book-entry form at CME Group’s transfer agent,
Computershare Investor Services, LLP (“Computershare”); and

 

(b)           each
B-1 Membership and Exercise Right Privilege included within such Group A
Settlement Unit(s) must be registered in such Group A Settlement Class Member’s
name on the records of the Board of Trade; provided, however, that B-1 Memberships and Exercise Right Privileges
registered in the name of a Board of Trade member firm’s appointee or nominee
under the Board of Trade’s Rules and Regulations shall be deemed owned by
the Board of Trade member firm.

 

(8)           By
the Eligibility Date, Class Counsel must have received from such Group A
Settlement Class Member a duly completed and executed Participating Group
A Settlement Class Member Claim Form in the form of Exhibit 1
attached to the Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlement of
Class Action, Settlement Hearing and 

 

17

 

Right to Appear (for Group A Settlement Class Members
that are natural persons) or Exhibit 2 attached to the Notice of
Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlement of Class Action,
Settlement Hearing and Right To Appear (for Group A Settlement Class Members
that are entities).

 

(9)           Participating
Group A Settlement Class Member Claim Forms must be submitted to Class Counsel
by hand delivery, overnight delivery or mail, addressed to:

 

Gordon B. Nash, Esq.

Drinker Biddle and Reath, LLP

191 North Wacker Drive, Suite 3700

Chicago, Illinois  60606-1698

 

Such Participating Group A Settlement Class Member
Claim Forms must be received by Class Counsel by not later than 5:00 p.m,
Chicago time, on the Eligibility Date. 
Any Person who fails to submit  a duly
completed and executed Participating Group A Settlement Class Member Claim
Form by that time and date will not be eligible to be a Participating
Group A Settlement Class Member or to receive any Settlement
Consideration.

 

(10)        All
disputes regarding the satisfaction of the foregoing conditions shall be
resolved by the Court.

 

Group
A Settlement Class Members may
supplement the records of the Board of Trade and Computershare in order to
demonstrate that they are Group A Settlement Class Members.  Group
A Settlement Class Members may do
so by attaching to the Participating Group A Settlement Class Member
Claim Form any records (e.g.,
broker account records, tax records) that they consider relevant to their
status as a member of the Group A Settlement Class.

 

30U.     “Participating Group B Settlement Class Member”
means a Group B Settlement Class Member who the Court determines is the
record owner of at least one Exercise Right Privilege as of 5:00 p.m.,
Chicago time, on the Eligibility Date and satisfies the following additional
conditions:

 

(1)           By
the Eligibility Date, Class Counsel must have received from such Group B
Settlement Class Member a duly completed and executed Participating Group
B Settlement Class Member Claim Form in the form of Exhibit 3
attached to the Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlement of
Class Action, Settlement Hearing and Right to Appear (for Group B
Settlement Class Member that are natural persons) or Exhibit 4
attached to the Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlement of
Class Action, Settlement Hearing and Right To Appear (for Group B
Settlement Class Member that are entities).

 

18

 

(2)           Participating
Group B Settlement Class Member Claim Forms must be submitted to Class Counsel
by hand delivery, overnight delivery or mail, addressed to:

 

Peter B. Carey, Esq.

Law Offices of Peter B. Carey

11 South LaSalle Street, Suite 1600

Chicago, Illinois 60603-1304

 

Such Participating Group B Settlement Class Member
Claim Forms must be received by Class Counsel by not later than 5:00 p.m,
Chicago time, on the Eligibility Date. 
Any individual or entity who fails to submit  a
duly completed and executed Participating Group B Settlement Class Member
Claim Form by that time and date will not be eligible to be a
Participating Group B Settlement Class Member or to receive any Settlement
Consideration.

 

(3)          All disputes
regarding the satisfaction of the foregoing conditions shall be resolved by the
Court.

 

30V.     “Participating Settlement Class Members”
means collectively the Participating Group A Settlement Class Members and
the Participating Group B Settlement Class Members.

 

30W.    “Paying Agent” means Class Counsel or
such Person as Class Counsel shall designate to receive Settlement
Consideration from CBOE and to disburse it to Participating Settlement Class Members.

 

30X.     “Person” means any natural person,
corporation, partnership, limited liability company, trust, estate or other
entity.

 

30Y.     “Released Parties” means the Plaintiffs and
Defendants in this Action and their respective immediate family members, their
respective present and former parents, subsidiaries, divisions, and affiliates;
the present and former employees, members, partners, principals, officers, and
directors of each of them; the present and former attorneys, advisors,
financial advisors, investment bankers, trustees, administrators, fiduciaries,
consultants, representatives, accountants and auditors, insurers, and agents of
each of them; and the 

 

19

 

predecessors, estates, heirs, executors, trusts,
trustees, administrators, successors and assigns of each.

 

30Z.     “Settled Claims” means all claims, demands,
rights, actions or causes of action, liabilities, damages, losses, obligations,
judgments, suits, fees, expenses, costs, matters, and issues of any kind or
nature whatsoever, whether known or unknown, contingent or absolute, suspected
or unsuspected, disclosed or undisclosed, matured or unmatured, that have been,
could have been, or in the future can or might be asserted in this Action or in
any court, tribunal, or proceeding (including, but not limited to, any claims
arising under federal or state statutory or common law relating to alleged
breach of any duty, violations of state corporation law, federal securities law
or otherwise) by or on behalf of any Settlement Class Member, by or on
behalf of any of the Plaintiffs in the Action, or by any of the Defendants,
whether individual, class, derivative, representative, legal, equitable, or any
other type or in any other capacity, and based on any conduct that occurred
prior to the date of Final Approval, that was or could have been asserted
against any of the Released Parties, whether or not any such Released Party was
named, served with process, or appeared in this Action, which have arisen,
could have arisen, arise now, or may hereafter arise out of, or related in any
manner to the claims, demands, assertions, allegations, facts, events,
transactions, matters, acts, occurrences, statements, representations,
misrepresentations, omissions, or any other matter, thing, or cause whatsoever,
or any series thereof, embraced, involved, or set forth in, or referred to or
otherwise related, directly or indirectly, in any way to, this Action, or the
subject matter of this Action, and including, without limitation, any claims
(whether or not asserted) in any way related to: (i) Article Fifth(b) of
CBOE’s Certificate of Incorporation, the “Exercise Right” created by Article Fifth(b) and
any interpretation of Article Fifth(b), (ii) Sections 2.1 and 2.5 of
CBOE’s Constitution and CBOE

 

20

 

Rules 3.16 and 3.19, (iii) Article IV(D)(2)(b)(2),
Article IV(D)(2)(c) and Article IV(F) of the Amended and
Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, Inc.,
(iv) CBOT Rules 128 and 106(D)(14), (v) the 1992 Agreement, (vi) the
2001 Agreement, (vii) any and all actions taken by CBOE and the CBOE Board
concerning the interpretation of Article Fifth(b) (including, but not
limited to, the CBOE Board’s decision to approve the Eligibility Rule Filing
and to submit that filing to the SEC), (viii) any an all actions taken by
CBOE and the CBOE Board concerning the interpretations of CBOE Rule 3.19
(including, but not limited to, the decisions to approve the Continued
Membership Interpretation and the Transition Rule Filing and the related
filings CBOE made with the SEC), (ix) any “state law” issues referred to
in the SEC Approval Order, (x) any “economic rights issues” raised by the
Third Amended Complaint in this Action regarding CBOE’s planned
demutualization, whether arising under state contract law, state fiduciary duty
law, state corporate law or otherwise (including, but not limited to, any
claims referred to in the Memorandum Opinions issued by the Court on August 3,
2007), and (xi) any claims related in any way to who is entitled to any
consideration in connection with the CBOE Demutualization Transaction or any
CBOE Conversion Event and the amount of such consideration, except as otherwise
explicitly provided for herein as part of the Settlement Consideration or
otherwise; provided, however, that “Settled Claims” shall not include any
claims that CBOE may have against Plaintiffs or Settlement Class Members,
in their capacity as current or former members of CBOE, as applicable, in
respect of compliance with any rule of CBOE.  In addition, “Settled Claims” also
means all claims, demands, rights, actions or causes of action, liabilities,
damages, losses, obligations, judgments, suits, fees, expenses, costs, matters,
and issues of any kind or nature whatsoever, whether known or unknown,
contingent or absolute, suspected 

 

21

 

or unsuspected, disclosed or undisclosed, matured or
unmatured, that have been, could have been, or in the future can or might be
asserted in connection with the Federal Appeal.

 

30AA. The “Settlement Class” will consist of a
non-opt out class, certified by the Court pursuant to Court of Chancery Rules 23(a),
23(b)(1) and (b)(2), consisting of (A) all Persons who at any time
prior to June 2, 2008 simultaneously beneficially owned or possessed by
delegation (i) at least one B-1 Membership, (ii) at least one
Exercise Right Privilege, and (iii) at least 27,338 shares of CBOT Common
Stock or, after consummation of the CME Transaction, at least 10,251.75 shares
of CME Group Common Stock (the “Group A Settlement Class,” each member of which
is a “Group A Settlement Class Member”),  and (B) all Persons who own of record at
least one Exercise Right Privilege as of 5:00 p.m., Chicago time, on the
Eligibility Date and their transferees and assigns (the “Group B Settlement
Class,” each member of which is a “Group B
Settlement Class Member”).

 

30BB.   A “Settlement Class Member” is a Person who falls within the definition of the “Settlement
Class” provided in paragraph 30AA.

 

30CC.   “Settlement Consideration” includes the
following components:

 

(1)           An
“Equity Pool,” consisting of a pool of fully paid and non-assessable shares of Class B Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization
Entity that will be issued pursuant to the provisions
of paragraph 36A  below at the time
of the CBOE Demutualization Transaction to Participating Group A Settlement Class Members and
which will not be “restricted securities” within the meaning of the Securities
Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”) and the regulations promulgated
thereunder.  The number of
shares of Class B Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity in the
Equity Pool shall be equal to the product of (A) 0.21951220 times (B) the
aggregate number of shares of Class A Common Stock of the CBOE
Demutualization Entity issued to CBOE Seat Owners pursuant to the CBOE
Demutualization Transaction.

 

(2)           A
“Cash Pool,” consisting of US$300,000,000, that will be paid by or on behalf of
CBOE to the Paying Agent for the benefit of Participating Settlement Class Members pursuant to the provisions of paragraphs 36B and
36C.

 

22

 

(3)           A
“Fee Based Payment,” which will be paid by CBOE to certain Participating Group A Settlement Class Members as described below in paragraph 36F.

 

(4)           A “Supplemental Fee Based Payment”
that, subject to the requirements of paragraph 36G, will be paid by CBOE to
certain Participating Group
A Settlement Class Members as provided in
paragraph 36G.

 

(5)           Any
consideration paid by CBOE to Participating Group A Settlement Class Members
as provided in paragraph 44.

 

(6)           Any
consideration to which Participating Group A Settlement Class Members
are entitled pursuant to paragraph 43.

 

(7)           For
each of the payments made by CBOE to the Paying Agent for the benefit of
Participating Settlement Class Members, CBOE will issue an Internal
Revenue Service Form 1099-MISC to the Paying Agent and the Paying Agent will issue Form 1099s to the individual
Participating Settlement Class Members.

 

30DD.  “Settlement Hearing Date” means the date set
by the Court in the Scheduling Order for the Settlement Hearing.

 

30EE.   “Settlement Period” means the period of time
from 5:00 p.m., Chicago time, on the Eligibility Date through and
including 5:00 p.m., Chicago time, on the Settlement Hearing Date.

 

30FF.   “Three Parts” means (i) one B-1
Membership, (ii) one Exercise Right Privilege, and (iii) at least
27,338 shares of CBOT Common Stock or, after consummation of the CME
Transaction, at least 10,251.75 shares of CME Group Common Stock (subject to
adjustment as set forth in paragraph 30Q).

 

RELEASE OF UNKNOWN CLAIMS

 

31.           The releases contemplated by this
Stipulation as set forth in paragraph 29 extend to claims that any person or
entity granting a release (the “Releasing Person”) does not know or suspect to
exist at the time of the release, which, if known, might have affected the
Releasing Person’s decision to enter into that release.  The Releasing Person will be deemed to
relinquish, 

 

23

 

to the extent it is applicable, and to the full extent
permitted by law, the provisions, rights and benefits of § 1542 of the
California Civil Code which provides:

 

A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT
EXTEND TO CLAIMS WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS OR
HER FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM OR HER
MUST HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS OR HER SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR.

 

In addition, the Releasing Person will be deemed to
relinquish, to the extent they are applicable, and to the full extent permitted
by law, the provisions, rights, and benefits of any law of any state or
territory of the United States, federal law, or principle of common law, which
is similar, comparable, or equivalent to § 1542 of the California Civil
Code.  The Releasing Persons acknowledge
that they may discover facts in addition to or different from those now known
or believed to be true with respect to the Settled Claims, but that it is the
intention of the Releasing Persons to hereby completely, fully, finally, and
forever compromise, settle, release, discharge, and extinguish any and all
Settled Claims known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, which now exist, or
heretofore existed, or may hereafter exist, and without regard to the
subsequent discovery or existence of additional or different facts.  The Releasing Persons warrant that they have
read and understand § 1542 of the California Civil Code and have had the
opportunity to consult with and be advised by counsel regarding its meaning and
effect.  The Releasing Persons hereby
voluntarily waive the provisions, rights, and benefits of § 1542 of the
California Civil Code and the provisions, rights, and benefits of any law of
any state or territory of the United States, federal law, or principle of
common law, which is similar, comparable, or equivalent to § 1542 of the
California Civil Code.

 

24

 

SUBMISSION AND APPLICATION TO THE COURT

 

32.           As soon as practicable after this
Stipulation is executed and after the Settlement terms set forth herein have
been approved by CBOE’s Board of Directors, the Board of Trade’s Board of
Directors, CME Group’s Board of Directors and the Individual Plaintiffs in this
action, the parties will jointly apply to the Court for an order in
substantially the form attached hereto as Exhibit B (the “Scheduling Order”),
which will include provisions:

 

32A.     preliminarily certifying the Settlement Class pursuant
to Chancery Court Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2);

 

32B.     scheduling a hearing (the “Settlement
Hearing”) at which the Court will: (i) determine whether this action
should be certified finally as a class action on behalf of the Settlement Class pursuant
to Delaware Court of Chancery Rules 23(a) and (b)(1) and/or
(b)(2); (ii) determine whether the Individual Plaintiffs and the Board of
Trade, respectively, and Class Counsel have fairly and adequately
represented the interests of the Group A and Group B Settlement Class Members;
(iii) determine who are Participating Group A Settlement Class Members
and the number of Group A Settlement Units held by each Participating Group A
Settlement Class Member for purposes of the Settlement; (iv) determine
who are Participating Group B Settlement Class Members and the number of
Group B Settlement Units held by each Participating Group B Settlement Class Member
for purposes of the Settlement; (v) determine who are Participating
Group A Settlement Class Members who qualify for the Fee Based
Payment or the Supplemental Fee Based Payment for purposes of
paragraphs 36F and 36G; (vi) determine whether the terms and
conditions of the Settlement are substantively and procedurally fair,
reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members;
(vii) determine whether final judgment should be entered dismissing this
Action  as to all of the Defendants with 

 

25

 

prejudice as against all of the Plaintiffs and
Settlement Class Members, releasing the Settled Claims and enjoining
prosecution of any and all Settled Claims; (viii) hear and determine any
objections to the Settlement; and (ix) order such other and further relief
as the Court may deem necessary and appropriate;

 

32C.     directing that (A) a Notice of
Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlement of Class Action,
Settlement Hearing and Right to Appear (the “Class Action Notice”), in
substantially the form attached hereto as Exhibit C be mailed by Class Counsel,
within five business days following the entry of the Scheduling Order, to all
current and former record owners and delegates (e.g.,
lessees) of B-1 Memberships and all current and former record owners and
delegates of Exercise Right Privileges, as shown on the books and records of
the Board of Trade as of 5:00 p.m., Chicago time, on the date of entry of
the Scheduling Order, to their last known address by first-class mail, postage
prepaid, (B) a Summary Notice of Pendency of Class Action and
Proposed Settlement (the “Summary Notice”) be published within five business
days or as soon as practicable thereafter in the print edition of Crain’s
Chicago Business or a comparable publication for at least one business day and (C) the
Class Action Notice be posted on the websites of both CME Group and the
Board of Trade until the day of the Settlement Hearing, and further providing
that the distribution of the notice substantially in the manner set forth in
the Scheduling Order constitutes due and sufficient notice of the Settlement
Hearing to all persons entitled to receive such notice, and fully satisfies the
requirements of due process, Court of Chancery Rule 23, and applicable law; and

 

32D.     directing that

 

(1)           the
Class Counsel shall obtain from Computershare and submit to the Court and
the parties, no later than five (5) days after the Eligibility Date, a
list of the owners of record (and their related share holdings) of at least
10,251.75 shares of CME Group 

 

26

 

Common Stock held in book-entry form at Computershare
as of 5:00 p.m., Chicago time, on the Eligibility Date (the “Initial
Shareholder List”);

 

(2)           the
Class Counsel shall obtain from Computershare and submit to the Court and
the parties prior to the Settlement Hearing Date, (i) a list of the owners
of record (and their related share holdings) of at least 10,251.75 shares of
CME Group Common Stock held in book-entry form at Computershare as of 5:00 p.m.,
Chicago time, on the third (3rd) business day prior to the Settlement Hearing
Date, and (ii) a schedule of any sales or transfers (including
transferring shares from book-entry to certificated form) of shares of CME
Group Common Stock by any of the Persons listed on the Initial Shareholder List
on or prior to such date;

 

(3)           the
Class Counsel shall obtain from Computershare and submit to the Court and
the parties, as promptly as practicable following the Settlement Hearing Date, (i) a
list of the owners of record (and their total share holdings) of at least
10,251.75 shares of CME Group Common Stock held in book-entry form at
Computershare as of 5:00 p.m., Chicago time, on the Settlement Hearing
Date, and (ii) a schedule of any sales or transfers (including
transferring shares from book-entry to certificated form) of shares of CME
Group Common Stock by any of the Persons listed on the Initial Shareholder List
during the Settlement Period;

 

(4)           the
Class Counsel shall obtain from the Board of Trade and submit to the Court
and the parties, no later than five (5) days after the Eligibility Date (i) a
list of the owners of record as of 5:00 p.m., Chicago time, on the
Eligibility Date of at least one B-1 Membership (and their total B-1 Membership
holdings) and at least one Exercise Right Privilege (and their total Exercise
Right Privilege holdings), and (ii) in the event that any B-1 Memberships
or Exercise Right Privileges shown on such list are held as appointee or
nominee for a Board of Trade member firm, the name of the related member firm
(the “Initial Member/ERP List”);

 

(5)           the
Class Counsel shall obtain from the Board of Trade and submit to the Court
and the parties prior to the Settlement Hearing Date (i) a list of the
owners of record as of 5:00 p.m., Chicago time, on the third (3rd) business day prior to the Settlement Hearing Date of
at least one B-1 Membership (and their total B-1 Membership holdings) and at
least one Exercise Right Privilege (and their total Exercise Right Privilege
holdings), (ii) in the event that any B-1 Memberships or Exercise Right
Privileges shown on such list are held as appointee or nominee for a Board of
Trade member firm, the name of the related member firm, and (iii) a
schedule of any sales or transfers of B-1 Memberships or Exercise Right
Privileges by any of the Persons listed on the Initial Member/ERP List on or
prior to such date;

 

(6)           the
Class Counsel shall obtain from the Board of Trade and submit to the Court
and the parties, as promptly as practicable after the Settlement Hearing Date (i) a
list of the owners of record as of 5:00 p.m., Chicago time, on the
Settlement Hearing Date of at least one B-1 Membership (and their total B-1
Membership holdings) and at least one Exercise Right Privilege (and their total
Exercise Right Privilege holdings), (ii) in the 

 

27

 

case of any B-1 Memberships or Exercise Right
Privileges shown on such list are held as appointee or nominee for a Board of
Trade member firm, the name of the related member firm, and (iii) a
schedule of any sales or transfers of B-1 Memberships or Exercise Right
Privileges by any of the Persons listed on the Initial Member/ERP List during
the Settlement Period;

 

(7)           the
Class Counsel shall obtain from the Board of Trade and submit to the Court
and the parties, no later than five (5) days after the Eligibility Date, a
list of Persons that, prior to June 2, 2008, as shown by the records
maintained by the CBOT, (i) simultaneously owned or possessed by
delegation (a) at least one B-1 Membership, and (b) at least one
Exercise Right Privilege, (ii) the number of B-1 Membership(s) and
Exercise Right Privilege(s) simultaneously owned or possessed by
delegation by each such Person prior to June 2, 2008, and (iii) the
dates on which such B-1 Membership(s) and Exercise Right Privilege(s) were
simultaneously owned or possessed by delegation by such person prior to June 2,
2008;

 

(8)           the
Class Counsel shall obtain from Computershare and submit to the Court and
the parties, no later than five (5) days after the Eligibility Date, (i) a
list of (a) the owners of record (and their related share holdings) of at
least 27,338 shares of CBOT Common Stock at any time prior to the time of the
CME Transaction and (b) the dates on which such shares of CBOT Common
Stock were held, and (ii) a list of (a) the owners of record (and their
related share holdings) of at least 10,251.75 shares of CME Group Common Stock
at any time on or after the time of the CME Transaction and prior to June 2,
2008 and (b) the dates on which such shares of CBOT Common Stock were
held;

 

(9)           the
Class Counsel shall obtain from the Board of Trade and submit to the Court
and to the parties, no later than five (5) days after the Eligibility
Date, a list of Persons that, as shown by the records maintained by the CBOT,
beneficially owned at least one B-1 Membership and at least one Exercise Right
Privilege on July 11, 2007, and that list shall specify the total number
of B-1 Memberships and Exercise Right Privileges held by each such Person on
that date;

 

(10)         the Class Counsel
shall obtain from Computershare and submit to the Court and to the parties, no
later than five (5) days after the Eligibility Date, a list of the Persons
that, as shown on the records maintained by Computershare, beneficially owned
at least 27,338 shares of CBOT Common Stock on July 11, 2007, and that
list shall specify the total number of shares of CBOT Common Stock held by each
such Person on that date; and

 

(11)         the
CBOE shall submit to the Court and the parties, not later than five (5) days
after the Eligibility Date, (a) a list of Persons that, as shown by the
records of CBOE, became a CBOE Temporary Member pursuant to CBOE Rule 3.19.01
on July 11, 2007 and (b) a list of Persons that, as shown by the
records of CBOE, were CBOE Temporary Members on June 1, 2008.

 

28

 

32E.      No later than ten business days after the
Eligibility Date, Class Counsel shall file a list with the Court of all
persons and entities that have submitted to Class Counsel a Participating
Group A Settlement Class Member Claim Form or a Participating Group B
Settlement Class Member Claim Form along with copies of each such
Form.  Class Counsel shall also
submit at that time a proposed form of notice (the “Notice of Class Eligibility
Hearing”) of a hearing (the “Class Eligibility Hearing”) to be held as a
part of the Settlement Hearing.  The
Notice of Class Eligibility Hearing shall identify all Persons who have
timely submitted a properly completed and executed Participating Group A
Settlement Class Member Claim Form or Participating Group B
Settlement Class Member Claim Form. 
The Notice of Class Eligibility Hearing shall also identify all
Persons whose status as (i) a Participating Group A Settlement Class Member,
(ii) a Participating Group B Settlement Class Member, (iii) a
Participating Group A Settlement Class Member who qualifies for the Fee
Based Payment, and (iv) a Participating Group A Settlement Class Member
who qualifies for the Supplemental Fee Based Payment is not objected to by any
of the parties.  The Notice of Class Eligibility
Hearing shall further identify any Persons whose status as (w) a
Participating Group A Settlement Class Member, (x) a Participating
Group B Settlement Class Member, (y) a Participating
Group A Settlement Class Member who qualifies for the Fee Based
Payment, or (z) a Participating Group A Settlement Class Member
who qualifies for the Supplemental Fee Based Payment is objected to by any of
the parties and a short statement of the basis for such objection.  Within five business days after approval by
the Court, the Notice of Class Eligibility Hearing shall be sent by Class Counsel
by first class mail to all Persons identified in subsections (i) — (iv) and
(w) — (z) of this paragraph 32E.

 

32F.      At the Settlement Hearing and the Class Eligibility
Hearing, in addition to determining whether the Settlement is fair and
reasonable, the Court will determine the Persons 

 

29

 

who are Participating Group A Settlement Class Members,
Participating Group B Settlement Class Members, Participating Group A
Settlement Class Members who qualify for the Fee Based Payment,
Participating Group A Settlement Class Members who qualify for the
Supplemental Fee Based Payment, and the number of Group A Settlement Units and
Group B Settlement Units held by each Participating Group A Settlement Class Member
or Participating Group B Settlement Class Member (taking into account the
provisions of paragraphs 30Q and 30R), respectively, and the Court will
hear any objections raised by either the parties or any Person who claims to be
a Participating Settlement Class Member. 
The Court will make the final determination with respect to all such
objections.  All such objections must
comply with the requirements set out for the filing of objections in the Notice
of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlement of Class Action,
Settlement Hearing and Right to Appear. 
Each Person who claims a right to be a Participating Settlement Class Member
shall be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court with respect
to that issue, and the Court will have discretion to determine whether any
investigation or discovery will be permitted regarding the issue of whether the
Person meets the conditions to be a Participating Group A Settlement Class Member,
a Participating Group B Settlement Class Member, a Participating Group A
Settlement Class Member who qualifies for the Fee Based Payment, or a
Participating Group A Settlement Class Member who qualifies for the
Supplemental Fee Based Payment.  No
discovery shall be allowed on the merits of the Action or any other provision
of the Settlement.

 

32G.     Within five business days after the Court’s
final determination of the Persons who are (i) Participating Group A
Settlement Class Members and the number of Group A Settlement Units held
by each Participating Group A Settlement Class Member, (ii) Participating
Group B Settlement Class Members and the number of Group B Settlement
Units held by each

 

30

 

Participating Group B Settlement Class Member, (iii) Participating
Group A Settlement Class Members who qualify for the Fee Based
Payment, and (iv) Participating Group A Settlement Class Members
who qualify for the Supplemental Fee Based Payment, Class Counsel shall
prepare and submit to the Court for its approval, with a copy to all parties, a
final list of (x) Participating Group A Settlement Class Members,
including the mailing address for each such Participating Group A Settlement Class Member
as provided on the Participating Group A Settlement Class Member Claim
Form, and the number of Group A Settlement Units held by each such
Participating Group A Settlement Class Member; (y) Participating
Group B Settlement Class Members, including the mailing address for each
such Participating Group B Settlement Class Member as provided on the
Participating Group B Settlement Class Member Claim Form, and the number
of Group B Settlement Units held by each such Participating Group B Settlement Class Member;
and (z) Participating Group A Settlement Class Members who
qualify for the Fee Based Payment and/or the Supplemental Fee Based Payment,
including the mailing address for each such Participating Group A Settlement Class Member
as provided on the Participating Group A Settlement Class Member Claim
Form, and any other information that may be reasonably required by CBOE or CBOE’s
transfer agent in order to disburse the Settlement Consideration.

 

32H.     Any Person that might otherwise qualify as
a member of the Participating Group A Settlement Class, but who does not comply
with the requirements of paragraph 30T, will not be entitled to become a
Participating Group A Settlement Class Member or to receive any Settlement
Consideration with respect to such Person’s Group A Settlement Units, and any
Person that might otherwise qualify as a member of the Participating Group B
Settlement Class, but who does not comply with the requirements of paragraph
30U, will not be entitled to become a Participating Group B Settlement Class Member
or to receive any Settlement Consideration with 

 

31

 

respect to such Person’s Group B Settlement
Units.  All Persons who are Settlement Class Members
will be bound by the terms of this Stipulation of Settlement, including the
terms of the Order of Approval and Final Judgment to be entered in the Action
and the releases provided for herein, and will be barred from bringing any
action against the Released Parties concerning the Settled Claims, whether or
not they qualify to be a Participating Settlement Class Member as
determined by the Court.

 

32I.       All proceedings with respect to the Settlement Class certification,
the identification of Participating Group A Settlement Class Members, the identification of
Participating Group B Settlement Class Members, the identification of
Participating Group A Settlement Class Members who qualify for the
Fee Based Payment, the identification of Participating Group A Settlement Class Members
who qualify for the Supplemental Fee Based Payment, the determination of the
number of Group A Settlement Units held by any Participating Group A Settlement
Class Member and the number of Group B Settlement Units held by any
Participating Group B Settlement Class Member, and the determination of
all controversies relating thereto, including disputed questions of law and
fact with respect to the validity of any claims raised by a person or entity
claiming a right to be a Participating Group A Settlement Class Member or
a Participating Group B Settlement Class Member, shall be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court.

 

ORDER OF APPROVAL AND FINAL JUDGMENT

 

33.           If the Court finally approves the
Stipulation (including any modification thereto made with the consent of the
parties as provided herein), the parties to this Stipulation shall promptly
request that the Court enter the Order of Approval and Final Judgment, which:

 

32

 

33A.     finally certifies the Settlement Class pursuant
to Delaware Court of Chancery Rules 23(a), 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2),
approves the Settlement, adjudges the terms of the Settlement to be fair,
reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the Settlement Class, and
directs consummation of the Settlement in accordance with the terms and
conditions of this Stipulation;

 

33B.     determines that the requirements of the
Delaware Court of Chancery Rules and due process have been satisfied in
connection with the notice provided to the Settlement Class;

 

33C.     identifies the Persons who are
Participating Group A Settlement Class Members, Participating Group B
Settlement Class Members, Participating Group A Settlement Class Members
who qualify for the Fee Based Payment, and Participating Group A
Settlement Class Members who qualify for the Supplemental Fee Based
Payment, and determines the number of Group A Settlement Units and the number
of Group B Settlement Units that each Participating Group A Settlement Class Member
and Participating Group B Settlement Class Member owns;

 

33D.     dismisses this Action with prejudice, with
the dismissal subject only to compliance by the parties with the terms of this
Stipulation and any Order of the Court concerning this Stipulation;

 

33E.      contains an express finding that upon
Final Approval, there will no longer be any persons eligible to become members
of CBOE pursuant to Article Fifth(b) of CBOE’s Certificate of
Incorporation for any purpose and that Article Fifth(b) shall not be
deemed to provide any person the right to vote, trade or participate in the
CBOE Demutualization Transaction or a CBOE Conversion Event in that capacity;
and

 

33

 

33F.      provides that the Court will
have and retain exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any and all disputes relating
in any way to the interpretation or enforcement of this Stipulation or to
the Order of Approval and Final Judgment and have the power and jurisdiction to award injunctive
relief, in addition to such other remedies and relief that would, in the event
of a breach of the provisions of this Stipulation, be available.

 

CLASS NOTICES

 

34.           Class Counsel shall assume the
administrative responsibility for providing all notices required by this
Stipulation or by the Court, including the notice of the Settlement and the
notice associated with the Class Eligibility Hearing in accordance with
the Scheduling Order and paragraph 32E.  CME Group’s and the Board of
Trade’s sole responsibilities in connection with the foregoing are to (i) advance
costs associated with providing and administering such notices, (ii) furnish
to Class Counsel the lists provided for in paragraph 32D(4), (5), (6), (7) and
(9), and (iii) provide Class Counsel with the most recent address
contained in the Board of Trade’s records for all names included on such
lists.

 

35.           Defendants shall have no
responsibility for, or obligation regarding, the distribution of any of the
notices required by this Stipulation or by the Court  and
shall have no liability in connection with any such notice.  Neither CME Group nor the Board of Trade
shall have any responsibility for, or obligation regarding, the distribution of
any of the notices required by this Stipulation or by the Court, except as
provided by paragraph 34, and shall have no liability in connection with any
such notices.

 

DISTRIBUTION OF THE SETTLEMENT

CONSIDERATION TO PARTICIPATING CLASS MEMBERS

 

36.           After Final Approval, the Settlement
Consideration will be distributed in accordance with the following provisions:

 

34

 

36A.     Subject to the provisions of paragraph 36E
and to the application of the Equity Consideration Cap described below, each
Person listed on the list of Participating Group A Settlement Class Members,
for each Group A Settlement Unit owned by such Participating Group A Settlement
Class Member as listed on the list of Participating Group A Settlement Class Members,
will receive from the Equity Pool, within the earlier of five business days  of the CBOE Demutualization Date and the date the Class A
Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity is issued, that number of
shares, rounded to the nearest second decimal place in the case of any
fractional share, of Class B Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization
Entity equal to the lesser of (A) (1) the number of shares of Class B
Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity in the Equity Pool divided by (2) the
aggregate number of Group A Settlement Units owned by all of the Participating
Group A Settlement Class Members as listed on the list of Participating
Group A Settlement Class Members, and (B) (1) the number of
shares of Class B Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity in the
Equity Pool divided by (2) 408.292682 (the amount provided in this clause (B) being
referred to as the “Equity Consideration Cap”). 
Any shares of Class B Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization
Entity that are not issued to Participating Group A Settlement Class Members
because such an issuance would exceed the Equity Consideration Cap will be
retained by the CBOE Demutualization Entity, and no Participating Group A
Settlement Class Member will be entitled to any portion of those
shares.  The Class B Common Stock of
the CBOE Demutualization Entity will be issued to each Person who is listed on
the Participating Group A Settlement Class Member list in the same
proportionate series, if any, as the Class A Common Stock of the CBOE
Demutualization Entity is issued to CBOE Seat Owners in the CBOE
Demutualization Transaction in book-entry form by listing the shares on the
stock ledger for the CBOE Demutualization Entity maintained by the CBOE
Demutualization 

 

35

 

Entity’s stock transfer agent; provided, however, that
if the CBOE Demutualization Entity offers the holders of the Class A
Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity the option of receiving
physical stock certificates, the CBOE Demutualization Entity will offer that
same option to the holders of Class B Common Stock of the CBOE
Demutualization Entity on the same terms. 
Upon the initial closing of an Initial Public Offering, each share of Class B
Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity shall automatically convert
into a share of Class A Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity
and shall have the same rights, privileges, limitations and restrictions as the
shares of Class A Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity that are
issued to the CBOE Seat Owners in the CBOE Demutualization Transaction.  If the Class A Common Stock of the CBOE
Demutualization Entity is issued in the CBOE Demutualization Transaction to
CBOE Seat Owners in multiple series, then upon completion of any such
Initial Public Offering, each share of each series of Class B Common Stock
of the CBOE Demutualization Entity will convert into a share of the
corresponding series of Class A
Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity, and shall have all the
same rights, privileges, limitations and restrictions as a share of such series
of Class A
Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity, including any lock-up
period applicable to the shares of such series.  The shares of
Class B Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity will be registered
at the time of issuance under the Securities Act or issued in a transaction
exempt from registration pursuant to Section 3(a)(10) under the
Securities Act, and CBOE shall inform the Court of which alternative it will be
relying on.

 

36B.     Subject to the application of the Cash Consideration
Cap described below, each person or entity listed on the list of Participating
Group A Settlement Class Members will receive from the Cash Pool, for each
Group A Settlement Unit owned of record by each 

 

36

 

Participating Group A Settlement Class Member as
listed on the list of Participating Group A Settlement Class Members, a
payment equal to the amount (the “Participating Group A Settlement Class Member
Payment”) obtained by dividing (I) the difference between (x) the
amount of the Cash Pool minus (y) both the aggregate amount of cash paid
to Participating Group B Settlement Class Members pursuant to paragraph
36C and the class representative award paid to Michael Floodstrand pursuant to
paragraph 58,  by (II) the number of Group
A Settlement Units owned by Participating Group A Settlement Class Members
as listed on the list of Participating Group A Settlement Class Members.  If the Participating Group A Settlement Class Member
Payment calculated in accordance with the first sentence of this paragraph 36B
would exceed $600,000, then the Participating Group A Settlement Class Member
Payment shall be $600,000. Any portion of the Cash Pool that is not distributed
to Participating Group A Settlement Class Members as a result of the
calculation described in the previous sentence (the “Cash Consideration Cap”)
will be retained by CBOE for its own account, and no Settlement Class Member
will be entitled to any portion of the Cash Pool that is not distributed as a
result of the Cash Consideration Cap. 
All other amounts in the Cash Pool, including amounts that are not paid
to Participating Settlement Class Members (such as because checks are not
negotiated), shall remain the property of the Participating Group A Settlement Class Members
and shall not be retained by or returned to CBOE.  Class Counsel is authorized to seek a
Court order permitting such amounts, if any, to be distributed to the other
Participating Group A Settlement Class Members pro rata (based on the
number of Group A Settlement Class Units owned of record by such
Participating Group A Settlement Class Members as shown on the list of
Participating Group A Settlement Class Members).

 

37

 

36C.     Each
Person listed on the list of Participating Group B Settlement Class Members will receive from the Cash Pool a payment in the
amount of $250,000 for each Group B Settlement Unit owned of record by that Person as listed on the list
of Participating Group B Settlement Class Members.

 

36D.     CBOE will make the payments due under
paragraphs 36B and 36C on the earlier of (i) the CBOE Demutualization
Date, (ii) the CBOE Conversion Event Date, and (iii) the 365th day
after Final Approval (or, if such date is not a business day, on the next
succeeding business day), in each case by a single wire transfer of immediately
available funds to an account designated in writing by the Paying Agent.  The Paying Agent and Class Counsel will
then be solely responsible for the distribution of the Cash Pool to the
Participating Settlement Class Members, and Defendants shall have no
obligation to disburse any portion of the Cash Pool by any other means or to
make any payments from the Cash Pool directly to the Participating Settlement Class Members.

 

36E.      If, following Final Approval but before the CBOE
Demutualization Date has occurred, a CBOE Conversion Event occurs, then CBOE
agrees that each Person listed on the list of Participating Group A Settlement Class Members
shall receive, on the date of the issuance of any stock or other consideration
issued pursuant to such CBOE Conversion Event (subject to the requirements of
paragraph 36D), for each Group A Settlement Unit held by such
Participating Group A Settlement Class Members and in substitution for the
Settlement Consideration set forth in paragraph 36A, an amount of stock or
other consideration that such Person would have received if, prior to the
consummation or completion of such CBOE Conversion Event, (x) the CBOE
Demutualization Date had occurred, (y) an Initial Public Offering of the
CBOE Demutualization Entity had occurred (and the Class B Common Stock of
the CBOE Demutualization Entity had 

 

38

 

been converted into Class A Common Stock of the
CBOE Demutualization Entity in accordance with the terms of this Settlement)
and (z) all of the consideration paid in connection with such CBOE
Conversion Event had been paid to the holders of the Class A Common Stock
of the CBOE Demutualization Entity.

 

36F.      A “Fee Based Payment” will be paid by CBOE on the
earlier of the CBOE Demutualization Date or the CBOE Conversion Event Date to
each Participating Group A Settlement Class Member who became a CBOE
Temporary Members pursuant to CBOE Rules 3.19.01 or 3.19.02, provided that
such Participating
Group A Settlement Class Member beneficially owned, on July 11,
2007, at least one B-1 Membership as reflected on the records of the Board of
Trade, at least one Exercise Right Privilege as reflected on the records of the
Board of Trade, and at least 27,338 shares of CBOT Common Stock as reflected on
the records of Computershare.  The Fee Based
Payment will be equal to the total amount of access fees paid to CBOE during the period from July 11,
2007 to May 31, 2008 by each such Participating Group A Settlement Class Member,
provided that access fees will be considered in the calculation of that Fee
Based Payment only if they were paid in respect of CBOE Temporary Membership(s) held
because such Participating Group A Settlement Class Member
beneficially owned all of the three interests described in the previous
sentence on July 11, 2007. 
In no event,
however, will CBOE be obligated to make Fee Based Payments exceeding, in the
aggregate, a total of $2,800,000 (the “Fee Based Payment Cap”).  In the event that the Fee Based Payments
would otherwise exceed the Fee Based Payment Cap, CBOE will be required to pay
only a total amount of $2,800,000 to meet its obligations under this paragraph,
and that amount shall be apportioned among the Participating Group A
Settlement Class Members who qualify for the Fee Based Payment on a
proportionate basis by comparing the amount of access fees paid by each
Participating Group A 

 

39

 

Settlement Class Member who qualifies for a Fee
Based Payment with the total amount of access fees paid by all Participating
Group A Settlement Class Members who qualify for the Fee Based
Payment.

 

36G.     Subject to the approval of the SEC, which
CBOE will use its best efforts to obtain, a “Supplemental Fee Based Payment”
will be paid by CBOE to each Participating Group A Settlement Class Member
who qualifies for a Fee Based Payment and who paid any access fees to CBOE
pursuant to CBOE Rule 3.19 from June 1, 2008 to the CBOE
Demutualization Date or the CBOE Conversion Event Date.  Such “Supplemental Fee Based Payment” will be
equal to the total amount of access fees paid to CBOE by each such
Participating Group A Settlement Class Member during the period from June 1,
2008 to the CBOE Demutualization Date or the CBOE Conversion Event Date,
provided that access fees will be considered in the calculation of that
Supplemental Fee Based Payment only if they were paid in respect of CBOE
Temporary Membership(s) held because such Participating Group A Settlement
Class Member beneficially owned all of the three interests described in
the first sentence of paragraph 36F on July 11, 2007. 
The Supplemental Fee Based Payment will be paid by CBOE within five
business days of the later of (i) the CBOE Demutualization Date or the
CBOE Conversion Event Date, and (ii) the SEC’s order approving CBOE’s
request to make a Supplemental Fee Based Payment pursuant to this
paragraph.  If the SEC does not approve
CBOE’s request to return the access fees paid to CBOE after June 1, 2008
by Participating Group A Settlement Class Members who qualify for the
Supplemental Fee Based Payment or abrogates a CBOE rule that provides for
the return of such fees, CBOE shall have no obligation under this paragraph.

 

40

 

36H.     Only those Persons who are determined by
the Court to be Participating Settlement Class Members shall be entitled
to any Settlement Consideration, but all Settlement Class Members shall be
bound by this Settlement, the release of the Settled Claims as provided in
paragraphs 29 and 31 and the Court’s orders related to this Settlement.

 

36I.       Other than distributing the Settlement
Consideration in the manner set forth in paragraphs 36, 43 and 44, Defendants
shall have no liability for the administration of the Settlement or the
disbursement of the Settlement Consideration. 
CME Group and the Board of Trade shall have no obligation,
responsibility or liability for the administration of the Settlement or the
disbursement of the Settlement Consideration, except to advance costs
associated with administering the Settlement to Class Counsel and any
other Paying Agent.  Under no
circumstances shall any Released Party be liable to any Settlement Class Member
who fails to take the necessary steps to be recognized by the Court as a
Participating Settlement Class Member, and the Released Parties shall have
no responsibility for, or liability in connection with, the preparation of the
lists of Participating Settlement Class Members that are approved by the
Court.

 

36J.      The Court will have and retain exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve any and all disputes relating in any way to the
interpretation or enforcement of this Stipulation or to the Order of
Approval and Final Judgment. CBOE agrees (a) that it will not effect the
CBOE Demutualization Transaction, a CBOE Conversion Event or any other
transaction in connection with which ownership interests in CBOE or any of its
affiliates are issued to CBOE Seat Owners, except in a manner consistent with
the terms of this Stipulation, (b) that monetary damages will not be an
adequate remedy for a breach of CBOE’s obligations pursuant to the foregoing
clause (a), and (c) the Court shall have the power and jurisdiction
to award injunctive relief, in 

 

41

 

addition to such other remedies and relief that would,
in the event of a breach of the provisions of this Stipulation, be available.

 

36K.     The parties acknowledge and agree that the CBOE
Director Defendants have no obligation to personally pay, are not personally
liable for, and will not pay any Settlement Consideration to be paid or
distributed in connection with the Settlement.

 

ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF PLAINTIFFS

 

37.           Within five business  days after the date of this Stipulation, the parties will
jointly petition the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit to enter an order in the Federal Appeal extending the stay
currently in place pending the determination of whether Final Approval will be
granted.  Within five business  days after Final Approval, the Board of Trade and the
Individual Plaintiffs will execute any necessary documents and take all other
action required to obtain the prompt dismissal, with prejudice, of the Federal
Appeal, with all parties to bear their own attorneys’ fees, costs, court fees
and expenses relating to such matter except as otherwise provided in paragraph
58.  If Final Approval is not granted,
the parties shall within thirty days jointly petition the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to lift the stay in the Federal
Appeal.

 

38.           The parties agree that, upon Final
Approval, there no longer will be any persons eligible to become members of
CBOE pursuant to Article Fifth(b) of CBOE’s Certificate of Incorporation
and that no person will be entitled to be an Exerciser Member or vote or
participate in any way in the CBOE Demutualization Transaction or a CBOE
Conversion Event in the capacity of an Exerciser Member or Eligible CBOT Full
Member pursuant to Article Fifth(b). 
Participating Group A Settlement Class Members will not otherwise
have any right to vote in such a transaction except as otherwise provided
herein.

 

42

 

39.           Plaintiffs will use their best efforts
to cooperate with CBOE to resolve as expeditiously as possible any issues
regarding the prompt dismissal of this Action in accordance with paragraph 37
above.

 

40.           Plaintiffs will use their best
efforts to cooperate with CBOE’s efforts to obtain SEC approval of the CBOE
Demutualization Transaction and any CBOE rule changes required in
connection with the CBOE Demutualization Transaction.

 

ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF CBOE

 

41.           CBOE will use commercially reasonable
efforts to complete the CBOE Demutualization Transaction as soon as
commercially possible following Final Approval and the receipt of all
regulatory approvals required in connection with the CBOE Demutualization
Transaction; provided, however, that CBOE shall not be required to proceed with
the CBOE Demutualization Transaction in the event (i) that a person files
an action challenging the propriety of the CBOE Demutualization Transaction (or
any elements thereof) or (ii) of regulatory considerations relating to the
CBOE Demutualization Transaction, in each case as a result of which it is
commercially unreasonable to proceed with the CBOE Demutualization Transaction.

 

42.           Prior to the consummation of the CBOE
Demutualization Transaction or a CBOE Conversion Event, neither CBOE nor a CBOE
Demutualization Entity, if different from CBOE, will (i) declare or pay
any dividends, including dividends payable in additional membership interests
or shares of capital stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity, or other
payments or distributions of any kind payable to either CBOE Seat Owners or
CBOE Demutualization Entity shareholders as a group in respect of their status
as CBOE Seat Owners or shareholders, or (ii) repurchase any membership
interests from CBOE Seat Owners.  In
addition, prior to Final 

 

43

 

Approval, neither CBOE nor a CBOE Demutualization
Entity, if different from CBOE, shall announce any intention with respect to
any possible or future dividends, stock repurchases or other payments or
distributions that might be made following CBOE’s Demutualization Transaction.

 

43.           If, in connection with the CBOE
Demutualization Transaction or a CBOE Conversion Event, CBOE offers CBOE Seat
Owners the opportunity to obtain a trading permit that will allow them to continue
trading at CBOE following the CBOE Demutualization Transaction or CBOE
Conversion Event, CBOE shall offer to all Participating Group A Settlement
Class Members who are Temporary Members of CBOE immediately prior to the
CBOE Demutualization Transaction or CBOE Conversion Event, or who held trading
permits at that time if Temporary Members have been converted to holders of
trading permits, the opportunity to obtain a trading permit on the same terms
and conditions as are offered to CBOE Seat Owners.

 

44.           If either (a) CBOE or any of its
affiliates provides, directly or indirectly, any securities, cash, property or
other interests (including, but not limited to, memberships) to CBOE Seat
Owners as a group after the date of this Stipulation other than Class A
Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity, or (b) in connection with
the CBOE Demutualization Transaction or a CBOE Conversion Event, any
securities, cash, property or other interests (including but not limited to
memberships) are provided to or retained by CBOE Seat Owners as a group other
than Class A Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity, then the
Settlement Consideration provided for in sub-clause (5) of paragraph 30CC
hereof shall include a pool of securities, cash, property or other interests
identical to those provided to or retained by the CBOE Seat Owners equal to (x) the
aggregate number or amount of such securities, cash, 

 

44

 

property or other interests provided to or retained by
the CBOE Seat Owners, times (y) 0.21951220 (the “Additional Consideration
Pool”); provided, however, that neither (i) the issuance of trading
permits or trading access to CBOE Seat Owners that must be paid for by the CBOE
Seat Owners nor (ii) the rates to be paid with respect to such trading
permits or trading access shall constitute securities, cash, property or other
interests under this provision or give rise to any claim that any amounts
should be included in or require the formation of an Additional Consideration
Pool so long as the rates applicable to such trading permits or trading access
are established in accordance with paragraph 45.  Each Person on the list of Participating
Group A Settlement Class Members, for each Group A Settlement Unit shown
as owned by such Participating Group A Settlement Class Member on that
list, will be entitled to receive from the Additional Consideration Pool,
simultaneously with the issuance or provision of such securities, cash,
property or other interests to the CBOE Seat Owner, that number of securities
or amount of cash, property or other interests, rounded to the nearest second
decimal place in the case of any fractional securities, property or interests,
equal to the lesser of (A) (1) the number or amount of such
securities, cash, property or other interests in the Additional Consideration
Pool divided by (2) the aggregate number of Group A Settlement Units owned
by all of the Participating Group A Settlement Class Members as listed on
the list of Participating Group A Settlement Class Members and (B) (1) the
number or amount of such securities, cash, property or other interests in the
Additional Consideration Pool divided by (2) 408.292682.  Any fractional securities, property or
interests may be issued, held, leased (if a whole of such securities, property
or other interests could otherwise be leased) and transferred in whole or in
fractions, and any fractions may be combined by the holders thereof from time
to time to form one or more whole securities, property or other interests.  In the event that interests are issued as a
result of this paragraph 44 

 

45

 

that create fractional trading rights, such fractional
trading rights shall not confer on the holder thereof any rights of any kind
except to the extent that a holder of fractional trading rights has combined
together enough fractional trading rights that such person holds fractional
trading rights equal to 100% of a full trading right.  Unless combined with other fractional trading
rights to assemble a full trading right, any fractional trading rights provided
under this paragraph 44 shall expire on the last day of the 24th month
following the effective date of the CBOE’s Demutualization Transaction or any
such applicable CBOE Conversion Event.

 

45.           CBOE agrees that if and when it sets
the rates to be charged for trading permits or trading access to become
effective at the time of the CBOE Demutualization Transaction or any CBOE
Conversion Event or changes such rates from time to time, the board of
directors of the CBOE will establish or approve such rates in good faith and at
a rate that it believes will be in the best interests of the CBOE and the
owners of the Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization Entity as a whole,
provided that this provision shall no longer apply after the completion of a
CBOE Demutualization Transaction.

 

46.           If CBOE establishes a market or
facilities for the trading of shares of Class A Common Stock of the CBOE
Demutualization Entity, it shall establish a comparable market or facility for
the trading of shares of Class B Common Stock of the CBOE Demutualization
Entity.

 

INJUNCTION

 

47.           Pursuant to the Scheduling Order,
pending final determination of whether the Settlement should be approved,
Plaintiffs and all Settlement Class Members, their respective affiliates,
their successors, transferees or assigns, and anyone claiming through or for
the benefit of any of them, are barred and enjoined from commencing, or in any
way participating in the commencement of, any new action or other proceeding,
in any forum, asserting against any of 

 

46

 

the Released Parties any of the Settled Claims, either
directly, representatively, derivatively, or in any other capacity.

 

EVENTS THAT WILL VOID THE SETTLEMENT

 

48.           In the event that the Settlement
provided for in this Stipulation does not receive a majority vote by a quorum
of CBOE members entitled to vote at a vote held prior to the Settlement Hearing
or there is no Final Approval of the Settlement provided for in this
Stipulation, including, but not limited to, the requirement of the Settlement
that the Court certify the non-opt out class defined in paragraph 30AA, the
Settlement shall be null and void and of no force and effect, unless otherwise
agreed to in writing by the parties to this Stipulation, and all of the parties
shall be restored to their respective positions as they existed prior to the
execution of the Stipulation.  In the
event that the Settlement is rendered null and void for any reason, Defendants
reserve the right to oppose certification of any class in future proceedings or
to seek to further revise the definition of the class, and this Stipulation
shall not be deemed to prejudice in any way the respective positions of the
parties with respect to this Action, and neither the existence of this
Stipulation nor its contents shall be admissible in evidence or shall be
referred to for any purpose in this Action or in any other litigation or proceeding.

 

AUTHORITY

 

49.           Each of the individuals executing the
Stipulation on behalf of one or more of the parties warrants and represents
that he or she has been duly authorized to execute this Stipulation on behalf
of such party, and that it shall be binding on such party in accordance with
its terms.

 

DENIAL OF LIABILITY

 

50.           Each party specifically disclaims any
liability whatsoever relating to any of the Settled Claims, expressly denies
having engaged in, or threatened to engage in, any wrongful or 

 

47

 

illegal activity, or having failed to act in any
manner required by law or rule, or having violated, or threatened to violate,
any law or regulation or duty, expressly denies that any person or entity has
suffered any harm or damages as a result of such party’s involvement with the
Settled Claims (or the events at issue therein), and such party is making this
Settlement (without conceding any infirmity in such party’s defenses to the
Settled Claims) solely to avoid the risk, distraction, burden, and expense
occasioned by litigation.  The Court has
made no finding that any party has engaged in any wrongdoing or wrongful
conduct or otherwise acted improperly or in violation of any law or regulation
or duty in any respect.

 

STIPULATION NOT AN ADMISSION

 

51.           No provisions contained in this
Stipulation and no negotiations, statements, or proceedings in connection
therewith shall be, or shall be argued to be, or shall be deemed to be a
presumption, a concession, or an admission by any party of any fault,
liability, omission, or wrongdoing as to any fact or claim alleged or asserted
in this Action or any other actions or proceedings, or shall be interpreted,
construed, deemed, invoked, offered, or received in evidence, or otherwise
shall be used by any party or person in this or any other actions or
proceedings, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, except in a proceeding
to enforce the terms or conditions of this Stipulation.

 

COUNTERPARTS

 

52.           This Stipulation may be executed in
any number of actual or copied counterparts and by each of the different
parties on several counterparts, each of which when so executed and delivered
will be considered to be an original. 
The executed signature page(s) from each actual or copied
counterpart may be joined together and attached and will constitute one and the
same instrument.

 

48

 

WAIVER

 

53.           The waiver by any party of any breach
of this Stipulation will not be deemed or construed as a waiver of any other
breach of this Stipulation, whether prior, subsequent, or contemporaneous.

 

FURTHER ASSURANCES

 

54.           In addition to the actions
specifically provided for in this Stipulation, the parties will use their
reasonable best efforts from the date hereof to take, or cause to be taken, all
actions, and to do, or cause to be done, all things, reasonably necessary,
proper, or advisable under applicable laws, regulations, and agreements to
consummate and make effective the Stipulation including, but not limited to,
using their best efforts to resolve any objections raised to the
Settlement.  The parties and their
attorneys agree to cooperate fully with one another in seeking the Court’s
approval of the Settlement and to use their best efforts to effect the
consummation of the Settlement.  Without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, CBOE shall not, through any
reorganization, transfer of assets, merger, dissolution, issue or sale of
memberships or securities or any other voluntary action, avoid or seek to avoid
the observance or performance of any of the terms to be observed or performed
pursuant to this Stipulation by CBOE.

 

55.           Without further order of the Court,
the parties may agree to request from the Court reasonable extensions of time
not expressly set by Court order to carry out any of the provisions of this
Stipulation.

 

REVIEW OF STIPULATION

 

56.           Each party represents and warrants
that such party, or a responsible officer or partner or other fiduciary
thereof, has read this Stipulation and understands its contents.

 

49

 

INVESTIGATION OF SETTLEMENT

 

57.           Each party represents and warrants
that the party has made such investigation of the facts pertaining to the
Settlement provided for in this Stipulation, and of all of the matters
pertaining thereto, as the party deems necessary and advisable.

 

FEES AND EXPENSES

 

58.           Defendants shall have no obligation
for any attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses incurred or advanced by any of the
Plaintiffs in connection with the Action, the Eligibility Rule Filing, the
Continued Membership Interpretation or the Transition Rule Filing, the
Federal Appeal, or this Stipulation and the Settlement.  CME Group has paid, and agrees to continue to
pay, the attorneys’ fees and expenses of Class Counsel.  The Plaintiff Michael Floodstrand will be
paid a $15,000 class representative award from the Cash Pool in addition to any
consideration he is otherwise entitled to receive as a Participating Settlement
Class Member.

 

AMENDMENTS

 

59.           This Stipulation may not be amended,
changed, waived, discharged, or terminated (except as explicitly provided
herein), in whole or in part, except by an instrument in writing signed by all
parties hereto.

 

GOVERNING LAW AND FORUM

 

60.           This Stipulation and the Settlement
will be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of
Delaware, without regard to conflict of law principles.  Any action relating to the enforcement of this
Stipulation will be filed exclusively in this Court, and accordingly, each
party hereto in any such action in the Court (i) consents to personal
jurisdiction, (ii) consents to service of process by registered mail upon
such party and/or such party’s agent, (iii) waives any objection to venue
in the Court and any claim that Delaware or the 

 

50

 

Court is an inconvenient forum, and (iv) waives
any right to demand a jury trial as to any such action.

 

ENTIRE AGREEMENT

 

61.           This Stipulation constitutes the
entire agreement among the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof,
and supersedes all prior or contemporaneous oral or written agreements,
understandings, or representations, including, but not limited to, those
contained in the Term Sheet dated on or about June 2, 2008 and in any
press release, member communication or regulatory or other filing, whether
public or otherwise, made by any of CBOE, CBOE Holdings, Inc., the Board
of Trade, CBOT Holdings or CME Group.

 

SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS

 

62.           This Stipulation and the Settlement
contained herein is and will be binding on, and inure to the benefit of, the
parties and their respective affiliates, agents, executors, heirs, successors,
transferees and permitted assigns and on all persons who become Settlement Class Members
pursuant to the terms of this Stipulation and the Settlement.

 

NO ASSIGNMENT

 

63.           Plaintiffs warrant that they have not
assigned, encumbered, or in any manner transferred (in whole or in part), or
purported to assign, encumber, or in any manner transfer (in whole or in part),
any Settled Claim, and that they will not do so at any time prior to the
Settlement Date as defined herein.

 

INTERPRETATION

 

64.           This Stipulation and each of its
provisions, shall be construed as having been drafted jointly by the parties,
and no presumption shall apply to construe the language for or against any of
the parties.

 

51

 

	
  For
  CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS 

  EXCHANGE,
  INCORPORATED and the 

  CBOE
  DIRECTOR DEFENDANTS

   

   

  Samuel
  A. Nolen (#971) 

  Daniel
  A. Dreisbach (#2583) 

  Rudolf
  Koch (#4947) 

  Seth
  Barrett Tillman (#4777) 

  Richards,
  Layton & Finger, P.A. 

  One
  Rodney Square 

  P.O. Box
  551 

  Wilmington,
  Delaware 19899 

  (302)
  651-7700 

   

  	
  For
  CME GROUP, INC. 

   

  Kenneth
  J. Nachbar (#2607) 

  Morris,
  Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP 

  1201
  N. Market Street 

  P.O. Box
  1347 

  Wilmington,
  Delaware 19899-1347 

  (302)
  658-9200

   

  Jerrold
  E. Salzman Skadden, 

  Arps,
  Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP 

  333
  W. Wacker Drive 

  Chicago,
  Illinois 60606 

  (312)
  407-0718 

  
	
  Paul
  E. Dengel 

  	
   

  
	
  Paul
  E. Greenwalt, III 

  	
   

  
	
  Schiff
  Hardin LLP 

  	
  By:
  

  	
  /s/
  Jerrold E. Salzman

  
	
  6600
  Sears Tower 

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Chicago,
  Illinois 60606 

  	
  Printed:
  

  	
  Jerrold
  E. Salzman 

  
	
  (312)
  258-5600 

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  For
  THE BOARD OF TRADE OF THE CITY

  
	
  By:

  	
  /s/
  Paul E. Dengel 

  	
   

  	
  OF
  CHICAGO, INC. 

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Printed:

  	
  Paul
  E. Dengel

  	
   

  	
  Kenneth
  J. Nachbar (#2607) 

  
	
   

  	
  Morris,
  Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP

  1201
  N. Market Street 

  P.O. Box
  1347 

  Wilmington,
  Delaware 19899-1347 

  (302)
  658-9200 

   

  Hugh
  R. McCombs 

  Michele
  L. Odorizzi 

  Michael
  K. Forde 

  Mayer
  Brown LLP 

  71
  South Wacker Drive 

  Chicago,
  Illinois 60606-4637 

  (312)
  782-0600 

   

  Peter
  B. Carey 

  Law
  Offices of Peter B. Carey 

  11
  South LaSalle Street, Suite 1600 

  Chicago,
  Illinois 60603 

  (312)
  541-0360 

  

 

52

 

	
   

  	
  Kevin
  M. Forde 

  Kevin
  M. Forde, Ltd. 

  111
  West Washington Street, Suite 1100 

  Chicago,
  Illinois 60602 

  (312)
  641-1441 

   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  By:
   

  	
  /s/
  Peter B. Carey 

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Printed:
  

  	
  Peter
  B. Carey

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  For
  MICHAEL FLOODSTRAND and 

  THOMAS
  J. WARD and All Others Similarly 

  Situated
  

   

  Andre
  G. Bouchard (#2504) 

  222
  Delaware Avenue, Suite 1400 

  Wilmington,
  Delaware 19801 

  (302)
  573-3500 

   

  Gordon
  B. Nash, Jr. 

  Scott
  C. Lascari 

  Drinker
  Biddle & Reath LLP 

  191
  North Wacker Drive, Suite 3700 

  Chicago,
  Illinois 60606-1698 

  (312)
  569-1000

   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  By:

  	
  /s/
  Gordon B. Nash, Jr. 

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Printed:
  

  	
  Gordon
  B. Nash, Jr.

  

 

53

 

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF
THE STATE OF DELAWARE

 

	
  CME
  GROUP INC, a Delaware Corporation, as

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  successor
  by merger to CBOT HOLDINGS, INC., a

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  Delaware
  corporation; THE BOARD OF TRADE

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  OF
  THE CITY OF CHICAGO, INC., a Delaware

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  corporation;
  and MICHAEL FLOODSTRAND and

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  THOMAS
  J. WARD and All Others Similarly

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  Situated,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  Plaintiffs,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  v.

  	
  )

  	
  Civil
  Action No. 2369-VCN

  
	
   

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  CHICAGO
  BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  INC.,
  a Delaware non-stock corporation,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  WILLIAM
  J. BRODSKY, JOHN E. SMOLLEN,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  ROBERT
  J. BIRNBAUM, JAMES R. BORIS,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  MARK
  F. DUFFY, DAVID FISHER, JONATHAN

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  G.
  FLATOW, JANET P. FROETSCHER,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  BRADLEY
  G. GRIFFITH, PAUL J. JIGANTI,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  PAUL
  KEPES, STUART K. KIPNES, DUANE R.

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  KULLBERG,
  JAMES P. MacGILVRAY,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  ANTHONY
  D. McCORMICK, R. EDEN

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  MARTIN,
  KEVIN MURPHY, RODERICK

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  PALMORE,
  THOMAS H. PATRICK, JR., SUSAN

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  M.
  PHILLIPS, WILLIAM R. POWER, SAMUEL

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  K.
  SKINNER, CAROLE E. STONE, HOWARD L.

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  STONE,
  and EUGENE S. SUNSHINE,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  Defendants.

  	
  )

  	
   

  

 

AMENDMENT
TO STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT

 

Following the September 29, 2008 hearing to
consider certain objections to the terms of the August 20, 2008
Stipulation of Settlement (the “Stipulation”), and after consideration of the
comments made by the Court during that hearing, the parties have agreed to
amend the Stipulation as follows:

 

 

1.             The reference to “June 2, 2008”
in paragraph 30AA of the Stipulation defining the “Settlement Class” is amended
to read “August 22, 2008.”  As a
result, paragraph 30AA will now read as follows:

 

The “Settlement Class” will consist of a non-opt out class, certified
by the Court pursuant to Court of Chancery Rules 23(a), 23(b)(1) and
(b)(2), consisting of (A) all Persons who at any time prior to August 22,
2008 simultaneously beneficially owned or possessed by delegation (i) at
least one B-1 Membership, (ii) at least one Exercise Right Privilege, and (iii) at
least 27,338 shares of CBOT Common Stock or, after consummation of the CME
Transaction, at least 10,251.75 shares of CME Group Common Stock (the “Group A
Settlement Class,” each member of which is a “Group A Settlement Class Member”),
and (B) all Persons who own of record at least one Exercise Right
Privilege as of 5:00 p.m., Chicago time, on the Eligibility Date and their
transferees and assigns (the “Group B Settlement Class,” each member of which
is a “Group B Settlement Class Member”).

 

In addition, each of the references to “June 2,
2008” in paragraphs 30Q, 32D(7) and 32D(8) are amended to read “August 22,
2008.”

 

2.             The reference to the “45th day following the entry of the Scheduling
Order” in the definition of the “Eligibility Date” found in paragraph 30N of
the Stipulation is amended to read the “53rd day following entry of the Scheduling Order.”  As a result, the “Eligibility Date,” which
previously fell on October 6, 2008, will now be 5:00 p.m. Chicago
time on October 14, 2008.

 

3.             As soon as possible, but in no event later than October 2,
2008, Class Counsel will mail a copy of this Amendment to Stipulation of
Settlement to all persons who were sent a Class Action Notice, pursuant to
paragraph 32C of the Stipulation, at the address to which the Class Action
Notice was sent or to the last known address provided to Class Counsel and
to all persons who have otherwise indicated to Class Counsel that they are
potential members of the Settlement Class and who have provided Class Counsel
with a mailing address as of October 1, 2008.

 

2

 

4.             Except as otherwise provided herein, the remaining
provisions of the Stipulation of Settlement remain in full force and effect.

 

	
  For
  CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS

  	
   

  	
  For
  CME GROUP, INC.

  
	
  EXCHANGE,
  INCORPORATED and the

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  CBOE
  DIRECTOR DEFENDANTS

  	
   

  	
  Kenneth
  J. Nachbar (#2607)

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Morris,
  Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP

  
	
  Samuel
  A. Nolen (#971)

  	
   

  	
  1201
  N. Market Street

  
	
  Daniel
  A. Dreisbach (#2583)

  	
   

  	
  P.O. Box
  1347

  
	
  Rudolf
  Koch (#4947)

  	
   

  	
  Wilmington,
  Delaware 19899-1347

  
	
  Richards,
  Layton & Finger, P.A.

  	
   

  	
  (302)
  658-9200

  
	
  One
  Rodney Square

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  P.O. Box
  551

  	
   

  	
  Jerrold
  E. Salzman

  
	
  Wilmington,
  Delaware 19899

  	
   

  	
  Skadden,
  Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP

  
	
  (302)
  651-7700

  	
   

  	
  333
  W. Wacker Drive

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Chicago,
  Illinois 60606

  
	
  Paul
  E. Dengel

  	
   

  	
  (312)
  407-0718

  
	
  Paul
  E. Greenwalt, III

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Schiff
  Hardin LLP

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  6600
  Sears Tower

  	
   

  	
  By:

  	
  /s/
  Jerrold E. Salzman

  
	
  Chicago,
  Illinois 60606

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  (312)
  258-5600

  	
   

  	
  Printed:

  	
  Jerrold
  E. Salzman

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By:

  	
  /s/
  Paul E. Dengel

  	
   

  	
  For
  THE BOARD OF TRADE OF THE CITY 

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  OF
  CHICAGO, INC.

  
	
  Printed:

  	
  Paul
  E. Dengel

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Kenneth
  J. Nachbar (#2607)

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Morris,
  Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  1201
  N. Market Street

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  P.O. Box
  1347

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Wilmington,
  Delaware 19899-1347

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  (302)
  658-9200

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Hugh
  R. McCombs

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Michele
  L. Odorizzi

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Michael
  K. Forde

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Mayer
  Brown LLP

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  71
  South Wacker Drive

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Chicago,
  Illinois 60606-4637

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  (312)
  782-0600

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Peter
  B. Carey

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Law
  Offices of Peter B. Carey

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  11
  South LaSalle Street, Suite 1600

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Chicago,
  Illinois 60603

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  (312)
  541-0360

  

 

3

 

	
   

  	
   

  	
  Kevin
  M. Forde

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Kevin
  M. Forde, Ltd.

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  111
  West Washington Street, Suite 1100

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Chicago,
  Illinois 60602

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  (312)
  641-1441

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  By:
  

  	
  /s/
  Peter B. Carey

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Printed:

  	
  Peter
  B. Carey

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  For
  MICHAEL FLOODSTRAND and

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  THOMAS
  J. WARD and All Others Similarly

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Situated

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Andre
  G. Bouchard (#2504)

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  222
  Delaware Avenue, Suite 1400

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Wilmington,
  Delaware 19801

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  (302)
  573-3500

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Gordon
  B. Nash, Jr.

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Scott
  C. Lascari

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Drinker
  Biddle & Reath LLP

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  191
  North Wacker Drive, Suite 3700

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Chicago,
  Illinois 60606-1698

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  (312)
  569-1000

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  By:

  	
  /s/
  Gordon B. Nash, Jr.

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Printed:

  	
  Gordon
  B. Nash, Jr.

  

 

4

 

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF
THE STATE OF DELAWARE

 

	
  CME GROUP INC, a
  Delaware Corporation, as

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  successor
  by merger to CBOT HOLDINGS, INC., a

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  Delaware
  corporation; THE BOARD OF TRADE

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  OF
  THE CITY OF CHICAGO, INC., a Delaware

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  corporation;
  and MICHAEL FLOODSTRAND and

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  THOMAS
  J. WARD and All Others Similarly

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  Situated,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  Plaintiffs,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  )

  	
  Civil Action No. 2369-VCN

  
	
  v.

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  CHICAGO
  BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  INC.,
  a Delaware non-stock corporation,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  WILLIAM
  J. BRODSKY, JOHN E. SMOLLEN,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  ROBERT
  J. BIRNBAUM, JAMES R. BORIS,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  MARK
  F. DUFFY, DAVID FISHER, JONATHAN

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  G.
  FLATOW, JANET P. FROETSCHER,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  BRADLEY
  G. GRIFFITH, PAUL J. JIGANTI,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  PAUL
  KEPES, STUART K. KIPNES, DUANE R.

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  KULLBERG,
  JAMES P. MacGILVRAY,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  ANTHONY
  D. McCORMICK, R. EDEN

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  MARTIN,
  KEVIN MURPHY, RODERICK

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  PALMORE,
  THOMAS H. PATRICK, JR., SUSAN

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  M.
  PHILLIPS, WILLIAM R. POWER, SAMUEL

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  K.
  SKINNER, CAROLE E. STONE, HOWARD L.

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  STONE,
  and EUGENE S. SUNSHINE,

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  )

  	
   

  
	
  Defendants.

  	
  )

  	
   

  

 

SECOND
AMENDMENT TO STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT

 

Following the September 29, 2008 hearing to
consider certain objections to the terms of the August 20, 2008
Stipulation of Settlement, and after consideration of the comments made by the
Court during that hearing, the parties have now agreed to further amend the August 20,
2008 Stipulation of Settlement, as amended on September 30, 2008 (the “Stipulation”),
as follows:

 

 

1.                                       The reference to “the Settlement Hearing
Date” in paragraph 30EE of the Stipulation defining the “Settlement Period” is
amended to read “October 31, 2008.” 
As a result, paragraph 30EE will now read as follows:

 

“Settlement Period” means the period of time from 5:00 p.m.,
Chicago time, on the Eligibility Date through and including 5:00 p.m.,
Chicago time, on October 31, 2008.

 

2.                                       As a result of the amendment of the
definition of the term “Settlement Hearing Date” in paragraph 30EE of the
Stipulation and consistent with the September 30, 2008 Amendment to
Stipulation of Settlement, the provisions of paragraph 32D of the Stipulation
have been amended in their entirety, and that paragraph will now read as
follows:

 

32D.                        directing that

 

(1)                                  the Class Counsel shall obtain from
Computershare and submit to the Court and the parties, no later than October 21,
2008, a list of the owners of record (and their related share holdings) of at
least 10,251.75 shares of CME Group Common Stock held in book-entry form at
Computershare as of 5:00 p.m., Chicago time, on the Eligibility Date (the “Initial
Shareholder List”);

 

(2)                                  the Class Counsel shall obtain from
Computershare and submit to the Court and the parties, no later than November 10,
2008, (i) a list of the owners of record (and their total share holdings)
of at least 10,251.75 shares of CME Group Common Stock held in book-entry form
at Computershare during the Settlement Period, and (ii) a schedule of any
sales or transfers (including transferring shares from book-entry to
certificated form) of shares of CME Group Common Stock by any of the Persons
listed on the Initial Shareholder List during the Settlement Period;

 

(3)                                  the Class Counsel shall obtain from
the Board of Trade and submit to the Court and the parties, no later than October 21,
2008 (i) a list of the owners of record as of 5:00 p.m., Chicago
time, on the Eligibility Date of at least one B-1 Membership (and their total
B-1 Membership holdings) and at least one Exercise Right Privilege (and their
total Exercise Right Privilege holdings), and (ii) in the event that any
B-1 Memberships or Exercise Right Privileges shown on such list are held as
appointee or nominee for a Board of Trade member firm, the name of the related
member firm (the “Initial Member/ERP List”);

 

(4)                                  the Class Counsel shall obtain from
the Board of Trade and submit to the Court and the parties, no later than November 10,
2008, (i) a list of the owners of record as of 5:00 p.m., Chicago
time, during the Settlement Period of at least one B-1 Membership (and their
total B-1 Membership holdings) and at least one Exercise Right Privilege (and 

 

2

 

their total Exercise Right Privilege holdings), (ii) in
the case of any B-1 Memberships or Exercise Right Privileges shown on such list
are held as appointee or nominee for a Board of Trade member firm, the name of
the related member firm, and (iii) a schedule of any sales or transfers of
B-1 Memberships or Exercise Right Privileges by any of the Persons listed on
the Initial Member/ERP List during the Settlement Period;

 

(5)                                  the Class Counsel shall obtain from
the Board of Trade and submit to the Court and the parties, no later than October 21,
2008, a list of Persons that, prior to August 22, 2008, as shown by the
records maintained by the CBOT, (i) simultaneously owned or possessed by
delegation (a) at least one B-1 Membership, and (b) at least one
Exercise Right Privilege, (ii) the number of B-1 Membership(s) and
Exercise Right Privilege(s) simultaneously owned or possessed by
delegation by each such Person prior to August 22, 2008, and (iii) the
dates on which such B-1 Membership(s) and Exercise Right Privilege(s) were
simultaneously owned or possessed by delegation by such person prior to August 22,
2008;

 

(6)                                  the Class Counsel shall obtain from
Computershare and submit to the Court and the parties, no later than October 21,
2008, (i) a list of (a) the owners of record (and their related share
holdings) of at least 27,338 shares of CBOT Common Stock at any time prior to
the time of the CME Transaction and (b) the dates on which such shares of
CBOT Common Stock were held, and (ii) a list of (a) the owners of
record (and their related share holdings) of at least 10,251.75 shares of CME
Group Common Stock at any time on or after the time of the CME Transaction and
prior to August 22, 2008 and (b) the dates on which such shares of
CBOT Common Stock were held;

 

(7)                                  the Class Counsel shall obtain from
the Board of Trade and submit to the Court and to the parties, no later than October 21,
2008, a list of Persons that, as shown by the records maintained by the CBOT,
beneficially owned at least one B-1 Membership and at least one Exercise Right
Privilege on July 11, 2007, and that list shall specify the total number
of B-1 Memberships and Exercise Right Privileges held by each such Person on
that date;

 

(8)                                  the Class Counsel shall obtain from
Computershare and submit to the Court and to the parties, no later than October 21,
2008, a list of the Persons that, as shown on the records maintained by
Computershare, beneficially owned at least 27,338 shares of CBOT Common Stock
on July 11, 2007, and that list shall specify the total number of shares
of CBOT Common Stock held by each such Person on that date; and

 

(9)                                  the CBOE shall submit to the Court and
the parties, no later than October 21, 2008, (a) a list of Persons
that, as shown by the records of CBOE, became a CBOE Temporary Member pursuant
to CBOE Rule 3.19.01 on July 11, 2007 and (b) a list of Persons
that, as shown by the records of CBOE, were CBOE Temporary Members on June 1,
2008.

 

3.                                       As soon as possible, but in no event
later than October 7, 2008, Class Counsel will mail a copy of this
Second Amendment to Stipulation of Settlement to all persons who were 

 

3

 

sent a Class Action Notice, pursuant to paragraph
32C of the Stipulation, at the address to which the Class Action Notice
was sent or to the last known address provided to Class Counsel and to all
persons who have otherwise indicated to Class Counsel that they are
potential members of the Settlement Class and who have provided Class Counsel
with a mailing address as of October 6, 2008.

 

4.                                       Except as otherwise provided herein, the
remaining provisions of the Stipulation of Settlement remain in full force and
effect.

 

	
  For
  CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS

  	
   

  	
  For
  CME GROUP, INC.

  
	
  EXCHANGE,
  INCORPORATED and the

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  CBOE
  DIRECTOR DEFENDANTS

  	
   

  	
  Kenneth
  J. Nachbar (#2607)

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Morris,
  Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP

  
	
  Samuel
  A. Nolen (#971)

  	
   

  	
  1201
  N. Market Street

  
	
  Daniel
  A. Dreisbach (#2583)

  	
   

  	
  P.O. Box
  1347

  
	
  Rudolf
  Koch (#4947)

  	
   

  	
  Wilmington,
  Delaware 19899-1347

  
	
  Richards,
  Layton & Finger, P.A.

  	
   

  	
  (302)
  658-9200

  
	
  One
  Rodney Square

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  P.O. Box
  551

  	
   

  	
  Jerrold
  E. Salzman

  
	
  Wilmington,
  Delaware 19899

  	
   

  	
  Skadden,
  Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP

  
	
  (302)
  651-7700

  	
   

  	
  333
  W. Wacker Drive

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Chicago,
  Illinois 60606

  
	
  Paul
  E. Dengel

  	
   

  	
  (312)
  407-0718

  
	
  Paul
  E. Greenwalt, III

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Schiff
  Hardin LLP

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  6600
  Sears Tower

  	
   

  	
  By:

  	
  /s/
  Kenneth J. Nachbar

  
	
  Chicago,
  Illinois 60606

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  (312)
  258-5600

  	
   

  	
  Printed:

  	
  Kenneth
  J. Nachbar

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By:

  	
  /s/
  Paul E. Dengel

  	
   

  	
  For
  THE BOARD OF TRADE OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO,

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  INC.

  
	
  Printed:

  	
  Paul
  E. Dengel

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Kenneth
  J. Nachbar (#2607)

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Morris,
  Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  1201
  N. Market Street

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  P.O. Box
  1347

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Wilmington,
  Delaware 19899-1347

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  (302)
  658-9200

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Hugh R. McCombs

  

 

4

 

	
   

  	
   

  	
  Michele
  L. Odorizzi

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Michael
  K. Forde

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Mayer
  Brown LLP

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  71
  South Wacker Drive

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Chicago,
  Illinois 60606-4637

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  (312)
  782-0600

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Peter
  B. Carey

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Law
  Offices of Peter B. Carey

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  11
  South LaSalle Street, Suite 1600

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Chicago,
  Illinois 60603

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  (312)
  541-0360

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Kevin
  M. Forde

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Kevin
  M. Forde, Ltd.

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  111
  West Washington Street, Suite 1100

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Chicago,
  Illinois 60602

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  (312)
  641-1441

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  By:

  	
  /s/
  Peter B. Carey

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Printed:

  	
  Peter
  B. Carey

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  For
  MICHAEL FLOODSTRAND and

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  THOMAS
  J. WARD and All Others Similarly

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Situated

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Andre
  G. Bouchard (#2504)

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  222
  Delaware Avenue, Suite 1400

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Wilmington,
  Delaware 19801

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  (302)
  573-3500

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Gordon
  B. Nash, Jr.

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Scott
  C. Lascari

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Drinker
  Biddle & Reath LLP

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  191
  North Wacker Drive, Suite 3700

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Chicago,
  Illinois 60606-1698

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  (312)
  569-1000

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  By:

  	
  /s/
  Gordon B. Nash, Jr.

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Printed:

  	
  Gordon B. Nash, Jr.

  

 

5EXHIBIT 4.4

 

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF
THE STATE OF DELAWARE

 

	
  CME
  GROUP INC., a Delaware corporation,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  as
  successor by merger to CBOT HOLDINGS,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  INC.,
  a Delaware corporation; THE BOARD OF

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  TRADE
  OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, INC.,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  a
  Delaware corporation; and MICHAEL

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  FLOODSTRAND
  and THOMAS J. WARD

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  and
  All Others Similarly Situated,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Plaintiffs,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  v.

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
  C.A.
  No. 2369-VCN

  
	
   

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  CHICAGO
  BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  INC.,
  a Delaware non-stock corporation,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  WILLIAM
  J. BRODSKY, JOHN E. SMOLLEN,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  ROBERT
  J. BIRNBAUM, JAMES R. BORIS,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  MARK
  F. DUFFY, DAVID FISHER,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  JONATHAN
  G. FLATOW, JANET P.

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  FROETSCHER,
  BRADLEY G. GRIFFITH,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  PAUL
  J. JIGANTI, PAUL KEPES, STUART K.

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  KIPNES,
  DUANE R. KULLBERG, JAMES P.

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  MACGILVRAY,
  ANTHONY D. MCCORMICK,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  R.
  EDEN MARTIN, KEVIN MURPHY,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  RODERICK
  PALMORE, THOMAS H.

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  PATRICK,
  JR., SUSAN M. PHILLIPS,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  WILLIAM
  R. POWER, SAMUEL K. SKINNER,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  CAROLE
  E. STONE, HOWARD L. STONE,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  and
  EUGENE S. SUNSHINE,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Defendants.

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 

Date Submitted: December 16, 2008 

Date Decided: June 3, 2009

 

 

 

Kenneth J. Nachbar, Esquire
of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Hugh R.
McCombs, Esquire, Michele L. Odorizzi, Esquire, and Michael K. Forde, Esquire
of Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Peter B. Carey, Esquire of Law Offices
of Peter B. Carey, Chicago, Illinois; Kevin M. Forde, Esquire of Kevin M.
Forde, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Plaintiffs CME Group, Inc.
and The Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, Inc.

 

Edward P. Welch, Esquire and
Edward B. Micheletti, Esquire of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, and Jerrold E. Salzman, Esquire and Christal Lint,
Esquire of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Chicago,
Illinois, Attorneys for Plaintiffs CME Group, Inc. and The Board of Trade
of the City of Chicago, Inc.

 

Andre G. Bouchard, Esquire
and Joel Friedlander, Esquire of Bouchard, Margules & Friedlander,
P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, and Gordon B. Nash, Jr., Esquire and Scott C.
Lascari, Esquire of Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Chicago, Illinois,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Michael Floodstrand, Thomas J. Ward, and All Others
Similarly Situated.

 

Samuel A. Nolen, Esquire,
Daniel A. Dreisbach, Esquire, and Rudolf Koch, Esquire of Richards, Layton &
Finger, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, and Paul E. Dengel, Esquire and Paul E.
Greenwalt, III, Esquire of Schiff Hardin LLP, Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for
Defendants.

 

Kevin G. Abrams, Esquire and
Nathan A. Cook, Esquire of Abrams & Laster LLP, Wilmington, Delaware,
Attorneys for Objectors Nicholas J. Neubauer, A. Alan Zatopa, Charles Westphal,
DRW Investments LLC, DRW Securities LLC, DRW Holdings LLC, and Alan Matthew;
James D. Wareharn, Esquire of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP,
Washington, DC, and Kevin C. Logue, Esquire of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky &
Walker LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys for Objector Charles Westphal.

 

John H. Williams, Jr.,
Esquire of John Williams, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Objector
Theodore Pecora.

 

Melanie K. Sharp, Esquire
and Michele Sherretta Budicak, Esquire of Young Conaway Stargatt &
Taylor, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, and Nicholas C. Zagotta, Esquire and Joseph
P. Simon, Esquire of Connelly Roberts & McGivney LLC, Chicago,
Illinois, Attorneys for Objectors Quiet Light Trading, LLC, and Quiet Light
Securities, LLC.

 

Vernon R. Proctor, Esquire
and Jill K. Argo, Esquire of Proctor Heyman LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney
for Objectors SKTY Trading, LLC, The Ira S. Nathan Revocable Trust, J.P. Morgan
Futures Inc., and Rho Trading Securities, LLC, and Phillip S. Reed, Esquire of
Patzik, Frank & Samotny Ltd., Chicago, Illinois, Attorney for Objector
The Ira S. Nathan Revocable Trust.

 

Michael A. Weidinger,
Esquire and Joanne Pileggi Pinckney, Esquire of Pinckney, Harris &
Weidinger, LLC, Wilmington, Delaware, and David W. Porteous, Esquire and James
G. Martignon, Esquire of Levenfeld Pearlstein, LLC, Chicago, Illinois,
Attorneys for Objector Daniel M. Ambrosino.

 

Carolyn S. Hake, Esquire and
Lauren E. Maguire, Esquire of Ashby & Geddes, Wilmington, Delaware,
and Patrick L. Kenney, Esquire, Michael S. Cessna, Esquire, and Benjamin C. 

 

 

Hassebrock, Esquire of
Lathrop & Gage L.C., Kansas City, Missouri, Attorneys for Objector
Agrex, Inc.

 

Denise Seastone Kraft,
Esquire and John L. Reed, Esquire of Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge
LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, and Darrell J. Graham, Esquire of The Law Office of
Darrell J. Graham, LLC, Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Objectors Jeffrey
Holland and Louis Panos.

 

Joseph A. Rosenthal, Esquire
and P. Bradford deLeeuw, Esquire of Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess,
P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, and J. Samuel Tenenbaum, Esquire and Meredith M.
Casper, Esquire of Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys
for Objectors Milton Robinson and Bryan Shaughnessy.

 

Daniel B. Rath, Esquire and
Rebecca L. Butcher, Esquire of Landis Rath & Cobb LLP, Wilmington,
Delaware, and David A. Genelly, Esquire of Vanasco Genelly & Miller,
Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Objectors Kottke Associates LLC and Barbara
Whitlow, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Richard
Whitlow.

 

David S. Eagle, Esquire and
Kelly A. Green, Esquire of Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg & Ellers,
Wilmington, Delaware, and Jeffrey H. Bergman, Esquire and Jennifer Zordani,
Esquire of Ungaretti & Harris LLP, Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for
Objectors UBS Securities, LLC and UBS Financial Services, Inc.

 

Kevin J. Mangan, Esquire of
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, Wilmington, Delaware, and
Edward S. Weil, Esquire and Heather L. Kramer, Esquire of Dykema Gossett PLLC,
Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Objector Infinium Capital Management, LLC.

 

Paul A. Fioravanti, Jr.,
Esquire and Laina M. Herbert, Esquire of Prickett, Jones & Elliott,
P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, and Brett Nolan, Esquire of Shefsky &
Froelich Ltd., Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Objector The Kolton Family
Limited Partnership.

 

Paul A. Fioravanti, Jr.,
Esquire and Laina M. Herbert, Esquire of Prickett, Jones & Elliott,
P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, and Daryl M. Schumacher, Esquire of The Law Offices
of Daryl M. Schumacher, P.C., Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Objectors
Anthony J. McKerr and Mary C. McKerr Trust est. 3/13/97.

 

Richard I. G. Jones, Jr.,
Esquire and Toni Ann Platia, Esquire of Ashby & Geddes, Wilmington,
Delaware, Attorneys for Objector Geneva Trading USA, LLC.

 

Patricia R. Uhlenbrock,
Esquire and Fotini A. Antoniadis, Esquire of Morris James LLP, Wilmington,
Delaware, and William T. Rodeghier, Esquire, of Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys
for Objector William P. Sullivan.

 

Lewis H. Lazarus, Esquire
and Michael J. Custer, Esquire of Morris James LLP, Wilmington, Delaware,
Attorneys for Objector Nicholas A. Rapanos.

 

Henry E. Gallagher, Jr.,
Esquire and Kevin F. Brady, Esquire of Connolly Bove Lodge & Hutz LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware, and George R. Dougherty, Esquire, Gary M. Miller,
Esquire, and 

 

 

Justin M. Sandberg, Esquire
of Grippo & Elders LLC, Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Objector John
S. Stafford, Jr.

 

Martin S. Lessner, Esquire,
Danielle Gibbs, Esquire, and Kathaleen McCormick, Esquire of Young Conaway
Stargatt & Taylor LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, and Seth L. Levine,
Esquire and Manda M. Sertich, Esquire of Foley & Lardner LLP, New
York, New York, and Kathryn M. Trkla, Esquire of Foley & Lardner LLP,
Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Objector WH Trading LLC.

 

David A. Jenkins, Esquire of
Smith, Katzenstein & Furlow LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for
Objector Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.

 

Objector Tom Mallers, pro se.

 

Objector Peter C. Kelly, pro se.

 

Objector Scott A. Hall, pro se.

 

Objector Donald T. McMurray,
pro se.

 

Objector [J. A] Dohl, pro se.

 

Objector William L. Allen,
Trustee of the William L. Allen Trust, pro se.

 

Objectors Thomas M. Marsh, pro se and Jamin Nixon, pro se.

 

Objector Brian R. Sherman, pro se.

 

Objector Dennis Quinn Cook, pro se.

 

Objector Thomas Hafner, pro se.

 

 

 

 

NOBLE,
Vice Chancellor

 

 

Before the Court is a motion for approval of a
proposed settlement of a putative class action. 
When the settlement was negotiated, its value approached $1 billion.(1) 
There is no challenge to the adequacy of the total consideration achieved.  Instead, the primary debates concern the
means by which the economic benefits of the settlement are to be allocated
among the various stakeholders and the procedures imposed to qualify for
participation.

 

In this memorandum opinion, the Court will address
several questions, including whether this action should be certified as a class
action; whether the settlement is fair and reasonable as between the Plaintiff
class and the Defendants; whether the allocation of the settlement proceeds
among the putative class members is fair and reasonable; and whether the
requirements imposed in order to qualify for receiving distribution of
settlement proceeds are fair and reasonable.(2)  Of these contentions, the
methodology for allocating the settlement proceeds among members of the class
and the requirements for participating in the settlement distribution are the
most challenging.

 

I. 
BACKGROUND

 

In 2007, this Court reviewed the history of how this
dispute evolved.(3)  It is not the only tribunal to have been drawn into
this quagmire.(4)

 

This action was filed to establish the economic and
trading rights of members of the Plaintiff Board of Trade of the City of
Chicago (“CBOT”), now under the auspices of CME 

 

(1) Although the
magnitude of the proposed settlement may be unusual, the proposed settlement
becomes even more unusual when one learns that it is not accompanied by any
application for an award of attorneys’ fees.

 

(2) Also pending are
requests by class members for review of the decisions of class counsel that
excluded them from participating in the Settlement because of shortcomings in
the filing of their claims.  Those maters
will be addressed separately.

 

(3) CBOT Holdings, Inc. v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., 2007
WL 2296355 (Del. Ch. Aug. 3, 2007).

 

(4) See, notes 6 & 9, infra.

 

1

 

Group, Inc., as
successor by merger to CBOT Holdings, Inc., as Exercise Members or
Exercise Member Delegates of Defendant Chicago Board Options Exchange (“CBOE”).

 

CBOT established and financed the OBOE, which, as a
national securities exchange, is regulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”).  Article Fifth (b) of
CBOE’s Certificate of Incorporation entitles a “member” of CBOT to become a “member”
of the CBOE without having to pay separately for that membership.  “Exercise Rights” were established by Article Fifth
(b) which provided:

 

[E]very present and future
member of [the] Board of Trade who applies for membership in the [CBOE] and to
otherwise qualify shall, so long as he remains a member of the [Board of
Trade], be entitled to be a member of the [CBOE] . . . without the necessity of
acquiring such membership for consideration or value from [CBOE].(5)

 

A Board of Trade member who took advantage of the
Exercise Right was known as an Exerciser Member of the OBOE.

 

Because Article Fifth (b) determines who
may trade on a national exchange, it is an exchange rule subject to the
jurisdiction of the SEC.  Interpretations
of exchange rules require the approval of the SEC in order to be
effective.  As CBOT evolved,
interpretations of (or revisions to) Article Fifth (b) became
necessary.  For example, a major
interpretation (or renegotiation of the relationship between CBOT member’s and
the CBOE) occurred in 1992 (the “1992 Agreement”) and was approved by the SEC
in 1993.

 

An already difficult relationship became more
complex in 2000 when CBOT considered demutualization.  CBOE asserted that demutualization would
eliminate the Exercise Right and, thus, Exerciser Members of the CBOE.  CBOT contested CBOE’s attempt to eliminate
the 

 

(5) Disputes over the
Exercise Rights of CBOT members in the CBOE have existed almost since they were
created by Article Fifth (b) in 1972.

 

2

 

Exercise Right in a
proceeding in an Illinois state court.(6)  That litigation was resolved by
yet another agreement (the “2001 Agreement”) that has been amended from time to
time, most recently in February 2005. 
The parties agreed—shared interpretation may be the proper term of
art—that the Exercise Right, under certain circumstances, could survive CBOT’s
demutualization.  At the risk of
oversimplification, a CBOT full member (or full member delegate) would hold the
Exercise Right if that person held each of the following “Three Parts”:  (1) 27,338 shares of Class A common
stock of CBOT Holdings, Inc.; (2) one Series B-1 membership in
the Board of Trade; and (3) one Exercise Right Privilege or “ERP,” newly
issued by the Board of Trade.

 

The trend in the industry toward demutualization
continued when, in September 2005, CBOE announced that it would
demutualize and its members would receive shares in a stock corporation.  A special committee was appointed by the CBOE
board of directors in July 2006 to consider the relative interests of the
Exerciser Members (i.e., those who held rights by virtue of their relationship
with CBOT) and the CBOE Seat Owners (i.e., those who had paid for their
memberships).  This action was filed
shortly thereafter by CBOT Holdings, CBOT, and the individual Plaintiffs.  The class to be represented was composed of
certain “full” Board of Trade members. 
The goal of that action was to bar the demutualization of CBOE unless
the Exerciser Members and the CBOE Seat Owners were treated equally.

 

A few months later, in October 2006, CBOT
Holdings and Chicago Mercantile Exchange Holdings, Inc. (“CME Group”)
announced that CME Group would merge with CBOT Holdings.  CBOT would, following that merger, be a
wholly-owned subsidiary of CME Group.

 

(6) See Bd. of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch.,
Case No. 00 CH 15000 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty, Ill).

 

3

 

CBOE, in December 2006, reacted to the proposed
merger of CBOT Holdings and CME Group by determining that, pursuant to Article Fifth
(b), the merger would extinguish any rights of the class to become (or remain)
members of CBOE as a result of their Exercise Rights.  At the same time, CBOE sought SEC approval of
its interpretation of Article Fifth (b).

 

At the beginning of 2007, the Plaintiffs in this
action filed their Second Amended Complaint. 
They alleged that the CBOE’s proposed interpretation of Article Fifth
(b) was both a breach of contract and a breach of the CBOE’s board’s
fiduciary duties.  The Plaintiffs sought
an injunction barring the CBOE from terminating the Exercise Right (and
Exerciser Member status) in the event of a CBOT-CME Group merger.  Later that month, CBOE adopted a plan of
demutualization.  CBOE assumed that the
CBOT-CME Group merger would occur first and that the SEC would accept its
interpretation of Article Fifth (b) in these circumstances.  Thus, CBOE did not make provision for any
rights of the Exerciser Members within the context of its demutualization
plan.  With the announcement that the
vote on the CBOT-CME Group merger would be held in early July, CBOE, addressing
transitional issues, adopted an interpretation of a rule that allowed for
interim status of Exerciser Members (“Temporary Members”) until the SEC made
its determination.  The CBOT-CME Group
merger was approved and consummated in July 2007.  In August 2007, this Court denied the
Plaintiffs’ application for interim relief with respect to CBOE’s transition
rule.(7)  On the same day, this action was stayed pending decision by the
SEC on whether Article Fifth (b) should be interpreted to the effect
that the dernutualization of CBOT resulted in the loss of Exerciser Member
status.(8)

 

(7) CBOT Holdings, Inc. v Chicago Bd. Options Exch., 2007
WL 2296.356 (Del. Ch. Aug 3, 2007).

 

(8) CBOT Holdings, Inc., 2007 WL 2296355.

 

4

 

The SEC approved CBOE’s interpretation of Article Fifth
(b) that no person could qualify as an Exerciser Member of CBOE after the
CBOT-CME Group merger.(9)  This order, issued January 15, 2008, in
substance resolved the question of who could trade on the CBOE as a result of a
previous interest in CBOT.  The SEC also
indicated that this Court had jurisdiction to decide state law issues.  The state law issues were generally understood
to involve breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims; more specifically,
they addressed the economic rights associated with the interests held by CBOT
members in the CBOE.(10)

 

In early February 2008, Plaintiffs, by now also
including the CME Group, filed a Third Amended Complaint against CBOE and
certain of its current or former directors. 
That action raised or reiterated numerous claims, including that CBOE
could not eliminate the rights, including trading rights, of Exerciser Members
as the result of the consummation of the CBOT-CME Group merger and that
Exerciser Members and CBOE Seat Owners should receive the same consideration as
the result of the CBOE’s demutualization. 
The parties, thereafter, filed various motions for summary judgment and,
shortly before the scheduled argument of those motions on June 2, 2008,
they reached an agreement in principle resolving this litigation.  The Stipulation of Settlement (the “Stipulation”)
was submitted to the Court for its consideration on August 20, 2008.(11)  Two days later, a scheduling order was
entered which, inter alia certified a temporary
class, directed the sending of notices, and established the procedures for a
hearing on the Settlement and for making any objections to the Settlement.  In order to qualify for certain 

 

(9) Securities Exchange
Act, Release No. 34-57159 (Jan. 22, 2008), 73 FR 3769-01
(SR-CBOE-2006-106).

 

(10) Various
CBOT-related parties appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, Case No. 08-1116, seeking review of the
SEC’s approval of the CBOE’s interpretation. 
That appeal has been stayed.

 

(11) The terms of the
Settlement are discussed in greater detail below.  The Stipulation was revised in filings of September 30,
2008, and October 3, 2008. 
References to the Stipulation generally are to its final form.

 

 

5

 

benefits under the terms of
the Settlement, the Three Parts—at least 27,338 shares of CBOT common stock or,
after the merger, at least 10,251.75 shares of CME Group common stock, one ERP,
and one CBOT B-1 membership—had to be held simultaneously. (12)

 

Eventually, the Stipulation was revised to make the
qualification process slightly easier. 
The cutoff date for meeting the qualifying requirements was extended
from June 2, 2008, to August 22, 2008.  Also, the Eligibility Date(13) was extended
from October 8, 2008, to October 14, 2008.  Finally, a requirement that the CME Group
stock be held lien-free, in book-entry form at Computershare was reduced from a
period of seven weeks to a period of seventeen days.  Instead of spanning the period between October 14
and December 2, 2008, the shares had to be deposited with Computershare in
accordance with the Stipulation only from October 14, 2008, through October 31,
2008.

 

The class, for purposes of distributing settlement
proceeds, has been divided into two groups: Group A and Group B.  The Participating Group A Settlement Class Members(14)
must have held all Three Parts simultaneously at some time before August 22,
2008, and held those parts from the Eligibility Date of October 14, 2008,
through the settlement period (until October 31, 2008).  The Participating Group A Settlement Class Members
will share in (i) an equity pool consisting of 18% of the equity interest
to be issued to both the CBOE Seat Owners and the Participating Group A
Settlement Class Members and (ii) a cash pool of $300 million.  In 

 

(12) Stipulation ¶
30FF.  The Three Parts were the product
of the 2001 Agreement and its requirements to be a Full Member of the CBOT and
entitled to an Exercise Right.

 

(13) Stipulation ¶ 30N.

 

(14) Stipulation ¶ 30T.

 

6

 

addition, some Participating
Group A Settlement Class Members, also Temporary Members of the CBOE, may
receive payments based on certain access fees that they had paid to CBOE.(15)

 

The second group—not a separate class or
subclass—consists of the Participating Group B Settlement Class Members.(16)  They must have owned one ERP from the
Eligibility Date (October 14, 2008) through the end of the settlement
period (October 31, 2008) and will receive a payment of $250,000.

 

Other class members, who are not eligible to receive
any settlement proceeds, will be bound by the release to be provided as the
result of the Settlement.(17)  In order
to participate in the Settlement, CBOE insisted upon a dismissal of all the
litigation, with prejudice, and a release of all claims which could be tied to
prior interests in CBOT, including the holding of one or more of the Three
Parts.  Proceeds will be paid only to
those satisfying the requirements to be a member of either Group A or Group B.

 

Finally, in order to participate in the Settlement,
certain technical requirements were imposed, such as the timely filing of
necessary paperwork.  One of the
technical requirements, the depositing of a necessary minimum number of CME
Group shares with Computershare in book entry, lien-free, form has proved to be
problematic and is the basis of a challenge to the fairness of the Settlement.

 

(15) Other Participating
Group A Settlement Class Members will not be entitled to obtain a rebate
of certain access fees which they paid. 
This distinction is the basis of objections which the Court addresses in
Part V1, infra.

 

(16) Stipulation ¶ 30U.

 

(17) There are approximately
850 Participating Group A Settlement Class Members and 365 Participating
Group B Settlement Class Members out of roughly 1,330 who could have
qualified, and perhaps as many as 1,200 class members who will be bound by the
release but without any entitlement to settlement proceeds,.  See Tr. of
Settlement Hig. at 19; Notice of Hrg., Exs. 3 & 4.

 

7

 

II.  THE COURT’S TASK

 

The Court starts with consideration of whether class
certification is appropriate and whether the Settlement in gross should be
approved.  It then turns its attention to
the various specific objections to the terms of the Settlement.(18)

 

 

III.  CLASS CERTIFICATION

 

Court of Chancery Rule 23 establishes the
requirements for certification of a class.(19) 
By Court of Chancery Rule 23(a), there are four criteria that must
be satisfied: (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and
(4) adequacy of representation.

 

The proposed class has at least 2,500 members and, accordingly, joinder
of these potential plaintiffs in one proceeding is impracticable.(20)  The numerosity standard is
satisfied.(21)  The commonality prong
requires that the plaintiffs share questions of law or fact in common with
other class members.(22)  Although the
members of the class are not all similarly situated, they share numerous
questions of law and fact, including the continuing import of CBOE’s
certificate of incorporation, the 1992 Agreement, and the 2001 Agreement, as
revised.  The focus of the questions
common to the class would involve whether CBOE could unilaterally extinguish,
as a result of the CME Group merger, the Exercise Right and the corresponding
rights and privileges that settlement class members had, or may have had, with
respect to CBOE membership.  In addition,
there are questions of whether members of the CBOE board discharged their
fiduciary duties to class members.  These
common questions predominate over 

 

(18) As noted, supra note 2,
this memorandum opinion does not address the applications of those persons who
claim to have been improperly denied the opportunity to participate in the Settlement
because, according to class counsel, they failed to satisfy one or more of
the Stipulation’s procedural requirements, such as, for example, timely filing
of a claim.

 

(19) See generally Prezant v. DeAngelis,
636 A.2d 915, 925 (Del. 1994).

 

(20) See, e.g.,
Leon N. Weiner and Assocs., Inc. v. Krapf, 584 A.2d 1220, 1225
(Del. 1991)

 

(21) Ct. Ch. R. 23(a)(1).

 

(22) Ct. Ch. R. 23(a)(2).

 

8

 

any
questions that may confront class members individually.(23)  Accordingly, the commonality prong has been
satisfied.

 

 

With respect to typicality, the class
representatives’ legal and factual positions are substantially the same as
those of other members of the class.(24) 
Moreover, although it may vary in degree, the harm arising from the
elimination of rights with respect to the CBOE that trace back to the CBOT are
typical of all members.  Thus, the
typicality requirement is satisfied.

 

Finally, the class representatives are
knowledgeable, share economic incentives with the class, and have retained
sophisticated and experienced counsel to represent the class interest.  As further protection for the class members,
separate counsel have represented the interests of Group A and Group
B.(25)  The Court finds that class
representatives fairly and adequately represented the interests of the
class.(26)

 

In addition to satisfying the requirements of Court
of Chancery Rule 23(a), parties seeking certification of a class must also
satisfy at least one of the standards of Court of Chancery Rule 23(b).  In this instance, certification of a
mandatory (i.e., non-op-out) class is 

 

(23) Krapf,
584 A.2d at 1225 (class members need not be “identically situated”).

 

(24) See id.
Ct. Ch. R. 23(a)(3).

 

(25) The individual
plaintiffs are both Participating Group A Settlement Class Members.  That no plaintiff is a Participating Group B
Settlement Class Member is, of course, a source of concern.  The presence of independent counsel
representing Group B interests exclusively, coupled with the Court’s conclusion
that the allocation between the two groups is fair and reasonable, see, Part V.C., infra, provides
confidence that Group B’s interests have been adequately represented.

 

(26) Ct. Ch. R,
23(a)(4).  Some of the objections, such
as the one based on the difference between consideration for Group A and Group
B, the recoupment of certain fees paid to CBOE, and the timing requirements,
carry with them suggestions that there may have been conflicts between class
representatives and certain class members. 
The existence of material conflicts between the class representatives
and members of the class would limit the Court’s ability to conclude that the
class representatives’ efforts have been adequate within the meaning of Court
of Chancery Rule 23(a)(4).  A review
of those alleged conflicts is best done within the context of assessing the
merits of the objections.  Because the
Court will overrule those objections, infra, and
conclude that the class representatives and their counsel discharged their
responsibilities fairly and adequately and without any adverse consequences
from what the objectors have perceived as potential conflicts, the requirements
of Court of Chancery Rule 23(a)(4) have been satisfied.

 

9

 

appropriate under both Court
of Chancery Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2).  Certification under Court of Chancery Rule 23(b)(1) is
appropriate because prosecution of separate actions by individual class members
would likely result in inconsistent and varying results that would impose
inconsistent obligations on opposing parties and because adjudication of
individual claims would likely be dispositive of the interests of other
potential class members who are not parties. 
For these reasons, actions challenging the exercise of corporate
fiduciary duties are frequently certified under this rule.  Court of Chancery Rule 23(b)(2) is
routinely relied upon in instances where class-wide injunctive or declaratory
relief is sought.  Although the remedy
achieved here is a monetary (or monetary equivalent) settlement, this action
was commenced with a firm focus on injunctive relief.  This equitable relief was designed to
preserve the trading and other rights of CBOT members with respect to the CBOE.  It is this aspect of equitable relief that
supports certification of a mandatory class.(27)

 

Accordingly, the class, as defined in the
Stipulation, is certified.(28)

 

(27) See
generally Nottingham Partners v. Dana, 564 A.2d 1089, 1095 (Del.
1989); Noerr v. Greenwood, 2002 WL, 31720734,
at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 22, 2002).

 

(28) Notice in accordance
with the Court’s scheduling order was duly given, and class members have
had ample opportunity to express their views.

 

10

 

IV.  ADEQUACY OF THE SETTLEMENT

 

In determining whether to approve a settlement of
this nature, the Court is not in a position to resolve the merits of the
dispute.  Instead, the Court must assess
the nature of the claims asserted and the defenses that might be raised in
opposition and then apply its own business Judgment to determine whether the
proposed settlement is fair and reasonable.(29)

 

There is no general opposition to the consideration
achieved by the proposed class settlement with CBOE, nor should there
be.(30)  Based on assumptions made that
were reasonable when the Settlement was proposed, the Settlement carries a
value of roughly $1 billion.  This
consists of an equity pool in excess of $700 million and a cash pool of $300
million.  Using these numbers, each
Participating Group A Settlement Class Member will receive stock and cash
valued at approximately $1 million.  Each
Participating Group B Settlement Class Member, will receive $250,000 in
cash.  This litigation was difficult and
complicated.  Indeed, the Defendants had
many significant arguments running in their favor.  The dispute between the CBOT and the CBOE had
been ongoing for decades.  The various
agreements, tied to Article Fifth (b), as the product of several
compromised negotiations, were subject to multiple potential interpretations.  One assumes that, when the documents
establishing the CBOT-CBOE relationship were drafted, demutualization was not
high on the list of likely events, and, thus, demutualization did not fit
neatly into the structure established by Article Fifth (b).  In short, this was a case where litigation 

 

(29) See, e.g.,
In re Resorts Ini’l S’holder Litig., Appeals, 570 A.2d 259, 266
(Del. 1990); Rome v. Archer, 197 A.2d 49,
53-54 (Del. 1964). The Court is informed by the following factors: (1) the
probable validity of the claims, (2) the apparent difficulties in
enforcing the claims through the courts, (3) the collectibility of any
judgment recovered, (4) the delay, expense and trouble of litigation, (5) the
amount of the compromise as compared with the amount and collectibility of a
judgment, and (6) the views of the parties involved, pro and con. Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del, 1986).  The critical factor here is the (excellent)
benefit achieved when measured against the (very real) risk of litigation.  The other factors identified in Polk are of little moment in this instance, but they
certainly do not counsel against approval of the Settlement.

 

(30) Indeed, no objection
has been submitted that challenges the sufficiency of the settlement
proceeds.  Numerous objections have been
filed as to how the settlement proceeds are to be allocated and what must be
done in order to qualify to receive those payments.

 

11

 

risk to the class members
was substantial.  The risk of getting
nothing, especially in light of the SEC’s determination that there were no
longer any trading rights in the CBOE based on the CBOT interests, was
substantial.  Accordingly, after much
work by class counsel, much of it in this Court, this Settlement, on its
merits, is a compelling one and, save for the Court’s consideration of the more
specific objections, will be approved.

 

V. 
STRUCTURAL OBJECTIONS

 

For convenience, the structural objections will be
divided into three groups: (1) objections dealing with class membership
cutoff and eligibility dates; (2) objections to the verification
procedures established to assure that Participating Group A Settlement Class Members
satisfied the various requirements; (3) objections to the allocation of
value as between the Group A settlement class members and the Group B
settlement class members; and (4) an objection to the scope of the release
obtained by CBOE.

 

A.                                   Timing
Issues

 

In order to qualify as a Group A settlement class
member, the person must have simultaneously held all three parts—10,251.25
shares of CME Group common stock, a CBOT B-1 membership, and an ERP—at some
time before August 22, 2008.(31) 
Twelve objections were filed;(32) these objectors argue that a
prospective date should have been set so that they could have assembled the
Three Parts for the first time after announcement of the Settlement.(33)  Certain 

 

(31) If someone had owned
all of the parts simultaneously but had sold one or more of the parts, that
person had until October to reacquire (or reassemble) all of the parts.

 

(32) This objection has been
raised by DRW Investments, LLC, DRW Securities, LLC, DRW Holdings LLC, Scott A.
Hall, Jeffrey Holland, Peter C. Kelly, Tom Mallers, Nickolas J. Neubauer, Louis
Panos, Charles Westphal, Barbara J. Whitlow, and A. Alan Zatopa.  The record suggests that Mr. Westphal’s
objection may have been rendered moot by extension of the cutoff date from
June 2, 2008, to August 22, 2008.

 

(33) The August 22,
2008, record date was changed from the initial one of June 2, 2008, which
was the date that the settlement was initially announced.  The new date did not specifically afford an
opportunity to satisfy prospectively the simultaneous holding requirement.

 

12

 

objectors argue that
portions of the 1992 Agreement should be interpreted as requiring a prospective
date.  That language, however, addresses “any
offer, distribution or redemption.”  It
does not speak to the Court’s task here, the review of a proposed settlement of
contested litigation.  The date chosen
precluded a stranger to the litigation or the CBOT membership from assembling
the Three Parts for the first time after the Settlement was announced and then
participating in the Settlement.  The
effect of this cutoff date is to protect those persons allegedly directly
injured by CBOE’s conduct from having to share settlement proceeds with
others.  This is fair and
reasonable.(34)  Similarly, the October 14,
2008, Eligibility Date, by which time the Three Parts had to be held together
and submitted for compliance purposes, is reasonable.  It allowed those who sought to reassemble the
parts seven weeks to do so.

 

B.                                     Deposit
of CME Group Shares with Computershare

 

Group A settlement class members were required to
hold at least 10,251.25 shares of CME Group common stock (one of the three
parts) (or an equivalent number of CBOT Holdings shares in the absence of the
merger).  In order to confirm accurately
those holdings, participants were required to register the shares, lien free,
in book entry form, at Computershare during the period from October 14,
2008 through October 31, 2008. 
Various objections have been lodged with respect to these
requirements.(35)

 

(34) Some record date was,
of course, necessary.  One could argue
that an even earlier date would have been sustainable.  It is worth noting that this action was
initially filed over trading rights, more so than accompanying economic rights.  The trading rights were effectively disposed
of (subject to appeal) by the SEC in January 2008.

 

WH Trading, LLC (joined by
others) has questioned the setting of the cutoff date.  It suggested that discovery into that topic
is necessary.  The Court fails to see how
any such discovery could lead to any relevant or admissible evidence.  The initial cutoff date of June 2, 2008,
was tied to the announcement of the Settlement. 
The August date was the product of what amounted to an effort to
accommodate some concerns that were troubling the Court and of the filing of
the Stipulation only a few days before. 
Any suggestion that the date was set with some sort of a nefarious
purpose of trying to target specific potential class members lacks any
foundation and is reminiscent of that proverbial fishing expedition.

 

(35)
The verification requirements of paragraph 30T of the Stipulation drew
objections from William L. Allen, DRW Investments, LLC, DRW Securities, LLC,
DRW Holdings LLC, Scott A. Hall, Jeffrey Holland, Peter C. Kelly, Tom Mallers,
Thomas M. Marsh, Donald T. McMurray, Ira S. Nathan Revocable Trust, Louis
Panos, 

 

13

 

Most Group A participants were apparently able to
satisfy this requirement without material difficulty and, indeed, some
objectors eventually found ways to comply. 
Because of the multitude of ways possessory and ownership rights in
shares of stock can be divvied up, some procedure was necessary to assure that
the Group A proceeds would only be paid to those persons having genuine
attributes of ownership of the shares.(36) 
Otherwise, there would be significant risk that the Settlement would not
be managed on a fair and consistent basis.

 

Computershare was chosen because most class members
would have already had a relationship as a result of its role as transfer agent
for the CBOT demutualization and the CME Group merger.(37)  Many class members had accounts there;
indeed, full members were issued their CBOT stock following CBOT’s
demutualization through Computershare. 
In short, Computershare was a logical choice.

 

This arrangement was a fair and reasonable means of
verifying entitlement to participate in the class recovery.  It, of course, was not the only way, but many
of the others that might be suggested—relying upon broker’s affidavits and
other third-party information—would have imposed unnecessary administrative and
investigative burdens on class counsel. 
In addition, the requirement that the shares be lien-free provided
significantly greater confidence—again, without the need for extensive
investigation—that only genuine owners (those holding the real 

 

Brian R. Sherman, Nickolas
J. Neubauer, Jamin Nixon, Charles Westphal, UBS Financial Services, Inc.,
and A. Alan Zatopa.  The record suggests
that the Neubauer, Hall, Westphal, and Nixon objections may have been rendered
moot by their subsequent compliance with the verification requirements.

 

(36) The Court recognizes
that compliance with this requirement may have imposed economic costs.  Certain objectors complain that the deposit
with Computershare requirement is atypical of other, class action settlement
procedures.  That fact does not render
this requirement unreasonable.  The
consideration achieved as a result of this Settlement is atypical, and the
concomitant increased need for care in verifying that the claimants are, in
fact, entitled to participate justifies atypical treatment.

 

(37) The objectors note
that, on June 2, 2008, a class representative suggested that an
alternative method of ownership verification might be permissible, instead of
forcing all owners to register shares in book form with Computershare.  Whether true or not, as of the Stipulation,
all parties were on notice of the Computershare requirement and had sufficient
time to comply (or shortly thereafter).

 

14

 

economic interest and not some sort of
prepaid forward contract holding or short sale holding) were permitted to
participate.  Again, the requirement is
reasonable; as such, it is sustained.

 

Finally, some holding period to complete the
verification process was necessary.  The
initial period was shortened by almost two months; it ended up being only a
little longer than two weeks.  Any
significantly shorter period likely would have been unworkable and likely would
have called into question the accuracy and the fairness of the verification
process.  Thus, the holding period of
seventeen days is also sustained as reasonable.

 

C.                                     Allocation
of Settlement Proceeds

 

Three Group B participants have challenged the
disparity of roughly $750,000 between the value of a Group A settlement unit
and the value of a Group B settlement unit. (38)  The Group B participants, of course, hold one
ERP while the Group A participants hold all Three Parts.

 

“An allocation plan must be fair, reasonable, and adequate.”(39)  Approval of the allocation is part of the
process of approving the Settlement.  The
standards guiding the Court’s exercise of its discretion are the same.  As with evaluation of the wisdom of a
compromise of litigation claims, there is no mathematical model that will yield
the proper division of proceeds among the class members when the class members
are not situated in exactly the same fashion.

 

CBOE, through the Settlement, seeks to extinguish
the ERPs because in that way it can be sure that no one who had acquired a B-1
membership and sufficient equity in CME Group, or whatever entity may stand in
its stead, will appear later and demand trading rights on its exchange.  This has been a critical impediment to CBOE’s
demutualization effort.  Of the various
parts, the ERP is the most critical to CBOE’s efforts to reduce future
risk.  Thus, it is 

 

(38) Participating Group B
Settlement Class Members Thomas Hafner, Jeffrey Holland, and Louis Panos
have brought this objection.

 

(39) Schultz v.
Ginsburg, 965 A.2d 661, 668 (Del. 2009).

 

15

 

argued that the key role of the ERP should
entitle the holder of an ERP to a greater portion of the settlement, even
without the other parts.  The history of
the CBOT-CBOE relationship and the purpose of the ERP defeat this
contention.  In order to be able to trade
as an Exerciser Member of the CBOE, one needed all Three Parts.  The ERP, alone, delivered little, if any,
value.  Indeed, the ERP was created to
allow CBOE a separate mechanism for reducing (by buying up ERPs) the potential
number of Exerciser Members.

 

The Settlement here is driven, as was the
commencement of this action, by the loss of trading rights.  Those who had, but lost, trading rights on
the CBOE held all Three Parts.  It
follows that those who held all Three Parts should be paid a substantially
greater proportion of the settlement than those who held only an ERP.

 

That it is reasonable to pay substantially more to
the holders of Group A settlement units than to the holders of Group B
settlement units, of course, does not compel any particular conclusion with
respect to a specific number.  There is
no magic formula that allows a valuation of an ERP at, say, $225,000 or
$325,000.

 

Nonetheless, the Court is satisfied that the
allocation between Group A and Group B proposed in the Settlement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate.  Group A
interests and Group B interests were represented by separate, independent, and
competent counsel.  The amount paid to Group
B for the ERP was higher than any price paid for an ERP in the preceding eight
months and, in the preceding three years, only twenty-five transactions were
recorded with a higher price than $250,000 per ERP.(40)  Thus, the amount to be paid to Group B participants
is consistent with prevailing market values, although it may be that the
uncertainty surrounding the future of the CBOT-CBOE relationship may have
depressed the value.  More importantly,
the amount to be 

 

(40)
Krewer Aff. at ¶ 5, Ex. B.

 

 

16

 

paid to the Group A
participants fairly reflects the loss—and in a more global sense, to include
trading rights—as the result of CBOE’s actions. 
Although the Court may have differentiated between economic rights and
trading rights, it would be unfair to consider trading rights as carrying no
economic benefit.  The Settlement was
also designed to accommodate the economic loss associated with the loss of
trading rights that also formed the focus for the breach of contract and
fiduciary duty claims and presented a significant litigation risk that CBOE had
to confront.  Therefore, the allocation
of the settlement proceeds was fair and reasonable.

 

D.                                    The
Release

 

As perhaps should be expected of a settlement with
so many components, the release sought by CBOE reaches persons who qualify
neither as Group A settlement class members nor as Group B settlement class
members.  Thus, they will be bound by the
release but will receive no consideration. 
That is not necessarily a sound basis for objecting to a settlement,(41)
because a party funding a settlement reasonably can expect to put all claims
relating to the subject matter of the litigation—real claims and theoretical
claims—behind it.(42)  One objection,
that of Dennis Quinn Cook, highlights this possibility.  Mr. Cook held full membership in CBOT
from 1966 until March 21, 2006, when he sold his full interest.  He claims that he was damaged when CBOE, in September 2005,
announced its plans for demutualization and that it would not expect to pay
Exerciser Members anything as a result of the restructuring.  This claim appears to be related directly to
the substance of these proceedings—the consequences of CBOE’s predictions of
the fate of Exerciser Members after demutualization.  Yet, it is a claim detached from any notion
of cause and effect.  There is no showing
that the announcement had any impact on the

 

(41)
See In re Triare Cos., Inc. Class and Deriv. Litig.,
791 A.2d 872, 876 (Del. Ch. 2001).

 

(42)
The reach of the proposed release is determined by reference to the Stipulation
at ¶ 30Y (Released Parties), ¶ 30Z (Settled Claims), and ¶ 31 (Release of
Unknown Claims).

 

17

 

value of his CBOT
interests.  All CBOE did was announce its
intentions.  It took no direct
action.  Why a mere announcement under
these circumstances would give rise to liability on the part of CBOE is not
apparent.  The relationship between CBOT
and CBOE had been relatively strained for many years before Mr. Cook
decided to sell his interests.  Instead
of pursuing his claims, he sold his various CBOT interests and, now, with a
substantial settlement fund having been established, he seeks to draw from it.  His claim is so general that it is difficult
to assess, but, for purposes of approving the scope of the release, it is
sufficient to note that the Court, in the exercise of its business judgment, is
readily able to conclude that the “probable validity” of his claim is minimal
and the “likelihood” of monetary recovery is negligible.  In these circumstances, Mr. Cook’s
objection, and any other like it, must be rejected.

 

VI.  ADDDITIONAL PAYMENTS

 

As the CBOE reacted to CBOT’s demutualization and
the CBOT-CME Group merger, various transitional arrangements were
implemented.  One of these resulted in “Temporary
Members” who could trade on the CBOE but with the payment of substantial
fees.  As part of the Settlement, certain
payments are to be made to some of the CBOE Temporary Members.(43)  CBOE takes the position that only “individuals”—not
legal entities—can collect Additional Payments. 
Three entities (the “Entities”) that would otherwise qualify for
Additional Payments if they are not limited to individuals have
objected.(44)  They argue that the
Stipulation allows them, even as legal entities, to receive Additional
Payments.  If they are not entitled under
the Stipulation to receive those payments, then, they argue, the Settlement
should be rejected 

 

(43) They are designated
“Fee Based Payments” and “Supplemental Fee Based Payments” in paragraphs 36F
and 36G of the Stipulation.  For
convenience, they will be referred to, collectively, as “Additional Payments.”  The Court’s focus will be on the Fee Based Payment
because, in order to qualify for a Supplemental Fee Based Payment, one must
first be entitled to a Fee Based Payment.

 

(44) The Entities are Quiet
Light Securities, LLC, Infinium Capital Management, LLC, and UBS Securities,
LLC.

 

18

 

because there is no rational
basis for distinguishing between legal entities and individuals with respect to
their entitlement to Additional Payments.(45)

 

Under paragraph 36F of the Stipulation, CBOE will
make a “Fee Based Payment” to “each Participating Group A Settlement Class Member
who became a CBOE Temporary Member [pursuant to CBOE Rules 3.19.01 or
3.19.02] . . .”.  Thus, to receive a
fee-based payment, the person must (1) be a Participating Group A
Settlement Class Member (i.e., hold the three parts under the necessary
conditions which the Entitles did) and (2) have been a CBOE Temporary
Member.

 

To understand who could have been a CBOE Temporary
Member, it is necessary to review briefly a few CBOE Rules.  For present purposes, a “Temporary Member,”
by CBOE Rule 3.19.01, would include a “person who is a member of CBOE (an ‘exerciser
member’) pursuant to [Article Fifth (b)] as of July 1, 2007.”(46)  Thus, to be a Temporary Member in order to
qualify for Additional Payments, one must first have been an Exerciser
Member.  CBOE Rule 3.16(b) provides,
with respect to Article Fifth (b) that “[f]or the purpose of
entitlement to membership on the [CBOE] in accordance with [Article Fifth
(b)] the term ‘member of [the CBOT] as used in Article Fifth (b) is
interpreted to mean an individual, who is either an ‘Eligible CBOT Full Member’
or an ‘Eligible CBOT Full Member Delegate,’ as those terms are defined in the
[1992 Agreement and the 2001 Agreement] . . . and shall not mean any other
person.”  By the 1992 Agreement, both “Eligible
CBOT Full Member” and “Eligible CBOT Full Member 

 

(45) In general, the Court
has limited this memorandum opinion to approval of the settlement and not to
questions of individual eligibility to participate in the settlement.  The question of whether legal entities may
receive Additional Payments, is addressed here because, if the Entities qualify
under the terms of the Settlement, then they have no quarrel with the
Stipulation’s handling of Additional Payments.

 

(46) See also
CBOE Rule 3.19.02 for, in substance, an extension of this rule.

 

19

 

Delegate” are defined as “individual[s].”(47)  Support for CBOE’s position can also be found
in other provisions of the 1992 Agreement. 
For example, at paragraph 2(a), it provides that: “[t]he CBOT agrees, in
its own capacity and on behalf of its members, that only an individual who is
an Eligible CBOT Full Member or an Eligible CBOT Full Member Delegate is a
member of the CBOT within the meaning of Article Fifth (b) eligible
to have an Exercise Right and to be an Exercise Member.”  The 2001 Agreement, as revised, may have
modified the definitions of Eligible CBOT Full Member and Eligible CBOT Full
Member Delegate as a result of CBOT’s planned demutualization, yet the notion
that only individuals could be Exerciser Members persists.  For example, in Section 1 (d) of
the Agreement, “an individual shall be deemed to be an Eligible CBOT Full
Member if the individual [satisfies the three-part test].”

 

The Entities, because they held the Three Parts,
were able to designate their employees to be Exerciser Members.  Those employees were able to be Temporary
Members.  The Entities, of course, paid
all fees related to the employees’ status as Temporary Members.(48)  Because the Entities were not Temporary
Members, they did not satisfy the second requirement necessary to qualify for
an Additional Payment under the Settlement.(49)

 

With the conclusion that the Entities do not quality
for Additional Payments under the Stipulation, it becomes necessary to consider
whether exclusion of the Entities from those payments impairs the fairness and
reasonableness of the settlement.  The
Entities make the 

 

(47) 1992 Agreement § 1(a) &
(b).

 

(48) Although the employees
were qualified temporary members, they did not hold the Three Parts, and, thus,
they did not qualify for additional payments.

 

(49) The Entities point to
various other factors, such as billing practices, regular conduct, and some
arguably less than clear provisions of the CBOE Rules (see, e.g., Rule 3.8(c) which is in accord with the
Court’s analysis because of its use of his and her for the antecedent CBOT
Exerciser.)  None of these arguments,
however, overcomes the clear tenor set forth through the CBOE rules directly
defining who could be an Exerciser Member, and, thus, a temporary member.

 

20

 

simple and somewhat
appealing argument that:  if fees are to
be rebated, what difference does it make if they are to be paid to individuals
or to firms?  The answer is that the
conditions required to qualify for Additional Payments were intensely
negotiated terms.(50)  Only individuals
were Temporary Members.  If rights to
Additional Payments were opened up to legal entities generally, the exposure of
CBOE would be increased materially.  This
is but one part of a much larger settlement negotiation process.  In the context of the overall settlement and
in recognition that many contested lines had to be drawn, the Court concludes
that the conditions for qualifying for Additional Payments were established
reasonably.(51)

 

In short, the objections of the Entities to the
fairness of the Settlement as to Additional Payments are overruled.

 

VII.  A BRIEF POSTSCRIPT

 

This was a difficult matter.  Class counsel, in the Court’s judgment,
came to a fair and reasonable balancing of the various interests of all class
members.  The tension between Group A and
Group B was addressed with separate counsel representing each group.  The Court is satisfied that those class
members who qualify for neither Group A nor Group B had no material chance of
independent recovery.  Certain requirements
to participate in the Settlement were imposed—such as Computershare registration—as
pragmatic solutions to troubling concerns. 
They were not imposed to create any undue burden on any particular class
member.  Although 

 

(50) Discovery has been
requested with respect to the adequacy of class counsel and their effort in negotiating
Additional Payments, as well as whether the Additional Payments aspect
satisfies the typicality requirement of Court of Chancery Rule 23(a)(3).  As with the other requests for discovery, see note 34, supra, a
generalized and unfocused effort to discovery into the negotiation process is
not likely to result in useful or relevant evidence in these circumstances.

 

(51) In light of the SEC’s
approval of the CBOE’s interpretation of its rules that would have
excluded Exerciser Members from free trading rights on the CBOE, CBOE certainly
had a good argument that would have supported its requirement that additional
fees be paid.  In this sense, that any of
the fees that had been paid are being rebated is perhaps a fortuitous product
of negotiations.

 

 

21

 

there may have been other
means available, the path chosen by class counsel was reasonable, and it is far
from certain that some other path would not have suffered from yet a different
set of potential shortcomings.  Class counsel
negotiated the best deal—one perhaps better than what should have been
expected—that they could.  There are,
admittedly, some rough edges, but, frankly, it is difficult to see how that
could have been avoided.  Competent and
fair-minded counsel resolved the tough issues in a reasonable and responsible
manner.(52)  Ultimately, the Court is in
no position to reach any conclusion other than that the Settlement, including
its allocation plan, was, in the words of Schultz, “fair,
reasonable, and adequate.”

 

VIII.  CONCLUSION

 

For the foregoing reasons, the class as proposed
will be certified, this action may be maintained as a class action, and the
Settlement will be approved.  An
implementing order will be filed.

 

(52) This,
together with the Court’s review of the substantive objections, resolves any
lingering disquiet about the adequacy (and absence of material conflict) of the
class representatives and their counsel.

 

22

 

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF
THE STATE OF DELAWARE

 

	
  CME GROUP INC., a Delaware
  corporation,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  as successor by merger to
  CBOT HOLDINGS,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  INC., a Delaware
  corporation; THE BOARD OF

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  TRADE OF THE CITY OF
  CHICAGO, INC.,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  a Delaware corporation;
  and MICHAEL

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  FLOODSTRAND and THOMAS J.
  WARD

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  and All Others Similarly
  Situated,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Plaintiffs,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  v.

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
  C.A. No. 2369-VCN

  
	
   

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS
  EXCHANGE,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  INC., a Delaware non-stock
  corporation,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  WILLIAM J. BRODSKY, JOHN
  E. SMOLLEN,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  ROBERT J. BIRNBAUM, JAMES
  R. BORIS,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  MARK F. DUFFY, DAVID
  FISHER,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  JONATHAN G. FLATOW, JANET
  P.

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  FROETSCHER, BRADLEY G.
  GRIFFITH,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  PAUL J. JIGANTI, PAUL
  KEPES, STUART K.

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  KIPNES, DUANE R. KULLBERG,
  JAMES P.

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  MACGILVRAY, ANTHONY D.
  MCCORMICK,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  R. EDEN MARTIN, KEVIN
  MURPHY,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  RODERICK PALMORE, THOMAS
  H.

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  PATRICK, JR., SUSAN M.
  PHILLIPS,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  WILLIAM R. POWER, SAMUEL
  K. SKINNER,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  CAROLE E. STONE, HOWARD L.
  STONE,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  and EUGENE S. SUNSHINE,

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Defendants.

  	
  :

  	
   

  	
   

  

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 

Date Submitted: December 16, 2008

Date Decided:  June 25, 2009

 

 

 

Kenneth J. Nachbar, Esquire
of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Hugh R.
McCombs, Esquire, Michele L. Odorizzi, Esquire, and Michael K. Forde, Esquire
of Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Peter B. Carey, Esquire of Law Offices
of Peter B. Carey, Chicago, Illinois; Kevin M. Forde, Esquire of Kevin M.
Forde, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Plaintiffs CME Group, Inc.
and The Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, Inc.

 

Edward P. Welch, Esquire and
Edward B. Micheletti, Esquire of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, and Jerrold E. Salzman, Esquire and Christal Lint,
Esquire of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Chicago,
Illinois, Attorneys for Plaintiffs CME Group, Inc. and The Board of Trade
of the City of Chicago, Inc.

 

Andre G. Bouchard, Esquire
and Joel Friedlander, Esquire of Bouchard, Margules & Friedlander,
P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, and Gordon B. Nash, Jr., Esquire and Scott C.
Lascari, Esquire of Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Chicago, Illinois,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Michael Floodstrand, Thomas J. Ward, and All Others
Similarly Situated.

 

Samuel A. Nolen, Esquire,
Daniel A. Dreisbach, Esquire, and Rudolf Koch, Esquire of Richards, Layton &
Finger, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, and Paul E. Dengel, Esquire and Paul E.
Greenwalt, III, Esquire of Schiff Hardin LLP, Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys
for Defendants.

 

Kevin G. Abrams, Esquire and
Nathan A. Cook, Esquire of Abrams & Laster LLP, Wilmington, Delaware,
Attorneys for Objectors Nickolas J. Neubauer, A. Alan Zatopa, Charles Westphal,
DRW Investments LLC, DRW Securities LLC, DRW Holdings LLC, and Alan Matthew;
James D. Wareham, Esquire of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP,
Washington, DC, and Kevin C. Logue, Esquire of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky &
Walker LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys for Objector Charles Westphal.

 

John H. Williams, Jr.,
Esquire of John Williams, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Objector
Theodore Pecora.

 

Melanie K. Sharp, Esquire
and Michele Sherretta Budicak, Esquire of Young Conaway Stargatt &
Taylor, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, and Nicholas C. Zagotta, Esquire and Joseph
P. Simon, Esquire of Connelly Roberts & McGivney LLC, Chicago,
Illinois, Attorneys for Objectors Quiet Light Trading, LLC, and Quiet Light
Securities, LLC.

 

Vernon R. Proctor, Esquire
and Jill K. Argo, Esquire of Proctor Heyman LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney
for Objectors SKTY Trading, LLC, The Ira S. Nathan Revocable Trust, J.P. Morgan
Futures Inc., and Rho Trading Securities, LLC, and Phillip S. Reed, Esquire of
Patzik, Frank & Samotny Ltd., Chicago, Illinois, Attorney for Objector
The Ira S. Nathan Revocable Trust.

 

Michael A. Weidinger,
Esquire and Joanne Pileggi Pinckney, Esquire of Pinckney, Harris &
Weidinger, LLC, Wilmington, Delaware, and David W. Porteous, Esquire and James
G. Martignon, Esquire of Levenfeld Pearlstein, LLC, Chicago, Illinois,
Attorneys for Objector Daniel M. Ambrosino.

 

Carolyn S. Hake, Esquire and
Lauren E. Maguire, Esquire of Ashby & Geddes, Wilmington, Delaware,
and Patrick L. Kenney, Esquire, Michael S. Cessna, Esquire, and Benjamin C. 

 

 

Hassebrock, Esquire of
Lathrop & Gage L.C., Kansas City, Missouri, Attorneys for Objector
Agrex, Inc.

 

Denise Seastone Kraft,
Esquire and John L. Reed, Esquire of Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge
LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, and Darrell J. Graham, Esquire of The Law Office of
Darrell J. Graham, LLC, Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Objectors Jeffrey
Holland and Louis Panos.

 

Joseph A. Rosenthal, Esquire
and P. Bradford deLeeuw, Esquire of Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess,
P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, and J. Samuel Tenenbaum, Esquire and Meredith M.
Casper, Esquire of Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys
for Objectors Milton Robinson and Bryan Shaughnessy.

 

Daniel B. Rath, Esquire and
Rebecca L. Butcher, Esquire of Landis Rath & Cobb LLP, Wilmington,
Delaware, and David A. Genelly, Esquire of Vanasco Genelly & Miller,
Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Objectors Kottke Associates LLC and Barbara
Whitlow, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Richard
Whitlow.

 

David S. Eagle, Esquire and
Kelly A. Green, Esquire of Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg & Ellers,
Wilmington, Delaware, and Jeffrey H. Bergman, Esquire and Jennifer Zordani,
Esquire of Ungaretti & Harris LLP, Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for
Objectors UBS Securities, LLC and UBS Financial Services, Inc.

 

Kevin J. Mangan, Esquire of
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, Wilmington, Delaware, and
Edward S. Weil, Esquire and Heather L. Kramer, Esquire of Dykema Gossett PLLC,
Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Objector Infinium Capital Management, LLC.

 

Paul A. Fioravanti, Jr.,
Esquire and Laina M. Herbert, Esquire of Prickett, Jones & Elliott,
P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, and Brett Nolan, Esquire of Shefsky &
Froelich Ltd., Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Objector The Kolton Family
Limited Partnership.

 

Paul A. Fioravanti, Jr.,
Esquire and Laina M. Herbert, Esquire of Prickett, Jones & Elliott,
P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, and Daryl M. Schumacher, Esquire of The Law Offices
of Daryl M. Schumacher, P.C., Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Objectors
Anthony J. McKerr and Mary C. McKerr Trust est. 3/13/97.

 

Richard I. G. Jones, Jr.,
Esquire and Toni Ann Platia, Esquire of Ashby & Geddes, Wilmington,
Delaware, Attorneys for Objector Geneva Trading USA, LLC.

 

Patricia R. Uhlenbrock,
Esquire and Fotini A. Antoniadis, Esquire of Morris James LLP, Wilmington,
Delaware, and William T. Rodeghier, Esquire, of Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys
for Objector William P. Sullivan.

 

Lewis H. Lazarus, Esquire
and Michael J. Custer, Esquire of Morris James LLP, Wilmington, Delaware,
Attorneys for Objector Nicholas A. Rapanos.

 

Henry E. Gallagher, Jr.,
Esquire and Kevin F. Brady, Esquire of Connolly Bove Lodge & Hutz LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware, and George R. Dougherty, Esquire, Gary M. Miller,
Esquire, and 

 

 

Justin M. Sandberg, Esquire
of Grippo & Elders LLC, Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Objector John
S. Stafford, Jr.

 

Martin S. Lessner, Esquire,
Danielle Gibbs, Esquire, and Kathaleen McCormick, Esquire of Young Conaway
Stargatt & Taylor LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, and Seth L. Levine,
Esquire and Manda M. Sertich, Esquire of Foley & Lardner LLP, New
York, New York, and Kathryn M. Trkla, Esquire of Foley & Lardner LLP,
Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Objector WH Trading LLC.

 

David A. Jenkins, Esquire of
Smith, Katzenstein & Furlow LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for
Objector Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.

 

Objector Tom Mallers, pro se.

 

Objector Peter C. Kelly, pro se.

 

Objector Scott A. Hall, pro se.

 

Objector Donald T. McMurray,
pro se.

 

Objector [J. A.] Dohl, pro se.

 

Objector William L. Allen,
Trustee of the William L. Allen Trust, pro se.

 

Objectors Thomas M. Marsh, pro se and Jamin Nixon, pro se.

 

Objector Brian R. Sherman, pro se.

 

Objector Dennis Quinn Cook, pro se.

 

Objector Thomas Hafner, pro se.

 

 

 

 

NOBLE, Vice Chancellor

 

 

I. 
BACKGROUND

 

The Court recently approved the proposed Stipulation
of Settlement in this class action (the “Settlement”).(1)  Claims of
potential class members had been submitted before the Settlement was
considered.  The claims process was
supervised and administered by Class Counsel who excluded a number of
Settlement Class Members from participating in the benefits conferred
under the Settlement because of their failure to comply strictly with the
Settlement’s conditions for eligibility.(2)  Some have objected (the “Objectors”)
to their exclusion.  The objections can
be placed into five categories:  (1) Objectors
who, for various reasons, submitted untimely Settlement Claim Forms; (2) Objectors
who failed to transfer their CME shares in book entry to Computershare during
the period of October 14, 2008, through 5:00 p.m. on October 31,
2008, due to an oversight or error; (3) one Objector that falls under both
categories 1 and 2 above—it filed a late Claim Form and did not comply
with the Settlement’s Computershare requirement; (4) Objectors who were
excluded based upon Class Counsel’s determination that they did not “beneficially
own” the requisite Three Parts needed to qualify as a Participating Group A
Settlement Class Member; and (5) one miscellaneous Objector.  The Court addresses these objections in this
memorandum opinion.

 

(1) CME Group, Inc. v. Chicago Bd. Options Exchange, Inc., 2009
WL 1547510 (Del. Ch. June 3, 2009). 
Familiarity with that memorandum opinion is presumed.

 

(2) The
Court overturns several of Class Counsel’s decisions regarding participation
in the proceeds conferred by the Settlement. 
Class Counsel, in the Court’s judgment, fairly and accurately
performed their duties.  It was their
responsibility to apply the terms of the Settlement strictly and
consistently.  They did not, however,
have the Court’s equitable discretion that is inherent in its supervision of
the class action claims process.

 

1

 

II.    DISCUSSION

 

A.                                   Objections
to Exclusion Based Upon Late Filing

 

Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement, in order to
qualify as a Participating Group A or Group B Settlement Class Member, a
Settlement Class Member must have submitted a Claim Form by October 14,
2008 (the “Eligibility Date”).  Class Counsel
excluded certain Settlement Class Members from participating in the
Settlement (as either Group A or Group B Settlement Class Members) based
upon their failure to submit a Claim Form by the Eligibility Date.  Several of these excluded Settlement Class Members
have objected, arguing that excluding them from participating would be
inequitable.

 

There are two types of later filers:  (1) Class Members who, because of
an inadvertent error—either their own, Class Counsel’s, or the United
States Postal Service’s—submitted their Claim Forms late, but otherwise met the
requirements in order to participate in the settlement; and (2) Class Members
who in good faith submitted a Group A Settlement Class Member Claim Form that
was rejected by Class Counsel and, upon receiving such rejection,
promptly—but after October 14, 2008—sought to become Participating Group B
Settlement Class Members.  Both
types of objector/late filer will be discussed in turn.

 

1.                                       The First Category of Late Filer

 

The first group of Objectors(3) all claim, in
essence, that their failure to file timely Claims Forms should not prohibit
them from participating in the Settlement under either the “excusable neglect”
or “substantial compliance” standard.  It
is undisputed that each of the later filers in this first category would
otherwise have satisfied all ownership and registration requirements to 

 

(3) The late filers to
whom the Court refers are:  Theodore
Pecora, Argex, Inc., John S. Stafford, William P. Sullivan, Anthony J.
McKerr and Marry C. McKerr Trust Est. 3/13/1997, Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce, Milton Robinson and Bryan Shaughnessy, Alan Matthew, and J.P. Morgan
Futures, Inc.

 

 

2

 

become a Participating Group
A or Group B (depending on the particular Objector) Settlement Class Member.(4)

 

There is substantial overlap in the facts of all
Objectors’ cases in this group—i.e., all of the members of this group filed
late Claims Forms because of an excusable, inadvertent error.  Any difference amongst them does not alter
the analysis.  Accordingly, the Court
will assess these Objectors’ claims as a group.(5)

 

In determining whether to approve the Settlement,
the Court was bound to exercise its own business judgment as to the fairness of
the settlement.(6)  “A corollary to that duty must be the duty of this
Court to insure that the stockholders who are entitled to participate in the
settlement are given a reasonable opportunity to file for and receive what is
due to them.”(7)  Of course, the Court already approved as reasonable the
Settlement’s Eligibility Date.  However, “[w]hile
it is true that the function of the filing deadline is to put a time limit on
the claims procedure, and . . . fair warning was given to the potential
claimants concerning the deadline, nevertheless the filing deadline is not
inflexible and must yield, if necessary, to the demands of equity.”(8) 
The parties seem to dispute the legal standard—“excusable neglect” or “substantial

 

(4) See Pls.’ Mem.
in Supp. of Mot. for Final Approval of the Proposed Settlement at 49 (“Class Counsel
acknowledges that all of the[] objectors [at issue] were in compliance except
for timely filing the appropriate Participating Settlement Class Member
Claim Form . . . .”).

 

(5) Within this group
of late filers, there are two subgroups. 
First, there are those persons who apparently timely sent off their
claim forms, but the forms were never received and recorded by Class Counsel.  Whether there was a problem with the delivery
service or whether their forms were misplaced by Class Counsel cannot be
determined.  Second, there are those who
did not submit their claim forms in a timely fashion because, for example, they
had not received notice of the Settlement or of the claims process.  It seems apparent that the position of those
who sent off their forms which were not received and recorded by Class Counsel
is deserving of greater sympathy. 
Nonetheless, because the Court’s analysis as to all the members of this
group is unchanged by the subtle differences in facts among them, assigning
blame for whatever error caused the late filing for a particular Objector is of
no use.

 

(6) Neponsit Inv. Co. v. Abramson, 405 A.2d 97, 100 (Del. 1979).

 

(7) Mendich v. Hunt Int’l Res., Inc., 1981 WL 7629, at *2
(Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1981).

 

(8) Id. at *3.

 

3

 

compliance” —the Court is to
employ in determining whether the filing deadline must yield to the demands of
equity.  The Court need not decide this
issue because it holds that under either standard, equitable principles demand
that the filing deadline be waived for the Objectors in this group.

 

In Mendich v. Hunt
International Resources, Inc., the Court of Chancery held that “although
a claims procedure approved by the Court should be followed, . . . substantial
compliance should be adequate.”(9)  The Court determined that “[t]he
missing of the postmark deadline, even without excuse, is substantial
compliance with the procedures for the filing of claims, when all the equities
are considered, if the postmark shows mailing within a few days of the
deadline.”(10)  Here, the facts of the Objectors’ cases indicate
substantial compliance under Mendich.  The Objectors either (1) mailed the
Claim Form prior to the Eligibility Date but Class Counsel, for
reasons that are unclear, did not receive it; or (2) received the Claim Form from
Class Counsel late, also for reasons that are unclear, but promptly mailed
the Claim Form upon actual receipt of it. 
Therefore, these Objectors have substantially complied with the terms of
the Settlement under Mendich.

 

In Brown v. Penn Central
Corp.,(11) this Court applied the seemingly more rigorous excusable
neglect standard in order to determine whether a settlement’s filing deadline
should be waived for late filers. 
Excusable neglect is a four factor test in which the Court
considers:  (1) the danger of
prejudice to the adverse party; (2) the length of the delay and its
potential effect on judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay,
including whether it was within the reasonable 

 

(9) Id. at *2.

 

(10) Id. at *3.

 

(11) 1986 WL 5477 (Del. Ch., May 12, 1986).

 

4

 

control of the late filer;
and (4) whether the late filer acted in good faith.(12)  All of the factors weigh in favor of the
Objectors and they are, therefore, entitled to participate as Group A or Group
B Settlement Class Members.

 

The first factor weighs in favor of the Objectors
because there is no prejudice to the other Participating Group A and Group B
Settlement Class Members.  Even
though other Group A Members’ distributions will be diminished somewhat
(because Group A Members share in the proceeds of the balance of the Settlement
pool, while Group B Members received the same lump sum payment), the additional
proceeds from the settlement pool they would receive if the late filers were
excluded is simply a windfall. 
Accordingly, they suffer no prejudice.(13)  Factor two weighs in favor of the Objectors
because the length of the delay was relatively minimal and it did not affect
the proceedings in this Court.  Factor
three also weighs in favor of the Objectors because in all cases the delay was
not reasonably in the control of the late filer.  Finally, factor four weighs in favor of the
Objectors because all the Objectors acted in good faith.

 

In sum, the Eligibility Date for the Objectors in
this group must yield to the demands of equity; it is therefore waived for
these Objectors.

 

(12) Pioneer Inv.
Servs. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993).

 

(13) See In re
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d 315, 323-24 (3rd
Cir. 2001).

 

5

 

2.                                       The Second Category of Late Filer

 

The second group of Objectors(14) all meet the
requirements to become Participating Group B Settlement Class Members.  However, none submitted Participating Group B
Settlement Class Member Claim Forms. 
This is because all filed, in good faith, Participating Group A
Settlement Class Member Claim Forms (believing, in good faith, that they
met the requirements to become Participating Group A Settlement Class Members),
and because the Settlement provided that a claimant was only permitted to use
an individual ERP (the only “part” required for Group B Membership) as either
one of the Three Parts(15) to support Group A Membership or to support Group B
Membership, but not both.  Class Counsel
subsequently rejected these Objectors’ Participating Group A Settlement Class Member
Claim Forms.  Such rejection came after
the time to submit Participating Group B Settlement Class Member Claim
Forms had passed.  

 

(14) Those Objectors
are:  WH Trading, Kottke, Daniel M.
Ambrosinno, and the Bunge Companies (Bunge Chicago, Inc., Bunge Global
Markets, Inc., Bunge Limited, Bunge North America (East), LLC, and Bunge
North America, Inc.).

 

Below the Court rejects WH Trading’s and Kottke’s
arguments that Class Counsel wrongfully excluded them from becoming
Participating Group A Settlement Class Members.  Both parties have argued, in the alternative,
that their failed Group A Claim From be considered a claim for Group B
Membership.  Bunge could be seen as
belonging in a somewhat different category because, although its claim to be a
Group A Settlement Class Member was timely filed, its claim to be a Group
B Settlement Class Member and its objection here were not submitted until
several months after the Settlement hearing. 
That delay is attributable to the fact that it did not receive
notice—the reason is not clear—of Class Counsel’s rejection of Group A
Claim.  Bunge, nonetheless, came forward
as soon as practicable and no prejudice will result from its participating, as
it would otherwise have been entitled, as a Group B Settlement Class Member.

 

Barbara Whitlow also argues that she should be
eligible for Group B Membership based upon her good faith filing of a Group A
Membership Claim Form.  However, because
the Court determines below that Ms. Whitlow beneficially owned the
requisite three parts for Group A Membership, the Court need not address her
alternative argument that she is eligible for Class B Membership based on
her filing of a Group A Claim Form.

 

(15) The Three Parts
are:  one B-1 Membership of the CBOT; one
Exercise Right Privilege (“ERP”); and at least 10,251.75 shares of CME Group
Common Stock. Stip. ¶ 30FF.

 

 

6

 

Accordingly, Class Counsel
now objects to granting these Objectors Participating Group B Settlement Class Membership.

 

Class Counsel concede, as they must, that
Paragraph 30R of the Settlement permitted Class Members to use an
individual ERP either to constitute Group A Membership or Group B Membership,
but not both.  Class Counsel argue,
however, that this provision “does not restrict or limit filing Claim Forms in
the alternative or filing Claim Forms for both a Group A Settlement Unit and a
Group B Settlement Unit.”(16)  In other
words, because it was possible for Class Members to file for both types of
membership, failing to do so precludes their participation in the
Settlement.  But this fact demonstrates
only that the Settlement’s procedures for submitting claims were imperfect
because it was entirely reasonable for a Class Member to do precisely what
these Objectors did.  They believed in
good faith that they had assembled the Three Parts necessary to become
Participating Group A Settlement Class Members; thus, they submitted Group
A Claim Forms.  There was no reason for
them to assume that Class Counsel would deny those Claims.  Instead, it may have been unreasonable to
have expected them to file Group B Claim Forms separately.  Accordingly, the Eligibility Date requirement
is waived for these Objectors.

 

B.                                     Objections
to Exclusion Based Upon Failure to Meet the Computershare Requirement

 

Pursuant to the Settlement, in order to be eligible
for Group A Membership, a Settlement Class Member must have transferred to
Computershare to be held, lien-free, in book entry form, a sufficient number of
CME Group shares necessary to qualify for a Group A Settlement Unit for a
specified time period (from October 14, 2008 to October 31,
2008).  The Objectors in this 

 

(16) Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of
Mot. for Final Approval of the Proposed Settlement at 67.

 

7

 

Section were excluded
by Class Counsel for failure to comply with the Computershare requirement.

 

1.                                       Nicholas Rapanos

 

Nicholas Rapanos owned the requisite Three Parts;
this is undisputed.  However, he did not
timely transfer the sufficient number of shares of CME Group Common Stock to
Computershare.  Therefore, Class Counsel
excluded him from Group A Membership.  Mr. Rapanos
has objected, arguing that he was unaware of the Computershare requirement
because he never received the necessary information in the mail, and that, as
soon as he became aware of it, he promptly transferred his shares to
Computershare; accordingly, the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and
he is therefore eligible for Group A Membership.

 

Class Counsel state that they initially mailed
a copy of the Class Action Notice to Mr. Rapanos on August 29,
2008, at his last known address, and that such mailing was never returned to Class Counsel’s
offices as undeliverable.  Subsequently,
on September 24, 2008, Class Counsel by overnight courier sent
another copy of the Class Action Notice to Mr. Rapanos at that
address, and such mailing also was never returned as undeliverable.

 

The Court has no reason to question the truth of either
version.  It is entirely possible that Mr. Rapanos,
through no fault of his own, did not in fact receive the Class Action
Notice in time to transfer his shares. 
His Affidavit, which he filed under penalty of perjury, states that he
was unaware of the Computershare requirement, and that as soon as he became
aware, he promptly transferred his shares to Computershare.(17)  The balance of the equities therefore tip in Mr. Rapanos’s
favor, and, accordingly, the Computershare cutoff dates must yield to the demands
of 

 

(17) See
Aff. of Nicholas A. Rapanos at 2-3.

 

8

 

equity.(18)  The Court therefore finds that Mr. Rapanos
must be included as a Participating Group A Settlement Class Member.(19)

 

2.                                       Ira S. Nathan Revocable Trust dated March 23,
1979(20)

 

The Ira S. Nathan Revocable Trust dated March 23,
1979 (the “Nathan Trust”) was also excluded by Class Counsel for failure
to comply with the Computershare requirement. 
It is undisputed that the Nathan Trust owned the requisite Three
Parts.  The Nathan Trust did in fact
transfer its CME Group shares to Computershare and held them there from October 14,
2008 through October 31, 2008. 
However, the Settlement required that the shares be held by
Computershare until 5:00 p.m. on October 31.  Due to an error by the Nathan Trust’s
investment advisors, the shares were transferred out of Computershare a few
hours before 5:00 p.m. on October 31. 
For this reason Class Counsel excluded the Nathan Trust from
participating in the Settlement.

 

The Nathan Trust substantially complied with the
terms of the Settlement.  The removal of
the shares a few hours early was an error that was not within the Nathan Trust’s
control.  Therefore, equity would not be
served by excluding the Nathan Trust from participating in the Settlement.  Accordingly, the Computershare requirement
must yield to the demands of equity, and the Nathan Trust is eligible to become
a Participating Group A Settlement Class Member.

 

C.                                     Objection
to Exclusion Based Upon Late Filing and Failure to Meet the Computershare
Requirement

 

(18) See cases cited supra notes 7,
11.

 

(19) Class Counsel,
if they so choose, will be entitled to take discovery on the question of
whether Mr. Rapanos was on notice (actual or constructive) of the
obligation to transfer his shares to Computershare.  They also may take discovery on the question
of whether Mr. Rapanos could have satisfied the Computershare requirement
during the appropriate period.  The
Court’s conclusions with respect to Mr. Rapanos are subject to this
option.

 

(20) The Court’s
determination here renders the Nathan Trust’s Motion for Clarification or
Reargument, filed June 10, 2009, moot.

 

9

 

Rho Trading Securities, LLC (“Rho”) was excluded by Class Counsel
for filing its Participating Group A Settlement Claim Form on January 28,
2009, more than three months late. 
Therefore, not only was Rho a late filer, but it also did not comply
with the Settlement’s Computershare requirement.  Class Counsel argue that in the interest
of fairness to all Class Members who complied with all the deadlines Rho
must be excluded.  Rho claims that it
received neither the Class Action Notice, nor the follow-up letters
regarding amendments to the Settlement. 
Rho’s contact information maintained by the CBOT was up to date.  However, Rho maintains that it never received
any correspondence regarding the class action until approximately January 27,
2009.  Upon learning about the action,
Rho promptly filed its Participating Group A Settlement Class Member Claim
Form.  Rho conducted a thorough internal
investigation in order to determine whether any notice of the action had been
received by any Rho employee; there was no indication that there was.(21)  The Court has no reason to doubt that this is
true.  Accordingly, Rho has substantially
complied with the terms of the Settlement, and, therefore, the filing deadlines
and the Computershare requirement must yield to the demands of equity.(22)

 

D.                                    Beneficial
Ownership

 

Paragraph 30AA of the Settlement provides that in
order for a Settlement Class Member to become a Participating Group A
Settlement Class Member, such member must have “beneficially owned” the
requisite Three Parts.  The Settlement,
however, does not define the term “beneficial ownership,” which is commonly
understood to encompass the notion of having the “true” ownership interest but
with title held by another.  Shares of
stock registered in “street 

 

(21) Verified Objection of
Rho Trading Securities, LLC to Proposed Settlement at ¶¶ 2, 5, 6 & 7.

 

(22) This conclusion,
however, is subject to the right of Class Counsel, if they so choose, to
take discovery on the question of whether Rho was on notice (actual or
constructive) of the Class Action and whether Rho could have complied with
the Settlement’s terms, including the Computershare requirements during the
appropriate period.

 

10

 

name” or assets held in a
trust for a beneficiary are typical examples of how beneficial interests are
established.(23)

 

Class Counsel rejected a number of Settlement Class Members’
claims based on their determination that the Class Member did not
beneficially own the Three Parts. 
Several of those Class Members have objected, arguing that they
beneficially owned the requisite Three Parts. 
The Court, thus, turns to their objections.

 

1.                                       Kottke Associates and WH Trading

 

Objectors Kottke Associates, LLC (“Kottke”) and WH
Trading, LLC (“WH Trading”) each owned two of the Three Parts required for a
Group A Settlement Unit.  Both parties
claim that they beneficially owned the missing third part (a B-1 Membership for
Kottke and shares of CME Group Common Stock for WH Trading) because such part
was assigned to them to support their status as a clearing member firm (of the
CBOT or the CME).  Class Counsel
rejected both claims because they concluded that neither Kottke nor WH Trading
beneficially owned the missing third part. 
Indeed, both Kottke and WH Trading concede that they do not own the
missing part.  Instead, Kottke and WH
Trading argue the missing part was assigned to them and the interest in the
assigned part to which they claim a beneficial ownership interest is sufficient
to meet the Settlement’s beneficial ownership requirements.

 

Class Counsel correctly rejected Kottke’s and
WH Trading’s claims.  Neither Kottke nor
WH Trading beneficially own the missing part they claim an ownership interest
in.  Under CBOT Rule 902 and CME Rule 902,
the assignment of stock or a membership by an individual member to support a
clearing member firm’s status as a clearing member runs to the CME

 

(23) Some of the Objectors
have sought discovery from Class Counsel to determine their understanding
of what constitutes a beneficial interest within the scope of the
Settlement.  Although the Settlement was
not drafted by the Court, it is the Court’s document and its interpretation is
a matter for the Court’s resolution.  No
plausible allegation of bias or even of a specific instance of inconsistent
application has been lodged by the Objectors.

 

11

 

clearing house, not to the
clearing member firm.(24)  Accordingly,
the clearing member firm—i.e., Kottke and WH Trading—acquired no interest in
the asset assigned and, therefore, do not beneficially own it.(25)

 

2.                                       Geneva Trading USA and DRW Securities

 

Geneva Trading USA, LLC (“Geneva Trading USA”) and
DRW Securities LLC (“DRW Securities”) both submitted Participating Group A
Settlement Class Claim Forms, which were rejected by Class Counsel.  Geneva Trading USA owned a B-1 Membership, an
ERP, and 6,977 shares of CME Group common stock.  Its Claim Form stated that it
beneficially owned an additional 3,275 shares of CME Group common stock through
its wholly owned subsidiary, Geneva Ireland Financial Trading Limited (“Geneva
Ireland”).  When combined with the 6,977
shares directly owned, the Settlement’s stock ownership threshold would be
met.  Similarly, DRW Securities owned a
B-1 Membership and an ERP, but it did not own the requisite CME Group
shares.  The CME Group shares of common
stock DRW Securities claimed it owned were actually owned by its affiliate, DRW
Investments LLC.  Both DRW Securities and
DRW Investments are wholly owned subsidiaries of DRW Holdings LLC (“DRW
Holdings”).

 

Class Counsel rejected both Geneva Trading USA’s
and DRW Securities’ claims based upon their interpretation of beneficial
ownership, an interpretation that does not include a parent corporation’s
interest in its wholly owned subsidiary’s assets or a corporation’s interest in
its affiliate corporation’s assets.  Class Counsel
rest their interpretation of “beneficial ownership” on two passages in Fletcher’s
Cyclopedia; they are:  “a person who has
voluntarily adopted the 

 

(24) See Pls.’ Mem. in Supp, of Mot. for Final Approval of the
Proposed Settlement Ex. G, H.

 

(25) The Settlement’s
concept of ownership reaches not only parts “beneficially owned” but also those
“possessed by delegation.”  Neither
Kottke nor WH Trading has relied upon delegation.  Delegation of rights related to the exchange
has a history that carries a specific contextual understanding, one that cannot
readily be extended by analogy.  For that
reason, Kottke’s argument that its situation is “analogous” to the specifically
recognized delegator/delegatee status fails.

 

12

 

corporate form to engage in
business may be deemed to be precluded from asking courts to disregard that
form merely because the person is disadvantaged by its use”;(26) and “a
business enterprise’s corporate structure is determined by choice, and if the
owners are to accept the advantages of dividing the business into separate
corporate entities, they must also be subject to the disadvantages.”(27)  Both Geneva Trading USA and DRW Securities
voluntarily adopted a corporate form, presumably because it made business sense
to do so.  The Court agrees with Class Counsel
that these entities, in electing a certain corporate form, cannot simply
abandon that form when it is convenient. 
The Court must respect the corporate form chosen.  Therefore, Class Counsel correctly
excluded Geneva Trading USA and DRW Securities from participating in the
Settlement.

 

3.                                       Barbara Whitlow

 

Barbara Whitlow is the widow of Richard Whitlow, a
long time member of the CBOT.  Mr. Whitlow
died on April 3, 2008.  For many years
Mr. Whitlow owned what is now the requisite Three Parts for a
Participating Group A Settlement Unit. 
In late 2007 or early 2008, Mr. Whitlow transferred his shares of
CME stock into joint ownership with Ms. Whitlow.  Shortly before his death, Mr. Whitlow
and Ms. Whitlow sold 3,000 of their CME shares, which brought their
ownership below the level required for Participating Group A Membership.  Pursuant to the Settlement, however, a Class Member
seeking to participate in the Settlement who had transferred a portion of the
components of CBOT membership was entitled to recombine those components on or
before October 14, 2008.

 

(26) 1 Fletcher’s
Cyclopedia Corporations § 41.70 n.9 (West 2006).

 

(27) Id. at § 43.50.

 

13

 

In July 2008, Mr. Whitlow’s estate was
opened, and Ms. Whitlow was appointed the personal representative of the
estate.  Under the terms of Mr. Whitlow’s
will, Ms. Whitlow was to succeed to all of her late husband’s assets.  On July 17, 2008, an Indiana probate
court directed the transfer of the B-1 Membership and the ERP to Ms. Whitlow.  The CME Group shares automatically passed to Ms. Whitlow
as the surviving joint tenant.  Ms. Whitlow
then began repurchasing the 2,951 shares she needed to be eligible for a
Participating Group A Settlement Unit. 
She did so by September 6, 2008, and deposited her shares in
Computershare under her name.  Upon
receiving her Participating Group A Settlement Class Claim Form, Class Counsel
excluded Barbara Whitlow from participating in the Settlement because she had
not at any time prior to August 22, 2008 simultaneously beneficially owned
or possessed by delegation the Three Parts required by Paragraph 30AA of the
Settlement.(28)

 

A court of equity is a court of conscience, and the
Court cannot, in good conscience, let this result stand.  Were Ms. Whitlow not allowed to
participate in the Settlement, it would be because of her husband’s death,
which would also result in a minor windfall to the other Group A Members.  Moreover, Class Counsel cannot be
concerned about overlapping claims based upon the same Three Parts owned by Mr. Whitlow.  It is clear that Ms. Whitlow is the sole
owner of the Three Parts and will be the only person submitting a claim based
upon those parts.  And the purpose of the
Settlement’s stringent ownership requirements is to protect against parties
submitting claims based upon overlapping ownership interests in the CBOT.  Accordingly, no harm will result by allowing
her to participate.  Therefore, the
Court, in the exercise of its 

 

(28) As a joint tenant, she
had once held the necessary number of CME Group shares.  She did not acquire the B-1 Membership or the
ERP until after she could no longer claim ownership of the minimum number of
shares.

 

14

 

discretion, determines that Ms. Whitlow
must be deemed to have held a Participating Group A Settlement Unit, and, thus,
she is entitled to participate as a Group A Settlement Class Member.(29)

 

5.             The Kolton Family Limited Partnership

 

The Kolton Family Limited Partnership’s (the “Kolton
Partnership”) Participating Group A Settlement Class Member Claim Form was
rejected by Class Counsel because the records indicated that the Kolton
Partnership owned only the CME Group shares, but neither a B-1 Membership nor
an ERP.  The B-1 Membership and the ERP
relied upon by the Kolton Partnership claims are owned individually by its
general partner and 46% owner, Bradley Kolton. 
Mr. Kolton was a long time member of the CBOT.  Mr. Kolton established the Kolton
Partnership in 1987, and shares of CME Group Common Stock are its only
assets.  The Partnership was created for
the benefit of Mr. Kolton’s three sons, the limited partners of the Kolton
Partnership.

 

The Settlement provides that natural persons
submitting Group A Claims satisfy the requirement that they own CME Group
Common Stock if such shares are owned of record by “one or more trusts for the
benefit of such Group A Settlement Class Member or such Group A Settlement
Class Member’s spouse, children,
stepchildren, or grandchildren . . . not formed for 

 

(29)
Brown v. Penn Central Corp., 1986 WL
5477, at *2 (“Until the fund created by the settlement is actually distributed,
the court retains its traditional equity powers.  It is not novel law to announce that a court
supervising the distribution of a trust fund has the inherent power and duty to
protect unnamed but interested persons.  In
the words of Professor Chafee, the dean of equity law, these individuals are
akin to ‘wards of court.’”).

 

Because of the complexity of
the Settlement’s structure, a relatively large number of claimants who “came
close” to meeting the various requirements must be considered.  It is obvious that those who are deemed to
have satisfied the requirements and those who are not allowed to share (or to
share fully) in the Settlement are on something of a continuum.  It is also obvious that, in light of the
various factual circumstances of those seeking relief from strict application
of the Settlement’s conditions, some “line drawing” by the Court is
inevitable.  It is even more obvious that
those persons close to, but on the “wrong side” of, the line are likely to
chafe at the Court’s conclusions.  But,
perhaps unfortunately, just because some who did not strictly qualify under the
Settlement are, as a matter of equity, allowed to participate in the benefits
of the Settlement, does not mean that all who can find some nexus to the
Settlement’s conditions should be entitled to participate.  At some point, a further relaxing of the
Settlement’s requirements in the name of equity would run the risk of
undermining the carefully designed settlement standards that have previously
been approved by this Court.

 

15

 

the purpose of participating
in the Settlement . . . .”(30)  Although
not within the scope of the trust exception because the Kolton Partnership is
not a “natural person,” family wealth transfer is the obvious purpose behind
the creation of the Kolton Partnership. 
In this instance, the partnership, owned by family members, serves
purposes parallel to those of the trusts expressly allowed to participate in
the Settlement.  As such, for purposes of
the Settlement, there is no material basis for distinguishing between the
Kolton Partnership and the trusts that are otherwise allowed to share in the
proceeds of the Settlement.  Further, as
is the case with Ms. Whitlow, there is no potential for abuse here.  Accordingly, the Court finds that equity would
not be served if the Kolton Partnership were excluded from participating in the
Settlement.

 

E.             Miscellaneous Objector

 

SKYT Trading, LLC (“SKYT”) was excluded by Class Counsel
because Class Counsel had no evidence of ownership of a sufficient number of
CME Group shares by SKYT and that such shares were duly deposited with
Computershare.  This was due to a
clerical error by either ABN/AMRO (the clearing entity through which SKYT
purchased its CBOT membership in 2005) or Computershare which resulted in the
record ownership of the CME Group shares being listed as held by “SKYT LLC.”  In November 2008, SKYT brought this
error to Class Counsel’s attention, but Class Counsel declined SKYT’s
request to include it as a Participating Group A Settlement Class Member.  Class Counsel claims that it “lacks
sufficient information to verify the accuracy of SKYT’s assertion.”(31)  The Court is satisfied with SKYT’s
representations to the Court, both in its brief and at the hearing on their
objection, and the supplemental documents it 

 

(30) Stipulation of
Settlement ¶ 30T(3) (emphasis added).

 

(31)
Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Final Approval of the Proposed Settlement at
61.

 

16

 

submitted,(32) that SKYT
Trading, LLC is the record owner of the shares transferred to
Computershare.  Accordingly, having met
all of the Settlement’s requirements, SKYT is entitled to become a
Participating Group A Settlement Class Member.

 

III.  CONCLUSION

 

Accordingly, the various objections are resolved as
set forth above.  An implementing order
will be required.

 

(32)
These documents include Form 1099-DIV and an employer identification form,
Form SS-4.

 

17

 

 

COURT OF CHANCERY

OF THE 

STATE OF DELAWARE

 

 

	
  JOHN W. NOBLE 

  VICE CHANCELLOR

  	
   

  	
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  2009

  

 

July 28, 2009

 

	
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  Morris, Nichols,
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John G. Harris, Esquire

Riley Riper Hollin & Colagreco

One Commerce Center, 3rd Floor

1201 North Orange Street

Wilmington, DE 19801

 

	
  Re:

  	
  CME Group, Inc. v.
  Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc.

  
	
   

  	
  C.A. No. 2369-VCN

  
	
   

  	
  Date Submitted:
  July 15, 2009

  

 

Dear Counsel:

 

I write to address three
applications.

 

 

1.                                       William L. Allen Trust, dated September 5,
1995.

 

The William L. Allen Trust, dated September 5,
1995 (the “Trust”), submitted a Group A Settlement Claim form that was rejected
because of the Trust’s failure to comply with the requirement that its shares
be deposited in book entry form at Computershare.  The Trust held an ERP and, thus, was entitled
to participate in the Group B Class Settlement.  It did not, however, submit any Class B
Settlement claim form.  It now seeks to
participate in the Group B Settlement. 
The Trust analogizes its predicament to that of Geneva Trading LLC which
was recently allowed to participate in the Group B Settlement despite having
only filed a Group A Settlement claim form (for the interest at issue).  Geneva, however, had a substantial argument
that it had met the requirements to participate in the Group A Settlement.  The Trust, unfortunately, did not (and, apparently
because of what the Trust has labeled as bad advice from a broker, could not)
attempt or approach compliance with the Computershare requirement.

 

Nevertheless, I am persuaded that the Trust should
be allowed to participate in the Group B Settlement.  The documents it submitted in support of its
timely Group A Settlement claim form—evidencing the necessary ERP—demonstrated
an entitlement to Group B participation. 
Denying the Trust the opportunity to participate in the Group B
Settlement process would result in a windfall to the Group A participants.

 

2.                                       Jeffrey Holland.

 

Mr. Holland, a qualifying Group B Settlement Class Member,
seeks the Court’s approval to participate in the Group A Settlement.  He now does so by way of a motion for
clarification.  Because of some
uncertainty on the part of Mr. Holland, he did not reassemble the “Three
Parts.”  He was aware of the need to
acquire (or reacquire) certain interests, but he chose not to do so.  He attempts to blame all of this on the
decision of Class Counsel not to provide specific and 

 

3

 

individual legal advice to
him in advance of his submission of a claim as to whether or not he had
previously held certain interest by “delegation” as that concept is addressed
in the Settlement.  The “delegation”
standard may have be complicated, but it was sufficient to inform Mr. Holland
(who is represented by counsel) and to enable him to determine whether, within
the terms of the Settlement, he could properly participate as a Group A
Settlement Class Member through “delegation.” Apparently, he was unwilling
to run the risk or expense of reassembling the Three Parts without first
obtaining certainty as to whether he would qualify.  That may (or may not) have been prudent, but
it was his own choice not to reassemble the various components.  As such, he failed to meet the requirements
of the Settlement, including, specifically, the requirement for book entry of
shares of CME Group Common Stock with Computershare.  That failure is fatal to his efforts to
obtain Group A status.  Thus, Mr. Holland’s
motion for clarification is denied.

 

3.                                       A. Alan Zatopa.

 

Mr. Zatopa persists in his resistance to the
Computershare requirement.  He timely
raised his objection to this prerequisite for participation as a Group A
Settlement Class Member.  But for
the Computershare requirement, he would have qualified for a second Group A
Settlement Class unit.(1)  The Court has sustained the Computershare
requirement.(2) Mr. Zatopa has moved for reargument.(3)  Mr. Zatopa challenged—and this may be
something of an over-simplification—the 

 

(1) It appears that
some of those who initially objected to the Computershare requirement
eventually complied with it.

 

(2) See CME Group, Inc. v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc.,
2009 WL 1547510, at *6-7 (Del. Ch. June 3, 2009).

 

(3) The Court has
addressed objections primarily in two opinions. 
The first dealt with the structural objections.  Id.  The second dealt with the individual
objections.  CME Group, Inc.
v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 2009 WL 1856693 (Del. Ch.
June 25, 2009).  Mr. Zatopa’s
arguments largely reprise the structural arguments addressed by the Court in
the first opinion.  The Court, in
consideration of the individual arguments, did not directly address
Mr. Zatopa’s circumstances. 
Mr. Zatopa premises his motion for reargument on his individual 

 

4

 

Computershare requirement as
unnecessary.  He contended that there
were other ways by which Class Counsel could have accurately confirmed
compliance with the various requirements for participating in the
Settlement.  Those arguments, as noted,
were rejected, but he now refines his argument. 
He contends that when his personal circumstances are considered, equity
should relieve him of the Computershare burden. 
Mr. Zatopa asserts that he owned the necessary CME Group common
stock in certificate form throughout the applicable timeframe.  He argues that he made the necessary records
available to Class Counsel and made himself available for
questioning.  Instead of offering a
reason why equity should come to his aid, Mr. Zatopa, instead, simply
seeks special treatment.  The
Computershare requirement was reasonable. 
That other approaches might have been available does not refute that
conclusion.  To allow Mr. Zatopa to
participate in the Group A Settlement without compliance with the Computershare
requirement would unfairly interfere with a reasonable and approved
condition.  By extension, acceptance of Mr. Zatopa’s
argument would suggest that no one who held CME Group Common Stock in
certificate form should have bothered to comply with the Computershare
requirement either.  Accordingly, the
Court concludes that because Mr. Zatopa failed to comply with the
Computershare requirement, he may not participate as the holder of a second
Group A Class Settlement Unit.

 

 

	
   

  	
  Very truly yours,

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  /s/ John W. Noble

  

 

circumstances.  To the extent that Mr. Zatopa seeks
reargument of the Court’s consideration of the Computershare requirement
generally, his motion is denied because it does nothing more than reprise
earlier arguments and he has not demonstrated that the Court either misapplied
the law or misunderstood the facts.  See, e.g., Serv Corp. of Westover Hills v. Guzzetta, 2008 WL
5459249 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2008). 
To the extent that the Court did not consider his individual
circumstances, reargument is appropriate for matters fairly presented to the
Court but which it did not address.  See, e.g., Stone v. Stant, 2008 WL 2938543, at *1 (Del. Ch.
July 18, 2008).  Whether
Mr. Zatopa raises genuinely individual arguments or simply takes his
general arguments and recasts them as applying to himself is an interesting, but
ultimately unnecessary, topic for debate. 
The Court will treat his motion under the rubric of having failed to
consider his individual claims previously.

 

5

 

JWN/cap

 

cc:                                 Richard I. G. Jones, Jr.,
Esquire

John H. Williams, Jr., Esquire

Melanie K. Sharp, Esquire

Vernon R. Proctor, Esquire

Michael A. Weidinger, Esquire

Paul A. Fioravanti, Jr., Esquire

Henry E. Gallagher, Jr., Esquire

Joseph A. Rosenthal, Esquire

Patricia R. Uhlenbrock, Esquire

Carolyn S. Hake, Esquire

David S. Eagle, Esquire

Daniel B. Rath, Esquire

Kevin J. Mangan, Esquire

Lewis H. Lazarus, Esquire

Martin S. Lessner, Esquire

David A. Jenkins, Esquire

Arthur L. Dent, Esquire

Register in Chancery-K

 

6

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