Document:

Exhibit

Exhibit 10.2

2019 Management Cash Incentive Plan

Introduction and Objectives

Northfield Bancorp, Inc.’s (A Delaware Corporation) “Northfield” or the “Company” 2019 Management Cash Incentive Plan (the “MIP” or the “Plan”) is designed to retain, motivate, recognize, and reward designated management team members, within appropriate risk management objectives, for their collective contributions to Northfield Bancorp, Inc. and its subsidiaries ( including Northfield Bank, referred to as the “Company” or the “Bank”).  The Plan focuses on measures that are critical to the Company’s longer-term growth and profitability.  The MIP serves as a critical component of a competitive total compensation package that enables the Company to attract and retain talent needed to drive the Company’s future success.  This MIP is governed by all terms and conditions of the Northfield Management Cash Incentive Plan approved by the Company’s stockholders on May 28, 2014 (the “Governing Plan”), which shall be the prevailing document if the terms and conditions detailed below are unclear or in contradiction to such plan.

Objectives of the Plan include:

		
	•
	Align management compensation with Company performance.

		
	•
	Provide clear focus on key strategic business objectives.

		
	•
	Position the Company’s total cash compensation to be competitive with market. 

		
	•
	Enable the Company to attract, retain and develop the talent needed to drive success.

		
	•
	Motivate and reward management for achieving/exceeding performance goals.

		
	•
	Encourage teamwork across the Company’s operating groups.

		
	•
	Balance performance goals and incentives with appropriate risk management objectives.

Eligibility/Participation

•Eligibility will be limited to key members of management and key employees.  Participants will be nominated by management and approved by the Compensation Committee.  Unless specifically approved by the Compensation Committee, the Offices of the Chief Risk Officer and Chief Internal Auditor, Bank Secrecy Act Officer, and the Compliance Officer (collectively, Risk Management Officers), are not eligible to participate in the Corporate performance incentive awards.  Incentive awards will be based on individual goals for these employees with goals and final incentive awards to be approved by the Board Committees that the individual reports to.
New employees must be hired by July 1 to participate in that year’s incentive.  Incentive awards for employees hired between January 1 and July 1 will be pro-rated based on the employee’s date of hire (i.e., for these purposes, “base salary” shall mean the base salary in effect on the last day of the performance period).  Participants must maintain a satisfactory level of performance to be eligible for an incentive award.
		
	•
	Except as set forth below under “Death or Disability,” participants must be an active employee as of the award payout date to receive an award.

Performance Period
The performance period and plan operate on a calendar year basis (January 1, 2019– December 31, 202019).   

Performance Gate/Trigger
In order for the incentive plan to activate, Northfield must achieve at least 80% of budgeted net income.  If the Company does not achieve this level of performance, the MIP will not fund awards (corporate or individual) for participants that year.  The Committee, and the respective Board Committees as it relates to Risk Management Officers, will retain discretion, at all times, to recommend individual discretionary bonuses.
Incentive Award Opportunity
Each participant will have a target cash incentive opportunity that is expressed as a percentage of his or her base salary (i.e., base salary shall mean the base salary in effect on the last day of the performance period).
.  Cash incentive awards are based, in part, on the Company’s philosophy to target total cash compensation at approximately the 50th percentile of market for executive management, with individual adjustments made for each participant’s specific experience, responsibilities and performance.  The 2019 incentive cash targets consider market practice and the Company’s current base salary levels.  For 2019, participants, as detailed by title below, will have an opportunity to earn a target award as a percentage of base salary as defined above, for meeting defined goals.  The Actual payouts can range from 0% (for not meeting any performance goals) to up to 150% of target for exceeding all performance goals.

Achieving performance goals will generally result in a full award at target.  Actual payouts will vary above and below the target incentive to reflect actual performance relative to the goals and weights.  The Compensation Committee retains the discretion to determine awards relative to goals and may consider other factors in making the award (e.g. extraordinary events).

The total incentive opportunity and range is summarized below.  These are subject to change based on market practice, internal Company practices, and compensation philosophy.

	
					
	 
	Annual Incentive as a % of Base Salary
(in future years these targets may change and be different by tier)

	Positions
	Below Threshold
	Threshold Performance
	Target Performance
	Stretch
Performance

	Pres./CEO
	0%
	25%
	50%
	75%

	EVP
	0%
	20%
	40%
	60%

	SVP
	0%
	12.5%-15%
	25-30%
	37.5%-45%

Incentive Plan Measures

For 2019, the Compensation Committee will determine the Corporate performance goal(s) in conformity with the Governing Plan.  A significant portion of all participants’ incentive will be based on our overall corporate performance.  This approach supports our desire to foster a collaborative team-oriented culture among our senior leadership team.  The Compensation Committee, at its sole discretion, may determine to exclude from actual 2019 performance results, items that are considered non-recurring in nature, and not suitable for consideration in measuring financial performance.  In addition to corporate performance, individual/division performance goals will also be considered.  By considering multiple performance goals and perspectives, our Plan supports our goal to provide a balanced and reasonable approach to risk management.

Below is a summary of the weighting of awards based on Corporate and Individual/Division Goals:    

	
			
	Role
	Corporate Performance
	Individual/Division Performance

	Pres./CEO
	0% - 100%
	0% - 100%

	EVP
	0% - 100%
	0% - 100%

	SVP (Individual percentages to be determined by the CEO)
	0% - 100%
	0% - 100%

Goal Setting

The Corporate Performance goal(s) will be recommended by the Compensation Committee as part of the Board’s annual business planning process, and approved by the Board of Directors.  The Compensation Committee will approve the performance range and weights associated with the Corporate Performance goals. 

The Compensation Committee, at its discretion, may define goals that have a defined threshold, target and stretch performance and payout range.  The relationship between performance goals and payout ranges will be determined by the Compensation Committee.  Once threshold performance is achieved, the award will increase incrementally.  Actual payouts between threshold, target, and stretch will be prorated between levels to reward incremental performance

Individual/Division goals will be developed and recommended by management and approved by the Compensation Committee at the beginning of the year.   As it relates to Risk Management Officers, the respective Board committee will develop and approve individual/division goals at the beginning of the year.  Generally, Individual goals should be limited to no more than three goals that reflect critical financial and strategic goals.  Each individual goal is at a target payout.  However, where possible, individual goals should also define a threshold and stretch level which will correspond to the appropriate payout in the table immediately above.  Such goals will help clarify potential pay-performance relationship.  In recognition that some individual goals may not be quantitative, the Compensation Committee and the respective Board Committees as it relates to Risk Management Officers, retains the discretion to determine payouts in a manner that appropriately reflects performance.  

Award Payouts and Discretion of the Compensation Committee

Payouts relative to the target will be recommended by management (except for the CEO), certified and approved by the Compensation Committee and the respective Board Committees as it relates to Risk Management Officers, and ratified by the Board of Directors.  In the case of the CEO, the payout will be determined by the Compensation Committee and ratified by the Board of Directors.

Payouts will be made in cash within a reasonable time period after the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm has made its final report to the Audit Committee on the Company’s 2019 consolidated financial statements.  Generally, payouts will occur within two and a half months following the close of the fiscal year.  Awards are calculated based on actual performance relative to target.  Payouts will be based on percentage of a participant’s base salary in effect as of the last business day of the performance period.  This will allow for ease of calculation of incentives to reflect participants who work a partial year or part time hours.

All award payouts under the Plan are subject to the discretion of the Compensation Committee and the respective Board Committees as it relates to Risk Management Officers.  In determining an award level 

(both corporate awards and individual awards) consideration may be given to the overall performance of the Company and each individual’s performance and may include, but are not limited to, consideration of audit and regulatory findings, internal control assessments and the amount and direction of risk being assumed by the Company.    The Compensation Committee may, at its sole discretion, consider the effect of “passed” audit adjustments proposed by the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm in determining the achievement of the Corporate or Individual goals established under the Plan.

PLAN TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
Plan Authorization 
The Plan is authorized by the Board of Directors of the Company and administered by the Compensation Committee. 
Program Changes or Discontinuance
The Company has developed this Plan based on current objectives and business conditions.  The Plan was developed based on existing business, market and economic conditions; current services; and staff assignments.  If substantial changes occur that affect these conditions, services, assignments, or forecasts, the Company may add to, amend, modify, or discontinue any of the terms or conditions of the Plan at any time.
Compensation Committee Discretion
The Compensation Committee may, at its sole discretion, waive, change, or amend the Plan as it deems appropriate.
The Committee and the respective Board Committees, as it relates to Risk Management Officers may, at its or their sole discretion, increase or decrease an award based upon its consideration of a Plan participant’s performance or achievements. 
Termination of Employment 
If a Plan participant leaves or is terminated by the Company before awards are paid, no incentive award will be paid.  Participants must be an active employee of the Company on the date the incentive is paid to receive an award.  (See exceptions for death and disability below.)  
Disability or Death 
If a participant is disabled by an accident or illness, his/her bonus award for the Plan period will be prorated so that the award is based on the period of active employment only (i.e. the award will be reduced by the period of time of disability).  
In the event of death, the Company will pay to the participant’s estate the pro rata portion of the award that had been earned by the participant as of the date of death.
No award will be earned on a pro-rata basis for disability or death if such an event occurs within six months from the beginning of the Plan year.
Payments made in the event of death or disability will be made at the same time payment is made to active employees under the Plan.

Ethics and Interpretation
If there is any ambiguity as to the meaning of any terms or provisions of this Plan or any questions as to the correct interpretation of any information contained therein, the Company’s interpretation expressed by the Compensation Committee will be final and binding.
The altering, inflating, and/or inappropriate manipulation of performance/financial results or any other infraction of recognized ethical business standards, will subject the employee to disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment.  In addition, any incentive compensation as provided by the Plan to which the employee would otherwise be entitled will be revoked.
Recoupment of Awards

Participants of this Plan agree that the Company has the right to recoup or “clawback” awards paid under this Plan if the Compensation Committee concludes that such awards were based on information that was later found to be materially incorrect, including awards that were determined, in whole or in part, on financial statement information that is subsequently restated.  This includes any error that is material to previously-issued financial statements that results in notification that they cannot be relied upon.   Additionally, if the Committee determines, upon review of the facts and circumstances, that an executive officer conducted his or herself in violation of the terms of the executive officer’s Employment Agreement, the Committee may determine that incentive compensation awards may or may not be revoked.  Participants of the Plan agree that such recoupment would be made in accordance with prevailing laws and regulations.  The Company also has the right to revise its clawback requirements, or policies subject to this Plan, if changes in laws and regulations require (or permit) the Company to do so.  

Miscellaneous 
The Plan will not be deemed to give any participant the right to be retained in the employ of the Company nor will the Plan interfere with the right of the Company to discharge any participant at any time.  
The Compensation Committee will determine on at least an annual basis, those employees of the Company and its consolidated subsidiaries that will be eligible to participate in the Plan.
In the absence of an authorized, written employment contract, the relationship between employees and the Company is one of at-will employment.  The Plan does not alter the relationship.  The Plan will not supersede any specific employment contract obligations the Company may have with a Plan participant.
This Plan and the transactions and payments hereunder shall, in all respect, be governed by, and construed and enforced in accordance with applicable governmental laws and regulations.
Each provision in this Plan is severable, and if any provision is held to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable, the validity, legality, and enforceability of the remaining provisions shall not, in any way, be affected or impaired thereby.

* * * * *esl-ex101_469.htm

 

EXHIBIT 10.1

 

Esterline Technologies Corporation

 

FY19 Annual Incentive Compensation Plan

for Corporate Office Participants

 

 

	
1.
	
Purpose.  Esterline Technologies Corporation (“Esterline” or the “Company”) has established this Annual Incentive Compensation Plan (“Corporate IC Plan” or the “Plan”) to reward its officers and other Corporate staff for effective work that leads and supports our operations in achieving  expected and superior results for shareholders this fiscal year.

 

	
 
	
2.
	
Corporate IC Terms.  The Company established this Plan pursuant to its 2013 Equity Incentive Plan, as amended and restated (“2013 Plan”).  The terms of the appointment letter, this Plan, and the 2013 Plan together constitute the “Corporate IC Terms.”   

 

	
3.
	
Participation.  All Company officers and other employees who hold regular full-time or part-time job assignments, and who report to one of the Company’s corporate offices are eligible to participate in this Plan (“Participants”). 

	
 
	
a.
	
Appointments. Eligible employees become Participants upon receipt of an appointment letter for a single fiscal year. Appointment letters will establish a target award for each Participant, expressed as a percentage of the Participant’s base salary in effect on the last day of the fiscal year (“Target Award”).  If appointed after the first fiscal quarter, Participants will receive a pro-rata award for the portion of the fiscal year following their appointment, calculated as provided in section 6 below.  Appointment as a Participant in one or more fiscal years does not entitle employees to subsequent appointments.

	
 
	
b.
	
Board Approval.  Plan appointments for Company officers and any other senior manager who reports directly to the CEO require approval by the Company’s Board of Directors (“Board”).

 

	
4.
	
Performance Goals.  The Plan has the following performance goals for the fiscal year (“Plan Goals”): 

	
 
	
a.
	
EBIT.  Earnings before interest and taxes (“EBIT”), weighted at 50%; 

 

	
 
	
b.
	
ROS. Return on sales (“ROS”), weighted at 30%; and

 

	
 
	
c.
	
Strategic Objectives.  The Strategic Objectives together are weighted at a total of 20%.

 

The numerical values for the EBIT and ROS goals, and the details and metrics for the Strategic Objectives will be determined by the Board and stated in Participant appointment letters. 

   

	
5.
	
Plan Awards.  Participants will earn 100% of their Target Award for achievement of Plan Goals. Participants’ actual awards will vary from their Target Awards if performance is above or below Plan Goals.  Participants will receive no award if results fall short of certain minimum threshold levels.  If performance results reach such minimum thresholds, Participants will earn 25% of their Target Award.  Participants will receive up to a maximum of 200% of their Target Award if performance exceeds Plan Goals and reaches certain maximum performance levels.  Between the Plan’s minimum threshold and maximum performance levels, Participants’ awards will increase or decrease from their Target Award amount in proportion to incremental achievement of Plan Goals.  

 

	
6.
	
Calculations.  

 

 

FY19 Corporate IC Plan

Revised November 2018

Page 1

 

 

 

	
 
	
a.
	
Performance Goals.  Esterline will calculate EBIT as total profit from continuing operations before interest and tax expense, and excluding non-recurring and/or unusual items.  ROS will be calculated as total EBIT from continuing operations, divided by total sales from continuing operations.  Calculations of both EBIT and ROS will be adjusted to remove the effects of acquisitions, divestitures, or corporate-designated integration projects, if any.  Achievement of Strategic Objectives will be measured as stated in Participant appointment letters.

 

	
 
	
b.
	
Pro-rata Awards.  Pro-rata award calculations will be based on performance results for the full fiscal year, with actual awards pro-rated for the time during which an employee participated in the Plan.  Participants who are appointed any time during the first fiscal quarter will be eligible to receive an award for the full fiscal year.  For those appointed after the first fiscal quarter, participation will be measured in full-month increments, rounded up for months in which a Participant was actively employed under the Plan for 15 days or more, and rounded down for active employment under the Plan of 14 days or less. The pro-rata factor will be a fraction, the numerator of which will be the number of months of participation, and the denominator of which will be 12. 

 

	
 
	
7.
	
Adjustments.  The Board may exercise its discretion to ensure Participants receive an equitable award by adjusting: (a) Plan Goals; (b) Plan calculations to include or exclude non-recurring and/or unusual items (including, without limitation, material effects of changes under U.S. Generally Applicable Accounting Principles or changes in applicable tax laws or regulations), in whole or in part; (c) an individual Participant’s actual award; or (d) the factors used to calculate Plan awards.  Such adjustments may be made if unanticipated and material events occur, or unusual business conditions develop after the beginning of a fiscal year.  The Committee will seek and consider advice from an independent executive compensation expert and from the General Counsel before deciding whether to recommend an adjustment under this section for Board action.

 

	
8.
	
Payment.  Subject to other Corporate IC Terms, the Company will pay Plan awards within 60 days following fiscal year-end, if and only if: Company auditors have issued an opinion consistent with the calculations; the Committee and Board have approved the awards. If these conditions delay award payments beyond the usual 60 days, such awards must be paid no later than 75 days following fiscal year end.  

 

	
9.
	
Continuous Employment.  To be eligible for payment, Participants must be actively employed by the Company through the end of the fiscal year, and through the date on which Plan awards are paid, except as might otherwise be provided in Corporate IC Terms.  Appointments will end automatically for Participants who do not satisfy these conditions and no Plan awards will be earned or due.  The Company considers approved leaves of absence to be active employment, provided they do not exceed the amount of leave to which a Participant is entitled under applicable Company policies, and under disability, family and medical leave laws.  For approved leaves that exceed such limits, payment of Plan awards, if any, is subject to CEO, Committee, and Board discretion, as applicable.  

 

	
10.
	
Employment Status Changes.  Except as otherwise determined by the CEO, Committee, or Board, consistent with the levels of authority outlined in section 3.a. above; or as might be provided in other Corporate IC Terms, the following provisions will apply to employment status changes:

	
 
	
a.
	
Transfers.  If during the fiscal year a Participant transfers employment to a Company Platform or business unit, his/her Plan award will be pro-rated proportionately, as provided section in 6 above.

 

	
 
	
b.
	
Suspension, Resignation, or Discharge.  All Participant rights under this Plan will be suspended during any period of suspension from employment.  A Participant’s appointment will automatically end when s/he leaves employment with the Company for any reason other than Retirement, Disability, or death.  The Committee may immediately cancel a Participant’s appointment and recover any awards made if it discovers facts that, if known earlier, would have constituted grounds for termination of employment for cause.

 

 

 

FY19 Corporate IC Plan

Revised November 2018

Page 2

 

 

	
 
	
c.
	
Retirement, Disability, or Death.  If a Participant leaves employment before the Plan payment date due to Retirement, Disability, or death, the Company will pay a pro-rata amount, as defined in Section 6 above.  Such payments will be made in the normal course, as provided in Section 8 above.  

	
11.
	
Change of Control.  In the event of a Change in Control as defined in the 2013 Plan, this Corporate IC Plan will automatically terminate and Participants will receive payment within 60 days in an amount equal to the Participant’s target award, pro-rated as defined in section 6 above.  Provided, however, that this Section does not apply to the Company’s executive and non-executive officers, or to any other Participant who is party to a Company Termination Protection Agreement.  

 

	
12.
	
Employment Terms.  Participants’ terms of employment remain unchanged by appointment to this Plan, except as specifically provided in the Corporate IC Terms.  Nothing in the appointment process or in the Corporate IC Terms guarantees continued employment.  Participants remain subject to usual Company policies and practices, and to any other employment agreements, service terms, appointments, or mandates to which they are otherwise subject.

 

	
13.
	
Plan Administration & Interpretation.  The Committee administers this Plan.  As such it shall consider and decide any issues arising under the Plan, and shall oversee and approve actual award calculations and payments.  The Committee’s decisions concerning Plan administration and interpretation are final and binding, except as they might relate to the CEO or to other executive officers, in which case the Board has final decision-making authority.  Definitions in the 2013 Plan apply to terms used in this Plan unless otherwise defined here. All references to the “Company” include a “Related Company,” as that term is defined in the 2013 Plan. 

 

	
14.
	
Modification and Termination.  The Committee or the Board, in its sole discretion, may modify or terminate this Plan at any time.  

 

	
15.
	
Section 409A.  The Company intends that this Plan and the payments provided hereunder comply with the requirements of Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”) and the Treasury Regulations thereunder.  Notwithstanding any provision in this Plan, the 2013 Plan or any other agreement to the contrary: (a) this Plan shall be interpreted, operated, and administered in a manner consistent with such intentions; and (b) in the event that the payment of an award is subject to acceleration upon a change in control or similar event with respect to the Company, such acceleration shall only occur to the extent that such change in control or similar event constitutes a change in control event with respect to the Company within the meaning of Section 409A of the Code and the Treasury Regulations thereunder.

 

	
16.
	
Reimbursement.  Plan participation and awards are subject to the Board’s Policy on Reimbursement of Incentive Awards, as it might change from time to time.  

 

 

Approved by the Committee & Board, and issued on their behalf,

 

 

Curtis C. Reusser

Chairman, President & CEO

 

December, 2018

 

 

FY19 Corporate IC Plan

Revised November 2018

Page 3

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