Document:

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                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.24

                          REGISTRATION RIGHTS AGREEMENT

                  This REGISTRATION RIGHTS AGREEMENT is made and entered into as
of April 24, 2002 (this "Agreement"), among Allos Therapeutics, Inc., a Delaware
corporation (the "Company"), and Perseus-Soros BioPharmaceutical Fund, LP, a
Delaware limited partnership ("Perseus-Soros"). Unless otherwise provided in
this Agreement, capitalized terms used herein have the respective meanings given
to them in Section 1.1 hereof. Capitalized terms used herein and not defined
have the respective meanings given to them in the Securities Purchase Agreement.

                  WHEREAS, Perseus-Soros is purchasing shares of the Company's
Common Stock (the "Shares"), par value $0.01 per share, pursuant to that certain
Securities Purchase Agreement, dated the date hereof (the "Securities Purchase
Agreement"), by and among the Company and Perseus-Soros; and

                  WHEREAS, the Company has agreed to grant certain registration
rights with respect to the Registrable Securities as set forth in this
Agreement.

                  NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and
agreements set forth herein, the parties hereto agree as follows:

                                    ARTICLE I

                                   DEFINITIONS

                  1.1 Definitions. As used in this Agreement, and unless the
context requires a different meaning, the following terms have the meanings
indicated:

                  "Agreement" means this Agreement as the same may be amended,
supplemented or modified in accordance with the terms hereof.

                  "Approved Underwriter" has the meaning set forth in Section
5.2.

                  "Charter Documents" means the Certificate of Incorporation and
the Bylaws of the Company.

                  "Closing Price" means, with respect to the Registrable
Securities, as of the date of determination, (a) if the Registrable Securities
are listed on a national securities exchange, the closing price per share of a
Registrable Security on such date published in The Wall Street Journal (National
Edition) or, if no such closing price on such date is published in The Wall
Street Journal (National Edition), the average of the closing bid and asked
prices on such date, as officially reported on the principal national securities
exchange on which the Registrable Securities are then listed or admitted to
trading; or (b) if the Registrable Securities are not then listed or admitted to
trading on any national securities exchange but are designated as national
market system securities by the NASD,

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the last trading price per share of a Registrable Security on such date; or (c)
if there shall have been no trading on such date or if the Registrable
Securities are not designated as national market system securities by the NASD,
the average of the reported closing bid and asked prices of the Registrable
Securities on such date as shown by the Nasdaq Stock Market (or its successor)
and reported by any member firm of The New York Stock Exchange, Inc. selected by
the Company; or (d) if none of (a), (b) or (c) is applicable, a market price per
share determined in good faith by the Board of Directors or, if such
determination is not reasonably satisfactory to the Designated Holders for whom
such determination is being made, by a nationally recognized investment banking
firm selected by the Company and such Designated Holders, the expenses for which
shall be borne equally by the Company and such Designated Holders. If trading is
conducted on a continuous basis on any exchange, then the closing price shall be
at 4:00 P.M. Eastern Standard Time.

                  "Common Stock Equivalents" means any security or obligation
which is by its terms convertible, exchangeable or exercisable into or for
shares of Common Stock, including, without limitation, any option, warrant or
other subscription or purchase right with respect to Common Stock or any Common
Stock Equivalent (including any securities of any Person exchangeable for Common
Stock or any Common Stock Equivalent).

                  "Company" has the meaning set forth in the preamble to this
Agreement.

                  "Company Underwriter" has the meaning set forth in Section
4.1.

                  "Designated Holder" means Perseus-Soros and any transferee of
Perseus-Soros to whom Registrable Securities have been transferred in accordance
with Section 9.5 of this Agreement, other than a transferee to whom Registrable
Securities have been transferred pursuant to a Registration Statement under the
Securities Act or Rule 144 under the Securities Act (or any successor rule
thereto).

                  "Effectiveness Period" means the period commencing with the
date of this Agreement and ending on the date that all Registrable Securities
have ceased to be Registrable Securities.

                  "Holders' Counsel" has the meaning set forth in Section
6.1(a).

                  "Incidental Registration" has the meaning set forth in Section
4.1.

                  "Indemnified Party" has the meaning set forth in Section 7.3.

                  "Indemnifying Party" has the meaning set forth in Section 7.3.

                  "Inspector" has the meaning set forth in Section 6.1(h).

                  "Liability" has the meaning set forth in Section 7.1.

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                  "Market Price" means, on any date of determination, the
average of the daily Closing Price of the Registrable Securities for the
immediately preceding thirty (30) days on which the national securities
exchanges are open for trading.

                  "NASD" means the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc.

                  "Perseus-Soros" has the meaning set forth in the preamble to
this Agreement and shall also include any transferee thereof.

                  "Records" has the meaning set forth in Section 6.1(h).

                  "Registrable Securities" means (a) the Shares and (b) any
shares of Common Stock issued (or issuable upon the conversion or exchange of
any Common Stock Equivalent which is issued) by way of share dividend or share
split or in connection with a combination of shares, recapitalization, merger,
consolidation or other reorganization or otherwise and any shares of Common
Stock issuable upon conversion, exercise or exchange thereof.

                  "Registration Expenses" has the meaning set forth in Section
6.4.

                  "Registration Statement" means a Registration Statement filed
pursuant to the Securities Act.

                  "Shelf Registration Statement" has the meaning set forth in
Section 3.1.

                  "S-3 Initiating Holder" has the meaning set forth in Section
5.1.

                  "S-3 Registration" has the meaning set forth in Section 5.1.

                  "Valid Business Reason" has the meaning set forth in Section
5.3.

                                   ARTICLE II

                  GENERAL; SECURITIES SUBJECT TO THIS AGREEMENT

                  2.1 Grant of Rights. The Company hereby grants registration
rights to the Designated Holders upon the terms and conditions set forth in this
Agreement.

                  2.2 Registrable Securities. For the purposes of this
Agreement, Registrable Securities will cease to be Registrable Securities, when
(i) a Registration Statement covering such Registrable Securities has been
declared effective under the Securities Act by the Commission and such
Registrable Securities have been disposed of pursuant to such effective
Registration Statement, (ii) such Registrable Securities are salable by the
holder thereof pursuant to Rule 144(k), or (iii) such Registrable Securities are
sold to the public pursuant to Rule 144.

                  2.3 Holders of Registrable Securities. A Person is deemed to
be a holder of Registrable Securities whenever such Person owns of record
Registrable

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Securities, or holds an option to purchase, or a security convertible into or
exercisable or exchangeable for, Registrable Securities whether or not such
acquisition or conversion has actually been effected. If the Company receives
conflicting instructions, notices or elections from two or more Persons with
respect to the same Registrable Securities, the Company may act upon the basis
of the instructions, notice or election received from the registered owner of
such Registrable Securities. Registrable Securities issuable upon exercise of an
option or upon conversion of another security shall be deemed outstanding for
the purposes of this Agreement.

                                   ARTICLE III

                          SHELF REGISTRATION STATEMENT

                  3.1 Shelf Registration Statement. Not later than fifteen (15)
days after the date hereof, the Company shall file with the Commission a shelf
registration statement pursuant to Rule 415 of the Securities Act (the "Shelf
Registration Statement") on Form S-3 (or any successor form thereto), with
respect to the resale, from time to time, of all of the Registrable Securities
held by Designated Holders.

                  3.2 Effective Shelf Registration Statement. The Company shall
use its reasonable best efforts to cause the Shelf Registration Statement to
become effective as soon as practicable after the date hereof (but not later
than seventy-five (75) days after the filing date of the Shelf Registration
Statement), and shall use its reasonable best efforts to keep the Shelf
Registration Statement continuously effective under the Securities Act, subject
to the provisions of Section 6.3, for the lesser of (i) the period during which
all Registrable Securities registered under the Shelf Registration Statement are
sold and (ii) such time as the Company delivers an opinion of counsel that each
Designated Holder may sell in the open market in a single transaction all
Registrable Securities then held by each such Designated Holder pursuant to Rule
144(k) of the Securities Act (or any successor provision then in effect) without
being subject to the volume limitations thereof.

                                   ARTICLE IV

                     INCIDENTAL OR "PIGGY-BACK" REGISTRATION

                  4.1 Request for Incidental Registration. At any time after the
date hereof, if the Shelf Registration Statement is not effective and the
Company proposes to file a Registration Statement under the Securities Act with
respect to an offering by the Company for its own account (other than a
Registration Statement on Form S-4 or S-8 or any successor thereto) or for the
account of any stockholder of the Company other than the Designated Holders,
then the Company shall give written notice of such proposed filing to each of
the Designated Holders as far in advance as practicable (but not less than ten
(10) Business Days) before the anticipated filing date, and such notice shall
describe the proposed registration and distribution and offer such Designated
Holders the opportunity to register the number of Registrable Securities as each
such Designated Holder may request in writing (an "Incidental Registration").
Upon the written request of

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such Designated Holder made within ten (10) days after the receipt of any such
notice (which request shall specify the Registrable Securities intended to be
disposed of by such Designated Holder), the Company shall use its commercially
reasonable efforts (within ten (10) days of the notice provided for in the
preceding sentence) to cause the managing underwriter or underwriters in the
case of a proposed underwritten offering (the "Company Underwriter") to permit
each of the Designated Holders who have requested in writing to participate in
the Incidental Registration to include its or his Registrable Securities in such
offering on the same terms and conditions as the securities of the Company or
the account of such other stockholder, as the case may be, included therein. In
connection with any Incidental Registration under this Section 4.1 involving an
underwritten offering, the Company shall not be required to include any
Registrable Securities in such underwritten offering unless the Designated
Holders accept the terms of the underwritten offering as agreed upon between the
Company, such other stockholders, if any, and the Company Underwriter. If the
Company Underwriter determines that the registration of all or part of the
Registrable Securities which the Designated Holders have requested to be
included would adversely affect the success of such offering, then the Company
shall be required to include in such Incidental Registration, to the extent of
the amount that the Company Underwriter believes may be sold without causing
such adverse effect, first, all of the securities to be offered for the account
of the Company; second, the Registrable Securities to be offered for the account
of the Designated Holders pursuant to this Article IV as a group, pro rata based
on the number of Registrable Securities requested to be included in such
registration; and third other securities requested to be included in such
offering.

                  4.2 Right to Terminate Registration. The Company shall have
the right to terminate or withdraw any registration initiated by it under
Section 4.1 prior to the effectiveness of such registration whether or not any
Designated Holder has elected to include Registrable Securities in such
registration.

                                    ARTICLE V

                              FORM S-3 REGISTRATION

                  5.1 Request for a Form S-3 Registration. At any time after the
date hereof, in the event that the Company shall receive from Perseus-Soros (the
"S-3 Initiating Holder"), at any time that the Shelf Registration Statement is
not effective, a written request that the Company register, under the Securities
Act on Form S-3 (or any successor form then in effect) (an "S-3 Registration"),
all or a portion of the Registrable Securities owned by such S-3 Initiating
Holder, the Company shall give written notice of such request to all of the
Designated Holders (other than the S-3 Initiating Holder who has requested an
S-3 Registration under this Section 5.1) as far in advance as practicable (but
not less than ten (10) Business Days) before the anticipated filing date of such
Form S-3, and such notice shall describe the proposed registration and offer
such Designated Holders the opportunity to register the number of Registrable
Securities as each such Designated Holder may request in writing to the Company,
given within ten (10) days after their receipt from the Company of the written
notice of such registration. With respect to each S-3 Registration, the Company
shall, subject to Section 5.2, (i) include in

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such offering the Registrable Securities of the S-3 Initiating Holder and (ii)
use its reasonable best efforts to (x) cause such registration pursuant to this
Section 5.1 to become and remain effective as soon as practicable, but in any
event not later than seventy-five (75) days after it receives a request
therefor, and (y) include in such offering the Registrable Securities of the
Designated Holders (other than the S-3 Initiating Holder who has requested an
S-3 Registration under this Section 5.1) who have requested in writing to
participate in such registration on the same terms and conditions as the
Registrable Securities of the S-3 Initiating Holder included therein.

                  5.2 Form S-3 Underwriting Procedures. If the S-3 Initiating
Holder so elects, the Company shall use its reasonable best efforts to cause the
S-3 Registration pursuant to this Article V to be in the form of a firm
commitment underwritten offering and the managing underwriter or underwriters
selected for such offering shall be selected by the Company and shall be
reasonably acceptable to the S-3 Initiating Holder (the "Approved Underwriter").

                  5.3 Limitations on Form S-3 Registrations. If the Board of
Directors, in its good faith judgment, determines that any registration of
Registrable Securities pursuant to Section 5.1 should not be made or continued
because it would interfere with any material financing, acquisition, corporate
reorganization or merger or other material transaction involving the Company (a
"Valid Business Reason"), the Company may (x) postpone filing a registration
statement relating to a S-3 Registration until such Valid Business Reason no
longer exists, but in no event for more than ninety (90) days, and (y) in case a
registration statement has been filed relating to a S-3 Registration, if the
Valid Business Reason has not resulted from actions taken by the Company, the
Company may cause such registration statement to be withdrawn and its
effectiveness terminated or may postpone amending or supplementing such
registration statement (so long as the Designated Holders shall have the rights
set forth in this Article V within ninety (90) days of any such event). The
Company shall give written notice of its determination to postpone or withdraw a
registration statement (provided that the Company shall not disclose any
information that could be deemed material non-public information to any holder
of Registrable Securities that are included in a registration statement that is
subject to such postponement or withdrawal) and of the fact that the Valid
Business Reason for such postponement or withdrawal no longer exists, in each
case, promptly after the occurrence thereof. Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained herein, the Company may not postpone or withdraw a filing due
to a Valid Business Reason more than once in any twelve (12) month period. In
addition, the Company shall not be required to effect any registration pursuant
to Section 5.1, (i) within ninety (90) days after the effective date of any
other Registration Statement of the Company if (a) the Registration Statement
was not for the account of the Designated Holders but the Designated Holders had
the opportunity to include at least two-thirds of the Registrable Securities
they requested to include in such registration pursuant to Article IV, or (b)
the Registration Statement was filed pursuant to Article V, (ii) if Form S-3 (or
any successor form then in effect) is not available for such offering by the S-3
Initiating Holder, (iii) if the S-3 Initiating Holder registering Registrable
Securities in such registration, proposes to sell their Registrable Securities
at an aggregate price (calculated based upon the Market Price of the Registrable
Securities on the date of filing of the Form S-3 with

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respect to such Registrable Securities) to the public of less than $2,000,000 or
(iv) more than two times in any twelve month period.

                  5.4 No Limitation of Shelf Registration Right. No registration
requested by any S-3 Initiating Holder pursuant to this Article V shall be
deemed to limit the rights of the Designated Holder set forth in Article III.

                                   ARTICLE VI

                             REGISTRATION PROCEDURES

                  6.1 Obligations of the Company. Whenever registration of
Registrable Securities is required pursuant to Article III, Article IV or
Article V of this Agreement, the Company shall use its reasonable best efforts
to effect the registration and sale of such Registrable Securities in accordance
with the intended method of distribution thereof as quickly as practicable, and
in connection with any such request, the Company shall, as expeditiously as
possible:

                           (a) prepare and file with the Commission a
Registration Statement on any form for which the Company then qualifies or which
counsel for the Company shall deem appropriate and which form shall be available
for the sale of such Registrable Securities in accordance with the intended
method of distribution thereof, and cause such Registration Statement to become
effective; provided, however, that before filing a Registration Statement or
prospectus or any amendments or supplements thereto, the Company shall provide
counsel selected by the Designated Holders holding a majority of the Registrable
Securities being registered in such registration ("Holders' Counsel") and any
other Inspector with an adequate and appropriate opportunity to review and
comment on such Registration Statement and each prospectus included therein (and
each amendment or supplement thereto) to be filed with the Commission, subject
to such documents being under the Company's control;

                           (b) prepare and file with the Commission such
amendments and supplements to such Registration Statement and the prospectus
used in connection therewith as may be necessary to keep such Registration
Statement effective for the period specified in such Article, or if not so
specified, the lesser of (x) 180 days and (y) such shorter period which will
terminate when all Registrable Securities covered by such Registration Statement
have been sold, and comply with the provisions of the Securities Act with
respect to the disposition of all securities covered by such Registration
Statement during such period in accordance with the intended methods of
disposition by the sellers thereof set forth in such Registration Statement;

                           (c) furnish to each seller of Registrable Securities,
prior to filing a Registration Statement, at least one copy of such Registration
Statement as is proposed to be filed, and thereafter such number of copies of
such Registration Statement, each amendment and supplement thereto (in each case
including all exhibits thereto), and the prospectus included in such
Registration Statement (including each preliminary prospectus) and any
prospectus filed under Rule 424 under the Securities Act

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                                                                               8

as each such seller may reasonably request in order to facilitate the
disposition of the Registrable Securities owned by such seller;

                           (d) register or qualify such Registrable Securities
under such other securities or "blue sky" laws of such jurisdictions within the
United States as any seller of Registrable Securities may reasonably request,
and to continue such registration or qualification in effect in such
jurisdiction for as long as permissible pursuant to the laws of such
jurisdiction, or for as long as any such seller requests or until all of such
Registrable Securities are sold, whichever is shortest, and do any and all other
acts and things which may be reasonably necessary or advisable to enable any
such seller to consummate the disposition in such jurisdictions of the
Registrable Securities owned by such seller; provided, however, that the Company
shall not be required to (x) qualify generally to do business in any
jurisdiction where it would not otherwise be required to qualify but for this
Section 6.1(d), (y) subject itself to taxation in any such jurisdiction or (z)
consent to general service of process in any such jurisdiction;

                           (e) notify each seller of Registrable Securities: (i)
when a prospectus, any prospectus supplement, a Registration Statement or a
post-effective amendment to a Registration Statement has been filed with the
Commission, and, with respect to a Registration Statement or any post-effective
amendment, when the same has become effective; (ii) of any request by the
Commission or any other federal or state governmental authority for amendments
or supplements to a Registration Statement or related prospectus or for
additional information; (iii) of the issuance by the Commission or any other
federal or state governmental authority of any stop order suspending the
effectiveness of a Registration Statement or the initiation or threatening of
any proceedings for that purpose; (iv) of the receipt by the Company of any
notification with respect to the suspension of the qualification or exemption
from qualification of any of the Registrable Securities for sale in any
jurisdiction or the initiation or threatening of any proceedings for such
purpose; (v) of the existence of any fact or happening of any event which makes
any statement of a material fact in such Registration Statement or related
prospectus or any document incorporated or deemed to be incorporated therein by
reference untrue or which would require the making of any changes in the
Registration Statement or prospectus in order that, in the case of the
Registration Statement, it will not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, and that in the case of
the Prospectus, it will not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading; and (vi) determination by counsel of the Company that
a post-effective amendment to a Registration Statement is advisable.

                           (f) upon the occurrence of any event contemplated by
Section 6.1(e)(v), as promptly as practicable prepare a supplement or amendment
to such Registration Statement or related prospectus and furnish to each seller
of Registrable Securities a reasonable number of copies of such supplement to or
amendment of such Registration Statement or prospectus as may be necessary so
that, after delivery to the purchasers of such Registrable Securities, such
prospectus shall not contain an untrue

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statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading;

                           (g) enter into and perform customary agreements
(including an underwriting agreement in customary form with the Approved
Underwriter or Company Underwriter, if any, selected as provided in Article IV
or Article V, as the case may be) and take such other actions as are prudent and
reasonably required in order to expedite or facilitate the disposition of such
Registrable Securities;

                           (h) make available at reasonable times for inspection
by any seller of Registrable Securities, any managing underwriter participating
in any disposition of such Registrable Securities pursuant to a Registration
Statement, Holders' Counsel and any attorney, accountant or other agent retained
by any managing underwriter (each, an "Inspector" and collectively, the
"Inspectors"), all financial and other records, pertinent corporate documents
and properties of the Company and its subsidiaries (collectively, the "Records")
as shall be reasonably necessary to enable them to exercise their due diligence
responsibility, and cause the Company's and its subsidiaries' officers,
directors and employees, and the independent public accountants of the Company,
to supply all information reasonably requested by any such Inspector in
connection with such Registration Statement. Records that the Company
determines, in good faith, to be confidential and which it notifies the
Inspectors are confidential shall not be disclosed by the Inspectors (and the
Inspectors shall confirm their agreement in writing in advance to the Company if
the Company shall so request) unless (x) the disclosure of such Records is
necessary, in the Company's judgment, to avoid or correct a misstatement or
omission in the Registration Statement, (y) the release of such Records is
ordered pursuant to a subpoena or other order from a court of competent
jurisdiction after exhaustion of all appeals therefrom or (z) the information in
such Records has been made generally available to the public. Each seller of
Registrable Securities agrees that it shall, upon learning that disclosure of
such Records is sought in a court of competent jurisdiction, give notice to the
Company and allow the Company, at the Company's expense, to undertake
appropriate action to prevent disclosure of the Records deemed confidential;

                           (i) if such sale is pursuant to an underwritten
offering, obtain "comfort" letters dated the effective date of the registration
statement and the date of the closing under the underwriting agreement from the
Company's independent public accountants in customary form and covering such
matters of the type customarily covered by "comfort" letters as Holders' Counsel
or the managing underwriter reasonably requests;

                           (j) furnish, at the request of any seller of
Registrable Securities on the date such securities are delivered to the
underwriters for sale pursuant to such registration or, if such securities are
not being sold through underwriters, on the date the Registration Statement with
respect to such securities becomes effective, an opinion, dated such date, of
counsel representing the Company for the purposes of such registration,
addressed to the underwriters, if any, and to the seller making such request,
covering such legal matters with respect to the registration in respect of which
such

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opinion is being given as the underwriters, if any, and such seller may
reasonably request and are customarily included in such opinions;

                           (k) comply in all material respects with all
applicable rules and regulations of the Commission, and make generally available
to its security holders, as soon as reasonably practicable but no later than
fifteen (15) months after the effective date of the Registration Statement, an
earnings statement covering a period of twelve (12) months beginning after the
effective date of the Registration Statement, in a manner which satisfies the
provisions of Section 11(a) of the Securities Act and Rule 158 thereunder;

                           (l) cause all such Registrable Securities to be
listed on each securities exchange on which similar securities issued by the
Company are then listed, provided that the applicable listing requirements are
satisfied;

                           (m) keep Holders' Counsel advised in writing as to
the initiation and progress of any registration under Article III, Article IV or
Article V hereunder (provided that the Company shall provide Holders' Counsel
with all correspondence with the Commission in connection with any Registration
Statement filed hereunder to the extent that such Registration Statement has not
been declared effective on or prior to the date required hereunder);

                           (n) cooperate with each seller of Registrable
Securities and each underwriter participating in the disposition of such
Registrable Securities and their respective counsel in connection with any
filings required to be made with the NASD; and

                           (o) take all other steps reasonably necessary to
effect the registration of the Registrable Securities contemplated hereby.

                  6.2 Seller Information. In connection with any Registration
Statement in which a Designated Holder is participating pursuant to Article III,
Article IV or Article V hereof, each such Designated Holder shall promptly
furnish to the Company in writing such information with respect to such
Designated Holder as the Company may reasonably request or as may be required by
law for use in connection with any such Registration Statement or preliminary,
final or summary prospectus or amendment or supplement, or a document
incorporated by reference into any of the foregoing and all information required
to be disclosed in order to make the information previously furnished to the
Company by such Designated Holder not materially misleading or necessary to
cause such Registration Statement not to omit a material fact with respect to
such Designated Holder necessary in order to make the statements therein not
misleading. Any Designated Holder who fails to provide such information to the
Company shall not be entitled to use the Registration Statement or any
preliminary, final or summary prospectus or amendment or supplement relating
thereto.

                  6.3 Notice to Discontinue. In the event (a) of the happening
of any event of the kind described in Section 6.1(e)(ii) (to the extent the
Company is required in

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the opinion of counsel to take the action requested thereunder and is taking
such action), 6.1(e)(iii) (in connection with a stop order), 6.1(e)(iv) (to the
extent that in the opinion of counsel sales under the Registration Statement in
question are no longer permitted as a result of such suspension), 6.1(e)(v) or
6.1(e)(vi) hereof or (b) that, in the good faith judgment of the Company's board
of directors after consultation with Company counsel, it is advisable to suspend
the use of a prospectus included in any Registration Statement for a discrete
period of time (not to exceed 30 days) due to pending material corporate
developments or similar material events that have not yet been publicly
disclosed and as to which the Company after consultation with counsel believes
public disclosure will be prejudicial to the Company (and that such public
disclosure would be required absent such suspension), the Company shall deliver
a certificate in writing, signed by an authorized senior executive officer of
the Company, to the Designated Holders, to the effect of the foregoing and
thereafter the Designated Holders shall discontinue any disposition of
Registrable Securities pursuant to the Registration Statement and the prospectus
included therein, and the Company, subject to the terms of this Section 6.3,
shall thereafter not be required to maintain the effectiveness or update the
Registration Statement or the prospectus included therein. The Company will use
its reasonable best efforts to ensure that the use of the Registration Statement
and the prospectus may be resumed as soon as practicable, in the case of
suspension under Section 6.3(a), and, in the case of a pending development or
event referred to in Section 6.3(b) hereof, as soon as, in the good faith
judgment of the Company, public disclosure of such material corporate
development or similar material event would not have a material adverse effect
on the Company. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Company shall not under any
circumstances be entitled to: (x) exercise its right under Section 6.3(a) hereof
to suspend the use of a Registration Statement and related prospectus more than
one (1) time in any six (6) month period, and the periods in which the use of a
Registration Statement and related prospectus is suspended shall not exceed 30
days in any six-month period; (y) exercise its right under Section 6.3(b) hereof
to suspend the use of a Registration Statement and related prospectus more than
one (1) time in any six (6) month period, and the periods in which the use of a
Registration Statement and related prospectus is suspended shall not exceed 30
days in any six-month period; and (z) exercise its rights under either Section
6.3(a) or (b) hereof if the use of a Registration Statement and related
prospectus has been suspended at any time during the immediately preceding
thirty (30) days pursuant to either of said Sections 6.3(a) or (b).

                  6.4 Registration Expenses. The Company shall pay all expenses
arising from or incident to its performance of, or compliance with, this
Agreement, including, without limitation, (i) Commission, stock exchange and
NASD registration and filing fees, (ii) all fees and expenses incurred in
complying with securities or "blue sky" laws (including reasonable fees, charges
and disbursements of counsel to any underwriter incurred in connection with
"blue sky" qualifications of the Registrable Securities as may be set forth in
any underwriting agreement), (iii) all printing, messenger and delivery
expenses, (iv) the fees, charges and disbursements of counsel to the Company and
of its independent public accountants and any other accounting fees, charges and
expenses incurred by the Company (including, without limitation, any expenses
arising from any "cold comfort" letters or any special audits incident to or
required by any registration or qualification), and (v) the fees, charges and
disbursements

<PAGE>
                                                                              12

up to $25,000 of one counsel to the Designated Holders (which shall be
designated by a majority in interest of the Designated Holders of Registrable
Securities participating in the proposed sale pursuant to the Registration
Statement in question). All of the expenses described in the preceding sentence
of this Section 6.4 are referred to herein as "Registration Expenses." The
Designated Holders of Registrable Securities sold pursuant to a Registration
Statement shall bear the expense of any broker's commission or underwriter's
discount or commission relating to registration and sale of such Designated
Holders' Registrable Securities and, subject to clause (v) above, shall bear the
fees and expenses of their own counsel.

                                   ARTICLE VII

                          INDEMNIFICATION; CONTRIBUTION

                  7.1 Indemnification by the Company. The Company agrees to
indemnify and hold harmless each Designated Holder, its general or limited
partners, members, directors, officers, Affiliates and each Person who controls
(within the meaning of Section 15 of the Securities Act) any of the foregoing
from and against any and all losses, claims, damages, liabilities and expenses
(including reasonable costs of investigation) (each, a "Liability" and
collectively, "Liabilities"), (i) arising out of or based upon any untrue, or
allegedly untrue, statement of a material fact contained in any Registration
Statement or preliminary, final or summary prospectus contained therein (as
amended or supplemented if the Company shall have furnished any amendments or
supplements thereto) or (ii) arising out of or based upon any omission or
alleged omission to state therein a material fact required to be stated therein
or necessary to make the statements therein (in the case of a prospectus, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made) not misleading; provided,
however, that (x) the Company will not be liable insofar as any such Liability
arises out of or is based upon any untrue statement or alleged untrue statement
or omission or alleged omission contained in such Registration Statement or
preliminary, final or summary prospectus or amendment or supplement, or a
document incorporated by reference into any of the foregoing in reliance and in
conformity with information furnished in writing to the Company by or on behalf
of a Designated Holder expressly for use therein, including, without limitation,
the information furnished to the Company pursuant to Section 6.2; and (y) the
Company will not be liable with respect to any Liabilities arising out of or
based on any untrue statement or alleged untrue statement of a material fact or
any omission or alleged omission to state a material fact contained in any
Registration Statement or preliminary, final or summary prospectus or amendment
or supplement which is corrected in the Registration Statement, prospectus,
amendment or supplement, if the person asserting any such Liability purchased
Registrable Securities from a Designated Holder but was not sent or given a copy
of the corrected Registration Statement, prospectus, amendment or supplement at
or prior to the written confirmation of the sale of such Registrable Securities
to such person if the corrected Registration Statement, prospectus, amendment or
supplement had been delivered to such Designated Holder at least four (4)
Business Days prior to the date of such written confirmation of such sale.

<PAGE>
                                                                              13

                  7.2 Indemnification by Designated Holders. Each Designated
Holder agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Company, its directors,
officers, Affiliates, any underwriter retained by the Company and each Person
who controls the Company or such underwriter (within the meaning of Section 15
of the Securities Act) to the same extent as the foregoing indemnity from the
Company to the Designated Holders, but only if such untrue statement or alleged
untrue statement or omission or alleged omission was made in reliance upon and
in conformity with information with respect to such Designated Holder furnished
in writing to the Company by such Designated Holder expressly for use in such
Registration Statement or preliminary, final or summary prospectus or amendment
or supplement, or a document incorporated by reference into any of the
foregoing, including, without limitation, the information furnished to the
Company pursuant to Section 6.2; provided, however, that the total amount to be
indemnified by such Designated Holder pursuant to this Section 7.2 shall be
limited to the net proceeds received by such Designated Holder in the offering
to which the Registration Statement or prospectus relates.

                  7.3 Conduct of Indemnification Proceedings. Any Person
entitled to indemnification hereunder (the "Indemnified Party") agrees to give
prompt written notice to the indemnifying party (the "Indemnifying Party") after
the receipt by the Indemnified Party of any written notice of the commencement
of any action, suit, proceeding or investigation or threat thereof made in
writing for which the Indemnified Party intends to claim indemnification or
contribution pursuant to this Agreement; provided, however, that the failure so
to notify the Indemnifying Party shall not relieve the Indemnifying Party of any
Liability that it may have to the Indemnified Party hereunder (except to the
extent that the Indemnifying Party is materially prejudiced). If notice of
commencement of any such action is given to the Indemnifying Party as above
provided, the Indemnifying Party shall be entitled to participate in and, to the
extent it may wish, jointly with any other Indemnifying Party similarly
notified, to assume the defense of such action at its own expense, with counsel
chosen by it. The Indemnified Party shall have the right to employ separate
counsel in any such action and participate in the defense thereof, but the fees
and expenses of such counsel shall be paid by the Indemnified Party unless (i)
the Indemnifying Party agrees to pay the same, (ii) the Indemnifying Party fails
to assume promptly the defense of such action or (iii) the named parties to any
such action (including any impleaded parties) include both the Indemnifying
Party and the Indemnified Party and the Indemnified Party has been advised by
such counsel that either (x) representation of such Indemnified Party and the
Indemnifying Party by the same counsel would be inappropriate under applicable
standards of professional conduct or (y) there may be one or more legal defenses
available to the Indemnified Party which are different from or additional to
those available to the Indemnifying Party. In any of such cases, the
Indemnifying Party shall not have the right to assume the defense of such action
on behalf of such Indemnified Party, it being understood, however, that the
Indemnifying Party shall not be liable for the fees and expenses of more than
one separate firm of attorneys (in addition to any local counsel) for all
Indemnified Parties. No Indemnifying Party shall be liable for any settlement
entered into without its written consent, which consent shall not be
unreasonably withheld. No Indemnifying Party shall, without the consent of such
Indemnified Party, effect any settlement of any pending or threatened proceeding
in

<PAGE>
                                                                              14

respect of which such Indemnified Party is a party and indemnity has been sought
hereunder by such Indemnified Party, unless such settlement includes an
unconditional release of such Indemnified Party from all liability for claims
that are the subject matter of such proceeding.

                  7.4 Contribution. If the indemnification provided for in this
Article VII from the Indemnifying Party is unavailable to an Indemnified Party
hereunder in respect of any Liabilities referred to herein, then the
Indemnifying Party, in lieu of indemnifying such Indemnified Party, shall
contribute to the amount paid or payable by such Indemnified Party as a result
of such Liabilities in such proportion as is appropriate to reflect the relative
fault of the Indemnifying Party and Indemnified Party in connection with the
actions which resulted in such Liabilities, as well as any other relevant
equitable considerations. The relative faults of such Indemnifying Party and
Indemnified Party shall be determined by reference to, among other things,
whether any action in question, including any untrue or alleged untrue statement
of a material fact or omission or alleged omission to state a material fact, has
been made by, or relates to information supplied by, such Indemnifying Party or
Indemnified Party, and the parties' relative intent, knowledge, access to
information and opportunity to correct or prevent such action. The amount paid
or payable by a party as a result of the Liabilities referred to above shall be
deemed to include, subject to the limitations set forth in Sections 7.1 and 7.2,
any legal or other fees, charges or expenses reasonably incurred by such party
in connection with any investigation or proceeding; provided that the total
amount to be contributed by such Designated Holder shall be limited to the net
proceeds received by such Designated Holder in the offering.

                  The parties hereto agree that it would not be just and
equitable if contribution pursuant to this Section 7.4 were determined by pro
rata allocation or by any other method of allocation which does not take account
of the equitable considerations referred to in the immediately preceding
paragraph. No Person guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation (within the meaning
of Section 11(f) of the Securities Act) shall be entitled to contribution from
any Person who was not guilty of such fraudulent misrepresentation.

                                  ARTICLE VIII

                                    COVENANTS

                  8.1 Rule 144. The Company covenants that from and after the
date hereof it shall use commercially reasonable efforts to (a) file any reports
required to be filed by it under the Exchange Act and (b) take such further
action as each Designated Holder of Registrable Securities may reasonably
request (including providing any information necessary to comply with Rule 144
under the Securities Act), all to the extent required from time to time to
enable such Designated Holder to sell Registrable Securities without
registration under the Securities Act within the limitation of the exemptions
provided by (i) Rule 144 under the Securities Act, as such rule may be amended
from time to time, or Regulation S under the Securities Act or (ii) any similar
rules or regulations hereafter adopted by the Commission.

<PAGE>
                                                                              15

                  8.2 Restrictions on Public Sale by the Company. The Company
agrees not to effect any public sale or distribution of any of its securities,
or any securities convertible into or exchangeable or exercisable for such
securities (except pursuant to registrations on Form S-4 or S-8 or any successor
thereto), during the period beginning 8.4 on the effective date of the first
Registration Statement under Article V in which at least two-thirds of the
Registrable Securities requested to be included in such Registration Statement
were included in such Registration Statement and ending on the earlier and
ending on the earlier of (i) the date that all Registrable Securities registered
on such Shelf Registration Statement are sold and (ii) thirty (30) days after
the effective date of such Shelf Registration Statement (except as part of such
registration).

                                   ARTICLE IX

                                  MISCELLANEOUS

                  9.1 Recapitalizations, Exchanges, etc. The provisions of this
Agreement shall apply, to the full extent set forth herein with respect to the
shares of Common Stock and the Common Stock Equivalents, to any and all shares
of capital stock of the Company, Common Stock Equivalents or other securities of
the Company that may be issued in respect of, in exchange for, or in
substitution of the shares of Common Stock or Common Stock Equivalents, and
shall be appropriately adjusted for any stock dividends, splits, reverse splits,
combinations, reclassifications, recapitalizations and the like occurring after
the date of this Agreement. If, and as often as, there are any changes in the
shares of Common Stock or the Common Stock Equivalents, by way of any stock
dividends, splits, reverse splits, combinations, or reclassifications, or
through merger, consolidation, reorganization or recapitalization or by any
other means occurring after the date of this Agreement, appropriate adjustment
shall be made to the provisions of this Agreement, as may be required, so that
the rights, privileges, duties and obligations hereunder shall continue with
respect to the shares of Common Stock and Common Stock Equivalents as so
changed.

                  9.2 No Inconsistent Agreements. The Company represents and
warrants that it has not granted to any Person the right to request or require
the Company to register any securities issued by the Company, other than the
rights granted to the Designated Holders herein.

                  9.3 Remedies. The Designated Holders, in addition to being
entitled to exercise all rights granted by law, including recovery of damages,
shall be entitled to specific performance of their rights under this Agreement.
The Company agrees that monetary damages would not be adequate compensation for
any loss incurred by reason of a breach by it of the provisions of this
Agreement and hereby agrees to waive in any action for specific performance the
defense that a remedy at law would be adequate.

                  9.4 Notices. All notices, demands and other communications
provided for or permitted hereunder shall be made in the manner provided for
under the Securities Purchase Agreement.

<PAGE>
                                                                              16

                  9.5 Successors and Assigns; Third Party Beneficiaries. This
Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the successors and
permitted assigns of the parties hereto as hereinafter provided. The rights of
the Designated Holder contained in Articles III, IV and V hereof shall be, (i)
with respect to any Registrable Security that is transferred to an Affiliate of
a Designated Holder, automatically transferred to such Affiliate and (ii) with
respect to any Registrable Security that is transferred in all cases to a
non-Affiliate, transferred only when the transferee is acquiring at least
500,000 shares of Common Stock from the Designated Holder or otherwise with the
consent of the Company which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. All of
the obligations of the Company hereunder shall survive any such transfer. Except
as provided in Article VII, no Person other than the parties hereto and their
successors and permitted assigns are intended to be a beneficiary of this
Agreement.

                  9.6 Amendments and Waivers. Except as otherwise provided
herein, the provisions of this Agreement may not be amended, modified or
supplemented, and waivers or consents to departures from the provisions hereof
may not be given unless consented to in writing by (i) the Company and (ii)
Perseus-Soros.

                  9.7 Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in any number
of counterparts and by the parties hereto in separate counterparts, each of
which when so executed shall be deemed to be an original and all of which taken
together shall constitute one and the same agreement. The parties hereto confirm
that any facsimile copy of another party's executed counterpart of this
Agreement (or its signature page thereof) will be deemed to be an executed
original thereof.

                  9.8 Headings. The headings in this Agreement are for
convenience of reference only and shall not limit or otherwise affect the
meaning hereof.

                  9.9 Severability. If any one or more of the provisions
contained herein, or the application thereof in any circumstance, is held
invalid, illegal or unenforceable in any respect for any reason, the validity,
legality and enforceability of any such provision in every other respect and of
the remaining provisions hereof shall not be in any way impaired, unless the
provisions held invalid, illegal or unenforceable shall substantially impair the
benefits of the remaining provisions hereof.

                  9.10 Rules of Construction. Unless the context otherwise
requires, references to sections or subsections refer to sections or subsections
of this Agreement.

                  9.11 Entire Agreement. This Agreement is intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement and intended to be a complete
and exclusive statement of the agreement and understanding of the parties hereto
with respect to the subject matter contained herein. There are no restrictions,
promises, representations, warranties or undertakings with respect to the
subject matter contained herein, other than those set forth or referred to
herein. This Agreement supersedes all prior agreements and understandings among
the parties with respect to such subject matter.

<PAGE>
                                                                              17

                  9.12 Further Assurances. Each of the parties shall, and shall
cause their respective Affiliates to, execute such documents and perform such
further acts as may be reasonably required or desirable to carry out or to
perform the provisions of this Agreement.

                  9.13 Other Agreements. Nothing contained in this Agreement
shall be deemed to be a waiver of, or release from, any obligations any party
hereto may have under, or any restrictions on the transfer of Registrable
Securities or other securities of the Company imposed by, any other agreement
including, but not limited to, the Charter Documents and the Securities Purchase
Agreement.

                  9.14 Termination. This Agreement and the obligations of the
parties hereunder shall terminate upon the end of the Effectiveness Period,
except for liabilities or obligations under Section 6.4 or Article VII, all of
which shall remain in effect in accordance with their terms.

                  9.15 GOVERNING LAW. THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY AND
CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, WITHOUT REGARD
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICTS OF LAW THEREOF.

                  [Remainder of page intentionally left blank]

<PAGE>
                                                                              18

                  IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed, or have
caused to be executed, this Registration Rights Agreement on the date first
written above.

                                       ALLOS THERAPEUTICS, INC.

                                       By: /s/ Michael E. Hart
                                          --------------------------------------
                                          Name: Michael E. Hart
                                          Title: President and CEO

                                       PERSEUS-SOROS BIOPHARMACEUTICAL FUND, LP

                                       By:  Perseus-Soros Partners, LLC, General
                                            Partner

                                       By:  SFM Participation, L.P., Member

                                       By:  SFM AH, Inc., General Partner

                                       By: /s/ Richard D. Holahan
                                          --------------------------------------
                                          Name: Richard D. Holahan, Jr.
                                          Title: SecretaryPUBLISHED

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                            FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

================================================|
R.M.S. TITANIC, INCORPORATED,
successor in interest to Titanic
Ventures, limited partnership,
          Plaintiff-Appellant,

          v.

THE WRECKED AND ABANDONED
VESSEL,  its engines,  tackle apparel,
appurtenances, cargo,  etc., located
within one (1) nautical mile of a
point located at 41o 43E 32 North
Latitude and 49o 56E 49 West
Longitude, believed to be the
R.M.S. Titanic, in rem; ROBERT C.
BLUMBERG, Attorney-Advisor, Office                                 No. 01-2227
of Oceans Affairs, United States
Department of State; OLE VARMER,
Attorney-Advisor, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration,
United States Department of
Commerce; MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT,
Secretary of State, United States
Department of State; WILLIAM M.
DALEY, Secretary of Commerce,
United States Department of
Commerce; D. JAMES BAKER,
Administrator, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, United
States Department of Commerce,
          Defendants,
================================================|

<PAGE>

================================================|
LIVERPOOL AND LONDON STEAMSHIP
PROTECTION AND INDEMNITY
ASSOCIATION, LIMITED,
          Claimant,

DEEP OCEAN EXPEDITIONS;
WILDWINGS WORLDWIDE TRAVEL;
BAKERS WORLD TRAVEL; QUARK
EXPEDITIONS, INCORPORATED; MIKE
MCDOWELL; RALPH WHITE; DON
WALSH, Ph.D.; ALFRED S. MCLAREN,

Ph.D.; CHRISTOPHER S. HAVER; R/V
AKADEMIK MSTISLAV KELDYSH;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
BLACKHAWK TELEVISION,
          Parties in Interest,

JOHN A. JOSLYN,
Movant.

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA APPELLATE
LITIGATION CLINIC; DAVID SHUTTLE,
          Amici Curiae.
================================================|

          Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
                        District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
                        Rebecca B. Smith, District Judge;
                 J. Calvitt Clarke, Jr., Senior District Judge.
                                  (CA-93-902-N)

                           Argued: February 25, 2002

                            Decided: April 12, 2002

              Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Affirmed by published opinion.  Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge
Wilkins and Judge King joined.

                                       2

<PAGE>

                                     COUNSEL

ARGUED: Mark Steven Davis, CARR & PORTER, L.L.C., Ports-
mouth, Virginia, for Appellant. Neal Lawrence Walters, Appellate
Litigation Clinic, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW,
Charlottesville, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae Clinic. ON BRIEF:
Robert C. Scaro, Jr., Mark A. Stallings, CARR & PORTER, L.L.C.,
Portsmouth, Virginia, for Appellant. Craig A. Markham, ELDERKIN,
MARTIN, KELLY & MESSINA, Erie, Pennsylvania, for Amicus
Curiae Shuttle.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                    OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

     R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. ("RMST"), as  salvor-in-possession  of the sub- merged
wreck of the R.M.S.  Titanic and the artifacts  salvaged from it, challenges the
district  court's  orders of  September  26, 2001,  and October 19, 2001.  These
orders were  entered  after the court  discov- ered RMST's plans to sell some of
the artifacts and confirmed that the court's earlier orders prohibiting the sale
of artifacts  "were proper and were necessary when entered." RMST contends that,
because in 1994 it was granted absolute title to all the artifacts it retrieved,
the district court cannot now restrict its right, as owner of the artifacts,  to
sell them at its discretion.

     Finding   that   RMST's   arguments   are   grounded   on   a   fundamental
misunderstanding  of its role as  salvor-in-possession,  we reject its arguments
and affirm the orders of the district court.

                                       I

     In 1985, a joint  American-French  expedition  discovered  the wreck of the
Titanic in the North Atlantic Ocean in  international  waters.  Two years later,
Titanic  Ventures,  a limited  partnership,  explored  the  wreck,  bringing  up
approximately 1,800 artifacts.  Thereafter, it sold its interests in the salvage
operations and the artifacts to RMST.

                                       3

<PAGE>

     In 1993,  RMST  commenced  this in rem action against the Titanic to become
its salvor-in-possession.  In its complaint, RMST requested, among other things,
that, under the law of finds, it be declared "the true, sole and exclusive owner
of any items  salvaged from the wreck" or,  alternatively,  that,  under salvage
law, it be "awarded a liberal sal- vage award . . . as may be determined by this
Court." Acting under  principles of salvage law and consistent with the inchoate
lien that RMST obtained as salvor, the district court exercised in rem jurisdic-
tion and  issued a warrant  directing  the United  States  Marshal to arrest the
wreck and all artifacts already salvaged and yet to be salvaged. Simultaneously,
it ordered  that RMST be  substituted  for the Marshal as the  custodian  of the
wreck,  the wreck site, and the artifacts.  Notice of the  proceedings  was duly
published. Following a claim made by an insurance company and settlement of that
claim,  the court  approved the  settlement  and issued an order,  dated June 7,
1994, declaring RMST salvor-in-possession. In its order, the court stated:

      The Court FINDS AND ORDERS that R.M.S. Titanic, Inc.
      is the salvor-in-possession of the wreck . . . and that R.M.S.
      Titanic, Inc. is the true, sole and exclusive owner of any
      items salvaged from the wreck of the defendant vessel in the
      past and, so long as R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. remains salvor-in-
      possession, items salvaged in the future, and is entitled to all
      salvage rights . . . .

     During the course of the hearing leading to this order,  the district court
confirmed  its  understanding  that it was RMST's  "intention  to display  these
artifacts  and to try to get [its] money back out of admis- sions to the display
rather than selling them off." Counsel for RMST affirmed that  understanding and
explained  further "that the process [of] going  forward with the  exhibition of
the artifacts and not sell[ing them] continues and . . . that is the position of
the salvors in this case,  that the 1987  artifacts and the 1993  artifacts will
not be sold, but rather will be exhibited."

     Two  years   after   entry  of  the  June  1994   order   appointing   RMST
salvor-in-possession,  John A. Joslyn  filed a motion in this action  requesting
that  the   district   court   rescind   its  June  1994   order   naming   RMST
salvor-in-possession  because RMST had failed to salvage the Titanic  diligently
and lacked the financial capacity to undertake future

                                       4

<PAGE>

salvage  operations.  The district court rejected Joslyn's claims and denied his
motion.  But in doing so, it ordered RMST to make more  frequent  reports to the
court about its salvage  efforts.  R.M.S.  Titanic,  Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned
Vessel, the R.M.S.  Titanic, 924 F. Supp. 714, 724 (E.D. Va. 1996). In addition,
the district court entered a preliminary  injunction prohibiting Joslyn, as well
as anyone else, from visiting the site of the wreck and from  photographing  it.
R.M.S.  Titanic,  Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned  Vessel,  No.  2:93CV902,  1996 WL
650135 (E.D.  Va. Aug. 13, 1996).  The court reasoned that because RMST was "not
selling artifacts like traditional salvors, it must be given the rights to other
means of obtaining income." Id. at *2.

     In 1998,  when a British Virgin Islands  corporation  headquartered  on the
Isle of Man, Great Britain, began marketing to the public an expedition to visit
the Titanic wreck, which it called "Operation  Titanic," RMST filed a motion for
a more  specific  injunction  to  pre-  vent  that  corporation  as  well as its
principals and customers from vis- iting and  photographing  the wreck site. The
district court issued an expanded  injunction,  enjoining that  corporation,  as
well as its  princi-  pals  and a named  passenger,  from  visiting  a yet  more
generously  defined site in the North Atlantic and from photographing the wreck.
R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 9 F. Supp. 2d 624, 626 (E.D.
Va. 1998).  The court  reasoned that because RMST was not selling the artifacts,
it needed a stream of income,  and the  exclusive  photographic  and  visitation
rights would help insure this  income.  Id. at 635-36.  We reversed  that order,
concluding  that it was beyond the power of the district court and  inconsistent
with salvage law to confer those rights:  "Neither  prohibition  is justified by
the law of salvage or allowed by the law of free  navigation  on the high seas."
R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 970 (4th Cir. 1999). RMST maintains
that this refusal to give it exclusive  visitation and  photographic  rights has
had a  substantial  adverse  impact on its income  stream and has  impaired  its
ability to finance further salvage operations.

     RMST has  continued  to  conduct  salvage  operations  and to  display  the
artifacts  recovered in order to obtain income. In November 1999, the management
of RMST  changed,  and the new  management  articu-  lated a new  business  plan
designed "to maximize shareholder value

                                       5

<PAGE>

while still  protecting the  archeological  and historical  value of the wreck."
While the  financial  strategy of RMST's  previous  manage-  ment had focused on
generating  earnings through the exhibition of artifacts,  RMST's new management
expanded this strategic  plan to include "the possible  disposition of artifacts
to   increase    revenues"    and   thereby   to   maintain    its   status   as
salvor-in-possession.  But these plans were undeveloped, and during a hearing in
March 2000, the new pres- ident of RMST testified before the district court that
RMST had "no plans to sell any portion of the collection."

     Several  months  later,  however,  "it [came] to the attention of the court
that there ha[d] been a change in  management in R.M.S.  Titanic,  Inc. and that
there  [was] a  concern  held by some  persons  and  organizations  that  R.M.S.
Titanic,  Inc.  [was]  considering  disposal of some  artifacts  recovered."  In
response to this  information,  the  district  court issued an order sua sponte,
dated July 28, 2000,  directing RMST "not [to] sell or otherwise  dispose of any
artifacts or any object  recovered  from the wreck site and further that it must
continue to treat and preserve any such artifacts and objects recovered from the
wreck  site." In its order,  the court noted  that"[t]his  court has contin- ued
R.M.S.  Titanic, Inc. as  salvor-in-possession  of the wreck of the Titanic from
year to year on the  understanding  that R.M.S.  Titanic,  Inc.  would treat and
preserve all artifacts  recovered and would exhibit them to the public and would
not sell or dispose of any of said arti- facts."

     In its periodic report to the court several weeks later,  RMST acknowledged
the court's July 2000 order,  stating,  "RMST notes that since it had never sold
any artifacts or objects  recovered from the Titanic  without first advising the
Court (i.e. sales of coal and encum- brance of coins and currencies),  and since
it had advised  the Court  earlier in its July 5, 2000  periodic  report that it
would not cut into the wreck, the only new effect of the [July 28] order was the
prohibition on detaching any part of the wreck."  Consistent with this position,
RMST did not appeal the district court's July 2000 order prohibiting the sale or
dispersion of the artifacts.

     In April 2001, RMST sought a clarification of the July 2000 order to permit
it to sell the coal it had recovered from the wreck.  During the hearing on this
issue, RMST broached, for the first time, plans to

                                       6
<PAGE>

form a new  foundation  which might  "explore  the  acquisition  of the artifact
collections  at some time in the  future."  RMST's  counsel  explained  that the
"desire on the part of [RMST] to explore  transfer . . . raise[d] some questions
.. . . with the [July 2000] order," which had confirmed the  prohibition  against
selling any  artifacts.  On the issue of whether  selling coal -- which RMST had
already  done --  violated  the  court's  orders,  counsel  explained  that coal
recovered from the site was always treated as "organic matter, rather than arti-
facts," and that RMST had always felt free to sell coal. After the court invited
RMST to  submit a  clarifying  order  authorizing  the sale of coal,  the  court
reiterated its position about selling artifacts:

      You have to remember  now that  during the whole time that R.M.S.  Titanic
      has worked with the court,  they have always taken the position  that they
      are not going to sell any arti- facts,  that their purpose in getting them
      is to get them, pre- serve them, and put them on display.

Counsel for RMST confirmed the court's understanding,  stating, "That is exactly
what has been represented to the court. The company has never taken the position
that it wanted to sell the  artifacts."  In  accordance  with the  hearing,  the
district court signed an order dated April 30, 2001, modifying the July 28, 2000
order "to reflect the fact that the Salvor  remains free to sell or encumber any
coal that it has  recovered  or that it might  recover  in the  future  from the
TITANIC wreck site." Again,  RMST did not appeal this  modification  of the July
2000 order.

     Beginning  in July 2001,  RMST's  gently  leaked idea to form a  foundation
became  concrete,  and  RMST  submitted  a  supplemental  report  to the  court,
describing the formation of The Titanic Founda- tion, Inc. and the  Foundation's
interest in purchasing the artifacts from RMST.  Upon receiving the report,  the
district  court  issued  an  order,  again  sua  sponte,  dated  July 31,  2001,
reiterating  that  RMST  could  not  "convey  in any  manner  any of the  R.M.S.
Titanic's arti- facts" until the court had held a full hearing.

     That  hearing was held on  September  24,  2001.  The court then learned in
detail  about  the  formation  of The  Titanic  Foundation  and  noted  that the
principals of RMST and The Titanic Foundation were

                                       7

<PAGE>

the same people,  observing "so it is really a one man show; is that not right?"
The court noted that this might create irreconcilable conflicts of interest with
respect to the  principals'  duties to both the  public  cor-  poration  and the
nonprofit  foundation.  Counsel for RMST explained that the foundation  would be
able to solicit  charitable  contributions  which then could be used to purchase
the  artifacts.  Counsel  justified  the need for the  foundation in part by our
decision in Haver,  in which we denied RMST  exclusive  rights to visit the site
and to photograph the wreck. 171 F.3d at 971. At the hearing, the district court
did not reject the notion that the  collection of artifacts as a whole -- rather
than  piecemeal  -- could  possibly  be sold  pursuant  to an  acceptable  plan,
approved by the court.  But counsel  then  explained a practical  difficulty  in
having to obtain the court's  approval of any such  transfer  of  artifacts.  As
counsel  explained,  approval  "puts the company in a very  awkward  position in
dealing with those who want to acquire col- lections, in that you have to say to
them,  well, do your due diligence,  you go out and get your  appraisal,  you do
everything else that you have to do, and then we as a company will do the things
that we have to do. . . . So it requires  opinions,  various things that have to
be done for due diligence,  and then to the potential acquirer,  we will come to
the  court  and ask for  approval  of  that."  After  the  court  explained  the
difficulty in foregoing  approval,  it stated  that,"[t]here  is no sense in the
court or your taking the time to decide some abstract question.  If you have got
some sort of an agreement or deal worked out, submit that to the court,  and the
court  will say  whether or not it  approves  it."  Following  the  hearing  and
apparently out of concern over the possi- bility that  artifacts  might be sold,
the district court entered another order, dated September 26, 2001, stating:

      The Court FINDS after the  September  24, 2001  hearing  that its previous
      Orders  entered in this case,  designed  to  prevent  sales of  individual
      artifacts recovered from the Wreck of R.M.S. Titanic, were proper and were
      necessary when entered.

Two weeks later, RMST appealed that order. And after RMST appealed the September
26 order,  the district  court  entered  another  order dated  October 19, 2001,
amending the September 26 order, essentially explaining its position, as well as
earlier orders. In its explanation, the court indicated that it first learned in
April 2001 of

                                       8
<PAGE>

the  possibility  that RMST might convey the  collection  and  recognized  "that
circumstances  change and it becomes  necessary to change plans and approaches."
The court invited further motions on the disposition of artifacts. RMST appealed
this October 19, 2001 order as well.

     Because there was no party in opposition to represent the district  court's
position,  this court asked the University of Virginia School of Law's Appellate
Litigation  Clinic to file an amicus brief to serve as the answering  brief. The
clinic did so ably,  and we have  considered  the arguments of both RMST and its
counsel as well as counsel from the clinic.

                                      II

     The  amicus   appropriately   raises  the   question  of  whether  we  have
jurisdiction  to review the  September 26 and October 19, 2001 orders.  RMST has
asserted  jurisdiction  under 28 U.S.C.  S 1292(a)(1)  (autho- rizing appeals of
interlocutory orders "granting,  continuing, modify- ing, refusing or dissolving
injunctions,  or refusing to dissolve or modify  injunctions")  and 28 U.S.C.  S
1292(a)(3) (authorizing appeals of interlocutory decrees "determining the rights
and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases").

     The amicus argues that RMST cannot appeal under S 1292(a)(1)  because:  (1)
RMST consented  earlier to the same order of July 28, 2000, see Haitian  Refugee
Ctr.  v.  Civiletti,  614 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir.  1980);  (2) no factual or legal
change has occurred to justify  appealing an ongoing  injunction  which RMST did
not earlier appeal, see SEC v. Suter, 832 F.2d 988, 990 (7th Cir. 1987); and (3)
the district  court left open  alternative  avenues of relief,  inviting RMST to
submit  a for-  mal  motion  for  approval  of any new  deal.  Also  challenging
jurisdic-  tion under S  1292(a)(3),  the amicus  argues that  Congress  limited
interlocutory review in admiralty cases to interlocutory  decrees that determine
rights and  liabilities,  and it did not grant a right to appeal  every  interim
order.  See Pickle v. Char Lee  Seafood,  Inc.,  174 F.3d 444, 448 n.1 (4th Cir.
1999); Evergreen Int'l (USA) Corp. v. Standard Warehouse,  33 F.3d 420, 425 (4th
Cir. 1994).

     We  agree  with  the  amicus  that  if  RMST is  appealing  orders  under S
1292(a)(1) that simply clarify or interpret earlier orders that it failed

                                       9
<PAGE>

to appeal,  its appeal  rights  would be  forfeited by its failure to appeal the
earlier orders.  See, e.g., Major v. Orthopedic  Equip. Co., 561 F.2d 1112, 1115
(4th  Cir.  1977)  (holding  that  court  lacked  jurisdiction  on  appeal  from
injunction  because  the order was  "simply an  interpreta-  tion" of an earlier
order).  This  principle  is based on the notion that the more  recent  appealed
orders add nothing in substance to earlier orders left unappealed.  If either of
the appealed  orders,  on the other hand,  modifies the  substance of an earlier
order or extends its duration,  the new order is appealable  under S 1292(a)(1).
See, e.g.,  Pickle,  174 F.3d at 448 (finding  appealable an order that denied a
party's request for  modification of an injunction);  Sierra Club v. Marsh,  907
F.2d 210,  213-14 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that an order that extends or prolongs
the restraint  imposed by an earlier  order is  appealable).  Similarly,  if the
factual and legal  circumstances  applicable  to an earlier  order  change,  the
substantive  effect of a restated  injunction may cause it to become appealable.
See, e.g., Suter, 832 F.2d at 990 (suggesting that "changes in fact of law since
[the injunction's] entry" may justify an appeal).

     The question of  jurisdiction  in this case is a close one which RMST could
have made  easier by filing in the  district  court a motion to vacate or modify
the July 28, 2000 injunction, based on the new fac- tual developments.  Although
RMST filed no such motion,  it advances a persuasive  argument that the periodic
reports and hearings prior to the orders  appealed in this case provide  support
for a position  that the  circumstances  had  changed and that,  therefore,  the
September  26 and  October  19,  2001  orders,  which  were  aimed  at  the  new
circumstances, had a new substantive effect.

     As RMST  accurately  points out, the April 2001 periodic  report  indicated
that two organizations  had expressed  interest in purchasing some or all of the
Titanic  artifacts,  The Titanic  Foundation  and the Museums and  Galleries  of
Northern Ireland.  To acquire information about the possible  arrangements,  the
court conducted a hearing on September 24, 2001, where witnesses testified about
the  details of a  potential  artifact  sale to those  entities.  After  hearing
testimony about these new developments,  the district court, sua sponte,  issued
the Sep- tember 26 and October 19, 2001 orders from which RMST appealed.

     RMST  suggests  that not only did the  September  26 and  October  19, 2001
orders focus on the new developments, but in substance they

                                      10
<PAGE>

also extended the scope of the earlier injunctions to cover new cir- cumstances.
It argues that the  district  court itself  observed  that the court had earlier
only prohibited the sale of individual artifacts but had never enjoined the sale
of the artifacts as a  collection.  With its September 26 and October 19 orders,
the court was enjoining any sale of the artifacts "as a group."

     We believe that the new  developments  that  preceded the  September 26 and
October 19 orders were  sufficiently  material as to justify RMST's challenge to
the renewed  injunctions  entered  following  the hearing on September 24, 2001.
While the court may not have explic- itly expanded its earlier  injunctions,  it
acknowledged  that the earlier  injunctions  were  "designed to prevent sales of
individual  artifacts" and that it would consider a modification  of them if the
modification was "designed to keep the recovered and  to-be-recovered  artifacts
together as a group." The court also  acknowledged  that "circum- stances change
and it becomes necessary to change plans and approaches."

     Moreover,  this case presents the rare  circumstance  that might ren- der a
later review of these  interlocutory  orders impossible.  It is unclear how long
the in rem action  will  continue  because it is unclear how long  salvage  will
continue.  It could be years  depending on RMST's  capacity,  will, and diligent
performance  of  salvage  services.   Because  no  final  termination  of  these
proceedings  is  currently  in sight,  RMST  could be left  without a remedy for
challenging the two orders entered in light of the new developments.

     Accordingly,  in the peculiar  circumstances before us, we conclude that we
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1).  We need not,  therefore,  reach
the question of whether this case presents a decree appealable under 28 U.S.C. S
1292(a)(3).

                                      III

     On the merits,  RMST,  relying  heavily on language taken from the district
court's June 7, 1994 order  appointing RMST salvor-in-  possession,  directs our
focus to the district court's  declaration in that order that RMST "is the true,
sole and exclusive  owner of any items  salvaged from the wreck of the defendant
vessel in the past and, so

                                      11
<PAGE>

long as [RMST] remains  salvor-in-possession,  items salvaged in the future, and
is entitled to all salvage rights."  (Emphasis added).  RMST maintains that, for
several reasons, this language confirms that it became the absolute owner of the
artifacts,  free  and  clear,  as they  were  retrieved  from the  Titanic  and,
therefore,  that  it is  entitled  to sell  them,  notwithstanding  its  earlier
expressions to the court of an intent not to sell them.

     Specifically,  RMST  argues  first  that there  were no  "contingencies  or
exceptions" to the district  court's "in specie" award.  Second,  RMST maintains
that the  maritime  law  "does  not  permit a  District  Court  to  impose  such
restrictions on disposition of artifacts,  awarded in specie, for some perceived
public benefit.  These  restrictions  equate to a `taking' of private property."
Third, RMST asserts that the district court had no justification for "converting
statements  by RMST  regarding a business plan into a binding  restriction  upon
disposition of items recovered from the wreck."  Fourth,  RMST observes that the
district  court  speaks only  through its orders and not through its opin- ions,
whether oral or written,  and its June 1994 order  contains no  restrictions  on
disposition.  Fifth,  RMST  argues that the  doctrine  of  judicial  estoppel is
inapplicable to its statements of intent about not selling the artifacts because
it never made misleading statements to the court in order to obtain any benefit.
And  finally,   RMST   contends   that  the   restrictions   are   substantively
"inappropriate"  in view of the public policy behind  salvage law,  arguing that
the restrictions  against resale of the artifacts actually inhibit incentives to
perform salvage operations and that RMST, as a publicly traded company,  "has an
obligation to maximize shareholder value," which should be consid- ered. Indeed,
the adverse effects of the district  court's orders on the continuing  financial
viability  of RMST  runs  throughout  RMST's  arguments  that  the  court  acted
illegally and inappropriately.

     Before addressing RMST's specific  arguments,  it is necessary to set forth
the  relevant  fundamental  principles  of  salvage  law  and to  recognize  the
significance of this case as an in rem proceeding insti- tuted under the salvage
law to enforce RMST's inchoate lien for a sal- vage reward.

                                       A

     A salvor in admiralty is one who voluntarily saves life or property at sea.
Because of the dangers of the sea and the mutual interest of

                                      12

<PAGE>

seamen and seafaring  nations to traverse the sea  notwithstanding  its dangers,
the law of admiralty  for almost 3,000 years has  uniformly  held that those who
voluntarily  come to the  assistance  of fellow sea- men in distress and perform
salvage are  entitled to be  rewarded.  Haver,  171 F.3d at 962;  see  generally
Martin J.  Norris,  3A Benedict on Admiralty  SS 5-13 (7th ed.  1998).  As Chief
Justice  Marshall  elo-  quently  explained,  this is a policy for  seamen,  not
landlubbers:

      If the property of an individual on land be exposed to the greatest peril,
      and be  saved  by the  voluntary  exertions  of any  person  whatever;  if
      valuable goods be rescued from a house in flames,  at the imminent  hazard
      of life by the salvor, no remuneration in the shape of salvage is allowed.
      The act is  highly  meritorious,  and the  service  is as great as if ren-
      dered at sea. Yet the claim for salvage could not, perhaps,  be supported.
      It is certainly not made. Let precisely the same service, at precisely the
      same  hazard,  be rendered at sea, and a very ample award will be bestowed
      in the courts of justice.

Mason v. The Ship  Blaireau,  6 U.S.  (2  Cranch)  240,  266  (1804).  By saving
property at sea, salvors do not become the property's owner;  rather,  they save
it for the  owners and become  entitled  to a reward  from the owner or from his
property. Haver, 171 F.3d at 963; The Amethyst, 1 F. Cas. 762, 764 (D. Me. 1840)
(No.  330)  (stating  that a salvor  stands as a  "voluntary  agent" and thus is
"bound to act for the  interest  of the owner as well as his  own").  The reward
provides an incentive for rendering  salvage service at sea, and courts of admi-
ralty have long enforced claims to this award against  owners.  Mason, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) at 266 (allowing "a very ample  compensation  for those  services,  (one
very much exceeding the mere risk encountered,  and labour employed in effecting
them)"). As one court early explained:

      Salvage,  it is true,  is not a  question  of  compensation  pro  opera et
      labore.  It rises to a higher  dignity.  It takes  its  source in a deeper
      policy.  It combines with private merit and individual  sacrifices  larger
      considerations  of the  public  good,  of  commercial  liberality,  and of
      international justice. It offers, a premium, by way of honorary award, for
      prompt and ready assistance to human sufferings; for a bold and

                                      13

<PAGE>

      fearless  intrepidity;  and for that  affecting  chivalry,  which  forgets
      itself in an anxiety to save property, as well as life.

The Henry Ewbank, 11 F. Cas. 1166, 1170 (D. Mass. 1833) (No.
6,376).

     The  principal  method  of  enforcing  a  salvor's  award  is  through  the
recognition of a salvor's lien in the property saved. The Sabine,  101 U.S. 384,
386 (1879) (explaining that a salvage lien "ordinarily  affords the best mode of
securing  the payment of [a salvor's]  claims");  Haver,  171 F.3d at 963.  This
maritime lien arises from the moment salvage service is performed, United States
v. ZP Chandon,  889 F.2d 233, 237 (9th Cir. 1989),  and, as with any other lien,
secures the payment of the as-yet-to-be-determined salvage award. Such liens are
a temporary  encumbrance of the property saved,  lasting only until payment of a
salvage award can be made. The Everosa, 93 F.2d 732, 735 (1st Cir. 1937).

     Although there are substantive  differences between maritime and common law
liens, see generally Grant Gilmore & Charles Black,  Jr., The Law of Admiralty S
9.1 - 9.2 (2d ed. 1975),  the maritime  lien  enforcement  process -- i.e.,  the
execution of the lien -- parrots the lien foreclosure  process in civil law. The
process  begins when the sal- vor  commences an in rem  proceeding  in admiralty
against the prop- erty.  Fed. R. Civ. P., Supp.  R. C(1)(a)  (stating that "[a]n
action in rem may be brought . . . [t]o  enforce any maritime  lien");  see also
Haver, 171 F.3d at 963;  Treasure  Salvors,  Inc. v. The Unidentified  Wrecked &
Abandoned  Sailing Vessel,  640 F.2d 560, 567 (5th Cir.  1981).  The salvor must
provide notice of the in rem  proceeding to the owner,  other  lienholders,  and
potential  claimants to the property.  Fed. R. Civ. P., Supp. R. C(4) (requiring
public  notice of the action and arrest if the  property  has not been  released
under Rule E).

     If the owner appears and pays the salvage reward  determined by the court,*
the lien is discharged and the owner takes the property
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     *In determining the appropriate award, courts generally rely on the six
factors set out in The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869):

      (1.) The labor expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage
      service. (2.) The promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in ren-

                                      14

<PAGE>

clear of the salvage lien.  Cf.  Ferrous  Financial  Servs.  Co. v. O/S Arc- tic
Producer,  567 F. Supp. 400, 401 (W.D. Wash. 1983) (permitting  judicial sale to
go forward  because  owner was in default  and could not obtain  bond to release
arrested ship).  On the other hand, if the owner does not appear,  then the case
continues as an in rem action,  and the court  determines  the award,  sells the
property,  and,  from the proceeds,  pays the salvor.  Fed. R. Civ. P., Supp. R.
E(9)(c).  Any remainder from the sale is remitted to the owner.  If the owner is
no longer  living,  the court  presumably  pays the excess to the owner's heirs,
and, if there are no heirs, to the state according to its escheat law.

     If the sale of the  salvaged  property  yields too  little to  satisfy  the
salvor's  lien  for a  reward,  then  all of the  proceeds  from the sale of the
salvaged property are paid to the salvor.  Courts have held that an award cannot
exceed the value of the property itself.  Even if it does,  though, in an in rem
proceeding,  there certainly cannot be a defi- ciency judgment against the owner
because the action is against the property and any judgment therefore is limited
to the value of the property. See Allseas Maritime, S.A. v. M/V Mimosa, 812 F.2d
243, 246 (5th Cir.  1987) ("The salvage award is therefore  limited by the value
of the  property  saved  after all of the  appropriate  factors  are taken  into
account"); Lambros Seaplane Base, Inc. v. The Batory, 215 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir.
1954) (concluding that where owner did not appear to claim a salvaged  seaplane,
the owner could not be held per- sonally  liable to the  salvor).  If it becomes
apparent to the court that the proceeds of any sale would  clearly be inadequate
to pay the  salvor  its  full  reward,  then the  court  might,  as a matter  of
discretion,  award the salvor  title to the  property in lieu of the proceeds of
sale,  thus sav- ing the costs of sale. The salvor does not have a direct right,
however, to title in the property. See Platoro Ltd. v. Unidentified Remains, 695
F.2d 893, 903-04 (5th Cir. 1983) ("We cannot find a case where the salvage award
was expressed in terms of the res rather than in dol-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      dering the service and saving the property. (3.) The value of the
      property employed by the salvors in rendering the service, and
      the danger to which such property was exposed. (4.) The risk
      incurred by the salvors in securing the property from the impend-
      ing peril. (5.) The value of the property saved. (6.) The degree
      of danger from which the property was rescued.

                                      15

<PAGE>

lars");  Chance v. Certain  Artifacts Found & Salvaged from The Nash- ville, 606
F. Supp. 801, 808 (S.D. Ga. 1984) (declining "to accept the in specie award as a
valid award in a salvage action"),  aff'd 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir. 1985). Rather,
the  salvor  has only a lien on the prop- erty  which  may,  upon  execution  or
foreclosure  and in the  discretion  of the court,  be  satisfied by the court's
conveying  title to the salvor after the court  determines  that the appropriate
amount of award can- not be satisfied by a sale of the property. Haver, 171 F.3d
at 966.

     Thus,  hypothetically,  if RMST were to recover an  artifact  valued at $50
million (we know, for instance,  that paintings have at times sold for more) and
the court were to determine that the  appropriate  salvage award was $5 million,
the court  could not give the  property to RMST in  satisfaction  of its salvage
lien because the lien exists only to the extent of $5 million. The court instead
would have to sell the property and remit to RMST $5 million from the  proceeds.
On the other hand,  if RMST were to recover an artifact  valued at $2 million (a
historic  vase,  for example) and the court were to determine,  again,  that the
appropriate  salvage award was $5 million, a sale would be useless. In lieu of a
sale to foreclose the salvage  lien,  the court could simply convey title in the
$2 million  vase to RMST,  essentially  pro- viding RMST what is  analogous to a
"deed in lieu of foreclosure."

     Once the lien is executed and the salvor as lienholder is paid its
reward, whether in money or in kind, the reward becomes the prop-
erty of the salvor to do with what it wants. Point Landing Inc. v. Ala-
bama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 261 F.2d 861, 866 (5th Cir.
1958) ("The [judicial] sale cuts off the rights of all non-parties. The
title from the marshal is good against the world.").

     It is critical to note that under  salvage law, the salvor  receives a lien
in the property,  not title to the  property,  and as long as the case remains a
salvage case, the  lienholder  cannot assert a right to title even though he may
end up with title  following  execution or foreclo- sure of the lien. See, e.g.,
The Akaba v. Burg,  54 F. 197, 200 (4th Cir.  1893) ("When  articles are lost at
sea the  title  of the  owner  in them  remains");  see  also  Adams  v.  Unione
Mediterranea di Sicurta,  220 F.3d 659, 670-71 (5th Cir. 2000)  (explaining that
the owner of the sal- vaged goods "does not lose title even though the  property
may become the subject of salvage services," because, through the lien, the

                                      16

<PAGE>

salvor  obtains only a "right of  possession" in the property and not "ownership
or title  to the  salved  property")  (quoting  Benedict  on  Admiralty  S 150);
Treasure  Salvors,  640 F.2d at 567  ("Although  the law of  salvage  grants the
salvor a right to possession  of the property,  the salvage of a vessel or goods
at sea,  even when the goods have been  abandoned,  does not divest the original
owner of title or grant ownership  rights to the salvor");  Continental Ins. Co.
v. The Clayton Hardtop Skiff,  367 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir. 1966) ("The salvor has
the right to salvage but he does not achieve  ownership of the vessel by salving
it");  Chance,  606 F.  Supp.  at 804  (stating  that  "even  though a vessel is
abandoned  without  the hope of  recovery  or  return,  the title of the  vessel
remains in her owner" and "[t]he salvor of property has a right to an award or a
lien  against  the  property"),  aff'd 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir.  1985);  Hener v.
United States,  525 F. Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y.  1981)  (explaining that salvage
law grants the salvor "only a superior right of possession, and not title, until
a court has passed on title and the salvage fee"  (citing The Alaska,  54 F. 197
(4th Cir.  1893));  The Port  Hunter,  6 F. Supp.  1009,  1011 (D.  Mass.  1934)
(stating the salvors have a claim  "paramount  to all others" and the control to
enforce  the  claim,  "[b]ut  `their  interest  in the goods  did not  amount to
ownership.  . . . Th[e] right is merely a lien, a right to retain the goods till
the  salvage be paid'")  (quoting  Whitwell  v.  Wells,  24 Pick  (Mass.) 25, 30
(1834)); The Carl Schurz, 5 F. Cas. 84, 86 (W.D. Tenn. 1879) (No. 2414) (stating
that the salvor "is, to all intents and purposes, a joint owner" of the property
along with the original owner);  The Amethyst,  1 F. Cas. at 763 ("The finder of
property,  left  derelict at sea,  does not acquire the dominion or the absolute
property in what is found.  He acquires  the right of  possession  only,  with a
title to a reasonable reward for his services").

     This principle, while firm in the salvage law, does not mean that a salvage
case could not be converted into a finds case. See Platoro Ltd., 695 F.2d at 904
(noting that  salvage  awards can be made by award of title to the res under the
law of finds);  Treasure  Salvors,  Inc.  v.  Unidentified  Wrecked &  Abandoned
Sailing Vessel,  569 F.2d 330, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1978) (recognizing that title to
lost ships can be divested  from the owner under the law of finds).  Under finds
law, "title to abandoned  property vests in the person who reduces that property
to his or her  possession."  Id. at 337.  Before  such a  conver-  sion is made,
however, the prerequisites for divesting title under the

                                      17

<PAGE>

law of finds must be satisfied. See, e.g.,  Columbus-America  Discovery Group v.
Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450,  464-65 (4th Cir. 1992)  (requiring  clear and
convincing evidence of abandonment before the law of finds is applied).

     Turning to the specifics in the case before us, RMST,  as salvor,  obtained
an  inchoate  lien  in the  artifacts  upon  performing  salvage  ser-  vice  in
connection with the Titanic, and it became entitled to enforce that lien through
the in rem  proceeding  which is now pending before the district  court.  It did
not, however, obtain a lien in any property that it merely discovered; discovery
alone  does not  amount to  salvage  service,  although  it can lead to  salvage
service.  The Sabine,  101 U.S. 384, 384 (1879) (setting out three  requirements
for a  salvage  award:  existence  of a marine  peril,  voluntary  action by the
salvor,  and suc- cessful  salvage).  When RMST performed  salvage service,  the
district court exercised  "constructive"  in rem jurisdiction over the wreck and
declared RMST the sole  salvor-in-possession  of the Titanic. Haver, 171 F.3d at
967. And through that order,  the court gave RMST the exclusive right to salvage
artifacts  from the Titanic and to obtain a reward  through  enforcement  of its
salvor's lien in the artifacts.  If and when RMST abandons its role as salvor or
the court  dispossesses  RMST of that role, the unsalvaged  wreck will remain as
any other  unsalvaged wreck at the bottom of the sea, subject to salvage service
by others.

     Many of these basic principles of salvage and lien law have been overlooked
by RMST in its arguments.  In addition to claiming  title as a  lien-holder,  it
has, for example,  also  extensively  argued that the district court should have
taken into account RMST's financial viabil- ity. But this issue has no relevance
to whether RMST is entitled to enforce its salvage  lien  against the  artifacts
that it salvaged. When RMST voluntarily salvaged property -- even with profit in
mind -- it became entitled only to a  yet-to-be-determined  reward,  enforceable
against the property.  The Camanche, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 448, 475 (1869) (allowing
recovery even by those salvors  "whose  business it is to be always ready and at
command  whenever  assistance is required");  B.V.  Bureau  Wijsmuller v. United
States,  702 F.2d 333, 339 (2d Cir.  1983).  RMST is not entitled to a guarantee
that it remain in  business  as a viable  company to conduct  salvage  services.
Surely if RMST abandoned its efforts, others would take over. In this case,

                                      18

<PAGE>

other potential salvors have unsuccessfully  petitioned the district court to do
exactly that. See R.M.S.  Titanic,  Inc. v. Wrecked & Aban- doned Vessel, 924 F.
Supp. 714 (E.D. Va. 1996) (rejecting claim of potential salvor to rescind RMST's
salvor-in-possession  rights). And if no others were to do so, then the wreck of
the  Titanic  would lie uns-  alvaged as it did for the first 75 years  after it
sank.

     With these  important  principles  in hand,  we now turn to address  RMST's
specific arguments ad seriatim.

                                       B

     The first and most fundamental  issue raised by RMST is the mean- ing to be
given to the district court's June 7, 1994 order. Resting on its contention that
this order gave RMST full,  unrestricted title to the salvaged  artifacts,  RMST
argues as a matter of property law that the court  cannot now reverse  itself to
impose restrictions on the disposi- tion of the artifacts which belong to RMST.

     First, it must be pointed out that the June 1994 order,  drafted by counsel
for RMST, is inherently ambiguous, repeating the language of RMST's complaint in
which it appears that RMST sought both absolute  title in the artifacts  through
the law of finds and salvage  rights  through the law of salvage.  Because  RMST
pursued  only sal- vage rights and the court only  declared  it a salvor,  not a
finder,  any  suggestion  that it obtained  title to the wreck of the Titanic is
mis-  placed.  Yet, the order  submitted  to give RMST salvage  rights uses both
salvage language and finds language. It says:

      The court FINDS AND ORDERS that R.M.S. Titanic, Inc.
      is the salvor-in-possession of the wreck and wreck site of
      the R.M.S. Titanic, including without limitation the hull,
      machinery, engine, tackle, apparel, appurtenances, contents
      and cargo, and that R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. is the true, sole and
      exclusive owner of any items salvaged from the wreck of
      the defendant vessel in the past and, so long as R.M.S.
      Titanic, Inc. remains salvor in possession, items salvaged in
      the future, and is entitled to all salvage rights, and that
      default judgment is entered against all potential claimants
      who have not yet filed claims and such claims are therefore

                                      19

<PAGE>

      barred and precluded so long as R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. remains
      salvor in possession, and the Court accordingly enters judg-
      ment in favor of R.M.S. Titanic, Inc.

Just as this order gives property rights, it also takes them away. It appears to
give  ownership of the artifacts to RMST -- declaring  RMST the "true,  sole and
exclusive  owner" -- but then in the same sentence states that RMST "is entitled
to all salvage rights" as long as it maintains its role as salvor.  Indeed,  the
lead-in to the same sen- tence also states that RMST is the salvor-in-possession
-- not the  finder -- of the wreck and the  wreck  site.  Because  the court was
clearly  applying  the law of  salvage  and not the law of finds,  it could only
convey possession, not title. Haver, 171 F.3d at 961-62.

     Moreover,  contemporaneously with entry of the June 1994 order, the parties
expressed  their  unequivocal  intent that  RMST's  role be that of salvor,  not
finder.  And RMST has never argued that the Titanic had been  abandoned and that
it was entitled to full title to the entire ship and the  artifacts  from it, as
would be required if this case progressed  under the law of finds.  See Fairport
Int'l Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel, 177 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. 1999)
(explaining  that under law of finds,  claimant  must show that the property has
been  abandoned  and that courts apply a  presumption  against  abandon-  ment);
Columbus-America,  974 F.2d at 461, 464-65 (explaining that, in maritime law, "a
strong  actus  element  [is]   required  to  prove  the  necessary   intent"  of
abandonment,  such as express  declaration aban- doning title).  RMST's position
that it was only the salvor is consistent with admiralty law's strong preference
for recognizing persons who discover wrecks as salvors rather than finders.  See
Haver, 171 F.3d at 961; Columbus-America, 974 F.2d at 464 (explaining that "when
sunken  ships or their cargo are  rescued  from the bottom of the ocean by those
other than the owners,  courts favor  applying the law of sal- vage over the law
of finds").

     Also  contemporaneous  with the entry of the June 1994 order,  the district
court and RMST understood the order's language to give RMST exclusive possession
of the  artifacts  to permit RMST to earn money  through the  exhibition  of the
artifacts as an interim  advance to fund  further  salvage  efforts.  But it was
clear that RMST was not authorized to sell the artifacts.  At the hearing before
entry of the June

                                      20
<PAGE>

1994  order,  the  court  sought  reconfirmation  from  RMST that it had in fact
advised the court of its  "intention to display  these  artifacts and to try and
get [its] money back out of admissions  to the display  rather than selling them
off. Is that still the intention of the Titanic people?" Counsel for RMST stated
unequivocally,  "Yes,  sir,  Your  Honor." Co-  counsel for RMST then  explained
further "that the 1987  artifacts and the 1993  artifacts  will not be sold, but
rather will be exhibited."

     But of overarching importance to the party's contemporaneous  understanding
of the June 1994 order was the nature and status of the court proceedings.  RMST
had filed an in rem action  against the Titanic to enforce its salvage lien. The
fact that no  claimants  appeared  -- other  than an  insurance  company,  which
settled -- does not mean that RMST's lien in the artifacts  automatically became
converted  to title to the  artifacts.  RMST must  first  complete  the  salvage
service  that it intends to perform  and have its reward  determined,  unless it
intends to seek periodic awards. Only after its reward is determined can it seek
to enforce the lien against the artifacts themselves.

     Yet  none  of  these  necessary  steps  had  taken  place  as of  1994.  No
determination  of a reward had been made;  no one had  submitted an appraisal of
the  artifacts  or  testified  that  sale  of the  artifacts  would  produce  an
inadequate sum to satisfy the lien. The determination of the reward itself is an
involved process that encompasses evaluation of the salvage services in light of
the Blackwall factors.  See, e.g.,  Margate Shipping Co. v. M/V JA Orgeron,  143
F.3d 976,  984-85 (5th Cir.  1998)  (describing  the  extensive  district  court
process of evaluat-  ing  Blackwall  factors).  Thus,  at the early stage of the
proceedings in 1994,  the court could only have given RMST exclusive  possession
of the artifacts pending further necessary proceedings.

     But even if this  understanding  was not apparent to RMST, the court's July
28, 2000 order made it apparent.  That order, confirming what the court believed
about its June 1994 order,  categorically  pro- hibited the sale of artifacts as
follows:

      This court has continued RMS TITANIC, Inc. as salvor in
      possession of the wreck of the TITANIC from year to year
      on the understanding that RMS TITANIC, Inc. would treat
      and preserve all artifacts recovered and would exhibit them

                                      21
<PAGE>

      to the public and would not sell or dispose of any of said
      artifacts. . . .

      It has come to the  attention of the court that there has been a change of
      management  in RMS TITANIC,  Inc. and that there is a concern held by some
      persons and organizations that RMS TITANIC,  Inc. is considering  disposal
      of some of the artifacts recovered. . . .

      It is ORDERED that RMS TITANIC,  Inc. and any of its employees,  agents or
      subcontractors may not sell or other- wise dispose of any artifacts or any
      object  recovered  from the TITANIC  wreck site and  further  that it must
      continue to treat and  preserve any such  artifacts  or objects  recovered
      from the wreck site.

No one  suggests  that this July 2000 order did not  unequivocally  restate that
RMST was still the  appointed  salvor and confirm that it was not  authorized to
"sell or dispose of any of said  artifacts."  More- over,  when,  in April 2001,
RMST proposed an amendment to the July 2000 order to permit the sale of coal, an
amendment to which the court agreed, RMST agreed with the court's interpretation
of its June 1994 order.  During the  hearing  that led to entry of the April 30,
2001 order  permitting  the sale of coal,  the court also  stated that "[i]t had
earlier in 1994 issued an order awarding R.M.S.  Titanic  salvor-in-  possession
status,  and that was based in part upon the  understanding,  I believe,  of the
court that the company intended to conserve and exhibit artifacts recovered from
the wreck site."

     Moreover,  RMST  never  took  issue  with the  court's  clarifications  and
interpretations  of the June 1994  order  made in the July  2000 and April  2001
orders.  It did not appeal either order.  Any question  about what the June 1994
order meant, therefore,  was answered by the court's unappealed July 2000 order,
as restated in the court's April 2001 order.  Now, some 18 months after entry of
the July 2000  order,  RMST is simply not free to reargue  that  order,  nor the
April 2001 order.

     In  sum,  while  the  language  of  the  June  1994  order  declaring  RMST
salvor-in-possession may have been ambiguous with respect to own-

                                      22
<PAGE>

ership of the artifacts, the contemporaneous understanding between the court and
RMST at least put in doubt any claim to absolute own- ership.  More importantly,
the court could not  legally  have  awarded  title to the  artifacts  to enforce
RMST's  salvage  lien until the amount of the lien was  decided and the value of
the artifacts determined or evidence taken that the sale would produce less than
the amount of the lien. As everyone  understood,  these  determinations  had not
been made. Finally, the court construed its June 1994 order by its July 2000 and
April 2001 orders,  interpretations  with which RMST agreed and which it did not
appeal.  Accordingly,  we will not now permit  RMST to take a few words from the
June 1994 order out of their  context -- both the  context of that order and the
context of the legal  proceedings -- to claim that it was granted absolute title
to the artifacts at that time.

                                       C

     The remaining  arguments do not require much discussion because they depend
on RMST's  reading  of the June 1994  order as giving it  absolute  title to the
artifacts as they were removed from the Titanic.

     RMST's  position  that once it was awarded the  artifacts  "in specie," the
district court was not free to restrict the  disposition of the property and any
such  restriction  amounted to a "taking of private  property"  may be a tenable
position.  But as  pointed  out  above,  the  district  court did not award RMST
absolute  title in the property,  nor could it have in the  circumstances.  As a
condition  to such an  award  in a  salvage  proceeding,  it  would  have had to
complete  execution or foreclosure of RMST's salvor's lien.  Indeed,  the reward
secured by the  salvor's  lien had not yet been  determined.  Accordingly,  this
argument, while probably correct as an abstract statement, is irrelevant to what
occurred in these proceedings.

     Similarly,  RMST  may  have a valid  point  when  it  asserts  that  RMST's
expression of business  plans cannot be converted to restric-  tions on property
awarded to it as its reward.  But again, this position is irrelevant  because it
assumes incorrectly that RMST had full title to the artifacts.

     On another argument, RMST asserts correctly that its expression of business
plans cannot form the basis for application of the doctrine of

                                      23

<PAGE>

judicial estoppel. See generally King v. Herbert J. Thomas Mem'l Hosp., 159 F.3d
192,  196-97 (4th Cir. 1998);  Lowery v. Stovall,  92 F.3d 219, 223-24 (4th Cir.
1996).  In  making  this  argument,  however,  RMST  assumed  that it owned  the
artifacts and that judicial estoppel should not improperly be applied to deny it
ownership.  Again,  this  position is only  hypothetical  in the context of this
case.

     Finally,  RMST argues that restrictions now in place that prohibit the sale
and distribution of the artifacts are substantively  "inappropri- ate." But this
argument  is also made in the  context  of RMST's  posi-  tion that it owned the
artifacts.  When  it is  acknowledged  that  the  district  court  had  not  yet
determined  RMST's reward and had not yet executed RMST's salvor's lien, it must
also be  recognized  that the  property  at this  stage was in  custodia  legis,
pending further  proceed- ings, even though RMST had physical  possession of the
property.  If the court in its  discretion  had  determined  that it would await
comple- tion of RMST's salvage  services before  determining an award, the court
would not have acted  inappropriately.  Maintaining  the  artifacts  in a single
collection  accommodates the possibility that their value in any subsequent sale
might be greater in a collection  than in pieces.  On the other hand,  the court
would  not need to await  completion  of  RMST's  salvage  services  as it could
determine awards on a periodic basis. See, e.g., Cobb Coin Co. v.  Unidentified,
Wrecked & Aban- doned Sailing  Vessel,  549 F. Supp.  540, 561 (S.D.  Fla. 1982)
(retain-  ing  jurisdiction  in ongoing  salvage  effort  "[t]o  adjudicate  the
plaintiff's  claim to a salvage  award on a periodic  basis" and  requiring  the
salvor to file periodic  reports that  "catalogu[e]  the artifacts  saved in the
previous  calendar year" in order to determine each  individual  award).  At the
most recent  hearing  conducted  by the district  court in this case,  the court
expressed a willingness to consider a proposal to sell the artifacts,  objecting
only to deciding  this  question in the  abstract.  It invited RMST to submit an
appropriate proposal.  But, as of now, pending further decisions by the district
court,  RMST has not demonstrated that maintaining the artifacts as a collection
is inappro- priate or illegal. Indeed, in the end, RMST's lien might become more
readily satisfiable by maintaining the artifacts as a collection at this time.

     The Titanic was a historic ship, and the artifacts recovered from its
wreckage therefore have enhanced value. RMST currently has a

                                      24
<PAGE>

unique role as the Titanic's  exclusive  salvor,  and, having performed  salvage
services, it has a lien in the artifacts and is entitled to a reward enforceable
against those artifacts.  At this stage of the proceedings,  however,  we cannot
conclude that RMST has title to any artifacts.  We also cannot conclude that the
course  that the  district  court is  pursuing  violates  the law of  salvage or
amounts  to an abuse of  discretion.  Accordingly,  the  orders of the  district
court, dated September 26, 2001, and October 19, 2001, are affirmed.

                                                                        AFFIRMED

                                      25

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