Document:

exv4w1w1

 

Exhibit 4.1.1

AMENDMENT TO THE CNH GLOBAL N.V.

OUTSIDE DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION PLAN

     This Amendment to the Outside Directors’ Compensation Plan (the “Plan”) which was last amended
and restated as of May 8, 2003 is hereby made effective as of April 26, 2004 following approval by
the shareholders of CNH Global N.V. The Plan is hereby amended as follows:

	 	1.  	The last sentence of Section 1(c) of the Plan is hereby amended and restated
to read as follows: Such payment will be made at the earliest possible date after the
end of the Plan Year Quarter in which the relevant meeting(s) was/were attended.
	 
	 	2.  	Appendix A of the Plan is hereby amended and restated in its entirety and the
Appendix A attached hereto is hereby substituted for the Appendix A previously
attached to the Plan.

 

 

Appendix A – Schedule of Outside Directors’ Compensation

	 	 	 	 	 
	Annual Fees (1):
	 	 	 	 
	• Outside Director serving as Chairman of the Board
	 	$	150,000	 
	• Each other Outside Director
	 	$	40,000	 
	• Annual Committee Chair fee:
	 	$	5,000	 
	 
	 	 	 	 
	Meeting Fees (2):
	 	 	 	 
	• Board meeting fee: (for each meeting attended)
	 	$	1,250	 
	• Committee meeting fee: (for each meeting attended)
	 	$	1,250	 

			
	 	 	 
	Annual Automatic Stock Option Grant:
	 	4,000 stock options

	(1)	 	Payable each Plan Year Quarter in Common Shares unless otherwise elected (cash or stock
options).
	 
	(2)	 	Payable only in cash as soon as possible after the end of each Plan Year Quarter.

At the beginning of the Fifth Plan Year in May 2003, any eligible Outside Director will be entitled
to receive a one-time grant of an amount of stock options equal to 20% of the Annual Automatic
Stock Options and 15% of the Elective Stock Options he or she has been granted prior to May 6,
2002.exv4w2w1

 

EXHIBIT 4.2.1

2004

LONG TERM

INCENTIVE

PLAN

 

 

2004 Long Term Incentive Plan (LTI)

CNH Global N.V. (the “Company”) is providing a performance based long term incentive plan to
selected individuals of the Company and its affiliates. The provisions of the long term incentive
plan (the” Plan”) are specified in this document. The equity portion of the award payout, under
the Plan is offered under and governed by the CNH Global N.V. Equity Incentive Plan, (as amended
and restated on July 23, 2001).

2004 Program Highlights:

	 	•  	3-year performance cycle plan, rolling cycle each year. Results after cumulative
3-year period determine incentive payout. For 2004 plan: performance cycle is:
2004-2006.
	 
	 	•  	Performance criteria set for the 3-year cycle. New performance criteria can be set for
each new cycle. For the 2004 plan: Cumulative operating margin % (operating income/net
revenue) of CNH’s 2004-2006 fiscal years.
	 
	 	•  	Thresholds, target and maximum company results determine levels of payout. For the
2004 Plan, Target is set at 100% of Strategic Business Plan. Threshold at 90% of targeted
results. Maximum at 115% of targeted results.
	 
	 	•  	Threshold results (90% of target) must be achieved for any payout.
	 
	 	•  	All selected participants will be individually notified of their threshold, target and
maximum incentive award opportunities.
	 
	 	•  	The company’s performance must meet the threshold requirements under the CNH
Performance Management System annual bonus plan for 2 out of 3 years of the performance
cycle for any payout under the long term incentive plan.
	 
	 	•  	Participants must earn an annual Performance Bonus for 2 out of 3 years of the
performance cycle to be eligible for their payout opportunity under the long term
incentive plan.
	 
	 	•  	Individual Award opportunities will be set at the beginning of the cycle and will be
set 50% in cash and 50% in shares.

2          

 

 

	 	•  	Payout is after the results of the 3rd year of the cycle have been announced
and annual performance assessment completed. Payout for the 2004 LTI plan: by
1st half of 2007.
	 
	 	•  	For the 2004 LTI plan, an accelerated timing for 50% of the payout will be possible, if
the targeted operating margin % for the cumulative 2 years, 2004-2005 is achieved.
	 
	 	•  	If the criteria for accelerated payout are met, participants are eligible, if they
earned an annual Performance Bonus for both the 2004 & 2005 plan years.
	 
	 	•  	Any accelerated payouts will be paid after the 2005 results are announced and the
annual performance assessment completed by 1st half of 2006.

How the Program Works: 

2004 Plan Year:

Each year a new performance cycle under the Long Term Incentive Plan (LTI) will be in effect when
and as announced.

The 3-year performance cycle period for the 2004 LTI plan is defined as the period January
1st 2004 to December 31st 2006.

Eligibility:

For the purpose of the LTI plan, participants will be individually notified of their participation
in the plan. For each new performance cycle, participants will again be individually notified.
Participation in one year’s LTI plan does not entitle participation in subsequent years’ LTI plan.

Selected participants’ signature will be required on individual award letters for official
acceptance of the award and terms. Acceptance of the Award Letters terms and conditions will be
required each of every year the individual is selected to participate in a new 3 year performance
cycle.

Selected participants must be on the payroll at the date of payment and not on notice, except in
the case of involuntary layoff, retirement, approved leave of absence or death after the plan year
ends on December 31, 2006. In the case of accelerated payout, eligible participants must be on the
payroll at the date of payment and not on notice with no exceptions.

3          

 

 

2004 LTI Performance Criteria:

KPI: Cumulative Operating Margin %.

The CNH consolidated operating margin % of the cumulative three fiscal years, 2004-2006, as
measured under International Accounting Standards (IAS) and as applied by CNH is the performance
criterion for the 2004 LTI plan.

Operating margin % is the percentage of Operating Income to Net Revenue. The targeted 3 year
cumulative operating income is 5.3%, as illustrated below:

2004 Performance Cycle: 2004-2006

[Chart showing targets]

Thresholds

A threshold of 90% of the targeted cumulative operating margin % for the 3-year period is required
for any payout under the plan. The 2004 Plan threshold is 4.8% operating margin, 90% of the
targeted 5.3% operating margin.

An additional threshold required is that the criteria for the annual bonus under the CNH
Performance Management System must be achieved in 2 of the 3 bonus plan years during the LTI
performance cycle before any LTI payout is earned.

Also, individuals must achieve a performance bonus in 2 of the 3 years to be eligible to receive
any payout under the LTI plan. A performance bonus is one under the following CNH performance
bonus plans: the Performance Management System Bonus Plan, the Sales Incentive Plan and Capital
Incentive Plan. Payments made under any Special Award plans will not satisfy this criterion of the
2004 LTI plan.

4          

 

 

2004 LTI Payout Opportunity

If the performance criteria are met as set forth in this Plan document, the eligible participants
will have a range of incentive opportunity defined by Threshold, Target, and Maximum levels.

The individual award letters will indicate the participants’ incentive award opportunities for
Threshold, Target and Maximum levels of company results. Should actual results fall in between the
threshold, target and maximum levels, the payout amount will be interpolated.

Any awards to be paid out will typically be made in 50% cash and 50% Company shares. The cash and
number of shares opportunity will be set at the beginning of the performance cycle and included in
the award letter.

The total award is based on a percentage of annual base salary. For the 2004 LTI plan year,
December 31, 2003 annual base pay will be used to set the cash and shares awards. The fair market
value of the Company shares on the day of the grant will be used to determine the number of shares
for the 50% portion to be awarded in shares.

The cash and share award will not be issued to the participants until the performance criteria have
been met at the end of the performance cycle. Any payout for the 2004 LTI plan will be made by the
1st half of 2007. During the performance cycle period, there is no ownership rights to
the shares, meaning no dividends or voting rights apply to the award until the shares are issued to
the individuals.

In most countries, both the cash and share award are considered compensation income at the time the
award is issued. The employee is subject to income and social security taxes. The Company will be
required to withhold all applicable taxes and social contributions from the employees’ pay.

Once the shares are issued, there are no Company restrictions on the shares for the individuals.
However, the Company’s insider trading policy applies to any shares issued under the Plan.

5          

 

 

Transitional Payout Opportunity

Given the transition to a new equity incentive plan which requires a 3-year time frame before a
payout is earned, for the 2004 LTI plan year, accelerated timing for a partial payout may occur
under certain conditions. The accelerated timing is after the 2005 results and 50% of the total
award may be payable, if the following conditions are met:

	 	•  	The targeted operating margin % for the cumulative 1st 2 years of the performance
cycle is met. Cumulative operating margin % for 2004-2005 is 4.7%.
	 
	 	•  	The criteria for payout under the Performance Management System annual bonus plan
is met for both plan years 2004 and 2005.
	 
	 	•  	Individuals are eligible for an accelerated payout only if they earned a
performance bonus in both 2004 and 2005 plan years.

Any payout of the remainder of the 2004 LTI performance award will follow the plan provisions as
specified in this plan document.

Final Benefit Determination:

All benefits granted under this plan are subject to the final approval of the CNH Global N.V. Board
of Directors, Nominating and Compensation Committee, in its sole discretion. The Compensation
Committee also reserves the right to amend, suspend or terminate any or all provisions of the plan
for the future plan years within the sole discretion of the Board or Compensation Committee.

The Compensation Committee or the Board has the authority in its sole discretion to deny any or all
payments, even if the company targets were met, based upon consideration of factors of such gravity
which would adversely affect the financial stability or the future viability of the company.

6          

 

 

2004 Long Term Incentive Plan Illustrations

The following pages step through 2 examples of 2 consecutive performance cycles, from Criteria
Selection, to Objective Setting, to Actual Results through to the Payout Determination.

For the 2 examples, the Criteria Selection and the Objective Setting use identical assumptions.
The 3-Year Cumulative Operating Margin % is the criterion used for both the 1st and
2nd performance cycles.

Also, the examples assume 85% of the operating income $ target is the annual bonus threshold. The
annual bonus plan has separate criteria, objectives and thresholds from the LTI plan. These
examples are illustrative only. The annual bonus plan will be announced separately.

For the Actual Results, the 2 examples differ

	•  	Example 1: Great 1st year, Poor 2nd and 3rd year

	 	•  	This example will show no payout was met

	•  	Example 2: Great 1st year, average 2nd year and poor 3rd year

	 	•  	Shows the 1st cycle results earned a payout
	 
	 	•  	Shows the impact of the 1st cycle’s performance on the 2nd cycle
	 
	 	•  	Illustrates how the full Individual Payout is Determined based on the 1st
cycle results
	 
	 	•  	Shows the Transition Payout conditions are achieved
	 
	 	•  	Illustrates an Individual’s Transition Payout

These examples are purely illustrative, including the 2nd cycle criteria selection
and objective setting. For each new cycle, new criteria and/or objectives may be set.

7          

 

 

     Illustration: 

Criteria Selection:

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	1st
Cycle
	 	Perf cycle 2004-2006	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	4
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	2004	 	 	2005	 	 	2006	 	 	3 yr cum	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	Target Goal:
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Revenue $
	 	 	10,219	 	 	 	10,779	 	 	 	11,049	 	 	 	32,047	 
	Operating
Income $
	 	 	399	 	 	 	587	 	 	 	724	 	 	 	1,710	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Operating Margin %
	 	 	3.9	%	 	 	5.4	%	 	 	6.6	%	 	 	5.3	%
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	2nd
Cycle
	 	Perf cycle 2005-2007	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	4
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	2005	 	 	2006	 	 	2007	 	 	3 yr cum	 
	 	 	 
	Target Goal:
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Revenue $
	 	 	10,779	 	 	 	11,049	 	 	 	11500	 	 	 	33,328	 
	Operating
Income $
	 	 	587	 	 	 	724	 	 	 	850	 	 	 	2,161	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Operating Margin %
	 	 	5.4	%	 	 	6.6	%	 	 	7.4	%	 	 	6.5	%
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 

Operating Margin % for the 2nd Performance Cycle is illustrative. Each year, the
new performance cycle criteria may change.

Objective Setting:

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	LTI Objectives	 
	 	 	 	 	 	Threshold	 	 	 	 	 	Maximum	 
	 	 	Expected Results	 	(-10%)	 	 	Target (-)	 	 	(+15%)	 
	 	 	 
	1st Cycle
	 	Cum. Operating Margin %	 	 	4.8	%	 	 	5.3	%	 	 	6.1	%
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	2nd Cycle
	 	Cum. Operating Margin %	 	 	5.8	%	 	 	6.5	%	 	 	7.5	%

8          

 

 

	 	 	 	 	 
	Example 1 — Actual Results:

Great 1st year, Poor 2nd and 3rd year
	 	 
	 	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	2004	 	 	2005	 	 	2006	 	 	3 yr cum	 	 	Threshold	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	CNH Actual Results:
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Revenue $
	 	 	9,000	 	 	 	10,000	 	 	 	11,000	 	 	 	30,000	 	 	 	 	 
	Operating
Income $
	 	 	600	 	 	 	300	 	 	 	579	 	 	 	1,479	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Operating Margin %
	 	 	6.7	%	 	 	3.0	%	 	 	5.3	%	 	 	4.9	%	 	 	4.8	%
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	% of annual operating
income
budget achieved
	 	 	150	%	 	 	51	%	 	 	80	%	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Annual Bonus Payout
	 	Yes	 	No	 	No	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 

	 	•  	Even though the LTI Threshold is met (4.9% vs. 4.8%), NO LTI PAYOUT since 2 out of 3
annual bonus not met.
	 
	 	•  	In addition, the 2nd plan cycle will not have a payout because of not meeting annual bonus
criteria for payout in years 2005 & 2006.
	 
	 	•  	The additional threshold of annual bonus result is ensuring continuous focus after an
outstanding 1st year.

9          

 

 

	 	 	 
	Example 2 — Actual Results:
	 	 
	Great 1st Year, acceptable 2nd Year, and poor 3rd Year
	 	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	1st
cycle
	 	Perf cycle 2004-2006	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	4
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	2004	 	 	2005	 	 	2006	 	 	3 yr cum	 	 	Threshold	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	CNH Actual Results:
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Revenue $
	 	 	9,000	 	 	 	10,000	 	 	 	11,000	 	 	 	30,000	 	 	 	 	 
	Operating
Income $
	 	 	600	 	 	 	499	 	 	 	362	 	 	 	1,461	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Operating Margin %
	 	 	6.7	%	 	 	5.0	%	 	 	3.3	%	 	 	4.9	%	 	 	4.8	%
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Annual Bonus Payout
	 	Yes	 	Yes	 	No	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 

	 	•  	LTI PAYOUT since 2 out of 3 annual bonus met and LTI
threshold met (4.9% vs. 4.8%)
	 
	 	•  	Impact on next cycle shown on the next slide.

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	2nd
cycle
	 	Perf cycle 2005-2007	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	4
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	2005	 	 	2006	 	 	2007	 	 	3 yr cum	 	 	Threshold	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	CNH Actual Results:
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Revenue $
	 	 	10,000	 	 	 	11,000	 	 	 	11,500	 	 	 	32,500	 	 	 	 	 
	Operating
Income $
	 	 	499	 	 	 	362	 	 	 	850	 	 	 	1,711	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Operating Margin %
	 	 	5.0	%	 	 	3.3	%	 	 	7.4	%	 	 	5.3	%	 	 	5.8	%
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Annual Bonus Payout
	 	Yes	 	No	 	Yes	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 

	 	•  	NO LTI PAYOUT because LTI threshold not met (5.3% vs. 5.8%)
	 
	 	•  	This example used to illustrate that relaxing after a strong year in one cycle may
jeopardize the next cycle’s payout chances.
	 

10          

 

 

     Payout Determination:

	 	 	 	 	 
	Employee A:
	 	 	 	 
	Base Salary at 12/31/03
	 	$	150,000	 
	Share Price at Grant:
	 	$	17.00	 
	Share Price at Issue Date:
	 	$	22.00	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Threshold	 	Target	 	Maximum	 	Actual
	Operating Margin:

	 	 	 	 	 	 	4.8	%	 	 	5.3	%	 	 	6.1	%	 	 	4.9	%
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Award Opportunity:
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Total Award at grant

	 	% of Base
Pay
	 	 	12.0	%	 	 	20.0	%	 	 	30.0	%	 	 	13.6	%
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Total Award at grant

	 	$ equivalent
	 	$	18,000	 	 	$	30,000	 	 	$	45,000	 	 	$	20,400	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Cash Award

	 	 	50%	 	$	9,000	 	 	$	15,000	 	 	$	22,500	 	 	$	10,200	 
	Shares Award

	 	 	50%	 	 	529	 	 	 	882	 	 	 	1,324	 	 	 	600	 
	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 

Notes:

	 
	 	   	The award is interpolated between the Threshold and Target Level.
	 
	 	   	The Shares Award is set at grant date and has both risk and opportunity in terms of intrinsic value.

Memo: Total Award at date issued — $equivalent (for the example of $22/share ):                    $23,400

($10,200 cash award
+ 600 shares award X $22/share)

11          

 

 

     Transition Payout:

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	Perf cycle 2004-2006
	 	 	 	 	4

	 	 	 	 
	 	 	2004	 	 	2005	 	 	2005 cum	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	Target Goal:
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Revenue $
	 	 	10,219	 	 	 	10,779	 	 	 	20,998	 
	Operating
Income $
	 	 	399	 	 	 	587	 	 	 	986	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Operating Margin %
	 	 	3.9	%	 	 	5.4	%	 	 	4.70	%
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	2004	 	 	2005	 	 	2005 cum	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	CNH Actual Results:
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Revenue $
	 	 	9,000	 	 	 	10,000	 	 	 	19,000	 
	Operating
Income $
	 	 	600	 	 	 	499	 	 	 	1,099	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Operating Margin %
	 	 	6.7	%	 	 	5.0	%	 	 	5.79	%
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Annual Bonus Payout
	 	Yes	 	Yes	 	 	 	 

	 	•  	The 2004-2005 cumulative operating margin % % target is 4.7%
	 
	 	•  	The actual result is 5.79%, which is greater than the target; therefore, the first
condition for an LTI transition payout is met.
	 
	 	•  	The annual bonus plan had a payout in both 2004 and 2005, meeting the second condition
for an LTI transition payout.
	 

12          

 

 

	 	 	 	 	 
	Accelerated Payout

Opportunity:

	 	 
	 	 

	 	 	 	 	 
	Employee A:
	 	 	 	 
	Base Salary at 12/31/03
	 	$	150,000	 
	Share Price at Grant:
	 	$	17.00	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Accelerated	 
	 	 	Target	 	 	Payout	 
	Award Opportunity:
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	
Total Award at grant
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	— % of Base Pay
	 	 	20.0	%	 	 	 	 
	— $ equivalent
	 	$	30,000	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Cash Award
	 	$	15,000	 	 	$	7,500	 
	Shares Award
	 	 	882	 	 	 	441	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 

	•  	The Shares Award is set at grant date and has both risk and opportunity in terms of
intrinsic value.
	 
	•  	The remainder of the Total Award Opportunity pays according to the LTI Plan rules after
the 3rd year results are known.
	 
	•  	The Transition payment is an acceleration of 50% of the 1st performance cycle’s total
award opportunity at target. It is not in addition to the full award opportunity.

In our example we had previously seen ahead that the total payout was $10,200 in cash and 600
in shares. After the transitional payment in 2006 of $7,500 in cash and 441 shares, the
remaining award payout from our example would be paid in 2007 for $2,700 in cash and 159
shares.

In 2008 and each year after, provided the LTI plan remains in effect, the full award
opportunity has the potential to payout for those selected to participate.

13          

 

 

CNH GLOBAL N.V. EQUITY INCENTIVE PLAN

Performance Unit Award Agreement

     THIS AWARD AGREEMENT entered into as of the            day of      , by and between CNH
Global N.V. (the “Company”), and                                         (the “Participant”).

WITNESSETH:

     WHEREAS the Company maintains the CNH Global N.V. Equity Incentive Plan (the “Plan”) for the
benefit of eligible employees; and

     WHEREAS pursuant to the authority vested in it under the Plan, the Nominating and Compensation
Committee of the Board of Directors of the Company (the “Committee”), has approved the granting of
this Award to the Participant;

     NOW, THEREFORE, the Company and the Participant agree as follows:

1. Award of Performance Units

     (a) Share Units. Subject to the terms of this Agreement and the Plan, the Participant
is hereby awarded Performance Units under the Plan in an amount specified and determined pursuant
to Schedule 1 of this Agreement. Subject to paragraph 3 below, each Performance Unit under this
Section 1(a) shall entitle the Participant to a Common Share of the Company on the Settlement Date
for that Performance Unit, as provided in paragraph 4 below.

     (b) Cash Units. Subject to the terms of this Agreement and the Plan, the Participant
is hereby awarded Performance Units under the Plan in an amount specified and determined pursuant
to Schedule 1 of this Agreement. Subject to paragraph 3 below, each Performance Unit under this
Section 1(b) shall entitle the Participant to a cash payment on the Settlement Date for that
Performance Unit at $ 1.00 per Performance Unit, as provided in paragraph 4 below.

2. Vesting of Awards

     Unless forfeited earlier under paragraph 3 below, a percentage of the Performance Units
awarded in paragraph 1 above shall vest upon the Settlement Date (as defined in Section 4 below).

     In the event of the Participant’s death, Total Disability (as defined below) or other approved
leave of absence retirement, or involuntary layoff after December 31, 2006, the Participant shall
vest in the Performance Units awarded according to this Award Agreement. Upon a change in control
(as determined by the Committee) after December

 

 

31, 2006, the Participant shall vest in the Performance Units awarded according to the
provisions of this Award Agreement.

     “Total Disability” means, as determined in good faith by the Company, the permanent inability
of the Participant, which is as a result of accident or sickness, to perform such Participant’s
occupation or employment for which the Participant is suited by reason of the Participant’s
previous training, education and experience and which results in the termination of the
Participant’s employment.

3. Forfeiture of Performance Units

     All Performance Units that have not previously vested shall be forfeited on the earlier to
occur of the following dates:

	 	(a)  	June 30, 2007; or
	 
	 	(b)  	the day following the Participant’s termination of employment with the
Company for any reason, except as provided in Section 2 of this Agreement; or
	 
	 	(c)  	upon the date the Company determines the objectives set forth on Schedule 1
and 2 are not met.

4. Settlement of Performance Units

     (a) In Common Shares. As soon as practicable after each Determination Date (the
“Settlement Date”), the Company shall transfer to the Participant certificates or book entry shares
issued in the Participant’s name for the number of shares of Common Shares equal to the number of
Performance Units granted pursuant to Section 1(a) of this Award Agreement and vesting on such
date, if any; provided, however, the Company, in its sole discretion, may withhold shares of Common
Shares otherwise payable to the Participant to satisfy any applicable withholding taxes.

“Determination Date” means the date(s) that the Company determines the number of Performance Units
the Participant is entitled to receive as set forth on Schedule 2.

     (b) In Cash. As soon as practicable after each Determination Date, the Company shall
pay the Participant, in cash, an amount equal to the number of Performance Units granted pursuant
to Section 1(b) of this Award Agreement and vesting on such date, if any, multiplied by $1.00. The
Company, in its sole discretion, may withhold payment otherwise payable to the Participant to
satisfy any applicable withholding taxes. Any withholding taxes resulting from any awards under
this Award Agreement shall be paid out of the cash payment under this Section 4(b) prior to the
Company withholding any Common Shares for applicable withholding taxes.

- 2 -

 

5. Adjustments

     The Performance Units granted in this Agreement shall be subject to adjustments by the
Committee in accordance with Section 7 of the Plan.

6. Rights as Shareholder

     The Participant shall have no rights as a shareholder with respect to any shares of Common
Shares until and unless the Participant becomes the shareholder of record of such shares. Except
as provided in Section 7 of the Plan, no adjustment shall be made for dividends or other rights for
which the record date is prior to the date on which the Participant becomes a shareholder of
record.

7. Employment

     Neither the granting of this Award nor any term or provision of this Agreement shall
constitute or be evidence of any understanding, expressed or implied, on the part of the Company to
employ the Participant for any period of time.

8. Nontransferability

     During the Participant’s lifetime, this Award shall not be transferable (voluntarily or
involuntarily) by the Participant. The benefits of the Award shall pass, upon death, to the
beneficiary designated by the Participant on a form provided by, and filed prior to death with, the
Company. If no designation is made or if the designated beneficiary does not survive the
Participant’s death, the Award shall pass by will or the laws of descent and distribution.

9. Definitions

     Except where the context clearly implies or indicates the contrary, a word, term, or phrase
used in the Plan is similarly used in this Agreement.

10. Amendment

     This Agreement may be amended by the Committee at any time, provided that no such amendment,
without the written consent of the Participant, shall adversely affect the rights of the
Participant granted hereunder.

11. Miscellaneous

	 	(a)  	Headings. The headings in this Agreement are inserted for
convenience only and shall have no significance in the interpretation of this
Agreement.

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	 	(b)  	Entire Agreement. This Agreement contains the entire agreement
between the parties with respect to the transactions contemplated hereunder and
supersedes any prior arrangements or understandings with respect thereto, written or
oral. No agreements or representations, oral or otherwise, expressed or implied, with
respect to the subject matter hereof have been made by either party which are not set
forth expressly in this Agreement (including the Plan).
	 
	 	(c)  	Successors. The terms and conditions of this Agreement shall be
binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective
heirs, personal representatives and successors.
	 
	 	(d)  	Governing Law. In the event of any inconsistency between the terms
of this Agreement and the Plan, the terms of the Plan shall control. This Agreement
shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of
Delaware applicable to agreements made and entirely to be performed within such
jurisdiction except to the extent federal law may be applicable.
	 
	 	(e)  	Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in one or more
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original and all of which
together shall constitute one and the same instrument.

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     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the parties hereto has executed this Agreement as of the day and
year first above written.

CNH GLOBAL N.V.

	 	 	 
	By
	 	 
	

	 	 

ACCEPTED:

	 	 	 
	 
	Participant

	 	Date

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SCHEDULE 1

CALCULATION OF AWARD

Potential Performance Units if

a) the Company achieves 4.8% cumulative operating margin for the CNH fiscal years of 2004-2006;

b) an annual bonus is earned by the Participant pursuant to the annual bonus rules of the Company
for 2 of the 3 plan years of the 2004-2006 cycle, and

c) the Company achieves the threshold for an annual bonus pursuant to the annual bonus rules
of the Company for at least 2 of the 3 plan years of the cycle of 2004-2006:

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Threshold	 	 	 	 	Maximum	 
	(Target – 10%)	Target	 	 	(Target + 15%)	 
	2004-2006 Cumulative
Operating Margin %
	 	 	4.8	%	 	 	5.3%	 	 	 	6.1%	 
	 

Section 1(a) Award1:

Section 1(b) Award2:

The Target means achievement by the Company of the targeted amount of operating income divided by
net revenue of the Company as specified in the strategic business plan of the Company, as
determined by the Company in its sole discretion.

If the amount of operating income divided by net revenue of the Company falls between the Threshold
and the Target or between the Target and the Maximum, the amount of Performance Units awarded shall
be interpolated accordingly.

	1	 	Each Section 1(a) Performance Unit
equals one share of Common Shares of the Company.
	 
	2	 	Each Section 1(b) Performance Unit
equals $1.

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SCHEDULE 2

AWARD PAYOUT

	-  	50% of Performance Units at Target Potential vest upon determination date provided,
that, (i) the Participant has received a bonus pursuant to the Company’s annual bonus
rules for calendar year 2004 and 2005, (ii) the Company achieves the threshold for an
annual bonus pursuant to the annual bonus rules of the Company for both calendar years
2004 and 2005, and (iii) the Company has achieved the cumulative operating margin
percentage target of 4.7% for calendar years 2004 and 2005, cumulatively.

	-  	Remainder, if any, of the Performance Units vest upon the Determination Date;
provided, that, (i) the Participant has received an annual bonus pursuant to the Company’s
annual bonus rules for at least 2 of the 3 years cycle of 2004-2006, (ii) the Company has
achieved the threshold for an annual bonus pursuant to the annual bonus rules of the
Company (as established by the Company, in its sole discretion) for at least 2 years out
of the 3 years cycle of 2004-2006, and (iii) the Company achieves 4.8% cumulative
operating margin for the CNH fiscal years of 2004-2006.

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