Document:

EX-10(pp)

 Exhibit 10(pp) 

POTASH CORPORATION OF SASKATCHEWAN INC. 

CEO Multi-Year Incentive Plan 
  

			
	Award Type:		 Full-value stock
units, either Restricted Stock Units (“RSUs”) or Deferred Share Units (“DSUs”), as selected by CEO. In December 2014, CEO confirmed his election of DSUs. Each unit represents the value of one share of Potash Corporation common
stock.
  

	Grant Date:		 July 1, 2014 general terms agreed pursuant to the
employment agreement.
  
 For accounting purposes, February 20, 2015 will be the grant
date, when the vesting terms are confirmed. DSUs will not appear in the summary compensation table or other tables until next year.
  

	Number of Units:		 187,454 units, which is $7.5 million divided by
average price of a share of Potash Corporation common stock on the TSX averaged over the 20 trading days prior to July 1, 2014.
  

	Grant Date Fair Value:		 To be determined by accountants based on a number
of factors, including the assessment of likelihood of satisfaction of performance vesting conditions, expected duration and dividend equivalent rights.
  

	Earned Units:		 CEO will earn a number of the units based on
Company performance and individual performance during the period July 1, 2014 through December 31, 2015. 50% of the units (93,727 units) may be earned based on achievement of Company performance metrics and 50% of the units (92,727 units)
may be earned based on achievement of individual CEO performance metrics.
  

	Company Performance Metrics and Individual CEO Performance Metrics:		 Attached is Schedule A which sets forth the
metrics to determine the number of earned units based on the achievement of Company performance metrics and Schedule B which sets forth the metrics to determine the number of earned units based on the achievement of CEO individual performance
metrics. Schedule C sets forth a flow chart illustrating the calculations set forth on Schedules A and B. The attached schedules set forth (1) the component metrics, (2) the weighting of each component metric, (3) the manner in which the component
metric is to be measured and (4) the achievement necessary to achieve that component metric. The total of the units earned will be sum of the units earned for the component metrics.

 

	Vested Units:		 CEO will vest in the number of earned units (as
calculated above) based on continued employment through the third anniversary of the grant date.
  

			
	Additional Units on Account of Dividend Like Amount:		 CEO will be entitled
to additional units on account of dividend-like amounts based on procedures equivalent to those under the Company’s Deferred Share Unit Plan for Non-Employee Directors, as in effect on July 1, 2014 (the “Directors Deferred Share Unit
Plan”). For such purposes, the additional number of units will be calculated assuming that the CEO was granted on July 1, 2014 a number of units equal to the number of units actually earned, as calculated above. The number of additional
units will be the sum of the number of additional units calculated as described in the following sentence on each date on which a dividend is declared and paid by the Company on its common shares between July 1, 2014 and the “entitlement
date” (as defined below). The number of additional units on each such date shall be the quotient determined by dividing: (1) the product of (a) the amount of each such dividend on a per shares basis (excluding stock dividends, but including
dividends which may be paid in cash or in shares at the option of the shareholder) by (b) the sum of the number of earned units plus any additional units accrued as of the record date for the payment of such dividend, by (2) the market value of a
common share on the payment date of such dividend, with fractions computed to four decimal places. CEO shall only be entitled to any additional units to the extent that the earned units have become vested.

 

	Consequence of Change In Control:		 Per 3.3.3 of employment agreement, full vesting if
a change in control occurs during vesting period and either (1) the Company terminates the CEO without just cause or (2) the CEO terminates for good reason.
  

	Settlement:		 The award will settle in cash. Since DSUs were
selected, vested units will be settled in cash based on the date of the CEO’s termination of employment under settlement procedures equivalent to those under the Company’s Director’s Deferred Share Unit Plan. Under such procedures,
the CEO generally will be permitted to select an “entitlement date” over a specified extended period ending on the first day of December in the calendar year immediately following the calendar year in which termination of employment
occurs. The vested units, and any additional units credited through dividend-like amounts, generally will be valued on the CEO’s selected entitlement date and the cash amount will be delivered to the CEO on the fourteenth day after the
entitlement date.
  

	Administration of the Plan:		 This Plan shall be administered by the
Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors. The Compensation Committee shall have full and complete authority to interpret this Plan and the schedules, to prescribe such rules and regulations and to make such other determinations as it deems
necessary or desirable for the administration of this Plan. All actions taken and decisions made by the Compensation Committee shall be final, conclusive and binding on all parties concerned.

 

 SCHEDULE A 

Company Performance Metrics 
  

					
	TSR Peers:		TSR Relative to Peers (Reported in (Home) Currency)		(50%)
	  
 ·   
  Agrium
  
 ·   
  APC
  
 ·   
  CF Industries
  
 ·   
  Intrepid
  
 ·   
  K + S
  
 ·   
  ICL
  
 ·   
  Mosaic
  
 ·   
  SQM
  
 ·   
  Uralkali
  
 ·   
  Yara
		  
 ·   
  July 1, 2014 – December 31, 2015
		
		  
 Change in EPS
		(25%)
		  
 ·     
July 1, 2014 – December 31, 2015
vs. January 1, 2013 – June 30, 2014
		
		  
 Change in CFPS before Working Capital
		(25%)
		  
 ·     
July 1, 2014 – December 31, 2015
vs. January 1, 2013 – June 30, 2014
		
		  
 TSR Vesting Schedule:
		
		  
 ·     
#1 to #4: 100% Vesting
		
		 ·     #5 to #7: 75% Vesting
		
		 ·     #8: 50% Vesting
		
		 ·     #9 to #11: 0% Vesting
		
		  
 EPS and CFPS Vesting Schedule:
		
		  
 ·     
Zero or less: 0% Vesting
		
		 ·     10% or more: 100% Vesting
		
		 ·     Results greater than zero but less than 10% will be interpolated

		  
 The Compensation Committee shall have the
authority to confirm in its reasonable discretion that the TSR peer group remains intact, appropriate and relevant at the end of the performance period (i.e., as of December 31, 2015).

 SCHEDULE B 

Individual CEO Performance Metrics 
  

			
	Goal		Goal
Weighting
 

	 Goal 1 -
Leadership Team:
  
 Assess strengths of organizational structure and leadership
team to ensure optimal performance
  
		15%
	 Goal 2 –
Knowledge:
  
 Develop and demonstrate depth of knowledge regarding the company and
industry, including a strong understanding of key markets and operations
  
		15%
	 Goal 3 –
Communication & Engagement:
  
 Provide leadership for PotashCorp through
ongoing engagement and communication with key stakeholders, including investors, employees and communities
  
		10%
	 Goal 4 –
Governance:
  
 Lead Board and management interaction, ensuring transparency and
alignment
  
		15%
	 Goal 5 –
Strategy:
  
 Together with the leadership team, review and evolve the
company’s strategic objectives, including a comprehensive review of opportunities and risks associated with current assets, investments and growth opportunities
  
		25%
	 Goal 6 –
Compensation Plans:
  
 Review and assess incentive compensation plans to ensure
they reward performance, align with shareholder interests and are competitive
  
		10%
	 Goal 7 –
Performance Evaluation & Succession:
  
 Develop a company-wide
performance-based evaluation process to assess individual performance and prepare for succession in the key business units
  
		10%
	 Goal 8 –
Safety, Health & Environment: Discretionary: -100% to +30% of
Sub-Total Product
  

As an overarching objective, the Compensation Committee has the discretion to adjust the CEO’s STIP for overall safety, health and environmental
performance during the year. Discretionary adjustment will be within the parameters of the STIP program (i.e., minimum payout of nil for extremely poor overall performance, maximum payout of +30% for very strong performance)

 
		-100%
to

+30%

			
	 Goal
Performance
		Goal Rating
	 Exceeded above and beyond
		10
	 Met all of goal
		8
	 Met most of goal
		6
	 Fell well short of goal
		4
	 Did not perform goal
		0

  

			
	 Multiplier
		Composite Rating
	 0
		3.99
	 0.40
		4
	 0.70
		6
	 1.00
		8
	 1.30
		10

 SCHEDULE C 

(See attached)Exhibit 10.14

 

TELEPHONE AND
DATA SYSTEMS, INC. (TDS)

2014 OFFICER
BONUS PROGRAM

                                                                 

 

This
bonus program covers all TDS officers other than the President and CEO of TDS
and the Chairman Emeritus of TDS.  Payments under this program to the TDS
Telecom President and CEO and the below listed executive officers require
specific approval of the TDS Compensation Committee.  Bonuses for other
officers covered by this program require the approval of the President and CEO
of TDS.  This program does not apply to any officer of a TDS subsidiary other
than the President and CEO of TDS Telecom.  

 

Ø 
TDS EXECUTIVE
OFFICER PARTICIPANTS:

 

Ÿ 
SVP
Technology, Services and Strategy

Ÿ 
SVP Finance
and Treasurer

Ÿ 
SVP and
Controller

Ÿ 
SVP and CIO 

Ÿ 
SVP,
Acquisitions and Corporate Development

Ÿ 
VP Human
Resources 

 

The
TDS Telecom President and CEO (Dave Wittwer) will have the same company and
individual performance weightings as the TDS executive officers.  However, this
officer’s company performance bonus opportunity will be based on TDS Telecom’s
approved 2014 Bonus Plan, which will be aligned with the metrics in this program,
but may contain additional performance measures.

 

Ø 
COMPANY
PERFORMANCE COMPONENT:

 

Ÿ 
Weighting:   60%

 

Ÿ 
Performance
Measures:  The
following performance measures are primary indicators of progress against the
TDS Portfolio goal to create increasing results to shareholders and other
stakeholders.

 

û 
Consolidated
Operating Revenue Growth: 
Revenue growth is the primary driver to long-term growth in profitability and
returns.  It is also an indicator of the success of past investments.  

 

ü 
Consolidated
Operating Revenue Growth will be calculated as year-over-year growth in TDS
Consolidated revenue excluding U.S. Cellular Equipment Revenue.  For 2014,
year-over-year growth will be calculated using U.S. Cellular Core market
results pro forma for 2013. 

 

û 
Consolidated
Adjusted Income Before Income Taxes (AIBIT): AIBIT is a direct measure of the
cash generated from the operations of the TDS businesses in a given year and
the overall profitability of the company.  

 

ü 
The
calculation of AIBIT will align with the methodology used for external
reporting purposes, which is currently defined as income before income taxes,
depreciation, amortization and accretion, net gain or loss on sale of business
and other exit costs, net gain or loss on sale of licenses and exchanges, gain
or loss on investment and interest expense.  

 

û 
Consolidated
Simple Free Cash Flow (Simple FCF):  Simple 
FCF, defined as AIBIT less capital expenditures, is an indicator of TDS’s
success in delivering shareholder value.  As TDS’s major business units are
capital intensive businesses, the simple FCF measure is an indicator of how
efficiently the business is managing its capital expenditures and the level of
cash the company has available to invest in future growth opportunities or create
returns for shareholders.  

 

ü 
The
calculation of AIBIT will follow the methodology described above.  The
calculation of capital expenditures will focus on cash outflows and therefore
exclude capitalized interest, which is a non-cash accounting adjustment.

 

Adjustments
to Company Performance component calculations:

 

Ÿ 
Acquisitions: 

 

û 
Acquisitions
that occur in the second half of the fiscal year will be excluded from bonus
calculations (target and actual).

 

 

 

 

û  Adjustment will be made for
acquisitions that occur in the first half of the fiscal year, with performance
judged against the valuation model and adjusted for any timing differences
between expected and actual closing.  To the extent that the acquisition is not
included in the targets, the targets will be adjusted at the time of the
acquisition closing date to reflect the valuation model (as approved by the
Board) and any known timing differences.

 

û 
Transaction
costs related to the acquisition will be excluded from both the target and
actual results.

 

Ÿ 
Divestitures: 

 

û 
Divestitures
or discontinued operations that occur in the first half of the fiscal year will
be excluded from the bonus calculations (target and actual).

 

û 
Divestitures
or discontinued operations that occur in the second half of the fiscal year
will be included in the bonus calculation.  If a divestiture or discontinued
operation was not included in the targets, the targets will be adjusted at the
time of the closing date to reflect the impact of the period of time that the
divesture is not owned.  In addition, significant shifts in strategy will be
taken into consideration when determining the appropriate treatment of
divestitures in the bonus calculation. 

û 
Transaction
costs related to the divestiture will be excluded from both the target and
actual results.

 

Ÿ 
Other
Adjustments:  Any
adjustments to the target or actual bonus calculations will be presented to the
Compensation Committee for review and approval.  Adjustment recommendations
should be limited to material accounting adjust-ments or major business
decisions that, without their adjustment, would cause the calculated bonus
results to differ materially from unadjusted calculation and therefore not
reflect the true performance delivered in the year.  Bonus expense will be
included in the AIBIT and Simple FCF metrics.      

 

Ÿ 
Bonus
Ranges: 

The bonus ranges were set to reinforce the Company’s pay for performance
culture.  The minimum performance level for a performance measure needs to be
achieved before any bonus for that performance measure is earned.  The narrow
ranges result in substantial reductions in bonuses when targets are not
achieved, and greater rewards for above target performance.  See Appendix A for
payout grids.

 

	
  PERFORMANCE
  MEASURE

  	
  MINIMUM

  	
  TARGET

  	
  MAXIMUM

  
	
  Consolidated Operating Revenues Growth

  	
  1.0%

  	
  6.5%

  	
  11.9%

  
	
  Consolidated AIBIT

  	
  $677M

  	
  $797M

  	
  $917M

  
	
  Consolidated Simple FCF

  	
  -$156M

  	
  -$55M

  	
  $46M

  

 

Ÿ 
Bonus
Payouts As A Percent Of Target At Minimum And Maximum Performance Levels:

 

	
  PERFORMANCE
  MEASURE

  	
  MINIMUM

  	
  TARGET

  	
  MAXIMUM

  
	
  Consolidated Operating Revenues Growth

  	
  50%

  	
  100%

  	
  200%

  
	
  Consolidated AIBIT

  	
  50%

  	
  100%

  	
  200%

  
	
  Consolidated Simple FCF

  	
  50%

  	
  100%

  	
  200%

  

 

Bonus
payouts between the minimum and target and between target and maximum
performance level for each performance measure will be computed by interpolation.

 

Any
bonus for performance below the minimum percentage for a performance measure
will be at the discretion of the Compensation Committee.

 

 

Ÿ 
Weighting
Of Performance Measures:

 

	
  PERFORMANCE
  MEASURE

  	
  WEIGHTING

  
	
  Consolidated
  Operating Revenues Growth

  	
  40%

  
	
  Consolidated AIBIT

  	
  30%

  
	
  Consolidated Simple FCF

  	
  30%

  
	
   

  	
  100%

  

 

 

 

 

Ø 
THE
PERFORMANCE TARGETS:

 

They
will be set by the Compensation Committee each year based on the plans and
objectives of the business.  

 

Ø 
INDIVIDUAL
PERFORMANCE COMPONENT:

 

Ÿ 
Weighting:   40%

 

Ÿ 
Segment
Weighting:

 

û 
Key
Objectives:           
                 50% 

û 
Overall
Performance:                  
50%

100%

 

Ÿ 
Level of
Performance and Percent Payout of Target:

	
  PERFORMANCE

  	
  % PAYOUT OF

  TARGET

  
	
  Far
  exceeds target performance:  Performance
  greatly exceeded that which was planned and expected.

  	
  150% - 200%

  
	
  Significantly
  exceeds target performance: Performance
  substantially exceeded that which was planned and expected.

  	
  120% - 150%

  
	
  Somewhat
  exceeds/fully meets/almost fully meets target performance:  Performance was close to that
  which was planned and expected.

  	
  80% - 120%

  
	
  Partially
  meets target performance:
  Given the conditions that prevailed, performance was sufficient to merit a
  partial bonus.

  	
  Up to 80%

  
	
  Well
  below target performance:  Given
  the conditions that prevailed, performance was not sufficient to merit any
  bonus.

  	
  0%

  

 

Ÿ 
Key
Objectives:

 

With
regard to this bonus opportunity, the TDS President and CEO will, with input
from the executive officer, assign the executive officer 2 to 5 or so major
initia-tives to be carried out during the year, and decide how each will be
weighted.  As appropriate, these objectives will include that executive
officer’s expected individual contribution(s) toward executing the Company’s
Portfolio Management Strategy.  

 

With
the approval of the TDS President and CEO, an executive officer’s objec-tives
and weightings may be revised during the performance year if important new
initiatives arise or circumstances with respect to an objective have materially
changed.  Performance on each selected objective will be based on the TDS
President and CEO’s assessment of the results the executive/the executive’s
team achieved in meeting the assigned objectives.

 

Ÿ 
Overall
Performance:

 

Each
officer’s overall performance for the year will be assessed by the TDS
President and CEO based on his effectiveness/success with regard to:

 

û 
Carrying out
his/her ongoing responsibilities and significant initiatives during the
performance year (other than his/her above discussed key objectives).

 

û 
Recommending/making
decisions; taking actions; and providing support, assistance and counsel to the
business units, and to help achieve TDS Corporate Portfolio Strategy agreed
upon metrics and milestones.

 

û 
Providing
support, assistance and counsel to corporate senior leaders and management.

 

 

 

 

In
making these assessments, the TDS President and CEO will take into
consideration:

 

û 
His/her
evaluation of the officer’s performance in the above areas.

 

û 
The annual
written performance feedback he/she receives on the executive officer from
his/her peers.

 

û 
The
every-other-year written performance input he receives from the executive
officer’s direct reports and other key associates.

 

û 
The executive
officer’s report on his/her activities/accomplishments for the performance
year.

 

û 
Such other
creditable input as he/she may receive during the year about an officer’s performance.

 

Ø 
DETERMINATION
OF BONUS AWARDS:

 

Once
the Company performance bonus percentage is known, the TDS President and CEO
will recommend to the Compensation Committee for each participating executive
officer:

Ÿ 
His/her
company performance bonus.  This will be the amount calculated in accordance
with the terms of this program (unless the TDS President and CEO feels that
there is a compelling rationale to recommend an adjustment to this amount,
which he would provide to the Committee).

 

Ÿ 
His/her
recommended individual performance bonus, and his/her total recommended bonus.

 

The
Compensation Committee will review these proposed bonus awards and either
approve them as submitted or revise some or all of them, as they deem
appropriate.  Once the Committee and TDS President and CEO finalize the
officers’ bonus awards, they may be paid.  

 

Approved
bonus awards shall be paid during the period commencing on the January 1st
immediately following the performance year and ending on March 15th
immediately following the performance year.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, in
the event that payment by such March 15th is administratively
impracticable and such impracticability was unforeseeable, payment will be made
as soon as administra-tively practicable after such March 15th, but
in no event later than December 31st following the performance
year.  Payment will be made in the form of a lump sum.

 

Notwithstanding
any provision of this bonus program to the contrary, a participating officer
does not have a legally binding right to a bonus unless and until the bonus
amount, if any, is paid and no bonus shall be paid unless the officer remains
employed through the actual bonus payout date unless otherwise approved at the
discretion of the Compensation Committee or President and CEO of TDS, as
applicable.

 

Ø 
REVISIONS
TO THE OFFICER BONUS PROGRAM:

 

The
TDS Officer Bonus Program may be revised or discontinued at any time and for
any reason.  If and when either the Compensation Committee and/or management
determines that the TDS Officer Bonus Program should be revised, the parties
will discuss the proposed change(s) and the rationale for them, following which
the Committee will determine what, if any, changes will be made.

 

Ø 
BONUS
CLAWBACK:

 

Any bonus paid pursuant to this
program is subject to recovery by TDS or any other action pursuant to any
clawback or recoupment policy which TDS may adopt from time to time, including
without limitation any such policy which TDS may be required to adopt under the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and implementing
rules and regulations thereunder, or as otherwise required by law.

 

	
  Appendix A: 2014 Payout Grids - Company
  Performance Component

  
	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  
	
    

  
	
  Target Total Revenue

  	
  YoY Growth  ($)

  	
  YoY Growth (%)

  	
  Results ($) as a % of Target

  	
  Total Bonus Points Earned

  	
  % of Bonus Points Earned

  
	
  $4,438

  	
  $44

  	
  1.00%

  	
  95%

  	
  200 

  	
  50%

  
	
  $4,486

  	
  $92

  	
  2.10%

  	
  96%

  	
  240 

  	
  60%

  
	
  $4,534

  	
  $140

  	
  3.20%

  	
  97%

  	
  280 

  	
  70%

  
	
  $4,582

  	
  $188

  	
  4.30%

  	
  98%

  	
  320 

  	
  80%

  
	
  $4,630

  	
  $236

  	
  5.40%

  	
  99%

  	
  360 

  	
  90%

  
	
  $4,678

  	
  $284

  	
  6.50%

  	
  100%

  	
  400 

  	
  100%

  
	
  $4,726

  	
  $332

  	
  7.60%

  	
  101%

  	
  480 

  	
  120%

  
	
  $4,774

  	
  $380

  	
  8.60%

  	
  102%

  	
  560 

  	
  140%

  
	
  $4,822

  	
  $428

  	
  9.70%

  	
  103%

  	
  640 

  	
  160%

  
	
  $4,870

  	
  $476

  	
  10.80%

  	
  104%

  	
  720 

  	
  180%

  
	
  $4,918

  	
  $524

  	
  11.90%

  	
  105%

  	
  800 

  	
  200%

  
	
  >$4918

  	
  N/A

  	
  N/A

  	
  N/A

  	
  >800

  	
  200%

  
	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  
	
  CONSOLIDATED AIBIT ($ in millions)

  
	
  Target Total AIBIT

  	
  YoY Growth  ($)

  	
  YoY Growth (%)

  	
  Bonus Results as a % of Target

  	
  Total Bonus Points Earned

  	
  % of Bonus Points Earned

  
	
  $677

  	
  ($162)

  	
  -19.3%

  	
  85%

  	
  150 

  	
  50%

  
	
  $701

  	
  ($138)

  	
  -16.4%

  	
  88%

  	
  180 

  	
  60%

  
	
  $725

  	
  ($114)

  	
  -13.6%

  	
  91%

  	
  210 

  	
  70%

  
	
  $749

  	
  ($90)

  	
  -10.7%

  	
  94%

  	
  240 

  	
  80%

  
	
  $773

  	
  ($66)

  	
  -7.9%

  	
  97%

  	
  270 

  	
  90%

  
	
  $797

  	
  ($42)

  	
  -5.0%

  	
  100%

  	
  300 

  	
  100%

  
	
  $821

  	
  ($18)

  	
  -2.1%

  	
  103%

  	
  360 

  	
  120%

  
	
  $845

  	
  $6 

  	
  0.7%

  	
  106%

  	
  420 

  	
  140%

  
	
  $869

  	
  $30 

  	
  3.6%

  	
  109%

  	
  480 

  	
  160%

  
	
  $893

  	
  $54 

  	
  6.4%

  	
  112%

  	
  540 

  	
  180%

  
	
  $917

  	
  $78 

  	
  9.3%

  	
  115%

  	
  600 

  	
  200%

  
	
  >$917

  	
  N/A

  	
  N/A

  	
  N/A

  	
  >600

  	
  200%

  
	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  
	
  CONSOLIDATED FCF ($ in millions)

  
	
  Target Total FCF

  	
  YoY Growth  ($)

  	
  YoY Growth (%)

  	
  Bonus Results as a % of Target

  	
  Total Bonus Points Earned

  	
  % of Bonus Points Earned

  
	
  ($156)

  	
  ($85)

  	
  -120%

  	
  284%

  	
  150 

  	
  50%

  
	
  $135 

  	
  ($64)

  	
  -92%

  	
  245%

  	
  180 

  	
  60%

  
	
  ($115)

  	
  ($44)

  	
  -63%

  	
  209%

  	
  210 

  	
  70%

  
	
  ($95)

  	
  ($24)

  	
  -35%

  	
  173%

  	
  240 

  	
  80%

  
	
  ($75)

  	
  ($4)

  	
  -6%

  	
  136%

  	
  270 

  	
  90%

  
	
  ($55)

  	
  $16 

  	
  22%

  	
  100%

  	
  300 

  	
  100%

  
	
  ($35)

  	
  $36 

  	
  51%

  	
  64%

  	
  360 

  	
  120%

  
	
  ($15)

  	
  $56 

  	
  79%

  	
  27%

  	
  420 

  	
  140%

  
	
  $6 

  	
  $76 

  	
  108%

  	
  -9%

  	
  480 

  	
  160%

  
	
  $26 

  	
  $97 

  	
  137%

  	
  -47%

  	
  540 

  	
  180%

  
	
  $46 

  	
  $117 

  	
  165%

  	
  -84%

  	
  600 

  	
  200%

  
	
  >$46

  	
  N/A

  	
  N/A

  	
  N/A

  	
  >600

  	
  200%

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

	
  Appendix B: Financial Metrics Detail

  
	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  
	
  2014 Bonus -
  Financial Metrics

  	
  2013 Actual

  	
  2014 Budget

  	
  2014 Bonus Targets

  	
  Variance - Bonus Targets vs. Budget

  
	
  $ in Millions

  
	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  
	
  TDS
  Consolidated Operating Revenue

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  
	
    

  	
  U.S. Cellular
  CORE Service Revenue

  	
  $3,411 

  	
  $3,641 

  	
  $3,562 

  	
  ($79)

  
	
    

  	
  Wireline
  Segment

  	
  $720 

  	
  $701 

  	
  $701 

  	
  $0

  
	
    

  	
  HMS Segment

  	
  $187 

  	
  $303 

  	
  $303 

  	
  $0

  
	
    

  	
  Cable Segment

  	
  $36 

  	
  $92 

  	
  $92 

  	
  $0

  
	
    

  	
  TDS Telecom
  Eliminations

  	
  $4 

  	
  ($1)

  	
  ($1)

  	
  $0

  
	
    

  	
  TDS Parent and
  Eliminations

  	
  $35 

  	
  $22 

  	
  $22 

  	
  $0

  
	
  Total TDS
  Cons. Operating Revenue

  	
  $4,394 

  	
  $4,756 

  	
  $4,678 

  	
  ($78)

  
	
    

  	
  Growth

  	
    

  	
  8%

  	
  6%

  	
  -2%

  
	
  AIBT

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  
	
    

  	
  U.S. Cellular

  	
  $585 

  	
  $594 

  	
  $529 

  	
  ($66)

  
	
    

  	
  TDS Telecom

  	
  $249 

  	
  $272 

  	
  $272 

  	
  $0

  
	
    

  	
  Parent and
  Other

  	
  $5 

  	
  ($3)

  	
  ($3)

  	
  $0

  
	
    

  	
  TDS
  Consolidated

  	
  $839 

  	
  $863 

  	
  $797 

  	
  ($66)

  
	
  Capex

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  
	
    

  	
  U.S. Cellular

  	
  ($738)

  	
  ($642)

  	
  ($642)

  	
  $0

  
	
    

  	
  TDS Telecom

  	
  ($165)

  	
  ($202)

  	
  ($202)

  	
  $0

  
	
    

  	
  Parent and
  Other

  	
  ($7)

  	
  ($8)

  	
  ($8)

  	
  $0

  
	
    

  	
  TDS
  Consolidated

  	
  ($910)

  	
  ($851)

  	
  ($851)

  	
  $0

  
	
  Free Cash
  Flow

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  	
    

  
	
    

  	
  U.S. Cellular

  	
  ($153)

  	
  ($47)

  	
  ($113)

  	
  ($66)

  
	
    

  	
  TDS Telecom

  	
  $84 

  	
  $70 

  	
  $70 

  	
  $0

  
	
    

  	
  Parent and
  Other

  	
  ($2)

  	
  ($11)

  	
  ($11)

  	
  $0

  
	
    

  	
  TDS
  Consolidated

  	
  ($71)

  	
  $11 

  	
  ($55)

  	
  ($66)

Source: [{"source": "alea-institute/alea-institute/kl3m-data-edgar-agreements/train-00240-of-00352.parquet"}, [{"source": "alea-institute/alea-institute/kl3m-data-edgar-agreements/train-00240-of-00352.parquet"}]]