Document:

EX-10.3

 Exhibit 10.3 

DOMINION RESOURCES, INC. 

2017 PERFORMANCE GRANT PLAN (REGULAR GRANTS) 

1.    Purpose.    The purpose of the 2017 Performance Grant Plan (Regular Grants)
(the “Plan”) is to set forth the terms of 2017 Regular Performance Grants (“Performance Grants”) awarded by Dominion Resources, Inc., a Virginia corporation (the “Company”), pursuant to the Dominion Resources, Inc. 2014
Incentive Compensation Plan and any amendments thereto (the “2014 Incentive Compensation Plan”). This Plan contains the Performance Goals for the awards, the Performance Criteria, the target and maximum amounts payable, and other
applicable terms and conditions. 
 2.    Definitions. Capitalized terms used in this Plan not defined in
this Section 2 will have the meaning assigned to such terms in the 2014 Incentive Compensation Plan. 

a.    Cause. For purposes of this Plan, the term “Cause” will have the meaning assigned to
that term under a Participant’s Employment Continuity Agreement with the Company, as such Agreement may be amended from time to time. 

b.    Date of Grant. February 1, 2017. 

c.    Disability or Disabled. Means a “disability” as defined under Treasury Regulation
Section 1.409A-3(i)(4). The Committee, as defined in the 2014 Incentive Compensation Plan document, will determine whether or not a Disability exists and its determination will be conclusive and binding on the
Participant. 
 d.    Participant. An officer of the Company or a Dominion Company who receives a
Performance Grant on the Date of Grant. 
 e.    Performance Period. The 36-month period beginning on January 1, 2017 and ending on December 31, 2019. 

f.    Price-Earnings Ratio. The closing price of a share of common stock on the last trading day of
the Performance Period divided by the annual operating earnings per share reported for the 12-month period ending on the last day of the Performance Period. 

g.    Retire or Retirement. For purposes of this Plan, the term Retire or Retirement means a
voluntary termination of employment on a date when the Participant is eligible for early or normal retirement benefits under the terms of the Dominion Pension Plan, or would be eligible if any crediting of deemed additional years of age or service
applicable to the Participant under the Company’s Benefit Restoration Plan or New Benefit Restoration Plan was applied under the Dominion Pension Plan, as in effect at the time of the determination, unless the Company’s Chief Executive
Officer in his sole discretion (or, if the Participant is the Company’s Chief Executive Officer, the Committee in its sole discretion) determines that the Participant’s retirement is detrimental to the Company. 

h.    Target Amount. The dollar amount designated in the written notice to the Participant
communicating the Performance Grant. 

 3.    Performance Grants. A Participant will receive a written
notice of the amount designated as the Participant’s Target Amount for the Performance Grant payable under the terms of this Plan. The actual payout may be from 0% to 200% of the Target Amount, depending on the achievement of the Performance
Goals. 
 4.    Performance Achievement and Time of Payment. Upon the completion of the Performance
Period, the Committee will determine the final Performance Goal achievement of each of the Performance Criteria described in Section 6. The Company will then calculate the final amount of each Participant’s Performance Grant based on such
Performance Goal achievement. Except as provided in Sections 7(b) or 8, the Committee will determine the time of payout of the Performance Grants, provided that in no event will payment be made later than March 15, 2020. 

5.    Forfeiture. Except as provided in Sections 7 and 8, a Participant’s right to payout of a
Performance Grant will be forfeited if the Participant’s employment with the Company or a Dominion Company terminates for any reason before the end of the Performance Period. 

6.    Performance Goals. Payout of Performance Grants will be based on the Performance Goal achievement
described in this Section 6 of the Performance Criteria defined in Exhibit A. 
 a.    TSR
Performance. Total Shareholder Return Performance (“TSR Performance”) will determine fifty percent (50%) of the Target Amount (“TSR Percentage”). TSR Performance is defined in Exhibit A. The percentage of the TSR Percentage
that will be paid out, if any, is based on the following table: 
  

					
	Relative	  	 	 
	TSR Performance	  	Percentage Payout	 
	 Percentile Ranking
	  	of TSR Percentage	 
	 85th or above
	  	 	200	% 
	 50th
	  	 	100	% 
	 25th
	  	 	50	% 
	 Below 25th
	  	 	0	% 

 To the extent that the Company’s Relative TSR Performance ranks in a percentile between
the 25th and 85th percentile in the table above, then the TSR Percentage payout will be interpolated between the corresponding TSR Percentage
payout set forth above. No payment of the TSR Percentage will be made if the Relative TSR Performance is below the 25th percentile, except that a payment of 25% of the TSR Percentage will be made
if the Company’s Relative TSR Performance is below the 25th percentile but its Absolute TSR Performance is at least 9%. In addition to the foregoing payments, and regardless of the
Company’s Relative TSR Performance, either (but not both) of the following may be earned: (i) an additional payment of 25% of the TSR Percentage will be made if the Company’s Absolute TSR Performance is at least 10% but less than 15%,
and/or if the Company’s Price-Earnings Ratio is at or above the 50th percentile and below the top third of the group of companies (inclusive of the Company) used to measure Relative TSR
Performance in accordance with Exhibit A hereto, or (ii) an additional payment of 50% of the TSR Percentage will be made if the Company’s Absolute TSR Performance is at least 15%, and/or if the Company’s Price-Earnings Ratio is at or
above the top third of the group of companies (inclusive of the Company) used to measure Relative TSR Performance in accordance with Exhibit A hereto (in either case, the “Performance Adder”). The Committee may reduce or eliminate payment
of the Performance Adder in its sole discretion. 

  
 - 2 - 

 The aggregate payments under this Section 6(a) may not exceed 250% of the TSR
Percentage. In addition, the overall percentage payment under the entire Performance Grant may not exceed 200%. 

b.    ROIC Performance. Return on Invested Capital Performance (“ROIC Performance”) will
determine fifty percent (50%) of the Target Amount (“ROIC Percentage”). ROIC Performance is defined in Exhibit A. The percentage of the ROIC Percentage that will be paid out, if any, is based on the following table: 

 

					
	 ROIC Performance
	  	Percentage Payout
of ROIC Percentage	 
	 6.92% and above
	  	 	200	% 
	 6.60%
	  	 	125	% 
	 6.21% - 6.45%
	  	 	100	% 
	 5.99%
	  	 	50	% 
	 Below 5.99%
	  	 	0	% 

  

	 	•	 	To the extent that the Company’s ROIC Performance is greater than 5.99% and less than 6.21%, the ROIC Percentage payout will be interpolated between the applicable Percentage Payout of ROIC Percentage range set
forth above. 

  

	 	•	 	To the extent that the Company’s ROIC Performance is greater than 6.45% and less than 6.60%, the ROIC Percentage payout will be interpolated between the applicable Percentage Payout of ROIC Percentage range set
forth above. 

  

	 	•	 	To the extent that the Company’s ROIC Performance is greater than 6.60% and less than 6.92%, the ROIC Percentage payout will be interpolated between the applicable Percentage Payout of ROIC Percentage range set
forth above. 

 7.    Retirement, Involuntary Termination without Cause, Death or Disability. 

a.    Retirement or Involuntary Termination without Cause. Except as provided in Section 8, if
a Participant Retires during the Performance Period or if a Participant’s employment is involuntarily terminated by the Company or a Dominion Company without Cause during the Performance Period, and in either case the Participant would have
been eligible for a payment if the Participant had remained employed until the end of the Performance Period, the Participant will receive a pro-rated payout of the Participant’s Performance Grant equal
to the payment the Participant would have received had the Participant remained employed until the end of the Performance Period multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of whole months from the Date of Grant to the first day
of the month coinciding with or immediately following the date of the Participant’s retirement or termination of employment, and the denominator of which is thirty-five (35). Payment will be made after the end of the Performance Period at the
time provided in Section 4 based on the Performance Goal achievement approved by the Committee. If the Participant Retires, however, no payment will be made if the Company’s Chief Executive Officer in his sole discretion (or, if the
Participant is the Company’s Chief Executive Officer, the Committee in its sole discretion) determines that the Participant’s Retirement is detrimental to the Company. 

  
 - 3 - 

 b.    Death or Disability. If, while employed by the
Company or a Dominion Company, a Participant dies or becomes Disabled during the Performance Period, the Participant or, in the event of the Participant’s death, the Participant’s Beneficiary will receive a lump sum cash payment equal to
the product of (i) and (ii) where: 
  

	 	(i)	is the amount that would be paid based on the predicted performance used for determining the compensation cost recognized by the Company for the Participant’s Performance Grant for the latest financial statement
filed with the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K or Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q immediately prior to the event; and 

 

	 	(ii)	is a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of whole months from the Date of Grant to the first day of the calendar month coinciding with or immediately following the date of the Participant’s death or
Disability, and the denominator of which is thirty-five (35). 

 Payment under this Section 7(b) will be made as soon as
administratively feasible (and in any event within sixty (60) days) after the date of the Participant’s death or Disability, and the Participant shall not have the right to any further payment under this Agreement. In the event of
the Participant’s death, payment will be made to the Participant’s designated Beneficiary. 

8.    Qualifying Change of Control. Upon a Qualifying Change of Control prior to the end of the Performance
Period, provided the Participant has remained continuously employed with Dominion or a Dominion Company from the Date of Grant to the date of the Qualifying Change of Control, the Participant will receive a lump sum cash payment equal to the greater
of (i) the Target Amount or (ii) the total payout that would be made at the end of the Performance Period if the predicted performance used for determining the compensation cost recognized by the Company for the Participant’s
Performance Grant for the latest financial statement filed with the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K or Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q immediately prior to the
Qualifying Change of Control was the actual performance for the Performance Period (in either case, the “COC Payout Amount”). Payment will be made on or as soon as administratively feasible following the Qualifying Change of Control date
and in no event later than sixty (60) days following the Qualifying Change of Control date. If a Qualifying Change of Control occurs prior to the end of the Performance Period and after a Participant has Retired or been involuntarily terminated
without Cause pursuant to Section 7(a) above, then the Participant will receive a pro-rated payout of the Participant’s Performance Grant, equal to the COC Payout Amount multiplied by the fraction set
forth in Section 7(a) above, with payment occurring in a cash lump sum on or as soon as administratively feasible (but in any event within sixty (60) days) after the Qualifying Change of Control date. Following any payment under this
Section 8, the Participant shall not have the right to any further payment under this Agreement. 

9.    Termination for Cause. Notwithstanding any provision of this Plan to the contrary, if the
Participant’s employment with the Company or a Dominion Company is terminated for Cause (as defined by the Employment Continuity Agreement between the Participant and the Company), the Participant will forfeit all rights to his or her
Performance Grant. 

  
 - 4 - 

 10.    Clawback of Award Payment. 

a.    Restatement of Financial Statements. If the Company’s financial statements are required
to be restated at any time within a two (2) year period following the end of the Performance Period as a result of fraud or intentional misconduct, the Committee may, in its discretion, based on the facts and circumstances surrounding the
restatement, direct the Company to recover all or a portion of the Performance Grant payout from the Participant if the Participant’s conduct directly caused or partially caused the need for the restatement. 

b.    Fraudulent or Intentional Misconduct. If the Company determines that the Participant has
engaged in fraudulent or intentional misconduct related to or materially affecting the Company’s business operations or the Participant’s duties at the Company, the Committee may, in its discretion, based on the facts and circumstances
surrounding the misconduct, direct the Company to withhold payment, or if payment has been made, to recover all or a portion of the Performance Grant payout from the Participant. 

c.    Recovery of Payout. The Company reserves the right to recover a Performance Grant payout
pursuant to this Section 10 by (i) seeking repayment from the Participant; (ii) reducing the amount that would otherwise be payable to the Participant under another Company benefit plan or compensation program to the extent permitted
by applicable law; (iii) withholding future annual and long-term incentive awards or salary increases; or (iv) taking any combination of these actions. 

d.    No Limitation on Remedies. The Company’s right to recover a Performance Grant payout
pursuant to this Section 10 shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, actions the Company may take to remedy or discipline a Participant’s misconduct including, but not limited to, termination of employment or initiation of a legal
action for breach of fiduciary duty. 
 e.    Subject to Future Rulemaking. The Performance Grant
payout is subject to any claw back policies the Company may adopt in order to conform to the requirements of Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act and Consumer Protection Act and resulting rules issued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission or national securities exchanges thereunder and that the Company determines should apply to this Performance Grant Plan. 

11.    Miscellaneous. 

a.    Nontransferability. Except as provided in Section 7(b), a Performance Grant is not
transferable and is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture until the end of the Performance Period. 

b.    No Right to Continued Employment. A Performance Grant does not confer upon a Participant any
right with respect to continuance of employment by the Company, nor will it interfere in any way with the right of the Company to terminate a Participant’s employment at any time. 

c.    Tax Withholding. The Company will withhold Applicable Withholding Taxes from the payout of
Performance Grants. 

  
 - 5 - 

 d.    Application of Code Section 162(m). Performance
Grants are intended to constitute “qualified performance-based compensation” within the meaning of section 1.162-27(e) of the Income Tax Regulations. The Committee will certify the achievement of the
Performance Goals described in Section 6. To the maximum extent possible, this Plan will be interpreted and construed in accordance with this subsection 11(d). 

e.    Negative Discretion. Pursuant to Section 6(c) of the 2014 Incentive Compensation Plan, the
Committee retains the authority to exercise negative discretion to reduce payments under this Plan as it deems appropriate. 

f.    Governing Law. This Plan shall be governed by the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia,
without regard to its choice of law provisions. 
 g.    Conflicts. In the event of any material
conflict between the provisions of the 2014 Incentive Compensation Plan and the provisions of this Plan, the provisions of the 2014 Incentive Compensation Plan will govern. 

h.    Participant Bound by Plan. By accepting a Performance Grant, a Participant acknowledges
receipt of a copy of this Plan and the 2014 Incentive Compensation Plan document and prospectus, which are accessible on the Company Intranet, and agrees to be bound by all the terms and provisions thereof. 

i.    Binding Effect.    This Plan will be binding upon and inure to the benefit
of the legatees, distributes, and personal representatives of Participants and any successors of the Company. 

j.    Section 409A. This Plan and the Performance Grants hereunder are intended to comply with
Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (“Code Section 409A”), and shall be interpreted to the maximum extent possible in accordance with such intent. To the extent necessary to comply with Code Section 409A, no
payment will be made earlier than six months after a Participant’s termination of employment other than for death if the Performance Grant is subject to Code Section 409A and the Participant is a “specified employee” (within the
meaning of Code Section 409A(a)(2)(B)(i)). 

  
 - 6 - 

 EXHIBIT A 

DOMINION RESOURCES, INC. 

2017 PERFORMANCE GRANT PLAN 

PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 

Total Shareholder Return 
 Relative TSR
Performance will be measured based on where the Company’s total shareholder return during the Performance Period ranks in relation to the total shareholder returns of the companies that are members of the Company’s compensation peer group
as of the Grant Date as set forth below (the “Comparison Companies”): 
  

			
	Ameren Corporation	  	Exelon Corporation
	American Electric Power Company	  	FirstEnergy Corporation
	CenterPoint Energy	  	NextEra Energy
	Consolidated Edison Company	  	Pacific Gas & Electric Company
	DTE Energy Company	  	PPL Corporation
	Duke Energy Corporation	  	Public Service Enterprise Group
	Edison International	  	Southern Company
	Entergy Corporation	  	Xcel Energy
	Eversource Energy	  	

 The Comparison Companies shall be adjusted during the Performance Period as follows: 

 

	 	(i)	In the event of a merger, acquisition or business combination transaction of a Comparison Company with or by another Comparison Company, effective upon the public announcement of the transaction, the surviving entity
shall remain a Comparison Company and the non-surviving entity shall cease to be a Comparison Company (provided that, if the proposed transaction is subsequently terminated before the Relative TSR Performance
is calculated, then the non-surviving company shall be retroactively reinstated as a Comparison Company); 

  

	 	(ii)	If it is publicly announced that a Comparison Company will be acquired by another company that is not a Comparison Company, or in the event a “going private transaction” is publicly announced where the
Comparison Company will not be the surviving entity or will otherwise no longer be publicly traded, the company shall cease to be a Comparison Company as of the date such announcement is made (provided that, if the proposed transaction is
subsequently terminated before the Relative TSR Performance is calculated , then the company shall be retroactively reinstated as a Comparison Company); 

  

	 	(iii)	In the event of a spinoff, divestiture, or sale of assets of a Comparison Company, the Comparison Company shall no longer be a Comparison Company if the company’s reported revenue for the four most recently
reported quarters ending on or before the last day of the Performance Period falls below 40% of Dominion’s reported revenue for last year of the Performance Period; and 

 

	 	(iv)	In the event of a bankruptcy of a Comparison Company, such company shall remain a Comparison Company and its stock price will continue to be tracked for purposes of Relative TSR Performance. If the company liquidates,
it will remain a Comparison Company and its stock price will be reduced to zero for the remaining Performance Period. 

  
 i 

 Absolute TSR Performance will be the Company’s total shareholder return on a compounded annual basis for the
Performance Period. In general, total shareholder return consists of the difference between the value of a share of common stock at the beginning and end of the Performance Period, plus the value of dividends paid as if reinvested in stock and other
appropriate adjustments for such events as stock splits. For purposes of TSR Performance, the total shareholder return of the Company and the Comparison Companies will be calculated using Bloomberg L.P. As soon as practicable after the completion of
the Performance Period, the total shareholder returns of the Comparison Companies will be obtained from Bloomberg L.P. and ranked from highest to lowest by the Committee. The Company’s total shareholder return will then be ranked in terms of
which percentile it would have placed in among the Comparison Companies. 
 Return on Invested Capital 

Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) 
 The following terms
are used to calculate ROIC for purposes of the 2017 Performance Grant: 
 ROIC means Total Return divided by Average Invested Capital. Performance
will be calculated for the two successive fiscal years within the Performance Period, added together and then divided by two to arrive at an annual average ROIC for the Performance Period. 

Total Return means Operating Earnings plus After-tax Interest & Related Charges, all determined for
the two successive fiscal years within the Performance Period. 
 Operating Earnings means operating earnings as disclosed on the Company’s
earnings report furnished on Form 8-K for the applicable fiscal year. 
 Average Invested Capital means the
Average Balances for Long & Short-term Debt plus Preferred Equity plus Common Shareholders’ Equity. The Average Balances for a year are calculated by performing the calculation at the end of each month during the fiscal year plus the
last month of the prior fiscal year and then averaging those amounts over 13 months. Long and short-term debt shall exclude debt that is non-recourse to Dominion Resources, Inc. (Dominion) or its subsidiaries
where Dominion or its subsidiaries has not made an associated investment. Short-term debt shall be net of cash and cash equivalents. 
 Average Invested
Capital will be calculated by excluding (i) accumulated other comprehensive income/(loss) from Common Shareholders’ Equity (as shown on the Company’s financial statements during the Performance Period); (ii) impacts from changes
in accounting principles that were not prescribed as of the Date of Grant; and (iii) the effects of incremental impacts from non-operating gains or losses during the Performance Period, as disclosed on
the Company’s earnings report furnished on Form 8-K, that were not included in the projection on which the original ROIC calculation was based at the time of the grant.

  
 iiExhibit

Exhibit 10.4

	
			
	
	 
	2017 Executive Bonus Plan

This plan document outlines the Blucora Executive Bonus Plan (the “Plan”) for calendar year 2017.  To the extent any provision of this Plan conflicts with any provision of an Executive’s employment agreement, then such employment agreement will control.

PLAN OBJECTIVES
		
	•
	Provide variable pay opportunities and targeted total cash compensation that are (a) aligned with key financial drivers, and (b) otherwise consistent with the total cash compensation philosophy outlined from time to time by the Compensation Committee of the Compensation Committee of Blucora’s Board of Directors (“Compensation Committee”).

		
	•
	Increase the competitiveness of executive pay without increasing fixed costs, making bonus payments contingent upon organizational and individual success.

		
	•
	Create internal consistency and standard guidelines among the executive peer group.

EFFECTIVE PERIOD
The Plan is effective for calendar year 2017 and may be changed at any time at the sole discretion of the Compensation Committee.

PARTICIPATION ELIGIBILITY, BONUS TARGETS AND PAYOUT TIMING
The positions eligible for participation in the Plan are listed in the table below.  Each participant’s annual bonus target, which is stated as a percentage of annual base salary, is also set forth in the table below.  If the executive leadership team changes, any additions to the Plan will be recommended by the CEO and approved by the Compensation Committee.  Payment of bonuses awarded under this Plan will be made annually, following the conclusion of the calendar year.

	
		
	Job Title
	Target Bonus %

	President and Chief Executive Officer
	200%

	Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
	60%

	Chief Legal and Administrative Officer
	60%

	Chief Human Resources Officer
	50%

	Chief Marketing Officer
	40%

	President, TaxAct*
	60%

	Chief Executive Officer, HD Vest*
	100%

* Executive’s bonus for 2017 will be pro-rated to reflect the number of days of his employment in 2017 and will be no lower than the pro-rated amount of the Target Bonus.

Page 1 of 1

PLAN DESIGN
The Plan includes financial performance that differ among plan participants as noted in the table below.

	
								
	 
	Target Weighting

	Target Category
	CEO
	CFO
	CLO
	CMO
	CHRO
	CEO - HD
	CEO - TA

	Consolidated Revenue
	50%
	50%
	50%
	30%
	50%
	 
	 

	Consolidated Adj EBITDA
	50%
	50%
	50%
	30%
	50%
	20%
	20%

	Tax Revenue
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	30%

	Tax Segment Income*
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	30%

	Paid DDIY Efiles
	 
	 
	 
	20%
	 
	 
	20%

	HDV Net Revenue
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	30%
	 

	HDV Segment Income*
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	30%
	 

	Fee Base Net Flows
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	20%
	 

	Advisor Recruiting
	 
	 
	 
	20%
	 
	 
	 

	Total
	100%
	100%
	100%
	100%
	100%
	100%
	100%

*Pre-bonus

Each financial component may be achieved at a payout percentage ranging from 0 to 150%.  The relevant Executive Bonus Payment Scale set forth in the Bonus Scales section is applied to determine the payout percentage of the financial performance components.  The financial performance component targets at 100% match the corresponding operating plans for HDV, TaxAct and corporate opex approved by the Board of Directors. Efile targets shall be adjusted based on actual overall market performance relative to the assumptions for overall market performance in the budget model.

Financial Targets

The financial performance components used to determine the bonus achievement are defined below.  All components that are subject to normalization (e.g., removal of non-recurring expenses and/or revenue) shall only be so adjusted by the Compensation Committee, in its sole discretion.

		
	•
	Consolidated Revenue: Consolidated, externally reported Revenue

		
	•
	Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA: Consolidated, externally reported EBITDA, normalized for internally developed software and other non-operational items

Blucora 2017 Executive Bonus Plan    Page 2 of 2

		
	•
	Segment Revenue or Income (as applicable): Externally reported Income or Revenue for the applicable segment, with Income normalized for internally developed software and other non-operational items

		
	•
	Paid DDIY Efiles: Total DDIY efiles that are paid during the IRS designated filing season

		
	•
	Fee Based Net Flows: Actual new fee based assets relative to plan

		
	•
	Advisor Recruiting: Actual new advisors onboarded onto the HD Vest platform relative to plan

Bonus Scales

The applicable Executive Bonus Payment Scale below will be used to calculate the available amounts to be paid to each executive based on the financial performance components.
	
				
	Performance Level
	Financial Performance vs. Target
	Bonus Achievement
	Added Payout Rate Per 1% Attainment

	Below Minimum
	0% - 79%
	0.0%
	----

	Decelerated
	80% - 84%
	50.0% - 78%
	7%

	1:1
	85% - 115%
	85% - 115%
	----

	Accelerated
	116% - 120%
	122% - 150%
	7%

	Maximum
	> 120%
	Capped at 150%
	----

		
	•
	Rounding.  Performance results will be rounded up to the nearest whole percentage point.  For example, if the calculated performance achievement percentage is 79.1%, it will be rounded up to 80%.

		
	•
	Performance Thresholds.  There will be no payout for a financial performance component if the minimum specified threshold is not achieved.  However, if the threshold for one financial performance component is not achieved, a bonus may still be earned on the other financial performance component(s), provided performance for that measure achieves the applicable threshold.  

		
	•
	Acceleration Below and Above Target.  For determining bonus achievement percentage where a range is indicated in the financial performance vs. target column, the whole percentage point of financial performance achieved is mapped to the corresponding bonus achievement percentage using a linear scale between the low and high points in the range.

EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS
In order to be eligible for a bonus payment under the Plan, and for a bonus to be considered earned under the Plan, participants must be employed at the end of the fiscal year; provided, however, that if a participant’s employment is terminated during the year “without Cause” or by the participant for “Good Reason” or due to “Constructive Termination” as such terms are defined in the applicable participant’s employment agreement, then the participant will be entitled to accrued bonus as of the date of his or her 

Blucora 2017 Executive Bonus Plan    Page 3 of 3

termination.  Accrued bonus will be calculated as pro-rata achievement of financial performance components based on the then-current annual forecast.

APPROVAL
All bonus payments made to executives will be submitted to the Compensation Committee for final approval.  The Compensation Committee may adjust the final bonus amount as it deems appropriate.  The Committee has sole discretion to adjust bonus awards to reflect changes in the industry, company, the executive’s job duties or performance, or any other circumstance the Committee determines should impact bonus awards.

Blucora 2017 Executive Bonus Plan    Page 4 of 4

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