Document:

exv10w6

 

EXHIBIT 10.6

AMENDMENT #2

TO

AGREEMENT RE: CHANGE IN CONTROL

     THIS AMENDMENT #2 TO AGREEMENT RE: CHANGE IN CONTROL (this “Amendment #2) is made and entered
into as of the 21st day of February, 2008 (the “Effective Date”) by and between JAMES R. TALEVICH,
an individual (“Executive”), and I-FLOW CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation (“Company”).

Background

     A. The Company and Executive previously entered into that certain Agreement Re: Change in
Control dated as of June 21, 2001, as subsequently amended by an Amendment #1 to Agreement Re:
Change in Control dated as of February 23, 2006 (collectively, the “Agreement”).

     B. The Internal Revenue Service issued final regulations interpreting the rules and standards
under Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code on April 10, 2007 (the “Final 409A Regulations”).

     C. To comply with the Final 409A Regulations, the Company and Executive wish to amend and
modify certain provisions of the Agreement as provided herein, effective as of the Effective Date,
while leaving unchanged all other provisions of the Agreement.

Agreement

     In consideration of the foregoing, and for other good and valuable consideration the receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged, Executive and the Company hereby agree as follows:

          1. Qualifying Termination. Section 5(a) of the Agreement is hereby amended and
restated as follows:

(a) Executive voluntarily terminates his employment with the Company and its
affiliated companies. Executive, however, shall not be considered to have
voluntarily terminated his employment with the Company and its affiliated companies
if, following, or within ninety (90) days prior to, the Change in Control,
Executive’s base salary is reduced or adversely modified in any material respect or
Executive’s authority or duties are materially changed, and subsequent to such
reduction, modification or change Executive elects to terminate his employment with
the Company and its affiliated companies, after having given the Company at least 30
days prior written notice of such reduction, modification or change and a reasonable
opportunity to cure the same during such 30-day notice period. For such purposes,
Executive’s authority or duties shall conclusively be considered to have been
“materially changed” if, without Executive’s express and voluntary written consent,
there is any substantial diminution or adverse modification in Executive’s title,
status, overall position, responsibilities, reporting relationship, general working
environment (including without

 

 

limitation secretarial and staff support, offices, and frequency and mode of
travel), or if, without Executive’s express and voluntary written consent,
Executive’s job location is transferred to a site more than thirty (30) miles away
from his place of employment ninety (90) days prior to the Change in Control. In
this regard as well, Executive’s authority and duties shall conclusively be
considered to have been “materially changed” if, without Executive’s express and
voluntary written consent, Executive no longer holds the same title or no longer has
the same authority and responsibilities or no longer has the same reporting
responsibilities, in each case with respect and as to a publicly held parent company
which is not controlled by another entity or person.

          2. Compliance with Section 409A. Section 20 of the Agreement is hereby amended and
restated as follows:

20. Compliance with Section 409A. Notwithstanding any provision of this
Agreement to the contrary, if, at the time of Executive’s termination of employment
with the Company, Executive is a “specified employee” as defined in Section 409A of
the Code, and one or more of the payments or benefits received or to be received by
Executive pursuant to this Agreement would become subject to the additional tax
under Section 409A(a)(1)(B) of the Code or any other taxes or penalties imposed
under Section 409A of the Code (“Section 409A Taxes”) if provided at the time
otherwise required under this Agreement, no such payment or benefit will be provided
under this Agreement until the earliest of (a) the date which is six (6) months
after Executive’s “separation from service” or (b) the date of Executive’s death, or
such shorter period that, as determined by the Company, is sufficient to avoid the
imposition of Section 409A Taxes. The provisions of this Section 20 shall only
apply to the minimum extent required to avoid Executive’s incurrence of any Section
409A Taxes. In addition, if any provision of this Agreement would cause Executive
to incur any penalty tax or interest under Section 409A of the Code or any
regulations or Treasury guidance promulgated thereunder, the Company may reform such
provision to maintain to the maximum extent practicable the original intent of the
applicable provision without violating the provisions of Section 409A of the Code.

          3.No Other Changes. Except as otherwise set forth herein, all terms and provisions
of the Agreement remain unchanged and in full force and effect.

2

 

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have entered into this Amendment #2 as of the Effective
Date.

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	I-FLOW CORPORATION	 	 	 	JAMES R. TALEVICH	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	By:

	 	/s/ Donald M. Earhart
 

Donald M. Earhart

Chairman, President and

Chief Executive Officer
	 	 	 	By:
	 	/s/ James R. Talevich
 

James R. Talevich
	 	 

3exv10w7

 

EXHIBIT 10.7

I-FLOW CORPORATION

Summary of the

2008 Executive Performance Incentive Plan

Eligibility. The President and Chief Executive Officer, Executive Vice President and Chief
Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer are eligible to receive cash and equity bonuses under
the plan. All awards will be made pursuant to the I-Flow Corporation 2001 Equity Incentive Plan.

Objectives. The compensation committee determined that it will evaluate the following
criteria to determine whether and to what extent the plan objectives have been achieved: (i)
operating revenues (“Qualifying Revenues”) other than from its recently acquired subsidiary,
AcryMed Incorporated (“AcryMed”), (ii) operating expenses from operations excluding AcryMed
operating expenses and stock-based compensation as a percentage of Qualifying Revenues, and (iii)
operating profit from operations other than from AcryMed.

Administrative. The overall goal achievement percentage is the sum of (i) the
accomplishment percentage of each performance target times (ii) the weighting for each
objective. Thus, if one or more targets is exceeded, it is possible the overall goal achievement
percentage could be greater than 100%. In order to provide flexibility to management to operate and grow the
company, awards may be adjusted for any major events during the year; provided, however, that any
adjustment must be approved by the compensation committee and the board of directors. The
allocation of the aggregate awards, if any, among the officers will be determined by the
compensation committee and the board of directors based on their assessment of the contributions of
each officer.

Award Minimums/Maximums. In order to receive an award under the plan, a minimum aggregate
performance level of 85% must be achieved. At an overall goal achievement percentage of 100%, the
cash bonus award for the three officers combined is an aggregate of $1,000,000, and the equity
bonus award for the three officers combined is an aggregate of 150,000 shares of restricted stock.
The maximum cash bonus award for the three officers combined is an aggregate of $2,200,000, and the
maximum equity bonus award for the three officers combined is an aggregate of 225,000 shares of
restricted stock. At the minimum overall goal achievement percentage of 85%, the cash bonus award
for the three officers combined is an aggregate of $50,000, and the equity bonus award for the
three officers combined is an aggregate of 15,000 shares of restricted stock. For amounts earned
above or below the 100% performance level, the exact amount will be determined on a non-linear
graduated scale. All equity awards will be in the form of restricted stock granted pursuant to the
I-Flow Corporation 2001 Equity Incentive Plan.

Vesting of Equity Awards. Equity awards will consist of grants of restricted stock. The
restrictions will lapse and the shares will vest 50% on the first anniversary of the grant date and
50% on the second anniversary of the grant date.

Payment of Awards. After completion of the fiscal year, the compensation committee will
review the plan objectives and results and the recommendations of executive management. The board
of directors will assess the performance of the President and Chief Executive Officer, the
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer and the Chief Financial Officer and will, upon
recommendation from the compensation committee, approve the cash bonus awards and equity grants.
Earned cash bonus awards are typically paid each year in February. To be eligible for awards under
the plan, all employees must generally be on the Company’s payroll through the date of payment of the cash
bonus.exv10w14

 

    Exhibit 10.14

 

    Summary
    of the Covanta Holding Corporation Cash Bonus Program

 

    Administration.  With respect to senior
    management of Covanta Holding Corporation and its subsidiaries
    (collectively, the “Company”), the Cash Bonus Program
    is administered by the Compensation Committee (the
    “Committee”) of the Board of Directors of the Company.

 

    Purpose.  The annual cash bonus is a non-equity
    incentive-based compensation component designed such that a
    significant portion of a named executive officer’s annual
    compensation will be at risk and will vary (up or down) in any
    given year based upon the Company’s performance and the
    performance of each such named executive officer. One half of
    the annual cash bonus is determined by the Company’s actual
    financial performance compared to pre-determined financial
    performance measures and the other half of the annual cash bonus
    is based on the individual performance of the named executive
    officer compared to various individual performance measures
    specific to such named executive officer.

 

    Application of Company Performance
    Measures:  The Committee measures financial
    performance results with a percentage that is calculated between
    the stretch goal and the minimum goal. The Compensation
    Committee also sets a “target” bonus level for each of
    the named executive officers which is a stated percentage of
    such officer’s base salary. Based on the level of
    performance, bonuses are payable as follows:

 

			
	 	    • 
	
    if financial performance is at or below the “minimum”
    level, then no cash awards would be paid;

	 
	 	    • 
	
    if financial performance is at the “threshold” level,
    then a cash award at 65% of the “target bonus” level
    would be paid;

	 
	 	    • 
	
    if financial performance is at the “target” level,
    then a cash award at 100% of “target” level would be
    paid; and

	 
	 	    • 
	
    if financial performance is at or above the “stretch”
    level, then a cash award at 200% of the “target” level
    would be paid.

 

    Between the various levels, specific incentive cash award
    percentages are calculated as follows:

 

			
	 	    • 
	
    results between the “minimum” goal and an interim
    “threshold” goal are prorated linearly with 0% paid at
    the minimum goal and 65% paid at the “threshold” goal;

	 
	 	    • 
	
    results between the “threshold” goal and
    “target” goal are prorated linearly with 65% of
    “target” cash awards paid at the “threshold”
    goal and 100% of the “target” cash awards paid at the
    “target” goal; and

	 
	 	    • 
	
    results above the “target” goal are prorated linearly
    with 100% paid at the “target” goal and 200% paid at
    or above the “stretch” goal.

 

    Financial results are capped at 200% of target levels for all
    named executive officers.

 

    In order to assure that the intents and purposes of the
    compensation plans, including the annual bonuses, are
    effectuated, the Committee retains the discretion to make
    adjustments to the results for any given year. Reasons for
    adjustments could include removing the effects of unanticipated
    events, such as unbudgeted accounting changes, project
    restructurings, balance sheet adjustments and similar items
    which unless excluded would produce unintended consequences that
    are inconsistent with the intent and purpose of aligning the
    interests of named executive officers with those of our
    stockholders and to provide financial incentives to named
    executive officers to effectively implement our business plan
    and goals. In addition, the Committee retains the authority and
    discretion to increase or decrease the size of any
    performance-based award or payout.

 

    Individual Performance Measures.  The second
    component of the annual cash bonus for executive officers is
    their personal satisfaction of various individual performance
    measures (“Individual Performance Measures.”). These
    Individual Performance Measures, which are tied to the specific
    job and responsibilities of each named executive officer, are
    set on a prospective basis in February of each year by the
    Committee as part of its annual compensation process and
    communicated to each of the named executive officers. Although
    not directly tied to the Covanta Performance Measures, if the
    Company did not meet the “minimum” level of
    performance under the Covanta Performance Measures, then the
    bonus award pool would not have been funded and no cash bonuses
    would be payable for satisfaction of Individual Performance
    Measures.

Source: [{"source": "alea-institute/alea-institute/kl3m-data-edgar-agreements/train-00137-of-00352.parquet"}, [{"source": "alea-institute/alea-institute/kl3m-data-edgar-agreements/train-00137-of-00352.parquet"}], [{"source": "alea-institute/alea-institute/kl3m-data-edgar-agreements/train-00137-of-00352.parquet"}]]