Document:

Amendment to Employment Agreement between the Company and Judith Loughran

 Exhibit 10.2 
 EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT AMENDMENT 
 This Employment Agreement Amendment (this
“Amendment”) between Da-Lite Screen Company, Inc., an Indiana corporation (the “Company”), and Judith D. Loughran (the “Executive”) is dated as of March 29, 2011. 

WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive desire to amend certain provisions of the Executive’s Employment Agreement dated as of
April 5, 2004, as thereafter amended (the “Employment Agreement”). 
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the
premises and the mutual agreements contained herein, the Company and the Executive hereby agree as follows: 
 1. All of the
provisions of the Employment Agreement not amended hereby shall remain in full force and effect. Unless otherwise indicated, capitalized terms shall have the same meaning as referenced in the Employment Agreement. 

2. The Executive acknowledges and agrees that entering into this Amendment and the modifications to the Employment Agreement as a result
thereof do not constitute Good Reason and do not entitle the Executive to terminate employment for Good Reason. 
 3. The
Company shall pay the Executive a lump sum amount of $300,000 (“Closing Payment”), payable concurrently with the closing of the transactions contemplated by that certain Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of March 30, 2011, by and
among Milestone AV Technologies LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Milestone Holding Corporation, a Delaware corporation (“Buyer”), DLI Acquisition Corporation, an Indiana corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of Buyer, the
Company, and the Shareholders Representative (the “Merger”). If the transactions contemplated by the Merger are not consummated by the parties and a closing thereunder does not occur, then this Amendment will become null and void without
any further action by the Company or the Executive and the Executive will not be entitled to receive the Closing Payment. 
 4.
In consideration for the Closing Payment, the Executive has entered into this Amendment and agrees that if the Employment Period is not extended after the one (1) year anniversary of the closing of the Merger, for a one (1) year period
thereafter, the Executive will be available to the Company for general business consulting with compensation for such consulting services at a reasonable rate, as determined by mutual agreement between the Company and the Executive. 

5. This Amendment, and the amendments to the Employment Agreement set forth below, shall not go into effect or be binding on the Company
or the Executive until the closing of the Merger. 

 6. Section 1 of the Employment Agreement is amended by deleting the second sentence
thereof and replacing it with the following: 
 “The term of employment of the Executive by the Company pursuant to this
Agreement (the “Employment Period”) shall commence on the date that the Merger (as defined below) is consummated (the “Closing Date”) and end on the first (1st) anniversary of the Closing Date, unless earlier terminated
pursuant to Section 4 of this Agreement. During the Employment Period, the parties will determine whether it is mutually beneficial to negotiate a new longer-term employment agreement. The term “Merger” shall mean the transactions
contemplated by that certain Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of March 30, 2011, by and among Milestone AV Technologies LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Milestone Holding Corporation, a Delaware corporation (“Buyer”), DLI
Acquisition Corporation, an Indiana corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of Buyer, the Company, and the Shareholders Representative.” 
 7. The first sentence of Section 2 of the Employment Agreement shall be amended and restated by deleting the first sentence in its entirety and replacing it with the following: “The Company
shall employ the Executive during the Employment Period as its Executive Vice President.” 
 8. The Employment Agreement is
amended by adding the following new Section 19 as a part thereof: 
 “19. Code
Section 409A. It is intended that this Agreement will comply with Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”), and any regulations and guidelines issued thereunder, to the extent this Agreement is subject
thereto, and this Agreement shall be interpreted on a basis consistent with such intent.” 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties
have executed this Amendment as of the date above written. 
  

									
	Da-Lite Screen Company, Inc.	  		  	Executive	  	
					
	By:	 	 /s/ Richard E. Lundin
	  		  	 /s/ Judith D. Loughran
	  	

									
					
	Name:	 	 Richard E. Lundin
	  		  	Judith D. Loughran	  	

									
					
	Title:	 	 Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer2011 Award Formula under the Company's 2009 Key Officers Incentive Plan

 Exhibit 10.2 
 AWARD FORMULA FOR 2011 
 LEGGETT & PLATT, INCORPORATED

 2009 KEY OFFICERS INCENTIVE PLAN 
 The 2009 Key Officers Incentive Plan (“Plan”) provides cash awards to participants based on the Company’s operating results for the prior year. There are two award formulas under the
Plan, one for Corporate participants and one for Profit Center participants. 
 Under both formulas, a participant’s award is calculated by
reference to a percentage of the participant’s annual salary at the end of the year (the “target percentage”). The award formula and each participant’s target percentage are determined by the Plan Committee no later than
90 days after the beginning of each year or before 25% of the performance period has elapsed. 
 Participants in the Plan are the executive
officers of the Company. The Company has a separate Key Management Incentive Plan for other employees. Awards under the Key Management Incentive Plan are calculated in substantially the same manner as awards under the Plan. 

For 2011, awards under the Plan will be determined by achievement of the following performance objectives. In addition, awards will be made based on the
achievement of Individual Performance Goals, which will be established separately from this Plan and will be wholly independent of awards under this Plan. 
  

							
	 Participant Type
	  	 Performance Objectives
	  	Relative
Weight	 
	 Corporate Participants
	  	Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)	  	 	60	% 
		  	Cash Flow	  	 	20	% 
		  	Individual Performance Goals*	  	 	20	% 
	 Profit Center Participants
	  	Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)	  	 	60	% 
		  	Free Cash Flow (FCF)	  	 	20	% 
		  	Individual Performance Goals*	  	 	20	% 

  

	*	This portion of the award is established outside the Plan. 

 Award Formula for Corporate Participants 
 Awards for Corporate participants are
determined by the Company’s aggregate 2011 financial results. The performance objectives are calculated as follows. Financial results from acquisitions are excluded from calculations in the year of acquisition. 

 

					
	ROCE =	 	 EBIT
	  	
		 	Net PP&E and Working Capital1,2	  	

  

	1	 We use a quarterly
average for PP&E and Working Capital 

	2	 Working Capital,
excluding cash and current maturities of long-term debt, as presented on the December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2011 Company’s Consolidated Balance Sheets 

Cash Flow = EBITDA – Capital Expenditures +/- Change in Working Capital1 

 

	1	 Change in Working
Capital, excluding cash and current maturities of long-term debt, from December 31, 2010 to December 31, 2011, as reflected on the Company’s Consolidated Balance Sheets 

The Committee shall adjust all items of gain, loss or expense for the fiscal year determined to be (i) extraordinary, (ii) unusual in nature,
(iii) infrequent in occurrence, (iv) related to the disposal of a segment of a business, or (v) related to a change in accounting principle, all as determined in accordance with standards established under Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles. 

 Achievement targets and payout percentages for Corporate participants are set forth below. No awards are
paid for ROCE achievement below 24% and Cash Flow below $281M. The payout is capped at 150%. The payout will be interpolated for achievement levels falling between those set out in the schedule. 

2011 

Corporate Payout Schedule 
  

																			
	ROCE	 	 	 	 	 	Cash Flow	 
	 Achievement
	 	 	Payout	 	 	 	 	 	Achievement	 	 	Payout	 
	 	<24	% 	 	 	0	% 	 				 	<$	281M	  	 	 	0	% 
	 	24	% 	 	 	50	% 	 	 	Threshold	  	 	$	281M	  	 	 	50	% 
	 	26	% 	 	 	75	% 	 				 	$	296M	  	 	 	75	% 
	 	28	% 	 	 	100	% 	 	 	Target	  	 	$	311M	  	 	 	100	% 
	 	30	% 	 	 	125	% 	 				 	$	326M	  	 	 	125	% 
	 	32	% 	 	 	150	% 	 	 	Maximum	  	 	$	341M	  	 	 	150	% 

 The award is calculated by multiplying a
participant’s salary, target percentage, the relative weight of the performance measure, and the payout percentage. The sample calculation set forth below assumes a participant with a base salary of $250,000 and a target percentage of 50%. If
the Company achieved 28% ROCE and $281M Cash Flow, the participant’s award under the Plan (which does not include the Individual Performance Goals), would be $87,500. 

 

																					
	 Performance Objective
	  	Participant’s
Base
Salary	 	  	Participant’s
Target
%	 	 	Relative
Weight	 	 	Payout
Percentage	 	 	Award	 
	 ROCE
	  	$	250,000	  	  	 	50	% 	 	 	60	% 	 	 	100	% 	 	$	75,000	  
	 Cash Flow
	  	$	250,000	  	  	 	50	% 	 	 	20	% 	 	 	50	% 	 	$	12,500	  
		  				  				 				 				 	 	 	 
	 Total Award
	  				  				 				 				 	$	87,500	  

 Award Formula for Profit
Center Participants 
 Profit Center participants in the Plan manage numerous operating locations. The Company sets a ROCE target and a
FCF target for each Business Unit every year. The achievement of those BU targets “rolls up” to an aggregate achievement for all the operations under a Profit Center participant’s management. Financial results at each operating
location may include a critical compliance adjustment, consisting of a potential 5% increase for exceptional safety performance or a potential 20% deduction for critical compliance failures. 
 The performance objectives are calculated as follows. Financial results from acquisitions are excluded from calculations in the year of acquisition. 

 

					
	ROCE =	 	 EBIT
	  	
		 	Net PP&E + Working Capital1,2	  	

  

	1	 We use monthly
averaging for PP&E and Working Capital, adjusted for currency effects. 

	2	 Working Capital
excludes cash and current maturities of long-term debt and balance sheet items not directly related to on-going profit center activity, such as interest receivable and payable, income taxes receivable and payable, current deferred taxes assets and
liabilities, and dividends payable. 

  
 2 

			
	FCF =	 	EBITDA (adjusted for currency effects) ± Change in Working Capital1 ± Gain or Loss from Non-Cash Impairments – Capital Expenditures

 

	1	 Working Capital
excludes cash and current maturities of long-term debt and balance sheet items not directly related to on-going profit center activity, such as interest receivable and payable, income taxes receivable and payable, current deferred taxes assets and
liabilities, and dividends payable. 

 The Committee shall adjust all items of gain, loss or expense for the fiscal year
determined to be (i) extraordinary, (ii) unusual in nature, (iii) infrequent in occurrence, (iv) related to the disposal of a segment of a business, or (v) related to a change in accounting principle, all as determined in
accordance with standards established under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. 
 Achievement targets and payout percentages for Profit
Center participants are set forth below. No awards are paid for achievement below 80% of the ROCE and FCF targets for that business segment. The payout is capped at 150%. The payout will be interpolated for achievement levels falling between those
set out in the schedule. 
 2011 
 Profit Center Targets 
  

									
	 Segment
	  	ROCE Target	 	 	FCF Target	 
	 Residential
	  	 	27.4	% 	 	$	168.8M	  
	 Commercial
	  	 	24.2	% 	 	$	53.8M	  
	 Industrial
	  	 	23.7	% 	 	$	39.2M	  
	 Specialized
	  	 	30.1	% 	 	$	67.9M	  

 2011

 Profit Center Payout Schedule 
  

									
	 Achievement
	 	 	 	  	Payout	 
	 	<80	% 	 		  	 	0	% 
	 	80	% 	 	Threshold	  	 	60	% 
	 	90	% 	 		  	 	80	% 
	 	100	% 	 	Target	  	 	100	% 
	 	110	% 	 		  	 	120	% 
	 	120	% 	 		  	 	140	% 
	 	125	% 	 	Maximum	  	 	150	% 

 The award is calculated by multiplying a
participant’s salary, target percentage, the relative weight of the performance measure, and the payout percentage. The sample calculation below assumes a participant with a base salary of $250,000 and a target percentage of 50%. If the
business segment achieved 100% if its ROCE target and 90% of its FCF target, as adjusted for compliance, the participant’s award under the Plan (which does not include the Individual Performance Goals), would be $95,000. 

  
 3 

																					
	 Performance Objective
	  	Participant’s
Base
Salary	 	  	Participant’s
Target
%	 	 	Relative
Weight	 	 	Payout
Percentage	 	 	Award	 
	 ROCE
	  	$	250,000	  	  	 	50	% 	 	 	60	% 	 	 	100	% 	 	$	75,000	  
	 FCF
	  	$	250,000	  	  	 	50	% 	 	 	20	% 	 	 	80	% 	 	$	20,000	  
		  				  				 				 				 	 	 	 
	 Total Award
	  				  				 				 				 	$	95,000	  

  
 4

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