Document:

Exhibit 10(iii)43

	
 

	
 

	
 

	

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
May
30, 2007 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
  Table of Contents

	
 

	
 

	
Section
  I.

	
 

	
Objectives

	
3

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
II.

	
 

	
Overview

	
5

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
III.

	
 

	
Establishing Financial and Operating Goals

	
8

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
IV.

	
 

	
Individual Contributor Evaluation

	
10

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
V.

	
 

	
Calculating the Annual Incentive
  Payment

	
11

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Exhibit
  I

	
 

	
2007 STI Targets

	
12

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
I. Objectives 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
          Consistent
  with our emphasis on pay for performance incentive
  compensation programs, we have established the Executive Annual Incentive
  Plan under which our executive officers are eligible to receive annual
  incentive cash payments based on
  performance against annual established performance targets. The annual
  incentive is designed to reward achievement of
  each year’s business plan objectives in a manner consistent with achievement of the Corporation’s strategy
  of achieving long-term shareholder value.

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
          In
  order to ensure that our compensation package is weighted heavily towards pay for performance, the annual
  incentive for 2007 represented from 20% to 60% of an executive’s
  base salary (assuming payout at the target level), depending on the
  executive’s level of responsibility. Moreover, annual incentives are included in an executive’s “final average pay” for purposes of determining his/her
  retirement benefits and are included in the formula for calculating
  severance benefits in the event of a
  change in control.

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
          Under
  the Executive Annual Incentive Plan, our executives have the opportunity to earn targeted
  incentive cash payments that are calculated as a
  percentage of each person’s annual base
  salary. These percentages are developed by the CH Energy Group’s Compensation Committee (the “Committee”),
  and approved by the independent Directors on our Board
  of Directors, according to each person’s position and level of responsibility.
  Annual incentive award opportunities for our executives, in the aggregate, are targeted to result in cash payments
  equal to the market median of our comparator groups assuming our target business objectives, which are primarily
  quantitative and financial in nature, are achieved. Performance is measured
  according to levels established each year for threshold performance, targeted performance, and superior
  performance. The performance levels are established so that target attainment
  is not assured. Instead, our
  executives are required to demonstrate
  significant effort, dedication, and achievement to attain payment for performance at target or
  above.

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
          After
  the end of each calendar year, management assesses the performance of the Corporation for each
  performance target and calculates the annual incentive amounts for the prior
  year. These assessments and calculations
  are verified for accuracy each year
  by the Hay Group. The Compensation Committee then

- 3 -

	
 

	
 

	
reviews the verified assessments and calculations and
  approves the resulting annual incentive amounts. The incentive compensation opportunity will vary, from 0% to 150% of
  the targeted percentage of base salary, according to the
  level of overall corporate performance achieved
  for the year relative to the established
  performance targets.

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
The annual incentive amounts for each executive may be
  adjusted upwards or downwards by up to 50% based upon the CEO and/or the Committee’s assessment of the individual’s
  performance. Such adjustments, if made, are based
  on an evaluation of each officer’s contribution to achieving corporate
  opportunities and meeting corporate challenges, as well
  as an evaluation of the quality of  the individual’s performance in exercising
  responsibility described in his/her position
  description.

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Administration

	
 

	
The plan shall
  be administered by CHEG management under the direct supervision and approval of CHEG’s Board of
  Directors.

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
The plan is based on annual performance and requires
  that the participant be an active employee of
  CH Energy Group, Inc. (“CHEG”) or its
  subsidiaries or properties at the end of the calendar
  year during which performance goals have been set and results
  have been evaluated, except in the case of death, disability or normal retirement, the incentive opportunity
  will be prorated and the evaluation of performance against both
  quantitative goals and subjective goals
  will be at the sole discretion of Board of Directors and the CEO.

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Goals shall be agreed upon by the Board of Directors and
  be documented in writing no later than
  February 1 of each year.

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Performance evaluations and
  incentive award payments shall be completed and delivered to the
  participant no later than March 1 of the
  following year.

- 4 -

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
II. Overview of the Plan

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Incentive
Opportunity 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Notwithstanding
  the above statement, the board, at its sole discretion, may
  increase the calculated incentive amount or reduce it to zero. The calculated maximum amount may be exceeded should the directors
deem that the
  participant’s or company’s
  performance should merit additional compensation.

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
The
  board, at its sole discretion, may eliminate any or all of the annual awards under
  this plan in response to a major employee or public safety occurrence that
  resulted in a death or serious injury or a major public incident that
  reflected poorly on the company’s image or public trust.

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Target
and Maximum

Incentive
Schedule 

	
 

	
The
  following chart specifies the targeted and maximum incentive opportunity
  as a percent of base salary for each participant.

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Allocation
of Incentive 

Opportunities 

	
 

	
 Percent
of Base Salary  

	
 
	

	

	

	
 

	
Officer
Level  

	
Target 

Incentive  

	
Maximum Incentive  

	
 
	

	

	

	
 

	
CEO 

	
60% 

	
90% 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Senior
Officers 

	
40% 

	
60% 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
President of Griffith 

	
40% 

	
60% 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
SVP 

	
30% 

	
45% 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Vice
Presidents 

	
25% 

	
37.5%    

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
AVP/Other
Officers 

	
20% 

	
30% 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
The
  incentive opportunity is divided among various segments with varying weights
  for each segment depending on the participant’s business unit affiliation.
  Executives at CHEG or one of the business units may have their incentive
  opportunity tied to some or all of the following categories. The categories
  are:

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
1.

	
Corporate
Financial Performance: Financial and investment performance goals
approved by The Board of Directors for CHEG or its subsidiaries or business units.  

- 5 - 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
2.

	
The operation of CHGE against goals
  approved by the Board of Directors.

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
3.

	
The operational performance
  of CHEC or a business unit of CHEC against milestones approved by the Board of Directors.

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
4.

	
A
  subjective evaluation, recommended by the CEO and/or the
Compensation Committee and approved by the
  Board, of the participant’s overall contribution to the corporation’s performance based upon the
  Committee’s assessment of the individual’s
  performance. Such adjustments, if made, are
  based on an evaluation of each officer’s contribution to achieving corporate opportunities and meeting
  corporate challenges, as well as an evaluation of the
  quality of the individual’s
  performance in exercising responsibility described in his position description.

- 6 - 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Each of the incentive opportunities are measured,
 evaluated and rewarded independently
 although there are interconnections between
 each of them. The allocation and weighting of the targeted incentive
 opportunity and the assigned STI Target Groupings are as follows.

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Performance Category

	
 

	
CH Energy Group

	
 

	
CHG&E

	
 

	
Griffith

	

	

	

	

	

	

	

	
Corporate Financial Performance EPS - CH Energy Group

	
 

	
100%

	
 

	
0%

	
 

	
0%

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Redeployment of Capital Outside of CHG&E

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	

	

	

	

	

	

	

	
CHG&E Performance

	
 

	
0%

	
 

	
100%

	
 

	
0%

	

	

	

	

	

	

	

	
Griffith

	
 

	
0%

	
 

	
0%

	
 

	
100%

	

	

	

	

	

	

	

	
     The annual incentive amounts
 for each executive officer may be
 adjusted upwards or downwards by up to 50% based upon the Committee’s
 assessment of the individual’s
 performance. Such adjustments, if
 made, are based on an evaluation
 of each officer’s contribution to achieving corporate opportunities and meeting corporate challenges, as well as an evaluation of the quality of the individual’s performance in exercising responsibility described in his position
 description.

	
 

	
+/-50%

	
 

	
+/-50%

	
 

	
+/-50%

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
2007 STI Target Grouping

	
 

	

	
 

	
CH Energy Group

	
CHG&E

	
Griffith

	
 

	

	

	

	
 

	
SV
 Lant

	
CE
 Meyer

	
WR Groft

	
 

	
CM
 Capone

	
CA Freni

	
 

	
 

	
JJ
 DeVirgilio

	
DD
 VanBuren

	
 

	
 

	
DS
 Doyle

	
JP Lovette

	
 

	
 

	
SA Renner

	
TC
 Brocks

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
ML
 Mosher

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
KJ Wright

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
PE Haering

	
 

- 7 -

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
III. Establishing Financial and 

Operating Goals and
Milestones

	
 

	
Agreeing on
 and Defining 

 Operating Goals

	
 

	
Annually, the CEO and the Board
 will agree on one or several critical
 financial and/or operating goals to be achieved in the coming year by CH Energy Group, Inc., CHGE
 and/or CHEC. 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
The Goal
 Definition Process

	
 

	
Annually, the CEO and the
 board or its designated committee will
 reach an agreement on several parameters for each goal or goals specified: 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
•

	
The definition of the
 measurement involved 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
•

	
The relative weight assigned to
 that goal for each category of executive. 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
•

	
Three performance benchmarks for each goal: 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
•

	
Threshold performance 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
•

	
Targeted (or expected) performance
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
•

	
Superior performance 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Wherever possible, goals should
 be as definitive and quantitative as
 possible. 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
The current year’s Goals are
 attached as Exhibit I. 

- 8 -

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Calculating a
 Weighted 

 Performance Grade

	
 

	
Each of the goal-based
 performances would be evaluated at the end of the year and evaluation %
 approved by the committee. The relationship
 between performance and % award is as follows: 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
•     Below “Threshold” — 0%
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
•     “Threshold” —  50% 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
•     “Targeted’ — 100% 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
•     “Superior” — 150% 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
•     Above “Superior” — 150%
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
For performances between these benchmarks, a
 fractional % would be given based on a
 linear interpolation of the measurement
 and the % award. For example, if the performance were exactly midway
 between Targeted and Superior, then 125% of
 Target (midway between 100 and 150 %) would be awarded. 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Each performance category has
 been assigned a weighting. These have
 been specified in Section II of this document. For purposes of calculating an
 incentive, the % earned in each category is then weighted based on the
 weighting assigned to the category. 

- 9 -

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
IV.

	
Individual
 Contributor Evaluation

	
 

	
 

	
Intent of this Element

	
          The
 annual incentive amounts for each executive officer may be adjusted
 upwards or downwards by up to 50% based upon the Committee’s assessment of the individual’s performance. Such adjustments, if made,
are
 based on an evaluation of each
 officer’s contribution to achieving corporate
 opportunities and meeting corporate challenges, as well as an evaluation of the quality of the
 individual’s performance in
 exercising responsibility described in his position description. This incentive opportunity is intended to provide the CEO and
Compensation Committee with flexibility
 to reflect the participant’s performance in areas other than those directly quantified in the previous incentive elements. Included
in the considerations for
 this incentive would be the
 following:

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
An assessment of the quality of performance relative
 to the major responsibilities identified in the position description.

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
An assessment of the contribution made toward
 advancing corporate projects and priorities included in the business plan for the year and/or
 the contributions made toward effectively responding to emerging issues during the year.

- 10 -

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
V.

	
Calculating the
 Annual Incentive Payment 

	
 

	
 

	
Calibration of the Incentive
 Award

	
For all executives the weighting for this segment is
 +/- 50% of the incentive
 opportunity. The targeted evaluation is 0%.Calculating the Incentive Payment

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
The steps used to convert the various weighted average
 % earned are as follows:

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
1.

	
Calculate the evaluation % for each performance
 category. 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
2.

	
Convert the evaluation % based on the weighting for
 each category.

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
3.

	
Add the weighted evaluation percentages for all
 categories to determine the award percentage.

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
4.

	
Adjust the award percentage by +/- 50 % for the
 individual contribution evaluation and apply this amount to the incumbent’s salary at
 the beginning of the year to arrive at the incentive payment to be made.

- 11 -

EXHIBIT I

Revision — May 30, 2007 

(Revisions in Bold Type)

December
15, 2006 FINAL

2007 STI
Targets

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Target

	
Weight

	
Threshold

	
Target

	
Superior

	

	

	

	

	

	

	
CH
 Energy Group

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
EPS4,
 6

	
75

	
%

	
$2.48

	
$2.68

	
$2.88

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Redeployment of
Capital2, 5

 Outside of CHGE

	
25

	
%

	
$15 Million

	
$20 Million

	
$25 Million

	

	

	

	

	

	

	
CHGE

 EPS4

	
60

	
%

	
$1.94

	
$2.04

	
$2.14

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Customer Satisfaction -

 JD Power 3

	
20

	
%

	
7th of 15 

 Companies
 

 or 53rd
 

 Percentile

	
Top Third

	
Top Quartile

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Reliability
 (SAIF1)

	
20

	
%

	
1.50

	
LT 1.45 
(JP Penalty Level)

	
1.40

	

	

	

	

	

	

	
Griffith

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
EPS4

	
60

	
%

	
$.20

	
$.24

	
$.28

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Acquisitions2,
 5

	
20

	
%

	
$3 Million

	
$5 Million

	
$10 Million

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Additional
 Residential 

 Customers
 - Automatic 

 Delivery

	
10

	
%

	
0

	
600

	
1,200

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Delivery
 Efficiency1

	
10

	
%

	
11.2¢

	
11.0¢

	
10.6¢

	
 

	
 

	
1 -

	
Total
 Delivered Expense/Total Delivered Gallons. 

	
 

	
 

	
2 -

	
Based
 on dollars deployed. Performance of investments will be tracked in subsequent
 years vs. projections at time of commitment. Variations from projections will
 be considered in subsequent years, when relevant, in determining “individual
 contributor” adjustments to STI awards (±50%). 

	
 

	
 

	
3 -

	
Versus
 eastern region. 

	
 

	
 

	
4 -

	
Normalized
 for heating and cooling degree days, both revenue and expense and major
 storms. 

	
 

	
 

	
5 -

	
Includes
 both tuck-ins and expansions closed during the year. 

	
 

	
 

	
6 -

	
Net of interest income. 

- 12 -NOTICE OF PERFORMANCE UNIT AWARD

 Exhibit 10.2 
 NOTICE OF PERFORMANCE UNIT AWARD 
 under the 
 2003 ALBEMARLE CORPORATION INCENTIVE PLAN 
 This AWARD, made as of the fifth day of February 2008, by Albemarle Corporation, a Virginia corporation (the “Company”), to «Name» (“Participant”), is made pursuant to and subject to the
provisions of the Company’s 2003 Incentive Plan (the “Plan”). All terms that are used herein that are defined in the Plan shall have the same meaning given them in the Plan. 
 Contingent Performance Units 
  

	1.	Grant Date. Pursuant to the Plan, the Company, on February 5, 2008 (the “Grant Date”), granted Participant an Incentive Award (“Award”)
in the form of «Units» Performance Units (which number of Units is referred to herein as the “Target Units”), subject to the terms and conditions of the Plan and subject to the terms and conditions set forth
herein. «ThresholdUnits» Performance Units are defined as the Threshold Units to be earned upon the conditions stated below. 

  

	2.	Accounts. Performance Units granted to Participant shall be credited to an account (the “Account”) established and maintained for Participant. The Account of
Participant shall be the record of Performance Units granted to the Participant under the Plan, is solely for accounting purposes and shall not require a segregation of any Company assets. 

  

	3.	Terms and Conditions. No Award shall be earned and Participant’s interest in the Performance Units granted hereunder shall be forfeited, except to the extent that
the following paragraphs are satisfied. 

  

	4.	Performance Criteria. Participant’s Performance Units shall be earned as soon as practicable after the end of the Measurement Period based on the following
formula (to the nearest whole Performance Unit). Such Performance Units shall be subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the following paragraphs of this Agreement. 

  

	 	(a)	The Measurement Period is the 2008 and 2009 calendar period. 

  

	 	(b)	Earned Award = Net Income Performance Award % of Target Units x Performance Units 

 Net Income Performance Award % of Target Units. The Net Income Performance Award % of Target Units is determined according to the following table (awards to be interpolated between the dollar amounts listed
below): 
  

			
	 Cumulative Net Income
	  	Net Income Performance Award % of Target Units
	    $ 569 million	  	                150%
	    $ 516 million	  	                100%
	    $ 466 million	  	                Threshold Units
	< $ 466 million	  	                0%

  

 Page 1 of 5 

 “Net Income” is the net income before special items each calendar year in the Measurement
Period as determined by the Company for such purpose provided, however, that in accordance with the Plan and as approved by the Committee in its sole and absolute discretion, Net Income may be adjusted to reflect extraordinary and significant events
that distort current earnings. 
 “Cumulative Net Income” is the Net Income for each calendar year in the Measurement Period added
together. 
 For purposes of the above calculations, Net Income Performance Award % of Target Units will be rounded to the nearest whole
percent. 
 Valuation of Performance Units 
  

	5.	Value of Units. The value of each Performance Unit shall be equal to the value of one share of the Company’s common stock. 

  

	6.	Value of Stock. For purposes of this Award, the value of the Company’s common stock is the Fair Market Value (as defined in the Plan) on the date any Performance
Units become vested hereunder. 

 Vesting of Earned Performance Units 
  

	7.	Earned Awards. As soon as practicable after the end of the Measurement Period, a determination shall be made by the Committee of the number of whole Performance Units
that Participant has earned. The date as of which the Committee determines the number of Performance Units shall be the “Award Date.” 

  

	8.	Restrictions. Except as provided herein, the earned Performance Units shall remain unvested and forfeitable. 

  

	9.	Vesting. Participant’s interest in one-half of the earned Performance Units shall become vested and non-forfeitable on the Award Date and will be paid as soon as
practicable thereafter. The final one-half of the earned Performance Units shall become vested and non-forfeitable as of January 1 of the first calendar year following the calendar year that contains the Award Date. 

 Death, Disability, Retirement and Termination by the Company for any Reason other than Cause 
  

	10.	During the Measurement Period. Anything in this Notice of Award to the contrary notwithstanding, if Participant separates from service during the Measurement Period on
account of death, permanent and total disability within the meaning of section 22(e)(3) of the Code (“Disability” or “Disabled”), Retirement (as defined in paragraph 14 hereof) or termination by the Company for any reason other
than cause, the Participant’s Performance Units shall be deemed earned based on a ratio of the Net Income for the whole calendar year, if any, included in the Measurement Period that has elapsed as of date of termination divided by 50% of the
Cumulative Net Income target, times 50% of the performance units granted (one-half of the Measurement Period). The number of Performance Units shall be determined by the Committee in its sole and absolute discretion within the limits provided in the
Plan and the Performance Units shall be fully vested and payable pursuant to paragraphs 16-18 hereof. 

  

 Page 2 of 5 

	11.	During the Vesting Period. Anything in this Notice of Award to the contrary notwithstanding, if Participant dies, becomes Disabled or Retires while in the employ of
the Company or an Affiliate or is terminated by the Company for any reason other than cause and prior to the forfeiture of the Performance Units under paragraph 13, all earned Performance Units that are forfeitable shall become non-forfeitable as of
the date of Participant’s death, Disability, Retirement or termination by the Company for any reason other than cause, as the case may be. 

  

	12.	After the Measurement Period. Anything in this Notice of Award to the contrary notwithstanding, if, after the Measurement Period ends, but prior to the Award Date,
Participant dies, becomes Disabled or Retires while in the employ of the Company or an Affiliate or is terminated by the Company for any reason other than cause, such Participant shall earn his Performance Units pursuant to paragraph 7 and such
earned Units shall be fully vested as of the Award Date and payable pursuant to paragraphs 16-18 hereof. 

  

	13.	Forfeiture. All Performance Units that are forfeitable shall be forfeited if Participant’s employment with the Company or an Affiliate terminates voluntarily or
is terminated with cause, except by reason of Participant’s death, Retirement, Disability, or his termination by the Company for any reason other than cause. 

  

	14.	Retirement. Retirement means, for purposes of this Award, early, normal or late retirement under the terms of a qualified defined benefit retirement plan maintained by
the Company. 

  

	15.	Termination. The Committee shall have the authority, in its sole and absolute discretion, to determine whether Participant’s termination from employment is for
cause or for any reason other than cause. 

 Payment of Awards 
  

	 16.
	 Time of Payment. Payment of Participant’s Performance Units shall be made as soon as practicable
after the Units have become non-forfeitable, but in no event later than March 15th of the calendar year after the year in which the Units become
non-forfeitable. 

  

	17.	Form of Payment. The vested Performance Units shall be paid in whole shares of the Company’s common stock. 

  

	18.	Death of Participant. If Participant dies prior to the termination of his employment with the Company, an amount equal to the amount of the Participant’s
non-forfeitable Performance Units shall be paid to his or her Beneficiary. Participant shall have the right to designate a Beneficiary on a form filed with the Committee. If Participant fails to designate a Beneficiary, or if at the time of the
Participant’s death there is no surviving Beneficiary, any amounts payable will be paid to the Participant’s estate. 

  

	19.	Taxes. The Company will withhold from the Award the number of whole shares necessary to satisfy tax-withholding requirements. 

 General Provisions 
  

	20.	No Right to Continued Employment. Neither this Award nor the granting, earning or vesting of Performance Units shall confer upon Participant any right with respect to
continuance of employment by the Company or an Affiliate, nor shall it interfere in any way with the right of the Company or an Affiliate to terminate the Participant’s employment at any time. 

  

 Pag 3 of 5 

	21.	Change in Capital Structure. In accordance with the terms of the Plan, the terms of this grant shall be adjusted as the Committee determines is equitable in the event
the Company effects one or more stock dividends, stock split-ups, subdivisions or consolidations of shares or other similar changes in capitalization. 

  

	22.	Governing Law. This Award shall be governed by the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia and applicable Federal law. All disputes arising under this Award
shall be adjudicated solely within the state or federal courts located within the Commonwealth of Virginia 

  

	23.	Conflicts. In the event of any conflict between the provisions of the Plan as in effect on the Grant Date and the provisions of this Award, the provisions of the Plan
shall govern. All references herein to the Plan shall mean the Plan as in effect on the Grant Date. 

  

	24.	Binding Effect. Subject to the limitations stated above and in the Plan, this Award shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the legatees, distributees, and
personal representatives of Participant and the successors of the Company. 

  

	25.	Change in Control. Anything in this Notice of Award to the contrary notwithstanding, upon a Change in Control (as defined in the Plan), the following rules shall
apply: 

  

	(a)	If a Change in Control occurs before the Measurement Period has been completed, a portion of the Participant’s Performance Units shall be deemed earned and will be vested and
paid. The number of Performance Units that will be deemed earned and vested in accordance with the prior sentence shall equal the greater of: 

  

	(1)	the target number of Performance Units granted to the individual; and 

  

	(2)	a number of Performance Units based on actual performance of the Company against the performance criteria for the Performance Units for that portion of the Measurement Period for
the Performance Units elapsed up to the end of the most recently completed calendar quarter prior to the date of the Change in Control and based on target performance during the balance of such Measurement Period in accordance with the following
formula: 

 Number of Units to be vested and paid = (QC/8) x (AP/TP) x Number of Target Units + ((8-QC)/8) x Number of Target
Units 
 Where: QC = the number of completed calendar quarters of the performance period prior to a Change in Control. 
 AP = actual performance of the Company under the criteria for the Performance Units for the relevant period. 
 TP = target performance of the Company under the criteria for the Performance Units for the relevant period. 
 If a Change in Control occurs after the Measurement Period has been completed, but prior to the forfeiture of the Performance Units under paragraph 13,
all earned Performance Units that are forfeitable shall become non-forfeitable as of the date of the Change in Control. 
  

 Page 4 of 5 

 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Award to be signed on its behalf. 
  

			
	ALBEMARLE CORPORATION
		
	By:	 	  

  

 Page 5 of 5

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