Document:

EXB 10.20 - 2015 Officer Incentive Bonus Plan

Exhibit 10.20

2015 Executive Officer Incentive Bonus Plan
	
		
	To:
	Executive Officers 

	From:
	Compensation Committee, Board of Directors

	Date:
	March 2015

	Re:
	Incentive Bonus Pay for 2015

This document outlines the incentive bonus plan for executive officers of Green Dot Corporation (“Green Dot”) for 2015 (the “Plan”).  For purposes of the Plan, “executive officer” means an executive officer of Green Dot who has been designated by the Committee (as defined below) as a participant in the Plan (“Participant”).  
The Compensation Committee (the “Committee”) of Green Dot’s Board of Directors (the “Board”) will administer the Plan. Subject to the general purposes, terms and conditions of the Plan, the Committee shall have authority to implement and carry out the Plan including authority to construe and interpret the Plan. All questions of interpretation or construction of the Plan shall be determined by the Committee. The Committee reserves the right at any time during the year to modify the Plan in total or in part. This Plan may be amended, suspended or terminated at any time at the sole and absolute discretion of the Committee.
In order to be eligible to participate in the Plan a Participant must be (i) an employee 90 days before the close of the cycle and (ii) employed at the time of payment. 
Executive Officer Incentive Bonus Plan
Bonuses will be paid on an annual basis based upon Green Dot’s achievement of the earnings and revenue metrics set forth herein. Bonuses will be paid soon after the Audit Committee of the Board has approved Green Dot’s final 2015 financial statements, which should be during the first quarter of 2016.
Actual bonus paid = Base Salary x Target Bonus x Actual Payout Multiplier 
Target bonus
The target bonus is the target amount that a Participant is eligible to receive, stated as either a percentage of base salary or a flat dollar amount. For 2015, the target bonus amount for each Participant is 50% of his or her 2015 base salary, unless determined otherwise by the Committee.
Achievement of Corporate Objectives
The Actual Payout Multiplier is based upon the company’s achievement of two metrics (1) its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (“EBITDA”) and (2) its adjusted total operating revenue (“Annual Revenue”), both terms of which are defined below. EBITDA and Annual Revenue correlate to the Actual Payout Multiplier (as defined below). No bonus shall be payable if Green Dot fails to achieve at least 90% of the applicable target of either metric, even if Green Dot achieves at least 90% of the target of the other metric.

	
											
	Metric 2: EBITDA (as a % of target)
	% of Target
	Metric 1: Annual Revenue (as a % of target)

	90%
	92.5%
	95%
	97.5%
	100%
	105%
	110%
	115%
	120%

	120%
	100%
	106%
	113%
	119%
	125%
	131%
	138%
	144%
	150%

	115%
	94%
	100%
	106%
	113%
	119%
	125%
	131%
	138%
	144%

	110%
	88%
	94%
	100%
	106%
	113%
	119%
	125%
	131%
	138%

	105%
	81%
	88%
	94%
	100%
	106%
	113%
	119%
	125%
	131%

	100%
	75%
	81%
	88%
	94%
	100%
	106%
	113%
	119%
	125%

	97.5
	69%
	75%
	81%
	88%
	94%
	100%
	106%
	113%
	119%

	95%
	63%
	69%
	75%
	81%
	88%
	94%
	100%
	106%
	113%

	92.5
	56%
	63%
	69%
	75%
	81%
	88%
	94%
	100%
	106%

	90%
	50%
	56%
	63%
	69%
	75%
	81%
	88%
	94%
	100%

As illustrated in the table above, Participants can achieve 100% of their target bonus amount under this Plan under varying degrees of performance.  For example, Participants would earn 100% of their target bonus amount if Green Dot achieves 95% and 110% of the target EBITDA and Annual Revenue, respectively, or if Green Dot achieves 120% and 90% of the target EBITDA and Annual Revenue, respectively.   The minimum bonus payable is 50% of target upon Green Dot achieving 90% of the target of each of EBITDA and Annual Revenue, and the maximum bonus payable is 150% of target upon Green Dot achieving 120% or more of the target of each of EBITDA and Annual Revenue.  For example, a Participant with a $150,000 annual base salary for 2015 would, at 100% of target, receive a bonus of $60,000 ($150,000 (base salary) x 40% (% of base salary) x 100% (Actual Payout Multiplier). 
“EBITDA” means the amount of earnings before interest, income taxes, depreciation and amortization for the year ending December 31, 2015 reflected in Green Dot’s consolidated statements of operations excluding employee stock-based compensation expense, stock-based retailer incentive compensation expense and other non-recurring items. Other non-recurring items to be excluded for purposes of computing EBITDA are subject to the review and approval of the Committee.  Furthermore, the Committee may exercise discretion to exclude certain items from the calculation of EBITDA for purposes of the Plan. The Committee shall establish the EBITDA target and communicate it to Participants.
“Annual Revenue” means the amount of total operating revenue for the year ending December 31, 2015 reflected in Green Dot’s consolidated statements of operations less the impact of stock-based retailer incentive compensation expense and other non-recurring items.  The Committee shall establish the Annual Revenue target and communicate it to Participants.
“Actual Payout Multiplier” means the percentage set forth in the table above when Green Dot’s achievement of each of the EBITDA metric and Annual Revenue metric are correlated.  For example, if Green Dot achieves 105% of the target of the EBITDA metric and 95% of the target of the Annual Revenue metric, then the Actual Payout Multiplier would be 94%.
“Base Salary” means the base pay earned during the performance cycle, January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015.  It includes those items considered part of base salary, including retroactive pay, vacation pay, sick pay and holiday pay.  It does not include any stock-based compensation earnings.
Recoupment
In the event that (i) achievement of the EBITDA and Annual Revenue metrics under the Plan is based on financial results that were subsequently the subject of a substantial restatement of Green Dot financial statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and (ii) a Participant’s fraud or intentional illegal conduct materially contributed to such financial restatement, then, in addition to any other remedies available to Green Dot under applicable law, to the extent permitted by law and as the Board of Directors, in its sole discretion, determines appropriate, Green Dot may require recoupment of all or a portion of any after-tax portion of any bonus paid to such participant under the Plan, less compensation that would have been earned by the individual based upon the restated financial results.
        

General
Nothing contained herein shall be construed as conferring upon any participant the right to continue in the employ of Green Dot as an employee and employment with Green Dot is employment at-will, terminable by either party at any time for any reason. 
The Plan shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of Green Dot, its successors and assigns and, with respect to any earned but unpaid bonus, to the participant and his or her heirs, executors, administrators and legal representatives. The Plan shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the laws of the State of California. 
No amounts payable under the Plan shall be funded, set aside or otherwise segregated prior to payment.  The obligation to pay bonus amounts shall at all times be an unfunded and unsecured obligation of Green Dot, and Green Dot shall not be required to incur indebtedness to fund any bonus amounts under the Plan unless otherwise directed to do so by the Committee.  Participants shall have the status of general creditors.  The Plan is not qualified under Section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and is not subject to any provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
Any questions regarding this Plan should be directed to Green Dot’s Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors.Exhibit 10.23

PHARMERICA CORPORATION

SUMMARY OF

2014 SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE PROGRAM – CEO

AND

2014 SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE PROGRAM

2014 Short-Term Incentive Program – CEO

On March 11, 2014, the Board of Directors of PharMerica Corporation (the “Corporation”), upon recommendation of the Compensation Committee, adopted the 2014 Short-Term Incentive Program (the “CEO STIP”) under the PharMerica Corporation 2007 Omnibus Incentive Plan, as amended (the “Omnibus Plan”), for the Corporation’s Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Gregory Weishar. The CEO STIP provides for a performance-based annual cash award to Mr. Weishar.

Performance Cycle. The STIP performance cycle is for the current year, beginning on January 1, 2014 and ending on December 31, 2014.

Maximum Award. If the Corporation’s Adjusted EBITDA (as defined below) is equal to or greater than a target Adjusted EBITDA for the 2014 fiscal year, then Mr. Weishar is eligible to receive a payment under the CEO STIP equal to the lesser of (i) 2.2% of Adjusted EBITDA for the 2014 fiscal year; or (ii) $2 million (the “Maximum Award”). The Compensation Committee, in its sole discretion, may decrease the Maximum Award based on its assessment of the Corporation’s performance, the Chief Executive Officer’s individual performance, or any other factors it considers relevant, however in no event may the Compensation Committee reduce the Maximum Award below the annual bonus amount for the Chief Executive Officer (the “Bonus Amount”).

Bonus Amount. The target Bonus Amount for Mr. Weishar is 125% of 2014 Base Salary. Fifty percent (50%) of the target Bonus Amount is based on the Corporation’s performance and 50% of the target Bonus Amount is based on individual performance goals. The Corporation must at least meet threshold Adjusted EBITDA of 80.0% of the target Adjusted EBITDA amount in order for any payment to be made under the individual performance-based component.

The Corporation’s performance will be measured by comparing the Corporation’s annual earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, and other amounts as reported in the Corporation’s disclosures in its Form 10-K as of and for the year ended December 31, 2014, except that there shall not be an add-back for stock based and deferred compensation (“Adjusted EBITDA”), to a target Adjusted EBITDA for the entire 2014 fiscal year. Individual performance will be measured by comparing certain individual performance metrics to the target individual performance metrics determined by the Compensation Committee.

 

The actual Bonus Amount is based on the percentage of the performance target achieved. Generally, the percentage of the Bonus Amount earned at the end of the performance cycle will be determined according to the following schedule; however the actual Bonus Amount will be interpolated between the percentages set forth in the chart based on actual results:

 

	
Performance Achievement

	
 

	
Payout Level

	
< 80.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
0.0% of Award Target

	
80.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
40.0% of Award Target

	
90.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
70.0% of Award Target

	
96.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
88.0% of Award Target

	
100.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
100.0% of Award Target

	
105.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
118.8% of Award Target

	
110.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
137.5% of Award Target

	
115.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
156.3% of Award Target

	
120.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
175.0% of Award Target

	
> 120.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
175.0% of Award Target

2014 Short-Term Incentive Program

On March 11, 2014, the Board of Directors of the Corporation, upon recommendation of the Compensation Committee, adopted the 2014 Short-Term Incentive Program (the “STIP”) under the Omnibus Plan. The STIP provides for performance-based annual cash awards to the Corporation’s executive officers, and certain other officers and employees of the Corporation. The STIP advances the Corporation’s commitment to performance-based compensation practices by providing participants an opportunity to earn annual cash bonuses upon achievement of certain pre-established short-term performance objectives.

Eligibility. Officers and employees of the Corporation may receive STIP cash awards as determined by the Board of Directors or the Compensation Committee.

Performance Cycle. The STIP performance cycle is for the current year, beginning on January 1, 2014 and ending on December 31, 2014.

Award Targets. The amount of the awards under the STIP are based on individual participant bonus targets. Individual participant bonus targets are established for each participant by the Compensation Committee, in the case of the senior executive officers reporting to the Chief Executive Officer, and by the Chief Executive Officer, for other participants, based upon a determination of the appropriate bonus target amounts which will enable the Corporation to remain competitive, to retain and recruit top employees, and to align such employee’s interests with certain strategic initiatives of the Corporation. Individual non-executive participant bonus targets range from 5% to 100% of base salary on December 31, 2014, with targets for the Corporation’s executive officers between 25% and 125% of base salary.

The Compensation Committee established the bonus targets under the STIP for the Corporation’s fiscal 2013 Named Executive Officers, other than the principal executive officer, as follows:

	
Executive

	
 

	
Title

	
 

	
Bonus Target

	
David Froesel

	
 

	
Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer

	
 

	
80% of base salary

	
Robert McKay

	
 

	
Senior Vice President of Purchasing and Trade Relations

	
 

	
65% of base salary

	
Thomas Caneris

	
 

	
Senior Vice President, General Counsel, Chief Compliance Officer and Secretary

	
 

	
70% of base salary

Performance Criteria. The performance criteria under the STIP is divided into a company performance-based component and individual/group performance-based component for different employees. The breakdown for the Named Executive Officers, other than the Chief Executive Officer, is as set forth in the chart below. The Corporation must at least meet threshold Adjusted EBITDA of 80.0% of target in order for any payment to be made to a Named Executive Officer under the individual/group performance-based components of the STIP.

	
Executive

		
Title

	 	
Company

Performance

	 	 	
Individual/Group

Performance

	 
	
David Froesel

		
Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer

	 	 	
50

	
%

	 	 	
50

	
%

	
Robert McKay

		
Senior Vice President of Purchasing and Trade Relations

	 	 	
50

	
%

	 	 	
50

	
%

	
Thomas Caneris

		
Senior Vice President, General Counsel, Chief Compliance Officer and Secretary

	 	 	
50

	
%

	 	 	
50

	
%

Under the STIP, company performance will be measured by comparing the Corporation’s Adjusted EBITDA, to a target Adjusted EBITDA for the entire 2014 fiscal year. Individual/group performance will be measured by comparing certain individual/group performance metrics to target individual/group performance metrics established by the Corporation’s Compensation Committee in consultation with the Chief Executive Officer for the Named Executive Officers other than the Chief Executive Officer.

 

Award Payouts. Award payout levels are based on the percentage of the performance target achieved. Generally, the percentage of the award earned at the end of the performance cycle will be determined according to the following schedule; however the actual award payout will be interpolated between the percentages set forth in the chart based on actual results:

	
Performance Achievement

	
 

	
Payout Level

	
< 80.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
0.0% of Award Target

	
80.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
40.0% of Award Target

	
90.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
70.0% of Award Target

	
96.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
88.0% of Award Target

	
100.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
100.0% of Award Target

	
105.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
118.8% of Award Target

	
110.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
137.5% of Award Target

	
115.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
156.3% of Award Target

	
120.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
175.0% of Award Target

	
> 120.0% of Performance Target

	
 

	
175.0% of Award Target

Payment of Awards. Payment of STIP awards will be made in cash. Awards will be paid on a specific date by which the Compensation Committee reasonably expects that the Corporation’s Adjusted EBITDA for the year on which the award was based will have been reported. The Corporation will make the payment of the STIP awards to participants as soon as administratively practicable following the date of the award determination.

Vesting and Forfeiture. STIP participants must remain continuously employed full-time by the Corporation until the award payment date in order to be entitled to receive a payout of an STIP award.

Other Terms & Provisions. STIP participants are not permitted to transfer STIP awards, except by will or the laws of descent and distribution. The Corporation is entitled to withhold from any payments of awards under the STIP any and all amounts required to be withheld for federal, state and local withholding taxes. The Compensation Committee has the discretion to change terms and conditions of STIP awards as it deems necessary to ensure that the STIP awards satisfy all requirements for “performance-based compensation” within the meaning of Section 162(m)(4)(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.

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