Document:

Blueprint

 

 

Exhibit
10.3

.

FIRST
AMENDMENT TO LEASE

 

THIS FIRST AMENDMENT TO LEASE (this
“First
Amendment”) is entered into as of the 9th day of January, 2019 (the
“First Amendment Effective
Date”) by and between CIO UNIVERSITY TECH, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company (“Landlord”), and LIGHTPATH TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Delaware
corporation (“Tenant”).

 

W
I T N E S S E T H:

 

WHEREAS, on or
about April 20, 2018, Landlord, as landlord, and Tenant, as tenant,
entered into that certain Lease (the “Lease”) wherein Tenant leased
certain real property in Orange County, Florida consisting of
approximately 12,378 square feet of rentable area known as Suite
180 located at 12565 Research Parkway, Orlando, FL 32826 (the
“Premises”);
and

 

WHEREAS, the
Commencement Date under the Lease was December 1, 2018;
and

 

WHEREAS, Landlord
and Tenant desire to memorialize a rent credit as a full and final
settlement of any amounts that may be due from Landlord to Tenant
as a result of the delivery of the Premises to Tenant after the
Outside Commencement Date; and

 

WHEREAS, Landlord
and Tenant desire to amend the Lease in certain respects
hereinafter set forth.

 

NOW
THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the premises and other good
and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which
are hereby acknowledged, Landlord and Tenant hereby covenant and
agree as follows:

 

1.
Recitals. The above
recitals are true and correct and are hereby incorporated by this
reference.

 

2.
Definitions. All
capitalized terms not defined herein shall have the meanings
ascribed to them in the Lease.

 

3.
Delay Concession.
Landlord shall provide a rent concession to Tenant in the amount of
Twenty-Four Thousand Two Hundred Three and 70/100 Dollars
($24,203.70) (the “DelayConcession”), which Delay
Concession shall be credited against Annual Minimum Rent and
Additional Rent due from Tenant to Landlord for the month of
February 2019. Tenant shall pay any amounts of Annual Minimum Rent
and Additional Rent for February 2019 in excess of the Delay
Concession as they come due under the Lease. The parties
acknowledge that the Delay Concession is a full and final
settlement of amounts owed from Landlord to Tenant as a result of
delivery of the Premises after the Outside Commencement Date
pursuant to Section 2.2 of the Lease.

 

4.
Brokerage
Commission. Tenant represents and warrants it has dealt with
no broker, agent, or other person representing Tenant in connection
with this First Amendment other than Landlord’s broker, Tower
Realty Partners, Inc. (“Landlord Broker”), and Tenant
shall

 

 

1

 

 

indemnify and hold
Landlord and Landlord’s property manager and leasing agent(s)
harmless from and against any and all claims by any other broker,
agent, or other person claiming a commission or other form of
compensation by virtue of having dealt with Tenant in connection
with the negotiation and execution of this First Amendment,
including all costs, expenses and liabilities incurred by Landlord
in connection with any such claim, including, without limitation,
attorneys’ fees and expenses. Landlord represents and
warrants it has dealt with no broker, agent, or other person
representing Landlord in connection with this First Amendment other
than Landlord Broker and Landlord shall indemnify and hold Tenant
harmless from and against any and all claims by any other broker,
agent, or other person claiming a commission or other form of
compensation by virtue of having dealt with Landlord in connection
with the negotiation and execution of this First Amendment,
including all costs, expenses and liabilities incurred by Tenant in
connection with any such claim, including, without limitation,
attorneys’ fees and expenses. Landlord Broker will be
compensated by Landlord through a separate agreement for any fee or
commission that may be due and payable to Landlord Broker by virtue
of its involvement in this First Amendment.

 

5.            

Miscellaneous.

 

(a)
Ratification. The
foregoing terms and conditions are hereby incorporated into the
Lease effective as of the First Amendment Effective Date. Except as
specifically amended by the provisions of this First Amendment, the
terms and provisions of the Lease shall continue to control the
rights and obligations of the parties. The Lease, as amended,
contains the entire agreement between Landlord and Tenant as to the
Premises, and there are no other agreements, oral or written,
between Landlord and Tenant relating to the Premises. Tenant
certifies as of the First Amendment Effective Date: (a) that it has
no offsets, defenses, or claims as to its obligations under the
Lease; (b) that there are no defaults existing under the Lease on
the part of either Landlord or Tenant; and (c) there is no existing
basis for Tenant to terminate the Lease.

 

(b)
Conflict. In the
event of a conflict between the provisions of this First Amendment
and the provisions of the Lease, the provisions of this First
Amendment shall control.

 

(c)
Successors and
Assigns. This First Amendment shall be binding upon, and
inure to the benefit of, the parties hereto and their respective
successors and assigns.

 

(d)
No Offer.
Submission of this First Amendment by Landlord or Tenant is not an
offer to enter into this First Amendment. Neither Landlord nor
Tenant shall be bound by this First Amendment until both Landlord
and Tenant have executed it and delivered the same to the other
party.

 

(e)
Final Agreement.
This First Amendment constitutes the final agreement between the
parties. It is the complete and exclusive expression of the
parties’ agreement on the matters contained in this First
Amendment. All prior and contemporaneous negotiations and
agreements between the parties on the matters contained in this
First Amendment are expressly merged into and superseded by this
First Amendment. The

 

 

2

 

 

provisions of this
First Amendment may not be explained, supplemented, or qualified
through evidence of trade usage or a prior course of dealings. In
entering into this First Amendment, neither party has relied upon
any statement, representation, warranty, or agreement of the other
party except for those expressly contained in this First Amendment.
There are no conditions precedent or approvals of any First parties
to the effectiveness of this First Amendment, other than those (if
any) expressly stated in this First Amendment.

 

(f)
Counterparts. This
First Amendment may be executed in counterparts, each of which,
when taken together, shall constitute one and the same document. A
facsimile signature of either party shall constitute an original
signature of such party for all purposes and is binding on said
party. This First Amendment is effective upon full execution of
this First Amendment.

 

(g)
Rules of
Construction. This First Amendment shall be interpreted
without regard to any presumption or rule requiring construction
against the party causing this First Amendment to be drafted. No
inference shall be drawn from the modification or deletion of
versions of the provisions of this First Amendment contained in any
drafts exchanged between the parties before execution of the final
version of this First Amendment that would be inconsistent in any
way with the construction or interpretation that would be
appropriate if the prior drafts had never existed.

 

(h)
Review by Counsel.
Each party has reviewed this First Amendment and all of its terms
with legal counsel, or had an opportunity to review this First
Amendment with legal counsel, and is not relying on any
representations made to him by any other person concerning the
effect of this First Amendment.

 

[SIGNATURES
ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES]

 

 

3

 

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Landlord and Tenant have executed this
First Amendment in manner and form sufficient to bind them as of
the day and year first above written.

 

	
Signed, sealed and
delivered in the presence of:

	
LANDLORD:

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
CIO UNIVERSITY TECH, LLC,
a

	
 

	
Delaware limited
liability company

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
By: SCCP CENTRAL
VALLEY GP CORP., a Delaware corporation, as
Manager

	
/s/ Cori
Hansen

	
 

	

Print
Name: Cori
Hansen

	
BY: /s/
James
Farrar

	
(name of first
witness)

	
NAME: James
Farrar

	
 

	
TITLE: President

	
/s/ Nina
Fitzpatrick

	
 

	
Print Name:
Nina
Fitzpatrick 

	
 

	
(name of second
witness)

	
 

	
 

	
 

	
Signed, sealed and
delivered in the presence of:

	
TENANT:

	
 

	
 

	
/s/ Natalie
Cockayne

	
LIGHTPATH TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
a

	
Print Name:
Natalie
Cockayne 

	
Delaware
corporation

	
(name of first
witness)

	
 

	
 

	

BY:
/s/ J. James
Gaynor

	
/s/ Dorothy M.
Cipolla

	

NAME: J. James Gaynor

	
Print Name:
Dorothy M.
Cipolla 

	
TITLE: President &
CEO

	
(name of second
witness)

	
 

 

 

 

 

4EX-10.1

 Exhibit 10.1 
  

			
	DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP	  	 HEARING DATE AND TIME: March 11, 2019

@ 10:00 a.m. (EDT)

	 1177 Avenue of the Americas
 41st Floor
 New York, New York 10036-2714

Telephone: (212) 248-3140

Facsimile: (212) 248-3141

E-mail: kristin.going@dbr.com

clay.pierce@dbr.com

marita.erbeck@dbr.com
 Kristin K. Going

Clay J. Pierce
 Marita S. Erbeck
	  	 OBJECTION DEADLINE: March 4, 2019

@ 4:00 p.m. (EST)

 Attorneys for the Motors Liquidation Company 

GUC Trust Administrator 
  

							
	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT	 		 		  	
	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	 		 		  	
	  
	 		 	X	  	
		 		 	:	  	
	In re:	 		 	:	  	 Chapter 11

	MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY, et al.,	 		 	:	  	 Case No.: 09-50026 (MG)

	 f/k/a General Motors Corp., et al.,
	 		 	: :	  	
		 		 		  	
	 Debtors.
	 		 	:	  	 (Jointly Administered)

	  
	 		 	X	  	

 MOTION OF MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY GUC TRUST TO APPROVE 

(I) THE GUC TRUST ADMINISTRATOR’S ACTIONS, (II) THE SETTLEMENT 

AGREEMENT BY AND AMONG THE SIGNATORY PLAINTIFFS 

AND THE GUC TRUST PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 105, 363, 

AND 1142 AND BANKRUPTCY RULES 3002, 9014, AND 9019, AND (III) AUTHORIZE  

THE REALLOCATION OF GUC TRUST ASSETS 

 TABLE OF CONTENTS 

 

							
	 	  	 	  	Page	 
	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	  	 	ii	 
		
	PRELIMINARY STATEMENT	  	 	1	 
		
	JURISDICTION	  	 	7	 
		
	BACKGROUND	  	 	7	 
			
	 I.   
	  	Old GM’s Bankruptcy and the Creation of the GUC Trust	  	 	7	 
			
	 II. 
	  	The Recalls and Subsequent Proceedings In the Bankruptcy Court and Second Circuit	  	 	9	 
			
	 III.  
	  	Developments in the Bankruptcy Court Following the Second Circuit Opinion	  	 	12	 
			
	 IV.  
	  	Plaintiffs’ Alleged Claims Against Old GM	  	 	15	 
			
	 V. 
	  	The Settlement Agreement	  	 	18	 
		
	RELIEF REQUESTED	  	 	21	 
		
	BASIS FOR RELIEF REQUESTED	  	 	22	 
			
	 I.   
	  	The Court Should Find that Entry into the Settlement is an Appropriate Exercise of the GUC Trust Administrator’s Authority and Approve Actions Taken by the GUC Trust Administrator in Connection Therewith Pursuant to
Section 8.1(e) of the GUC Trust Agreement	  	 	22	 
			
	 II. 
	  	The Bankruptcy Court Should Approve and Authorize the Reallocation of $13,720,000 of GUC Trust Assets	  	 	25	 
			
	 III.  
	  	The Settlement Will Confer Benefits Greater than Those that Would be Obtained Through Further Litigation	  	 	26	 
			
		  	 A. Plaintiffs’ Claims Raise Numerous Complex Litigation Issues
	  	 	28	 
			
		  	 1.  Litigation over Plaintiffs’ Claims Raises Numerous Complex Issues
	  	 	28	 
			
		  	 2.  The Terms of the Settlement Agreement Outweigh the Risks of Continued
Litigation
	  	 	32	 
			
		  	 B. The Benefits of Settling Exceed the Potential Benefits of Continued Litigation
	  	 	34	 
			
		  	 C. The Settlement Agreement Satisfies the Remaining Iridium Factors
	  	 	35	 
		
	NOTICE	  	 	36	 
		
	CONCLUSION	  	 	36	 

  
 -i- 

 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

 

					
	Cases	  	Page(s)	 
	 Ad Hoc Comm. Of Personal Injury Asbestos Claimants v. Dana Corp. (In re Dana Corp.) 412 B.R. 53
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)
	  	 	34	 
		
	 In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 327 B.R. 143 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)
	  	 	27	 
		
	 Airline Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Ionosphere
Clubs, Inc.), 156 B.R. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d, 17 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1994)
	  	 	26	 
		
	 In re Am. Home Mort. Inv. Trust 2005-2, No. 14 Civ.
2494 (AKH), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111867
	  	 	22	 
		
	 In the Matter of the Application of U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 651625/2018
	  	 	22	 
		
	 In re Arts de Provinces de France, Inc., 153 B.R. 144 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993)
	  	 	30	 
		
	 In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944 (2d Cir. 1993)
	  	 	30, 31	 
		
	 In re Hibbard Brown & Co., Inc., 217 B.R. 41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998)
	  	 	26, 27	 
		
	 Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951)
	  	 	22	 
		
	 Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d
452 (2d Cir. 2007)
	  	 	passim	 
		
	 In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, vacated in part sub nom. Elliott v. General Motors LLC (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 829 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2016)
	  	 	passim	 
		
	 Nellis v. Shugrue, 165 B.R. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
	  	 	26	 
		
	 Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1972)
	  	 	26	 
		
	 In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 59 A.3d 471 (Del. Ch. 2012)
	  	 	22	 

  
 -ii- 

					
	 Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380 (1993)
	  	 	passim	 
		
	 Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414
(1968)
	  	 	27	 
		
	 In re PT-1 Commc’ns, Inc., 292 B.R. 482 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2003)
	  	 	30	 
		
	 In re Purofied Down Prods. Corp., 150 B.R. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
	  	 	26	 
		
	 In re Residential Capital, LLC, Case No. 12-12020
(MG), 2015 WL 515387 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2015)
	  	 	29	 
		
	 In re Tronox Inc., No. 09-10156 (MEW), 2015 Bankr.
LEXIS 1974 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2015)
	  	 
	22, 23,
24	 
 
		
	 In re W.T. Grant, Co., 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1983)
	  	 	27	 
		
	 STATUTES, RULES &
REGULATIONS
	  			
		
	 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)
	  	 	passim	 
		
	 11 U.S.C. § 363
	  	 	1, 7, 21	 
		
	 11 U.S.C. § 502(h)
	  	 	33	 
		
	 11 U.S.C. § 1142
	  	 	1, 7, 21	 
		
	 28 U.S.C. § 157
	  	 	7	 
		
	 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)
	  	 	7	 
		
	 28 U.S.C. § 1334
	  	 	7	 
		
	 28 U.S.C. § 1408
	  	 	7	 
		
	 28 U.S.C. § 1409
	  	 	7	 
		
	 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002
	  	 	1, 7, 21	 
		
	 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014
	  	 	1,7, 21	 
		
	 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019
	  	 	passim	 

  
 -iii- 

 By and through its undersigned counsel, the GUC Trust Administrator1 of the Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust (the “GUC Trust”), as established under the Debtors’ Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan dated as of March 18, 2011 [ECF
No. 9836] (as confirmed, the “Plan”) of the above-captioned post-effective date debtors (the “Debtors”), respectfully submits this Motion of Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust to Approve (I) the GUC
Trust Administrator’s Actions, (II) the Settlement Agreement By and Among the Signatory Plaintiffs and the GUC Trust Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 105, 363, and 1142 and Bankruptcy Rules 3002, 9014, and 9019, and
(III) Authorize the Reallocation of GUC Trust Assets (the “Motion”), seeking entry of an order approving the Settlement Agreement and the actions taken by the GUC Trust in furtherance of the Settlement Agreement (as
defined herein). In support of this Motion, the GUC Trust Administrator respectfully represents as follows: 
 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

 1. By this Motion, the GUC Trust asks this Court to approve the actions the GUC Trust Administrator proposes to undertake
pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, approve the Settlement between and among it and certain Ignition Switch Plaintiffs,2 certain Non-Ignition
Switch Plaintiffs,3 and certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs4 (collectively, the 

 
  

	1 	 Capitalized terms not defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the Settlement Agreement, the
Plan or the GUC Trust Agreement, as applicable. Any description herein of the terms of the Plan or the GUC Trust Agreement is qualified in its entirety by the terms of the Plan or the GUC Trust Agreement, as applicable. 

	2 	 The term “Ignition Switch Plaintiffs” shall mean those plaintiffs asserting economic
loss claims or persons suffering economic losses who, prior to July 10, 2009, owned or leased a vehicle with an ignition switch defect included in Recall No. 14V-047 (the “Ignition Switch Defect”). 

	3 	 The term “Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs” shall mean those plaintiffs asserting
economic loss claims or persons suffering economic losses who, prior to July 10, 2009, owned or leased a vehicle with defects in ignition switches, side airbags or power steering included in Recall Nos. 14V-355, 14V-394, 14V-400, 14V-118 and
14V-153. 

	4 	 The term “Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs” shall mean those plaintiffs asserting
personal injury or wrongful death claims or persons who suffered a personal injury or wrongful death arising from an accident that occurred prior to the Closing Date involving an Old GM vehicle that was later subject to Recall Nos. 14V-118, 14V-153,
14V-355, 14V-394, 14V-400, and 14V-540 and who have signed the Settlement Agreement. Collectively, the Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs who have signed the Settlement Agreement, the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, and the Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs
are “Plaintiffs.” 

  
 1 

 
“Signatory Plaintiffs,” and together with the GUC Trust, the “Parties”) and authorize the GUC Trust to reallocate $13,720,000 in GUC Trust Assets
for the cost of notice more fully described herein. As set forth more fully below, among other things, the Settlement resolves many of the issues arising from the Late Claims Motions (defined below) in a global fashion, correcting the historic
pattern of piecemeal litigation of Plaintiffs’ claims. 
 2. On April 21, 2014, New GM filed its first of three motions with this
Court seeking a ruling that owners of Old GM vehicles that were the subject of recalls conducted by New GM were barred from asserting claims against New GM.5 New GM’s request precipitated
years of litigation in this Court involving numerous parties and a host of complex issues, including, but not limited to, whether the Signatory Plaintiffs and other plaintiffs should be granted authority to file late proofs of claim (and whether
such authority can be granted solely on due process grounds), whether the Plaintiffs’ asserted claims are equitably moot, whether additional grounds exist to object to the Plaintiffs’ asserted claims, and the amount of said claims in the
event that they are allowed. 
 3. Litigation of these issues has been ongoing for several years, and has consumed significant time, money
and resources from the parties and the Bankruptcy Court. Nevertheless, key disputes between the Parties remain unresolved. For example, in the April 2015 Decision, the Bankruptcy Court ruled that Old GM failed to provide Ignition Switch Plaintiffs
with 
  
  

	5 	 See Motion of General Motors LLC Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363 to Enforce the
Court’s July 5, 2009 Sale Order and Injunction, dated April 21, 2014 [ECF No. 12620], Motion of General Motors LLC Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363 to Enforce the Court’s July 5, 2009 Sale Order and Injunction Against
Plaintiffs in Pre-Closing Accident Lawsuits, dated Aug. 1, 2014 [ECF No. 12807] and Motion of General Motors LLC Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363 to Enforce the Court’s July 5, 2009 Sale Order and Injunction (Monetary Relief
Actions, Other Than Ignition Switch Actions), dated Aug. 1, 2014 [ECF No. 12808]. 

  
 2 

 
constitutionally proper notice of the Bar Date.6 While the Bankruptcy Court ruled that assets of the GUC Trust could not be tapped to pay any
late claims that might be allowed as a result of the doctrine of equitable mootness, the Second Circuit vacated this holding as an advisory opinion—leaving open the question of the applicability of equitable mootness.7 In addition, there is an on-going dispute as to whether an additional showing under the factors articulated in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v.
Brunswick Associates Ltd., 507 U.S. 380 (1993) is required for Plaintiffs to obtain leave to file late claims. In the event Plaintiffs are granted leave to file late claims, the allowance and amount of such claims would also have to be
litigated, a process that could take years. 
 4. Continuation of protracted litigation on the foregoing and related issues will deplete
remaining GUC Trust Assets, delay any further GUC Trust distributions, and subject the Parties to uncertain results. In an effort to avoid these risks, the GUC Trust, Co-Lead Counsel for Ignition Switch and
certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, counsel for certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs and the Participating Unitholders engaged in good faith, arms’-length
negotiations concerning a potential settlement (the “Initial Settlement”) that would resolve the many disputes surrounding those plaintiffs’ ability to file late proposed class claims that seek relief for:
(i) economic losses related to Old GM’s alleged concealment of safety defects in ignition switches (including the Ignition Switch Defect and similarly defective ignition switches), side airbags, and power steering and (ii) personal
injury and wrongful death claims against the GUC Trust related to Old GM vehicles subject to the Recalls. 
  

 

	6 	 See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. 510, 573-74, 583 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Elliott v. General Motors LLC (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 829 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2016) (the “April 2015 Decision”). 

	7 	 See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. at 529; Elliott, 829 F.3d at 168-69.

  
 3 

 5. As discussed in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order Regarding Motion to
Enforce the Settlement Agreement By and Among the Signatory Plaintiffs and the GUC Trust, dated January18, 2018 [ECF No. 14212] (the “Settlement Decision”), the GUC Trust determined ultimately not to execute the
Initial Settlement. Following the Court’s issuance of the Settlement Decision, the GUC Trust retained new counsel, and after termination of a forbearance agreement with New GM; the GUC Trust, the Participating Unitholders, the Co-Lead Counsel for the Ignition Switch and certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, and counsel for certain Pre-Closing Accident
Plaintiffs resumed their good faith, arms’-length negotiations and entered into a settlement agreement on April 24, 2018 (and amended on May 22, 2018) (the “Prior Settlement”).8 The Court held that the Prior Settlement as drafted could not be approved unless the Ignition Switch and certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs could certify
one or more classes under Rule 23 and denied the Initial 9019 Motion without prejudice.9 

6. Further good faith, arms’-length negotiations between the Signatory Plaintiffs, the GUC Trust, and the Participating Unitholders
following this decision culminated in the Parties’ agreement to the settlement that is the subject of this Motion (the “Settlement,” and the agreement documenting it, the “Settlement Agreement”).
The Settlement Agreement includes a class settlement of the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs’ and Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs’ claims, and settlement on an individual basis of certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs’ claims. 
 7. Following entry of the Preliminary Approval Order (as
defined in the Settlement Agreement), the Parties request that this Court enter an order: (i) approving the actions of the GUC Trust Administrator in entering into the Settlement; (ii) authorizing the GUC Trust to reallocate up to
$13.72 million in GUC Trust Assets to pay for noticing costs. 
  

 

	8 	 See Motion of Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust to Approve (I) the GUC Trust Administrator’s
Actions and (II) the Settlement Agreement by and Among the Signatory Plaintiffs and the GUC Trust Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 105, 363, and 1142 and Bankruptcy Rules 3002 and 9019 and to (III) Authorize the Reallocation of GUC Trust
Assets, dated May 3, 2018 [ECF No. 14293] (the “Initial 9019 Motion”). 

	9 	 See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 591 B.R. 501 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (the “Rule 23
Decision”). 

  
 4 

 8. Further, simultaneous with the entry of an order (the “Final Approval
Order”), which shall (i) grant class certification for settlement purposes with respect to the Ignition Switch and Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs; and (ii) appoint class representatives
and class counsel for Rule 23(a) and (g) settlement certification purposes, following notice and an opportunity to be heard at a final fairness hearing, the GUC Trust requests this Court approve the Settlement pursuant to Rule 9019 of the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”) and order that all Plaintiffs have waived and released any rights or claims against the GUC Trust, Wilmington Trust Company as trust administrator and trustee of the GUC
Trust (the “GUC Trust Administrator”), FTI Consulting, Inc., as monitor of the GUC Trust (the “GUC Trust Monitor”), the Motors Liquidation Company Avoidance Action Trust (the “Avoidance
Action Trust”) and holders of beneficial interests in the GUC Trust (the “Unitholders”). By its terms, the waiver and release applies to those Plaintiffs’ claims or rights, including any rights to any assets
that are presently in the GUC Trust and any distributions that have previously been made to Unitholders (collectively, “GUC Trust Assets”) and to distributions that have or will be made by the Avoidance Action Trust (the
“Release”). In so doing, the waiver and release provides finality and certainty to the GUC Trust and Unitholders (regardless of whether or in what amount, the Claims Estimate Order (defined below) may ultimately be entered),
protects against the risk of claw-back or recapture of prior distributions of GUC Trust Assets and eliminates delay in the GUC Trust wind-down process and distribution of assets. 

  
 5 

 9. In exchange, under the Settlement Agreement, the GUC Trust agrees to pay up to
$13,720,000 for the cost of notice to the putative class, and, after entry of the Final Approval Order, to file a motion (the “Estimation Motion”) seeking entry of an order (the “Claims
Estimate Order”) that would estimate the amount of Plaintiffs’ claims, in an amount that may (depending on the amount of the Court’s estimate) trigger New GM’s obligation to issue additional shares of New GM
common stock (the “Adjustment Shares”) pursuant to the terms of the Sale Agreement.10 Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, any Adjustment Shares would be set
aside for the exclusive benefit of the Plaintiffs. 
 10. Approval of the Settlement Agreement is appropriate under Bankruptcy Rule 9019. The
Settlement resolves all issues arising from the Late Claims Motions in a global fashion, correcting the historic pattern of piecemeal litigation of Plaintiffs’ claims. This includes a host of complex issues, including, but not limited to,
whether the Signatory Plaintiffs should be granted authority to file late proofs of claim (and whether such authority can be granted solely on due process grounds), whether the Plaintiffs’ claims are equitably moot, whether additional grounds
exist to object to the Plaintiffs’ claims, and the amount of said claims in the event that they are allowed. 
 11. The Settlement
Agreement resulted from extensive, good faith negotiations between experienced counsel to reasonably resolve the many issues arising out of the Late Claims Motions. This Court should approve the Settlement because it will substantially reduce costs
and the expenditure of resources, eliminate the risk of uncertain litigation outcomes, and prevent 
  

 

	10 	 Upon entry of the Claims Estimate Order, all Adjustment Shares will be placed in a fund for the exclusive
benefit of Plaintiffs. The Signatory Plaintiffs will subsequently propose the allocation of the value of the Adjustment Shares between economic loss claims and personal injury/wrongful death claims, the eligibility and criteria for payment, and the
procedures for payment of attorneys’ fees, which shall be subject to an order of this Court after notice and an opportunity to be heard. Being defined as a Plaintiff does not assure any party that he, she, or it will receive a distribution from
the Adjustment Shares (or their value), if any, or any other consideration contained in the Settlement Fund. Under the Final Approval Order, the GUC Trust, Unitholders, and defendants in the Term Loan Avoidance Action, via agreement and/or notice
and an opportunity to be heard, shall be found to have waived any rights to the Adjustment Shares. 

  
 6 

 
further delay in distributions of remaining GUC Trust Assets, without disturbing the recovery expectations of other creditors and Unitholders. Moreover, the Settlement Agreement establishes a
streamlined process for allowing Plaintiffs’ claims and providing Plaintiffs a source of recovery from the Adjustment Shares. Again, regardless of whether the Claims Estimate Order is ultimately entered, the waivers and releases by Plaintiffs
that are set forth in the Settlement will be binding on all Parties, subject only to approval of the Final Approval Order. In light of the inherent risks and costs associated with litigation, the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate, and clearly falls above the lowest rung in the range of reasonableness and should be approved under Bankruptcy Rule 9019. Moreover, the Settlement Agreement was the result of good faith, arms’-length negotiations by counsel.
Accordingly, the Court should approve the Settlement Agreement pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 as a fair, reasonable, adequate, and equitable resolution of the ongoing litigation between the Parties. 

JURISDICTION 
 12.
This Court has jurisdiction over the Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. This is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). 

13. Venue is proper before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409. 

14. The statutory predicates for the relief sought in this Motion are Bankruptcy Code sections 105(a), 363, and 1142 and Bankruptcy Rules 3002,
9014, and 9019. 
 BACKGROUND 
  

	I.	 Old GM’s Bankruptcy and the Creation of the GUC Trust. 

15. On June 1, 2009, General Motors Corporation (“Old GM”) and certain of its affiliates (collectively, the
“Debtors”) filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in this Court and entered into an agreement (the “Sale Agreement”) to sell substantially all of its assets to NGMCO, Inc. (“New
GM”) in exchange for, inter alia, New GM common stock and warrants. See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. at 535. 

  
 7 

 16. The Sale Agreement was amended on July 5, 2009 to, inter alia, add a feature
requiring New GM to provide additional New GM common stock in the event that the amount of allowed general unsecured claims against the Old GM estate exceeds a threshold amount (the “Purchase Price Adjustment”). See
AMSPA § 3.2(c).11 Specifically, the Purchase Price Adjustment provides that if the Bankruptcy Court issues an order finding that the estimated aggregate allowed general unsecured claims
against the Old GM estate exceeds $35 billion, then within five business days thereof New GM will issue Adjustment Shares to the GUC Trust. See id. If such order estimates the aggregate allowed general unsecured claims at
or in excess of $42 billion, New GM must issue 30 million Adjustment Shares, the maximum amount of Adjustment Shares that may be required under the AMSPA. See id. 

17. On July 5, 2009, the sale was approved by the Bankruptcy Court. See Elliott, 829 F.3d at 146-47. 
 18. In September 2009, the Court established November 30, 2009 (the “Bar
Date”) as the deadline for filing proofs of claim against Old GM. See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. at 535. 

19. On March 29, 2011, the Court entered an order confirming the Plan, which, among other things, authorized the creation of the GUC Trust
pursuant to the terms set forth in the GUC Trust Agreement. See id. at 535-36. 
  

 

	11 	 See Second Amended and Restated Master Sale and Purchase Agreement, by and among General Motors
Corporation, Saturn LLC, Saturn Distribution Corporation and Chevrolet-Saturn of Harlem, Inc., as Sellers, and NGMCO, Inc., as Purchaser, dated as of June 26, 2009 (the “AMSPA”). 

  
 8 

 20. Pursuant to the Plan, the GUC Trust Agreement, and a side letter by and between the GUC
Trust, the Debtors, New GM, and FTI Consulting (as trust monitor of the GUC Trust) dated September 23, 2011 (the “Side Letter”), the GUC Trust was granted exclusive authority to object to the allowance of general
unsecured claims, seek estimation of the amount of allowed general unsecured claims, and seek Adjustment Shares from New GM. See Plan §§ 7.1(b), 7.3; GUC Trust Agreement § 5.1. 

21. In February 2012, the Court entered an order providing that any claims filed after entry of the order would be deemed disallowed unless,
inter alia, the claimant obtained leave of the Court or written consent of the GUC Trust.12 

22. As of December 31, 2018, the total amount of Allowed General Unsecured Claims against the Debtors’ estate was $31,855,431,837.00
approximately $3.1 billion below the threshold for triggering the issuance of Adjustment Shares under the AMSPA.13 
  

	II.	 The Recalls and Subsequent Proceedings  

In the Bankruptcy Court and Second Circuit. 

23. In February and March 2014, over four years after the Bar Date, New GM publicly disclosed the existence of the Ignition Switch Defect and
issued a recall, NHTSA Recall Number 14V-047, impacting approximately 2.1 million vehicles. After this first wave of recalls, New GM issued additional recalls in June, July and September of 2014
concerning defective ignition switches affecting approximately 10 million additional vehicles, NHTSA Recall Numbers 14V-355, 14V-394,
14V-400, and 14V-540. 
  

 

	12 	 See Order Approving Motion Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 3003 and
Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code for an Order Disallowing Certain Late Filed Claims, dated February 8, 2012 [ECF No. 11394] (the “Late Filed Claims Order”). 

	13 	 See Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust Quarterly Section 6.2(c) Report
and Budget Variance Report as of Dec. 31, 2018, dated Jan. 24, 2019 [ECF No. 14402]. 

  
 9 

 24. New GM issued a multitude of other recalls for safety defects throughout 2014. These
included a recall issued in March 2014 pertaining to approximately 1.2 million vehicles with defective side airbags, NHTSA Recall Number 14V-118, and another recall issued in March 2014 pertaining to over
1.3 million vehicles with defective power steering, NHTSA Recall Number 14V-153.
 25. After the
issuance of these recalls (collectively, the “Recalls”), many owners and lessees of defective Old GM and New GM vehicles filed lawsuits against New GM. New GM sought to enjoin that litigation by filing motions to enforce the
Sale Order in the Bankruptcy Court. Specifically, New GM filed the following motions: 
  

	 	•	 	 Motion of General Motors LLC Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363
to Enforce the Court’s July 5, 2009 Sale Order and Injunction, dated Apr. 21, 2014 [ECF No. 12620] (the “Ignition Switch Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce”); 

 

	 	•	 	 Motion of General Motors LLC Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363
to Enforce the Court’s July 5, 2009 Sale Order and Injunction Against Plaintiffs in Pre-Closing Accident Lawsuits, dated Aug. 1, 2014 [ECF No. 12807] (the
“Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce”)14; 

 

	 	•	 	 Motion of General Motors LLC Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363
to Enforce the Court’s July 5, 2009 Sale Order and Injunction (Monetary Relief Actions, Other Than Ignition Switch Actions), dated Aug. 1, 2014 [ECF No. 12808] (the “Non-Ignition Switch
Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce” and together with the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce and the Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce, the “Motions to
Enforce”). 

  
  

	14 	 The claims sought to be enjoined in that motion were limited to personal injury and wrongful death claims
resulting from vehicles with the Ignition Switch Defect (i.e., Recall No. 14V-047). The Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce was also filed in
conjunction with the launch of the Feinberg Protocol which “provided eligible Plaintiffs with an alternative (i.e., a source of recovery under the Feinberg Protocol) to the enforcement of the Sale Order and Injunction against them.”
According to the Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce, the Feinberg Protocol was developed and designed “for the submission, evaluation, and settlement of death or physical injury claims
resulting from accidents allegedly caused by defective ignition switches in certain vehicles.” Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce [ECF No. 12807] at 2.

  
 10 

 26. In large part, the prosecution of the Motions to Enforce set in motion litigation over
Plaintiffs’ late claims that was piecemeal and disjointed. In furtherance of resolution of the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce, on or about July 11, 2014, the Bankruptcy Court entered a Supplemental Scheduling Order
Regarding (I) Motion of General Motors LLC Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363 to Enforce the Court’s July 5, 2009 Sale Order and
Injunction, (II) Objection Filed by Certain Plaintiffs in Respect Thereto, and (III) Adversary Proceeding No. 14-01929 [ECF No. 12770]
(the “Supplemental Scheduling Order”).15 The Supplemental Scheduling Order identified four threshold issues (the “2014 Threshold Issues”) to be
determined, including whether any of the claims in these actions were claims against Old GM and, if so, whether such claims should “nevertheless be disallowed/dismissed on grounds of equitable mootness . . . .” Id.16 The Supplemental Scheduling Order also required the parties to submit to the Bankruptcy Court on or before August 8, 2014 agreed upon stipulations of fact and to jointly identify any facts that
could not be stipulated to with respect to the Four Threshold Issues,17 and established a briefing schedule for the Four Threshold Issues. 

 
  

	15 	 The Supplemental Scheduling Order superseded the Scheduling Order Regarding (I) Motion of
General Motors LLC Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363 to Enforce the Court’s July 5, 2009 Sale Order and Injunction, (II) Objection Filed
by Certain Plaintiffs in Respect Thereto, and (III) Adversary Proceeding No. 14-01929 entered on May 16, 2014 [ECF No. 12697] (the “May 2014
Scheduling Order”). Among other things, the May 2014 Scheduling Order identified five (5) threshold issues to be resolved and required the submission of agreed-upon stipulations of fact to the Bankruptcy Court by July 1, 2014.

	16 	 Notably, the only vehicles covered by the 2014 Threshold Issues briefing were those with the Ignition Switch
Defect. 

	17 	 On August 8, 2014, New GM, certain Plaintiffs by and through Designated Counsel, the Groman Plaintiffs,
the GUC Trust, and the Unitholders filed the Agreed and Disputed Stipulations of Fact Pursuant to the Court’s Supplemental Scheduling Order, Dated July 11, 2014 [ECF No. 12826] (the
“August 8, 2014 Stipulations of Fact”). 

  
 11 

 27. This schedule was later applied to the
Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce, which was limited to accidents involving vehicles with the Ignition Switch Defect. See Scheduling Order Regarding Motion of General Motors LLC
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363 to Enforce the Court’s July 5, 2009 Sale Order and Injunction Against Plaintiffs in
Pre-Closing Accident Lawsuits [ECF No. 12897]. 
 28. On April 15, 2015, the Bankruptcy
Court issued its Decision on Motion to Enforce Sale Order, In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. 510 (the “Enforcement Decision”) [ECF No. 13109]. The Bankruptcy Court held that the Ignition Switch
Plaintiffs were known creditors who did not receive constitutionally adequate notice of the Sale or Bar Date. See id. at 574. 

29. The Bankruptcy Court further held that while “late claims filed by the Plaintiffs might still be allowed, assets transferred to the
GUC Trust under the Plan could not now be tapped to pay them” under the doctrine of equitable mootness. Id. at 529; see also June 2015 Judgment ¶ 6. On direct appeal, the Second Circuit vacated this equitable mootness
ruling as an advisory opinion. See Elliott, 829 F.3d at 168-69. 
 30. The Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce, which was limited to plaintiffs asserting economic loss claims and did not cover accident plaintiffs, was deferred pending resolution of the Ignition Switch
Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce. See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. at 523. It has not yet been determined whether any non-ignition switch plaintiffs suffered a due process violation
in connection with the entry of the Sale Order or the Bar Date Order. 

  
 12 

	III.	 Developments in the Bankruptcy Court Following the Second Circuit Opinion. 

31. On or about December 13, 2016, on remand from the Second Circuit’s opinion vacating the equitable mootness ruling and making
clear the due process violation, the Bankruptcy Court issued the Order to Show Cause Regarding Certain Issues Arising from Lawsuits with Claims Asserted Against General Motors LLC That Involve Vehicles Manufactured by General Motors
Corporation [ECF No. 13802] (the “Order to Show Cause”). The Order to Show Cause identified five (5) threshold issues (the “2016 Threshold Issues”) for resolution in light of the Second
Circuit decision. Relevant here is the issue of whether “the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and/or Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs [defined in the Order to include plaintiffs asserting both economic loss and
personal injury or wrongful death claims] satisfy the requirements for authorization to file late proof(s) of claim against the GUC Trust and/or are such claims equitably moot (the “Late Proof of Claim Issue”).”18 
 32. The Order to Show Cause also established a December 22, 2016 deadline to file
motions seeking authority to file late claims (“Late Claims Motions”).19 See Order to Show Cause at 5 ¶ 1. No additional issues (such as class certification,
discovery, or the merits of a late proof of claim) would be addressed in these motions. See id. In addition, the procedures provided that briefing and adjudication of any Late Claims Motions filed by Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs would be stayed pending resolution of the other 2016 Threshold Issues. See id. at 5
¶ 2. 
 33. In accordance with the Order to Show Cause, on December 22, 2016, the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, and certain Pre-Closing Accident 
  

 

	18 	 Order to Show Cause Regarding Certain Issues Arising from Lawsuits with Claims Asserted Against General
Motors LLC (“New GM”) that Involve Vehicles Manufactured by General Motors Corporation (“Old GM”), dated Dec. 13, 2016 [ECF No. 13802], at 2-3. 

	19 	 Pursuant to an Order to Show Cause, on December 22, 2016, the Economic Loss Plaintiffs and certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs who had not received notice of the Order to Show Cause, filed motions for authority to file late proofs of claim [ECF Nos. 13806, 13807], including late class proofs of claim; on
July 28, 2017, certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs filed a motion for authority to file late proofs of claim [ECF No. 14018], as supplemented on August 10, 2017, September 19, 2017,
December 12, 2017 and July 19, 2018 [ECF Nos. 14046, 14112, 14195, 14346]; and on July 27, 2018, certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs filed a motion for authority to file late proofs of claim
[ECF No. 14350]. Pursuant to the Order to Show Cause, certain other Plaintiffs have filed joinders to these motions [ECF Nos. 13811, 13818]. On May 25, 2018, certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs
filed a supplemental Late Claims Motion [ECF No. 14325]. The term “Late Claims Motions” as defined in this Motion encompasses all of these filings. 

  
 13 

 
Plaintiffs filed Late Claims Motions.20 The motions attached proposed proofs of claim, including proposed class proofs of claim asserted on
behalf of purported class representatives for Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, and 175 individual proofs of claim on behalf of certain
Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs. See id.21 Certain other Plaintiffs subsequently filed joinders to the Late Claims Motions pursuant to
the terms of the Order to Show Cause. 
 34. Thereafter, in connection with the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs’ and certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs’ Late Claims Motions, the parties participated in two status conferences before the Bankruptcy Court, engaged in preliminary rounds of discovery, and filed briefs addressing two
preliminary issues raised in the Late Claims Motions: (i) whether relief can be granted absent a showing of excusable neglect under the Pioneer factors; and (ii) the applicability of any purported agreements with the GUC
Trust or other tolling arrangements to toll timeliness objections (the “Initial Late Claims Motions Issues”).22 Subsequent to such briefing, certain Plaintiffs who had not
previously appeared before the Bankruptcy Court filed motions seeking authority to file late proofs of claim. 
  

 

	20 	 See Motion for an Order Granting Authority to File Late Class Proofs of Claim,
dated Dec. 22, 2016 [ECF No. 13806] (the “Economic Loss Late Claim Motion”); Omnibus Motion by Certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs for Authority to File Late Proofs of Claim
for Personal Injuries and Wrongful Deaths, dated Dec. 22, 2016 [ECF No. 13807]. 

	21 	 On April 24, 2018, the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and certain
Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs filed amended proposed class proofs of claim. See Notice of Filing of Amended Exhibits to Motion for an Order Granting Authority to File Late Class Proofs
of Claim, dated Apr. 25, 2018 [ECF No. 14280]. 

	22 	 See Order Establishing, Inter Alia, Briefing Schedule for Certain issues Arising from Late Claim
Motions Filed by Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and Certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs, dated Mar. 2, 2017 [ECF No. 13869];
Opening Brief by General Motors LLC with Respect to Initial Late Claim Motions Issues, dated Mar. 6, 2017 [ECF No. 13871]; The Ignition Switch Plaintiffs’ Brief on the Initial Late Claim Motions Issues, dated
Mar. 6, 2017 [ECF No. 13872]; Opening Brief of GUC Trust Administrator and Participating Unitholders on the Applicability of Pioneer and Tolling to Plaintiffs’ Motions to File Late Claims, dated Mar. 6, 2017 [ECF
No. 13873]; Brief on Applicability of Pioneer and Tolling Issues in Connection with Omnibus Motion by Certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs for Authority to File Late Proofs of Claim for Personal
Injuries and Wrongful Deaths, dated Mar. 6, 2017 [ECF No. 13874]. 

  
 14 

	IV.	 Plaintiffs’ Alleged Claims Against Old GM. 

35. The proposed class claims addressed in the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs’ and certain
Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs’ Late Claims Motions (the “Proposed Class Claims”) allege that Old GM knew about the Ignition Switch Defect, other
defects in ignition switches, defects in side airbags, and defects in power steering for years prior to the Bar Date.23 The Proposed Class Claims further allege that Old GM concealed the
existence of these defects, causing Plaintiffs to overpay for defective vehicles and bear the costs of repairs while Old GM reaped the benefit of selling defective vehicles at inflated prices and avoiding the costs of a recall.24 
 36. Based on these allegations, the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs assert claims against the Old GM estate under the laws of each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia for: (i) fraudulent concealment; (ii) unjust enrichment;
(iii) consumer protection claims; (iv) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; and (v) negligence.25 

37. Certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs assert personal injury and wrongful death claims arising
from accidents they assert were caused by vehicles subject to Recall No.14V-047. Certain other Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs assert personal injury and wrongful death
claims arising from accidents they assert were caused by vehicles subject to Recall Nos. 14V-118, 14V-153, 14V-355, 14V-394, 14V-400, and 14V-540 (collectively, the “Personal Injury Claims,” and together with the Proposed
Class Claims, the “Claims”). 
  
  

	23 	 See Amended Exhibit A to the Economic Loss Late Claim Motion (the “Proposed Ignition Switch
Class Claim”), ¶¶ 57-285; Exhibit B to the Economic Loss Late Claim Motion (the “Proposed Non-Ignition
Switch Class Claim”) ¶¶ 38-175. 

	24 	 See, e.g., Proposed Ignition Switch Class Claim ¶ 374; Proposed
Non-Ignition Switch Class Claim ¶ 278. 

	25 	 See Proposed Ignition Switch Class Claim ¶¶
358-1697; Proposed Non-Ignition Switch Class Claim ¶¶ 262-1744. 

  
 15 

 38. New GM has consistently taken the position that the Claims are properly asserted against
the GUC Trust and not against New GM.26 
 39. Subsequent to filing the Late Claims
Motions, counsel for the proposed class representatives for the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, the proposed class representatives for certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, and counsel for certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs provided the GUC Trust with materials and expert reports describing in detail the factual background for their Claims, the alleged viability of the asserted Claims and the alleged
amount of damages (the “Proffered Evidence”). 
 40. In addition, they provided a report by Stefan Boedeker, an
expert on surveys and statistical sampling, analyzing the amount of alleged damages for the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs’ and certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs’ claims based on a conjoint analysis
conducted by Mr. Boedeker and the Berkeley Research Group. 
 41. Conjoint analysis is a set of econometric and statistical techniques
developed to study consumer preferences and is widely used as a market research tool. In a conjoint analysis, study participants review a set of products with different attributes (such as a vehicle shown in different colors) and choose which
product they would prefer to purchase. The collected data can be used to determine market preferences and the value consumers place on particular attributes of a product. Here, the alleged amount of damages for economic loss claims was determined by
using a conjoint analysis to evaluate the difference in value that consumers placed on an Old GM vehicle without a defect as compared to an identical vehicle with a defect. Conjoint studies were conducted where the defect was described as causing
physical harm and death, as well as where the defect was described as involving no physical harm or death. 
  

 

	26 	 The record is replete with attempts by New GM to saddle the Old GM estate with these potentially massive
claims. “To the extent Plaintiffs can prove that they are entitled to any relief, the appropriate remedy is to permit them to seek allowance of an unsecured claim against the Old GM bankruptcy estate.” Dkt. 12981 (New GM’s 2014
Threshold Issues Br.) at 53; “To the extent they had any claim, it was against Old GM and they retained that claim after the 363 Sale.” Id. at 36; “Every one of their claims, the economic loss plaintiffs’ claims, is
a claim that’s assertable against Old GM as it relates to an Old GM vehicle.” Hr’g Tr. Feb. 17, 2015 at 59:17-19 (New GM counsel Arthur Steinberg).

  
 16 

 42. Following rulings by Judge Furman in the multi-district proceeding pending in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York regarding the viability of claims in certain states, counsel for the Named Plaintiffs provided the GUC Trust with refined estimates of the amount of damages. Counsel started with median
estimates of damages per vehicle based on the conjoint analysis, and multiplied that by the number of defective Old GM vehicles in each state without a manifestation requirement. Depending on which estimate was used (i.e., the estimate based
on a defect causing physical harm and death, or the estimate based on time-to-recall), the estimated damages could equal or exceed $77 billion. 

43. Certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs provided materials describing the personal injury and
wrongful death claims of certain plaintiffs and demonstrating the alleged value of these claims based on exemplar verdict amounts. The valuation of damages was assessed and approved by W. Mark Lanier, an experienced trial attorney recognized as a
leader in the field. 
 44. The valuation of these plaintiffs’ asserted damages in the Proffered Evidence is well in excess of the
amount necessary to trigger New GM’s obligation to issue the maximum amount of Adjustment Shares under the AMSPA. While the GUC Trust disputes that Plaintiffs are entitled to this (or any) level of damages, it recognizes that there is no
guarantee that it would be able to defeat or reduce such damages claims if the issues were litigated. 
 45. Likewise, New GM has presented
the GUC Trust Administrator with expert reports and other evidence attempting to discredit the Proffered Evidence and also support its position in these bankruptcy cases and other related litigation (“New GM Evidence”). New
GM offers no alternative damage valuation method. Rather, New GM alleges that there is simply no basis for economic loss or personal injury damages. 

  
 17 

 46. While the GUC Trust believes there are legal and factual arguments that refute the
damages asserted in the Proffered Evidence, it recognizes that there is no guarantee that it would be able to defeat or reduce such damages claims if the issues were litigated. At a minimum, the GUC Trust believes that such litigation would be
expensive and time consuming. Thus, after reviewing the Proffered Evidence, the New GM Evidence, and in consultation with the GUC Trust Monitor, and considering the benefits of the Settlement as a whole to the Unitholders to whom it owes its
fiduciary duty, the GUC Trust has concluded that the Settlement falls well within the range of reasonableness. 
  

	V.	 The Settlement Agreement. 

47. Following the filing of the Late Claims Motions, the Parties engaged in extensive negotiations to resolve the numerous complex issues
raised by Plaintiffs’ claims against the Old GM estate and the assets held and previously distributed by the GUC Trust. After the Court issued the Settlement Decision, and after the expiration of the forbearance agreement between the GUC Trust
and New GM, the GUC Trust conducted extensive additional negotiations with the Plaintiffs and New GM. The GUC Trust also reviewed voluminous materials regarding the merits and potential value of Plaintiffs’ claims that were provided by each
side of the dispute (i.e., Plaintiffs and New GM). As a result of these additional negotiations, the GUC Trust, Co-Lead Counsel for Ignition Switch and certain
Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, counsel for certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs and the Participating Unitholders entered into the Prior Settlement. The Court held
in the Rule 23 Decisions that the Prior Settlement as drafted could not be approved unless the Ignition Switch and certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs could certify one or more classes under Rule 23, and
denied the Initial 9019 Motion without prejudice. 

  
 18 

 48. Following the Rule 23 Decisions, the Signatory Plaintiffs, the GUC Trust, and the
Participating Unitholders engaged in further good faith, arms’-length negotiations. As a result of these further negotiations, the Parties executed the Settlement Agreement that is the subject of this Motion. 

49. The Settlement Agreement resolves the Late Claims Motions (including the Initial Late Claim Motions Issues) filed by the Signatory
Plaintiffs, and provides a mechanism (estimation) for the determination of the allowance of the Signatory Plaintiffs’ claims, and the Signatory Plaintiffs’ rights to GUC Trust Assets. The Settlement Agreement also places the asserted
claims of all Signatory Plaintiffs on the same track, correcting, for the most part, the disjointed approach introduced by New GM. 
 50. The
key terms of the Settlement Agreement are as follows:27 
 Notice Costs: 

 

	 	a.	 The GUC Trust agrees to pay the reasonable costs and expense for Court-approved notice of the Settlement to the
Classes and Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs in an amount not to exceed $13.72 million.28 

Condition Precedent to the Settlement Agreement: 
  

	 	b.	 The Settlement set forth in the Settlement Agreement becomes effective on the date the Final Approval Order is
entered (the “Settlement Effective Date”). 

 Plaintiffs’ Release: 

 
  

	27 	 This summary of the Settlement Agreement is qualified in its entirety by the terms and provisions of the
Settlement Agreement. To the extent that there are any inconsistencies between the description of the Settlement Agreement contained in the Motion and the terms and provisions of the Settlement Agreement, the Settlement Agreement shall control. A
copy of the Settlement Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 

	28 	 The GUC Trust’s agreement to pay up to $13.72 million of notice costs under the Settlement Agreement
is an increase from the $6 million notice cost cap amount under the Prior Settlement Agreement. In exchange for this increase in notice funding, and the practical reality that these amounts must now be paid prior to receiving any release from
the Plaintiffs, under the Settlement Agreement, the GUC Trust is not making the $15 million settlement amount payment to the Plaintiffs that was contemplated under the Prior Settlement Agreement. 

  
 19 

	 	c.	 Upon the Settlement Effective Date, the Plaintiffs will be deemed to irrevocably waive and release all claims
against the GUC Trust, including a release of any rights to prior distributions of or current GUC Trust Assets and any rights to distributions by the Avoidance Action Trust, and waive jury trial rights with regard to fixing the amount of individual
claims that are estimated for allowance purposes and entitlement to any value from the Adjustment Shares (the “Waiver Provision”). 

Settlement Fund: 
  

	 	d.	 In light of the benefits of the Settlement, the GUC Trust agrees that, subject to the entry of the Final
Approval Order, it will seek the entry of a Claims Estimate Order that: (i) estimates the aggregate allowed General Unsecured Claims of Plaintiffs against Sellers and/or the GUC Trust pursuant to Section 5.1 of the GUC Trust Agreement,
Section 7.3 of the Plan, Section 3.2(c) of the AMSPA, and the Side Letter, in an amount that, as of the date of the Estimation Order, could equal or exceed $10 billion, thus triggering the issuance of the maximum amount of the
Adjustment Shares; and (ii) directs that, subject to Section 7 of the Settlement Agreement, any such Adjustment Shares issued as a result of an Estimation Order, or the value of such Adjustment Shares be promptly delivered by New GM to a
trust, fund or other vehicle (the “Settlement Fund”) established and designated by the Signatory Plaintiffs for the exclusive benefit of Plaintiffs. 

 

	 	e.	 Certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs consent to estimation of their
personal injury and wrongful death claims by this Court solely for the purposes of determining the aggregate Allowed General Unsecured Claims for a Claims Estimate Order, and waive any related jury trial rights. 

 

	 	f.	 Under the Final Approval Order, all Unitholders, all defendants in the Term Loan Avoidance Action, and all
holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims, other than the Plaintiffs, via notice and bar order, will be deemed to irrevocably waive and release any and all rights to the Adjustment Shares. 

Settlement Payments And Attorneys’ Fees: 
  

	 	g.	 Subject to notice, an opportunity for Plaintiffs to object, and approval by the Bankruptcy Court, the Signatory
Plaintiffs will determine the overall allocation of the value of the Settlement Fund between economic loss claims and personal injury/wrongful death claims, the eligibility and criteria for payment, and procedures for payment of attorneys’
fees. 

  

	 	h.	 Notice of the proposed allocation, proposed eligibility and criteria for payment, and proposed procedures for
payment of attorneys’ fees will be posted on a settlement website, along with information about the hearing date and how and when to assert any objections. 

 

	 	i.	 Being defined as a Plaintiff does not assure any party that he, she, or it will receive a distribution from
the Adjustment Shares (or their value), if any, or any other consideration contained in the Settlement Fund. 

  
 20 

 No Waiver Of Claims Against New GM: 

 

	 	j.	 Nothing in the Settlement Agreement is intended to waive any claims against New GM or to be an election of
remedies against New GM; nor does the Settlement Agreement or any payments made in connection therewith represent full satisfaction of any claims against Old GM, unless and until such claims are, in fact, paid in full from every available source;
provided, however, that in no event shall any Plaintiff be permitted to seek any further payment or compensation from the GUC Trust in respect of their claims or otherwise, other than the Adjustment Shares. 

 

	 	k.	 Except as mandated otherwise under applicable law, nothing in the Settlement Agreement shall waive any claims
that any Plaintiff may have against New GM or constitute an election of remedies by any Plaintiff, and neither Adjustment Shares nor any distribution thereof to any Plaintiff shall represent full and final satisfaction of any claim that any
Plaintiff may have against New GM, all of which are expressly reserved. 

  

	 	l.	 The Bankruptcy Court’s estimate of the aggregate Allowed General Unsecured Claims in the Claims Estimate
Order shall not operate as a cap on any of the claims of any of the Plaintiffs against New GM. 

 51. Under the Settlement
Agreement, the “Ignition Switch Class” is defined as plaintiffs asserting economic loss claims who, prior to July 10, 2009, owned or leased a vehicle with an ignition switch defect included in Recall No. 14V-047. The “Non-Ignition Switch Class” (together with the Ignition Switch Class, the “Classes”) is defined as plaintiffs
asserting economic loss claims who, prior to July 10, 2009, owned or leased a vehicle with defects in ignition switches, side airbags, or power steering included in NHTSA Recall Nos. 14V-118, 14V-153, 14V-355, 14V-394, and 14V-400. 

RELIEF REQUESTED 

52. By this Motion, the GUC Trust respectfully requests that this Court, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 105, 363, and 1142 and
Bankruptcy Rules 3002, 9014, and 9019: (i) approve the actions of the GUC Trust Administrator in entering into the Settlement and seeking estimation of the claims at the appropriate time as provided by the Settlement Agreement; and
(ii) authorize the reallocation of GUC Trust Assets. The GUC Trust further requests that this Court approve the Settlement pursuant to Rule 9019 at the time of the Final Approval Hearing. 

  
 21 

 BASIS FOR RELIEF REQUESTED 

 

	I.	 The Court Should Find that Entry into the Settlement is an Appropriate Exercise of the GUC Trust
Administrator’s Authority and Approve Actions Taken by the GUC Trust Administrator in Connection Therewith Pursuant to Section 8.1(e) of the GUC Trust Agreement. 

53. The GUC Trust Administrator seeks a determination by the Court that entry into the Settlement and a motion seeking estimation of Allowed
General Unsecured Claims, at the time and in the manner described in the Settlement Agreement, is an appropriate exercise of the GUC Trust Administrator’s rights, powers, and/or privileges. 

54. “The practice is well established by which trustees seek instructions from the court, given upon notice to creditors and interested
parties, as to matters which involve difficult questions of judgment.” Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 274 (1951); see also In the Matter of the Application of U.S. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n, No. 651625/2018, NYSCEF No. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 4, 2018) (petition seeking an order, following an estimation proceeding, that instructs and authorizes trustees to make distributions pursuant to method
proposed); In re Am. Home Mort. Inv. Trust 2005-2, No. 14 Civ. 2494 (AKH), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111867, at *29-30 (explaining that
“[t]rust instruction proceedings are a well-established procedure by which trustees (and other affected parties) can seek judicial guidance from the court about how to resolve immediate and difficult issues of interpretation of governing
documents”), In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 59 A.3d 471, 477 (Del. Ch. 2012) (noting that a “request for judicial relief involving a trust can be appropriate in many circumstances”). 

55. Judge Wiles recently considered a similar request for instruction in In re Tronox Inc.,
No. 09-10156 (MEW), 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 1974 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2015). In that matter, the trustee of the Tronox Incorporated Tort Claims Trust (established under the Tronox debtors’ plan
of reorganization, and governed by a trust agreement and a set of trust distribution 

  
 22 

 
procedures) filed a motion seeking instruction regarding whether the trustee was correct with respect to certain past action. See id. at
*1-2. The court noted that because the trustee was seeking “‘comfort’ as to actions already taken rather than . . . ‘instructions’ as to what the [t]rustee should do going forward in
administering the [t]rust,” it had “some skepticism as to whether the motion . . . [was] an appropriate request for instructions.” Id. at *21. The court based its skepticism on the notion that
“[o]rdinarily a [t]rustee seeks instructions when it has not yet taken action and where the [t]rustee is unsure as to what to do, and may even face liability for an incorrect choice.” Id. (citations omitted). The court
further noted that the request before it was “not really a request for ‘instructions’ as to how to interpret the existing [t]rust documents[,]” but “more of a request for an advisory opinion as to whether a proposed change
to the” trust distribution procedures “would be consistent (or inconsistent) with the terms of the [debtors’ plan] and the vested rights of claimants.” Id. at *22. Noting, however, that it was “plain that
further litigation – and thereby further delays in distributions to the beneficiaries of the [t]rust, who [had] already been waiting for many years – [were] inevitable unless some binding clarification of these issues is provided[,]”
and based upon the conclusion that the court, under the plan, had “continuing jurisdiction over any issue relating to the interpretation and application of the [t]rust [a]greement” and the trust distribution procedures, the court found
that it was “appropriate” to exercise its jurisdiction and issue the ruling as requested. Id. at *23. 
 56. Here,
the GUC Trust Administrator is specifically authorized to seek guidance from the Court in this matter pursuant to § 8.1(e) of the GUC Trust Agreement, which provides, in relevant part, that 

where the GUC Trust Administrator determines, in its reasonable discretion, that it is necessary, appropriate, or desirable, the GUC Trust
Administrator will have the right to submit to the Bankruptcy Court . . . any question or questions regarding any specific action 

  
 23 

 
proposed to be taken by the GUC Trust Administrator with respect to the [GUC Trust Agreement], the GUC Trust, or the GUC Trust Assets . . . . Pursuant to the Plan, the Bankruptcy Court has
retained jurisdiction for such purposes and may approve or disapprove any such proposed action upon motion by the GUC Trust Administrator. 
 GUC Trust
Agreement § 8.1(e). 
 57. The GUC Trust Administrator has determined that, given the import of both the Settlement and the estimation
of allowed General Unsecured Claims, it is necessary, appropriate, and desirable to ask the Court at this time whether the actions the GUC Trust Administrator proposes to take in connection therewith are permissible and appropriate. As noted, the
GUC Trust Administrator has the exclusive right to object to General Unsecured Claims, seek estimation of the amount of allowed General Unsecured Claims, and seek Adjustment Shares from New GM. Plan §§ 7.1(b), 7.3; GUC Trust Agreement
§ 5.1. Moreover, similar to the circumstances extant in Tronox, the Court has continuing jurisdiction to interpret, implement, or enforce the GUC Trust Agreement. Plan § 11.1(i); see also GUC Trust Agreement §
8.1(e). Unlike the Tronox trustee, however, the GUC Trust Administrator is seeking instruction regarding actions it proposes to take based on its interpretation of the relevant documents. Based on the foregoing, it is well within the
Court’s authority to issue a ruling “approv[ing] . . . [the described] proposed action” by the GUC Trust Administrator. GUC Trust Agreement § 8.1(e). 

58. Accordingly, the Court should find that entry into the Settlement Agreement is an appropriate exercise of the GUC Trust
Administrator’s authority and approve the actions to be taken pursuant therewith, including seeking entry of a Claims Estimate Order after entry of the Final Approval Order. 

  
 24 

	II.	 The Bankruptcy Court Should Approve and Authorize the Reallocation of $13,720,000 of GUC Trust
Assets. 

 53. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the GUC Trust is responsible for funding the cost of notice
contemplated herein, up to an amount of $13.72 million (the “Notice Cost Cap Amount”). The Notice Cost Cap Amount is based on an estimate by the Plaintiffs’ notice expert Epiq/Hilsoft for the costs of direct mail
notice of the Settlement Agreement to the Classes. The projected costs are “all in” amounts that provide for a “state of the art” notice program including costs for mailing and social media. The GUC Trust respectfully requests
authority to reallocate $13.72 million from otherwise distributable assets of the GUC Trust for use in funding the notice. 
 58. As
noted above, under the terms of the Settlement, the GUC Trust is obligated to pay up to $13.72 million to fund the cost of notice. Pursuant to Section 5.5 of the GUC Trust Agreement, the GUC Trust Administrator is afforded the flexibility
to “hold back” from distributions (with the approval of the GUC Trust Monitor)29 assets that would otherwise be distributed to GUC Trust Beneficiaries to reserve for unresolved disputed
claims. See GUC Trust Agreement § 5.5. The GUC Trust has historically held back an amount sufficient to pay $50 million in disputed claims, which totals approximately $14.8 million. Since the only remaining dispute is with the
Plaintiffs, the GUC Trust seeks authority to use the disputed claims holdback to pay the amount required under the Settlement Agreement. Section 6.1 of the GUC Trust Agreement specifically provides the GUC Trust Administrator with the ability
to seek Bankruptcy Court approval (after consultation with the GUC Trust Monitor) to redesignate GUC Trust Distributable Assets. 
  

 

	29 	 As required by Section 6.1 of the GUC Trust Agreement, the GUC Trust Administrator has consulted with the
GUC Trust Monitor with respect to the proposed reallocation and use of distributable cash. GUC Trust Agreement § 6.1. The GUC Trust Monitor supports the relief requested herein. 

  
 25 

 59. The GUC Trust’s agreement to pay up to $13.72 million for notice falls well
within the types of “expenses, costs, liabilities, obligations or fees” that may be “held back” and reallocated for use by the GUC Trust pursuant to Section 6.1 of the GUC Trust Agreement. 

60. Accordingly, the GUC Trust submits that, pursuant to Sections 5.5 and 6.1(b) of the GUC Trust Agreement, the request to reallocate
$13.72 million of otherwise distributable assets for the purposes of funding notice is warranted and the Settlement should be approved pursuant to the terms of the GUC Trust Agreement. 

 

	III.	 The Settlement Will Confer Benefits Greater than Those that Would be Obtained Through Further
Litigation. 

 61. Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a) provides, in part, that “[o]n motion by the trustee and after
notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a). This Court also has authority to approve a settlement under Bankruptcy Code section 105(a), which empowers it to issue any order that is
“necessary or appropriate.” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). 
 62. The authority to approve a compromise or settlement is within the sound
discretion of the Court. See Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1972). The Court should exercise its discretion “in light of the general public policy favoring settlements.” In re Hibbard
Brown & Co., Inc., 217 B.R. 41, 46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citation omitted); see also Nellis v. Shugrue, 165 B.R. 115, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[T]he general rule [is] that settlements are favored
and, in fact, encouraged . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 63. When exercising its discretion, the Court must determine whether the
settlement is fair and equitable, reasonable, and in the best interests of the estate. See, e.g., Airline Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Am. Nat’l Bank &
Tr. Co. (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 156 B.R. 414, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d, 17 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Purofied Down Prods. Corp., 150 B.R. 519, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Where “the integrity
of the negotiation process is preserved, a strong initial presumption of fairness attaches to the proposed settlement . . . .” In re Hibbard, 217 B.R. at 46. 

  
 26 

 64. The Court need not decide the numerous issues of law and fact raised in the underlying
dispute, “but must only ‘canvass the issues and see whether the settlement falls below the lowest point in the range of reasonableness.’” In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 327 B.R. 143, 159 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting In re W.T. Grant, Co., 699 F.2d 599, 608 (2d Cir. 1983)); see also In re Purofied, 150 B.R. at 522 (“[T]he court need not conduct a ‘mini-trial’ to determine the merits of the
underlying [dispute] . . . .”). 
 65. The Court evaluates whether the Settlement Agreement is fair and equitable based on “the
probabilities of ultimate success should the claim be litigated,” and “an educated estimate of the complexity, expense, and likely duration of . . . litigation, the possible difficulties of collecting on any judgment which might be
obtained, and all other factors relevant to a full and fair assessment of the wisdom of the proposed compromise.” Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968). 

66. Courts in this jurisdiction consider the following Iridium factors in determining whether approval of a settlement is
warranted: 
 (1) the balance between the litigation’s possibility of success and the settlement’s future benefits; (2) the
likelihood of complex and protracted litigation, “with its attendant expense, inconvenience, and delay,” including the difficulty in collecting on the judgment; (3) “the paramount interests of the creditors,” including each
affected class’s relative benefits “and the degree to which creditors either do not object to or affirmatively support the proposed settlement”; (4) whether other parties in interest support the settlement; (5) the
“competency and experience of counsel” supporting, and “[t]he experience and knowledge of the bankruptcy court judge” reviewing, the settlement; (6) “the nature and breadth of releases to be obtained by officers and
directors”; and (7) “the extent to which the settlement is the product of arm’s length bargaining.” 

  
 27 

 Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478
F.3d 452, 462 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 
 67. The Settlement Agreement falls well within the range of reasonableness and satisfies
each of the Iridium factors as set forth below. Thus, the Settlement Agreement should be approved under Bankruptcy Rule 9019. 
  

	 	A.	 Plaintiffs’ Claims Raise Numerous Complex Litigation Issues. 

68. The first two Iridium factors—(1) the balance between the litigation’s likelihood of success and the
settlement’s benefits; and (2) the likelihood of complex and protracted litigation—are easily met. As detailed below, continued litigation over Plaintiffs’ claims raises significant, complex issues, has an uncertain outcome, and
would be costly and time consuming. Conversely, the benefits of near-term, certain resolution are clear. 
  

	 	1.	 Litigation over Plaintiffs’ Claims Raises Numerous Complex Issues. 

69. One complex, contentious issue raised by the litigation over Plaintiffs’ claims is whether the Court should grant Plaintiffs authority
to file late claims and class claims under the Late Filed Claims Order. See Late Filed Claims Order at 1-2. 

70. As an initial matter, there is a dispute over the standard for obtaining leave to file late claims. Certain Plaintiffs have argued that
creditors may assert late claims based solely on a showing that they have suffered a due process violation related to the Bar Date.30 The GUC Trust has taken the position that Plaintiffs are
precluded from asserting late claims because of Plaintiffs’ strategic delay in pursuing claims against the GUC Trust after the Recalls.31 

 
  

	30 	 See, e.g., The Ignition Switch Plaintiffs’ Brief on the Initial Late Claim Motions
Issues, dated Mar. 6, 2017 [ECF No. 13872]; Brief on Applicability of Pioneer and Tolling Issues in Connection with Omnibus Motion by Certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs for Authority to File
Late Proofs of Claim for Personal Injuries and Wrongful Deaths, dated Mar. 6, 2017 [ECF No. 13874]. 

	31 	 See Opening Brief of GUC Trust Administrator and Participating Unitholders on the Applicability of
Pioneer and Tolling to Plaintiffs’ Motions to File Late Claims, dated Mar. 6, 2017 [ECF No. 13873]. 

  
 28 

 71. The Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and certain
Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs have also asserted that they can meet the Pioneer factors for demonstrating excusable neglect. Of the four Pioneer factors, the one given the most
weight is the reason for the delay in filing claims, including whether the delay was in the reasonable control of the movant. See In re Residential Capital, LLC, Case No. 12-12020
(MG), 2015 WL 515387, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2015). The Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs have argued that a debtor’s failure to provide actual notice to a
known creditor is evidence that any delay was not in the control of the creditor. The GUC Trust, in turn, has argued that the delay here is attributable to Plaintiffs’ voluntary strategic decision, made after the Recalls, to pursue New GM and
not the GUC Trust. In response, the Plaintiffs have argued that, among other things, the Late Filed Claims Order effectively precluded the filing of late claims until the Second Circuit vacated the equitable mootness ruling. 

72. Although Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and certain
Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs have not yet demonstrated a due process violation, many of these plaintiffs have alleged that their claims arise out of defects that are substantially similar to the Ignition
Switch Defect—defects that involve the same condition (low torque switches that move out of the “run” position) and have the same effects (loss of power to steering, brakes, and airbags). The
Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs have also argued that they can demonstrate a violation of their due process rights in
connection with the Bar Date. 
 73. Further, the Plaintiffs have argued, and the GUC Trust disputes, that excusable neglect can exist in the
absence of a due process violation. For example, Plaintiffs have asserted that excusable neglect can be found where the debtors failed to comply with bankruptcy procedures in providing notice of a bar date and where a claimant, through no fault of
its own, was unaware of its claim prior to the bar date. See In re Arts de Provinces de France, Inc., 153 B.R. 144, 147 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re PT-1
Commc’ns, Inc., 292 B.R. 482, 489 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003). This issue, too, would have to be litigated. 

  
 29 

 74. Another complex issue is whether the doctrine of equitable mootness is applicable to bar
Plaintiffs’ claims. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944, 952-53 (2d Cir. 1993). 

75. In the April 2015 Decision, the Bankruptcy Court applied the five Chateaugay factors32 and determined that if the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs’ or certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs’ late claims were allowed, GUC Trust Assets could
not be tapped to pay them under the doctrine of equitable mootness. See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. at 598. The Bankruptcy Court found, inter alia, that any relief would “knock the props out” from the
transactions in which Unitholders acquired their units. See id. at 587-88, 592. Allowing billions of dollars in additional claims against the GUC Trust, in Judge Gerber’s view, would
be “extraordinarily unjust” given the Unitholders’ expectation that the universe of claims against the GUC Trust would decrease, and not increase, over time following the Bar Date. Id. at 88. The Bankruptcy Court’s
determination was also based, in part, on its acknowledgment that purchasers of GUC Trust units could not foresee that future distributions would be delayed while additional claims were filed and litigated. Id. at 88-89. 
  
  

	32 	 These five factors are: (i) the court can still order some effective relief; (ii) such relief will
not affect “the re-emergence of the debtor as a revitalized corporate entity”; (iii) such relief will not unravel intricate transactions so as to “knock the props out from under the
authorization for every transaction that has taken place” and “create an unmanageable, uncontrollable situation for the Bankruptcy Court”; (iv) the “parties who would be adversely affected by the modification have notice of the
appeal and an opportunity to participate in the proceedings;” and (v) the appellant “pursue[d] with diligence all available remedies to obtain a stay of execution of the objectionable order . . . if the failure to do so creates a
situation rendering it inequitable to reverse the orders appealed from.” In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d at 952-53 (citations omitted).

  
 30 

 76. On appeal, the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and certain
Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs argued that the Bankruptcy Court erred because, inter alia, effective relief could be fashioned without disturbing any transactions or having an adverse impact on
Unitholders by providing Plaintiffs with exclusive access to any Adjustment Shares that may be issued under the AMSPA.33 These Plaintiffs argued that where any relief, including partial relief, is
available, equitable mootness should not be applied. See, e.g., Chateaugay, 10 F.3d at 954. In addition, they argued that equitable mootness was only applicable in the context of bankruptcy appeals.34 
 77. The Second Circuit vacated the Bankruptcy Court’s equitable mootness ruling as
advisory, neither affirming nor reversing that decision. See Elliott, 829 F.3d at 168-69. 

78. Additional complex issues would certainly arise from continued litigation of Plaintiffs’ claims. The Bankruptcy Court would still need
to decide whether class certification for the Ignition Switch and Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs’ Proposed Class Claims would be appropriate. In addition, the GUC Trust could raise objections to
allowance of these class claims, as well as to the separate proofs of claim filed by Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs. This could lead to extensive additional litigation and delay. 

79. In sum, while the GUC Trust believes that it has meritorious defenses to the claims of all Plaintiffs, the resolution of the numerous,
complex issues raised by the litigation over Plaintiffs’ claims is uncertain, and, as set forth below, would result in significant expense and delay. 
  

 

	33 	 See Br. for Appellant Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, Elliott v. General Motors LLC (In re Motors
Liquidation Co.), Appeal Nos. 15-2844(L), 15-2847(XAP), 15-2848(XAP) (2d Cir. Nov. 16, 2015) [ECF No. 235], 49-52; Br. for certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs, Elliott v. General Motors LLC (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), Appeal Nos.
15-2844(L), 15-2847(XAP), 15-2848(XAP) (2d Cir. Nov. 16, 2015) [ECF No. 183], 4, 52 n.18 (incorporating the arguments on the
application of equitable mootness in the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs’ brief). 

	34 	 See Response and Reply Br. for Appellant-Cross-Appellee Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, Elliott v.
General Motors LLC (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), Appeal Nos. 15-2844(L), 15-2847(XAP), 15-2848(XAP) (2d Cir. Feb. 1, 2016)
[ECF No. 315], at 40-43. 

  
 31 

	 	2.	 The Terms of the Settlement Agreement  

	 	         Outweigh	 the Risks of Continued Litigation. 

80. Litigation of these complex issues has been ongoing for years, consuming large sums of money and countless hours of labor for the Parties
and this Court. In the absence of settlement, there is a high likelihood of even more expensive, protracted and contentious litigation that will consume significant estate funds and expose the estate to risk and uncertainty. In addition, resolution
of these issues may require the added time and expense of discovery. For example, the Pioneer analysis is fact intensive and, to date, only limited discovery, restricted to a proposed class representative of the Ignition Switch
Plaintiffs and certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs, has occurred on this issue. 
 81. By
comparison, settling the litigation provides the Parties with greater certainty and eliminates the significant cost and delay of litigation. 

82. Likewise, the Settlement avoids the likely substantial costs and expenses, significant risk, and practical difficulties for the Plaintiffs,
the GUC Trust and potential defendants surrounding litigation relating to the clawback of prior distributions of GUC Trust Assets. On a similar score, the waiver under the Settlement Agreement of certain
Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs’ jury trial rights with regard to fixing the amount of individual claims that are estimated for allowance purposes and entitlement to any value from the Adjustment Shares
obviates potentially prolonged litigation across several forums. 
 83. In addition, the Settlement Agreement provides several benefits
beyond avoiding continued litigation. 
 84. First, the Parties’ determination to seek a Claims Estimate Order allowing and estimating
Plaintiffs’ claims in an amount, when combined with all of the other Allowed General Unsecured Claims against the Old GM estate, that may equal or exceed $42 billion, provides an efficient and reasonable resolution of the allowable amount
of Plaintiffs’ claims. This will provide a potential source of recovery in the near-term for Plaintiffs who have been waiting years for any recovery, including Plaintiffs who have suffered personal injury or wrongful death. 

  
 32 

 85. Under the Settlement, any Adjustment Shares issued by New GM under this Claims Estimate
Order would be for the exclusive benefit of Plaintiffs. Based on the amount of allowed and disputed unsecured claims against Old GM, New GM’s obligation to issue these shares would not be triggered absent allowance of Plaintiffs’ claims.35 Thus, the GUC Trust determined that it was reasonable to forgo any potential future recovery from the Adjustment Shares in consideration for the Release. This provision potentially paves the way for
Plaintiffs to obtain a recovery on their claims without disturbing other creditors’ past or future recoveries. 
 86. Further, the
Settlement removes a major impediment to winding down the Old GM estate. The resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims and waiver of certain rights and claims eliminates the likelihood of complex and protracted litigation, including with respect to
Plaintiffs’ attempts to enjoin further GUC Trust distributions, thus preventing delay in distributing remaining GUC Trust Assets and protects Unitholders from the risk of claw-back or recapture of prior distributions. 

87. Finally, given that nearly all the GUC Trust’s Assets have been distributed or reserved for the Bankruptcy Code section 502(h) claim
emanating from the Avoidance Action Litigation, it is likely that the GUC Trust would run out of funds prior to completing the litigation of Plaintiffs’ Claims. 

88. The terms of the Settlement Agreement reflect a reasonable assessment of the substantial time and expense of litigating Plaintiffs’
claims, balanced against the benefits of more near-term, efficient and certain resolution of the allowable amount of Plaintiffs’ claims and sources of recovery. The benefits of the Settlement in the near term outweigh the benefit of potential
long-term success through the protracted litigation of complex issues. 
  

	35 	 See Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust Quarterly Section 6.2(c) Report
and Budget Variance Report as of December 31, 2018, dated Jan. 24. 2019 [ECF No. 144402]. 

  
 33 

	 	B.	 The Benefits of Settling Exceed the Potential Benefits of 

	 	          Continued	 Litigation. 

89. With respect to the third and fourth Iridium factors-the paramount interests of creditors and whether other interested
parties support the settlement—prolonging the litigation will increase costs and decrease the amount of GUC Trust Assets available to satisfy creditors. Approving the Settlement Agreement, on the other hand, avoids the significant expense and
uncertainty associated with continued litigation, and maximizes and expedites distributions to current GUC Trust beneficiaries. The release of Plaintiffs’ rights and claims with respect to the GUC Trust’s prior distributions and current
GUC Trust Assets allows the GUC Trust to complete the orderly wind-down of the Old GM estate. 
 90. Moreover, providing Plaintiffs with the
exclusive right to proceed against the Adjustment Shares potentially opens an avenue for Plaintiffs to recover on their claims against the GUC Trust without disturbing the recovery expectations of other creditors or Unitholders. Plaintiffs’
rights concerning the Adjustment Shares are protected because notice of any agreement by the Signatory Plaintiffs on proposed criteria to assert a claim against the Settlement Fund and a proposed methodology of allocation of the Settlement Fund
between economic loss claims and personal injury/wrongful death claims will be provided to Plaintiffs, who will be given an opportunity to object. 

91. The fourth Iridium factor—whether other interested parties support the settlement—is also met. Not surprisingly, the key
interested parties—the GUC Trust, Signatory Plaintiffs and the Participating Unitholders—all support the Settlement Agreement. See Ad Hoc Comm. of Personal Injury Asbestos Claimants v. Dana Corp. (In re Dana Corp.),
412 B.R. 53, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (affirming approval of settlement of claims of 7,500 asbestos personal injury claimants where, inter alia, the creditors’ committee and ad hoc bondholders’ committee supported the settlement). The
only anticipated opposition is from New GM. 

  
 34 

 92. Accordingly, for all of the reasons set forth above, the Settlement Agreement easily
meets the fourth Iridium factor and allows the GUC Trust to implement the express purpose of the GUC Trust Agreement. GUC Trust Agreement § 2.2 (stating that the “sole purpose of the GUC Trust is to implement the Plan on
behalf of, and for the benefit of the GUC Trust Beneficiaries”); GUC Trust Agreement § 4.2 (stating that “in no event shall the GUC Trust Administrator unduly prolong the duration of the GUC Trust, and the GUC Trust Administrator
shall, in the exercise of its reasonable business judgment and in the interests of all GUC Trust Beneficiaries, at all times endeavor to terminate the GUC Trust as soon as practicable in accordance with the purposes and provisions of this Trust
Agreement and the Plan.”). 
 C. The Settlement Agreement Satisfies the Remaining
Iridium Factors. 
 93. With respect to the sixth Iridium
factor, “the nature and breadth of releases to be obtained by officers and directors,” the Settlement Agreement releases any and all rights, claims and causes of action that any Plaintiff may assert against the GUC Trust, the GUC Trust
Administrator, the GUC Trust Assets, the Avoidance Action Trust and Unitholders. Importantly, the notice procedures set forth in Plaintiffs’ class certification motion contemplate a comprehensive individualized mailing program whereby
Plaintiffs receive a concise summary of the Settlement Agreement and instructions for accessing a website dedicated specifically to the Settlement. Each recipient, therefore, will have the opportunity and right to be heard by the Court in connection
with the Settlement. 

  
 35 

 94. With respect to the fifth and seventh Iridium factors, competent and
experienced counsel to the Parties who have been litigating these issues for years actively engaged in arms’-length, good faith negotiations to formulate the Settlement Agreement. The Parties, having considered the uncertainties, delay and cost
that would be incurred by further litigation, submit that the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable and appropriate, and in the best interests of the Parties. 

95. Based on the foregoing, the Settlement Agreement is in the best interests of the estate and its creditors and falls well within the range
of reasonableness. Therefore, entry into and approval of the Settlement Agreement pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 is warranted and the Settlement Agreement should be approved.36 

NOTICE 
 96. Notice
of this Motion has been provided in accordance with the Court-approved notice procedures. See Sixth Amended Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and Bankruptcy Rules 1015(c) and 9007 Establishing
Notice and Case Management Procedures, dated May 5, 2011 [ECF No. 10183]. Notice of this Motion has also been provided to any other required notice parties under Section 6.1(b)(iv) of the GUC Trust Agreement. The Parties submit
that no other or further notice need be provided. 
 CONCLUSION 

WHEREFORE, the Parties respectfully request that the Court: (i) enter an order substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit
B approving the actions to be undertaken by the GUC Trust Administrator under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, attached hereto as  

 

	36 	 In the event that the Settlement Agreement is not approved by the Court or the Settlement Agreement does not
become binding and enforceable for any reason, the Parties reserve all their rights and nothing herein shall be deemed or construed as an admission of any fact, liability, stipulation, or waiver, but rather as a statement made in furtherance of
settlement discussions. 

  
 36 

 
Exhibit A, and authorizing the reallocation of $13.72 million of GUC Trust Assets for notice costs; and (ii) approve the Settlement pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019; and
(iii) grant such other relief as is just and equitable. 
 [Remainder of the page intentionally left blank] 

  
 37 

 Dated: New York, New York 

  February 1, 2019 
  

			
	Respectfully submitted,
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Kristin K. Going

		 	Kristin K. Going
		 	Clay J. Pierce
		 	Marita S. Erbeck
		 	DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP
		 	1177 Avenue of the Americas
		 	41st Floor
		 	New York, NY 10036-2714
		 	Tel: (212) 248-3140
		 	E-mail: kristin.going@dbr.com
		 	       clay.pierce@dbr.com

		 	       marita.erbeck@dbr.com

		
		 	Attorneys for the Motors Liquidation
		 	Company GUC Trust Administrator

  
 38 

 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 

THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (the “Agreement”), dated as of February 1, 2019, is entered into between: 

Wilmington Trust Company, (the “GUC Trust Administrator”) solely in its capacity as trustee for and administrator of the Motors
Liquidation Company General Unsecured Creditors Trust (and as defined in Section 2.25 herein, the “GUC Trust”) 
 -and- 

The Signatory Plaintiffs, as hereinafter defined (the Signatory Plaintiffs and the GUC Trust, the “Parties”). 

PREAMBLE1 

Background: The Old GM Bankruptcy. 

A. Beginning on the Petition Date, Motors Liquidation Company f/k/a General Motors Corporation, a Delaware Corporation (“Old
GM”), and certain of its affiliated companies (together with Old GM, the “Debtors”) commenced the Old GM Bankruptcy Case under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code; 

B. Also on the Petition Date, the Sellers entered into an agreement pursuant to which certain assets of the Sellers, including the brand
“General Motors,” were to be sold to NGMCO, Inc., n/k/a General Motors LLC, a Delaware corporation (“New GM”); 

C. As of July 5, 2009, the AMSPA was further and finally amended pursuant to a Second Amendment to the Amended and Restated Master Sale
Purchase Agreement to, among other things, modify provisions in the original sale agreement relating to the issuance by New GM of a purchase price adjustment consisting of shares (the “Adjustment Shares”) of New GM Common
Stock in respect of Allowed General Unsecured Claims; 
 D. Pursuant to the AMSPA, if the Bankruptcy Court issues an order estimating the
aggregate allowed General Unsecured Claims against the Sellers at an amount exceeding thirty-five billion dollars ($35,000,000,000), then New GM must, within five (5) business days of entry of such order, issue the Adjustment Shares; 

E. If the Bankruptcy Court issues an Estimation Order estimating the aggregate allowed General Unsecured Claims against the Sellers at an
amount at or exceeding forty-two billion dollars ($42,000,000,000), New GM must issue the maximum amount of Adjustment Shares (30,000,000 shares); 

 

	1 	 Capitalized terms used, but not otherwise defined in the Preamble shall have the meanings ascribed to such
terms in the Definitions section of this Agreement. 

  
 1 

 F. On July 5, 2009, the AMSPA was approved pursuant to a Bankruptcy Code section 363
order (the “Sale Order”); 
 G. Pursuant to the Sale Order, New GM became vested in substantially all of the material
assets of the Sellers; 
 H. On July 10, 2009 (the “Closing Date”), the 363 Sale was consummated; 

I. On September 16, 2009, the Bar Date Order was entered establishing November 30, 2009 (the “Bar Date”) as
the deadline to file proofs of claim against the Debtors; 
 J. On March 29, 2011, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order (the
“Confirmation Order”) confirming the Plan; 
 K. The Plan created the GUC Trust pursuant to the GUC Trust Agreement,
as a post-confirmation successor to the Debtors pursuant to Section 1145 of the Bankruptcy Code, to, inter alia, administer the GUC Trust Assets; 

L. The Plan, GUC Trust Agreement, MSPA and Side Letter provided the GUC Trust with the sole, exclusive right to object to and settle General
Unsecured Claims, pursue an Estimation Order, and request and receive the Adjustment Shares; 
 M. On March 31, 2011 (the
“Effective Date”), the Plan was declared effective; 
 N. As of December 31, 2018, the total allowed General
Unsecured Claims are $31,855,431,837; 
 The Recalls and the Multi-District Litigation. 

O. In or around February and March of 2014, New GM issued a recall, NHTSA Recall Number 14V-047,
pertaining to 2,191,525 vehicles with an ignition switch defect (the “Ignition Switch Defect”); 
 P. In or around
June, July and September of 2014, New GM issued four additional recalls pertaining to approximately 10 million vehicles with defective ignition switches, NHTSA Recall Numbers 14V-355, 14V-394, 14V-540 and 14V-400; 

Q. In or around March of 2014, New GM issued a recall, NHTSA Recall Number 14V-118, pertaining to
approximately 1.2 million vehicles with defective side airbags; 
 R. In or around March of 2014, New GM issued a recall, NHTSA Recall
Number 14V-153, pertaining to over 1.3 million vehicles with defective power steering; 
 S.
Commencing after the issuance of the recalls, numerous lawsuits were filed against New GM, individually or on behalf of putative classes of persons, by, inter alia,: 

  
 2 

	 	a.	 plaintiffs asserting economic loss claims who, prior to the Closing Date, owned or leased a vehicle with an
ignition switch defect included in NHTSA Recall No. 14V-047 (the “Ignition Switch Plaintiffs”); 

 

	 	b.	 plaintiffs asserting economic loss claims who, prior to the Closing Date, owned or leased a vehicle with
defects in ignition switches, side airbags, or power steering included in NHTSA Recall Nos. 14V-355, 14V-394, 14V-400, 14V-118 and 14V-153 (the “Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs” and, together with the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs,
the “Economic Loss Plaintiffs”); 

  

	 	c.	 plaintiffs asserting personal injury or wrongful death claims based on or arising from an accident that
occurred before the Closing Date involving an Old GM vehicle that was later subject to an ignition switch defect included in NHTSA Recall No. 14V-047 (the “Ignition Switch Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs”); and 

  

	 	d.	 plaintiffs asserting personal injury or wrongful death claims based on or arising from an accident that
occurred before the Closing Date involving an Old GM vehicle that was later subject to NHTSA Recall Nos. 14V-355, 14V-540,
14V-394 or 14V-400 due to defects in ignition switches, side airbags, or power steering (the “Non-Ignition Switch Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs” and together with the Ignition Switch Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs, the
“Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs”), 

 T. Many of the
cases commenced against New GM were consolidated in a multi-district litigation (the “GM MDL”) pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York before the Hon. Jesse M. Furman (the
“District Court”); 
 The Motions to Enforce Litigation. 

U. In or around April and August of 2014, New GM sought to enjoin such lawsuits against New GM by filing motions to enforce the Sale Order with
respect to: (i) Ignition Switch Plaintiffs; (ii) Ignition Switch Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs; and (iii) Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs (the
“Motions to Enforce”); 
 V. Following the filing of the Motions to Enforce, the Bankruptcy Court identified initial
issues to be addressed on the Motions to Enforce with respect to the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and Ignition Switch Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs; 

W. Following briefing and argument, the Bankruptcy Court issued a Decision on April 15, 2015, and a Judgment implementing the Decision on
June 1, 2015; 
 X. In the Decision and the Judgment, the Bankruptcy Court ruled that “based on the doctrine of equitable mootness,
in no event shall assets of the GUC Trust held at any time in the past, now or in the future (collectively, the ‘GUC Trust Assets’) (as defined in the Plan) be used to satisfy any claims of the Plaintiffs”; 

Y. On July 13, 2016, the Second Circuit issued an opinion on direct appeal of the Decision and Judgment, vacating the Bankruptcy
Court’s equitable mootness ruling as an advisory opinion and further determining that (i) there was no clear error in the Bankruptcy Court’s factual finding that Old GM knew or reasonably should have known about the ignition switch
defect prior to bankruptcy, (ii) Old GM should have provided direct mail notice to vehicle owners, and (iii) individuals with claims arising out of the ignition switch defect were entitled to notice by direct mail or some equivalent, as
required by procedural due process; 

  
 3 

 Z. Following the issuance of the Second Circuit’s mandate, the Bankruptcy Court
identified initial issues to be addressed on remand, including whether the Economic Loss Plaintiffs or Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs satisfy the requirements for authorization to file late proof(s) of claim
against the GUC Trust and/or whether such claims are equitably moot; 
 AA. Pursuant to an Order to Show Cause, on December 22, 2016,
the Economic Loss Plaintiffs and certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs who had not received notice of the Order to Show Cause, filed motions [ECF Nos. 13806, 13807] for authority to file late proofs of
claim, including late class proofs of claim; on July 28, 2017, certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs filed a motion [ECF No. 14018] for authority to file late proofs of claim, as supplemented on
August 10, 2017, September 19, 2017, December 12, 2017 and July 19, 2018 [ECF Nos. 14046, 14112, 14195, 14346]; and on July 27, 2018, certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs filed a
motion [ECF No. 14350] for authority to file late proofs of claim (collectively, the “Late Claims Motions”); 

BB. Pursuant to the Order to Show Cause, certain other Plaintiffs have filed joinders to the Late Claims Motions [ECF Nos. 13811, 13818]; 

CC. In or around March 2017, additional briefs were filed by Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, certain Ignition Switch
Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs, New GM, and jointly by the GUC Trust and the Participating Unitholders on the Applicability of the Pioneer Issue and the Tolling Issue (as those terms are defined in the
Order Establishing, Inter Alia, Briefing Schedule for Certain Issues Arising From Late Claim Motions Filed by Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and Certain Ignition Switch Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs [ECF No. 13869]); 
 DD. On July 15, 2016 and June 30,
2017, Judge Furman issued opinions in the GM MDL explaining that the “benefit-of-the-bargain defect theory” of economic
loss damages “compensates a plaintiff for the fact that he or she overpaid, at the time of sale, for a defective vehicle. That form of injury has been recognized by many jurisdictions.” See In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch
Litig., 14-MD-2543 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2017) [ECF Nos. 3119, 4175]. On April 3, 2018, Judge Furman denied without prejudice, New GM’s motion for
summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims for “benefit-of-the-bargain” damages [ECF No. 5310]; 

EE. On April 24, 2018, the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs
filed amended Proofs of Claim in connection with the Late Claims Motions [ECF No. 14280]; 
 FF. On May 25, 2018, certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs filed a supplemental Late Claims Motion (the “Supplemental Late Claims Motion”) [ECF No. 14325]; 

GG. Based upon the complexity of the issues in dispute, including, but not limited to the remaining 2016 Threshold Issues (the
“Disputed Issues”), the potential for extensive, time consuming and expensive litigation regarding the Disputed Issues, the inherent uncertainty that would be attendant to litigating them, and the impact that an adverse
judgment would have on the 

  
 4 

 
GUC Trust, coupled with the desire to resolve the final potential claims against the GUC Trust, address any due process violations and attendant issues relating to the Recalls, and after review
of the expert reports and proffer of evidence from the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, and Ignition Switch Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs,
as well as expert reports and other materials from New GM, the GUC Trust agrees, as part of the settlement of the Disputed Issues, to seek the issuance of the Estimation Order as provided for pursuant to Section 3.2(c) of the AMSPA,
Section 7.3 of the Plan, the Side Letter and Section 5.1 of the GUC Trust Agreement. 
 AGREEMENT 

In settlement of the Disputed Issues between the GUC Trust and the Plaintiffs, the Parties agree to the following: 

1. Preamble. The Preamble constitutes an essential part of the Agreement and is incorporated herein. 

2. Definitions. The following terms used herein shall have the respective meanings defined below (such meanings to be equally applicable to both
the singular and plural): 
 2.1 Adjustment Shares shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Preamble. Solely in the
event that the Bankruptcy Court enters the Estimation Order, the term “Adjustment Shares” as used herein shall be deemed to exclude any amounts due and payable on account of taxes or withholding. 

2.2 Adjustment Shares Waiver Provision shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in Section 5.4 hereto. 

2.3 AMPSA means that certain Amended and Restated Master Sale and Purchase Agreement, by and among General Motors Corporation
and its debtor subsidiaries, as Sellers, and NGMCO, Inc., as successor in interest to Vehicle Acquisition Holdings LLC, a purchaser sponsored by the U.S. Treasury, as Purchaser, dated as of June 26, 2009, together with all related documents and
agreements as well as all exhibits, schedules, and addenda thereto, as amended, restated, modified, or supplemented from time to time. 

2.4 Bar Date Order means that Order Pursuant to Section 502(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy
Rule 3003(c)(3) Establishing the Deadline for Filing Proofs of Claim (Including Claims Under Bankruptcy Code Section 503(B)(9)) and Procedures Relating Thereto and Approving the Form and Manner of Notice Thereof, dated Sept.
16, 2009 [ECF No. 4079] entered by the Bankruptcy Court establishing the Bar Date. 
 2.5 Bar Date shall have the meaning
ascribed to such term in the Preamble. 
 2.6 Bankruptcy Code means title 11 of the United States Code. 

2.7 Bankruptcy Court means the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. 

2.8 Closing Date shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Preamble. 

  
 5 

 2.9 Co-Lead Counsel means, for
purposes of this Agreement, Steve W. Berman of Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP and Elizabeth Cabraser of Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, who were individually and collectively appointed to represent all economic loss plaintiffs
in the GM MDL by Order No. 8, In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 14-MD-2543 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014) [ECF No. 249], or any other or
replacement counsel appointed to represent any Ignition Switch or Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs in the GM MDL. 

2.10 Communication shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in Section 3.15. 

2.11 Confirmation Order shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Preamble. 

2.12 Debtors shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Preamble. 

2.13 Decision means the Decision on Motion to Enforce Sale Order, entered April 15, 2015 [ECF No. 13109] by
Judge Robert E. Gerber in the Bankruptcy Court, published as In re Motors Liquidation Company, 529 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015), as corrected in Errata Order RE: Decision on Motion to Enforce Sale Order, In re Motors Liquidation
Co., No. 09-50026, dated July 13, 2015 [ECF No. 13290]. 
 2.14 Disputed
Issues shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Preamble. 
 2.15 District Court shall have the meaning ascribed
to such term in the Preamble. 
 2.16 Economic Loss Classes shall mean the putative class of Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and the
putative class of Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs seeking certification under Rule 23. 
 2.17
Economic Loss Plaintiff shall mean any individual who, prior to the Closing Date, owned or leased a vehicle subject to a Recall other than NHTSA Recall No. 14v-540. 

2.18 Effective Date shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Preamble. 

2.19 Estimation Motion shall mean a motion filed in the Bankruptcy Court by the GUC Trust seeking a determination of
Plaintiffs’ aggregate Allowed General Unsecured Claims against the Sellers. 
 2.20 Estimation Order shall mean an order
of the Bankruptcy Court estimating Plaintiffs’ aggregate Allowed General Unsecured Claims against the Sellers, as contemplated by Section 3.2(c) of the AMSPA, substantially in the form to be agreed upon by the Parties. 

2.21 Final Approval Order shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in Section 5.2.2. 

2.22 Final Order shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Plan. 

2.23 General Unsecured Claim shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Plan. 

2.24 GM MDL shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Preamble. 

  
 6 

 2.25 GUC Trust means the trust created by the GUC Trust Agreement in the form
approved as Exhibit D to the Plan, as the same has been and may further be amended from time to time. 
 2.26 GUC Trust
Agreement means the Second Amended and Restated Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust Agreement, by and among Wilmington Trust Company, as trust administrator and trustee of the GUC Trust, and FTI Consulting, as trust monitor of the GUC
Trust, dated July 30, 2015, as it may be amended from time to time. 
 2.27 GUC Trust Assets means assets that have been
held, are held, or may be held in the future by the GUC Trust. Solely in the event that the Bankruptcy Court enters the Estimation Order, the term “GUC Trust Assets” as used herein shall be deemed to exclude the Adjustment Shares. 

2.28 GUC Trust Beneficiaries means, in accordance with Section F of the GUC Trust Agreement, holders of allowed General Unsecured
Claims as of the date of this Agreement, and, for the avoidance of doubt, does not include Plaintiffs. 
 2.29 Ignition Switch
Defect shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Preamble. 
 2.30 Ignition Switch Plaintiffs shall have the
meaning ascribed to such term in the Preamble. 
 2.31 Ignition Switch Pre-Closing Accident
Plaintiffs shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Preamble. 
 2.32 Judgment means the Judgment, entered
June 1, 2015 [ECF No. 13177] by Judge Robert E. Gerber in the Old GM Bankruptcy Case. 
 2.33 Late Claims Motions
shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Preamble. 
 2.34 Motors Liquidation Company Avoidance Action Trust
means the trust established under the Plan in connection with recovery of proceeds of the Term Loan Avoidance Action. 
 2.35
Motions to Enforce means, collectively, the (i) Motion of General Motors LLC Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363 to Enforce the Court’s July 5, 2009 Sale Order and Injunction, dated
April 21, 2014 [ECF No. 12620]; (ii) Motion of General Motors LLC Pursuant to 11 U.S.C §§ 105 and 363 to Enforce this Court’s July 5, 2009 Sale Order and Injunction Against Plaintiffs in Pre-Closing Accident Lawsuits, dated August 1, 2014 [ECF No. 12807]; and (iii) Motion of General Motors LLC Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363 to Enforce the Court’s
July 5, 2009 Sale Order and Injunction (Monetary Relief Actions, Other Than Ignition Switch Actions), dated August 1, 2014 [ECF No. 12808]. 

2.36 New GM shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Preamble. 

  
 7 

 2.37 New GM Common Stock means the common stock of New GM (NYSE: GM). 

2.38 NHTSA means the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 

2.39 Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the
Preamble. 
 2.40 Notice Cost Cap Amount shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in Section 4.4. 

2.41 Notice Provisions shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in Section 4.2. 

2.42 Old GM shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Preamble. 

2.43 Old GM Bankruptcy Case means those proceedings commenced on June 1, 2009 in the Bankruptcy Court captioned In re
Motors Liquidation Company, et al., f/k/a General Motors Corp., Bankr. No. 09-50026. 

2.44 Order to Show Cause means the order entered by the Bankruptcy Court on December 13, 2016, which identified five
threshold issues. 
 2.45 Participating Unitholders means certain unaffiliated holders of 67% of the beneficial units of the
GUC Trust, as of the date of this Agreement, represented by Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. 
 2.46 Parties means
the Signatory Plaintiffs and the GUC Trust. 
 2.47 Petition Date means June 1, 2009, when Motors Liquidation Company,
f/k/a General Motors Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, and certain of its affiliated companies commenced cases under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 

2.48 PIWD means claims for personal injury and wrongful death. 

2.49 PIWD Counsel means (i) Lisa M. Norman of Andrews Myers, P.C., but solely for the
Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs represented by that law firm with respect to a Late Claims Motion and identified on Schedule 2; and (ii) Mark Tsukerman of Cole Schotz P.C., but solely for the Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs represented by that law firm with respect to a Late Claims Motion and identified on Schedule 3. 

2.50 PIWD Plaintiffs means those certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs represented by
PIWD Counsel with respect to a Late Claims Motion or a Supplemental Late Claims Motion who have not entered into a settlement agreement with New GM and are identified on Schedules 2 and 3. 

2.51 Plaintiffs means the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, the Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs,
and the Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs, including all plaintiffs (whether named or unnamed, including unnamed members of the putative classes) covered by any of the Late Claims Motions, all plaintiffs
represented by counsel that is signatory hereto and any other party who (i) prior to 

  
 8 

 
July 10, 2009, suffered an economic loss claim by reason of his, her or its ownership or lease of an Old GM vehicle with an Ignition Switch Defect included in Recall No. 14V-047; (ii) prior to July 10, 2009 suffered an economic loss claim by reason of their ownership or lease of an Old GM vehicle with defects in ignition switches, side airbags, or power steering included in
NHTSA Recall Nos. 14V-355, 14V-394, 14V-400, 14V-118 or
14V-153, it being understood however that the covenants and agreements to be performed by the Signatory Plaintiffs are to be performed by Co-Lead Counsel and PIWD
Counsel and that no action or failure to act by any Plaintiff (other than the Signatory Plaintiffs) shall constitute a breach of this Agreement or shall excuse the performance of any other Party. 

2.52 Plan means the Debtors’ Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan, filed March 18, 2011 [ECF No. 9836] by Motors
Liquidation Company in the Old GM Bankruptcy Case. 
 2.53 Pre-Closing means any time
before July 10, 2009, the date on which the 363 Sale between the Sellers and New GM closed. 
 2.54 Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Preamble. 

2.55 Preliminary Approval Order means an Order of the Bankruptcy Court (i) extending its discretion to apply Rule 23 to
these proceedings, and (ii) approving the form and manner of notice to the Plaintiffs, including notice to the proposed Classes upon finding that this Court will likely be able to approve the Settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(e)(2) and certify the settlement-purpose classes. 
 2.56 Proofs of Claim means the late proofs of claim, including late
class proofs of claim, that the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs sought authority to file
pursuant to the Late Claims Motions and the Supplemental Late Claims Motion, and any amendments thereto filed prior to the execution of this Agreement. For the avoidance of doubt, the Proofs of Claim do not include any proofs of claim filed by any
client of Hilliard Martinez Gonzalez LLP or The Law Offices of Thomas J. Henry, including any parties who sought to file late claims pursuant to ECF No. 13807 and any related supplemental late claim motion (the “Hilliard Plaintiffs”).
The Hilliard Plaintiffs shall not be entitled to any of the rights or benefits conferred under this Agreement. 
 2.57 Release
shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in Section 5.3. 
 2.58 Recalls means NHTSA Recall Numbers 14V-047, 14V-355, 14V-394, 14V-540, 14V-400, 14V-118 and 14V-153. 
 2.59 Rule 23 means Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in effect on the date of this Agreement. 
 2.60 Sale Order means the Order
(I) Authorizing Sale of Assets Pursuant to Amended and Restated Master Sale and Purchase Agreement; (II) Authorizing Assumption and Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in Connection
with the Sale; and (III) Granting Related Relief, dated July 5, 2009 [ECF No. 2968] and the supporting Decision on Debtors’ Motion for Approval of (1) Sale of Assets to Vehicle Acquisition
Holdings, LLC; (2) Assumption and Assignment of Related Executory Contracts; and (3) Entry into UAW Retiree Settlement Agreement, dated July 5, 2009 [ECF No. 2967]. 

  
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 2.61 Sellers means Motors Liquidation Company, formerly known as General
Motors Corporation, together with three of its debtor subsidiaries, Chevrolet-Saturn of Harlem, Inc.; Saturn, LLC; and Saturn Distribution Corporation. 

2.62 Settlement means the settlement of the Parties’ disputes as provided for by this Agreement. 

2.63 Settlement Effective Date shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in Section 3.1. 

2.64 Settlement Fund means that trust, fund or other vehicle established and designated by the Signatory Plaintiffs for purposes
of administration of Plaintiffs’ claims reconciliation and/or distributions to Plaintiffs under a subsequent allocation methodology. 

2.65 Settlement Motion shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in Section 2.2. 

2.66 Side Letter shall mean the document attached hereto as Exhibit A, by and between the GUC Trust, the Debtors, New GM,
and FTI Consulting (as trust monitor of the GUC Trust) dated September 23, 2011. 
 2.67 Signatory Plaintiffs means PIWD
Counsel on behalf of the PIWD Plaintiffs identified on Schedule 2, and Co-Lead Counsel on behalf of the proposed class representatives for Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and proposed class representatives for
certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs identified on Schedule 3. 
 2.68 Supplemental Late
Claims Motion shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Preamble. 
 2.69 Term Loan Avoidance Action means the
action captioned Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation Co. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al., Adv. Pro. No. 09-00504 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2009). 

2.70 Term Loan Avoidance Action Claims shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the GUC Trust Agreement. 

2.71 2016 Threshold Issues means the five threshold issues identified in the Bankruptcy Court’s Order to Show Cause of
December 13, 2016. 
 2.72 363 Sale means the consummation of transactions that were approved on July 10, 2009
pursuant to the Sale Order. 
 3. Consent to Filing of Late Claims. The GUC Trust consents to the filing of the Proofs of Claim, as amended.
For the avoidance of doubt, (i) the GUC Trust does not consent to the filing of any proofs of claim submitted by the Hilliard Plaintiffs or any other parties who are not Signatory Plaintiffs and (ii) nothing in this Agreement shall
constitute an agreement regarding the allowance of any Proofs of Claim. 

  
 10 

	4.	 Class Certification. 

 

	 	4.1	 As soon as practicable following the execution of this agreement, the Economic Loss Plaintiffs shall
prepare a motion (“Class Certification Motion”) substantially in the form agreed upon by the GUC Trust, seeking certification of the Economic Loss Class pursuant to Rule 23 on a
preliminary and final basis, approval of the form and manner of notice, and appointment of class representatives and class counsel for Rule 23(a) and (g) settlement certification purposes. 

 

	 	4.2	 As part of the Preliminary Approval Order, the Economic Loss Plaintiffs shall seek Bankruptcy Court
approval of the form and manner of notice to the proposed members of the Economic Loss Classes and certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs (the “Notice Provisions”), substantially in
the form to be agreed upon by the Parties and approved by the Bankruptcy Court. 

  

	 	4.3	 The requested Notice Provisions shall include (i) publication notice by multimedia channels that
may include social media, e-mail, online car and consumer publications, and a settlement website (which, for the avoidance of doubt, may be the GUC Trust’s website at www.mlcguctrust.com) where all
relevant documents and long form notice will be posted; (ii) notice by postcard to: (A) all persons in the United States who, prior to July 10, 2009, owned or leased a vehicle manufactured by Old GM that was subject to the Recalls and
whose claim has not been settled or adjudicated finally; (B) all Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs who have filed a lawsuit against New GM as of the date of this Agreement and whose claim has not been
settled or adjudicated finally; and (C) all Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs who have filed or joined a motion for authorization to file late claims against the GUC Trust and whose claim has not been
settled or adjudicated finally; (iii) notice to all defendants in the Term Loan Avoidance Action via the Bankruptcy Court’s ECF system and, to the extent a defendant is not registered to receive notice via the ECF system, via postcard, and
(iv) notice via DTC’s LENSNOTICE system to holders of beneficial units of the GUC Trust. 

  

	 	4.4	 The GUC Trust agrees to pay the reasonable costs and expenses for notice in an amount up to $13,720,000
(the “Notice Cost Cap Amount”), to be paid directly to the Plaintiffs’ noticing agent upon presentment of an invoice and only after the Bankruptcy Court enters the Preliminary Approval Order, consistent with the terms of
this Agreement. For the avoidance of doubt, the GUC Trust shall not be obligated to fund or otherwise be committed to fund any amount in excess of the Notice Cost Cap Amount. 

 

	 	4.5	 The Parties agree that, in the event that the District Court issues an Opinion or Order on the
Defendant General Motors LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment Against the Bellwether Economic Loss Plaintiffs [GM MDL ECF No. 5859] (“Summary Judgment Decision”) that impacts the size, scope or composition of
the classes of Economic Loss Plaintiffs, the Parties shall, within five (5) business days from entry of the applicable Opinion or Order, engage in good faith negotiations regarding the applicable provisions of this Settlement Agreement impacted
by said decision. 

  
 11 

	 	4.6	 In furtherance of the Plaintiffs’ Class Certification Motion, the GUC Trust shall file a
motion seeking approval of an Order from the Bankruptcy Court directing the production of information held by General Motors LLC concerning the identity of any members of the Economic Loss Classes pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
2004 and the applicable provisions of the MSPA. 

  

	5.	 Motion for Approval of Settlement. 

 

	 	5.1	 As soon as practicable following the execution of this Agreement, the GUC Trust shall prepare and file a
motion in the Bankruptcy Court (the “Settlement Motion”) seeking approval of this Settlement pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The Settlement Motion shall be in a form to be agreed upon by
the Parties, and otherwise on terms acceptable to the GUC Trust, Co-Lead Counsel and PIWD Counsel, each in their sole and absolute discretion. 

 

	 	5.2	 The Settlement Motion will ask the Bankruptcy Court to issue: 

 

	 	5.2.1	 An order approving the reallocation up to the Notice Cost Cap Amount from GUC Trust Assets and
authorizing (i) the payment of the noticing costs and (ii) the GUC Trust to enter into the Settlement Agreement and seek estimation pursuant to the terms of the GUC Trust Agreement. 

 

	 	5.2.2	 An order granting approval of the Settlement Motion pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, which order may be the same order that provides final approval of the Settlement and Class Certification Motion pursuant to Rule 23 (the “Final Approval Order”). 

 

	 	5.3	 The Final Approval Order will include a provision that imposes a complete and irrevocable waiver and
release on the part of all Signatory Plaintiffs with respect to any and all rights, claims and causes of action (including but not limited to any claims and causes of action arising as a result of the Recalls or with respect to General Unsecured
Claims of the Plaintiffs arising under, or that may arise under, an Estimation Order), now existing or arising in the future, that any Signatory Plaintiff might directly or indirectly assert against the Debtors, their estates, the GUC Trust, the
trust administrator of the GUC Trust, the GUC Trust Monitor, the GUC Trust Assets, the Motors Liquidation Company Avoidance Action Trust, the trustee for the Motors Liquidation Company Avoidance Action and the GUC Trust Beneficiaries, and channels
all such claims or potential claims to the Settlement Fund for administration and satisfaction (the “Release Provision,” and the waiver and release contemplated thereby, the “Release”).

  

	 	5.4	 The Final Approval Order will include a provision that imposes a complete and irrevocable waiver and
release from the GUC Trust, the GUC Trust Beneficiaries, the Motors Liquidation Company Avoidance Action Trust, and all defendants in the Term Loan Avoidance Action, with respect to any rights to the Settlement Fund or the Adjustment Shares (the
“Adjustment Shares Waiver Provision”). 

  
 12 

	 	5.5	 Immediately upon the entry of the Final Approval Order, the Release Provision and Adjustment Shares
Waiver Provision shall become effective and binding on all affected parties. 

  

	 	5.6	 The Signatory Plaintiffs agree that they will not object to any and all injunctions sought by the GUC
Trust pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 105 to further effectuate the Release Provision. 

  

	6.	 Estimation. 

  

	 	6.1	 The GUC Trust shall file the Estimation Motion within three (3) business days of entry of the Final
Approval Order. The Estimation Motion shall seek entry of the Estimation Order, which order shall: 

  

	 	6.1.1	 estimate the aggregate allowed General Unsecured Claims of Economic Loss Plaintiffs and certain Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs against Sellers and/or the GUC Trust pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 502(c), Section 5.1 of the GUC Trust Agreement, Section 7.3 of the Plan, Section 3.2(c) of
the AMSPA and the Side Letter in an amount that, as of the date of the Estimation Order, could equal or exceed $10 billion, thus triggering the issuance of the maximum amount of the Adjustment Shares; 

 

	 	6.1.2	 direct that, subject to Section 7 hereof, any such Adjustment Shares issued as a result of an
Estimation Order, or the value of such Adjustment Shares, be promptly delivered by New GM to the Settlement Fund; and 

  

	 	6.1.3	 schedule a hearing in the Bankruptcy Court to consider the Estimation Motion and entry of the Estimation
Order. 

  

	 	6.2	 Notwithstanding Sections 157(b)(2)(B) and (b)(2)(O) of Title 28 of the United States Code, in connection
with the Settlement Motion, to the extent (if any) consent is required, the Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs represented by PIWD Counsel consent to the Bankruptcy Court estimating their personal injury and
wrongful death claims against the Sellers and/or the GUC Trust in connection with the settlement contemplated under this Agreement. The Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs represented by PIWD Counsel do not
consent to estimation of their personal injury and wrongful death claims by the Bankruptcy Court for any other purpose other than implementation of the settlement contemplated under this Agreement or in connection with any other proceeding other
than proceedings necessary to implement the settlement contemplated under this Agreement. 

  

	 	6.3	 For the avoidance of doubt, each Signatory Plaintiff that is a
Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiff settling a Late Claims Motion or a Supplemental Late Claims Motion against the GUC Trust relating to an accident that occurred before the Closing Date in a vehicle that was later
subject to one of the Recalls waives any right to a jury 

  
 13 

	 	
trial in connection with the following: (1) the estimation of his or her individual claim as a Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiff by the Bankruptcy Court,
(2) the estimation of all late claims of PIWD Plaintiffs taken as a whole by the Bankruptcy Court, (3) the fixing of the amount to be distributed to such Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiff on account of
his or her late claim, (4) the development and approval of the allocation of the Adjustment Shares and any other property or proceeds in the Settlement Fund between economic loss plaintiffs and
Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs, (5) the development and approval of the criteria and eligibility for such PIWD Plaintiff to receive distributions from the Settlement Fund on account of his or her late
claim, and (6) the fixing of the amount of such Signatory Plaintiff’s claim for purposes of receiving distributions (if any) from the Settlement Fund pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. 

7. Required Withholdings from Distributions. Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, and although not anticipated to be
required to do so, the GUC Trust, the GUC Trust Administrator, and any applicable withholding agent shall be entitled to deduct and withhold from the distribution of the Adjustment Shares otherwise payable to the Settlement Fund pursuant to this
Agreement any amount as may be required to be deducted and withheld with respect to the making of such payment under the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”), or any other provision of tax law.
The GUC Trust and the GUC Trust Administrator agree to provide the Settlement Fund with reasonable notice of its intent to deduct and withhold if required to do so, and to the extent practicable, consider in good faith any position that the
Settlement Fund raises as to why withholding is not required or alternative arrangements proposed by the Settlement Fund that may avoid the need for withholding. To the extent that amounts are so withheld or deducted by the GUC Trust, the GUC Trust
Administrator, or other applicable withholding agent, as the case may be, such withheld amounts shall be treated for all purposes of this Agreement as having been paid to the Settlement Fund. In addition, in accordance with Section 6.1(e) of
the GUC Trust Agreement and taking into account Section 7.3 of the GUC Trust Agreement, the GUC Trust Administrator may hold back from the distributions of Adjustment Shares contemplated by this Agreement sufficient Adjustment Shares or amounts
in order to settle the tax liabilities of the GUC Trust incurred as a result of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement. To the extent such hold back of Adjustment Shares is necessary, the GUC Trust Administrator shall monetize such held
back Adjustment Shares on the same date as the distribution of Adjustment Shares is provided to the Settlement Fund. Furthermore, the GUC Trust Administrator will request an expedited determination of taxes of the GUC Trust under Section 505(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code for all returns filed for, or on behalf of, the GUC Trust for any and all tax periods that include transactions contemplated by this Agreement. Upon such determination (or, in the event a court of competent jurisdiction
decides that such a determination is unavailable, as soon as reasonably practicable but no later than the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations), the GUC Trust Administrator will distribute in accordance with provisions of this
Agreement any amounts held back in excess of any tax liabilities incurred by the GUC Trust as a result of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement. The GUC Trust and the GUC Trust Administrator agree to provide the Settlement Fund with
reasonable notice of (a) any intent to hold back Adjustment Shares and (b) the amount to be withheld, with the intent that such withheld amount would not exceed what could be the final tax liability of the GUC Trust as a result of the
transactions contemplated by this Agreement. 

 8. The Settlement Fund. The Signatory Plaintiffs or, in the alternative, an administrator
appointed by the Signatory Plaintiffs, shall establish the Settlement Fund (at the sole cost of the Signatory Plaintiffs) and the procedures for the administration and allocation to Plaintiffs of the Settlement Fund, including the criteria for
Plaintiffs to assert a claim against the Settlement Fund, the methodology for allocating the Settlement Fund to Plaintiffs, and procedures for payment of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. 

(a) Allocation of any Adjustment Shares (or their value), and any other consideration contained in the Settlement Fund between the Economic
Loss Plaintiffs and Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs shall be determined and approved by the Bankruptcy Court. Notice of any agreement as to the proposed allocation of any Adjustment Shares (or their value),
and any other consideration contained in the Settlement Fund as between the Economic Loss Plaintiffs and Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs, along with information about the hearing date and how and when to
assert any objections, will be provided by, and at the sole cost of, Signatory Plaintiffs (and not the GUC Trust) via a settlement website to all known Plaintiffs whose rights might be affected by such allocation, and such Plaintiffs shall have an
opportunity to object to the proposed allocation at a hearing, as when and if such agreement is reached. 
 (b) Approval of the
qualifications and criteria for Plaintiffs to be eligible to receive distributions from any Adjustment Shares (or their value), and any other consideration contained in the Settlement Fund shall be done by the Bankruptcy Court. Notice of any
proposed criteria for determining the right or ability of each Plaintiff to receive a distribution from any Adjustment Shares (or their value), and any other consideration contained in the Settlement Fund on account of a claim against Debtors based
upon economic loss or for PIWD arising or occurring before the Closing Date, along with information about the hearing date and how and when to assert any objections, will be provided by, and at the sole cost of, Signatory Plaintiffs (and not the GUC
Trust) via a settlement website to all known Plaintiffs whose rights might be affected by the establishment of criteria for the payment of such claims and such Plaintiffs shall have an opportunity to object to the proposed criteria at a hearing, as
when and if such criteria is developed. Being defined as a Plaintiff does not assure any party that he, she, or it will receive a distribution from any Adjustment Shares (or their value), or any other consideration contained in the Settlement Fund.

 9. Settlement Effective Date. This Agreement shall become effective and binding on the Parties on the date on which this Agreement is fully
executed by each of the Parties. 
  

	10.	 Termination. 

  

	 	10.1	 Automatic Termination. This Agreement shall immediately terminate as to all Parties in the event
(a) the Bankruptcy Court does not approve any aspect of the relief sought in the Settlement Motion, (b) the Bankruptcy Court does not enter either the Preliminary Approval Order or Final Approval Order, (c) the Bankruptcy Court denies
class certification, or (d) the Bankruptcy Court requires notice or other procedures materially different from those set forth herein that are not otherwise reasonably acceptable to the Parties. For the avoidance of doubt, this Agreement shall
not immediately terminate if the Bankruptcy Court denies approval of the Estimation Order. In the event of such automatic termination, this Agreement shall be null and void, and each of the Parties’ respective interests, rights, remedies and
defenses shall be fully restored without prejudice as if this Agreement (except as set forth in Sections 11, 12, 13, 21, 23 and 27) had never existed and the Parties shall be returned to their respective positions status quo ante.

  
 15 

	 	10.2	 Termination by the GUC Trust. This Agreement shall be terminable at the option of the GUC Trust in the
event (a) the Preliminary Approval Order is not entered on or before September 15, 2019; or (b) an appeal of the Summary Judgment Decision is filed by Co-Lead Counsel. In the event of such
termination, this Agreement shall be null and void, and each of the Parties’ respective interests, rights, remedies and defenses shall be fully restored without prejudice as if this Agreement (except as set forth in Sections 11, 12, 13, 21, 23
and 27) had never existed and the Parties shall be returned to their respective positions status quo ante. 

  

	 	10.3	 Termination by Any Party for Cause. In the event of any material breach of the terms of this Agreement,
the non-breaching Party may elect (in addition to any other remedies available to the non-breaching party hereunder or under applicable law) to terminate this Agreement
by (i) providing a Communication to the breaching party as set forth in Section 23 below, and affording the breaching party a five (5) business day period in which to cure the purported breach, and (ii) absent such cure or the
commencement of an action in the Bankruptcy Court with respect to the existence of any such breach, by providing a follow-up Communication to the breaching Party as set forth in Section 23 below, that
declares the Agreement to be terminated. Following such termination for cause, the terms of the Agreement shall no longer be binding on the non-breaching Party (except as set forth in Sections 11, 12, 13, 21,
23 and 27). 

 11. Attorneys’ Fees. Except as otherwise provided for herein, each of the Parties shall pay its own court
costs, attorneys’ fees, and all other expenses, costs, and fees incurred relating to this Agreement and any related litigation, including but not limited to the GM MDL and Motions to Enforce litigation. If any lawsuit or proceeding is required
to enforce the terms of this Agreement, the prevailing party in any such lawsuit or proceeding shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. 

12. No Admission. Nothing in this Agreement shall be deemed an admission of any kind. To the extent provided by Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and
any applicable state rules of evidence, this Agreement and all negotiations relating thereto shall not be admissible into evidence in any proceeding. 

13. Remedies. Each of the Parties retain all remedies available in law or equity for breach of this Agreement by any Party, including, without
limitation, the right of a non-breaching Party to seek specific performance and injunctive or other equitable relief as a remedy for any such breach. For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in the Agreement is
intended to waive any claims against New GM or to be an election of remedies against New GM; nor does the Agreement or any payments made in connection therewith represent full satisfaction of any claims against the Debtors, unless and until such
claims are in fact paid in full from every available source; provided, however, that in no event shall any Plaintiff be permitted to seek any further payment or compensation from the 

  
 16 

 
GUC Trust in respect of its claims or otherwise, other than the Adjustment Shares. Except as mandated otherwise under applicable law, (i) nothing in the Settlement Agreement shall be
construed to waive (nor is anything in the Settlement Agreement intended by the Parties to waive) any claims that any Plaintiff may have against New GM or constitute an election of remedies by any Plaintiff; (ii) the Adjustment Shares (nor any
distribution thereof to any Plaintiff) shall not represent full and final satisfaction of any claim that any Plaintiff may have against New GM, all of which are expressly reserved; and (iii) the Bankruptcy Court’s estimate of the
Plaintiffs’ Allowed General Unsecured Claims in an Estimation Order shall not operate as a cap on any of the claims of any of the Plaintiffs against New GM. 

14. No Litigation. Except as may be necessary to enforce the terms of this Agreement, the Parties and any other person who is an intended
beneficiary hereunder, agree that she or he shall not commence or proceed with any action, claim, suit, proceeding or litigation against any other Party, directly or indirectly, regarding or relating to the matters described in this Agreement, or
take any action inconsistent with the terms of the Agreement. 
 15. Further Assurances. Each of the Parties covenant to, from time to time,
execute and deliver such further documents and instruments and take such other actions as may be reasonably required or appropriate to evidence, effectuate, or carry out the intent and purposes of this Agreement or to perform its obligations under
this Agreement and the transactions contemplated thereby. 
 16. Cooperation. The Parties agree to reasonably cooperate with one another to
effectuate an efficient and equitable implementation of this Agreement. 
 17. Counterparts; Facsimile; Signatures. This Agreement may be
executed in any number of counterparts and by different Parties to this Agreement on separate counterparts, each of which, when so executed, shall be deemed an original, but all such counterparts shall constitute one and the same agreement. Any
signature delivered by any of the Parties by facsimile or .pdf electronic transmission shall be as effective as delivery of a manually executed counterpart of this Agreement, shall be deemed to be an original signature hereto, and shall be
admissible as such in any legal proceeding to enforce this Agreement. 
 18. Binding Effect. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to
the benefit of the Parties and their respective agents, partners, attorneys, employees, representatives, officers, directors, shareholders, divisions, subsidiaries, affiliates, transferees, heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives,
legal representatives, successors, and assigns. 
 19. Integration. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding among the
Parties hereto relating to the subject matter hereof, and supersedes all prior proposals, negotiations, agreements, representations and understandings between or among any of the Parties hereto relating to such subject matter. In entering into this
Agreement, the Parties and each of them acknowledge that they are not relying on any statement, representation, warranty, covenant or agreement of any kind made by any other party hereto or any employee or agent of any other party hereto, except for
the representations, warranties, covenants and agreements of the Parties expressly set forth herein. 

  
 17 

 20. Amendment. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement, no amendment,
modification, rescission, waiver or release of any provision of this Agreement shall be effective unless the same shall be in writing and signed by the Parties. 

21. Interpretation. Whenever possible, each provision of this Agreement shall be interpreted in such a manner as to be effective and valid under
applicable law, and the Parties agree to take any and all steps which are necessary in order to enforce the provisions hereof. 
 22.
Severability. The terms and conditions of this Agreement are not severable. However, if any provision or part of any provision of this Agreement is for any reason declared or determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid,
unenforceable, or contrary to public policy, law, statute, or ordinance, the validity of the remaining parts, terms, or provisions of this Agreement shall not be affected thereby and shall remain valid and fully enforceable, and such invalid,
unenforceable, or illegal part or provision shall not be deemed to be part of this Agreement. 
 23. Notices. Any notice, demand, request,
consent, approval, declaration or other communication (a “Communication”) under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be given or delivered (i) by a nationally recognized private overnight courier service
addressed as indicated in Schedule 1 annexed hereto or to such other address as such party may indicate by a notice delivered to the other Parties hereto in accordance with the provisions hereof; or (ii) to the extent that such
Communication has been filed with the Bankruptcy Court, via the electronic distribution means used by the Bankruptcy Court. Any Communication shall be deemed to have been effectively delivered and received, if sent by a nationally recognized private
overnight courier service, on the first business day following the date upon which it is delivered for overnight delivery to such courier service. 

24. Choice of Law and Forum; Consent to Jurisdiction. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State
of New York, without reference to its conflict of laws principles. The Bankruptcy Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any dispute arising out of, related to or in connection with this Agreement to the exclusion of any other court, and
the Parties hereby consent to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court for resolution of such disputes and agree that they shall not attempt to litigate any such dispute in any other court. 

25. Advice of Counsel. Each Party represents and acknowledges that it has been represented by an attorney with respect to this Agreement and any
and all matters covered by or related to such Agreement. Each Party further represents and warrants to each other that the execution and delivery of this Agreement has been duly authorized by each of the Parties after consultation with counsel, that
the persons signing this Agreement on their behalf below have been fully authorized by their respective Parties to do so, and that the undersigned do fully understand the terms of this Agreement and have the express authority to enter into this
Agreement. 
 26. Assignment. No assignment of this Agreement or of any rights or obligations hereunder may be made by any party hereto without
the prior written consent of the other Parties hereto, and any attempted assignment without such prior consent shall be null and void. 

  
 18 

 27. Waiver. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement, any provision of this
Agreement may be waived only by a written instrument signed by the Party against whom enforcement of such waiver is sought. 
 28. Headings,
Number, and Gender. The descriptive headings of the sections of this Agreement are included for convenience of reference only and shall have no force or effect in the interpretation or construction of this Agreement. As used in this Agreement,
the singular shall include the plural, and the masculine shall include the feminine and neutral genders, and vice versa. 
 29. Waiver of Jury
Trial. Each of the Parties hereby irrevocably waives its rights, if any, to a jury trial for any claim or cause of action based upon or arising out of this Agreement. 

30. Authority. Each of the Parties represents and warrants that (i) it has the requisite power and authority to execute and deliver this
Agreement and any ancillary agreements connected hereto which it may be a party; (ii) the execution and delivery by it of this Agreement, and the performance of its obligations hereunder have been duly authorized by all necessary action on its
part and (iii) this Agreement constitutes a legal, valid and binding obligation of such Party. 
 31. GUC Trust Fiduciary Duties. Nothing
in this Agreement shall otherwise require the GUC Trust or the GUC Trust Administrator to take any action, or to refrain from taking any action, to the extent inconsistent with its fiduciary obligations under applicable law (as reasonably determined
by them in good faith after consultation with legal counsel). 

  
 19 

 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed and delivered this Agreement as of the date
first written above. 
  

									
	Wilmington Trust National Association, Not individually, but solely in its capacity as GUC Trust Administrator and Trustee of the GUC Trust	 		 	 HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
  

On behalf of the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs

					
	By:	 	 /s/ David A. Vanaskey
	 		 		 	
	Name: David A. Vanaskey, Jr.	 		 	By:	 	 /s/ Steve W. Berman

	Title: Vice President, Wilmington Trust Company	 		 	Name: Steve W. Berman
	  
 BROWN RUDNICK LLP
	 		 	Title: Co-Lead Counsel for the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs in the MDL Court
	On behalf of the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs	 		 	  
 LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN,
LLP

	  
 By:
	 	  
 /s/ Edward S. Weisfelner
	 		 	On behalf of the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and certain
	Name: Edward S. Weisfelner	 		 	Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs
	Name: Howard S. Steel	 		 		 	
	Title: Designated Counsel for the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and	 		 	By:	 	 /s/ Elizabeth J. Cabraser

	certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs in the Bankruptcy Court	 		 	Name: Elizabeth J. Cabraser
	  
 STUTZMAN, BROMBERG, ESSERMAN & PLIFKA,
P.C.
	 		 	Title: Co-Lead Counsel for the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs in the MDL Court
	On behalf of Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs	 		 	  
 ANDREWS MYERS, P.C.

On behalf of certain PIWD Plaintiffs

	By:	 	 /s/ Sander L. Esserman
	 		 	
	Name: Sander L. Esserman	 		 	By:	 	 /s/ Lisa M. Norman

	Title: Designated Counsel for the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs in the Bankruptcy Court	 		 	 Name: Lisa M. Norman
 Title: Counsel
to certain PIWD Plaintiffs

			
		 		 	COLE SCHOTZ, P.C.
		 		 	On behalf of certain PIWD Plaintiffs
				
		 		 	By:	 	 /s/ Mark Tsukerman

		 		 	Name: Mark Tsukerman
		 		 		 	Title: Counsel to certain PIWD Plaintiffs

  
 20 

 EXHIBIT A 

 MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY GUC TRUST 

c/o Wilmington Trust Company 

Rodney Square North 
 1100 North
Market Street 
 Wilmington, Delaware, 19890-1615 

September 23, 2011 
 Motors Liquidation
Company 
 401 S. Old Woodward, Suite 370 
 Birmingham, Michigan
48009 
 Attn: Ted Stenger 
 Remediation And Liability
Management Company, Inc. 
 c/o Motors Liquidation Company 
 401
S. Old Woodward, Suite 370 
 Birmingham, Michigan 48009 
 Attn:
Ted Stenger 
 General Motors LLC 
 300 Renaissance Center] 

Detroit Michigan 48265-3000 
 Attn: Lawrence Buonomo 

FTI Consulting, Inc. 
 1201 W. Peachtree St., Suite 600 

Atlanta, GA 30309 
 Attn: Anna Phillips 

Re: Adjustment Shares 
 Ladies and
Gentlemen, 
 Reference is made to the (i) Amended and Restated Master Sale and Purchase Agreement, dated as of July 5, 2009 (as amended, the
“MSPA”), by and among General Motors Corporation (now known as Motors Liquidation Company) (“MLC”), certain of MLC’s affiliated debtor entities listed therein (the “MSPA Affiliated Debtors”)
and NGMCO, Inc. (now known as General Motors LLC) (“GM”), (ii) Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust Agreement, dated as of March 30, 2011 (as amended, the “GUC Trust Agreement”), by and among MLC, the MSPA
Affiliated Debtors and certain other MLC affiliates (the “Debtors”), Wilmington Trust Company, solely in its capacity as GUC Trust Administrator and trustee of the Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust (the “GUC Trust
Administrator”), and FTI Consulting, Inc., solely in its capacity as GUC Trust Monitor of the Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust, and (iii) Debtors’ Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan (the “Plan”), as
confirmed by order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) on March 29, 2011. Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such
terms in the GUC Trust Agreement. 
 Pursuant to the GUC Trust Agreement and the Plan, the Debtors are the parties designated to pursue and receive any
Adjustment Shares (as such term is defined in the MSPA) prior to the GUC Trust Funding Date and the Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust is the party designated to pursue and receive any Adjustment Shares on and after the GUC Trust Funding Date. In
order to address any ambiguity under the MSPA or the GUC Trust Agreement regarding the timing and conditions precedent to the issuance of any Adjustment Shares and in order to eliminate the potential burden on the Bankruptcy Court of estimating
claims in order to calculate whether Adjustment Shares should be issued, the parties hereto enter into this letter agreement to fix procedures with respect thereto. 

  
 1 

 Notwithstanding Section 5.1 of the GUC Trust Agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with Sections
2.3(d) and 6.12 of the GUC Trust Agreement, the undersigned parties agree that the GUC Trust Administrator may, at any time (which for the avoidance of doubt shall not be restricted to on or before the 180th day following the Effective Time), seek
(or require the Debtors to seek, as applicable) the Claims Estimate Order (as such term is defined in the MSPA). In the event that the GUC Trust Administrator determines to seek the Claims Estimate Order prior to the GUC Trust Funding Date, the
Debtors agree to file and pursue the Claims Estimate Order (in accordance with Sections 2.3(d) and 6.12 of the GUC Trust Agreement) until the GUC Trust Funding Date, at which time the entitlement to pursue the Claims Estimate Order shall be
transferred to the GUC Trust Administrator. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this letter agreement, in the event that any Adjustment Shares are required to be issued prior to the GUC Trust Funding Date, such Adjustment Shares shall be
issued to MLC in accordance with section 3.2(c) of the MSPA. 
 The parties acknowledge that the GUC Trust Administrator’s current intention is to
delay a request for a Claims Estimate Order (which may be one or multiple orders) to such time, if any, that the GUC Trust Administrator determines, in its sole and absolute discretion, that the allowed eligible claims are likely to exceed
$35 billion in the aggregate. This delay is intended to eliminate the risk and uncertainty to all parties of estimating at this time the outcome of ongoing litigation with respect to Disputed Claims (as such term is defined in the Plan). 

By executing the acknowledgment below, the parties further agree that at any time on or following the GUC Trust Funding Date, the GUC Trust Administrator (as
successor to MLC) (i) may seek the Claims Estimate Order (or continue the prosecution of any Claims Estimate Order previously sought by the Debtors), and (ii) shall be entitled to receive the Adjustment Shares, in each case in accordance
with Section 3.2(c) of the MSPA as if it were MLC. 
 For avoidance of doubt, this letter agreement is not intended to amend the MSPA; rather it is
intended toclarify the parties’ rights and responsibilities thereunder. 
 This letter agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts (including by
means of telecopied or PDF signature pages), each of which shall be deemed an original but all of which taken together shall constitute one and the same instrument. Each party represents and warrants that (i) it has all requisite power and
authority to execute and deliver this letter agreement, (ii) this letter agreement constitutes the legal, valid and binding obligation of such party (assuming the due authorization, execution and delivery of this letter agreement by the other
parties), and (iii) no further consent, approval or authorization is required on the part of any such party. This letter agreement and all of the provisions hereof shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their
respective successors and permitted assigns. 
 [Signature Page Follows] 

 
			
	Very truly yours,
	
	MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY GUC TRUST
		
	By:	 	WILMINGTON TRUST COMPANY, solely in its capacity as GUC Trust Administrator
		
	By:	 	 /s/ David A. Vanaskey, Jr.

		 	Name: David A. Vanaskey, Jr.
		 	Title: Vice President

 Acknowledged and agreed to on 

this     day of September, 2011 by: 
 MOTORS
LIQUIDATION COMPANY 
  

			
	 By:
	 	 /s/ Stenger

	 Name:
	 	 Stenger

	 Title:
	 	 EVP

 REMEDIATION AND LIABILITY MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC: 
  

			
	 By:
	 	 /s/ Stenger

	 Name:
	 	 Stenger

	 Title:
	 	 EVP

 GENERAL MOTORS LLC 
  

			
	 By:
	 	 /s/ Michael P. Millikin

		 	 Name: Michael P. Millikin

		 	 Title: Senior Vice President and General Counsel

 FTI CONSULTING, INC., 
 solely
in its capacity as GUC Trust Monitor 
  

			
	 By:
	 	 /s/ Anna Phillips

		 	 Name: Anna Phillips

		 	 Title: Senior Managing Director

  

 Schedule 1 

If to the GUC Trust: 
 c/o Drinker Biddle &
Reath LLP 
 1177 Ave. of the Americas 
 41st Floor 

New York, NY 10036 
 Attn:     Kristin K.
Going 
      Clay Pierce 

If to the PIWD Plaintiffs represented by Andrews Myers, P.C.: 

c/o Andrews Myers, P.C. 
 1885 St. James Place, 15th Floor 

Houston, Texas 77056 
 Attn: Lisa M. Norman 

If to the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs and/or certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs (or Co-Lead Counsel on their behalf): 
  

			
	 c/o Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP
 1918 Eighth
Avenue, Suite 3300
 Seattle, WA 98101
 Attn: Steve W. Berman,
Esq.
	  	 c/o Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP

275 Battery Street, 29th Floor
 San Francisco, California
94111
 Attn: Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Esq.

		
	 c/o Brown Rudnick LLP
 Seven Times Square

New York, New York 10036
 Attn: Edward S. Weisfelner

  Howard S. Steel
	  	 c/o Stutzman, Bromberg, Esserman & Plifka, 
a Professional Corporation

2323 Bryan Street, Ste 2200
 Dallas, Texas 75201

Attn: Sander L. Esserman

 If to the PIWD Plaintiffs represented by Cole Schotz P.C.: 

c/o Cole Schotz, P.C. 
 1325 Avenue of the Americas, 19th Floor 
 New York, NY 10019 

Attn: Mark Tsukerman 
 c/o The Cooper Firm 

531 Roselane Street, Suite 200 
 Marietta, GA 30060 

Attn: Lance Cooper 

 c/o Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles P.C. 

218 Commerce Street 
 Montgomery, AL 36104 

Attn: J. Cole Portis 

 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

————————————————————————————————x
 
  

					
	  
 In re

 
 MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY, et al.,

f/k/a General Motors Corp., et al.
  

Debtors.
	  	 :
 :

:
 :

:
 :

:
 :
	  	  
 Chapter 11 Case No.

 
 09-50026 (MG)

 
 (Jointly Administered)

————————————————————————————————x
 
 ORDER (A) AUTHORIZING THE GUC TRUST ADMINISTRATOR 

TO REALLOCATE AND USE DISTRIBUTABLE CASH 

FOR THE PURPOSE OF FUNDING NOTICE COSTS PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF 

THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND (B) AUTHORIZING THE GUC TRUST TO  

PERFORM THE ACTIONS SET FORTH IN THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 

PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE TRUST AGREEMENT 

Upon the motion, dated January 31, 2019 (the “Motion”)1 of
Wilmington Trust Company in its capacity as trust administrator and trustee (in such capacity, the “GUC Trust Administrator”) of the Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust (the “GUC Trust”), as established under
the Debtors’ Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan dated as of March 18, 2011 [ECF No. 9836] (as confirmed, the “Plan”) of the above-captioned post-effective date debtors (the “Debtors”) seeking
entry of an Order pursuant to sections 105, 363, and 1142 of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”), Rules 3002, 9014, and 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and sections 5.5, 6.1(b), and 8.1(e)
of the GUC Trust Agreement, (A) authorizing the GUC Trust’s reallocation and use of Distributable Cash, and (B) approving the Settlement Agreement and authorizing the GUC Trust to perform the actions set forth in the Settlement
Agreement pursuant to the terms of the GUC Trust Agreement, all as more fully described in the Motion; and any objections to the Motion having been settled, resolved, 

 

	1 	 Capitalized terms not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Motion.

 
withdrawn or overruled; and this Court having determined that the relief requested in the Motion is in the best interests of the Debtors’ creditors and estates; and it further appearing that
proper and adequate notice of the Motion has been given and that no other or further notice is necessary; and after due deliberation thereon, and good and sufficient cause appearing therefor: 

IT IS HEREBY: 
 ORDERED, that the relief
requested in the Motion is granted to the extent provided herein; and it is further 
 ORDERED, that, pursuant to Section 6.1(b) of the
GUC Trust Agreement, the GUC Trust Administrator is authorized to reallocate and use up to $13,720,000 of Distributable Cash to satisfy noticing costs to the putative Classes and Pre-Closing Accident
Plaintiffs; and it is further 
 ORDERED, that, pursuant to Section 8.1(e) of the GUC Trust Agreement, the GUC Trust Administrator is
authorized to perform the actions set forth in the Settlement Agreement; and it is further 
 ORDERED, that nothing herein shall be deemed
to prohibit the GUC Trust Administrator from seeking additional Court authority to reallocate and use Distributable Cash to fund fees, costs or expenses of the GUC Trust incurred or anticipated for the calendar year 2019 or any future year; and it
is further 
 ORDERED, that this Court shall retain jurisdiction of all matters and disputes arising in connection with or related to the
interpretation or implementation of this Order, any reallocation or use of Distributable Cash in connection herewith, or the GUC Trust Agreement. 
 Dated:
                         , 2019 

New York, New York 
  

					
		 		 	                                      
                                  
		 		 	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

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