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                                                                 EXHIBIT 10.7

                                     JPE, INC.
                2002 INCENTIVE COMPENSATION PLAN FOR KEY EMPLOYEES

1.    PURPOSE

      The purpose of the JPE, Inc. 2002 Incentive Compensation Plan for Key
      Employees (the "Plan") is to provide incentive compensation award
      opportunities for 2002 to certain eligible employees of JPE, Inc. or an
      affiliate thereof (collectively, the "Company"). Such award opportunities
      shall be based on the achievement of pre-established, specific goals (as
      defined below) relating to Company- and (where applicable) plant-specific
      "EBITDA" (as defined in Section 3(a)(i) below), and shall be awarded in
      the discretion of JPE, Inc.

2.    ELIGIBLE EMPLOYEES

      A.   ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE

           The Plan shall only apply to those employees of the Company who are
           designated as participants in writing by the "Board Committee" (as
           defined in Section 9(a) below) ("Participants") and who:

           i.   Are employed by the Company on a regular full-time salaried
                basis as of December 31, 2002, including any such employee who
                is absent from work due to an authorized paid or unpaid leave of
                absence; and

           ii.  Are still employed by the Company on a regular full-time
                salaried basis as of the date in 2003 on which the incentive
                compensation awards under the Plan are paid out, including any
                such employee who is absent from work due to an authorized paid
                or unpaid leave of absence.

      B.   EMPLOYEES HIRED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2002

           A Participant who is hired after January 1, 2002 who satisfies both
           of the eligibility requirements set forth in subsection (a) above
           shall be eligible to receive an incentive compensation award for 2002
           under the Plan. Any such award shall, however, be prorated to reflect
           the number of full weeks in 2002 actually worked by such individual
           as a regular full-time salaried employee of the Company through
           December 31, 2002, as a fraction of 52 weeks.

      C.   DEATH OR DISABILITY

           A Participant who is employed by the Company as a regular full-time
           salaried employee during any part of 2002, but whose employment with
           the Company terminates in 2002 or 2003 due to death or "Disability"
           (as defined for purposes of the Company's group health plan) prior to
           the date in 2003 on which the incentive compensation awards under the
           Plan are paid out shall be eligible to receive an incentive
           compensation award under the Plan. Any such award shall be prorated
           to reflect the number of full weeks in 2002 actually worked by such
           individual as a regular full-time salaried employee of the Company
           through

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           December 31, 2002, as a fraction of 52 weeks. Payments of an
           incentive compensation award under this subsection (c) shall be
           payable to a Participant's estate, in the case of death.

      D.   OTHER TERMINATIONS

           An otherwise eligible Participant whose employment with the Company
           terminates for any reason other than death or Disability prior to the
           2003 payment date for incentive compensation awards under the Plan
           shall not receive any incentive compensation award payout under the
           Plan.

      E.   LEAVES OF ABSENCE

           A Participant who is employed by the Company as a regular full-time
           salaried employee during any part of 2002, but whose employment with
           the Company is interrupted in 2002 due to an authorized paid or
           unpaid leave of absence shall be eligible to receive an incentive
           compensation award under the Plan. Any such award shall be prorated
           to reflect the number of full weeks in 2002 actually worked by such
           individual as a regular full-time salaried employee of the Company
           through December 31, 2002, as a fraction of 52 weeks.

3.    PERFORMANCE GOALS

      A.   COMPANY PERFORMANCE GOALS

           i.   For 2002, the "Company Target EBITDA" shall be $5,381,000 of
                Company Adjusted EBITDA. "Company Adjusted EBITDA" is the
                Company's audited earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation
                and amortization ("EBITDA") for 2002 determined in accordance
                with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"), but
                excluding any accrual for incentive compensation awards to be
                paid for 2002 under this Plan.

           ii.  The "Company Threshold EBITDA" shall be $4,304,800, 80% of the
                Company Target EBITDA.

      B.   PLANT PERFORMANCE GOALS

           i.   For 2002, the "Plant Target EBITDA" shall be $4,239,000 (for the
                East Tawas Plant), $681,000 (for the Beavercreek Plant), and
                $5,236,000 (for the Dayton Parts Plant) of applicable Plant
                Adjusted EBITDA. "Plant Adjusted EBITDA" is, for each respective
                plant, the plant's audited EBITDA for 2002 determined in
                accordance with GAAP, but excluding any accrual for incentive
                compensation awards to be paid for 2002 under this Plan.

           ii.  The "Plant Threshold EBITDA" shall be $3,391,200 (for the East
                Tawas Plant), $544,800 (for the Beavercreek Plant), and
                $4,188,800 (for the Dayton Parts Plant), 80% of the respective
                Plant Target EBITDA.

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4.    INCENTIVE COMPENSATION

      For 2002, each Participant may earn incentive compensation, expressed as a
      percentage of the Participant's base salary, if Company (and/or Plant, if
      applicable) Adjusted EBITDA equals or exceeds Company (and/or Plant, if
      applicable) Threshold EBITDA. The incentive compensation that may be paid
      to a Participant if Company (and/or Plant, if applicable) Adjusted EBITDA
      equals Company (and/or Plant, if applicable) Target EBITDA ("Target
      Incentive Compensation") shall be specified by the Board Committee in
      writing. Such Target Incentive Compensation shall be allocated as follows:

      A.   For Participants who are not employed at the East Tawas, Beavercreek,
           or Dayton Parts Plant, 100% of the incentive compensation that may be
           earned shall be based on the Company Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage
           of the Company Target EBITDA (the "Corporate Performance Portion").

      B.   For Participants who are employed at the East Tawas, Beavercreek, or
           Dayton Parts Plant:

           i.   Forty percent of the incentive compensation that may be earned
                shall be based on the Company Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of
                the Company Target EBITDA (the "Corporate Performance Portion");
                and

           ii.  Sixty percent of the incentive compensation that may be earned
                shall be based on the applicable Plant Adjusted EBITDA as a
                percentage of the applicable Plant Target EBITDA (the "Plant
                Performance Portion").

5.    CALCULATION OF CORPORATE PERFORMANCE PORTION OF TARGET INCENTIVE
      COMPENSATION

      A.   COMPANY ADJUSTED EBITDA EQUAL TO COMPANY TARGET EBITDA

           If Company Adjusted EBITDA equals Company Target EBITDA for 2002,
           100% of the Corporate Performance Portion of the Participant's
           Target Incentive Compensation shall be earned.

      B.   COMPANY ADJUSTED EBITDA BELOW COMPANY TARGET EBITDA

           i.   If Company Adjusted EBITDA is less than Company Threshold EBITDA
                for 2002, none of the Corporate Performance Portion of the
                Participant's Target Incentive Compensation shall be earned.

           ii.  If Company Adjusted EBITDA is equal to or greater than Company
                Threshold EBITDA, but less than 90% of Company Target EBITDA for
                2002, 10% of the Corporate Performance Portion of the
                Participant's Target Incentive Compensation shall be earned.

                For Example:
                Company Target EBITDA         =     $5,381,000

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                Company Adjusted EBITDA       =     $4,573,850 (85% of Company
                                                                Target EBITDA)
                Participant's Base Salary     =     $100,000
                Target Incentive Compensation =     25%

                Because 85% of Company Target EBITDA was reached in 2002, the
                Participant, if he or she is not employed at the East Tawas,
                Beavercreek or Dayton Parts Plant, would receive $2,500, 10%
                of his or her Target Incentive Compensation (10% x 25% x
                $100,000 = $2,500). The Participant, if he or she is employed
                at one of the aforementioned plants, would receive as his or
                her Corporate Performance Portion $1,000, 10% of 40% of his or
                her Target Incentive Compensation (10% x 40% x 25% x $100,000
                = $1,000).

           iii. If Company Adjusted EBITDA is equal to or greater than 90% of
                Company Target EBITDA, but less than Company Target EBITDA for
                2002, 20% of the Corporate Performance Portion of the
                Participant's Target Incentive Compensation shall be earned.

                For Example:
                Company Target EBITDA         =     $5,381,000
                Company Adjusted EBITDA       =     $5,111,950 (95% of Company
                                                                Target EBITDA)
                Participant's Base Salary     =     $100,000
                Target Incentive Compensation =     25%

                Because 95% of the Company Target EBITDA was reached in 2002,
                the Participant, if he or she is not employed at the East
                Tawas, Beavercreek or Dayton Parts Plant, would receive
                $5,000, 20% of his or her Target Incentive Compensation (20% x
                25% x $100,000 = $5,000). The Participant, if he or she is
                employed at one of the aforementioned plants, would receive
                $2,000, 20% of 40% of his or her Target Incentive Compensation
                as his or her Corporate Performance Portion (20% x 40% x 25% x
                $100,000 = $2,000).

      C.   COMPANY ADJUSTED EBITDA ABOVE COMPANY TARGET EBITDA

           i.   If Company Adjusted EBITDA is greater than Company Target EBITDA
                for 2002, 100% of the Corporate Performance Portion of the
                Participant's Target Incentive Compensation shall be earned plus
                an additional 2% for each percentage point that Company Adjusted
                EBITDA exceeds Company Target EBITDA, up to 150% of Company
                Target EBITDA.

                For Example:
                Company Target EBITDA         =     $5,381,000
                Company Adjusted EBITDA       =     $6,457,200 (120% of
                                              Company Target EBITDA)
                Participant's Base Salary     =     $100,000
                Target Incentive Compensation =     25%

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                Because 120% of Company Target EBITDA was reached in 2002, the
                Participant, if he or she is not employed at the East Tawas,
                Beavercreek or Dayton Parts Plant, would receive $35,000, 140%
                of his or her Target Incentive Compensation (140% x 25% x
                $100,000 = $35,000). (120% is 20 percentage points in excess
                of 100% of Company Target EBITDA, and so the Participant's
                incentive compensation is increased to 140% of his or her
                Target Incentive Compensation.) The Participant, if he or she
                is employed at one of the aforementioned plants, would receive
                $14,000 as his or her Corporate Performance Portion, 140% of
                40% of his or her Target Incentive Compensation (140% x 40% x
                25% x $100,000 = $14,000).

                                      *   *   *   *   *

                Company Target EBITDA         =     $5,381,000
                Company Adjusted EBITDA       =     $8,609,600 (160% of
                                              Company Target EBITDA)
                Participant's Base Salary     =     $100,000
                Target Incentive Compensation =     25%

                Because 160% of Company Target EBITDA was reached in 2002 but
                the excess is capped at 150% for purposes of the Plan, the
                Participant, if he or she is not employed at the East Tawas,
                Beavercreek or Dayton Parts Plant, would receive $50,000, 200%
                of his or her Target Incentive Compensation (200% x 25% x
                $100,000 = $50,000). (150% is 50 percentage points in excess
                of 100% of Company Target EBITDA, and so the Participant's
                incentive compensation is increased to 200% of his or her
                Target Incentive Compensation.) The Participant, if he or she
                is employed at one of the aforementioned plants, would receive
                $20,000 as his or her Corporate Performance Portion, 200% of
                40% of his or her Target Incentive Compensation (200% x 40% x
                25% x $100,000 = $20,000).

6.    CALCULATION OF PLANT PERFORMANCE PORTION OF TARGET INCENTIVE COMPENSATION

      a.   PLANT ADJUSTED EBITDA EQUAL TO PLANT TARGET EBITDA

      If Plant Adjusted EBITDA equals Plant Target EBITDA for 2002, 100% of the
      Plant Performance Portion of the Participant's Target Incentive
      Compensation shall be earned for that year.

      b.   PLANT ADJUSTED EBITDA BELOW PLANT TARGET EBITDA

           i.       If Plant Adjusted EBITDA is less than Plant Threshold EBITDA
                for 2002, none of the Plant Performance Portion of the
                Participant's Target Incentive Compensation shall be earned.

           ii.      If Plant Adjusted EBITDA is equal to or greater than Plant
                Threshold EBITDA, but less than 90% of Plant Target EBITDA, 10%
                of

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                the Plant Performance Portion of the Participant's
                Target Incentive Compensation shall be earned.

                For Example:
                East Tawas Plant Target EBITDA      =     $4,239,000
                Actual Adjusted EBITDA              =     $3,603,150 (85% of
                                                          Plant Target EBITDA)
                Participant's Base Salary           =     $100,000
                Target Incentive Compensation       =     25%

                Because 85% of Plant Target EBITDA was reached in 2002, the
                Participant would receive as his or her Plant Performance
                Portion $1,500, 10% of 60% of his or her Target Incentive
                Compensation (10% x 60% x 25% x $100,000 = $1,500).

           iii. If Plant Adjusted EBITDA is equal to or greater than 90% of
                Plant Target EBITDA, but less than Plant Target EBITDA, 20% of
                the Plant Performance Portion of the Participant's Target
                Incentive Compensation shall be earned.

      c.   PLANT ADJUSTED EBITDA ABOVE PLANT TARGET EBITDA

           If Plant Adjusted EBITDA is greater than Plant Target EBITDA for
           2002, 100% of the Plant Performance Portion of the Participant's
           Target Incentive Compensation will be earned plus an additional 2%
           for each percentage point that Plant Adjusted EBITDA exceeds Plant
           Target EBITDA, up to 150% of Plant Target EBITDA.

7.    TIMING OF AWARDS

      a.   All incentive compensation award determinations under the Plan shall
           be made based on Company and (if applicable) Plant Adjusted EBITDA,
           as determined by the Board Committee, in its sole discretion.

      b.   Subject to subsection (c) below, all payments of incentive
           compensation awards made under the Plan shall be made by the Company
           only after:

           i.   JPE, Inc. has determined the Company and Plant Adjusted EBITDA
                for 2002;

           ii.  JPE, Inc.'s independent auditors have completed the financial
                audit; and

           iii. The Board Committee has approved any incentive compensation
                award payouts based on such results and any other applicable
                determinations it makes (not more than 30 days after the audited
                financial results are certified and delivered to the Board
                Committee).

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      c.   DISCRETION BY JPE, INC. TO MAKE INCENTIVE COMPENSATION AWARDS

           Notwithstanding any other provision of the Plan to the contrary,
           JPE, Inc. (acting through its Board of Directors) has the sole
           discretion whether or not to pay an incentive compensation award to
           any or all Participants under the Plan. Further, JPE, Inc. (acting
           through its Board of Directors) may terminate the Plan at any time,
           with or without notice to the Participants and without regard to the
           effect any such termination has on any incentive compensation
           award(s) under the Plan.

8.    SALE OF THE EMPLOYER

      a.   BUYER'S ASSUMPTION OF OBLIGATION

           If the Participant's "Employer" (as defined in subsection (d) below)
           undergoes a "Change in Control" (as defined in subsection (c) below)
           and the buyer of the Employer assumes the Employer's obligations
           under the Plan, then Participants may receive incentive compensation
           as calculated in accordance with Sections 5 and/or 6.

      b.   PRO-RATA INCENTIVE COMPENSATION

           Subject to Section 7(c), if the Employer undergoes a Change in
           Control and the buyer of the Employer does not assume the Employer's
           obligations under the Plan, then each Participant may receive
           incentive compensation under the Plan based on the Company (and
           Plant, if applicable) Adjusted EBITDA through the last day of the
           month before the month that contains the closing date of the Change
           in Control as a percentage of the Company (and Plant, if applicable)
           Target EBITDA, as budgeted through such last day of the month. Any
           such incentive compensation shall be prorated by the number of
           calendar days in 2002 prior to the closing date of the Change in
           Control, divided by 365.

      c.   "CHANGE IN CONTROL"

           For purposes of this Section, the term "Change in Control" shall
           mean:

           i.   that any person or entity, including a "group" (within the
                meaning of Rule 13d-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
                as amended ("Exchange Act")), but excluding any private equity
                fund managed by Questor Management Company, LLC ("Questor"), any
                affiliate of any such fund and any group of which any such fund
                or affiliate may be a member, becomes (in one transaction or in
                a series of related transactions) the beneficial owner of all or
                substantially all of the shares of the Employer held by QP
                Acquisition #2, Inc. or JPE, Inc, as applicable; or.

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           ii.  that any one or more persons or entities, including a "group"
                (within the meaning of Rule 13d-1 under the Exchange Act), but
                excluding any private equity fund managed by Questor, any
                affiliate of any such fund and any group of which any such fund
                or affiliate may be a member, becomes the owner of all or
                substantially all of the assets of the Employer (in one
                transaction or in a series of transactions).

      d.   "EMPLOYER"

           For purposes of this Section, the term "Employer" shall mean:

           i.   for a Participant employed by the Company and not by the East
                Tawas, Beavercreek or Dayton Parts Plant - JPE, Inc.;

           ii.  for a Participant employed at the East Tawas Plant - Starboard
                Industries, Inc.;

           iii. for a Participant employed at the Beavercreek Plant - Plastic
                Trim, Inc.; and

           iv.  for a Participant employed at the Dayton Parts Plant - Dayton
                Parts, Inc.

9.    GENERAL PROVISIONS

      a.   ADMINISTRATION

           The Plan shall be administered by a committee of directors (the
           "Board Committee") designated by JPE, Inc.'s Board of Directors. The
           Board Committee shall have the power and authority to delegate
           various functions to one or more officers of JPE, Inc., subject to
           the Board Committee's oversight and approval, and to such guidelines
           and parameters as the Board Committee may set from time to time, in
           its sole discretion.

           Subject to such limitations as the Board of Directors may set forth
           from time to time, and subject to the limitations of Section 7(c),
           the Board Committee shall have the authority, in its sole
           discretion, to make all determinations and interpretations regarding
           any issues arising under the terms of the Plan as set forth herein,
           including, but not limited to, issues regarding Participant status
           or the size of any incentive compensation award. All determinations
           made by the Board Committee shall be final and binding on all
           parties.

      b.   AMENDMENT OF PLAN

           The Board of Directors may at any time amend the Plan, with or
           without notice to the Participants.

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      c.   APPLICABLE LAW

           Any issue arising under, or otherwise relating to rights under, the
           Plan shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws
           of the State of Michigan, applied without regard to conflict of law
           principles.

      d.   TAX WITHHOLDING

           The Company shall have the right to make such provision(s) and take
           such action(s) as it may deem necessary or appropriate for the
           withholding of any and all Federal, state or local taxes that the
           Company may be required to withhold with respect to any incentive
           compensation awards paid under the Plan.

      e.   NO EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS CREATED

           Neither the existence of the Plan nor the participation of a
           Participant in the Plan shall give any individual the right to be, or
           continue to be, employed by the Company, and the Company specifically
           reserves the right to terminate any employee's employment with the
           Company at any time for any reason with or without notice or cause.

      f.   IMPACT OF INCENTIVE COMPENSATION AWARDS ON OTHER PLANS, PROGRAMS AND
           ARRANGEMENTS

           Awards under the Plan shall not be treated as covered compensation
           for purposes of any other compensation or benefit plan, program or
           arrangement of the Company, provided, however, that incentive
           compensation awards under the Plan shall be counted as covered
           compensation for purposes of The JPE, Inc. 401(k) Savings Plan if and
           to the extent such plan otherwise so provides subject, however, to
           any applicable limitations on covered compensation under the Employee
           Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, or the Internal
           Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

      g.   INAPPLICABILITY TO YEARS OTHER THAN 2002

           The Plan shall only apply to 2002, based on actual 2002 performance
           compared to the performance targets for that year, and shall not
           apply to any other year.

      h.   NON-ASSIGNABILITY AND GENERAL CREDITOR STATUS

           An award under the Plan shall not be transferable or otherwise
           assignable except in the event of the Participant's death (in which
           case any earned incentive compensation shall be payable to the
           Participant's estate, subject to Section 2(c)), and any attempt to
           transfer or assign such opportunity other than due to the
           Participant's death shall render the award voidable in the sole
           discretion of JPE, Inc.

           Nothing contained in the Plan shall provide any Participant with any
           rights with respect to any specific assets of the Company, and
           eligible Participants shall only have the rights of a general
           creditor with respect to any incentive compensation awards actually
           earned for 2002.

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      i.   HEADINGS

           The headings used in this document are for convenience only and are
           not intended to impact the meaning or interpretation of the Plan.

10.   EFFECTIVE DATE

      This Plan was adopted by JPE, Inc. and certain of its affiliates on July
      19, 2002, effective as of January 1, 2002.

                                                JPE, Inc.

                                                By: /s/ Scott K. Koepke
                                                    -----------------------

                                                Starboard Industries, Inc.

                                                By: /s/ Scott K. Koepke
                                                    -----------------------

                                                Plastic Trim, Inc.

                                                By: /s/ Scott K. Koepke
                                                    -----------------------

                                                Dayton Parts, Inc.

                                                By: /s/ Scott K. Koepke
                                                    -----------------------

                                        52exv4wxfy

 

Exhibit 4(f)

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Pulte Homes, Inc. (the “Company”) on
Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Mark J. O’Brien,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

	 	 	 
	 

Mark J. O’Brien

President and Chief Executive Officer

August 13, 2002

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