Document:

Exhibit

Exhibit (10-1)
Summary of the Company’s Short Term Achievement Reward Program  

SHORT TERM ACHIEVEMENT REWARD PROGRAM
(Effective July 1, 2019)

The Short Term Achievement Reward (“STAR”) Program is The Procter & Gamble Company’s (the “Company”) annual bonus program designed to motivate and reward employees for achieving outstanding short term business results for the Company and its subsidiaries.  STAR awards are made pursuant to authority delegated to the Compensation & Leadership Development Committee (the “C&LD Committee”) by the Board of Directors for awarding compensation to the Company’s principal officers and for making awards under the Procter & Gamble 2014 Stock and Incentive Compensation Plan (the “2014 Plan”) or any successor stock plan approved in accordance with applicable listing standards.  

I.    ELIGIBILITY

Employees at Band 2 or above and who worked at least 28 days (four calendar weeks) during the applicable fiscal year are eligible to participate.  Eligible employees who do not work a full schedule (e.g., leaves of absence, disability, and less-than-full time schedules) in the fiscal year in which the award is payable may have awards pro-rated.  

II.    Calculation

The individual STAR Award is calculated as follows:  

(STAR Target) x [ (Business Unit Performance Factor x 70% weighting) + (Total Company Performance Factor X 30% weighting) ] 

		
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	The STAR Target for each participant is calculated as:  

(Base Salary) x (STAR Target percent) where Base Salary at the end of the applicable fiscal year is used to calculate the STAR award.  Generally, the STAR Target Percent is dependent on the individual’s position and level (Band) in the organization.  The STAR Target percent for participants at Band 7 or above is set by the C&LD Committee.  The STAR Target percent for all other participants is set by the Chief Executive Officer, with the concurrence of the Chief Human Resources Officer, pursuant to authority delegated to them by the C&LD Committee. If an individual’s position and/or level changes during a fiscal year, and that change results in a new STAR Target Percent, the STAR Target Percent is pro-rated according to the amount of time in each position/level during the fiscal year.  

		
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	The Business Unit Performance Factor is weighted at 70% and is based on the fiscal year success for the appropriate STAR business unit. The STAR business units are defined by the Chief Human Resources Officer and may consist of business categories, segments, geographies, functions, organizations or a combination of one or more of these items.  The STAR business units will be defined within ninety (90) days of the beginning of the fiscal year, but may be adjusted as necessary to reflect business and/or organizational changes (e.g., reorganization, acquisition, merger, divestiture, etc.).  The Business Unit Performance Factors can range from 0% to 200% with a target of 100%.  In general, a committee consisting of at least two of the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Human Resources Officer and/or the Chief Operating Officer (the “STAR Committee”), conducts a comprehensive retrospective assessment of the fiscal year performance of each STAR business unit against previously established goals and relative to competition for one or more of the following measures: Operating Total Shareholder Return, After Tax Profit, Free Cash Flow Productivity, Value Share, Organic Sales, Internal controls, Accounts receivable ,Inventory, Organization Head Self-Assessment, and Cross Organization Assessment.  The STAR Committee makes a recommendation of an appropriate Business Unit Performance Factor to the C&LD Committee.  There may also be other factors significantly affecting STAR business unit results positively or negatively which can be considered by the STAR Committee when making its recommendation.  No member of the STAR Committee makes any recommendation or determination as to their own STAR award.  As a result, there are certain instances in which a Business Unit 

Performance Factor recommendation to the C&LD Committee must be made exclusively by the Chief Executive Officer.  
 
Business Unit leaders may then allocate the approved STAR Business Unit Factors among the divisions of the Business Unit to more closely align the STAR award with performance, so long as the total expenditure does not exceed that approved by the STAR Committee and no individual STAR award exceeds 200% of target.

		
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	The Total Company Performance Factor is weighted at 30% and is based on the total Company’s success during the fiscal year and ranges from 0% to 200%, with a target of 100%. The same Total Company Performance Factor is applied to all STAR award calculations, regardless of STAR business unit.  It is determined using a matrix which compares results against pre-established goals for fiscal year organic sales growth and core earnings per share (“EPS”) growth for the fiscal year.  

While the STAR Committee makes recommendations to the C&LD Committee regarding the Business Unit and Total Company performance factors to be applied to all STAR awards (except those for the STAR Committee members), only the final award amounts for principal officers are approved specifically by the C&LD Committee.  The C&LD Committee has delegated the approval of STAR awards for other participants to the Chief Executive Officer. The C&LD Committee has discretion to use, increase or decrease the performance factors recommended by the STAR Committee and/or to choose not to pay STAR awards during a given year.  

III.    TIMING AND FORM

STAR awards are determined after the close of the fiscal year and are paid on or about September 15.  The award form choices and relevant considerations are explained to participants annually.  Participants receive written notice of their award detailing the calculation and grant letters for those employees who elect to receive awards in stock options 

Generally, STAR awards are paid in cash. However, before the end of the calendar year preceding the award date, eligible participants can elect to receive their STAR award in forms other than cash.  Alternatives to cash include stock options, stock appreciation rights (“SARS”), local deferral programs (depending on local regulations in some countries) and/or deferred compensation (for employees eligible to participate in the Executive Deferred Compensation Program).  The number of stock options or SARs awarded to each employee will be determined on grant date by determining the USD value of the award chosen by the employee to be paid in stock options and dividing that value by the grant date GAAP expense of one stock option.  The result will be rounded up to the nearest whole share. Any STAR award paid in stock options or other form of equity shall be awarded pursuant to this program and the terms and conditions of the 2014 Plan or any successor stock plan approved in accordance with applicable listing standards, as they may be revised from time to time.  STAR awards paid in stock options or SARS will have the following terms unless otherwise approved by the C&LD Committee at grant:

Grant date will be the last business day on or before September 15.  If the New York Stock Exchange is closed on the day of the grant, then the C&LD Committee will establish a grant date as soon as practical following the date previously specified. Provided participants remain in compliance with the terms and conditions set forth in the currently active Stock Plan and the Regulations, STAR stock options and SARs are not forfeitable, will become exercisable three years after the grant date, and will expire ten years after the grant date.  In the event of death of the participant, the award becomes exercisable as of the date of death and the award remains exercisable until the Expiration Date.  For awards granted in France or the United Kingdom, the consequences of death are determined by the local plan supplement, if applicable.
The option price used for any STAR Award will be the closing price for a share of Common Stock on the New York Stock Exchange on the grant date, or such higher price as may be specified in the French Addendum of the Regulations (the “Grant Price”).

IV.    SEPARATION FROM THE COMPANY

		
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	Retirement, Death or Special Separation with a Separation Package:  If a participant worked at least 28 days (4 calendar weeks) during the fiscal year, the STAR award is pro-rated by dividing the number of calendar days the participant was an “active employee” during the fiscal year by 365. 

		
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	Voluntary Resignation or Termination for cause:  Separating employees must have been active employees as of June 30 or the last business day in June (the close of the fiscal year for which the award is payable) to receive an award.  

		
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	Separation due to a Company authorized divestiture: In the case of divestitures the CHRO is authorized to determine the appropriate STAR payout based on Business Unit factors either at Target or at projected or actual business results.  The CHRO is also authorized to pay awards for the current or following partial fiscal year at time of divestiture close for administrative convenience.  

Eligible participants who have left the Company will receive a cash payment (stock options can only be issued to active employees) on the same timing as STAR awards or as soon thereafter as possible.

V.    CHANGE IN CONTROL

Notwithstanding the foregoing, if there is a Change in Control in any fiscal year, STAR awards will be calculated in accordance with Section II above, but each factor will be calculated for the period from the beginning of the fiscal year in which a Change in Control occurred up to and including the date of such Change in Control (“CIC Period”).  “Change in Control” shall have the same meaning as defined in the 2014 Plan or any successor stock plan.

VI.    GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS

While any STAR award amount received by one individual for any year shall be considered as earned remuneration in addition to salary paid, it shall be understood that this plan does not give to any officer or employee any contract rights, express or implied, against any Company for any STAR award or for compensation in addition to the salary paid to him or her, or any right to question the action of the Board of Directors or the C&LD or STAR Committees.

The Chief Human Resources Officer or the Chief Legal Officer may withhold a STAR award for a separated employee who is discovered to have engaged in serious misconduct or actions detrimental to the Company’s interests.

Each award to an individual at Band 7 and above, made pursuant to this plan, is subject to the Senior Executive Recoupment Policy as amended by the C&LD Committee in April 2018.

To the extent applicable, it is intended that STAR comply with the provisions of Section 409A.  STAR will be administered and interpreted in a manner consistent with this intent.  Neither a Participant nor any of a Participant’s creditors or beneficiaries will have the right to subject any deferred compensation (within the meaning of Section 409A) payable under STAR to any anticipation, alienation, sale, transfer, assignment, pledge, encumbrance, attachment or garnishment.  Except as permitted under Section 409A, any deferred compensation (within the meaning of Section 409A) payable to a Participant under STAR may not be reduced by, or offset against, any amount owing by a Participant to the Company.

This program document may be amended at any time by the C&LD Committee.Exhibit

Exhibit (10-2)
The Procter & Gamble Performance Stock Program Summary

PERFORMANCE STOCK PROGRAM SUMMARY
(Effective July 1, 2019)

The Performance Stock Program (“PSP”) is a part of The Procter & Gamble Company’s (the “Company”) long-term incentive (“LTI”) compensation and is designed to provide additional focus on key Company measures for top executives with senior management responsibility for total Company results.  Awards granted under the PSP (“PSP Awards”) are made pursuant to authority delegated to the Compensation & Leadership Development Committee (the “C&LD Committee”) by the Board of Directors for determining compensation for the Company’s principal officers and for making awards under the Procter & Gamble 2014 Stock and Incentive Compensation Plan (the “2014 Plan”) or any successor stock plan approved in accordance with applicable listing standards.    PSP Awards are Performance-Based Compensation (as defined in Article 15 of the 2014 Plan). 

I.    ELIGIBILITY

The Chairman of the Board and/or Chief Executive Officer and those active executives at Band 6 or above as of October 1 prior to the grant date and recommended by management are eligible to participate (“Participants”).  In special circumstances such as for acquisitions or experienced hires, the CHRO may authorize participation for Band 6 or above employees who are not active as of October 1 but are active employees as of the grant date.

II.    OVERVIEW

A significant portion of the Band 6 and above compensation is delivered through two long-term incentive programs tied to Company performance: PSP and the Long-term Incentive Program. 
Total long-term incentive compensation targets are based on relevant competitive market data considering the median total long-term compensation of comparable positions, regressed for revenue size.  The C&LD Committee establishes the Peer Group and sets compensation targets for all Principal Officers including the CEO.  The CEO approves compensation targets for non-Principal Officers (generally Band 6 managers).  
The C&LD Committee determines the long-term incentive award for the CEO.  The CEO recommends all other Principal Officer awards to the C&LD Committee based on benchmarked long-term compensation targets, adjusted for business results and individual contributions attributable to each executive and including that individual’s leadership skills. The C&LD Committee retains full authority to accept, modify, or reject these recommendations. The CEO approves awards for participants who are not Principal Officers based on long-term compensation targets, business results and individual contributions. Long-term incentive awards can be up to 50% above or 50% below the benchmarked target. In exceptional cases, no award will be made. After total LTI award size is determined then approximately half of each Band 7 manager’s long-term compensation is allocated to PSP via an Initial PSU Grant (as defined below). The remaining portion is a Long-term Incentive Program Grant.  Approximately 25% of each Band 6 manager’s total LTI is allocated to PSP with the remainder awarded under the Long-term Incentive Program.

PSP rewards Participants for Company performance against certain three-year performance goals in categories established by the C&LD Committee.  The C&LD Committee sets these performance goals for each three-year period that begins on July 1 and ends on June 30 three years later (“Performance Period”).  In the first year of each Performance Period, the C&LD Committee grants Performance Stock Units (“PSUs”) to Participants that will vest at the end of the Performance Period based on the Company’s performance relative to the pre-established performance goals (“Initial PSU Grant”).  The number of PSUs that vest at the end of the Performance Period depends on the Company’s performance against the pre-established performance goals.  Vested PSUs, including dividend equivalents, are converted into shares of the Company’s common stock (“Common Stock”) delivered to the applicable Participant within 60 days following the end of the Performance Period, or such later date as may be elected by the Participant in accordance with Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code (“Section 409A”).

		
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	PERFORMANCE CATEGORIES 

The PSP Award is based on the Company’s performance in each of the following categories (each a “Performance Category”) and weighted as indicated:

		
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	Organic sales growth (percentile rank in the competitive peer group)*  - 30%

		
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	Constant currency core before-tax operating profit growth - 20%

		
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	Core earnings per share (EPS) growth - 30%

		
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	Adjusted free cash flow productivity - 20%

Awards will be further adjusted based on the three-year relative total shareholder return (R-TSR) of P&G compared to the competitive peer group*.  Awards will be adjusted for top quartile performance using a 125% multiplier to increase awards, and reduced for bottom quartile performance using a 75% multiplier.
* Competitive peer group is defined in the PSP Accounting Guidelines.

Within the first 90 days of each Performance Period, the C&LD Committee sets three-year performance goals (“Performance Goals”) for each Performance Category for such Performance Period and establishes a sliding scale to measure the Company’s performance against each Performance Goal in each Performance Category.  The C&LD Committee uses the sliding scale to establish a payout factor between 0% and 200% for each Performance Category (a “Sales Factor”, “Profit Factor”,  “EPS Factor” and “Cash Flow Factor”, collectively, “Performance Factors”).

In all cases, the C&LD Committee retains the discretion to include or exclude certain of the Performance Categories for purposes of determining the PSP Award.  The C&LD Committee may reduce or eliminate any payment if it determines that such payout is inconsistent with long-term shareholders’ interests or incongruous with the overall performance of the company.

PSP awards will have the following terms unless otherwise approved by the C&LD Committee:

IV.    THE INITIAL PSU GRANT 

The C&LD Committee has the sole discretion to establish the target award (“PSP Target”) for each Participant serving as a Principal Officer.  The CEO establishes the PSP Targets for participants who are not Principal Officers. The PSP Target will be a cash amount and will be the basis for the Initial PSU Grant.  The C&LD Committee will make the Initial PSU Grant on the last business date in February (“Grant Date”) following the beginning of each Performance Period.  If the New York Stock Exchange is closed on the day of the grant, then the C&LD will establish a grant date as soon as practical subsequent to the date previously specified for such award. The Initial PSU Grant will set forth a target and maximum number of PSUs.  The target number of PSUs will be determined by dividing the PSP Target by the expense value of one PSU using the same methodology by which the Company expenses PSUs, rounding to the nearest whole unit.

The Initial PSU Grant maximum will be two times the Initial PSU Grant.      
                                                                                                                           

V.     PSU VESTING AND PAYMENT

After the Performance Period is complete, the C&LD Committee will establish the Payout Factors for each of the Performance Categories based on the Company’s results versus the pre-established Performance Goals.  The number of PSUs that vest will be determined by multiplying the Performance Factors by their respective weightings, summing up the results, then applying the R-TSR multiplier if applicable.  The final result will be rounded up or down to the nearest full percentage.   The resulting percentage will be applied to the number of PSUs in the Initial PSU Grant target, including dividends that would have accumulated since the initial PSU grant on the vested units.  Any resulting fractional share units may be paid as cash, fractional shares, or rounded up to the next full share based on administrative preference of the Company.  The number of PSUs that vest may be equal to, above or below the Initial PSU Grant target depending on the Company’s performance in the Performance 

Categories, but in no event more than the Initial PSU Grant maximum.  Vested PSUs are converted into shares of Common Stock delivered to the applicable Participant within 60 days following the end of the Performance Period, or such later date as may be elected by the Participant if applicable and in accordance with Section 409A.

Participants at Band 7 and above may elect to defer delivery of the Common Stock by electing to receive Restricted Stock Units.  PSP RSUs will have the following terms unless otherwise approved by the Committee at grant:

VESTING AND SETTLEMENT:   PSP RSUs will be vested on the grant date with a settlement date at least one year following the original PSU delivery date (as elected by the Participant), are eligible for dividend equivalents, and can be further deferred in accordance with Section 409A.  These RSUs will be paid on their Original Settlement Date or the Agreed Settlement Date, except in the case of death.  In the case of death (except in France and the UK), payment will be made by the later of the end of the calendar year or two and a half months following the date of death.  For awards granted in France or the UK, the consequences of death are determined by the local plan supplement, if applicable.

VI.     SEPARATION FROM THE COMPANY (Defined terms shall have the meaning designated in the 2014 Plan or related award documents)

If the Participant’s Termination of Employment occurs for any reason before the Vest Date, except for the reasons listed below, the Award will be forfeited.  Participants must remain in compliance with the terms and conditions set forth in the 2014 Plan, including those in Article 6. 

		
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	Termination on Account of Death (except in France and the UK).  The Award is immediately vested and will become deliverable on the Settlement Date or Agreed Settlement Date, whichever is applicable. 

		
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	Termination on Account of Death for awards granted in France or the UK.  The consequences of death are determined by the local plan supplement, if applicable.

		
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	Termination on Account of Retirement or Disability after June 30th of the fiscal year in which this Award was granted.  PSUs are retained and will be delivered on the Settlement Date. 

		
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	Termination pursuant to a Written Separation Agreement that provides for retention of the Award, after June 30th of the fiscal year in which this Award was granted. PSUs are retained and will be delivered on the Settlement Date. 

		
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	Termination in connection with a divestiture or separation of any of the Company’s businesses, as determined by the Company’s Chief Human Resources Officer.  PSUs are retained and will be delivered on the Settlement Date. 

VII.    CHANGE IN CONTROL

Notwithstanding the foregoing, if there is a Change in Control that meets the requirements of a change in control event under Section 409A, all outstanding PSP Awards will vest at 100% of the Initial PSU Grant target (or 100% of the PSP Target if the Change in Control occurs prior to the Initial PSU Grant) including dividends that would have accumulated since the initial PSU grant on the vested units, and shall be paid in shares of Common Stock at the time of such Change in Control.  If there is a Change in Control event that does not meet the requirements of a change in control event under Section 409A, all outstanding PSP Awards will be settled according to the terms and conditions set forth herein, without the application Article 17 of the 2014 Plan.  “Change in Control” shall have the same meaning as defined in the 2014 Plan or any successor stock plan approved in accordance with applicable listing standards.

VIII.    GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS

It shall be understood that the PSP does not give to any officer or employee any contract rights, express or implied, against any Company for any PSP Award, or for compensation in addition to the salary paid to him or her, or any right to question the action of the Board of Directors or the C&LD Committee.

Each PSP Award made to an individual at Band 7 and above is subject to the Senior Executive Recoupment Policy adopted by the C&LD Committee in December 2006.

To the extent applicable, it is intended that the PSP comply with the provisions of Section 409A.  The PSP will be administered and interpreted in a manner consistent with this intent.  Neither a Participant nor any of a Participant’s creditors or beneficiaries will have the right to subject any deferred compensation (within the meaning of Section 409A) payable under the PSP to any anticipation, alienation, sale, transfer, assignment, pledge, encumbrance, attachment or garnishment.  Except as permitted under Section 409A, any deferred compensation (within the meaning of Section 409A) payable to a Participant under the PSP may not be reduced by, or offset against, any amount owing by a Participant to the Company.

This program document may be amended at any time by the C&LD Committee

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