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                                                                 EXHIBIT 10.17

                              AMENDED AND RESTATED
                      CHANGE IN CONTROL SEVERANCE AGREEMENT

                  THIS AMENDED AND RESTATED AGREEMENT ("Agreement"), initially
effective as of the 10th day of February, 2000 (the "Effective Date"), is
amended and restated in its entirety effective as of July 13, 2000, by and
between Allegheny Technologies Incorporated, a Delaware corporation (hereinafter
referred to as the "Company"), and the individual identified on the signature
page of this Agreement (the "Executive").

                              W I T N E S S E T H:

                  WHEREAS, the Board of Directors of the Company (the "Board")
has approved the Company entering into this agreement providing for certain
severance protection for the Executive following a Change in Control (as
hereinafter defined);

                  WHEREAS, the Board of Directors approved certain changes at
its meeting of July 13, 2000 and the parties hereto intend to hereby amend and
restate the Agreement in its entirety effective as of July 13, 2000 without
changing the Effective Date;

                  WHEREAS, the Board of the Company believes that, should the
possibility of a Change in Control arise, it is imperative that the Company be
able to receive and rely upon the Executive's advice, if requested, as to the
best interests of the Company and its stockholders without concern that the
Executive might be distracted by the personal uncertainties and risks created by
the possibility of a Change in Control; and

                  WHEREAS, in addition to the Executive's regular duties, the
Executive may be called upon to assist in the assessment of a possible Change in
Control, advise management and the Board of the Company as to whether such
Change in Control would be in the best interests of the Company and its
stockholders, and to take such other actions as the Board determines to be
appropriate;

                  NOW, THEREFORE, to assure the Company that it will have the
continued dedication of the Executive and the availability of Executive's advice
and counsel notwithstanding the possibility, threat, or occurrence of a Change
in Control, and to induce the Executive to remain in the employ of the Company,
and for good and valuable consideration and the mutual covenants set forth
herein, the Company and the Executive, intending to be legally bound, agree as
follows:

                             Article I. Definitions

         1.1 Definitions. Whenever used in this Agreement, the following terms
shall have the meanings set forth below when the initial letter of the word or
abbreviation is capitalized:

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(a) "Accrued Obligations" means, as of the Effective Date of Termination, the
sum of (i) the Executive's Base Compensation through and including the Effective
Date of Termination, (ii) the amount of any bonus, incentive compensation,
deferred compensation and other cash compensation accrued by the Executive as of
the Effective Date of Termination under the terms of any such arrangement and
not then paid, including, but not limited to, AIP accrued but not paid for a
year ending prior to the year in which occur, the Effective Date of Termination,
(iii) unused vacation time monetized at the then rate of Base Compensation, (iv)
expense reimbursements or other cash entitlements, (v) amounts accrued,
including but not limited to amounts accrued as a result of the application of
Section 2.2(g), under any qualified, non-qualified or supplemental employee
benefit plan, payroll practice, policy or perquisite.

(b) "AIP" means the Company's Annual Incentive Plan as it exists on the date
hereof and as it may be amended, supplemented or modified from time to time or
any successor plan.

(c) "Base Compensation" shall mean (1) the highest annual rate of base salary of
the Executive within the time period consisting of two years prior to the date
of a Change in Control and the Effective Date of Termination and (2) the AIP
bonus target for performance in the calendar year that a Change in Control
occurs or the actual AIP payment for the year immediately preceding the Change
in Control, whichever is higher.

(d) "Beneficiary" shall mean the persons or entities designated or deemed
designated by the Executive pursuant to Section 7.2 herein.

(e) "Board" shall mean the Board of Directors of the Company.

(f) For purposes hereof, the term "Cause" shall mean the Executive's conviction
of a felony, breach of a fiduciary duty involving personal profit to the
Executive or intentional failure to perform stated duties reasonably associated
with the Executive's position; provided, however, an intentional failure to
perform stated duties shall not constitute Cause unless and until the Board
provides the Executive with written notice setting forth the specific duties
that, in the Board's view, the Executive has failed to perform and the Executive
is provided a period of thirty (30) days to cure such specific failure(s) to the
reasonable satisfaction of the Board.

(g) For the purposes of this Agreement, "Change in Control" shall mean, and
shall be deemed to have occurred upon the occurrence of, any of the following
events:

                  (1) The Company acquires actual knowledge that (x) any Person,
                  other than the Company, a subsidiary, any employee benefit
                  plan(s) sponsored by the Company or a subsidiary, has acquired
                  the Beneficial Ownership, directly or indirectly, of
                  securities of the Company entitling such Person to 20% or more
                  of the Voting Power of the Company, or (y) any Person or
                  Persons agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring,
                  holding, voting or disposing of securities of the Company or
                  to act in concert or otherwise with the purpose or effect of
                  changing or influencing control of the Company, or in
                  connection with or as Beneficial Ownership, directly or
                  indirectly, of securities of the Company entitling such
                  Person(s) to 20% or more of the Voting Power of the Company;
                  or

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                  (2) The completion of a Tender Offer is made to acquire
                  securities of the Company entitling the holders thereof to 20%
                  or more of the Voting Power of the Company; or

                  (3) The occurrence of a successful solicitation subject to
                  Rule 14a-11 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as
                  amended (or any successor Rule) (the "1934 Act") relating to
                  the election or removal of 50% or more of the members of the
                  Board or any class of the Board shall be made by any person
                  other than the Company or less than 51% of the members of the
                  Board (excluding vacant seats) shall be Continuing Directors;
                  or

                  (4) The occurrence of a merger, consolidation, share exchange,
                  division or sale or other disposition of assets of the Company
                  as a result of which the stockholders of the Company
                  immediately prior to such transaction shall not hold, directly
                  or indirectly, immediately following such transaction a
                  majority of the Voting Power of (i) in the case of a merger or
                  consolidation, the surviving or resulting corporation, (ii) in
                  the case of a share exchange, the acquiring corporation or
                  (iii) in the case of a division or a sale or other disposition
                  of assets, each surviving, resulting or acquiring corporation
                  which, immediately following the transaction, holds more than
                  20% of the consolidated assets of the Company immediately
                  prior to the transaction;

provided, however that (A) if securities beneficially owned by Executive are
included in determining the Beneficial Ownership of a Person referred to in
Section (i), (B) if Executive is named pursuant to Item 2 of the Schedule 14D-1
(or any similar successor filing requirement) required to be filed by the bidder
making a Tender Offer referred to in Section (ii) or (C) if Executive is a
"participant" as defined in Instruction 3 to Item 4 of Schedule 14A under the
1934 Act in a solicitation referred to in Section (iii) then no Change of
Control with respect to Executive shall be deemed to have occurred by reason of
any such event.

                  For the purposes of Section 1(g), the following terms shall
have the following meanings:

                  (i) The term "Person" shall be used as that term is used in
                  Section 13(d) and 14(d) of the 1934 Act as in effect on the
                  Effective Date hereof.

                  (ii) "Beneficial Ownership" shall be determined as provided in
                  Rule 13d-3 under the 1934 Act as in effect on the Effective
                  Date hereof.

                  (iii) A specified percentage of "Voting Power" of a company
                  shall mean such number of the Voting Shares as shall enable
                  the holders thereof to cast such percentage of all the votes
                  which could be cast in an annual election of directors
                  (without consideration of the rights of any class of stock,
                  other than the common stock of the company, to elect directors
                  by a separate class vote); and "Voting Shares" shall mean all
                  securities of a company entitling the holders thereof to vote
                  in an annual election of directors (without consideration of
                  the rights of any class of stock,

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                  other than the common stock of the company, to elect directors
                  by a separate class vote).

                  (iv) "Tender Offer" shall mean a tender offer or exchange
                  offer to acquire securities of the Company (other than such an
                  offer made by the Company or any subsidiary), whether or not
                  such offer is approved or opposed by the Board.

                  (v) "Continuing Directors" shall mean a director of the
                  Company who either (x) was a director of the Company on the
                  date hereof or (y) is an individual whose election, or
                  nomination for election, as a director of the Company was
                  approved by a vote of at least two-thirds of the directors
                  then still in office who were Continuing Directors (other than
                  an individual whose initial assumption of office is in
                  connection with an actual or threatened election contest
                  relating to the election of directors of the Company which
                  would be subject to Rule 14a-11 under the 1934 Act, or any
                  successor Rule).

(h) "Code" shall mean the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

(i) "Effective Date of Termination" shall mean the date on which the Executive's
employment terminates in a circumstance in which Section 2.1 provides for
Severance Benefits (as defined in Section 2.1).

(j) "Good Reason" shall mean, without the Executive's express written consent,
the occurrence of any one or more of the following:

         (1) A material diminution of the Executive's authorities, duties,
responsibilities, or status (including offices, titles, or reporting
relationships) as an employee of the Company from those in effect as of one
hundred eighty (180) days prior to the Change in Control or as of the date of
execution of this Agreement if a Change in Control occurs within one hundred
eighty (180) days of the execution of this Agreement (the "Reference Date") or
the assignment to the Executive of duties or responsibilities inconsistent with
his position as of the Reference Date, other than an insubstantial and
inadvertent act that is remedied by the Company promptly after receipt of notice
thereof given by the Executive, and other than any such alteration which is
consented to by the Executive in writing;

         (2) The Company's requiring the Executive to be based at a location in
excess of thirty-five (35) miles from the location of the Executive's principal
job location or office immediately prior to the Change in Control, except for
required travel on the Company's business to an extent substantially consistent
with the Executive's present business obligations;

         (3) A reduction in the Executive's annual salary or any material
reduction by the Company of the Executive's other compensation or benefits from
that in effect on the Reference Date or on the date of the Change in Control,
whichever is greater;

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         (4) The failure of the Company to obtain an agreement satisfactory to
the Executive from any successor to the Company to assume and agree to perform
the Company's obligations under this Agreement, as contemplated in Article 5
herein; and

         (5) Any purported termination by the Company of the Executive's
employment that is not effected pursuant to a Notice of Termination satisfying
the requirements of Section 2.6 below, and for purposes of this Agreement, no
such purported termination shall be effective.

The Executive's right to terminate employment for Good Reason shall not be
affected by the Executive's (A) incapacity due to physical or mental illness or
(B) continued employment following the occurrence of any event constituting Good
Reason herein.

(k) "PSP" means the Company's Performance Share Program as it exists on the date
hereof and as it may be, amended, supplemented, or modified from time to time or
any successor plan.

(l) "SARP" means the Company's Stock Acquisition and Retention Program as it
exists on the date hereof and as it may be, amended, supplemented or modified
from time to time or any successor plan.

(m)      "Severance Compensation" means (Times) times Base Compensation.

                         Article II. Severance Benefits

         2.1 Right to Severance Benefits. The Executive shall be entitled to
receive from the Company severance benefits described in Section 2.2 below
(collectively, the "Severance Benefits") if a Change in Control shall occur and
within twenty-four (24) months after the Change in Control either of the
following shall occur:

                  (a)      an involuntary termination of the Executive's
                           employment with the Company without Cause; or

                  (b)      a voluntary termination of the Executive's employment
                           with the Company for Good Reason.

         2.2 Severance Benefits. In the event that the Executive becomes
entitled to receive Severance Benefits, as provided in Section 2.1, the Company
shall provide the Executive with total Severance Benefits as follows (but
subject to Sections 2.5 and 2.6):

                  (a)      The Executive shall receive a single lump sum cash
                           Severance Compensation payment within thirty (30)
                           days of the Effective Date of Termination.

                  (b)      The Executive shall receive the Accrued Obligations.

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                  (c)      The Executive shall receive as AIP for the year in
                           which the termination occurs a lump sum cash payment
                           paid within thirty (30) days of the Effective Date of
                           Termination equal to that which would have been paid
                           if corporate and personal performance had achieved
                           120% of target objectives established for the annual
                           period in which the Change in Control occurred,
                           multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is
                           the number of days elapsed in the current fiscal
                           period to the Effective Date of Termination, and the
                           denominator of which is 365.

                  (d)      The Executive shall receive a lump sum payment paid
                           within thirty (30) days of the Effective Date of
                           Termination (in accordance with the then current PSP;
                           provided that any portion of the PSP award which
                           would have been paid in stock under the PSP is to be
                           paid in cash based on the current market value of the
                           stock) which payment will be determined based upon
                           actual performance for the number of full years of
                           completed then current PSP measurement period(s) at
                           the time of the Effective Date of Termination and for
                           years not yet completed in the then current PSP
                           measurement period(s) Executive will be assumed to
                           have met all applicable goals at 120% of performance.

                  (e)      All welfare benefits, including medical, dental,
                           vision, life and disability benefits pursuant to
                           plans under which the Executive and/or the
                           Executive's family is eligible to receive benefits
                           and/or coverage shall be continued for a period of
                           thirty-six (36) months after the Effective Date of
                           Termination. Such benefits shall be provided to the
                           Executive at no less than the same coverage level as
                           in effect as of the date of the Change in Control.
                           The Company shall pay the full cost of such continued
                           benefits, except that the Executive shall bear any
                           portion of such cost as was required to be borne by
                           key executives of the Company generally at the date
                           of the Change in Control. Notwithstanding the
                           foregoing, the benefits described in this Section
                           2.2(e) may be discontinued prior to the end of the
                           periods provided in this Section to the extent, but
                           only to the extent, that the Executive receives
                           substantially similar benefits from a subsequent
                           employer. In the event any insurance carrier shall
                           refuse to provide coverage to a former employee, the
                           Company shall secure comparable coverage or may
                           self-insure the benefits if it pays such benefits
                           together with a payment to the Executive equal to the
                           federal income tax consequences of payments to a
                           former highly compensated employee from a
                           discriminatory self-insured plan.

                  (f)      The Executive shall be entitled to reimbursement for
                           actual payments made for professional outplacement
                           services or job search not to exceed $(Amount) in
                           the aggregate.

                  (g)      In determining the Executive's pension benefit
                           following entitlement to a Severance Benefit, (i) the
                           Executive shall be deemed to have satisfied

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                           the age and service requirements for full vesting
                           under the Company's qualified (within applicable
                           legal parameters), non-qualified and supplemental
                           pension plans as of the Effective Date of Termination
                           in which the Executive then participates such that
                           the Executive shall be entitled to receive the full
                           accrued benefit (based on actual service rendered
                           through the Effective Date of Termination plus the
                           service under subsection 2.2(g)(ii)) under all such
                           plans in effect as of the date of the Change in
                           Control, without any actuarial reduction for early
                           payment and (ii) the Executive shall be credited with
                           years of service for all purposes under each such
                           plan equal to the number used to multiply Base
                           Compensation in Section 1.1(m) (not to exceed a
                           maximum total of ten credited years of service under
                           the Company's Supplemental Pension Plan, if
                           applicable). To the extent the amounts determined
                           after giving effect to this Section 2.2(g) cannot be
                           paid from or under a qualified plan, as determined by
                           the administrator of the qualified plan(s), such
                           amounts shall be paid in a single cash payment with
                           the Accrued Obligations as provided in Section
                           2.2(b), it being understood that the Executive will
                           receive all amounts that can be paid from or under a
                           qualified plan from such plan when such amounts
                           otherwise become due.

                  (h)      If the Executive was investing in Company common
                           stock through automatic payroll deductions under the
                           Company's Employee Stock Purchase Plan (the "ESPP")
                           on the first business day of the year in which the
                           Change in Control occurs (the "ESPP Date"), the
                           Company shall pay the Executive a lump sum cash
                           payment within thirty (30) days of the Effective Date
                           of Termination equal to the amount the Company would
                           have paid as matching contributions under the ESPP if
                           the Executive had continued to invest in the ESPP at
                           the same level of participation in effect on the ESPP
                           Date for the number of years used to multiply Base
                           Compensation in Section 1.1(m).

         2.3. Stock Options. All Company stock options previously granted to the
Executive shall be fully vested and exercisable immediately upon a Change in
Control. Such options shall be exercisable for the remainder of the term
established by the Company's stock option plan as if the options had vested in
accordance with the normal vesting schedule and the Executive had remained an
employee of the Company. Company stock acquired pursuant to any such exercise
may be sold by the Executive free of any Company restrictions, whatsoever (other
than those imposed by federal and state securities laws).

         2.4. SARP. In the event of entitlement to a Severance Benefit, all
forfeiture restrictions on all Company stock purchased by or granted to the
Executive under the Company's SARP shall lapse and all shares of restricted
stock shall vest. All of the foregoing shares may be sold by the Executive free
of any Company restrictions whatsoever (other than those imposed by federal and
state securities laws). Any promissory notes of Executive under the SARP shall
be paid off by the Executive within ninety (90) days after Executive's receipt
of the Severance Benefits.

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         2.5. Termination for any Other Reason. If the Executive's employment
with the Company is terminated under any circumstances other than those set
forth in Section 2.1, including without limitation by reason of retirement,
death, disability, discharge for Cause or resignation without Good Reason, or
any termination, for any reason, that occurs prior to a Change in Control (other
than as provided below) or after twenty-four (24) months following a Change in
Control, the Executive shall have no right to receive the Severance Benefits
under this Agreement or to receive any payments in respect of this Agreement. In
such event Executive's benefits, if any, in respect of such termination shall be
determined in accordance with the Company's retirement, survivor's benefits,
insurance, and other applicable plans, programs, policies and practices then in
effect. Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, if the
Executive's employment with the Company is terminated at any time from three (3)
to eight (8) months prior to the date on which a Change in Control occurs either
(i) by the Company other than for Cause or (ii) by the Executive for Good
Reason, and it is reasonably demonstrated that termination of employment (a) was
at the request of an unrelated third party who has taken steps reasonably
calculated to effect a Change in Control, or (b) otherwise arose in connection
with or in anticipation of the Change in Control, then for all purposes of this
Agreement the termination shall be deemed to have occurred as if immediately
following a Change in Control for Good Reason and the Executive shall be
entitled to Severance Benefits as provided in Section 2.2 hereof.
Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, if the Executive's
employment with the Company is terminated at any time within three (3) months
prior to the date on which a Change in Control occurs either (i) by the Company
other than for Cause or (ii) by the Executive for Good Reason, such termination
shall conclusively be deemed to have occurred as if immediately following a
Change in Control for Good Reason and the Executive shall be entitled to
Severance Benefits as provided in Section 2.2. hereof.

         2.6. Notice of Termination. Any termination by the Company for Cause or
by the Executive for Good Reason shall be communicated by Notice of Termination
to the other party. For purposes of this Agreement, a "Notice of Termination"
shall mean a written notice which shall indicate the specific termination
provision in this Agreement relied upon, and shall set forth in reasonable
detail the facts and circumstances claimed to provide a basis for termination of
the Executive's employment under the provision so indicated.

         2.7. Withholding of Taxes. The Company shall withhold from any amounts
payable under this Agreement all Federal, state, local, or other taxes that are
legally required to be withheld.

         2.8. Certain Additional Payments by the Company.

                  (a)      Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the
                           contrary, in the event it shall be determined that
                           any economic benefit or payment or distribution by
                           the Company to or for the benefit of the Executive,
                           whether paid or payable or distributed or
                           distributable pursuant to the terms of this Agreement
                           or otherwise (a "Payment"), would be subject to the
                           excise tax imposed by Section 4999 of the Code or any
                           interest or penalties with respect to such excise tax
                           (such excise tax, together with any such interest and
                           penalties, are hereinafter collectively referred to
                           as the "Excise Tax"),

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                           then the Executive shall be entitled to receive an
                           additional payment (a "Gross-Up-Payment") in an
                           amount such that after payment by the Executive of
                           all taxes (including any interest or penalties
                           imposed with respect to such taxes), including any
                           Excise Tax imposed upon the Gross-Up Payment, the
                           Executive retains an amount of the Gross-Up Payment
                           equal to the Excise Tax imposed upon the Payments.

                  (b)      Subject to the provisions of Section 2.8(c), all
                           determinations required to be made under this Section
                           2.8, including whether a Gross-Up Payment is required
                           and the amount of such Gross-Up Payment, shall be
                           made by the Company's regular outside independent
                           public accounting firm (the "Accounting Firm") which
                           shall provide detailed supporting calculations both
                           to the Company and the Executive within fifteen (15)
                           business days of the Effective Date of Termination,
                           if applicable, or such earlier time as is requested
                           by the Company . The initial Gross-Up Payment, if
                           any, as determined pursuant to this Section 2.8(b),
                           shall be paid to the Executive within five (5) days
                           of the receipt of the Accounting Firm's
                           determination. If the Accounting Firm determines that
                           no Excise Tax is payable by the Executive, it shall
                           furnish the Executive with an opinion that the
                           Executive has substantial authority not to report any
                           Excise Tax or excess parachute payments on
                           Executive's federal income tax return. Any
                           determination by the Accounting Firm shall be binding
                           upon the Company and the Executive. As a result of
                           the uncertainty in the application of Section 4999 of
                           the Code at the time of the initial determination by
                           the Accounting Firm hereunder, it is possible that
                           Gross-Up Payments which will not have been made by
                           the Company should have been made ("Underpayment"),
                           consistent with the calculations required to be made
                           hereunder. In the event that the Company exhausts its
                           remedies pursuant to Section 2.8(c) and the Executive
                           thereafter is required to make a payment of any
                           Excise Tax, the Accounting Firm shall determine the
                           amount of the Underpayment that has occurred and any
                           such Underpayment shall be promptly paid by the
                           Company to or for the benefit of the Executive.

                  (c)      The Executive shall notify the Company in writing of
                           any claim by the Internal Revenue Service that, if
                           successful, would require the payment by the Company
                           of the Gross-Up Payment. Such notification shall be
                           given as soon as practicable but no later than ten
                           (10) business days after the later of either (i) the
                           date the Executive has actual knowledge of such
                           claim, or (ii) ten (10) days after the Internal
                           Revenue Service issues to the Executive either a
                           written report proposing imposition of the Excise Tax
                           or a statutory notice of deficiency with respect
                           thereto, and shall apprise the Company of the nature
                           of such claim and the date on which such claim is
                           requested to be paid. The Executive shall not pay
                           such claim prior to the expiration of the thirty-day
                           period following the date on which he gives such
                           notice to the Company (or such shorter period ending
                           on the date that any payment of taxes with respect to
                           such claim is due). If the Company

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                           notifies the Executive in writing prior to the
                           expiration of such period that the Company desires to
                           contest such claim, the Executive shall: (i) give the
                           Company any information reasonably requested by the
                           Company relating to such claim, (ii) take such action
                           in connection with contesting such claim as the
                           Company shall reasonably request in writing from time
                           to time, including, without limitation, accepting
                           legal representation with respect to such claim by an
                           attorney reasonably selected by the Company, (iii)
                           cooperate with the Company in good faith in order
                           effectively to contest such claim, (iv) permit the
                           Company to participate in any proceedings relating to
                           such claim; provided, however, that the Company shall
                           bear and pay directly all costs and expenses
                           (including additional interest and penalties)
                           incurred in connection with such contest and shall
                           indemnify and hold the Executive harmless, on an
                           after-tax basis, for any Excise Tax or income tax,
                           including interest and penalties with respect
                           thereto, imposed as a result of such representation
                           and payment of costs and expenses. Without limitation
                           of the foregoing provisions of this Section 2.8(c),
                           the Company shall control all proceedings taken in
                           connection with such contest and, at its sole option,
                           may pursue or forego any and all administrative
                           appeals, proceedings, hearings and conferences with
                           the taxing authority in respect of such claim and
                           may, at its sole option, either direct the Executive
                           to request or accede to a request for an extension of
                           the statute of limitations with respect only to the
                           tax claimed, or pay the tax claimed and sue for a
                           refund or contest the claim in any permissible
                           manner, and the Executive agrees to prosecute such
                           contest to a determination before any administrative
                           tribunal, in a court of initial jurisdiction and in
                           one or more appellate courts, as the Company shall
                           determine; provided, however, that if the Company
                           directs the Executive to pay such claim and sue for a
                           refund, the Company shall advance the amount of such
                           payment to the Executive, on an interest-free basis
                           and shall indemnify and hold the Executive harmless,
                           on an after-tax basis, from any Excise Tax or income
                           tax, including interest or penalties with respect
                           thereto, imposed with respect to such advance or with
                           respect to any imputed income with respect to such
                           advance; and provided further that any extension of
                           the statute of limitations requested or acceded to by
                           the Executive at the Company's request and relating
                           to payment of taxes for the taxable year of the
                           Executive with respect to which such contested amount
                           is claimed to be due is limited solely to such
                           contested amount. Furthermore, the Company's control
                           of the contest shall be limited to issues with
                           respect to which a Gross-Up Payment would be payable
                           hereunder and the Executive shall be entitled to
                           settle or contest, as the case may be, any other
                           issue raised by the Internal Revenue Service or any
                           other taxing authority.

                  (d)      If, after the receipt by the Executive of an amount
                           advanced by the Company pursuant to Section 2.8(c),
                           the Executive becomes entitled to receive any refund
                           with respect to such claim, the Executive shall
                           (subject

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                           to the Company's complying with the requirements of
                           Section 2.8(c)) promptly pay to the Company the
                           amount of such refund (together with any interest
                           paid or credited thereon after taxes applicable
                           thereto). If, after the receipt by the Executive of
                           an amount advanced by the Company pursuant to Section
                           2.8(c), a determination is made that the Executive
                           shall not be entitled to any refund with respect to
                           such claim and the Company does not notify the
                           Executive in writing of its intent to contest such
                           denial of refund prior to the expiration of thirty
                           (30) days after such determination, then such advance
                           shall be forgiven and shall not be required to be
                           repaid and the amount of such advance shall offset,
                           to the extent thereof, the amount of Gross-Up Payment
                           required to be paid.

                  (e)      In the event that any state or municipality or
                           subdivision thereof shall subject any Payment to any
                           special tax which shall be in addition to the
                           generally applicable income tax imposed by such
                           state, municipality, or subdivision with respect to
                           receipt of such Payment, the foregoing provisions of
                           this Section 2.8 shall apply, mutatis mutandis, with
                           respect to such special tax.

                  Article III. The Company's Payment Obligation

         3.1 Payment Obligations Absolute. Except as otherwise provided in the
last sentence of Section 2.2(e), the Company's obligation to make the payments
and the arrangements provided for in this Agreement shall be absolute and
unconditional, and shall not be affected by any circumstances, including,
without limitation, any offset, counterclaim, recoupment, defense, or other
right that the Company may have against the Executive or any other party. All
amounts payable by the Company under this Agreement shall be paid without notice
or demand. Each and every payment made hereunder by the Company shall be final,
and the Company shall not seek to recover all or any part of such payment from
the Executive or from whomsoever may be entitled thereto, for any reasons
whatsoever. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Agreement to the
contrary, the Company shall have no obligation to make any payment to the
Executive hereunder to the extent, but only to the extent, that such payment is
prohibited by the terms of any final order of a Federal or state court or
regulatory agency of competent jurisdiction; provided, however, that such an
order shall not affect, impair, or invalidate any provision of this Agreement
not expressly subject to such order.

         3.2 Contractual Rights to Payments and Benefits. This Agreement
establishes and vests in the Executive a contractual right to the payments and
benefits to which the Executive is entitled hereunder. Nothing herein contained
shall require or be deemed to require, or prohibit or be deemed to prohibit, the
Company to segregate, earmark, or otherwise set aside any funds or other assets,
in trust or otherwise, to provide for any payments to be made or required
hereunder. The Executive shall not be obligated to seek other employment in
mitigation of the amounts payable or arrangements made under any provision of
this Agreement, and the obtaining of any such other employment shall in no event
effect any reduction of the Company's obligations to make the payments and
arrangements required to be made under this Agreement, except to the extent
provided in the last sentence of Section 2.2(e).

                                      -11-
<PAGE>

                   Article IV . Enforcement and Legal Remedies

         4.1. Consent to Jurisdiction. Each of the parties hereto irrevocably
consents to personal jurisdiction in any action brought in connection with this
Agreement in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania or any Pennsylvania court of competent jurisdiction. The parties
also consent to venue in the above forums and to the convenience of the above
forums. Any suit brought to enforce the provisions of this Agreement must be
brought in the aforementioned forums.

         4.2 Cost of Enforcement. In the event that it shall be necessary or
desirable for the Executive to retain legal counsel in connection with the
enforcement of any or all of Executive's rights to Severance Benefits under
Section 2.2 of this Agreement, and provided that the Executive substantially
prevails in the enforcement of such rights, the Company, as applicable, shall
pay (or the Executive shall be entitled to recover from the Company, as the case
may be) the Executive's reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses in
connection with the enforcement of Executive's rights.

                      Article V. Binding Effect; Successors

         The rights of the parties hereunder shall inure to the benefit of their
respective successors, assigns, nominees, or other legal representatives. The
Company shall require any successor (whether direct or indirect, by purchase,
merger, reorganization, consolidation, acquisition of property or stock,
liquidation, or otherwise) to all or a significant portion of the assets of the
Company, as the case may be, by agreement in form and substance reasonably
satisfactory to the Executive, expressly to assume and agree to perform this
Agreement in the same manner and to the same extent that the Company, as the
case may be, would be required to perform if no such succession had taken place.
Regardless of whether such agreement is executed, this Agreement shall be
binding upon any successor in accordance with the operation of law and such
successor shall be deemed the "Company", as the case may be, for purposes of
this Agreement.

                          Article VI. Term of Agreement

         The term of this Agreement shall commence on the Effective Date and
shall continue in effect for three (3) full years (the "Term") unless further
extended as provided in this Article. The Term of this Agreement shall be
automatically and without action by either party extended for one additional
calendar month on the last business day of each calendar month so that at any
given time there are no fewer than 35 nor more than 36 months remaining unless
one party gives written notice to the other that it no longer wishes to extend
the Term of this Agreement, after which written notice, the Term shall not be
further extended except as may be provided in the following sentence. However,
in the event a Change in Control occurs during the Term, this Agreement will
remain in effect for the longer of: (i) thirty-six (36) months beyond the month
in which such Change in Control occurred; or (ii) until all obligations of the
Company hereunder have been fulfilled and all benefits required hereunder have
been paid to the Executive or other party entitled thereto.

                                      -12-
<PAGE>

                           Article VII. Miscellaneous

         7.1 Employment Status. Neither this Agreement nor any provision hereof
shall be deemed to create or confer upon the Executive any right to be retained
in the employ of the Company or any subsidiary or other affiliate thereof.

         7.2 Beneficiaries. The Executive may designate one or more persons or
entities as the primary and/or contingent Beneficiaries of any Severance
Benefits owing to the Executive under this Agreement. Such designation must be
in the form of a signed writing acceptable to the Board of Directors of the
Company. The Executive may make or change such designation at any time.

         7.3 Entire Agreement. This Agreement contains the entire understanding
of the Company and the Executive with respect to the subject matter hereof. Any
payments actually made under this Agreement in the event of the Executive's
termination of employment shall be in lieu of any severance benefits payable
under any severance plan, program, or policy of the Company to which the
Executive might otherwise be entitled.

         7.4 Gender and Number. Except where otherwise indicated by the context,
any masculine term used herein also shall include the feminine; the plural shall
include the singular, and the singular shall include the plural.

         7.5 Notices. All notices, requests, demands, and other communications
hereunder must be in writing and shall be deemed to have been duly given if
delivered by hand or mailed within the continental United States by first-class
certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, to the other party,
addressed as follows:

         (a)      If to the Company:

                  Allegheny Technologies Incorporated
                  1000 Six PPG Place
                  Pittsburgh, PA 15222-5479
                  Attn:  Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary

         (b) If to Executive, to the Executive's address set forth at the end of
this Agreement. Addresses may be changed by written notice sent to the other
party at the last recorded address of that party.

         7.6 Execution in Counterparts. The parties hereto in counterparts may
execute this Agreement, each of which shall be deemed to be original, but all
such counterparts shall constitute one and the same instrument, and all
signatures need not appear on any one counterpart.

         7.7. Severability. In the event any provision of this Agreement shall
be held illegal or invalid for any reason, the illegality or invalidity shall
not affect the remaining parts of the Agreement, and the Agreement shall be
construed and enforced as if the illegal or invalid

                                      -13-
<PAGE>

provision had not been included. Further, the captions of this Agreement are for
convenience of reference and not part of the provisions hereof and shall have no
force and effect.

         7.8. Modification. No provision of this Agreement may be modified,
waived, or discharged unless such modification, waiver, or discharge is agreed
to in writing and signed by the Executive and on behalf of the Company.

         7.9. Applicable Law. To the extent not preempted by the laws of the
United States, the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, other than the
conflict of law provisions thereof, shall be the controlling laws in all matters
relating to this Agreement.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of the
day and year first above written.

                                       ALLEGHENY TECHNOLOGIES INCORPORATED

                                       By: /s/ Jon D. Walton
                                           ------------------------------------
                                       Title: Senior Vice President, General
                                              Counsel and Secretary

                                       EXECUTIVE:

                                       ----------------------------------------
                                       Name: (FirstName) (M) (LastName)
                                       Address:

                                      -14-<PAGE>
                                                                EXHIBIT 10.28

                                         ALLEGHENY TECHNOLOGIES
                                         Specialty Materials That Make Our World

                            THE ANNUAL INCENTIVE PLAN
                                  FOR YEAR 2001

<PAGE>

CONTENTS                                                                   PAGE
--------                                                                   ----

At a Glance                                                                  1
     What is the Annual Incentive Plan?                                      1
     Who is Eligible for This Plan?                                          1
     How Does the Annual Incentive Plan Work?                                1

Calculation of the Annual Incentive Plan Award                               2
     Target Bonus Percentage                                                 2
     Performance Goals and the Target Bonus Percentage                       2
     Financial Performance Goals                                             3
     Safety Improvement Performance Goals                                    4
     Other Individual Performance Goals                                      4
How the AIP Incentive Award is Calculated When All Goals Are Achieved        5
How the AIP Incentive Award is Calculated for Other Achievement Levels       6
        o  Maximums and Minimums                                             6
        o  Formulas for Weighting Performance                                7
Putting it Together - Two Examples                                           8

Additional Guidelines for the Annual Incentive Plan                         12
     Discretionary Adjustments                                              12
     Some Special Circumstances                                             12
     Making Payments                                                        13

Administration Details                                                      13

<PAGE>

AT A GLANCE

WHAT IS THE ANNUAL INCENTIVE PLAN?

The Annual Incentive Plan (the "AIP" or the "Plan") provides key managers of
Allegheny Technologies Incorporated ("Allegheny Technologies" or the "Company")
and its operating companies with the opportunity to earn an incentive award when
certain pre-established goals are met at the corporate and operating company
levels and at the individual level.

WHO IS ELIGIBLE FOR THIS PLAN?

Generally, key managers who have a significant impact on the company's
operations will be eligible to participate in the Plan. Individuals eligible for
participation are determined annually, based on recommendations of the operating
company presidents, if applicable, and the Company's chief executive officer,
with the approval of the Personnel and Compensation Committee of the Company's
Board of Directors (the "Committee").

HOW DOES THE ANNUAL INCENTIVE PLAN WORK?

Under the Plan, key managers may earn an incentive award based on a percentage
of their base salary, depending on the extent to which pre-established
corporate, operating company and individual performance goals have been
achieved.

o    For purposes of the Plan, base salary is generally the manager's annual
     base salary rate as of the end of the year, excluding any commission or
     other incentive pay. For some special circumstances affecting the amount of
     base salary used in the Plan, see page 12.

o    A target bonus percentage is used in calculating the incentive award. It is
     explained on the next page. Each participating manager will have a target
     bonus percentage.

o    The target bonus percentage will be adjusted (upward or downward) based on
     the extent to which various performance goals are achieved.

Under the Plan, 80% of the target bonus percentage will be adjusted based on
corporate and operating company financial performance, 10% of the target bonus
percentage will be adjusted based on safety improvement, and 10% of the target
bonus percentage will be adjusted based on other individual performance.

Incentive award payments will generally be distributed in cash after the
year-end audit is complete.

                                     Page 1
<PAGE>

CALCULATION OF THE ANNUAL INCENTIVE PLAN AWARD

TARGET BONUS PERCENTAGE

The Plan establishes an incentive opportunity for each Plan participant,
calculated as a percentage of the manager's base salary. Each participant will
be provided with an initial percentage, referred to as a "target bonus
percentage."

Generally, the target bonus percentage is the percentage of base salary that can
be earned as an award under the Plan if 100% of the various performance goals
are achieved. For 2001, if 100% of the performance goals are achieved, 100% of
the target bonus percentage can be earned.

If there is a change in the key manager's job position during the year that
changes the manager's target bonus percentage, the target bonus percentage used
in the award calculation will be determined as follows:

o    If the individual has at least six months of service in the new position,
     the newly adjusted target bonus percentage will be used in calculating the
     individual's award for the full year.

o    If the individual has less than six months of service in the new position,
     the individual's award for the year will be calculated on a pro-rata basis
     using the two different target bonus percentages weighted by length of
     service in each position during the year.

Target bonus percentages, performance goals and performance achievements will be
communicated to each eligible participant. The Committee may change the goals
and objectives for the Plan at any time.

PERFORMANCE GOALS AND THE TARGET BONUS PERCENTAGE

An AIP award is based on the extent to which specified, preestablished
performance objectives are achieved. For 2001, AIP awards will be based on the
extent to which:

o    Allegheny Technologies and its operating companies achieve specified levels
     of Operating Profit and Managed Working Capital - the financial goals,

o    Allegheny Technologies and its operating companies achieve specified levels
     of improvements in safety performance - the safety goals, and

o    The participant achieves his or her own other individual performance
     objectives.

At the end of the year, the Company will measure actual performance against each
of the preestablished objectives.

                                     Page 2
<PAGE>

As a first step in the calculation, the Company will determine the extent to
which pre-established financial performance goals, specifically levels of
Operating Profit and Managed Working Capital for 2001, have been achieved. The
results achieved will be weighted under a formula, which in turn will impact 80%
of the target bonus percentage. The formulas for weighting financial
achievements are described on pages 5 to 7.

For the remaining 20% of the target bonus percentage, the Company will review
actual safety improvements and other individual performance against
pre-established objectives:

o    Since 10% of the target bonus percentage is based on safety improvements,
     the participant can earn up to 10% (or more) of the target bonus percentage
     based on the extent to which safety objectives are achieved. The formulas
     for weighting safety achievements are the same as for weighting financial
     achievements and are described on pages 5 to 7.

o    Since 10% of the target bonus percentage is based on other individual
     performance, the participant can earn up to 10% (or more) of the target
     bonus percentage based on the extent to which other individual performance
     objectives are achieved. The formulas for weighting other individual
     performance achievements are the same as for weighting financial
     achievements and are described on pages 5 to 7.

The weighted percentages attributable to each performance goal as noted above,
then will be added together, and that sum will be multiplied by: (1) the
individual's target bonus percentage, times (2) the individual's annual base
salary, to produce the amount of the incentive award for 2001. Note that
potential adjustments are described on page 12.

FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE GOALS

The financial performance goals for 2001 consist of two measures: Operating
Profit ("OP"), and Managed Working Capital ("MWC"), which together comprise 80%
of the target bonus percentage.

For operating company managers, note that 60% of the financial performance
goals' overall 80% weight will be based on the performance of the participant's
operating company, and 20% of the financial performance goals' overall 80%
weight will be based on corporate level performance. For corporate staff
employees, financial performance will be measured completely at the corporate
level.

More specifically, the financial performance measures comprising 80% of the
target bonus percentage will be as follows:

o    For managers at the operating companies:

     --  OP achievements at the participant's operating company:       45%
     --  MWC achievements at the participant's operating company:      15%
     --  OP achievements at Allegheny Technologies:                    12%
     --  MWC achievements at Allegheny Technologies:                    8%
                                                                       --
                                                                       80%

                                     Page 3
<PAGE>

o    For corporate staff employees:

     --  OP achievements at the corporate level:                       60%
     --  MWC achievements at the corporate level:                      20%
                                                                       --
                                                                       80%

Each year, financial performance goals will be set at the corporate and
operating company level based on the applicable business plan. With the
concurrence of the Company's chief executive officer and the Committee,
financial performance goals may be further weighted within a particular
operating company in accordance with its separate business units ("SBU's") for
key managers of those SBU's.

SAFETY IMPROVEMENT PERFORMANCE GOALS

10% of the target bonus percentage is based on the extent to which
pre-established levels of safety improvement are achieved. The Plan will
principally rely upon the percentage improvement in two metrics to measure
safety improvement: OSHA Total Recordable Incident Rate and the Lost Workday
Case Rate. Each safety metric will comprise 5% of the target bonus percentage.

Each of the safety achievement metrics - the OSHA Total Recordable Incident Rate
and the Lost Workday Case Rate - will be independently weighted for 2001 under
the same formulas as the financial performance goals.

Consistent with the overall business plan of Allegheny Technologies, the
pre-established safety goal under the Plan for 2001 is a 50% improvement vs.
1999.

Safety goals for individuals at specific sites can be adjusted to the needs of
their particular location as long as the collective goal for each operating
company is a 50% improvement in these safety metrics vs. 1999.

For corporate staff employees, the AIP award percentage for safety improvement
is based on achieving a 50% safety improvement on the weighted average of all
ATI operating companies vs. 1999.

OTHER INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE GOALS

10% of the target bonus percentage is based on the extent to which
pre-established individual performance goals are achieved. Each year, managers
will establish other individual performance goals with their immediate
supervisors.

The achievement of Other Individual Performance goals will be weighted under the
same formulas as the financial performance goals.

                                     Page 4
<PAGE>

HOW THE AIP INCENTIVE AWARD IS CALCULATED WHEN ALL GOALS ARE ACHIEVED

For the Year 2001, if 100% of the financial performance goals are achieved, then
80% of the target bonus percentage will be credited to the participant:

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                  Goal % of        Goal          Formula      Earned % of
               Goals               Target       Achieved %      Weighting       Target *
               -----               ------       ----------      ---------       --------
<S>                                <C>            <C>           <C>              <C>
   FINANCIAL
   OP - Operating Company            45%           100%           100%            45%
   MWC - Operating Co.               15%           100%           100%            15%
   OP - Corporate                    12%           100%           100%            12%
   MWC - Corporate                    8%           100%           100%             8%
                                     --                                           --
   Financial Total                   80%                                          80%
</TABLE>

   *Earned % of Target = Goal % of Target X Formula Weighting

Next, if 100% of the safety improvement goals are achieved, then an additional
10% of the target bonus percentage will be credited to the participant:

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                  Goal % of        Goal          Formula      Earned % of
               Goals               Target       Achieved %      Weighting       Target *
               -----               ------       ----------      ---------       --------
<S>                                <C>            <C>           <C>              <C>
   SAFETY
   Total Recordable Incident          5%           100%            100%            5%
   Rate

   Lost Workday Case Rate             5%           100%            100%            5%
                                     --                                           --

   Safety Total                      10%                                          10%
</TABLE>

Finally, if 100% of the individual performance goals are achieved, then an
additional 10% of the target bonus percentage will be credited to the
participant:

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                  Goal % of        Goal          Formula      Earned % of
               Goals               Target       Achieved %      Weighting       Target *
               -----               ------       ----------      ---------       --------
<S>                                <C>            <C>           <C>              <C>

   INDIVIDUAL GOALS                 10%            100%            100%            10%

</TABLE>

                                     Page 5
<PAGE>

The sum of weighting the financial performance, safety performance, and
individual performance produces the earned percentages of target as follows:

     Financial Performance Goals             80%
     Safety Improvement Goals                10%
     Individual Performance Goals            10%
                                            ---
     Total Earned Percentage of Target      100%

In this example, assume that the operating company manager's target bonus
percentage is 20%.

The target bonus percentage of 20% is then multiplied by 100% to produce an
adjusted bonus percentage equal to 20% of base salary:

   Earned Percentage of Target                    100%
   X  Target Bonus Percent                         20%
                                                   ---
   Equals Percentage of Salary for                 20%
   Incentive Award

The sections below discuss the impact of achieving more or less than 100% of
various goals, and they also discuss the impact of other potential adjustments.

HOW THE AIP INCENTIVE AWARD IS CALCULATED FOR OTHER ACHIEVEMENT LEVELS

The following section describes maximum and minimum achievement levels, and the
formulas used to weight achievements at all levels.

Maximums and Minimums

o    Generally, the maximum percentage used in adjusting or weighting
     performance achievement is 200%, and the overall maximum incentive award
     that an individual can earn under the weighting formula is 200% of his or
     her target bonus percentage.

o    Where 75% of a financial, safety or other individual performance goal is
     achieved, only 25% of that goal's share will be allocated to his or her
     target bonus percentage.

o    Where less than 75% of a financial, safety or other individual performance
     goal is achieved, no amount of that goal will be allocated to his or her
     target bonus percentage.

                                     Page 6
<PAGE>

Formulas for Weighting Performance
The following formulas will be used to weight financial, safety, or other
individual performance under the Plan:

Formula A:
     If 75% to and including 100% of a goal is achieved, the Percent Allocated
     for that goal equals the Percentage of Goal Achieved (i.e. Actual
     Performance divided by Planned Performance) minus 75% (which is the
     threshold level of performance) times 3, plus 25%.

     Formula A examples:
     1.  Assumption: Percentage of Goal Achieved    = 90%
         Weighted Percent for that Goal             = [(90% - 75%) x 3] + 25%
                                                    = [15% x 3] + 25%
                                                    = 45% + 25%
         Percent Allocated for Goal                 = 70%

     2.  Assumption: Percentage of Goal Achieved    = 85%
         Weighted Percent for that Goal             = [(85% - 75%) x 3] + 25%
                                                    = [10% x 3] + 25%
                                                    = 30% + 25%
         Percent Allocated for Goal                 = 55%

Formula B:
     If over 100% of goal is achieved, the Percent Allocated for that goal
     equals the Percentage of Goal Achieved (i.e. Actual Performance divided by
     Planned Performance) minus 100% times 5, plus 100%. In all cases, the
     maximum Percent Earned of 200% results when 120% or more of that goal is
     achieved.

     Formula B examples:
     1.  Assumption: Percentage of Goal Achieved    = 130%
         Weighted Percent for that Goal             = [(130% - 100%) x 5] + 100%
                                                    = [30% x 5] + 100%
                                                    = 150% + 100%
         Percent Allocated for Goal                 = 250%
              However, the maximum target bonus is capped at 200%.

     2.  Assumption: Percentage of Goal Achieved    = 105%
         Weighted Percent for that Goal             = [(105% - 100%) x 5] + 100%
                                                    = [5% x 5] + 100%
                                                    = 25% + 100%
          Percent Allocated for Goal                = 125%

                                     Page 7
<PAGE>

PUTTING IT TOGETHER

Here are two examples of how an incentive award might be determined under the
Plan.

Example One:
-----------
Assume that the operating company manager's annual salary is $80,000 and that
the manager's target bonus percentage is 20% of base salary. Also, assume actual
performance is:

Financial goals

     o    100% of planned Operating Profit, or OP, goals at the operating
          company

     o    105% of planned Managed Working Capital, or MWC, goals at the
          operating company

     o    105% of planned Operating Profit, or OP, goals at the corporate level

     o    130% of planned Managed Working Capital, or MWC, goals at the
          corporate level

Safety goals

     o    90% of Recordable Incident Rate (improvement of 45% in metric since
          1999)

     o    100% of Lost Workday Case Rate (improvement of 50% in metric since
          1999)

Other Individual Performance goals

     o    90% of planned Individual Performance goals are met

The first step in this example is to calculate the impact of the actual
financial performance on 80% of the target bonus percentage.

Formula A on page 7 would be used for weighting OP at the operating company
level, because 100% of that goal was achieved. Formula B on page 7 would be used
for weighting the other financial metrics, because more than 100% of those goals
were achieved. Following the formulas, the 80% share of the target bonus
percentage is adjusted to 94.75%:

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                  Goal % of        Goal          Formula      Earned % of
               Goals               Target       Achieved %      Weighting       Target *
               -----               ------       ----------      ---------       --------
<S>                                <C>            <C>           <C>              <C>
  OP - Operating Company            45%            100%           100% (A)        45.00%
  MWC - Operating Co.               15%            105%           125% (B)        18.75%
  OP - Corporate                    12%            105%           125% (B)        15.00%
  MWC - Corporate                    8%            130%           200% (B)        16.00%
                                    --                                            -----
  Goals Total                       80%                                           94.75%
</TABLE>

  *Earned % of Target = Goal % of Target X Formula Weighting

                                     Page 8
<PAGE>

The next step in this example is to calculate the impact of the actual safety
performance on 10% of the target bonus percentage.

Accordingly Formula A on page 7 would be used for weighting the safety
improvement metrics, because 100% or less of those goals were achieved.
Following the formulas, the 10% safety performance share of the target bonus
percentage is adjusted to 8.5%:

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                  Goal % of        Goal          Formula      Earned % of
               Goals               Target       Achieved %      Weighting       Target *
               -----               ------       ----------      ---------       --------
<S>                                <C>            <C>           <C>              <C>
   Recordable Incident Rate           5%            90%            70% (A)        3.5%
   Lost Workday Case Rate             5%           100%           100% (B)        5.0%
                                                                                  ----
   Goals Total                       10%                                          8.5%
</TABLE>

The last step in this example is to calculate the impact of the actual
individual performance on 10% of the target bonus percentage. Formula A on page
7 would be used for individual performance, because less than 100% of those
goals were achieved. Following the formulas, the 10% individual performance
share of the target bonus percentage is adjusted to 7%:

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                  Goal % of        Goal          Formula      Earned % of
               Goals               Target       Achieved %      Weighting       Target *
               -----               ------       ----------      ---------       --------
<S>                                <C>            <C>           <C>              <C>
   Individual Performance           10%            90%             70% (A)        7%

</TABLE>

The sum of the financial performance, safety performance, and individual
performance is:

     Financial Performance Goals             94.75%
     Safety Improvement Goals                 8.50%
     Individual Performance Goals             7.00%
                                            ------
     Total Earned Percentage of Target      110.25%

The target bonus percentage of 20% is multiplied by 110.25% to produce an
adjusted bonus percentage equal to 22.05% of base salary:

   Earned Percentage of Target                     110.25%
   X  Target Bonus Percent                          20   %
                                                   -----
   Equals Percentage of Salary for                 22.05%
   Incentive Award

With this first example, the incentive award would be calculated as 22.05% of
the manager's base salary of $80,000, or $17,640.

                                     Page 9
<PAGE>

Example Two:
-----------
Assume that the operating company manager's annual salary is again $80,000 and
that the manager's target bonus percentage is 20% of base salary but that actual
achievements are:

Financial goals

     o    90% of planned Operating Profit, or OP, goals at the operating company

     o    100% of planned Managed Working Capital, or MWC, goals at the
          operating company

     o    75% of planned Operating Profit, or OP, goals at the corporate level

     o    105% of planned Managed Working Capital, or MWC, goals at the
          corporate level

Safety goals

     o    100% of Recordable Incident Rate (improvement of 50% in metric since
          1999)

     o    160% of Lost Workday Case Rate (improvement of 80% in metric since
          1999)

Other Individual Performance goals

     o    105% of planned Individual Performance goals are met

The first step in this example is to calculate the impact of the actual
financial performance on 80% of the target bonus percentage.

Formula A on page 7 would be used for weighting OP and MWC at the operating
company and OP at the corporate level, because 100% or less of those goals were
achieved. Formula B on page 7 would be used for weighting the MWC goal at the
corporate level, because over 100% of that goal was achieved. Following the
formulas, the 80% share of the target bonus percentage is adjusted to 59.50%:

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                  Goal % of        Goal          Formula      Earned % of
               Goals               Target       Achieved %      Weighting       Target *
               -----               ------       ----------      ---------       --------
<S>                                <C>            <C>           <C>              <C>
   OP - Operating Company           45%             90%           70% (A)         31.50%
   MWC - Operating Co.              15%            100%          100% (A)         15.00%
   OP - Corporate                   12%             75%           25% (A)          3.00%
   MWC - Corporate                   8%            105%          125% (B)         10.00%
                                    --                                            -----
   Goals Total                      80%                                           59.50%
</TABLE>

   *Earned % of Target = Goal % of Target X Formula Weighting

                                    Page 10
<PAGE>

The next step in this example is to calculate the impact of the actual safety
performance on 10% of the target bonus percentage.

Accordingly Formula A on page 7 would be used for weighting the Total Recordable
Incident Rate or TRIR, because 100% or less of those goals were achieved.
Formula B will be used for weighting Lost Workday Case Rate or LWCR performance
achievements as they are greater than 100% of planned improvement.

Following the formulas, the 10% safety performance share of the target bonus
percentage is adjusted to 15%:

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                  Goal % of        Goal          Formula      Earned % of
               Goals               Target       Achieved %      Weighting       Target *
               -----               ------       ----------      ---------       --------
<S>                                <C>            <C>           <C>              <C>
   Recordable Incident Rate          5%            100%           100% (A)         5%
   Lost Workday Case Rate            5%            160%           200% (B)        10%
                                     --                                           ---
   Goals Total                      10%                                           15%
</TABLE>

The last step in this example is to calculate the impact of the actual
individual performance on 10% of the target bonus percentage. Formula B on page
7 would be used for individual performance, because over 100% of those goals
were achieved.

Following the formulas, the 10% individual performance share of the target bonus
 percentage is adjusted 12.5%:

<Table>
<CAPTION>
                                  Goal % of        Goal          Formula      Earned % of
               Goals               Target       Achieved %      Weighting       Target *
               -----               ------       ----------      ---------       --------
<S>                                <C>            <C>           <C>              <C>
   Individual Performance            10%           105%            125% (B)       12.5%
</TABLE>

The sum of the financial performance, safety performance, and individual
performance is:

     Financial Performance Goals            59.50%
     Safety Improvement Goals               15.00%
     Individual Performance Goals           12.50%
                                            ------
     Total Earned Percentage of Target      87.00%

The target bonus percentage of 20% is multiplied by 87.00% to produce an
adjusted bonus percentage equal to 17.40% of base salary:

   Earned Percentage of Target                                 87.00%
   X  Target Bonus Percent                                     20   %
                                                               -----
   Equals Percentage of Salary for                             17.40%
   Incentive Award

With this first example, the incentive award would be calculated as 17.40% of
the manager's base salary of $80,000, or $13,920.

                                    Page 11
<PAGE>

ADDITIONAL GUIDELINES FOR THE ANNUAL INCENTIVE PLAN

In any year, a minimum Operating Profit (OP) of 75% of plan must be achieved for
annual incentives to be paid regardless of other factors.

The total of the incentive awards in any given year cannot exceed 5% of the
Operating Profit of Allegheny Technologies or the operating company, as the case
may be. If, in any year, awards exceed 5% of Operating Profit, awards of the
affected company will be reduced to eliminate the excess.

DISCRETIONARY ADJUSTMENTS

In some cases, the Plan allows for discretionary adjustments of up to +20% or
-20% of an individual's calculated award. However, the sum of discretionary
adjustments for all eligible managers of the affected company cannot exceed +5%
of the aggregate calculated awards for that company.

SOME SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES

The above formulas generally determine the amount of the incentive award for the
year. Other factors that may affect the actual award follow:

o    If a manager leaves the company due to retirement, death, or disability, an
     award will be calculated based on the actual base salary earned during the
     year in which the manager left--so long as the manager worked at least six
     months of that year.

o    If a manager leaves the company before the end of the plan year for any
     other reason, the manager will not receive a bonus award for that year.

o    If a manager voluntarily leaves the company after the end of the year but
     before the award is paid, the manager would receive any bonus due unless
     the employment is terminated for cause. If employment is terminated for
     cause, the manager would not be entitled to receive an award under the
     Plan.

o    Managers who are hired mid-year may earn a pro-rated award for that year,
     based on the salary earned during that year. However, managers with less
     than two months service in a plan year (i.e. hired after October 31) would
     not be eligible for an award for that year.

o    If the manager received an adjustment in base salary due to a change in job
     position (i.e. other than a merit increase), the manager's base salary for
     plan purposes will be the sum of (1) the product of the number of months
     prior to the adjustment times the rate of monthly base salary immediately
     prior to the adjustment, and (2) the product of the number of months after
     the adjustment times the rate of monthly base salary as of the end of the
     Plan Year.

                                    Page 12
<PAGE>

MAKING PAYMENTS

All incentive award payments will generally be paid in cash, less applicable
withholding taxes, after the year-end audit is complete. This is expected to
occur by no later than March 15.

ADMINISTRATION DETAILS

This summary relates to the Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) of Allegheny
Technologies Incorporated and its subsidiaries. The Plan is administered by the
Committee, which has full authority to:

o    Interpret the Plan;

o    Designate eligible participants and categories of eligible participants;

o    Set the terms and conditions of incentive awards; and

o    Establish and modify administrative rules for the Plan.

Plan participants may obtain additional information about the plan and the
Committee from:

Senior Vice President,
General Counsel and Secretary
Allegheny Technologies Incorporated
1000 Six PPG Place
Pittsburgh PA  15222 5479
Phone:  412-394-2836                        Fax:  412-394-2837

The Plan will remain in effect until terminated by the Committee. The Committee
may also amend the plan at its discretion.

The Plan is not subject to the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and is not "qualified" under Section 401(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code.

                                    Page 13

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