Document:

EX-10.4

 Exhibit 10.4 

TERRENO REALTY CORPORATION 

AMENDED AND RESTATED LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN 

1. Purpose 
 This Amended and Restated
Long-Term Incentive Plan (the “Plan”) is intended to provide an incentive for superior work and to motivate executives and employees of Terreno Realty Corporation (the “Company”) toward even higher achievement and
business results, to tie their goals and interests to those of the Company and its stockholders and to enable the Company to attract and retain highly qualified executives and employees. The Plan is for the benefit of Participants (as defined
below). 
 2. Definitions 
 For
purposes of this Plan: 
 (a) “Award” means a grant to a Participant hereunder. 

(b) “Award Notice” means a notice or agreement provided to a Participant that sets forth the terms, conditions and
limitations of the Participant’s participation in this Plan, including, without limitation, the Participant’s Target Award. 
 (c)
“Board” means the Board of Directors of the Company. 
 (d) “Closing Index Value” means, with respect to
each Performance Measurement Index, the Performance Measurement Index Value as of the last day of any Performance Measurement Period. 
 (e)
“Closing Stock Price” means the Stock Price as of the last day of any Performance Measurement Period. 
 (f)
“Code” means Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. 
 (g) “Committee” means the Compensation
Committee of the Board. 
 (h) “Effective Date” means January 1, 2014. 

(i) “FTSE NAREIT Equity Industrial Index” means the FTSE NAREIT Equity Industrial Index, or, in the event such index is
discontinued or its methodology significantly changed, a comparable index selected by the Committee in good faith. 
 (j) “Initial
Index Value” means, with respect to each Performance Measurement Index, the Performance Measurement Index Value as of the first day of any Performance Measurement Period. 

(k) “Initial Stock Price” means the Stock Price as of the first day of any Performance Measurement Period. 

 (l) “MSCI US REIT Index” means the MSCI US REIT Index (RMS), or, in the event
such index is discontinued or its methodology significantly changed, a comparable index selected by the Committee in good faith. 
 (m)
“Participant” means an executive or employee of the Company selected by the Committee to participate in the Plan. 
 (n)
“Performance Measurement Indexes” means the MSCI US REIT Index and the FTSE NAREIT Equity Industrial Index. 
 (o)
“Performance Measurement Index Value” for each Performance Measurement Index means, with respect to any date, the average value of such Performance Measurement Index for the ten consecutive trading days immediately preceding such
date. 
 (p) “Performance Measurement Period” means, a three calendar year period commencing on January 1, 2014 and
each January 1 thereafter while this Plan is effective, and concluding on December 31 of the second calendar year thereafter. 

(q) “Stock” means the Company’s common stock, par value $0.01 per share. 

(r) “Stock Price” means, as of a particular date, the average closing price of one share of Stock for the ten consecutive
trading days ending on, and including, such date (or, if such date is not a trading day, the most recent trading day immediately preceding such date). 

(s) “Target Award” means a Participant’s target award for each Performance Measurement Period, as set forth in the
Participant’s Award Notice. 
 (t) “Total Shareholder Return” means, with respect to a Performance Measurement Period,
the compound, annualized percentage return per share achieved by the Stock assuming contemporaneous reinvestment in the Stock of all dividends and other distributions (excluding dividends and distributions paid in the form of additional shares of
Stock) at the closing price of one share of Stock on the date such dividend or other distribution was paid, based on the Initial Stock Price and the Closing Stock Price for such Performance Measurement Period. 

3. Administration 
 (a) The Plan shall be
administered by the Committee. The Committee shall have the discretionary authority to make all determinations (including, without limitation, the interpretation and construction of the Plan and the determination of relevant facts) regarding the
entitlement to any Award hereunder and the amount of any Award to be paid under the Plan (including the number of shares of Stock issuable to any Participant), provided such determinations are made in good faith and are consistent with the purpose
and intent of the Plan. In particular, but without limitation and subject to the foregoing, the Committee shall have the authority: 
 (i)
to select Participants under the Plan; 

  
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 (ii) to determine the Target Award and any formula or criteria for the determination of the
Target Award for each Participant; 
 (iii) to determine the terms and conditions, not inconsistent with the terms of this Plan, which shall
govern Award Notices and all other written instruments evidencing an Award hereunder, including the waiver or modification of any such conditions; 

(iv) to adopt, alter and repeal such administrative rules, guidelines and practices governing the Plan as it shall from time to time deem
advisable; and 
 (v) to interpret the terms and provisions of the Plan and any Award granted under the Plan (and any Award Notices or other
agreements relating thereto) and to otherwise supervise the administration of the Plan. 
 (b) Notwithstanding anything herein to the
contrary, the Committee may, in its discretion, make appropriate adjustments to any Award, any Target Award, any Initial Stock Price, any Closing Stock Price, the target performance levels for any Performance Measurement Period or the Total
Shareholder Return for any period in connection with or as a result of any of the following events which occur or have occurred after the Effective Date: reorganization, recapitalization, reclassification, stock dividend, stock split, reverse stock
split or other similar change in the Company’s capital stock, if the outstanding shares of Stock are increased or decreased or are exchanged for a different number or kind of shares or other securities of the Company, or additional shares or
new or different shares or other securities of the Company or other non-cash assets are distributed with respect to such shares of Stock or other securities. 

(c) Subject to the terms hereof, all decisions made by the Committee pursuant to the Plan shall be final, conclusive and binding on all
persons, including the Company and the Participants. No member of the Board or the Committee, nor any officer or employee of the Company acting on behalf of the Board or the Committee shall be personally liable for any action, determination or
interpretation taken or made in good faith with respect to the Plan, and all members of the Board or Committee and each and any officer or employee of the Company acting on their behalf shall, to the extent permitted by law, be fully indemnified and
protected by the Company in respect of any such action, determination or interpretation. 
 4. Determination and Payment of Awards 

(a) Each Participant’s Award Notice shall specify such Participant’s Target Award. The Target Award may be expressed as a dollar
amount or as a percentage of a Participant’s base salary or other compensation, a number of shares of Stock or pursuant to any other method, amount or formula selected by the Committee for such Participant, and may apply for all or a specified
number of Performance Measurement Periods, each as determined in the sole discretion of the Committee. 
 (b) The amount of a
Participant’s Award hereunder shall be determined based on Total Shareholder Return for each Performance Measurement Period relative to the compound, annualized percentage return of each Performance Measurement Index for such period. The
compound, annualized percentage return of each Performance Measurement Index shall be established by comparing the Initial Index Value to the Closing Index Value. Unless otherwise 

  
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specified in an Award Notice, (i) 50 percent of the Award shall be calculated with reference to Total Shareholder Return relative to the compound, annualized percentage return of the MSCI US
REIT Index, and (ii) the remaining 50 percent of the Award shall be calculated with reference to Total Shareholder Return relative to the compound, annualized percentage return of the FTSE NAREIT Equity Industrial Index. 

(c) The actual value of a Participant’s Award hereunder shall be determined at the conclusion of a Performance Measurement Period, as
follows: 
 (i) If Total Shareholder Return for the Performance Measurement Period is less than the compound, annualized
percentage return of a Performance Measurement Index for such period, Participants shall not receive an Award with respect to the 50 percent of the Target Award calculated with reference to such Performance Measurement Index. 

(ii) If Total Shareholder Return for the Performance Measurement Period equals or exceeds the compound, annualized percentage
return of a Performance Measurement Index for such period, Participants shall receive an Award equal to 50 percent of the Target Award. 

(iii) If Total Shareholder Return for the Performance Measurement Period exceeds the compound, annualized percentage return of
a Performance Measurement Index by 100 basis points or more, Participants shall receive an Award equal to 150 percent of the Target Award. If Total Shareholder Return for the Performance Measurement Period exceeds the compound, annualized percentage
return of both Performance Measurement Indexes by 100 basis points or more, Participants shall receive an Award equal to 300 percent of the Target Award. 

(iv) If Total Shareholder Return for the Performance Measurement Period exceeds the compound, annualized percentage return of a
Performance Measurement Index for such period but the excess is less than 100 basis points, the size of Awards granted to Participants with respect to such Performance Measurement Index shall be determined by linear interpolation. By way of
illustration only, if the excess performance is 50 basis points, Participants shall receive an Award equal to 100% of the Target Award. 

(v) Notwithstanding the foregoing, if Total Shareholder Return for the Performance Measurement Period is negative the value of
each Participant’s Award, as determined pursuant to Section 4(c)(ii), (iii) and (iv), above, shall be reduced by 50 percent. 

(d) The dollar value of Participant’s Awards shall be determined by the Committee as soon as practicable following the conclusion of the
relevant Performance Measurement Period. Following determination of such amounts, the Company shall issue to each Participant a number of shares of Stock with an aggregate Stock Price on the date of issuance equal to the dollar value of each
Participant’s Award. In the event the Company does not have sufficient shares available under its shareholder-approved stock plan, the Company shall settle a Participant’s Award in 

  
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cash to the extent of such unavailability of shares. The shares of Stock or cash shall be issued or paid between January 1 and March 15 of the calendar year that follows the conclusion
of the relevant Performance Measurement Period. 
 5. Termination of Employment 

Unless otherwise provided in any Award Notice, if at any time prior to the end of a Performance Measurement Period a Participant’s
employment or other service relationship with the Company terminates for any reason, such Participant shall forfeit the right to receive any payment or Award not paid to the Participant as of the date of termination of employment or other service
relationship. 
 6. Miscellaneous 
 (a)
Amendment and Termination. The Company reserves the right to amend or terminate the Plan at any time in its discretion without the consent of any Participants, but no such amendment shall adversely affect the rights of the Participants with
regard to outstanding Awards. In the event the Plan is terminated, the Company shall determine the Awards payable to Participants based on the Total Shareholder Return relative to the Performance Measurement Indexes for each Performance Measurement
Period ending on the date of Plan termination. The Awards for each Performance Measurement Period shall be further prorated to reflect the shortened Performance Measurement Period. 

(b) No Contract for Continuing Services. This Plan shall not be construed as creating any contract for continued services between the
Company or any of its subsidiaries and any Participant and nothing herein contained shall give any Participant the right to be retained as an employee or consultant of the Company or any of its subsidiaries. 

(c) No Transfers. A Participant’s rights in an interest under the Plan may not be assigned or transferred. 

(d) Unfunded Plan. The Plan shall be unfunded and shall not create (or be construed to create) a trust or separate fund. Likewise, the
Plan shall not establish any fiduciary relationship between the Company or any of subsidiaries or affiliates and any Participant. To the extent that any Participant holds any rights by virtue of an award under the Plan, such right shall be no
greater than the right of an unsecured general creditor of the Company or any of its subsidiaries. 
 (e) Governing Law. The Plan and
each Award Letter awarded under the Plan shall be construed in accordance with and governed the laws of the State of California, without regard to principles of conflict of laws of such state. 

(f) Tax Withholding. Any issuance of shares of Stock, or payment of cash pursuant to Section 4(d) of the Plan, to a Participant
shall be subject to tax withholding. Each Participant shall, no later than the date as of which the value of an Award or of any Stock or other amounts received thereunder first becomes includable in the gross income of the Particpant for Federal
income tax purposes, pay to the Company, or make arrangements satisfactory to the Administrator regarding payment of, any Federal, state, or local taxes of any kind required by 

  
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law to be withheld by the Company with respect to such income. In the case of the issuance of shares of Stock in settlement of an Award, the minimum tax withholding obligation may, at the
election of the Participant, be satisfied in whole or in part through a net issuance of shares, and the Company shall withhold from shares of Stock to be issued to the Participant a number of shares of Stock with an aggregate fair market value that
would satisfy the minimum withholding amount due. In the case of any payment of cash by the Company in settlement of an Award pursuant to Section 4(d) of the Plan, the minimum withholding amount shall be satisfied, to the extent permitted by
law and subject to the election of the Participant to elect a net issuance of shares as set forth in this Section 4(f), by the Company’s deduction from such cash payment of any minimum withholding taxes. 

(g) Construction. Wherever appropriate, the use of the masculine gender shall be extended to include the feminine and/or neuter or vice
versa; and the singular form of words shall be extended to include the plural; and the plural shall be restricted to mean the singular. 

(h) Headings. The Section headings and Section numbers are included solely for ease of reference. If there is any conflict between such
headings or numbers and the text of this Plan, the text shall control. 
 (i) Effect on Other Plans. Nothing in this Plan shall be
construed to limit the rights of Participants under the Company’s or its subsidiaries’ benefit plans, programs or policies. 
 (j)
Effective Date. The Plan shall be effective as of the Effective Date. 

  
 6EX-10.1

 Exhibit 10.1 

PENN VIRGINIA CORPORATION 

AMENDED AND RESTATED ANNUAL INCENTIVE CASH BONUS AND 

LONG-TERM EQUITY COMPENSATION GUIDELINES 
  

	1.	Purpose of the Guidelines. 

 The purpose of the Guidelines is to provide annual and
long-term incentive frameworks that are performance driven and focused on corporate and individual quantitative and qualitative objectives that are critical to the Company’s success. 

 

	2.	Definitions. 

 The following terms used herein shall have the following meanings: 

(a) “Board” means the Board of Directors of the Company. 

(b) “BOE” means barrel of oil equivalent. 

(c) “Budget” means the Company’s annual budget for the applicable Plan Year, as approved by the Board. 

(d) “Cash Bonus Award” means an incentive cash bonus award granted to a Participant pursuant to the Guidelines that is paid
in a lump sum cash payment. 
 (e) “Cash Bonus Percentages” shall mean those cash bonus award percentages described on
Exhibit A under the heading “Cash Bonus Percentages – Executive Officers – Percent of Base Salary.” 
 (f)
“Cash Bonus Pool” means that amount of cash actually available for Cash Bonus Awards in any given Plan Year, as determined in accordance with Section 3 of the Guidelines. 

(g) “Cash Bonus Pool Target” means, with respect to any given Plan Year, the total amount of cash that would be payable as
Cash Bonus Awards with respect to such Plan Year to all Participants if each Participant received his or her Target Cash Bonus. 
 (h)
“Cash Costs per BOE” means, with respect to any given Plan Year, (x) the sum of the Company’s cash lease operating, gathering, processing and transportation expenses, production and ad valorem taxes and general and
administrative expenses during such Plan Year as set forth in the Financial Statements divided by (y) the Company’s total Production during such Plan Year measured in BOE. 

(i) “CEO” means the Company’s Chief Executive Officer. 

(j) “Committee” means the Compensation and Benefits Committee of the Board. 

(k) “Company” means Penn Virginia Corporation and its subsidiaries. 

 (l) “Company Performance Measures” means, with respect to Plan Year 2014,
Leverage Ratio, Production, Reserves, Drilling F&D costs per BOE and Cash Costs per BOE. The Committee shall, by resolution, determine the Company Performance Measures for each Plan Year after 2014. 

(m) “Credit Agreement” means the Company’s Credit Agreement dated September 28, 2012, as amended, restated or
replaced. 
 (n) “Drilling F&D Costs per BOE” means (x) the sum of the Company’s drilling and completion
capital costs related to all wells completed or identified as dry holes during such Plan Year, including any capital costs incurred in any previous Plan Year related to the drilling of, or otherwise in connection with, such wells, divided by
(y) the Company’s proved reserves developed as a result of such wells measured in BOE by the Company’s independent third party engineering firm. 

(o) “EBITDAX” shall have the meaning assigned to such term in the Company’s Credit Agreement. 

(p) “Employee Stock Incentive Plan” means the Company’s 2013 Amended and Restated Long-Term Incentive Plan, as
amended, restated or replaced. 
 (q) “Executive Officer” means the Company’s CEO, Chief Financial Officer, Chief
Operating Officer and Chief Administrative Officer and any other officers which the Committee may, by resolution, identify as an Executive Officer. 

(r) “Financial Statements” means the Company’s audited financial statements as of and for the year ended
December 31st of the applicable Plan Year. 
 (s) “Guidelines”
means these Amended and Restated Annual Incentive Cash Bonus and Long-Term Equity Compensation Guidelines. 
 (t) “Individual
Performance Measures” means those objective and subjective corporate and individual measures that (i) the CEO considers in recommending to the Committee, and that the Committee uses to determine, the Cash Bonus Award and Long-Term
Equity Compensation Award of each Executive Officer other than the CEO, (ii) the Committee considers in determining the Cash Bonus Award and Long-Term Equity Compensation Award of the CEO and (iii) the CEO considers in approving Cash Bonus
Awards and Long-Term Equity Compensation Awards of Participants other than the Executive Officers. 
 (u) “Leverage Ratio”
means the ratio of Total Debt as of the end of a Plan Year to EBITDAX for such Plan Year. 
 (v) “Long-Term Equity Compensation
Award” means an incentive equity award determined to be granted to a Participant pursuant to the Guidelines that is denominated in a dollar amount and that is paid out in the form of an award under the Employee Stock Incentive Plan. 

  
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 (w) “Participant” means any employee of the Company who was employed by the
Company on December 31st of the Plan Year with respect to whom a Cash Bonus Award or Long-Term Equity Compensation Award is paid. 

(x) “Performance Level Percentages” means, with regard to Plan Year 2014, the performance level percentages set forth on
Exhibit B under the heading “Performance Level Percentages.” The Committee shall, by resolution, determine Performance Level Percentages for each Plan Year after 2014. 

(y) “Plan Year” means the Company’s fiscal year. 

(z) “Production” means the Company’s net production for the applicable Plan Year as set forth in the Financial
Statements. 
 (aa) “Reserves” means the Company’s proved reserves on December 31st of the applicable Plan Year as set forth in the official report prepared by the Company’s independent petroleum engineers for such Plan Year. 

(bb) “Target Cash Bonus” means, with respect to any Participant, the product of (x) such Participant’s base salary
on December 31st of the Plan Year with respect to which a Cash Bonus Award is being considered times (y) such Participant’s Target Cash Bonus Percentage times (z) a fraction,
the numerator of which is the number of days that the Participant was employed by the Company during such Plan Year and the denominator of which is 365. 

(cc) “Target Cash Bonus Percentage” means, with respect to Executive Officers, those percentages described on Exhibit A
under the heading “Cash Bonus Percentages – Executive Officers – Percent of Base Salary – Target” and, with respect to Participants other than Executive Officers, the target percentages for such Participants determined as
described on Exhibit A. 
 (dd) “Target Equity Incentive Percentage” means, with respect to Executive Officers, those
percentages described on Exhibit A under the heading “Equity Incentive Percentages – Executive Officers – Target Percent of Base Salary” and, with respect to Participants other than Executive Officers, the target percentages for
such Participants determined as described on Exhibit A. 
 (ee) “Total Debt” has the meaning assigned to such term in the
Credit Agreement. 
 (ff) “Weighting Factor” means the weighting percentage assigned to each Company Performance Measure as
described on Exhibit B under the heading “Quantitative Performance Measures and Weighting Factors – Weighting Factors.” 
  

	3.	Calculation of Cash Bonus Pool. 

 The amount of the Cash Bonus Pool available to pay Cash
Bonus Awards with respect to each Plan Year shall be that amount equal to the product of (x) the Cash Bonus Pool Target times (y) the sum of the products of (A) the Performance Level Percentage attained for each Company Performance
Measure times (B) the Weighting Factor for such Company Performance Measure. 

  
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The Committee shall have the discretion to increase or decrease the Cash Bonus Pool by 15%. The Committee shall have the discretion to delete, add or change any Performance Measure or the
Weighting Factor of any Performance Measure at any time or from time to time for any Plan Year. 
  

	4.	Determination of Cash Bonus Awards and Long-Term Equity Compensation Awards. 

 (a)
Individual Performance Measures. Prior to March 1st of each Plan Year: 

(i) The CEO shall recommend to the Committee Individual Performance Measures for each Executive Officer other than the CEO; 

(ii) The Committee shall approve Individual Performance Measures for each Executive Officer, including the CEO, and the CEO shall advise each
other Executive Officer of his or her Individual Performance Measures; and 
 (iii) Each Executive Officer other than the CEO shall
recommend to the CEO Individual Performance Measures for each Participant who reports directly to such Executive Officer, the CEO shall approve Individual Performance Measures for such Participants and each Executive Officer shall advise such
Participant of his or her Individual Performance Measures. 
 Individual Performance Measures for Participants other than the Executive Officers and the
Participants reporting directly to the Executive Officers shall be determined by the CEO or the other Executive Officers if and as they deem necessary. Individual Performance Measures may be weighted to indicate relative importance. The Committee
may delete, add or change any Individual Performance Measure or the relative importance of any Individual Performance Measure applicable to any Executive Officer at any time or from time to time for any Plan Year, and the CEO may take the same such
actions with respect to the Individual Performance Measures of any other Participant. 
 (b) Cash Bonus Awards. Prior to March 1st of each Plan Year: 
 (i) The CEO shall recommend to the Committee a Cash Bonus Award for
each Executive Officer with respect to the immediately preceding Plan Year, which recommendation shall be based on (A) the size of the Cash Bonus Pool available, (B) such Executive Officer’s Threshold, Target and Stretch Cash Bonus
Percentages as described on Exhibit A, (C) whether such Executive Officer met, exceeded or did not meet his or her Individual Performance Measures set for such immediately preceding Plan Year, (D) peer comparison data and
(E) such other appropriate criteria as the CEO shall determine; 
 (ii) The Committee shall set the Cash Bonus Award for each Executive
Officer, including the CEO, using the same criteria described in subsection (b)(i); and 
 (iii) After receiving recommendations from the
other Executive Officers, as appropriate, the CEO shall approve all Cash Bonus Awards to be paid to Participants other than the Executive Officers and shall advise the Committee of the total amount of such Cash Bonus Awards. 

  
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 All Cash Bonus Awards, if any, shall be paid by not later than March 15th of each Plan Year with respect to the immediately preceding Plan Year and, subject to the Committee’s discretion to increase the Cash Bonus Pool by 15%, shall not, in the aggregate, exceed the
Cash Bonus Pool. 
 (c) Long-Term Equity Compensation Awards. Prior to
March 1st of each Plan Year: 
 (i) The CEO shall recommend to the Committee a
Long-Term Equity Compensation Award for each Executive Officer with respect to the immediately preceding Plan Year, which recommendation shall be based on (A) such Executive Officer’s Target Equity Incentive Percentage, (B) whether
such Executive Officer met, exceeded or did not meet his or her Individual Performance Measures set for such immediately preceding Plan Year, (C) the relative importance to the success of the Company’s execution of its strategic objectives
of retaining and incentivizing the Executive Officer beyond the current Plan Year, (D) peer comparison data and (E) such other appropriate criteria as the CEO shall determine; 

(ii) The Committee shall set the Long-Term Equity Compensation Award for each Executive Officer, including the CEO, using the same criteria
described in subsection (c)(i); and 
 (iii) After receiving recommendations from the other Executive Officers, as appropriate, the CEO
shall approve the Long-Term Equity Compensation Award to be considered by the Committee to be paid to each Participant other than Executive Officers and shall advise the Committee of the amounts of such awards. All Long-Term Equity Compensation
Awards shall be paid out in the form of an award approved by the Committee under the Employee Stock Incentive Plan. 
  

	5.	Interpretation; Amendments. 

 The Committee shall have the power to interpret the
Guidelines and to make and amend rules for putting it into effect and administering it. To the extent applicable, grants under the Guidelines shall be structured either to be exempt from or to comply with the requirements of section 409A of the
Code. The provisions of the Guidelines shall be interpreted and applied insofar as possible to carry out such intent. The Guidelines may be amended at any time or from time to time by the Board or the Committee. 

 

	6.	Governing Law. 

 The validity, construction and effect of the Guidelines and any rules or
regulations relating to the Guidelines shall be determined in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania without regard to its conflict of laws principles. 
  

	7.	Effective Date and Term of Guidelines. 

 The Guidelines became effective on
February 23, 2011 and shall remain in effect until terminated by the Board. The Guidelines were last amended February 12, 2014. 

  
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 EXHIBIT A 

CASH BONUS PERCENTAGES 
 Executive
Officers 
  

											
	 	  	Percent of Base Salary	 
	 Officer
	  	Threshold	  	Target	 	  	Stretch	 
	 CEO
	  	0 – 50	  	 	100	  	  	 	200	  
	 COO
	  	0 – 50	  	 	90	  	  	 	180	  
	 CAO/GC
	  	0 – 40	  	 	80	  	  	 	160	  
	 CFO
	  	0 – 40	  	 	80	  	  	 	160	  
	 Sr. VP
	  	0 – 40	  	 	80	  	  	 	160	  

 Other Employees 

Prior to March 1st of each Plan Year, the CEO shall approve and advise the Committee of the Target
Cash Bonus Percentages for each Participant other than the Executive Officers. Such percentages shall be subject to increase or decrease in the event of a promotion or demotion. 

EQUITY INCENTIVE PERCENTAGES 

Executive Officers 
  

			
	 Officer
	  	Target Percent of Base Salary
	 CEO
	  	300 – 600
	 COO
	  	200 – 400
	 CAO/GC
	  	200 – 400
	 CFO
	  	200 – 400
	 Sr. VP
	  	200 – 400

 Other Employees 

Prior to March 1st of each Plan Year, the CEO shall approve and advise the Committee of the Target
Equity Incentive Percentages for each Participant other than the Executive Officers. Such percentages shall be subject to increase or decrease in the event of a promotion or demotion. 

  
 A-1 

 EXHIBIT B 

2014 QUANTITATIVE PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND WEIGHTING FACTORS 
  

											
	 Performance Measure
	  	Weighting
Factor	 	 	 Level of Attainment*
	  	Performance Level
Percentages	 
				
	 Production
	  	 	25	% 	 	111% of Budget	  	 	200	% 
		  				 	110% of Budget	  	 	185	% 
		  				 	109% of Budget	  	 	175	% 
		  				 	108% of Budget	  	 	170	% 
		  				 	107% of Budget	  	 	160	% 
		  				 	106% of Budget	  	 	145	% 
		  				 	105% of Budget	  	 	140	% 
		  				 	104% of Budget	  	 	135	% 
		  				 	103% of Budget	  	 	130	% 
		  				 	102% of Budget	  	 	115	% 
		  				 	99% – 101% of Budget	  	 	100	% 
		  				 	98% of Budget	  	 	95	% 
		  				 	97% of Budget	  	 	90	% 
		  				 	96% of Budget	  	 	85	% 
		  				 	95% of Budget	  	 	80	% 
		  				 	94% of Budget	  	 	75	% 
		  				 	93% of Budget	  	 	70	% 
		  				 	92% of Budget	  	 	55	% 
		  				 	90% – 91% of Budget	  	 	50	% 
				
	 Drilling F&D Costs per BOE
	  	 	25	% 	 	85% of Budget	  	 	200	% 
		  				 	86% of Budget	  	 	190	% 
	 Cash Costs Per BOE
	  	 	25	% 	 	87% of Budget	  	 	180	% 
		  				 	88% of Budget	  	 	175	% 
		  				 	89% of Budget	  	 	170	% 
	  				 	90% of Budget	  	 	165	% 
		  				 	91% of Budget	  	 	160	% 
		  				 	92% of Budget	  	 	155	% 
		  				 	93% of Budget	  	 	150	% 
		  				 	94% of Budget	  	 	142.5	% 
		  				 	95% of Budget	  	 	135	% 
		  				 	96% of Budget	  	 	125	% 
		  				 	97% of Budget	  	 	117.5	% 
		  				 	98% of Budget	  	 	110	% 
		  				 	99% – 101% of Budget	  	 	100	% 
		  				 	102% of Budget	  	 	97.5	% 
		  				 	103% of Budget	  	 	95	% 
		  				 	104% of Budget	  	 	90	% 
		  				 	105% – 106% of Budget	  	 	87.5	% 
		  				 	107% of Budget	  	 	85	% 
		  				 	108% of Budget	  	 	80	% 
		  				 	109% – 110% of Budget	  	 	77.5	% 
		  				 	111% of Budget	  	 	75	% 
		  				 	112% – 113% of Budget	  	 	70	% 
		  				 	114% of Budget	  	 	65	% 
		  				 	115% of Budget	  	 	57.5	% 
		  				 	116% of Budget	  	 	55	% 
		  				 	117% – 119% of Budget	  	 	50	% 

  
 B-1 

											
	 Leverage Ratio
	  	 	25	% 	 	80% of Budget	  	 	200	% 
		  				 	81% of Budget	  	 	185	% 
		  				 	82% of Budget	  	 	180	% 
		  				 	83% of Budget	  	 	175	% 
		  				 	84% of Budget	  	 	170	% 
		  				 	85% of Budget	  	 	165	% 
		  				 	86% – 87% of Budget	  	 	155	% 
		  				 	88% of Budget	  	 	150	% 
		  				 	89% of Budget	  	 	145	% 
		  				 	90% of Budget	  	 	140	% 
		  				 	91% of Budget	  	 	135	% 
		  				 	92% of Budget	  	 	130	% 
		  				 	93% – 94% of Budget	  	 	125	% 
		  				 	95% of Budget	  	 	120	% 
		  				 	96% of Budget	  	 	102.5	% 
		  				 	97% – 103% of Budget	  	 	100	% 
		  				 	104% of Budget	  	 	97.5	% 
		  				 	105% of Budget	  	 	95	% 
		  				 	106% – 107% of Budget	  	 	90	% 
		  				 	108% of Budget	  	 	85	% 
		  				 	109% of Budget	  	 	80	% 
		  				 	110% – 111% of Budget	  	 	75	% 
		  				 	112% of Budget	  	 	70	% 
		  				 	113% of Budget	  	 	65	% 
		  				 	114% – 115% of Budget	  	 	60	% 
		  				 	116% – 117% of Budget	  	 	55	% 
		  				 	118% – 120% of Budget	  	 	50	% 

  

	*	Levels of attainment falling between percentages will be rounded up (0.5 and over) or down (under 0.5), as appropriate 

  
 B-2

Source: [{"source": "alea-institute/alea-institute/kl3m-data-edgar-agreements/train-00226-of-00352.parquet"}, [{"source": "alea-institute/alea-institute/kl3m-data-edgar-agreements/train-00226-of-00352.parquet"}]]