Document:

Exhibit
10.43.3

IMS HEALTH INCORPORATED

 

Executive Annual Incentive Plan

Performance Restricted Stock
Incentive Plan

 

Summary of 2007 Performance
Goals

And Award Opportunities

 

This
is a summary of the terms of authorization of awards for 2007 under the Executive
Annual Incentive Plan (“AIP”) and the related Performance Restricted Stock
Incentive Plan (“PERS Plan”).  The PERS
Plan is an established program of IMS Health Incorporated (the “Company”)
implemented under the 1998 Employees’ Stock Incentive Plan (the “ESIP”).  These awards are authorized, and the AIP and
PERS Plan administered, by the Human Resources Committee (the “Committee”).  If there is any conflict between the terms of
this summary and the AIP, PERS Plan (as implemented in resolutions of the
Committee or otherwise), ESIP, or any resolution, award agreement, or other
document having legal effect with respect to the matters summarized herein,
such other plan or document shall govern.

 

Part I.    2007 Performance Goal

 

                (a)           AIP.  Individuals selected to participate in the
AIP for 2007 shall earn the AIP annual incentive award for 2007 based on the
achievement of financial performance goals and other measures of performance
and discretionary factors that may be considered by the Committee.  The AIP 2007 financial performance goals will
be weighted 50% for revenue and 50% for operating income, each determined on a
consolidated basis.  In addition, if such
financial performance equals or exceeds 80% of the targeted level of
performance for each of the revenue and operating income components of the
financial performance goal, the Committee may exercise discretion to adjust the
award upward, subject to the determinations of the Committee and in no event to
result in a payout in excess of 200% of the individual’s target payout or in
excess of the maximum individual award under the AIP.  The Committee intends to exercise this
discretion as follows:

 

	
  ·

  	
   

  	
  Progress in achieving strategic
  objectives: The level of achievement of strategic objectives will be
  determined by the CEO and reported to the Committee with a recommendation as
  to adjustments, if any; the Committee will determine whether to adjust the payout
  levels upward or downward with respect to each financial objective by up to
  10% based on achievement of strategic objectives. With respect to the CEO,
  the level of achievement of strategic objectives will be determined by the
  Committee.

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  ·

  	
   

  	
  Individual performance under PMP:
  Individual awards will be further adjusted upward or downward in accordance
  with the Annual Incentive Payout Guidelines under the Performance Management
  Program (“PMP”), which assesses individual achievement of goals and work-related
  skills/behaviors.

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  ·

  	
   

  	
  Other discretionary adjustment: The
  Committee also retains discretion to adjust awards upward or downward by 20%
  based on such other factors as the Committee may deem relevant.

  

 

These
are guidelines representing the intent of the Committee, but the Committee
retains discretion, consistent with the terms of the Plan, to adjust any award
downward and, if any upward adjustment is authorized, to determine the basis
for and amount of such adjustment, subject to the individual maximum specified
above and the applicable award limits under the AIP.

 

                (b)           PERS
Plan.  For 2007, each
participant shall be awarded PERS (restricted stock units) having a value equal
to the AIP annual incentive earned and paid for 2007 performance.

 

 

 

 

 

 

PERS
shall vest and become non-forfeitable if the participant remains in service
until the first business day of January, 2010, subject to the terms of the
ESIP, any Employment Agreement between the participant and the Company, and the
customary terms of the form of restricted stock units (PERS) agreement
previously approved by the Committee. 
The maximum PERS award that may be earned shall be limited in accordance
with applicable award limits under the ESIP.

 

                (c)           Financial
Performance Goal.

 

                (i)            Component Payout Percentage Table.  The “Component Payout Percentage Table ” for
the AIP financial performance goal for 2007 shall be as follows.  Percentages appearing in the table are
referred to in this Summary as Component Payout Percentages:

 

	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  Downside

  	
   

  	
  Downside

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  Upside

  	
   

  	
  Upside

  
	
  Performance

  	
   

  	
  Floor

  	
  Minimum

  	
   

  	
  Cliff

  	
   

  	
  Target

  	
   

  	
  Potential

  	
   

  	
  Maximum

  
	
  Revenue

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Component

  	
   

  	
  0%

  	
  75%

  	
   

  	
  85%

  	
   

  	
  100%

  	
   

  	
  150%

  	
   

  	
  200%

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Operating

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Income 

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Component

  	
   

  	
  0%

  	
  75%

  	
   

  	
  90%

  	
   

  	
  100%

  	
   

  	
  150%

  	
   

  	
  200%

  

 

The
Committee has separately specified the levels of Revenue and Operating Income
that correspond to the Floor, Downside Minimum, Downside Cliff, Target, Upside
Potential, and Maximum performance levels.

 

                (ii)           Award Opportunities Earned For Financial Performance.  The financial Performance Goal shall be
deemed achieved at the end of the Performance Period in accordance with the
following:  First, the Committee shall
determine the level of achievement of the revenue component of the Performance
Goal and the operating income component of the Performance Goal, and for each
the corresponding “Component Payout Percentage.”  (Example: 
Revenue at target has a Component Payout Percentage of 100%.)  For component performance between any two
performance levels (e.g., between “Floor” and “Downside Minimum”), the
Component Payout Percentage will be interpolated.  For performance below the “Floor” level, the
Component Payout Percentage will be zero, and for performance above the Upside
Maximum, the Component Payout Percentage will be 200%.  Second, the “Financial Performance Payout
Percentage” will be determined as the sum of 50% of the Component Payout
Percentage for revenues and 50% of the Component Payout Percentage for
operating income.

 

                (d)           Discretionary
Adjustments.  If the
threshold performance requirement specified in Part I(a) above is
met, the Committee will consider whether to make discretionary adjustments to
the participant’s award (expressed as a percentage of the target payout) based
on progress toward strategic objectives, assessed individual performance under
the PMP, and other discretionary considerations (as specified in Part I(a)).

 

                (e)           Final
Annual Incentive Award.  The
Committee will calculate the participant’s final AIP incentive award for 2007
by multiplying his or her Target Award by the percentage determined under Part I(c) and
(d) above,  In no event, however,
will the final AIP annual incentive exceed the applicable maximum award limit
specified in the AIP.

 

                (f)            Adjustments to Performance
Goals.  The Committee may
determine in its discretion to adjust each component of the financial
Performance Goal and the threshold 

 

 

 

 

 

performance
required for the individual Performance Goal, and shall adjust such components
to eliminate the positive and negative effects of extraordinary items,
including acquisitions (including effects in 2006 from the proposed merger with
VNU NV), and changes in accounting principles from 2005, including the adoption
of FAS123R, provided that no such adjustment is authorized or may be made with
respect to a Covered Employee if and to the extent that such authorization or
adjustment would cause the Performance Goal not to meet the applicable
requirements of Treasury Regulation § 1.162-27(e)(2) under the Code.  In addition, the Committee retains “negative
discretion” to limit or eliminate the amount payable in settlement of any
Award.

 

Part II.  Award
Payout/PERS Grant

 

                A participant’s annual incentive
award earned under the AIP for 2007 performance will be payable promptly upon
determination by the Committee, and in no event more than 2.5 months after the
end of the Company’s 2007 fiscal year, unless such award is validly deferred
under a deferral plan of the Company.  In
addition, PERS will be granted to such participant at the time the annual
incentive award is payable to the participant (disregarding any elective
deferral) in an amount equal to the amount of such annual incentive divided by
the average fair market value based on the average high/low stock price per
share of Company Common Stock over the final 20 trading days of 2007.  Unless otherwise determined by the Committee
(and subject to the terms of the AIP and any employment agreement or
change-in-control agreement between the participant and the Company), no amount
will be payable under the AIP and no PERS will be granted to a participant who
does not remain employed by the Company or a subsidiary at the payment date
determined by the Committee under this Part II.

 

Part III. Participants
and Target Award Opportunities

 

The
participants in the AIP and PERS Plan for 2007, and the target Award
opportunities of each, are set forth by the Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer and approved by the Committee annually, and may from time to
time be revised or supplemented.  AIP
award opportunities are designated under the AIP.  With respect to PERS, Award opportunities and
shares that may be issued or delivered in settlement of PERS shall be governed
by and drawn from the ESIP.  The
foregoing notwithstanding, the Chief Executive Officer of the Company may
modify or cancel any Award opportunity or Award granted to any participant in
order to comply with local laws or customs in any jurisdiction other than the
United States, or to avoid undue administrative expense with respect to such
foreign jurisdiction, but no such modification or cancellation is authorized
with respect to a person likely to be a Covered Employee as defined in the AIP
at the time compensation is payable hereunder.Exhibit 10.44.3

 

 

Exhibit A

 

IMS HEALTH INCORPORATED

Long-Term Incentive Program

 

Designation of 2007-08 Performance Period,
Performance Goal

And Award Opportunities

 

In furtherance of Section 4
of the Long-Term Incentive Program (the “Program”), for the period January 1,
2007 through December 31, 2008 (the “2007-08 Performance Period”) the
Performance Goal, Award Opportunities, and participation shall be as set forth
in this Designation.  Terms used in this
Designation have the meanings defined in the Program.

 

Part I.      2007-08 Performance Goal and Award
Opportunities

 

(a)                                  For the 2007-08
Performance Period, the Performance Goal shall be a blended goal weighted 50%
based on revenues of the Company and 50% based on operating income.  The Award Opportunity earnable by each
Participant shall range from 0% to 200% of the Participant’s target Award
Opportunity, and shall relate to the Performance Goal as set forth in (i) through
(iii) below:

 

(i)            Performance Goal.  The “Performance Goal” table for the 2007-08
Performance Period shall be as follows (subject to Section 4(c) of
the Program) (numbers in millions of U.S. dollars, except Payout Percentages):

 

	
  Performance

  	
   

  	
  Floor

  	
   

  	
  Downside

  Minimum

  	
   

  	
  Downside

  Cliff

  	
   

  	
  Target

  	
   

  	
  Upside

  Potential

  	
   

  	
  Maximum

  
	
  Revenue

  	
   

  	
  <3,904

  	
   

  	
  3,904

  	
   

  	
  4,252

  	
   

  	
  4,338

  	
   

  	
  4,554

  	
   

  	
  4,772

  
	
  Payout Percentage

  	
   

  	
  0%

  	
   

  	
  75%

  	
   

  	
  85%

  	
   

  	
  100%

  	
   

  	
  150%

  	
   

  	
  200%

  
	
  Operating Income

  	
   

  	
  <932

  	
   

  	
  932

  	
   

  	
  972

  	
   

  	
  982

  	
   

  	
  1,032

  	
   

  	
  1,056

  
	
  Payout Percentage

  	
   

  	
  0%

  	
   

  	
  75%

  	
   

  	
  90%

  	
   

  	
  100%

  	
   

  	
  150%

  	
   

  	
  200%

  

 

The Committee may adjust the
components of the Performance Goal specified above at any time, provided that,
in the case of a Covered Employee, the level of any element of the Performance
Goal as adjusted shall be not less than the Downside Minimum level specified
for that element of the Performance Goal as set forth in the above Table.  Thus, for purposes of Section 162(m),
the Performance Goal shall be deemed to be the Downside Minimum level of
performance which shall authorize the Committee to award up to the Maximum
level of payout, with any specification of a different Performance Goal
permitted hereunder in respect of a Covered Employee representing an exercise
of negative discretion decreasing the payouts that otherwise would be
authorized for achievement of such minimum levels of performance.

 

(ii)           Award
Opportunities Earned For Performance. 
Award opportunities shall be deemed earned at the end of the Performance
Period as follows:  

 

1

 

 

 

First, the Committee shall determine the level of achievement of the
revenue component of the Performance Goal and the operating income component of
the Performance Goal, and for each the corresponding “Component Payout
Percentages.”  (Example:  Revenue at target has a Component Payout
Percentage of 100%.)  For component
performance between any two performance levels (e.g., between “Downside Minimum”
and “Downside Cliff”), the Component Payout Percentage will be
interpolated.  For performance at the “Floor”
level, the Component Payout Percentage will be zero, and for performance above
the Upside Maximum, the Component Payout Percentage will be 200%.  Second, the “Final Payout Percentage” will be
determined as the sum of 50% of the Component Payout Percentage for revenues
and 50% of the Component Payout Percentage for operating income.  Third, the Participant’s target Award
Opportunity will be deemed earned at the Final Payout Percentage.  Any portion of the Award Opportunity not
earned will be canceled.

 

(iii)          Adjustments to
Performance Goal.  The Committee may
determine in its discretion to adjust the Performance Goal, and each component
thereof, as specified in (i) above and shall adjust the components of the
Performance Goal to eliminate the positive and negative effects of
extraordinary items and of major acquisitions and to eliminate the effects of
variation in foreign currency exchange rates from the rates used in developing
Company revenues and operating income budgets for 2007, provided that no such
adjustment is authorized or may be made with respect to a Covered Employee if
and to the extent that such authorization or adjustment would cause the
Performance Goal not to meet the applicable requirements of Treasury Regulation
1.162-27(e)(2) under the Code.

 

Part II.    Denomination of Award Opportunity

 

Subject to the terms of the
Plans and the Program, 50% of the Award Opportunity of each Participant shall
be denominated in Restricted Stock Units and 50% of such Award Opportunity
shall be denominated in cash.  For this
purpose, a Restricted Stock Unit, if earned, may only be settled by issuance or
delivery of a Share.  The number of
Restricted Stock Units earnable by a Participant for Target performance shall
equal the dollar amount of 50% of his or her Target Award Opportunity divided
by $27.62, which represents the average closing price per Share over the final
20 trading days of 2006.  For performance
other than Target performance, the number of Restricted Stock Units (as
distinguished from the initial dollar value of the Restricted Stock Units) and
the dollar amount of the cash-denominated portion of the Award Opportunity will
each be multiplied by the applicable Final Payout Percentage under Part I (ii) above
to determine the amount of the Award Opportunity earned.  The cash-denominated Award Opportunity, if
earned, may be settled by payment of cash or unrestricted Shares.

 

Part III.   Stated Vesting Schedule and Settlement

 

Subject to the terms of the
Plans and the Program, any of the cash-denominated portion of a Participant’s
Award Opportunity deemed earned for the 2007-08 Performance Period shall become
vested in full at December 31, 2008 if the Participant remains employed by
the Company or a Subsidiary through that date, and any of the Restricted Stock
Units portion of the Award Opportunity deemed earned for the 2007-08
Performance Period shall become vested in full at December 31, 2010 if the
Participant remains employed by the Company or a Subsidiary through 

 

2

 

 

 

that date.  Subject to any permitted deferrals under the
Plans and the Program, each portion of the Participant’s Award shall be settled
as promptly as practicable upon such portion becoming vested.

 

Part IV.   Participants and Target Award Opportunities

 

The
names of the Participants in the Program for the 2007-08 Performance Period,
and the target Award Opportunity of each, are set forth in Schedule I (as such
Schedule may from time to time be revised or supplemented).  Award Opportunities granted to any such
Participant who is, at any time during 
2007, an executive officer of the Company and Shares that may be issued
or delivered in settlement of such Participants’ Awards shall be governed by
and drawn from the ESIP, and Award Opportunities granted to other Participants
and Shares that may be issued or delivered in settlement of such Participants’
Awards shall be governed by and drawn from the 2000 Plan (but, if such Shares
are no longer available under the 2000 Plan, the Shares instead shall be drawn
from the ESIP).  The foregoing
notwithstanding, the Chief Executive Officer of the Company may modify or
cancel any Award Opportunity or Award granted to any Participant in order to
comply with local laws or customs in any jurisdiction other than the United
States, or to avoid undue administrative expense with respect to such foreign
jurisdiction, and may designate a Participant whose participation would
otherwise be governed by the 2000 Plan as instead to be governed by the ESIP.

 

3

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