Document:

Exhibit 4.12

 

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

BETWEEN

1. CRUCELL N.V.

AND

2. C. DE JONG

EFFECTIVE AS PER SEPTEMBER 1,
2007

 

 

CONTENTS

 

	
  Clause

  	
   

  	
  Page

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  1.

  	
  Date
  of Commencement of Service and Position, duration and notice period

  	
   

  	
  1

  
	
  2.

  	
  Remuneration

  	
   

  	
  2

  
	
  3.

  	
  Expenses
  and Company Car

  	
   

  	
  2

  
	
  4.

  	
  Holidays

  	
   

  	
  2

  
	
  5.

  	
  Insurance

  	
   

  	
  2

  
	
  6.

  	
  Sickness

  	
   

  	
  3

  
	
  7.

  	
  Pension

  	
   

  	
  3

  
	
  8.

  	
  Confidentiality

  	
   

  	
  3

  
	
  9.

  	
  Documents

  	
   

  	
  4

  
	
  10.

  	
  Non-Competition

  	
   

  	
  4

  
	
  11.

  	
  No
  Additional Occupation

  	
   

  	
  5

  
	
  12.

  	
  Intellectual
  and Industrial Property Rights

  	
   

  	
  5

  
	
  13.

  	
  Severance
  Arrangement in a Change in Control Situation

  	
   

  	
  5

  
	
  14.

  	
  Gifts

  	
   

  	
  5

  
	
  15.

  	
  Miscellaneous

  	
   

  	
  6

  
	
  16.

  	
  Applicable
  Law, No Collective Bargaining Agreement

  	
   

  	
  6

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Signatories

  	
   

  	
  6

  

 

 

THE
UNDERSIGNED:

 

(1)           CRUCELL
N.V., established at Leiden, represented by R.H.P. Brus, hereinafter “Crucell”;

 

(2)           C. de
Jong, residing at Strausslaan 1, 3723 JN Bilthoven, hereinafter “the
Executive”; 

 

WHEREAS:

 

The
Executive will be employed by Crucell or any of its affiliated companies as of
September 1, 2007;

 

Crucell
is a leading biotechnology company developing vaccine and antibody products to
prevent and treat infectious diseases;

 

The
Executive is fully aware that the business of Crucell requires strict
confidentiality as to everything that is created, developed, prepared,
investigated scientifically, organisationally, economically, as well as
commercially;

 

The
parties to this agreement, thereby superseding previous agreements between them
or between the Executive and any of Crucell’s affiliated companies, wish to lay
down the conditions which apply to their relationship;

 

DECLARE
AND HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

 

1.            DATE
OF COMMENCEMENT OF SERVICE AND POSITION

 

1.1          The Executive will
be employed by Crucell or any of its affiliated companies as of
September 1, 2007. He will be a member of the Management Committee and
holds the position of Chief Operating Officer.

 

1.2          The Executive’s
place of rendering service under this agreement will be the office of the
Crucell in Leiden. Crucell will be entitled to change this place after
consultation with the Executive.

 

1.3          The Executive is
obliged to do or to refrain from doing all that officers in similar positions
should do or should refrain from doing. The Executive shall fully devote
himself, his time and his energy to promoting the interest of Crucell and its
affiliated companies. To that effect the Executive is expected to spend
sufficient time in the Netherlands and in such other countries as deemed
commensurate with prevailing business needs.

 

Duration of the Agreement, Notice
during its Term

 

1.4          This agreement is
entered into for an indefinite period with a probation time of two months.

 

1.5          This agreement
shall terminate in any event, without notice being required, on the day that
the Executive reaches the pensionable age under the prevailing pension scheme
of Crucell.

 

1.6          The agreement may
be terminated by either party with due observance of a notice period of six months
for Crucell and three months for the Executive.

 

1

 

2.            REMUNERATION

 

2.1          Effective as per
September 1, 2007, the Executive’s base salary, including holiday
allowance, amounts to € 300.000 gross per year. The base salary, excluding
holiday allowance, shall be paid in twelve equal instalments at the end of each
month. The holiday allowance shall be paid in May each year. Each year the
Supervisory Board shall decide whether there is any reason to increase the
Executive’s base salary.

 

2.2          The Executive is
entitled to take part in the Crucell N.V. Executive Incentive Plan, subject to
the rules of the Plan, as determined by the Supervisory Board, and
established by the General Meeting of Shareholders, from time to time. The
maximum percentage that can be reached for the short term incentive is 60% of
the annual base salary (based on company and individual objectives). The long
term incentive can reach a maximum of 26% of the annual base salary.

 

2.3          The Executive is
granted the right to participate in Crucell’s option plan. The Executive
receives 185.000 options to be granted on September 1, 2007. The option
grant will exclusively be governed by Crucell’s applicable option plan.

 

3.            EXPENSES
AND COMPANY CAR

 

3.1          To the extent
Crucell has given prior approval for such expenses, Crucell shall reimburse all
reasonable expenses incurred by the Executive in the performance of his duties
upon submission of all the relevant invoices and vouchers. The Executive shall
observe any regulations on reimbursement of expenses as determined by Crucell
from time to time.

 

3.2          If he desires so,
the Executive shall be entitled with a company car by Crucell at no cost to the
Executive (with the provision that the tax implications are for the account of
the Executive) on such further conditions as shall be determined by Crucell
from time to time. In the event of sickness for a period exceeding 6 months,
Crucell will be entitled to reclaim the company car from the Executive, without
the Executive being entitled to any compensation. The Executive shall comply
with Crucell’s request to return the car.

 

3.3          Crucell shall pay
those costs of a mobile telephone and private fax machine for the Executive,
which are in excess of the amount that must be paid by the Executive in order
to avoid tax liability for Crucell, to the extent that those costs are
reasonable. The mobile phone and fax will be used tor 90% for business
purposes.

 

4.            HOLIDAYS

 

4.1          The Executive
shall be entitled to 25 working days vacation per year. In taking vacation, the
Executive shall duly observe the interests of Crucell. To that effect the
Executive shall be obliged to inform the CEO in time of intended vacation
periods as well as, afterwards, of vacation taken.

 

5.            INSURANCE

 

5.1          Crucell shall pay
the annual premium of Crucell’s travel and accident insurance. This insurance
shall, if and when the Executive is accepted, provide coverage to the Executive
as mentioned in the relevant policy.

 

5.2          Crucell shall take
out a Director’s and Officer’s Liability Policy under terms and conditions of
state of the art level and continue to have this or a similar policy in place
in connection with

 

2

 

claims made against the Executive alleging a wrongful act as defined in
such policy from time to time. Crucell shall pay the annual premium.

 

6.            SICKNESS

 

6.1          In the event of
sickness as defined in article 7:629 of the Civil Code, the Executive shall
notify Crucell as soon as possible.

 

6.2          In the event of
sickness, Crucell shall pay to the Executive in accordance with the applicable
Crucell policy and procedure.

 

6.3          The Executive is
only entitled to the payments referred to in article 6.2 if and to the extent
that pursuant to the requirements of article 7:629 under 3 through 7 and 9 of
the Dutch Civil Code, Crucell is under the obligation to pay salary in accordance
with article 7:629, under 1, of the Dutch Civil Code. Subsequent periods of
sickness with intervals of less than 4 weeks are regarded as one period for the
purpose of article 6.2.

 

6.4          The Executive
shall not be entitled to the payments referred to in the article 6.2, if and to
the extent that in connection with his sickness, he can validly claim damages
from a third party on account of loss of salary and if and to the extent that
the payments by Crucell set forth in the article 6.2 exceed the minimum obligation
referred to in article 7:629 sub 1 of the Civil Code. In this event, Crucell
shall satisfy payment solely by means of an advanced payment on the
compensation to be received from the third party and upon assignment by the
Executive of his rights to damages vis-à-vis the third party concerned up to the total amount of advanced
payments made. The advanced payments shall be set-off by Crucell if the
compensation is paid or, as the case may be, in proportion thereto.

 

6.5          If the sickness
continues after the first 52 weeks, the Executive shall be eligible to take
part in the Crucell’s Corporate Disability Insurance Plan under the conditions
set forth in that plan as determined by the Supervisory Board from time to
time. The premium shall be borne by Crucell.

 

7.            PENSION

 

7.1          The Executive will
participate in the pension scheme of Crucell for Management Committee members.
He will contribute 7% of the pensionable salary per year.

 

7.2          The Executive or
his next to kin shall enjoy such pension rights as are determined in the
prevailing pension scheme of Crucell.

 

7.3          The Executive is
entitled to a two years gross salary in case of death to be paid to his
rightful heirs. Crucell agrees to take out adequate insurance to cover this
risk.

 

8.            CONFIDENTIALITY

 

8.1          The Executive
shall throughout the duration of this agreement and after this agreement has
been terminated for whatever reason, refrain from disclosing in any manner to
any individual (including other personnel of Crucell or any of its subsidiaries
or affiliated companies unless such personnel must be informed in connection
with their work activities for Crucell) any information of a confidential
nature concerning Crucell or other companies affiliated with Crucell, which has
become known to the Executive as a result of his employment with Crucell and of
which the Executive knows or should have known to be of a confidential nature.

 

3

 

8.2          If the Executive
breaches the obligations pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article, the Executive
shall contrary to article 7:650, under 3, 4 and 5 of the Dutch Civil Code,
without any notice of default being required, pay to Crucell for each breach thereof,
a penalty amounting to € 100,000.
Alternatively, Crucell will be entitled to claim full damages.

 

9.            DOCUMENTS

 

9.1          The Executive
shall not have nor keep in his possession any documents and/or correspondence
and/or data carriers and/or copies thereof in any manner whatsoever, which
belong to Crucell or to other companies affiliated with Crucell and which have
been made available to the Executive as a result of his employment, except
insofar as and for as long as necessary for the performance of his work for
Crucell. In any event the Executive will be obliged to return to Crucell
immediately, without necessitating the need for any request to be made in this
regard, any and all such documents and/or correspondence and/or data carriers
and/or copies thereof at termination of this agreement or on suspension of the
Executive from active duty for whatever reason.

 

10.          NON-COMPETITION

 

10.1        The Executive
shall throughout the duration of this agreement and for a period of one year
after termination hereof not be engaged or involved in any manner, directly or
indirectly, whether for the account of the Executive or for the account of
others, in any activity, business or otherwise, relating to the commercial
application of discovery and development of biopharmaceutical products that
utilise the immune system to combat diseases within the fields in which Crucell
acts, has acted or prepares to act on at the moment the relationship comes to
an end. This obligation applies worldwide.

 

10.2        Furthermore, the
Executive shall throughout the duration of this agreement and for a period of
one year after termination hereof not be engaged or involved in any manner,
directly or indirectly, whether for the account of the Executive or for the
account of others, in the creation, the application for and the recording of
intellectual property rights beyond his proper performance under this
employment or, after the end thereof, the creation, the application for and the
recording of intellectual property rights concerning the existing or future
field of activities of Crucell.

 

10.3        The Executive
shall throughout the duration of this agreement and for a period of one year
after termination hereof not induce or attempt to induce any director or
employee of Crucell or any of its affiliated companies to leave the employment
of Crucell or any of its affiliated companies.

 

10.4        In the event the
Executive breaches the obligations as expressed in the paragraph 1, 2 and 3 of
this article, the Executive shall without notice of default being required, pay
to Crucell for each such breach a penalty equal to an amount of € 25,000, plus
a penalty of € 2,500 for each
day such breach occurs and continues. Alternatively, Crucell will be entitled
to claim full damages.

 

4

 

11.          NO ADDITIONAL
OCCUPATION

 

11.1        The Executive
shall refrain from accepting remunerated or time consuming non-remunerated work
activities with or for third parties or from doing business for his own account
without the prior written consent of the Supervisory Board. This obligation
also applies to any direct or indirect financial interest in any company or
business activity with the exception of ownership of stock traded on a
recognised stock exchange as long as the Executive holds less than 5% of such
traded stock.

 

12.          INTELLECTUAL
AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

 

12.1        The Executive
shall inform Crucell forthwith of every invention, procedure, publication,
design, model and in general every creative result in the field of industrial
or intellectual property attained by the Executive, if and to the extent that
it relates to Crucell’s business activities both in the Netherlands and abroad.
If the industrial and intellectual property rights attaching to the invention,
etc, do not automatically accrue to Crucell by virtue of the employment
relationship, the Executive shall at Crucell’s first request transfer such
rights to Crucell and co-operate fully in recording such rights in the name of
Crucell as exclusive owner, all at the expense of Crucell.

 

12.2        The Executive
hereby irrevocably appoints Crucell as his agent for the purpose of in his name
preparing all documents and performing all other acts necessary for the
implementation of the provisions of this article and Crucell is hereby
authorised to appoint a sub-agent for the implementation of the foregoing.

 

12.3        The Executive
acknowledges that his remuneration package includes reasonable compensation for
(his contribution to) the creation of intellectual and industrial property
rights.

 

13.          SEVERANCE
ARRANGEMENT IN A CHANGE IN CONTROL SITUATION

 

13.1        If, within twelve
months following a Change in Control, Crucell gives notice of termination of
this employment agreement, and this in a situation in which the Executive has
not given reasons which provide an urgent cause for such termination as defined
in article 7:678 of the Dutch Civil Code, then the Executive shall be entitled
to a severance payment. “Change in Control” means the acquisition by any
person, or persons, acting in concert, of more than 50% of the issued share capital
of Crucell conferring the right to attend and vote at the General Meetings of
Shareholders of Crucell or the substantial reorganisation of Crucell following
the sale of the whole or a part of Crucell and resulting in no or a lesser
position for the Executive. The severance payment shall be calculated in
accordance with then existing practices in the Netherlands, but shall not be
less than an amount equal to 18 months base salary as defined in article 3.1 at
the annual rate of salary payable immediately before termination.

 

14.          GIFTS

 

14.1        The Executive
shall not in connection with the performance of his duties, directly or
indirectly, accept or demand commission, contributions or reimbursement in any
form whatsoever from third parties. This does not apply to customary
promotional gifts with a value not exceeding €100,-.

 

5

 

15.          MISCELLANEOUS

 

15.1        Amendments to this
agreement may only be agreed upon in writing and with regard to Crucell, solely
when a decision to that effect has been taken by the competent body of Crucell.

 

16.          APPLICABLE
LAW, NO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

 

16.1        This agreement is
governed by the laws of the Netherlands.

 

16.2        No Collective
Bargaining Agreement is applicable to this agreement.

 

Signatories

 

In witness whereof, this agreement has been
signed and executed in duplicate. 

 

	
  SIGNED
  by: R.H.P. Brus

  
	
  For
  and on behalf of:

  
	
  Crucell
  N.V.

  
	
   

  
	
  /s/
  Ronald H.P. Brus

  	
   

  
	
   

  
	
  date:
  07-06-07

  
	
   

  
	
   

  
	
  SIGNED
  by: C. de Jong

  
	
   

  
	
  /s/
  Cees de Jong

  	
   

  
	
   

  
	
  date:
  08-06-07

  

 

6EXHIBIT
10.1

 

FORM OF

 

SEALED AIR CORPORATION
PERFORMANCE SHARE UNITS

AWARD GRANT

2009-2010

 

THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES PART OF A PROSPECTUS
COVERING

SECURITIES THAT HAVE BEEN REGISTERED UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933.

 

	
  Name:

  	
   

  	
   

  

 

Performance Period:  January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2010

 

Grant Date:  March 24, 2009

 

TARGET AWARD

 

You have been granted by Sealed Air
Corporation (the “Company”) a target Performance Share Units award under the
Company’s 2005 Contingent Stock Plan for the two-year performance period 2009
through 2010, comprised of the following:

 

Target Performance Share Units:                                
units

 

Each Performance Share Unit (a “Unit”)
will be equivalent to one share of Sealed Air Corporation common stock.

 

Your award is subject to the terms and
conditions of the Performance Share Units Program and the Company’s 2005
Contingent Stock Plan (collectively, the “Plan Documents”). If this award
agreement varies from the terms of the Plan Documents, the Plan Documents will
control.  A copy of the Performance Share
Units Program is attached as Appendix A.  The 2005 Contingent Stock Plan is included as
an attachment to “Information for Recipients of Performance Share Unit Awards
Under the 2005 Contingent Stock Plan of Sealed Air Corporation.”

 

PERFORMANCE GOALS

 

The number of Units you earn will depend
on the performance of the Company relative to certain performance goals for the
two-year performance cycle from January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2010
(the “Performance Period”).  The
performance goals and their relative weightings are attached as Appendix B
hereto.

 

The determination of whether the
performance goals have been met will be made by the Organization and
Compensation Committee of the Company’s Board of Directors following the end of
the Performance Period.

 

 

OTHER IMPORTANT INFORMATION

 

·                  Units earned will receive dividend equivalents
paid in cash (without interest) based on the dividend rates in effect during
the Performance Period applied to the number of Units you earn, which will be
subject to the performance goals and vesting provisions described above.

 

·                  You will not earn any Units if the Company’s
performance during the Performance Period is below threshold performance as set
forth on Appendix B.

 

·                  If actual performance equals or exceeds
threshold performance, the number of Units earned will range from 50% to 200%
of your Target Performance Share Units award based on attainment against the
performance goals as set forth on Appendix B.

 

·                  In order to receive any Units, you must remain
employed with the Company through December 31, 2010, except in the case of
death, disability or retirement as discussed below.  If you terminate employment prior to December 31,
2010 for reasons other than death, disability or retirement, you will forfeit
all Units.  Other special rules apply
in case of termination of employment following a Change in Control, as
described below.

 

·                  Units earned at the end of the Performance
Period, if any, will be paid in actual shares of Company common stock, less the
number of shares that may be withheld to satisfy applicable withholding
taxes.  Shares in settlement for any
Units earned will be issued on or before March 15, 2011.  Cash dividend equivalents accrued on the
earned Units will be paid in cash on or about the same time.

 

·                  If your employment terminates due to your death
or Disability (as defined in the 2005 Contingent Stock Plan) or you retire (as
defined below) during the Performance Period, you (or your estate, in the event
of your death) will receive a pro rata payout following the end of the
Performance Period, based upon the portion of the Performance Period during
which you were employed.  The actual
payout will not occur until after the end of the Performance Period, at which
time the performance and achievements during the Performance Period will be
used to determine the number of Units that you would have earned if you had
remained employed for the entire Performance Period prior to applying the pro
rata factor.  Any payout to you in case
of termination of employment during the Performance Period due to death, Disability
or retirement will be made at approximately the same time as payouts are made
to Participants who are still employed by the Company. You are considered to
have retired if your employment with the Company terminates when you have at
least 5 years of service and your combined age and years of service equal at
least 70, but excluding termination of employment due to your death or Disability
or termination of employment by the Company for cause.  “Cause” for this purpose means any of the
following as determined by the Company: (i) an act of gross negligence or
willful misconduct significantly injurious to the Company or any subsidiary, (ii) gross
dereliction of duties after notice to you and failure to correct the
deficiencies within a thirty (30) day period thereafter, or (iii) fraud in
your capacity as an employee.

 

2

 

·                  There is no automatic vesting of your Units upon
a “Change in Control” (as defined in the 2005 Contingent Stock Plan).  However, the 2005 Contingent Stock Plan
provides for pro rata vesting of your Units if within two years following the
Change in Control your employment is terminated either by the Company without
Cause or by you for “Good Reason” (also as defined in the 2005 Contingent Stock
Plan).

 

·                  The Organization and Compensation Committee
retains the right in its sole discretion to reduce any award which would
otherwise be payable, unless there has been a Change in Control, as defined in
the 2005 Contingent Stock Plan.

 

 

·                  This award is subject to the Company’s
Policy on Recoupment of Incentive Compensation, a current copy of which is
attached as Appendix C.

 

·                  Payments will be taken into account for purposes
of the Company’s employee benefit plans and programs only to the extent
provided under the terms of such plans and programs.

 

FOR MORE INFORMATION.

 

If you have any questions about your
award or Units or need additional information, contact H. Katherine White at
201-703-4145.

 

IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Award Grant to be executed by its
duly authorized officer, and you have hereunto set your hand, effective as of
the Grant Date stated above.

 

	
  SEALED
  AIR CORPORATION

  	
   

  	
  EMPLOYEE

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By:

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Name:

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Title:

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
					

 

3

 

APPENDIX A

 

SEALED AIR CORPORATION

PERFORMANCE SHARE UNITS PROGRAM

 

PURPOSE

 

The
Sealed Air Corporation Performance Share Units Program (the “Program”) has been
established effective as of January 1, 2008 (the “Effective Date”) to
provide long-term incentive compensation to key employees who are in a position
to influence the performance of Sealed Air Corporation and its subsidiaries
(the “Company”), and thereby enhance shareholder value over time.  The Program provides a significant additional
financial opportunity and complements other parts of the Company’s total compensation
program for key employees (base salary, annual performance plan, and benefits).

 

ELIGIBILITY
AND PERFORMANCE PERIODS

 

The
Committee (as defined in the “Program Administration” section of the Program)
will determine which employees of the Company are eligible to participate in
the Program from time to time. 
Participants will be selected within 90 days after the beginning of each
multi-year performance cycle (“Performance Period”).  Each Performance Period will be of two or
more years duration as determined by the Committee and will commence on January 1
of the first year of the Performance Period. 
A new Performance Period will commence each year unless the Committee
determines otherwise.

 

TARGET
AWARDS

 

At
the time a Participant is selected for participation in the Program for a
Performance Period, the Committee will assign the Participant a Performance
Share Units Target Award to be earned if the Company’s target performance
levels are met for the Performance Period (the “Target Award”).  The Target Award will be expressed as a
number of Performance Share Units under the Company’s 2005 Contingent Stock
Plan and will be evidenced by a Performance Share Units award grant consistent
with the provisions of the 2005 Contingent Stock Plan.

 

MAXIMUM
AND THRESHOLD AWARDS

 

At
the time a Participant is selected for participation in the Program for a
Performance Period, the Participant will be assigned maximum and threshold
award levels, expressed as a percentage of the Target Award.  Maximum award level represents the maximum
percentage of the Target Award that may be paid to a Participant for a
Performance Period based on performance above target performance levels.  Threshold award level represents the minimum
percentage of the Target Award that may be paid to a Participant for a
Performance Period based on performance below target performance levels.  Performance below the threshold performance
award level will earn no incentive payments.

 

4

 

Any
award of Performance Shares hereunder shall be subject to the individual award
limit applicable under the 2005 Contingent Stock Plan.

 

PERFORMANCE MEASURES

 

Performance
measures that may be used under the Program will be those “Performance Measures”
defined in the 2005 Contingent Stock Plan.

 

PERFORMANCE
GOALS

 

The
Committee will designate, within 90 days of the beginning of each Performance
Period:

 

·                  The performance measures and calculation
methods to be used for the Performance Period;

 

·                  A schedule for each performance measure
relating achievement levels for the performance measure to incentive award
levels as a percentage of Participants’ Target Awards; and

 

·                  The relative weightings of the performance
measures for the Performance Period.

 

The
performance goals established by the Committee for a Performance Period are
intended to satisfy the “objective compensation formula” requirements of
Treasury Regulations Section 1.162-27(e)(2).

 

PERFORMANCE
CERTIFICATION

 

As
soon as practicable following the end of each Performance Period and prior to
any award payments for the Performance Period, the Committee will certify the
Company’s performance with respect to each performance measure used for that
Performance Period.

 

AWARD
CALCULATION AND PAYMENT

 

For
each Performance Period, individual incentive awards will be calculated and
paid to each Participant who is still employed with the Company (subject to the
special provisions below for employees who terminate employment due to death,
disability or retirement) as soon as practicable following the Committee’s
certification of performance for the Performance Period.  The amount of a Participant’s incentive award
to be paid based on each individual performance measure will be calculated
based on the following formula:

 

	
  Participant’s
  Target Award

  	
   

  	
  

  X

  	
   

  	
  Percentage
  of target award to be paid based on performance measure results

  	
   

  	
  

  X

  	
   

  	
  Relative
  weighting of performance measure

  	
   

  	
  

  =

  	
   

  	
  Amount
  of incentive award based on performance measure results

  

 

5

 

The
incentive amounts to be paid to the Participant based on each performance
measure will be summed to arrive at the Participant’s total incentive award
payment for the Performance Period.

 

Payments
from the Program to a Participant, if any, will be made in the form of one
share of the Company’s common stock for each Unit earned (rounded up to the
nearest whole share if such calculation otherwise would result in issuance of a
fractional share).  A Participant
receiving an award under the Program will also receive a cash payment equal to
the dividends that would have been paid during the Performance Period on the
Units earned by the Participant had the Units been actual shares of Company
common stock.

 

TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
DUE TO DEATH, DISABILITY, RETIREMENT

 

If a Participant’s
employment terminates due to the Participant’s death or disability (as defined
in the 2005 Contingent Stock Plan) or retirement (as defined below) during the
Performance Period, the Participant (or the Participant’s estate, in the event
of the Participant’s death) will receive a pro rata payout following the end of
the Performance Period, based upon the portion of the Performance Period during
which the Participant was employed.  The
actual payout will not occur until after the end of the Performance Period, at
which time the performance and achievements during the Performance Period will
be used to determine the number of Units that the Participant would have earned
if the Participant had remained employed for the entire Performance Period
prior to applying the pro rata factor. 
Payouts to Participants whose employment terminates during the
Performance Period due to death, disability or retirement will be made at
approximately the same time as payouts are made to Participants who are still
employed by the Company. A Participant is considered to have retired if the
Participant’s employment with the Company terminates when the Participant has
at least 5 years of service and the Participant’s combined age and years of
service equals at least 70, but excluding termination of employment due to the
Participant’s death or disability or termination of employment by the Company
for cause.  “Cause” for this purpose
means any of the following as determined by the Company: (i) an act of
gross negligence or willful misconduct significantly injurious to the Company
or any subsidiary, (ii) gross dereliction of duties after notice to the
Participant and failure to correct the deficiencies within a thirty (30) day
period thereafter, or (iii) fraud in the Participant’s capacity as an
employee.

 

OTHER TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

 

If
a Participant’s employment terminates prior to the end of a Performance Period
for any reason (whether voluntary or involuntary) other than death, disability
or retirement, the Participant will forfeit all rights to compensation under
the Program, except for any special provisions under the 2005 Contingent Stock
Plan in connection with certain terminations of employment following a Change
in Control or unless the Committee determines otherwise.

 

NEW
HIRES OR PROMOTIONS INTO ELIGIBLE POSITIONS

 

Participants
will become eligible for participation in the Program at their new position
level beginning with the Performance Period which begins on the January 1
immediately 

 

6

 

following their hire or promotion date.  No new performance awards or adjustments to
awards for Performance Periods that commenced prior to a Participant’s hire or
promotion date will be made.

 

IMPACT
OF A CHANGE IN CONTROL

 

Any special vesting or payment rules with respect to awards under
the Program in connection with a Change in Control will be determined under the
provisions of the 2005 Contingent Stock Plan.

 

PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

 

The
Program will be administered by the Organization and Compensation Committee of
the Company’s Board of Directors in accordance with the terms of the 2005 Contingent
Stock Plan.

 

MISCELLANEOUS

 

(i)            Amendment and Termination.  The Committee may amend, modify, or terminate
the Program at any time, provided that no amendment, modification or
termination of the Program shall reduce the amount payable to a Participant
under the Program as of the date of such amendment, modification or
termination.

 

(ii)           Incorporation of 2005 Contingent Stock Plan.  The terms and provisions of the 2005
Contingent Stock Plan are incorporated herein by reference.  In case of any conflict between this Program
and the 2005 Contingent Stock Plan, the 2005 Contingent Stock Plan will
control.

 

(iii)          Coordination
With Other Company Benefit Plans. 
Payments under the Program will be taken into account for purposes of
the Company’s employee benefit plans and programs only to the extent provided
under the terms of such plans and programs.

 

(iv)          Participant’s
Rights.  A Participant’s rights and
interests under the Program may not be assigned or transferred by the
Participant.  To the extent the Participant
acquires a right to receive payments from the Company under the Program, such
right shall be no greater than the right of any unsecured general creditor of
the Company.  Nothing contained herein
shall be deemed to create a trust of any kind or any fiduciary relationship
between the Company and the Participant. 
Designation as a Participant in the Program for a Performance Period
shall not entitle or be deemed to entitle the Participant to be designated as a
Participant for any subsequent Performance Periods or to continued employment
with the Company.

 

7

 

APPENDIX B

 

Name:

 

Performance Period:  January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2010

 

Target Award:   Performance Share Units

 

Threshold Award Level:  50% of Target Award

 

Maximum Award Level:  200% of Target Award

 

Primary Performance Goal: 
The percentage of the Target Award that will be earned will be based on
cumulative operating income for the performance period, subject to the
exclusions set forth below, as follows:

 

	
   

  	
   

  	
  (Millions)

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Under $880

  	
   

  	
  0

  	
  %

  
	
  Threshold:

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  $880

  	
   

  	
  50

  	
  %

  
	
  Target:

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  $955

  	
   

  	
  100

  	
  %

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  $970

  	
   

  	
  150

  	
  %

  
	
  Maximum:

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  $985 and above

  	
   

  	
  200

  	
  %

  

 

Award levels based on cumulative
operating income between any two of these levels would be based on a pro-rata
calculation of the number of shares earned, except that no shares will be
earned for cumulative operating income below $880 million.  Fractional shares earned will be rounded up
to the nearest whole share.

 

Alternative Performance Goal: 
If the Company does not achieve the threshold cumulative operating
income of $880 million but achieves cumulative operating income greater than
$500 million, then the Organization and Compensation Committee may use the
following alternative method for determining the percentage of the Target Award
that is earned under the Plan.

 

The measure for earning
an award under the alternative performance goal will be based on the percentage
growth of cumulative operating income of the Company during the performance
period over the operating income for 2008 relative to the percentage growth of
cumulative operating income for the Company’s peer group companies (excluding
the Company) during the performance period over the operating income for 2008
for the peer group companies (excluding the Company). The Company’s performance
relative to its peer group must be at least at the median (which shall be the
threshold level for the Alternative Goal) for any shares to be earned. Earned
award levels will be based on Company performance relative to its peer group as
follows:

 

8

 

	
  Performance Relative to Peer
  Group

  	
   

  	
  Payout
  as % of Target

  
	
  Below
  median

  	
   

  	
  0%

  
	
  From
  median to 90th percentile

  	
   

  	
  Percentage
  equal to percentile ranking in peer group

  
	
  Above
  90th percentile

  	
   

  	
  100%

  

 

The peer group companies
shall be those currently approved by the Organization and Compensation
Committee for executive compensation purposes, provided that if any of such
peer group companies shall cease to publicly report its operating results
throughout the entire performance period (for example, by being acquired), then
that peer group company shall be dropped from the calculation.

 

If the Company’s
performance relative to its peer group is above the 90th percentile,
then the payout can be increased by an additional 40% of the target award if
the percentage increase in the Company’s stock price during this period is
consistent with (i.e., meets or exceeds) 100% of the percentage increase in the
Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Index over the same period.

 

Additional Goals: If the above threshold level is achieved
under either the Primary Goal or the Alternative Goal, then the number of
shares earned for each participant can be increased or decreased by up to 10%
at the discretion of the Organization and Compensation Committee depending on
whether either (or both) of the following additional performance goals is
achieved:

 

a.                           Inventory days-on-hand averaged over the
period from December 31, 2008 to December 31, 2010 calculated using the
days-on-hand metric at December 31, 2008 and each successive quarter end
through December 31, 2010 is less than 78 days (the average days on hand
for 2008); and

 

b.                          2010 safety result (TRIR) of 1.30,
excluding facilities acquired during the performance period.

 

Exclusions for calculation of
cumulative operating income:

 

The performance goals above shall exclude the effect of the following:

 

a.                           All
restructuring charges reported or accounted for in the 2009 through 2010
consolidated financial statements as “restructuring charges,” and restructuring
programs (including all unbudgeted charges, all restructuring related expense
such as equipment relocation and all non-recurring expenses related to the
company’s global manufacturing strategy) and all non-operating charges
associated with mergers and acquisitions, both if approved by the Board of
Directors no later than December 31, 2010. 
This exclusion shall include all restructuring charges approved by the
Board of Directors before 2009 that are recorded during 2009 through 2010.  For any restructuring programs approved
during 2009 through 2010 for which charges have been excluded, any expense
credits related to such programs will also be excluded;

 

9

 

b.                          All charges related to goodwill
amortization or impairment in the calculation of operating expense or operating
profit;

 

c.                           All expenses (including
litigation-related costs and expenses), liabilities and accruals related to or
arising from: (i) any liabilities that W.R. Grace & Co. or any of
its subsidiaries had agreed to assume or as to which any of them indemnified
the Corporation or any of its subsidiaries under any of the agreements entered
into in connection with the Cryovac Transaction (as defined in the Corporation’s
Financial Statements included in the Corporation’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q
for the quarter ended September 30, 2002); (ii) any claim or lawsuit
alleging that the Corporation or any of its subsidiaries is or may be liable
for any liabilities of W. R. Grace & Co., Fresenius Medical Care
Holdings, Inc., or any of their respective affiliates under any legal
theory, including without limitation any claim based on fraudulent transfer,
fraudulent conveyance, successor liability, or contractual obligation; (iii) any
securities class action litigation brought against the Corporation or any of
its officers or directors, including without limitation the case of MPERS/Senn
v. Hickey, et al.; (iv) any costs incurred to settle the aforementioned
liabilities, claims and lawsuits; or (v) any payment that the Corporation
or any of its subsidiaries may be required to make to any trust fund
established under federal law providing for the resolution of claims for bodily
injury caused by asbestos exposure.

 

d.                          All expenses related to capital markets
transactions authorized by the Board of Directors.  Such transactions will include the repurchase
of bonds and stock.

 

e.                           The effect (including related expenses)
of any acquisition or disposition transactions, whether or not closed during
2009 through 2010, provided that, as to transactions closed during 2009 through
2010 that were large enough to require Board of Director approval, the Board of
Directors has approved such transactions. 
However, the effect of any acquisition or disposition that closed prior
to 2009 shall not be excluded.

 

f.                             The effect of any accounting changes
implemented during 2009 through 2010, such as IFRS or the discontinuance of the
Last-in, First-out (LIFO) method for calculating the value of inventory in the
United States.

 

Discretion retained:  The Organization and Compensation Committee
retains the right in its sole discretion to reduce any award that would
otherwise be payable, except in the event of certain terminations following a
Change in Control as provided in the 2005 Contingent Stock Plan.

 

10

 

APPENDIX
C

 

SEALED AIR CORPORATION

 

POLICY ON RECOUPMENT OF INCENTIVE COMPENSATION

FROM EXECUTIVES IN THE EVENT OF CERTAIN RESTATEMENTS

 

The
Organization and Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors has approved
the policy that the Company will, to the extent permitted by governing law,
require reimbursement to the Company of all or a portion of any annual
incentive compensation (whether payable in cash or by an award under the 2005
Contingent Stock Plan) and any Performance Share Units awards under the 2005
Contingent Stock Plan awarded to any executive officer of the Company or to the
leader of any business unit or function of the Company for performance periods
beginning on or after January 1, 2008, where:

 

(a)        the payment or award was
predicated upon the achievement of certain financial results that were
subsequently the subject of a substantial restatement,

 

(b)       in the view of the Board,
the officer or leader engaged in fraud or misconduct, or recklessly or
negligently failed to prevent the fraud or misconduct, that caused or
significantly contributed to the need for the substantial restatement, and

 

(c)        either no payment or award,
or a lower payment or award, would have been made to the officer or leader
based upon the restated results.

 

In
each case, the Company will, to the extent practicable, seek to recover the
amount by which the officer’s or leader’s annual incentive compensation and/or
Performance Share Units award for the relevant period exceeded the lower amount
that would have been paid or awarded (or the entire amount, if nothing would have
been paid or awarded).  This may include
the cancellation of all or a portion of unvested awards or unpaid awards (or a
delay in payment of any such awards while financial results are under review by
the Company).

 

In
addition, any person who is subject to forfeiture of compensation or profits
from the sale of the Company’s securities under Section 304 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 shall reimburse the Company the amount of such
compensation and profits.

 

In
addition to these reimbursements, the Company may take any other actions that
it deems appropriate to remedy the fraud or misconduct based on a consideration
of the relevant facts and circumstances.

 

3/24/2008

 

11

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