Document:

Exhibit 10 (nn)

 Exhibit 10 (nn) 
 WASHINGTON REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST 
 SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN 
 (Effective January 1, 2009) 
 Description of Plan Operation 
 Background: This Short-Term Incentive Plan (“STIP”) replaces the STIP that was in
effect for calendar years 2006—2008, which is described in the document titled “Washington Real Estate Investment Trust Short-term Incentive Plan (Effective January 1, 2006).” 
 Overview: This STIP pays annual cash bonuses to Officers (other than the Managing Director – Leasing) based on the following three calendar year
performance measures: 
  

	•	 	 WRIT’s actual financial performance measuring funds from operations (FFO) per share against target FFO per share; 

  

	•	 	 WRIT’s actual financial performance measuring funds available for distribution (FAD) per share against target FAD per share; and 

 

	•	 	 the Participant’s actual individual performance measuring such performance against target quantitative and qualitative measures set for such Participant.

 The target FFO per share and FAD per share for financial performance, and target quantitative and qualitative measures for individual
performance, are determined as provided in this STIP. 
 Plan Operation: Set forth below is a description of the operation of this STIP.

  

	1.	Eligibility: Officers (other than the Managing Director – Leasing) who are employed at the commencement of the performance year (January 1) are eligible to participate
in the STIP and receive a short-term incentive award (STI award). 

 An Officer hired after January 1 will not participate,
unless the Officer’s offer letter specifies that the Officer will be eligible for an STI award in his or her first year of employment. In this case, the STI award will be pro-rated based on months of employment in the year during which the
Participant is employed by WRIT for more than 50% of the days in the month (i.e., 15 or more days in February and 16 or more days in all other months). 
  

	2.	Treatment of Officers who are Promoted During the Year: An employee who is promoted to Officer during the year will receive a pro-rated STI award for each portion of the year
during which he or she is employed as an Officer, based on months of employment as an Officer relative to months in the year. For this purpose, a month will be treated as a month of employment as an Officer only if the Officer serves as such for
more than 50% of the days in that month (i.e, 15 or more days in February and 16 or more days in all other months). 

	3.	Performance Measure Determination: The target financial performance measures will be initially determined, and ultimately measured against, in the following manner:

  

	 	•	 	 On or about November of the year preceding the performance year (e.g., November 2009 for the 2010 performance year), the CEO will draft and submit to the
Compensation Committee a discussion of the expected market conditions, key indicators and underlying budget assumptions for the coming year, and recommended target FFO per share and target FAD per share. The Compensation Committee will review such
recommendations and determine the target FFO per share and target FAD per share for the upcoming performance year at the November meeting (or at such later time as may be determined by the Compensation Committee, taking into account applicable legal
and tax considerations). 

  

	 	•	 	 On or about November of the performance year the CEO will draft and submit to the Compensation Committee a memorandum discussing any actual market conditions
relative to expected conditions. 

  

	 	•	 	 The Compensation Committee will assess the market changes and decide whether to adjust the performance outcome for incentive purposes. 

 

	 	•	 	 Only dramatic improvements or declines in market conditions will result in an adjustment to the performance outcomes. Any adjustments will in all cases be 5% or
less (added or subtracted to the performance outcome versus goal percentage) and will be applied at the discretion of the Compensation Committee. 

 The target individual performance measures will be initially determined, and ultimately measured against, in the following manner: 
  

	 	•	 	 On or about November of the year preceding the performance year, each Participant will submit proposed target quantitative and qualitative measures to his or her
STIP supervisor. The STIP supervisor is determined as follows: 

  

	 	•	 	 For the CEO, the STIP supervisor is the Compensation Committee 

  

	 	•	 	 For all other Participants, the STIP supervisor is the CEO or other Officer to whom such Participant directly reports 

 The STIP supervisor will review such proposed target quantitative and qualitative measures and then determine the final target quantitative and
qualitative measures to be utilized for the performance year. While the STIP supervisor will review the proposed target quantitative and qualitative measures submitted by the Participant, the STIP supervisor will determine the final target
quantitative and qualitative measures to be utilized for the 

  

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performance year in his, hers or its sole discretion (subject to the requirement that, if the STIP supervisor is an Officer other than the CEO, any target
quantitative and qualitative measures must also be reviewed and approved by the CEO). Each STIP supervisor will approve target quantitative and qualitative measures for the upcoming performance year by the following deadlines: (i) for the
Compensation Committee, at the November meeting (or at such later time as may be determined by the Compensation Committee, taking into account applicable legal and tax considerations), and (ii) for other STIP supervisors, by December 15
(or at such later time as may be determined by the CEO, taking into account applicable legal and tax considerations). If the Participant begins employment after January 1 and his or her offer letter specifies that he or she will be eligible for
an STI award in such year, or an employee is promoted to Officer after January 1 of a year, then in each case the Participant’s target goals and metrics will be determined by the STIP supervisor in the manner set forth above no later than
one month after employment commences or the promotion has occurred. For each Participant other than the CEO, the CEO will notify the Compensation Committee of the target quantitative and qualitative measures after they are determined as set forth
above. 
  

	 	•	 	 On or about November of the performance year the Participant may draft and submit to the applicable STIP supervisor a memorandum discussing the Participant’s
performance relative to his or her target quantitative and qualitative measures. 

  

	 	•	 	 The STIP supervisor will review any such memorandum and then determine, in his, her or its sole discretion, the level of actual performance of the Participant
relative to target quantitative and qualitative measures (subject to the requirement that, if the STIP supervisor is an Officer other than the CEO, any determination of actual performance relative to target quantitative and qualitative measures must
also be reviewed and approved by the CEO in his or her sole discretion). For each Participant other than the CEO, the CEO will notify the Compensation Committee of the level of actual performance of such Participant relative to target quantitative
and qualitative measures after such actual performance is determined as set forth above. 

  

	 	•	 	 All target quantitative and qualitative measures will be expressed in performance levels ranging from 1 to 5 in order to coordinate with the applicable percentages
in Appendix A. 

  

	4.	Determination of STI Awards: STI payouts, as a percentage of base salary, for each level of achievement, are attached as Appendix A. For purposes of determining STI
awards, the three performance measures will be weighted as follows 

  

	 	•	 	 50% FFO per share 

  

	 	•	 	 30% FAD per share 

  

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	 	•	 	 20% individual performance 

 Such
weightings are reflected in the STI payout levels set forth in Appendix A. 
 Notwithstanding the STI payout levels set forth in the
Appendix A, the Compensation Committee has discretion to adjust the payout upward or downward to recognize individual contributions. 
  

	5.	Payment Dates, Form of Payment: Each Officer will receive 80% of his or her STI award in cash on or about December 15 of the performance year, based on 11 months of
actual results and projected results for December of the performance year, unless the Officer makes a deferral election in which case Section 8 below will govern. Officers will receive the balance (based on the full 12 months of actual results)
on or about February 15 after the end of the performance year. 

  

	6.	Conditions for Payment: An Officer must be employed on December 31 to receive the February 15 payment, subject to exceptions for absences on authorized leave of one
month or longer, and terminations on account of retirement, death, total and permanent disability, or layoff as a result of a reduction in force. In each of these cases STI awards will be pro-rated based on months of employment in the year. For this
purpose, a month will be treated as a month of employment only if the Participant is employed as an Officer for more than 50% of the days in that month (i.e., 15 or more days in February and 16 or more days in all other months).

  

	 	•	 	 Retirement means termination of employment on or after age 65, or on or after age 55 with 20 years of continuous service 

  

	 	•	 	 Total and permanent disability means a medical or physical impairment which can be expected to result in death and/or last for a continuous period of at least 12
months, as a result of which the Participant is receiving income replacement benefits for a period of at least three months from an accident or health plan covering WRIT employees. 

  

	7.	Change in Control: The performance period will end on the date of a Change in Control. Each Participant who is employed by WRIT on the date of the Change in Control will
receive a pro rata STI award based on months of employment through the end of the performance period. The amount of the STI award to be prorated will be based on prorated targets through the end of the performance period. For this purpose, a month
will be treated as a month of employment only if the Officer is employed for more than 50% of the days in that month (i.e., 15 or more days in February and 16 or more days in all other months). If a Participant has terminated employment before the
Change in Control on account of death, total and permanent disability, retirement, or a layoff on account of a reduction in force, or on account of the Change in Control, his or her STI award will be based on prorated targets through the end of the
performance period and his or her months of employment relative to the months of employment he or she would have had he or she been employed on the date of the Change in Control. 

  

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	 	•	 	 A termination that occurs after a Change in Control and is involuntary or for good reason (i.e., one of the following (i) a material diminution in base
compensation; (ii) a material diminution in authority, duties or responsibilities; (iii) a material diminution in authority, duties, responsibilities of the supervisor to whom the Participant reports; (iv) a material change in the
geographic location at which the Participant must perform the services; or (v) any other action or inaction that constitutes a material breach of an employment agreement between WRIT and the Participant (if any)) will be considered on account
of a Change in Control. If a termination that is involuntary or for good reason occurs within 90 days before a Change of Control, it will be considered on account of a Change in Control, provided WRIT or its successor cannot demonstrate through a
preponderance of evidence that the termination was not on account of the Change in Control. 

  

	 	•	 	 The definition of Change in Control is the same as the definition in the Washington Real Estate Investment Trust 2007 Omnibus Long Term Incentive Plan.

  

	8.	Deferral Election: Each Officer may elect to defer up to 100% of the STI award amount payable on or about December 15 by making a deferral election under the WRIT
Deferred Compensation Plan for Officers. Elections must be made by December 15 of the year prior to the performance year. The deferral must be for at least five years unless the final 409A regulations clearly indicate that the deferral may be
made for fewer than five additional years. If a participant makes a deferral election his or her STI award will be converted to RSUs and held under the Deferred Compensation Plan until the end of the deferral period. Deferred amounts will be matched
25% in RSUs. (For details on the Deferred Compensation Plan, see separate summary entitled “WRIT Deferred Compensation Plan Summary.”) 

  

	9.	STIP Administration and Interpretation: The STIP will be administered by the Compensation Committee of the Board of Trustees of WRIT, which has the discretion and authority
to interpret the STIP. The STIP will be interpreted in a manner consistent with ensuring that STI awards under the STIP are exempt from the application of Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code as “short-term deferrals” within the
meaning of the regulations issued under Section 409A. 

  

	10.	Amendment and Termination of the STIP: WRIT reserves the right to amend or terminate the STIP at any time, provided that no amendment will deprive a Participant of any vested
right under the STIP. 

  

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	11.	Effective Date: The STIP is effective January 1, 2009. The provisions of the STIP, as described above, apply to STI awards made for performance years beginning
January 1, 2009 and each anniversary thereof. 

  

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 Appendix A 
 STIP Payout for as a Percentage of Salary 
 FFO per Share Payout Levels 
 Payouts start at 95% performance and end at 110% performance. Payouts for every 1% increase in performance are illustrated below. However, for performance that falls
between whole percentage points, payouts will be interpolated. 
  

									
	 Performance vs.
 Target
	 	 Payout as % of Salary

	 	 CEO
	 	 EVP
	 	 SVP
	 	 Managing
 Directors

	 <95%
	 	0%	 	0%	 	0%	 	0%
	 95%
	 	25.00%	 	18.75%	 	16.25%	 	12.50%
	 96%
	 	30.00%	 	22.50%	 	19.50%	 	15.00%
	 97%
	 	35.00%	 	26.25%	 	22.75%	 	17.50%
	 98%
	 	40.00%	 	30.00%	 	26.00%	 	20.00%
	 99%
	 	45.00%	 	33.75%	 	29.25%	 	22.50%
	 100%
	 	50.00%	 	37.50%	 	32.50%	 	25.00%
	 101%
	 	55.00%	 	41.25%	 	35.75%	 	27.50%
	 102%
	 	60.00%	 	45.00%	 	39.00%	 	30.00%
	 103%
	 	65.00%	 	48.75%	 	42.25%	 	32.50%
	 104%
	 	70.00%	 	52.50%	 	45.50%	 	35.00%
	 105%
	 	75.00%	 	56.25%	 	48.75%	 	37.50%
	 106%
	 	80.00%	 	60.00%	 	52.00%	 	40.00%
	 107%
	 	85.00%	 	63.75%	 	55.25%	 	42.50%
	 108%
	 	90.00%	 	67.50%	 	58.50%	 	45.00%
	 109%
	 	95.00%	 	71.25%	 	61.75%	 	47.50%
	 >=110%
	 	100.00%	 	75.00%	 	65.00%	 	50.00%

 FAD per Share Payout Levels 
 Payouts start at 95% performance and end at 110% performance. Payouts for every 1% increase in performance are illustrated below. However, for performance that falls between whole percentage points, payouts will be
interpolated. 
  

									
	 Performance vs.
 Target
	 	 Payout as % of Salary

	 	 CEO
	 	 EVP
	 	 SVP
	 	 Managing
 Directors

	 <95%
	 	0%	 	0%	 	0%	 	0%
	 95%
	 	15.00%	 	11.25%	 	9.75%	 	7.50%
	 96%
	 	18.00%	 	13.50%	 	11.70%	 	9.00%
	 97%
	 	21.00%	 	15.75%	 	13.65%	 	10.50%
	 98%
	 	24.00%	 	18.00%	 	15.60%	 	12.00%

  

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	 99%
	 	27.00%	 	20.25%	 	17.55%	 	13.50%
	 100%
	 	30.00%	 	22.50%	 	19.50%	 	15.00%
	 101%
	 	33.00%	 	24.75%	 	21.45%	 	16.50%
	 102%
	 	36.00%	 	27.00%	 	23.40%	 	18.00%
	 103%
	 	39.00%	 	29.25%	 	25.35%	 	19.50%
	 104%
	 	42.00%	 	31.50%	 	27.30%	 	21.00%
	 105%
	 	45.00%	 	33.75%	 	29.25%	 	22.50%
	 106%
	 	48.00%	 	36.00%	 	31.20%	 	24.00%
	 107%
	 	51.00%	 	38.25%	 	33.15%	 	25.50%
	 108%
	 	54.00%	 	40.50%	 	35.10%	 	27.00%
	 109%
	 	57.00%	 	42.75%	 	37.05%	 	28.50%
	 >=110%
	 	60.00%	 	45.00%	 	39.00%	 	30.00%

 Individual Performance Measures 
 Payouts start at performance level 2 and end at performance level 5. Payouts for every performance level are illustrated below. However, for performance levels that fall between whole performance levels, payouts will
be interpolated. 
  

									
	 Performance
 Level
	 	 Payout as % of Salary

	 	 CEO
	 	 EVP
	 	 SVP
	 	 Managing
 Directors

	 1
	 	0%	 	0%	 	0%	 	0%
	 2
	 	10.00%	 	7.50%	 	6.50%	 	5.00%
	 3 (Target)
	 	20.00%	 	15.00%	 	13.00%	 	10.00%
	 4
	 	30.00%	 	22.50%	 	19.50%	 	15.00%
	 5
	 	40.00%	 	30.00%	 	26.00%	 	20.00%

  

 8Exhibit 10(oo)

 Exhibit 10 (oo) 
 WASHINGTON REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST 
 LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN 
 (Effective January 1, 2009) 
 Description of Plan Operation 
 Background: This Long-Term Incentive Plan (“LTIP”) replaces the LTIP that was in
effect for calendar years 2006—2008, which is described in the document titled “Washington Real Estate Investment Trust 2006 Long-term Incentive Plan (Effective January 1, 2006)” (the “Prior LTIP”). The Prior LTIP
remains applicable with respect to all grants made thereunder through December 31, 2008, and therefore will remain effective with respect to such grants until the final vesting and payouts thereof. 
 Overview: Grants under the LTIP will be comprised of restricted share units (RSUs), with a five-year
vesting period, and performance share units (PSUs), which cliff vest after three years. Officers will receive  1/3 of their LTI
grants in RSUs and  2/3 in PSUs. RSUs and PSUs awarded, and WRIT shares issued, under the terms of the LTIP will be granted under
WRIT’s 2007 Omnibus Long-Term Incentive Plan, as amended and restated. 
 Plan Operation: Set forth below is a description
of the operation of this LTIP. 
  

	 	1.	Eligibility. Officers who are employed at the commencement of the performance period (January 1) are eligible to participate in the LTIP. In addition, an Officer hired after
January 1 may participate if the Officer’s offer letter specifies that the Officer will be eligible for an LTIP award for a performance period that has already commenced. 

  

	 	 2.
	 Determination of Grant for Officers. The value of the total target award (RSUs + PSUs) is based on a percentage
of salary established by the Compensation Committee and the Participant’s position at WRIT. Officers will receive  1/3 of
their LTI target awards in RSUs and  2/3 in PSUs. PSU LTIP target awards will be comprised of two separate components: 

  

	 	 •
	 	 PSUs based on funds from operations (FFO) per share, which comprise  2/3 of the PSU LTIP target award (FFO PSUs). 

  

	 	 •
	 	 PSUs based on total shareholder return (TSR), which comprise  1/
3 of the PSU LTIP target award (TSR PSUs). 

 The
dollar values of target awards are established by multiplying the percentage of salary established by the Compensation Committee for each position, with respect to RSUs and PSUs, respectively, shown on Appendix A, by the Officer’s base
salary. The number of RSUs and target number of FFO PSUs and TSR PSUs are determined as set forth below: 
  

	 	•	 	 The number of RSUs granted to each Officer is determined by dividing the dollar value of the target RSU award established for that Officer in Appendix A by
the price of WRIT shares at the time of grant. 

	 	•	 	 The target number of FFO PSUs granted to each Officer is determined by dividing the dollar value of the target FFO PSU award established for that Officer in
Appendix A by the price of WRIT shares at the time of grant, rounded to the nearest 100. 

  

	 	•	 	 The target number of TSR PSUs granted to each Officer is determined by dividing the dollar value of the target TSR PSU award established for that Officer in
Appendix A by the price of WRIT shares at the time of grant, rounded to the nearest 100. 

  

	 	3.	Performance Measures for PSUs. For FFO PSUs, performance will be measured on annual FFO per share in the manner described below. For TSR PSUs, performance will be measured on
TSR in the manner described below. 

 For FFO PSUs, targets are established for each year of the three-year performance period
in advance of the applicable year. The target FFO per share performance goal will be determined in the following manner: 
  

	 	•	 	 On or about November of the year preceding the performance year (e.g., November 2009 for the 2010 performance year), the CEO will draft and submit to the
Compensation Committee a discussion of the expected market conditions, key indicators and underlying budget assumptions for the coming year, and recommended target FFO per share. The Compensation Committee will review such recommendations and
determine the target FFO per share for the upcoming performance year at the November meeting (or at such later time as may be determined by the Compensation Committee, taking into account applicable legal and tax considerations).

 For TSR PSUs, TSR will be determined, and ultimately measured, based on the following: 
  

	 	•	 	 TSR will be defined as the quotient obtained by dividing – 

  

	 	1.	the sum of – 

  

	 	a.	the difference between (1) ending Share Price and (2) beginning Share Price and 

  

	 	b.	dividends paid during the performance period. 

 by

  

	 	2.	beginning Share Price 

  

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	 	•	 	 Each Share Price will be calculated based on the average closing price for the twenty (20) trading days immediately prior to the relevant measurement date. For
the beginning Share Price, the measurement date will be December 1 of the year prior to the first year in the three-year performance period. For the ending Share Price, the measurement date will be December 1 of the last year in the
three-year performance period. 

  

	 	•	 	 On or about November of the year preceding the three-year performance period (or at such later time as may be determined by the Compensation Committee, taking into
account applicable legal and tax considerations), the Compensation Committee will approve a list of 25 peer group companies against whose TSR performance WRIT will be compared. 

  

	 	•	 	 At the conclusion of the three-year performance period, the Compensation Committee will evaluate the TSR of WRIT against the 25 peer group companies and determine
the percentile that reflects WRIT’s performance measured against such peer group companies. If there are fewer than 25 peer companies at the end of the three-year performance period, WRIT’s performance will be measured against the
remaining peer companies. 

  

	 	•	 	 The Compensation Committee will make reasonable and customary adjustments to WRIT or peer company performance to reflect corporate events such as stock splits and
stock dividends. 

  

	 	4.	Determination of Actual PSU Awards. PSU payouts, as a percentage of the target PSU payout, for each level of performance, are attached as Appendix B.

 PSU payout calculations will be made as follows: 
  

	 	•	 	 FFO PSU payout calculation: The FFO per share performance level will be separately measured for each year in the three-year performance period, resulting in a
determination of the payout level, expressed as a percentage of target PSU award, for each such year based on Appendix B. Each of these three payout levels will then be averaged into a payout level that will apply to the FFO PSU payout for
the three-year performance period. 

  

	 	•	 	 TSR PSU payout calculation: The TSR performance level will be measured for the three-year performance period, resulting in a determination of the payout level for
such performance period based on Appendix B. This payout level will apply to the TSR PSU payout for the three-year performance period. 

 Notwithstanding Appendix B, the Compensation Committee will have sole discretion to increase or decrease the payout levels on FFO PSUs (but not TSR PSUs) by amounts not to exceed 20%. This discretion of the
Compensation Committee is intended to allow it to respond to unforeseen opportunities and challenges that arise during the performance period. 
 In addition, at the conclusion of each three-year performance period, the Compensation Committee will have sole discretion to award additional RSUs 

  

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(“Special RSUs”) to a Participant up to a maximum value equal to 10% of the total PSU target award for such Participant. Such Special RSUs will be
awarded by the Compensation Committee if it determines that extraordinary market conditions have negatively impacted WRIT’s performance for the three-year performance period. The Special RSUs awarded under this paragraph will vest one year
after their grant, and will otherwise be identical to the other RSUs provided for in this LTIP. 
  

	 	5.	Vesting of PSUs. PSUs cliff vest as of the last day of the three-year performance period (December 31). Non-vested PSUs are forfeited at termination of employment except in
the case of total and permanent disability, death, retirement, layoff on account of a reduction in force, or Change in Control (as defined below). 

  

	 	6.	Treatment of PSUs Upon Termination on Account of Death, Disability, Retirement, Layoff on account of a Reduction in Force. Non-vested PSUs are not forfeited at termination of
employment in the case of total and permanent disability, death, retirement, or layoff on account of a reduction in force. A pro rata portion of the PSUs granted to a Participant who has terminated employment for any of these reasons vests at the
end of the performance period. The pro rata portion of PSUs that vests is determined by multiplying the number of PSUs to which the Participant is entitled at the end of the performance period by a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of
the Participant’s months of employment during the performance period and the denominator of which is 36. For this purpose, a month will be treated as a month of employment only if the employee is employed for more than 50% of the days in that
month (i.e., 15 or more days in February and 16 or more days in all other months). 

  

	 	•	 	 Retirement means termination of employment on or after age 65, or on or after age 55 with 20 years of continuous service 

  

	 	•	 	 Total and permanent disability means a medical or physical impairment which can be expected to result in death and/or last for a continuous period of at least 12
months, as a result of which the Participant is receiving income replacement benefits for a period of at least three months from an accident or health plan covering WRIT employees. 

  

	 	7.	 Treatment of PSUs Upon Change in Control. The performance period will end on the date of a Change in Control. In the event of a Change in Control, each
Participant who is employed by WRIT on the date of the Change in Control will receive an award of PSU’s based on such performance period (whether or not such Participant terminates employment). The amount of the award will be determined by
comparison of the targets for each year through the end of such performance period (with the targets prorated for any partial year) to the entire original targets for such PSU award. Although the performance period will end on the date of the Change
in Control, the target amount of the award will not be reduced. If (1) a Participant has terminated employment during such performance period, but before the Change in Control, on account of death, total and permanent disability, retirement, or
a layoff on account of a reduction in force, or (2) the termination is 

  

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involuntary or for good reason (i.e., one of the following (i) a material diminution in base compensation; (ii) a material diminution in authority,
duties or responsibilities; (iii) a material diminution in authority, duties, responsibilities of the supervisor to whom the Participant reports; (iv) a material change in the geographic location at which the Participant must perform the
services; or (v) any other action or inaction that constitutes a material breach of an employment agreement between WRIT and the Participant (if any)), and in either case occurs within 90 days before the Change in Control and WRIT or its
successor cannot demonstrate through a preponderance of evidence that the termination was not on account of the Change in Control, the Participant’s award will be based on targets through the end of such performance period (with the targets
prorated for any partial year) as if he or she had been employed on the date of the Change in Control. 

  

	 	•	 	 Standards for determining whether a termination of employment is on account of a Change in Control shall be the same as in WRIT’s 2007 Omnibus Long-Term
Incentive Plan, as amended and restated. 

  

	 	 8.
	 Form and Timing of Payment of PSUs. PSUs will be converted to common shares of beneficial interest in WRIT and
delivered within 2- 1/2 months of the end of the performance period. 

  

	 	9.	Dividends on PSUs. An amount equal to the dividends granted on WRIT shares will be paid in cash at the end of the performance period based on PSUs awarded.

  

	 	10.	Vesting of RSUs. RSUs vest ratably over five years on the anniversary of the date of grant (except for Special RSUs, which vest over one year as described in Section 4).
Non-vested RSUs are forfeited at termination of employment except in the case of total and permanent disability, death, retirement, layoff on account of a reduction in force, or a Change in Control. Vested RSUs are forfeited if a Participant is
terminated for “cause”. 

  

	 	•	 	 “Cause” means any of the following: (1) commission by a Participant of a felony or crime of moral turpitude; (2) conduct by a Participant in the
performance of his/her duties which is illegal, dishonest, fraudulent or disloyal; (3) the breach by a Participant of any fiduciary duty the Participant owes to the WRIT; or (4) gross neglect of duty or poor performance which is not cured
by the Participant to the reasonable satisfaction of WRIT within 30 days of Participant’s receipt of written notice from WRIT advising Participant of said gross neglect or poor performance. 

  

	 	11.	Treatment of RSUs upon Termination on Account of Death, Disability, Retirement, or Layoff on account of a Reduction in Force, or Change in Control. Non-vested RSUs fully vest
at termination of employment in the case of (1) total and permanent disability, (2) death, (3) retirement, (4) layoff on account of a reduction in force, or (5) Change in Control. 

  

 5 

	 	•	 	 Retirement means termination of employment on or after age 65, or on or after age 55 with 20 years of continuous service 

  

	 	•	 	 Total and permanent disability means a medical or physical impairment which can be expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of at least 12
months, as a result of which the Participant is receiving income replacement benefits for a period of at least three months from an accident or health plan covering WRIT employees. 

  

	 	•	 	 A termination that is involuntary or for good reason will be considered on account of a Change in Control if it occurs (1) on or after the Change in Control or
(2) within 90 days before the Change in Control (provided WRIT or its successor cannot demonstrate through a preponderance of evidence that the termination was not on account of the Change in Control). 

  

	 	12.	Form and Timing of Payment of RSUs. RSUs will be converted to common shares of beneficial interest in WRIT and delivered after: (1) vesting in full for individuals who
are employed throughout the five year period; or (2) vesting prior to the end of the five-year period upon termination on account of total and permanent disability, death, retirement, layoff on account of a reduction in force, or Change in
Control. In addition, RSUs that were vested at the time of any other termination of employment (other than a termination for “cause”) will be converted to common shares of beneficial interest in WRIT and distributed. Shares will be paid by
the end of the next calendar quarter to all Participants who are entitled to distribution following vesting at the end of the five-year vesting period. Officers will receive their shares by the end of the next calendar quarter following termination
on account of death, but will not receive their shares until the earlier of (1) the expiration of six months following any other termination of employment or (2) the Officer’s death. 

  

	 	13.	Dividends on RSUs. For vested and non-vested RSUs, an amount equal to the dividends granted on WRIT common shares is paid in cash at the same time dividends on WRIT common
shares are paid. 

  

	 	14.	LTIP Administration and Interpretation. The LTIP will be administered by the Compensation Committee of the Board of Trustees of WRIT, which has the discretion and authority
to interpret the Plan. The LTIP will be interpreted in a manner consistent with ensuring the treatment of the LTIP as two separate plans: (1) a plan pursuant to which RSUs are granted and vest over a five-year period that is operated in
compliance with the requirements of Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code and the regulations and other interpretive guidance issued by the Internal Revenue Service and the U.S. Department of the Treasury guidance under Section 409A
(Section 409A regulations); and (2) a plan providing for the award of PSUs that vest as of the end of a three-year performance period and is operated to ensure that such PSUs are exempt from the application of Section 409A as
“short-term deferrals” under the Section 409A regulations. 

  

 6 

	 	15.	Amendment and Termination of the LTIP. WRIT reserves the right to amend or terminate the LTIP at any time, provided that no amendment will deprive a Participant of any vested
right under the LTIP, nor result in the acceleration of any award payable under the LTIP if such acceleration would result in a violation of Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code or the applicable Treasury Regulations under
Section 409A. If the LTIP is terminated under circumstances with respect to which an acceleration of benefit payments is permitted under Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-3(j)(4)(ix) or such other events and conditions which may be permitted in
generally applicable guidelines published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin, then WRIT reserves any discretion to distribute benefits in accordance with the requirements of such regulations and/or such guidelines. 

  

	 	16.	Effective Date. The provisions of the LTIP, as described above, apply to grants of RSUs and PSUs for performance periods beginning on or after January 1, 2009.

  

 7 

 Appendix A 
 LTI Target Award as a Percentage of Salary 
 Restricted Share Units 
  

											
	Dollar Value of Target RSU Award as a % of Salary	 
	CEO	 	 	EVPs	 	 	SVPs	 	 	Managing
Directors	 
	67	%	 	50	%	 	33	%	 	25	%

 Performance Share Units 
  

											
	Dollar Value of Target PSU Award as a % of Salary
 (and Dollar Value of Target FFO PSU and
 TSR PSU components as % of Salary)
	 
  
  

	CEO	 	 	EVPs	 	 	SVPs	 	 	Managing
Directors	 
	133	%	 	100	%	 	67	%	 	50	%

  

							
				
	PSU components:	  	PSU components:	 	PSU components:	 	PSU components:
				
	FFO PSU: 89.1%	  	FFO PSU: 67%	 	FFO PSU: 44.9%	 	FFO PSU: 33.5%
	TSR PSU: 43.9%	  	TSR PSU: 33%	 	TSR PSU: 22.1%	 	TSR PSU: 16.5%

  

 8 

 Appendix B 
 PSU Payouts as a Percentage of Target Award 
 For FFO PSUs 
 Payouts start above 90% performance and end at 110% performance, with a continuous payout slope of 0.67% increase in payout, as a percentage of the target FFO PSU award,
for every 0.1% increase in performance. 
 Payouts for every 1% increase in performance are illustrated below. However, for performance that falls between
whole percentage points, payouts will be interpolated. 
 Performance Share Units 
  

					
	Performance vs.
Target	 	 	Payout as a % of
Target FFO PSU
Award	 
	<=90	%	 	0	%
	91	%	 	6.7	%
	92	%	 	13.4	%
	93	%	 	20.1	%
	94	%	 	26.8	%
	95	%	 	33.5	%
	96	%	 	40.2	%
	97	%	 	46.9	%
	98	%	 	53.6	%
	99	%	 	60.3	%
	100	%	 	67	%
	101	%	 	73.7	%
	102	%	 	80.4	%
	103	%	 	87.1	%
	104	%	 	93.8	%
	105	%	 	100.5	%
	106	%	 	107.2	%
	107	%	 	113.9	%
	108	%	 	120.6	%
	109	%	 	127.3	%
	>=110	%	 	134	%

 For TSR PSUs 
 Payouts start at the 10th – 19th decile and end at the 90th – 99th decile. 
 Payouts for every decile are illustrated below. For performance that falls between deciles, payouts will not be interpolated. 
 Performance Share Units 
  

				
	Performance
Percentile
Ranking	  	Payout as a % of
Target TSR PSU
Award	 
	10th – 19th	  	6.6	%
	20th – 29th	  	13.2	%
	30th – 39th	  	19.8	%
	40th – 49th	  	26.4	%
	50th – 59th	  	33	%
	60th – 69th	  	41.25	%
	70th – 79th	  	49.5	%
	80th – 89th	  	57.75	%
	90th – 99th	  	66	%

  

 9

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