Document:

ex10-6.htm

EXHIBIT 10.6

Compensation Arrangements with Remer Y. Brinson, III

Neither Georgia-Carolina Bancshares, Inc. (“Company”), nor First Bank of Georgia (“Bank”), has a written employment agreement with Remer Y. Brinson, III, President and Chief Executive Officer of Georgia-Carolina Bancshares, Inc. and First Bank of Georgia.  Mr. Brinson’s current (2012) salary is $295,000 and Mr. Brinson is eligible for an annual incentive award under the Bank’s Annual Incentive Plan, pursuant to which he received $59,149 for his performance in 2011.  See Exhibit 10.8 for a description of Mr. Brinson’s Annual Incentive Plan.  Mr. Brinson is eligible for stock option grants under the Company’s option plans as determined from time to time by the Board of Directors of the Company.  In addition, Mr. Brinson participates in the Bank’s medical, dental, life and disability insurance plans and he may participate in the Company’s 401(k) plan.  Mr. Brinson also receives the following perquisites: payment of private and civic club membership dues, provision of an automobile and an automobile allowance.  The aggregate value of these perquisites in 2010 was less than $10,000.

Mr. Brinson entered into a Severance Protection Agreement with the Bank, which entitles him to certain payments following a change in control of the Company.  The Severance Protection Agreement was filed with the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2006 as Exhibit 10.6.ex10-7.htm

EXHIBIT 10.7

 

Compensation Arrangements with Thomas J. Flournoy

Neither Georgia-Carolina Bancshares, Inc. (“Company”), nor First Bank of Georgia (“Bank”), has a written employment agreement with Thomas J. Flournoy, Chief Financial Officer of Georgia-Carolina Bancshares, Inc. and First Bank of Georgia.  Mr. Flournoy’s current (2012) salary is $175,000 and Mr. Flournoy is eligible for an annual incentive award under the Bank’s Annual Incentive Plan, pursuant to which he received $53,920 for his performance in 2011.  See Exhibit 10.9 for a description of Mr. Flournoy’s Annual Incentive Plan.  Mr. Flournoy is eligible for stock option grants under the Company’s option plans as determined from time to time by the Board of Directors of the Company.  In addition, Mr. Flournoy participates in the Bank’s medical, dental, life and disability insurance plans and he may participate in the Company’s 401(k) plan.

Mr. Flournoy entered into a Severance Protection Agreement with the Bank, which entitles him to certain payments following a change in control of the Company.  The Severance Protection Agreement was filed with the Company’s 8-K filing on June 26, 2009.ex10-8.htm

EXHIBIT 10.8

 

First Bank of Georgia Annual Incentive Plan

for

Remer Y. Brinson, III, President and Chief Executive Officer,

Georgia-Carolina Bancshares, Inc. and First Bank of Georgia

In March 2006, the independent directors who are members of the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors of First Bank of Georgia approved the First Bank of Georgia Annual Incentive Plan (the “Plan”), pursuant to which Mr. Brinson (the “Executive Officer”) may earn an incentive award equal to a percentage of their annual base salary.  The cash incentive award is based upon meeting certain financial performance objectives established at the beginning of each calendar year.

The performance measures for Mr. Brinson are related to asset growth, net income (including accruals for incentive payments under the AIP), and a subjective assessment by the Board of Directors. The financial performance objectives of asset growth and net income are assigned a weighting factor of 40% each, and the subjective assessment of the Board of Directors is assigned a weighting factor of 20%.

The AIP includes a “threshold,” “target” and “stretch” or aspiration goal in each of the asset growth and net income categories.  Failure to meet the threshold goals results in no incentive payment in that category. Achievement of the threshold goals is designed to result in an incentive award of 15% of base salary. Achievement of the target goals is designed to result in an incentive award of 30% of base salary. Achievement of the stretch goals is designed to result in an incentive award of 60% of base salary.  The performance objectives are designed so that the achievement of the target goals would be considered to be reflective of superior performance, and the target goals are considered to be difficult to achieve.

Certain other quality measures are also included in the AIP, which can have the effect of increasing or decreasing the incentive award amount by as much as 45%. The credit quality measures are designed to act as control measures to ensure that net income is not achieved at the expense of credit quality, and that balanced results are achieved. The credit quality measures include expectations related to: (i) classified assets as a percent of total assets, (ii) charge-offs as a percent of loans, and (iii) delinquencies as a percent of loans. If the credit quality results do not meet expectations for a particular credit quality measure, the incentive award will be reduced by 15%. If the credit quality results meet expectations, there is no impact on the incentive award. If the credit quality results exceed expectations, there will be a 15% increase in the incentive award. Adjustments under the credit quality measures will only be made if the threshold net income measure is exceeded.

The subjective assessment of the Board of Directors takes into account various circumstances, developments and occurrences during the year which may have had an impact on the performance measures, and the Board of Directors may act subjectively based upon those considerations and may make upward or downward adjustments to an incentive award based upon the 20% weighting factor.

Excluding the subjective assessment of the Board of Directors, and assuming that (i) the stretch goals were attained for each financial performance category, and (ii) the results of each of the credit quality measures exceeded expectations, the maximum annual incentive award which could be earned is 87% of base salary.

Pursuant to the actual results for the year ended December 31, 2011, Mr. Brinson’s incentive award included a provision for asset growth, since that exceeded the threshold amount. Net income for the year ended December 31, 2011 did not meet the threshold goal, so no incentive payment was earned with respect to that performance measure. Since the net income goal was not met, the credit quality criteria is not applicable for 2011. Mr. Brinson’s incentive award for 2011 also included a subjective assessment of the Board of Directors at the “stretch” level.  Therefore, pursuant to the 2011 AIP, Mr. Brinson’s incentive award was $59,149.

The financial performance objectives and credit quality measures may be adjusted annually by the Board of Directors or an appropriate committee of the Board of Directors. The financial performance objectives have not been modified for the 2012 AIP year.ex10-9.htm

EXHIBIT 10.9

 

First Bank of Georgia Annual Incentive Plan

for

Thomas J. Flournoy, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer,

Georgia-Carolina Bancshares, Inc. and First Bank of Georgia

In March 2006, the independent directors who are members of the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors of First Bank of Georgia approved the First Bank of Georgia Annual Incentive Plan (the “Plan”), pursuant to which Mr. Flournoy (the “Chief Financial Officer”) may earn an incentive award equal to a percentage of their annual base salary.  The cash incentive award is based upon meeting certain financial performance objectives established at the beginning of each calendar year.

The performance measures for Mr. Flournoy are related to Bank operating expense control, core deposit growth and net interest margin, and a subjective assessment by the Board of Directors.  The financial performance objective of expense control is assigned a weighting factor of 50%, the financial performance objectives for core deposit growth and net interest margin are assigned a weighting factor of 20% each, and the subjective assessment of the Board of Directors is assigned a weighting factor of 10%.

The AIP for Mr. Flournoy includes a “threshold,” “target” and “stretch” or aspiration goal in each of the expense control, core deposit growth and net interest margin categories.  Failure to meet the threshold goals results in no incentive payment in that category.  Achievement of the threshold goals is designed to result in an incentive award of 10% of base salary.  Achievement of the target goals is designed to result in an incentive award of 20% of base salary.  Achievement of the stretch goals is designed to result in an incentive award of 40% of base salary.  The performance objectives are designed so that the achievement of the target goals would be considered to be reflective of superior performance, and the target goals are considered to be difficult to achieve.

Certain other quality measures are also included in the AIP, which can have the effect of decreasing the incentive award amount by as much 45%.  These quality measures are designed to act as control measures to ensure that financial reporting control is achieved.  These quality measures include expectations related to: (i) timely financial statement reporting, (ii) high quality audit results, and (iii) timely budget preparation.  Each of the three quality measures is separately measured.  If the quality results do not meet expectations for a particular quality measure, the incentive award will be reduced by 15% for each measure.  If the net quality results meet or exceed expectations, there is no impact on the incentive award.

The subjective assessment of the Board of Directors takes into account various circumstances, developments and occurrences during the year which may have had an impact on financial performance measures, and the Board of Directors may act subjectively based upon those considerations and may make upward or downward adjustments to an incentive award based upon the 10% weighting factor.

Excluding the subjective assessment of the Board of Directors, and assuming (i) the stretch goals were attained for each financial performance category, and (ii) the results of each of the quality measures meet or exceed expectations, the maximum annual incentive award which could be earned is 40% of base salary.

Pursuant to the actual results for the year ended December 31, 2011, Bank operating expenses and core deposit growth exceeded the stretch amount.  Net interest margin met the threshold goal, so an incentive payment was earned with respect that performance measure as well.  Mr. Flournoy’s incentive award also included a subjective assessment by the Board at the “target” level.  The quality measures mentioned above met expectations, therefore no reduction in Mr. Flournoy’s incentive award occurred.  Therefore, pursuant to the 2011 AIP, Mr. Flournoy’s incentive award was $53,920.

The financial performance objectives and credit quality measures may be adjusted annually by the Board of Directors or an appropriate committee of the Board of Directors. The financial performance objectives have not been modified for the 2012 AIP year.

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