Document:

Supplemental Indenture

 Exhibit 4.3 
 SUPPLEMENTAL INDENTURE 
 Supplemental Indenture (this “Supplemental Indenture”),
dated as of August 14, 2012, among REM East, LLC (the “Guaranteeing Subsidiary”), a subsidiary of National Mentor Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Issuer”), and Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association, as trustee (the “Trustee”). 
 WITNESSETH 
 WHEREAS, each of the Issuer and the Guarantors (as defined in the Indenture referred to below) has heretofore executed and delivered to the Trustee an indenture (the “Indenture”), dated
as of February 9, 2011, providing for the issuance of an unlimited aggregate principal amount of 12.50% Senior Notes due 2018 (the “Notes’); 
 WHEREAS, the Indenture provides that under certain circumstances the Guaranteeing Subsidiary shall execute and deliver to the Trustee a supplemental indenture pursuant to which the Guaranteeing Subsidiary
shall unconditionally guarantee all of the Issuer’s Obligations under the Notes and the Indenture on the terms and conditions set forth herein and under the Indenture (the “Guarantee”); and 

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9.01 of the Indenture, the Trustee is authorized to execute and deliver this Supplemental Indenture. 

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties
mutually covenant and agree for the equal and ratable benefit of the Holders of the Notes as follows: 
 (1) Capitalized Terms.
Capitalized terms used herein without definition shall have the meanings assigned to them in the Indenture. 
 (2) Agreement to be Bound.
The Guarantor hereby becomes a party to the Indenture as a Guarantor and as such will have all of the rights and be subject to all of the obligations and agreements of a Guarantor under the Indenture. The Guarantor agrees to be bound by all of the
provisions of the Indenture applicable to a Guarantor and to perform all of the obligations and agreements of a Guarantor under the Indenture. 

(3) Guarantee. The Guarantor agrees, on a joint and several basis with all the existing and future Guarantors, to fully, unconditionally and
irrevocably guarantee to each Holder of the Notes and the Trustee the Guarantor obligations pursuant to Article 11 of the Indenture, including without limitation, the full and prompt payment of the principal of, premium, if any, and interest
on the Notes, on a senior basis as provided in the Indenture. 
 (4) Notices. All notices and other communications to the Guarantor shall
be given as provided in the Indenture. 
 (5) Parties. Nothing expressed or mentioned herein is intended or shall be construed to give
any Person, firm or corporation, other than the Holders and the Trustee, any legal or equitable right, remedy or claim under or in respect of this Supplemental Indenture or the Indenture or any provision herein or therein contained. 

 (6) Governing Law. THIS SUPPLEMENTAL INDENTURE SHALL BE GOVERNED BY, AND CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH, THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
 (7) Ratification of Indenture; Supplemental Indentures Part of Indenture. Except as expressly
amended hereby, the Indenture is in all respects ratified and confirmed and all the terms, conditions and provisions thereof shall remain in full force and effect. This Supplemental Indenture shall form a part of the Indenture for all purposes, and
every Holder of Notes heretofore or hereafter authenticated and delivered shall be bound hereby. The Trustee makes no representation or warranty as to the validity or sufficiency of this Supplemental Indenture. 

(8) Counterparts. The parties hereto may sign one or more copies of this Supplemental Indenture in counterparts, all of which together shall
constitute one and the same agreement. 
 (9) Headings. The headings of in this Supplemental Indenture are for convenience of reference
only and shall not be deemed to alter or affect the meaning or interpretation of any provisions hereof. 

*    *    *    *    * 

 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Supplemental Indenture to be duly executed, all as
of the date first above written. 
  

					
	REM EAST, LLC
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Denis M. Holler

		 	Name:	 	Denis M. Holler
		 	Title:	 	CFO and Treasurer
	
	WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Richard Prokosch

		 	Name:	 	Richard Prokosch
		 	Title:	 	Vice PresidentThe Mentor Network Human Svcs and Corp Mgmt Incentive Compensation Plan

 Exhibit 10.26 
 The MENTOR Network 
 Human Services and Corporate Management

 Incentive Compensation Plan 
 Third Amendment and Restatement 
 dated December 20, 2012

 Effective October 1, 2012 

 Table of Contents 

 

					
	 Purpose of Plan
	  	 	1	  
	 Eligibility
	  	 	1	  
	 Definitions
	  	 	1	  
	 Minimum Threshold Requirement
	  	 	3	  
	 Weighting of Performance Criteria
	  	 	3	  
	 Calculation of Incentive Payouts
	  	 	3	  
	 Calculating the Potential Payout
	  	 	4	  
	 Applying Quality of Services or Work Rating to the Potential Payout
	  	 	4	  
	 Discretionary Incentive Compensation
	  	 	5	  
	 Distribution of 3% Discretionary Pool
	  	 	5	  
	 Discretionary Divestitures
	  	 	5	  
	 In the Event that Calculated Payouts Exceed Funds Available to Pay Incentive Compensation
	  	 	6	  
	 Administration
	  	 	6	  
	 Plan Changes
	  	 	6	  
	 Management of Financial Goals
	  	 	6	  
	 Incentive Compensation Payouts
	  	 	6	  
	 Approval of New Plan Entrants
	  	 	6	  
	 Participant Termination Provisions
	  	 	7	  
	 Terminations Without Cause and Voluntary Terminations
	  	 	7	  
	 Involuntary Terminations for Cause
	  	 	7	  
	 Retirement and Death
	  	 	7	  
	 Special Provisions Relating to Position and Status Changes
	  	 	8	  
	 Promotions and Job Transfers
	  	 	8	  
	 Interruptions in Work
	  	 	8	  
	 Plan Year and Effective Date
	  	 	8	  
	 Plan Amendments
	  	 	8	  
	 Exhibit A: Eligibility, Target IC Opportunity, and Weighting for Management Positions
	  	 	9	  
	 Exhibit B: Target IC Opportunity and Weighting for Executive Officer Positions
	  	 	10	  
	 Annex 1: Performance Scales
	  	 	11	  
	 Annex 2: Sample Incentive Compensation Calculation
	  	 	12	  

 Purpose of Plan 
 The purpose of The MENTOR Network Human Services and Corporate Management Incentive Compensation Plan (the “Plan”) is to provide executives, management and other employees in designated key
positions with the opportunity to receive an annual cash incentive award for achieving performance goals that align with the business goals of The MENTOR Network (“The Network”). 
 Eligibility 
 Eligibility for participation in the Plan is limited to employees in the Human
Services operating groups and certain other management positions, specifically: (i) Executive Officers (as such term is defined under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) and other employees whose positions are listed on Exhibit B
and (ii) employees whose positions are listed on Exhibit A. However, the President and Chief Operating Officer (“President/COO”), the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) and the Chief Human Resources Officer (“CHRO”),
acting together, may amend Exhibit A and Exhibit B with respect to positions which are not Executive Officers. Employees are not eligible to participate in the Plan if they are eligible for participation under any other cash incentive plan of The
Network, with the exception of discretionary bonuses available to participants in the Mergers and Acquisitions Bonus Plan and additional plans as may be specifically approved by the President/COO, CFO and CHRO from time to time. 

Definitions 
 3% Discretionary
Pool. The “3% Discretionary Pool” is a discretionary pool budgeted each fiscal year as three percent of the total budgeted incentive compensation. The actual pool amount is equal to three percent of the sum of the Potential
Payouts for all of the participants in the Plan. The discretionary pool may be used to increase incentive compensation payouts for participants whose calculated Potential Payout adjusted for quality of services/work rating may not adequately reflect
their performance; for example, to a high performer within a state or other organizational unit that does not perform well. 

Adjusted EBITDA. Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, with adjustments, as reported to The
Network’s equity sponsor.  
 Adjusted EBITDA/CTO. Adjusted EBITDA, CTO or both, as applicable to a particular
participant. Adjusted EBITDA/CTO excludes new start investments under immunity and acquisitions other than tuck-ins (as determined by the CEO). 
 Adjusted EBITDA/CTO Performance Level. Actual Adjusted EBITDA/CTO divided by planned (or budgeted) Adjusted EBITDA/CTO as applicable to a given participant, expressed as a percentage.

  
 1 

 CTO. “CTO” means contribution to overhead for a given organizational unit within The
Network. 
 IC Payout Level. The percentage incentive compensation payout that is associated with actual Adjusted EBITDA/CTO and
Revenue performance achieved against plan, as shown on the applicable Performance Scale in Annex 1. A given Performance Level corresponds to an IC Payout Level, ranging from 50.0% to 150.0%, which is factored into the Potential Payout calculation.
For Network Adjusted EBITDA/CTO and Revenue, the Performance Level scale ranges from 92.5% to 107.5%. For Human Services organizational unit Adjusted EBITDA/CTO and Revenue, the Performance Level scale ranges from 92.5% to 104.0%. In cases where
actual Adjusted EBITDA/CTO and/or Revenue performance falls between two performance points in the Performance Scale table, the IC Payout Level used for the Potential Payout calculation will fall proportionately between the two IC Payout Level
percentages in the table. 
 Potential Payout. A participant’s “Potential Payout” is the amount of incentive
compensation potentially payable to a participant based on Network and/or organizational unit performance, before reduction of up to 50 percent based on quality of services and/or quality of work, as determined by the participant’s
supervisor. 
 Reallocation Pool. Unallocated (or forfeited) incentive compensation as a result of unsatisfactory quality of
services/work, which forms a pool of residual dollars for potential reallocation by the applicable Operating Group President or Functional Head. 
 Revenue. As measured in The Network’s financial statements, excluding new start investments under immunity and acquisitions other than tuck-ins (as determined by the CEO). 

Revenue Performance Level. Actual Revenue achieved for the fiscal year divided by planned (or budgeted) Revenue for that year, expressed as
a percentage. 
 Target IC Opportunity. The amount a given participant may earn under the Plan if the applicable planned (or
budgeted) financial targets are achieved and the participant receives a satisfactory rating for quality of services/work. This amount is calculated by multiplying the participant’s annual salary by the applicable Target IC% shown in Exhibit A
or Exhibit B. A participant’s “Target IC Opportunity” is based on the participant’s level of responsibility for and impact on The Network’s business goals. Refer to Exhibit A for management and other key positions, and to
Exhibit B for Executive Officers and others. 

  
 2 

 Minimum Threshold Requirement 
 The minimum actual performance level required for a participant to receive incentive compensation is 92.5 percent of the planned Adjusted EBITDA/CTO target goal for The Network or an organizational unit,
whichever is applicable to the participant. If the minimum threshold requirement is not met, the participant will not receive any incentive compensation unless the participant is awarded discretionary incentive compensation. 

In the case of participants whose incentive compensation is based on both The Network’s and an organizational unit’s performance, the minimum
threshold requirement applies separately to each. That is, if The Network does not achieve the minimum threshold, then the participant will not receive the portion of the incentive compensation based on The Network’s performance. Similarly, if
the organizational unit does not achieve the minimum threshold, then the participant will not receive the portion of incentive compensation based on the organizational unit’s performance. 

Weighting of Performance Criteria 
 For
purposes of calculating a participant’s incentive compensation, weighting between The Network’s and organizational unit’s Adjusted EBITDA/CTO and Revenue performance is determined according to a participant’s position, as set out
on Exhibits A and B. 
 For purposes of calculating a participant’s incentive compensation, the weighting between Revenue and Adjusted
EBITDA and/or CTO is determined each year by the Compensation Committee. 
 Calculation of Incentive Payouts 

Plan participants are eligible to receive incentive compensation based on The Network’s and/or their organizational unit’s performance and their
quality of services/work. The principle steps for calculating a participant’s incentive compensation payout are as follows: 
  

	1.	Calculate the participant’s Potential Payout. 

  

	2.	Determine the participant’s rating for quality of services/work, then calculate the portion of the Potential Payout that will be paid to the participant based on
the results. If the participant achieved a satisfactory rating for quality of services/work (including workforce management and employee engagement), then the participant’s payout will equal the Potential Payout calculated in Step 1. However,
if the participant’s quality of services/work is less than satisfactory, the Potential Payout calculated in Step 1 will be reduced by as much as 50 percent. 

  
 3 

	3.	If applicable, add discretionary incentive compensation to the amount calculated in Step 2. Discretionary incentive compensation may be added from the Reallocation Pool
and/or the 3% Discretionary Pool. 

 For an example of an incentive compensation payout calculation, refer to Annex 2. 

Calculating the Potential Payout 
 To calculate a participant’s Potential Payout described in Step 1 above, the following steps apply: 
  

	1.	Determine if the Adjusted EBITDA/CTO Performance Level meets the minimum threshold requirement (i.e., 92.5 percent of planned performance). 

If the Adjusted EBITDA/CTO Performance Level does not meet the minimum threshold requirement, then the participant’s Potential Payout
is zero. If the minimum threshold requirement is met, then proceed to the next step. 
  

	2.	Determine the IC Payout Level associated with the EBITDA/CTO Performance Level determined in Step 1 using the Performance Scale set out on Annex 1.

  

	3.	Calculate the portion of the participant’s Potential Payout attributable to Adjusted EBITDA/CTO performance by multiplying the participant’s Target Incentive
Compensation by the applicable weighting, as determined by the Compensation Committee for that fiscal year, and then by the IC Payout Level determined in Step 2. 

 

	4.	Determine the Revenue Performance Level for The Network and/or the organizational unit, whichever is applicable to the participant, and then determine the IC Payout
Level associated with the Revenue Performance Level using the Performance Scale set out on Annex 1. 

  

	5.	Calculate the portion of the participant’s Potential Payout attributable to Revenue performance by multiplying the participant’s Target Incentive Compensation
by the applicable weighting, as determined by the Compensation Committee for that fiscal year, and then by the IC Payout Level determined in Step 4. 

  

	6.	Sum the amounts calculated in Steps 3 and 5 to obtain the Potential Payout. 

 Applying Quality of Services or Work Rating to the Potential Payout 
  

	1.	 When quality of services or work is satisfactory or better, the Initial Calculation is unaffected. When quality is assessed as less than satisfactory,
the Initial Calculation is modified. Human Services positions that are set forth on Exhibit A are rated based on quality of services of the participant’s applicable organizational unit, including factors such as licensure issues and
restrictions, workforce management and employee engagement. Other positions (as set forth on Exhibits A and B) are rated based on an individual participant’s quality of work, including factors such as quality of management, employee

  
 4 

	 	
engagement, achievement of assigned goals, completion of assigned projects, and contributions to the achievement of departmental or company goals. A participant’s ratings must be certified
by the participant’s supervisor and: (i) the Operating Group President for a Vice President of Operations; (ii) the Vice President of Operations, for all other Operations positions; (iii) the functional head, or chief, of a
corporate function (the “Functional Head”), for corporate positions. The CEO and the President will certify quality ratings for the Executive Officers reporting to each of them, respectively, and the Compensation Committee will approve and
certify the quality rating for the CEO. 

  

	2.	The participant’s supervisor will assign a percentage score ranging from 0 percent to 50 percent, where 0 percent represents a satisfactory
quality rating (and a deduction of 0) and 50 percent represents the lowest possible quality rating (and a deduction of 50 percent). 

  

	3.	The percentage score is multiplied by the Potential Payout, resulting in a modifier of the Potential Payout (the “Modifier”). 

 

	4.	The Modifier is subtracted from the Potential Payout to yield an initial calculation of an individual’s incentive compensation ranging from 50 percent to 100
percent of the Potential Payout as initially calculated. 

 Discretionary Incentive Compensation 

In cases where a participant’s performance may not be adequately rewarded by the calculations above, additional compensation may be awarded from the
3% Discretionary Pool, as detailed below, and/or the Reallocation Pool (established when quality of services/work ratings are less than satisfactory). Awards from the Reallocation Pool will be made in the discretion of the applicable Operating Group
President or Functional Head, except for additions to payouts for Executive Officers, whose additions must be recommended by the CEO and approved by the Compensation Committee. 
 Distribution of 3% Discretionary Pool 
 Based on actual Network Adjusted EBITDA and Revenue
performance, the planned (or budgeted) 3% Discretionary Pool will be adjusted so that it is 3 percent of the total potential pool. The 3% Discretionary Pool shall be available for increases to incentive compensation payouts to any participant,
which payouts shall be approved by the CEO, except for additions to payouts for Executive Officers, whose additions must be recommended by the CEO and approved by the Compensation Committee. 

Discretionary Divestitures 
 Notwithstanding the foregoing, if a participant engages in or bears responsibility for exceptionally poor conduct or poor performance during the fiscal year, he or she may not be entitled to receive any
incentive compensation whatsoever, regardless of the Potential Payout calculation and ratings for quality of services/work. The decision to divest a participant will be made by: (i) the President/COO and the Operating Group President, for
Operations positions; (ii) the CEO and Functional Head, for corporate positions; or (iii) the Compensation Committee, for Executive Officers. 

  
 5 

 In the Event that Calculated Payouts Exceed 

Funds Available to Pay Incentive Compensation 
 In the event that the total calculated incentive payouts, after taking into account any discretionary redistributions of unallocated incentive compensation, exceed the funds that are available to pay
incentive compensation, all payouts will be reduced proportionately based on the funds available. 
 Administration 

Plan Changes 
 The
Compensation Committee must approve the Plan and any changes to the Plan, except that the President, CFO and CHRO, acting together, may amend Exhibit A and/or Exhibit B to the extent such amendments do not relate to Executive Officers. 

Management of Financial Goals 
 For each fiscal year, the Compensation Committee must approve: 
  

	•	The Adjusted EBITDA and Revenue performance goals that will be used for measuring Cambridge Operating Group, Redwood Operating Group and Network performance;

  

	•	The weighting between Adjusted EBITDA and Revenue that will be used to calculate performance under the Plan; and 

 

	•	The actual performance results for Cambridge Operating Group, Redwood Operating Group and the Network that will be used as the basis for calculating incentive
compensation payouts. 

 The CEO, President/COO and CFO must approve actual performance results for organizational units as
compared to the budgeted (i.e., planned) goals approved by management. 
 Incentive Compensation Payouts 

Each fiscal year, the Compensation Committee must approve all incentive compensation payouts for Executive Officers. The CEO and President/COO must
approve all other incentive compensation payouts. If either the CEO or the President/COO is not available to sign approval of the payments, then the CFO or the CHRO may co-sign approval. 

Approval of New Plan Entrants 
 The Compensation Committee must approve any new Executive Officer entering the plan and the applicable performance weightings and incentive compensation payout opportunities. 

  
 6 

 Approval of new entrants other than Executive Officers is based on whether an employee’s position has
been approved for plan participation (as set forth on Exhibit A or Exhibit B). New participants (other than Executive Officers and other than those set forth on Exhibit A or Exhibit B) must be approved for entry into the Plan by the President/COO,
CFO and CHRO. 
 Participant Termination Provisions 
 Terminations Without Cause and Voluntary Terminations 
 Plan participants whose employment
is terminated without cause or who terminate employment voluntarily before the actual payment date of incentive compensation, other than by retirement, will not be eligible for any incentive payout under the Plan, with the exception of specific
situations that are approved by the CEO or, in the case of payouts for Executive Officers, approved by the Compensation Committee. 
 Involuntary Terminations for Cause 
 Plan participants whose employment is involuntarily
terminated for cause will not be eligible for incentive payouts under the Plan under any circumstances. “Cause” shall mean any of the following: (i) theft or embezzlement, or attempted theft or embezzlement, of money or property of
the Company or any subsidiary, perpetration or attempted perpetration of fraud, or participation in a fraud or attempted fraud, on the Company or any subsidiary, or any third party, or unauthorized appropriation of, or attempt to misappropriate, any
tangible or intangible assets or property of the Company or any subsidiary; (ii) any act or acts of disloyalty, misconduct, or moral turpitude injurious to the interest, property, operations, or business reputation of the Company or any
subsidiary; (iii) material violation of any agreement with the Company or any serious violation of the Company’s policies, including its Code of Conduct; or (iv) failure or inability (other than by reason of disability) to carry out
effectively a participant’s duties and obligations to the Company and its subsidiaries or to participate effectively and actively in the management of the Company and its subsidiaries, as determined in the reasonable judgment of the CEO or,
with respect to the CEO, the Compensation Committee. 
 Retirement and Death 

Plan participants whose employment terminates because of retirement or death are eligible to receive an incentive compensation payout. The payout will be
calculated based upon actual Network and/or organizational unit performance for the full fiscal year and the quality rating for the portion of the year that the individual was employed, and the resulting amount prorated for the portion of the year
that was worked. Any incentive compensation payout that is earned will be paid at the normal payout date for all Plan participants. 

  
 7 

 Special Provisions Relating to Position and Status Changes 

Promotions and Job Transfers 
 Plan goals and payout weightings may be reestablished for an individual participant upon transfer or promotion to a new position. Unless otherwise determined by the CEO, incentive payouts will be
calculated based upon the participant’s position and base salary as of the last day of the fiscal year. 
 Interruptions
in Work 
 A long-term illness or disability will not affect the eligibility of an employee to participate in the Plan. Actual performance
achieved will be evaluated and the corresponding incentive payout will be prorated based upon the amount of time worked during the performance period. 
 “Disability” shall mean the inability, due to illness, accident, injury, physical or mental incapacity, or other disability, of any participant to carry out effectively his or her duties and
obligations to the Company or to participate effectively and actively in the management of the Company for a period of at least 90 consecutive days or for shorter periods aggregating at least 90 days (whether or not consecutive) during any 180-day
period, as determined in the reasonable judgment of the CEO, or in the case of an Executive Officer, the Compensation Committee. 
 Special
assignments generally will not affect either the target goals or incentive payout, except as may be reflected in a participant’s performance review rating. However, if the special assignment is of a significant nature or duration, Plan goals
may be reestablished and incentive payouts prorated based on the time spent in each position during the performance period. 
 Plan Year and
Effective Date 
 The Plan year is the fiscal year, which starts on October 1st and ends on September 30th. The effective date of this amended and restated plan is
October 1, 2012. 
 Plan Amendments 
 The MENTOR Network reserves the right to amend this Plan at any time, including termination of the Plan, without prior notice to participants. 

  
 8 

 Exhibit A: Eligibility, Target IC Opportunity, and Weighting for Management Positions 

 

													
	 Eligible Positions
	  	Target IC % 

Opportunity	 	 	Network 
Weighting	 	 	Organizational 
Unit 
Weighting	 
	 Operations and Field Management Positions
	  				 				 			
	 Vice President, Operations
	  	 	30	% 	 	 	25	% 	 	 	75	% 
	 Vice President, CFO
	  	 	30	% 	 	 	25	% 	 	 	75	% 
	 Vice President, Field HR
	  	 	30	% 	 	 	25	% 	 	 	75	% 
	 Senior Executive Director
	  	 	25	% 	 	 	25	% 	 	 	75	% 
	 Executive Director
	  	 	20	% 	 	 	0	% 	 	 	100	% 
	 State Director
	  	 	20	% 	 	 	0	% 	 	 	100	% 
	 Regional Director
	  	 	15	% 	 	 	0	% 	 	 	100	% 
	 Operations Director
	  	 	15	% 	 	 	0	% 	 	 	100	% 
	 Area Director
	  	 	10	% 	 	 	0	% 	 	 	100	% 
	 Program Manager II
	  	 	10	% 	 	 	0	% 	 	 	100	% 
	 Senior Business Director
	  	 	20	% 	 	 	25	% 	 	 	75	% 
	 Business Director
	  	 	15	% 	 	 	25	% 	 	 	75	% 
	 Business Manager
	  	 	10	% 	 	 	0	% 	 	 	100	% 
	 State Accounting Manager
	  	 	10	% 	 	 	0	% 	 	 	100	% 
	 Operating Group Director, QA
	  	 	15	% 	 	 	25	% 	 	 	75	% 
	 Director (Regional level HR & QA)
	  	 	10	% 	 	 	25	% 	 	 	75	% 
				
	 Corporate (All positions at levels indicated below)
	  				 				 			
	 Vice President
	  	 	30	% 	 	 	100	% 	 	 	0	% 
	 Senior Director
	  	 	20	% 	 	 	100	% 	 	 	0	% 
	 Director
	  	 	15	% 	 	 	100	% 	 	 	0	% 
	 Manager
	  	 	10	% 	 	 	100	% 	 	 	0	% 
	 Manager (Designated Field)
	  	 	10	% 	 	 	100	% 	 	 	0	% 

  
 9 

 Exhibit B: Target IC Opportunity and Weighting for Executive Officer Positions 

 

													
	 Position
	  	Target IC 
Payout
Opportunity	 	 	Network	 	 	Operating Group	 
	 Chief Executive Officer
	  	 	100	% 	 	 	100	% 	 	 	0	% 
	 President and Chief Operating Officer
	  	 	75	% 	 	 	100	% 	 	 	0	% 
	 Operating Group Presidents
	  	 	50	% 	 	 	25	% 	 	 	75	% 
	 All Other Executive Officers
	  	 	50	% 	 	 	100	% 	 	 	0	% 

  
 10 

 Annex 1: Performance Scales 

 

																	
	 	  	IC Payout Level Based on Performance	 
	 	  	Network
Performance
Level
(Revenue
and EBITDA)	 	 	IC
Payout
Level	 	 	Human
Services
Performance
Level (Org
Unit
Revenue and
EBITDA/CTO)	 	 	IC
Payout
Level	 
		  	 	107.5	% 	 	 	150.0	% 	 				 			
		  	 	106.0	% 	 	 	140.0	% 	 	 	104.0	% 	 	 	150.0	% 
		  	 	104.5	% 	 	 	130.0	% 	 	 	103.0	% 	 	 	137.5	% 
		  	 	103.0	% 	 	 	120.0	% 	 	 	102.0	% 	 	 	125.0	% 
		  	 	101.5	% 	 	 	110.0	% 	 	 	101.0	% 	 	 	112.5	% 
		  	  
	  
	 	 	  
	  
	 	 	  
	  
	 	 	  
	  
	 
	 Target (Plan)
	  	 	100.0	% 	 	 	100.0	% 	 	 	100.0	% 	 	 	100.0	% 
		  	  
	  
	 	 	  
	  
	 	 	  
	  
	 	 	  
	  
	 
		  	 	98.5	% 	 	 	90.0	% 	 	 	98.5	% 	 	 	90.0	% 
		  	 	97.0	% 	 	 	80.0	% 	 	 	97.0	% 	 	 	80.0	% 
		  	 	95.5	% 	 	 	70.0	% 	 	 	95.5	% 	 	 	70.0	% 
		  	 	94.0	% 	 	 	60.0	% 	 	 	94.0	% 	 	 	60.0	% 
		  	 	92.5	% 	 	 	50.0	% 	 	 	92.5	% 	 	 	50.0	% 

  
 11 

 Annex 2: 
 Sample Incentive Compensation Calculation 

  
 12 

 Sample Incentive Compensation Calculations 
 Example #1: 
  

															
	General Information	 	 	Fiscal Year Results	  	 	 	 	 	 
	 Employee
	  	 	Brown, Jane	  	 	CTO Performance Level	  	 	97.00	% 	 			
	 Job Title
	  	 	Regional Director	  	 	CTO Payout Level	  	 	80.00	% 	 			
	 Annual Salary
	  	$	50,000	  	 	Revenue Performance Level	  	 	101.00	% 	 			
	 Target IC %
	  	 	15	% 	 	Revenue Payout Level	  	 	112.50	% 	 			
	 Target IC $
	  	$	7,500	  	 	Combined Payout Level	  	 	96.25	% 	 			
	 Network Weighting
	  	 	0	% 	 		  				 			
	 Org Unit Weighting
	  	 	100	% 	 	Quality Modifier	  	 	10	% 	 			
	 CTO Weighting
	  	 	50	% 	 		  				 			
	 Revenue Weighting
	  	 	50	% 	 	IC Payout Calculation	  				 			
		  				 	Potential Payout	  	$	7,219	  	 			
		  				 	Payout After Quality Modifier	  	$	6,497	  	 			
		  				 	Discretionary Awards	  	$	0	  	 			
		  				 	IC Payout	  	$	6,497	  	 			
	Example #2:	  				 		  				 			
				
	General Information	 	 	Fiscal Year Results	  	Network	 	 	Org Unit	 
	 Employee
	  	 	Smith, Robert	  	 	CTO Performance Level	  	 	94.00	% 	 	 	97.00	% 
	 Job Title
	  	 	Business Director	  	 	CTO Payout Level	  	 	60.00	% 	 	 	80.00	% 
	 Annual Salary
	  	$	50,000	  	 	Revenue Performance Level	  	 	101.50	% 	 	 	101.00	% 
	 Target IC %
	  	 	15	% 	 	Revenue Payout Level	  	 	110.00	% 	 	 	112.50	% 
	 Target IC $
	  	$	7,500	  	 	Combined Payout Level	  	 	85.00	% 	 	 	96.25	% 
	 Network Weighting
	  	 	25	% 	 		  				 			
	 Org Unit Weighting
	  	 	75	% 	 	Quality Modifier	  	 	0	% 	 			
	 CTO Weighting
	  	 	50	% 	 		  				 			
	 Revenue Weighting
	  	 	50	% 	 	IC Payout Calculation	  				 			
		  				 	Potential Payout	  	$	7,008	  	 			
		  				 	Payout After Quality Modifier	  	$	7,008	  	 			
		  				 	Discretionary Awards	  	$	1,000	  	 			
		  				 	IC Payout	  	$	8,008	  	 			

  
 13

Source: [{"source": "alea-institute/alea-institute/kl3m-data-edgar-agreements/train-00211-of-00352.parquet"}, [{"source": "alea-institute/alea-institute/kl3m-data-edgar-agreements/train-00211-of-00352.parquet"}]]