パレスチナ独立戦争

パレスチナ独立戦争もしくはパレスチナ・アラブ反乱（英語: 1936–39 Arab revolt in Palestine、ヘブライ語: המרד הערבי הגדול‎）は、イギリス委任統治領パレスチナのパレスチナ・アラブ人が大量のユダヤ人入植への反発とイギリス植民地支配に対し独立を求め起こした民族主義反乱である。 反乱は主に2つの期間に分類される。第1期は都市の精鋭であるアラブ高等委員会(HAC)が指揮し、同盟罷業と政治的抗議が主だった。1936年10月までに、この段階はイギリスのパレスチナ・トランスヨルダン高等委員会が政治的合意、外交(イラク、サウジアラビア、トランスヨルダン、イエメンの支配者を含む)、戒厳令を組み合わせて破壊した。 一方、第2期は1937年後半に始まり、暴力的で貧民が率いる抵抗運動がイギリス軍を襲撃した。第2期の間、反乱はイギリス軍やパレスチナ警察軍が野蛮な方法で鎮圧する事で、アラブ人の反乱への援助を削る事を狙った。 イギリスの公式の記録によると、軍と警察は戦闘で2000人以上のアラブ人を殺害し、108人を処刑し、961人がイギリスの言う「ギャング・テロ行為」で殺害された。 イギリス統計局のワリドゥ・ハリディ（英語版）の分析によると、1万9792人のアラブ人が犠牲者となった。内訳はイギリス人に殺された3832人、「テロ行為」で殺害された1200人(死者合計5032人)、負傷者が1万4760人である。パレスチナ人の成人男性(20歳～60歳)の1割以上が死亡・負傷・収監・亡命した。 パレスチナ・ユダヤ人は91人～数百人が殺害されたと推定されている。 パレスチナでの反乱は失敗したが、のちのパレスチナ戦争(1948年)のきっかけになった。 この反乱はイギリスによるハガナーのようなシオン主義軍事組織へのアラブのパレスチナでの大規模支援に繋がり、反乱の指導者であるエルサレムの大ムフティであるハジュ・アミン・アル・フッセイニは亡命した。 1930年、シェイクのイッズ・アドゥ・ディン・アル・カッサム(1882年～1935年)は、反シオニズム且つ反イギリスの軍事組織である黒の手を設立した。カッサムは貧民を雇用し軍事訓練を施し、1935年までに200人～800人を数えるようになった。構成員は爆弾や火器で武装し、ユダヤ人入植者を殺害し、入植者が植えた木やイギリス人が引いた鉄道を破壊した。 1935年11月、カッサム軍の2人が果物泥棒を探すパレスチナ警察を1人殺害した。この事件の後、イギリスはカッサムをヤーバドゥ近くの洞窟に追い込み、戦闘によって殺害した。カッサムの死はアラブ社会に大きな怒りを引き起こした。多くの人がカッサムの遺体をハイファに埋葬した。(Gilbert 1998, p. 80)1935年10月、パレスチナ人はヤッファ港のセメント事件でハガナーの運命を決定した。アラブ人がユダヤ軍を恐れる感情がパレスチナ人も覆い、ユダヤ人入植が最多となる1935年の数か月前にパレスチナ人が全土で反乱を起こした。1933年～36年の4年間で16.4万人以上のユダヤ人がパレスチナに入植し、1931年～36年の間にユダヤ人人口は17.5万人から2倍以上の37万人に増加した。これはユダヤ人人口が17%から27%に増加した事を意味し、パレスチナ人とユダヤ人の間に決定的な関係破壊を齎した。 1936年4月15日、ナーブルスからトゥルカームに向かう護送団への攻撃から反乱は始まり、その中で恐らくカッサミテの攻撃者がユダヤ人運転手イスラエル・カザン、ズヴィ・ダンネンベルグの2人を撃った。カザンは即死、ダンネンベルグは5日後に死亡した。 翌日、ユダヤ人のエツェル(ユダヤ民族軍事機構)は報復としてペタク・チクヴァ近くの小屋で眠っていたアラブ人労働者2人を射殺した。 4月17日にテルアビブで行われたカザンの葬儀はユダヤ人による暴動に繋がり、アラブ人の子供達が殴られ所有物が破壊された。4月19日～22日のヤッファとテルアビブの暴動で、ユダヤ人16人とアラブ人5人が殺害された。これを受けてアラブ人将軍が始めた反乱は1936年10月まで続いた。 1936年の夏には、何千ものユダヤ人の果樹園が破壊され、ユダヤ人は攻撃され殺害され、ベト・シェアンやアッコ等のユダヤ人社会は安全な地域に避難した。(Gilbert 1998, p. 80) 経済要因も独立戦争の開始に大きな影響を与えた 。パレスチナのファッラーヒーン(貧農)はアラブ人人口の2/3を占め、1920年代から都市に大量に移住したが、そこでも貧困と社会的限界にぶつかるだけだった。 多くはヤッファとハイファのあばら家に住み、そこで貧者の中で働くカリスマ的伝道者のカッサムの援助と励ましを受けた。カッサムの存在が独立戦争を全土に広めた。第一次世界大戦はパレスチナの特に田舎を深く貧しくした。オスマン帝国と委任統治政府が農作物に重税を課し、更に1920年～30年代に安い輸入品や自然災害によって価格が急落した為貧農の生活は更に苦しくなった。 貧農の地代は人口密度上昇やユダヤ人入植機構(ユダヤ人国立基金)による土地の強奪により鋭く上昇し、地代を払えない為に追い出される貧農が続出した。1931年までに59万人のアラブ人が164km²の低地農地を所有していたのに対し、5万人のユダヤ人が102km²を所有していた。 1931年以降「土地を持たないアラブ人」問題は大きくなり、ワウチョペ高等委員はこの社会的貧困が不満を生み、深刻な混乱に繋がるかも知れないと警告した。委任統治政府はアラブ人からユダヤ人への土地の移動を制限したが、容易に法の抜け道が見つけられ上手く機能しなかった。政府の経済成長・健康維持への投資の失敗と、イシューブ(ユダヤ人共同体)への投資だけを考えるシオン主義政党により、問題は更に拡大した。政府はアラブ人の最低賃金をユダヤ人より低く設定する事で、ユダヤ人共同体の経済基盤(例：ハイファ発電所、シェメン石油・石鹸工場、グランズ・モウリンズ製粉所、ネシェーセメント工場等)を地方のアラブ人に低賃金で作らせる事に成功した。 1935年以降は、建設過熱期の停滞と排他的ヘブライ労働計画へのユダヤ人共同体の集中によって、地方からの流入者は職を殆ど得られなくなった。1935年にはアラブ人労働人口のたった5%の1.2万人がユダヤ人部門で働き、その内半分は農業部門だった。3.2万人は委任統治政府で働き、21.1万人は自営業かアラブ人雇用者の下で働いていた。オスマン帝国時代から続くパレスチナの農業の崩壊は、土地を持たない為に都会で阻害され貧しく暮らす貧農を多く生み出し、彼らは喜んで独立戦争に参加した。 最初はシオン主義との衝突はアラブ・パレスチナ人社会を文化・社会・宗教・政治の面で保守的にした。イギリス植民地主義とユダヤ人の侵略の2つの衝撃に対抗して、自分達独自の遺産や存在を保護しようと強く動機付けられたからだ。伝統的にアラブ人は精鋭を輩出していたが、本当の意味での指導者はいなかった。 1930年代に両方変わった。この期間に新しい政治組織や新種の活動家が現れ始め、社会全体を巻き込むようになった。特に田舎社会に長く根付いていた民族主義が都会に定着し始めた。この時期若い活動家が急増した。有名な組織に1931年からシオン主義への武力抵抗を呼びかける「若者のムスリム協会」や汎アラブ感情を表明した「若者議会党」、1936年初頭に設立されて総同盟罷業で活躍した「パレスチナ人スカウト協会」がある。活発な社会問題となっていた女性組織も1920年代末から政治に関わるようになった。1929年にエルサレムで開催された「アラブ女性議会」は200人の参加者を集め、「アラブ女性協会」(後のアラブ女性連合)と共に女権論者のタラブ・アブドゥル・ハディが同時期に設立した。1930年代初頭から新しい政党が現れ始めた。中でもインド国民会議式ボイコットを主張する「独立党」や、ナシャシビ派の「国民防衛党」、フセイニ派の「パレスチナ人アラブ党」、ハリディ派の「改革党」、ナーブルスを基盤とする「国民議員連合」が有名である。 一方で、武装蜂起を目指す地下軍事組織も少数ながら存在した。ツファット山を中心としたが1931年にイギリスが消滅させた「緑の手」や、ヘブロン市を中心としたアブドゥ・アル・カディー・アル・フサイニが率いる「聖なる抗争の為の組織」(1948年の第2次パレスチナ独立戦争で重要な役割を果たした)や、1935年からトゥルカーム市やカルキルヤー市を中心とする「反抗する若者」が有名である。伝統あるネビ・ムサ祭も政治・民族主義的意味合いを持ち始めた。1917年のバルフォア宣言を祝う11月2日の「バルフォアの日」や、「ヒッティーンの戦い記念日」(1187年6月4日にサラーフッディーン(1137年～1193年)がエルサレムを奪還した)、1930年5月16日から祝うようになった「パレスチナの日」といった国民の記念日が導入・追加された。教育の普及や市民社会・輸送・意思疎通・広報の発展の全てがこれらの変化を生み出した。 近隣のアラブ諸国の政治体制の変化は、パレスチナ人に西側諸国の植民地の中で政治圧力と交渉技術を使って何が得られるか考えさせた。シリアでは1936年1月20日～3月6日にかけて総同盟罷業が全土の主要都市で行われ、国中で起きた政治的示威運動はシリア民族運動に新鮮な弾みを付けた。フランスの反応は厳しかったが、政府はフランス・シリア独立条約(1936年)を交渉する為にシリア人の代表をパリに派遣する事に3月2日に合意した。この事は経済的・政治的圧力によって脆い帝国支配に対抗出来る事を示した。 1936年3月2日、エジプトで行われたイギリスとエジプトの一連の交渉はイギリス・エジプト条約(1936年)に繋がり、スエズ運河地域におけるイギリス軍の駐留は続くもののエジプトは独立を勝ち取った。イラクでは総同盟罷業が1931年7月に起き、通りで組織された示威行動を行った事もあり、ヌーリー・アッ＝サイード首相(1888年～1958年)の下でイギリス委任統治領から独立し、1932年10月には国際連盟に正式加盟した。 4月19日にアラブ国民委員会創立の地であるナーブルスで同盟罷業が始まり、月末には国民委員会は全ての町や大きな村で設立された。 4月21日、5大主要党の代表はナーブルスで決定に合意し、工場、輸送、小売に関わる全てのアラブ人に4月22日に同盟罷業するよう呼びかけた。同盟罷業は最初は労働者や地方委員が組織していたが、下からの圧力によって政治指導者も組織に協力するようになった。これは1936年4月25日のアラブ高等委員会(AHC)設立に繋がった。委員会は「イギリス政府が現在の政策を根本的に変えるまで総同盟罷業を続ける」事を決議し、要求を以下の3点にまとめた。 ユダヤ人入植の禁止 アラブ人からユダヤ人への土地の受け渡しの禁止 代表議会に責任を持つ国民政府の設立 総同盟罷業開始から約1ヶ月後、指導者集団はユダヤ人入植に対抗して税金支払いを完全に拒否した。田舎では武装反乱が散発的に始まり、時が経つに連れて組織化されていった。反乱の主要標的の1つはイラクの石油企業が数年前に建設したモスル・ハイファ石油輸送網で、ガリラヤ湖の南のヨルダン川地点が狙われた。石油網の様々な場所が何度も爆破された。他の攻撃は線路や電車、ユダヤ人入植地、混住地域でのユダヤ人、ユダヤ教徒等に向けられた。 同盟罷業への対抗策は最初から厳しく、後には警告無しの家探しや夜襲、予防的拘留、鞭打ち、国外追放、資産没収、拷問のように更に残虐なものになった。1936年5月初頭、イギリスは武装車両で装備したユダヤ人予備警察を設立した。イギリス政府は同盟罷業はパレスチナ人の完全補助を受けていると確信し、「アラブの民の意思と魂は弱まらない」事を知った。1933年～36年にパレスチナ・トランスヨルダンのイギリス空軍で少将を務めたリチャード・ペイーセ(1892年～1970年)は武装反乱は村人に補助されていると報告した。 「反乱軍から主導権を奪い返すには反乱や破壊活動を起こす村人に対抗策を打つのが有効とすぐに明らかになった。それ故警察監察官のR.G.B.スパイサーに村を調査させる共同作戦を主導した。表面上武器や指名手配犯を見付ける為に行う調査方式はトルコ方式に似ており、厳しく効果的だった。」 現実にはこの方法が村人と独立勢力の間の結束を創り出した。政府派のナブルス市長は「前回の調査で村で行われた行為は破壊や宝石の窃盗、聖なるコーランの破壊であり、これは農民を激昂させるだけだった」と高等委員会に抗議した。しかしながら、ユダヤ人職員のモシェ・シェートクは事件の有った地域の全ての村人は罰せられるべきだと述べた。 6月2日、独立勢力の列車を脱線させる計画はエジプトからの「ベッドフォード村及びヘートフォード村第2連隊」の厳しい警備によって阻まれた。6月4日、政府はこの事件を受けて多数のパレスチナ人指導者を集めネゲヴ砂漠のアウジャ・アル・ハフィーの拘留施設で監禁した。7月、ファウジ・アル・カウクジ(1890年～1977年)率いるシリアやトランスヨルダンからのアラブ人義勇兵によって独立勢力は部隊を4分割出来るようになり、150～200人の小隊はそれぞれ地域司令官が指揮した。 9月7日、ロンドンの植民地行政府が発行した政策宣言では状況を「パレスチナのイギリス政府への直接的挑戦」と述べ、ジョン・ディル中将(1881年～1944年)を最高軍事司令官に任命した。9月終盤、2万人のパレスチナのイギリス兵が「アラブ人勢力を検挙する」為に配置された。1936年6月、イギリスはトランスヨルダン、イラク、サウジアラビア、エジプトにパレスチナのアラブ人鎮圧を呼び掛けた。10月9日、支配者は同盟罷業を終えるよう呼びかけた。柑橘類の価格急騰により、スペイン内戦で作られた柑橘類しか買えなくなった。 1936年10月11日に同盟罷業は終了し、ピール委員会があった約1年間暴力は弱まった。1936年5月18日に宣言された王立委員会とその委員は6月29日に呼ばれたが、ピール委員会は11月11日までパレスチナに到着しなかった。ピール委員会は後に1000人のアラブ人独立勢力が同盟罷業中に殺された事を踏まえ、この混乱を「植民地支配に対抗するパレスチナのアラブ人の開けた反乱で、他国のアラブ人が手助けしている」と描写した。また、2つの前代未聞の事件がこの独立運動で起きたと述べた。1つ目はパレスチナ行政府(全てのアラブ人裁判官を含む)の全てのアラブ人司令官、政治家、技術局が独立運動を援助した事である。2つ目は近くの国(シリア、イラク)のアラブ人が興味と共感を示し義勇兵として独立運動に協力した事である。 1920年代初頭の最初のパレスチナ高等委員会のハーバート・サミュエル(1870年～1963年)はパレスチナ・アラブ人とパレスチナ・ユダヤ人が1つの憲法の下で統一政府を創らせる事に失敗した。この失敗がユダヤ局がユダヤ人入植地に一定の自治権を行使する一方で、イスラム最高評議会が同様にイスラム教徒を管理する図式を作った。このように、ピール卿がパレスチナに到着する1936年11月11日には既に王立委員会が提案した領土分割交渉が進んでおり、これは1937年7月7日に報告された。ピールの主な狙いはパレスチナを小さなユダヤ州(当時のユダヤ人土地所有人口と国内の最も肥沃な土地を合わせた領域に基づく)と強制居住地区、トランスヨルダンに接する大きなアラブ州に分割する事だった。 2つ目且つより過激な提案はユダヤ州に住む22.5万人のアラブ人をアラブ州やトランスヨルダンに強制移住させる事だった。シオン主義指導者がピールに移住の概念を受け入れるよう説得したと見られており、これはシオン主義者の観念形態の一要素だった。アラブ高等委員会は直ちに提案を拒否し、修正シオン主義者も同様に拒否した。 初めはミズラチ(宗教的シオン主義組織)と一般的シオン主義運動の一部、労働シオン主義運動は提案に反対した。ピール委員会の援助を受けて強制移住を行ったベン=グリオンは、この強制移住を「ユダヤ人の自由な故郷の地固め」の基礎と考えた。続いて主要なユダヤ人指導者であるハイム・ヴァイツマン(1874年～1952年)とベン=グリオンは、世界シオン主義会議に曖昧な状態で「ピールの提案が今後の交渉の基礎であり、イギリスとピールの提案の修正交渉を行う」事に同意させた。 最初はイギリス政府はピールの提案を原則受け入れた。しかし戦争の気配がヨーロッパに近付く中で、イギリス政府はこの提案が多数派であるパレスチナ・アラブ人を抑圧し、その結果アラブ世界全体を敵に回す行為だと気付いた。ウッドヘッド委員会として知られる技術委員会は1938年に「自立的アラブ州は境界をどう設定しても実現出来ない」と報告した。ウッドヘッド委員会は「充分に入植の基礎を作り確実に土地収用する為の修正分割案」を報告した。これはイギリスが「アラブ州が予算を安定させる為の充分な援助」を提供する事が前提になっている。 ウッドヘッドが総合報告書を発行してすぐに、イギリス政府はパレスチナでの如何なる分割も非現実的だとして却下した。 ピール委員会の提案が失敗に終わったことで、反乱は1937年の秋に再開された。アンドリュースはガリラヤ地方長官代理のルイス・アンドリュースが9月26日にナザレでクアッセマイトの武装集団に暗殺されたことでパレスチナ人から広く嫌われていた。9月30日、政府は大英帝国のどの地域でも政治亡命者を拘留することを許可する規則が発行され、高等弁務官はその目的が公序良俗に反するとみなす団体を非合法化する権限を与えられた。ハジ・アミン・アル・フセイニは最高モスレム評議会の指導者から解任され、ワクフ一般委員会、地方全国委員会、アラブ高等委員会は解散させられ、5人のアラブ人指導者が逮捕され、セーシェルに強制送還された； 逮捕を恐れてジャマール・エル＝フセイニはシリアに、ハジ・アミン・エル＝フセイニはレバノンに逃亡した。パレスチナとのすべての国境は閉鎖され、近隣諸国との電話回線は引き揚げられ、報道検閲が導入され、特別な強制収容所がアクレ近郊に開設された。 1937年11月、イルグンはハブラガ政策を正式に否定し、ユダヤ人市民に対するアラブ人の攻撃に対する「積極的防衛」と呼ばれる形態として、アラブ人市民に対する一連の無差別攻撃に着手した。イギリス当局は軍事法廷を設置し、銃器の携帯・発砲、破壊工作、脅迫に関する罪の裁判を行った。しかし、それにもかかわらず、アラブ人による殺人と破壊工作のキャンペーンは続き、丘陵地帯のアラブ人ギャングは組織化されたゲリラ戦闘員の様相を呈した[105]。警察は陸軍司令官の作戦統制下に置かれ、軍関係者は秩序の執行において文民当局に取って代わった。10月には、反乱軍の拠点となっていたエルサレム旧市街が軍によって再占領された。年末までに町々では秩序が回復されたが、農村部では第二次世界大戦が勃発するまでテロが続いた。 軍法は、迅速な実刑判決を可能にした。何千人ものアラブ人が、裁判もなく、適切な衛生環境もないまま、過密な収容所に行政拘留された。イギリスはすでに1924年から1925年にかけての集団責任・処罰条例でパレスチナにおける集団処罰の原則を正式に定めており、1936年には集団罰金条例でこれらの条例を更新した。特に軍が家畜の没収、財産の破壊、長期の夜間外出禁止令、警察署の設置、家屋の取り壊し、アラブ人男性の一部または全員を遠方の収容所に拘留した。 完全な戒厳令は導入されなかったが、1936年から37年にかけての一連の公使命令と緊急規則において、「法定」戒厳令、すなわち文民権力の下での半軍事的支配と軍事権力の下での完全な戒厳令の中間の段階、文民高等弁務官ではなく軍が優位に立つ段階が設けられた。1938年10月にアラブ軍がエルサレム旧市街を占領した後、軍は事実上エルサレムを占領し、その後パレスチナ全土を占領した。イギリス軍が採用した集団処罰の主な形態は、財産の破壊であった。1938年10月にミアルで起こったように、村全体が瓦礫と化すこともあったが、著名な家屋数軒が爆破され、他の家屋は内部が荒らされることが多かった。最大の破壊行為は1936年6月16日にヤッファで行われたもので、大型のゲルグナイト爆薬を使って旧市街に長い通路を切り開き、220～240棟の建物を破壊し、最大6,000人のアラブ人が家を失った。この行為に対するパレスチナ最高裁長官マイケル・マクドネル卿の痛烈な批判は政権に受け入れられず、判事はすぐに国外に追放された。村はまた、罰金や家畜の没収によって頻繁に処罰された。イギリス軍は、戦艦HMSマラヤの機雷を使って家屋を破壊したこともあった。財産に対する行為に加え、殴打、拷問、超法規的殺人など、イギリス軍による残虐行為も大量に発生した。逃げようとして射殺された」捕虜は驚くほど多かった。アル＝バッサやハルフルでの虐殺など、深刻な残虐行為を伴う事件もいくつかあった。王立アルスター・ライフルズの将校デズモンド・ウッズは、アル・バッサでの虐殺についてこう語っている： 私はこの事件を決して忘れないだろう...。私たちはもう一つの辺境基地であるアル・マリキヤにいた。朝の6時ごろ、私たちのパトロール隊の一つが爆破され、ミリー・ロウ（死亡した将校）が殺されたという知らせが入った。ジェラルド・ウィットフェルド（大隊司令官G.H.P.ウィットフェルド中佐）は、ムフタールたちに、もしこのようなことが起きたら、地雷の現場に一番近い村に対して懲罰的措置を取ると言っていた。地雷現場に一番近い村はアル・バッサというところで、私たちC中隊は懲罰的措置に参加するよう命じられた。アル・バッサに到着して、第11ハッサーのロールスロイス装甲車がバッサに機銃掃射しているのを見たのは忘れられない。モンティは彼（大隊長）を呼び寄せて、そのことをすべて尋ね、ジェラルド・ウィットフェルドが彼に説明しました。閣下、私はこれらの村のムフタールに、もし私の将校や部下にこのようなことが起これば、私は彼らに対して懲罰的措置を取ると警告しました。モンティは "わかったよ、でも今後はもう少し気楽に行こう "と言った。 村を破壊するだけでなく、RURと英国工兵隊はアル・バッサから約50人を集め、バスの下で爆発させて何人かを吹き飛ばした。その場に居合わせた警官ハリー・アリゴニーによると、20人ほどがバスに乗せられ、逃げようとした者は射殺され、バスの運転手は兵士たちが埋めた強力な地雷の上を運転させられた。このような措置にもかかわらず、司令官ヘイニング中将は1938年12月1日、「事実上、この国のすべての村が反乱軍を匿い、支援しており、政府軍から彼らの正体を隠すのに協力している」と内閣に秘密裏に報告した。ハイニングは村落の捜索方法を報告した： まず、部隊か航空機が捜索地域を包囲し、住民には、この包囲網を突破しようとする者は射殺される可能性があると警告する。過去6ヵ月間、文字通り何百もの村が捜索され、場合によっては複数回にわたって捜索されたため、この手順はよく知られており、非常線を突破する者には軍隊を避けたい正当な理由があると考えてよい。このような柵破り者は、捜索中に何人も射殺されている。このような事例が、アラブ人捕虜が冷酷に射殺され、「逃走しようとして殺された」と報告されるプロパガンダの根拠になっているのだろう。封鎖線が張られた後、部隊は村に入り、すべての男性住民が身元確認と尋問のために集められる。 この報告書は、英国の一般市民、英国政府のメンバー、パレスチナ近隣諸国の政府の間で、軍事的措置の厳しさに対する懸念が高まっていることを受けて発表された。1938年8月、ナブルスでは5,000人近くが2日間檻に入れられ、次々と尋問された。拘留中、市内は捜索され、その後、拘留者一人一人に釈放のゴム印が押された。地雷攻撃や狙撃事件を防ぐために、地元のアラブ人を軍の輸送隊に同乗させるのは、イギリス軍の一般的なやり方だった。兵士たちは人質を貨物車のボンネットに縛り付けたり、列車の前部にある小さな平台に乗せたりした。軍は人質に対し、逃げようとする者は射殺すると言った。マンチェスター連隊の上等兵アーサー・レーンが回想している： ......任務が終わると、何も起こらず、爆弾も何もなく、運転手がハンドルを戻してトラックを揺らすと、前のほうにいた哀れな変人がデッキに転がり落ちる。運がよければ足の骨折で済んだが、運が悪ければ後ろから来たトラックがぶつかってくる。でも、誰もその破片を拾おうとはしなかった。俺たちがそこにいて、俺たちが親分で、俺たちがすることは何でも正しかったんだ......。彼はもう必要ない。彼は自分の仕事を全うした。そのときビル・アッシャー（司令官）が、ボンネットに座れる血まみれの反乱軍がいなくなる前にやめなければならないと言ったんだ。 イギリス軍はまた、アラブ人の負傷者を戦場に放置して死なせたり、戦場で捕らえられたアラブ人戦闘員を虐待したりした。反乱軍が戦場から負傷者や死者を追い出そうとするほどだった。兵士たちが村を占拠し、住民全員を追放して何カ月も居座ることもあった。とはいえ、外国の軍隊が民衆の反乱を鎮圧した他の多くの例と比べれば、イギリスの行動は全体的に良かったと論じられている。 Sir Charles Tegart was a senior police officer brought into Palestine from the colonial force of British India on 21 October 1937.Tegart and his deputy David Petrie (later head of MI5) advised a greater emphasis on foreign intelligence gathering and closure of Palestine's borders. Accordingly, from 1938 Gilbert Mackereth, the British Consul in Damascus, corresponded with Syrian and Transjordan authorities regarding border control and security to counteract arms smuggling and "terrorist" infiltration and produced a report for Tegart on the activities of the Palestine Defence Committee in Damascus. Tegart recommended the construction of a frontier road with a barbed wire fence, which became known as Tegart's wall, along the borders with Lebanon and Syria to help prevent the flow of insurgents, goods and weapons. Tegart encouraged close co-operation with the Jewish Agency. It was built by the Histadrut construction company Solel Boneh. The total cost was £2 million. The Army forced the fellahin to work on the roads without pay. Tegart introduced Arab Investigation Centres where prisoners were subjected to beatings, foot whipping, electric shocks, denailing and what is now known as "waterboarding". Tegart also imported Doberman Pinschers from South Africa and set up a special centre in Jerusalem to train interrogators in torture. The Royal Air Force developed close air support into its then most refined form during the Arab Revolt. Air patrols had been found effective in keeping convoys and trains free from attack, but this did not help to expose insurgents to battle conditions likely to cause their defeat. From the middle of June 1936 wireless vehicles accompanied all convoys and patrols. During rebel attacks these vehicles could issue emergency "XX calls" (XX with a coded location), which were given priority over all other radio traffic, to summon aerial reinforcements. Bombers, which were usually airborne within five minutes, could then either attack insurgents directly or "fix" their position for infantry troops. Forty-seven such XX calls were issued during the revolt, causing heavy losses to the rebels.This use of air power was so successful that the British were able to reduce the regular garrison.In 1936 an Air Staff Officer in Middle East Command based in Egypt, Arthur Harris, known as an advocate of "air policing", commented on the revolt saying that "one 250 lb. or 500 lb. bomb in each village that speaks out of turn" would satisfactorily solve the problem. In 1937 Harris was promoted to Air Commodore and in 1938 he was posted to Palestine and Trans-Jordan as Air Officer Commanding the RAF contingent in the region until September 1939. "Limited" bombing attacks on Arab villages were carried out by the RAF, although at times this involved razing whole villages to the ground. Harris described the system by which recalcitrant villages were kept under control by aerial bombardment as "Air-Pin".Aircraft of the RAF were also used to drop propaganda leaflets over Palestinian towns and villages telling the fellahin that they were the main sufferers of the rebellion and threatening an increase in taxes.Low flying RAF squadrons were able to produce detailed intelligence on the location of road blocks, sabotaged bridges, railways and pipelines. RAF aerial photographs were also used to build up a detailed map of Arab population distribution.Although the British Army was responsible for setting up the Arab counter-insurgent forces (known as the peace bands) and supplying them with arms and money these were operated by RAF Intelligence, commanded by Patrick Domville.At the beginning of the revolt RAF assets in the region comprised a bomber flight at RAF Ramleh, an RAF armoured car flight at Ramleh, fourteen bomber squadrons at RAF Amman, and a RAF armoured car company at Ma'an. At the beginning of the Revolt crew from the Haifa Naval Force's two cruisers were used to carry out tasks ashore, manning two howitzers and naval lorries equipped with QF 2 pounder naval guns and searchlights used to disperse Arab snipers. From the end of June two destroyers were used to patrol the coast of Palestine in a bid to prevent gun running. These searched as many as 150 vessels per week and were an effective preventive measure. At the request of the Army additional naval platoons landed in July to help protect Haifa and Jewish settlements in the surrounding countryside. The Navy also relieved the Army of duties in Haifa by using nine naval platoons to form the Haifa Town Force and in August three naval platoons were landed to support the police.Following publication of the Peel Commission's report in July 1937 HMS Repulse sailed to Haifa where landing parties were put ashore to maintain calm. Various other naval vessels continued with this role until the end of the revolt.Following the Irgun's detonation of a large bomb in a market in Haifa on 6 July 1938 the High Commissioner signalled the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, requesting the assistance of naval vessels capable of providing landing parties. Pound dispatched HMS Repulse and diverted HMS Emerald to Haifa, which arrived the same day and landed five platoons, one to each police district. HMS Repulse relieved HMS Emerald the following day and after another bomb was detonated on 10 July five platoons from the ship, made up of sailors and Royal Marines, dispersed mobs and patrolled the city.On 11 July provision of three platoons from Repulse released men of the West Kent Regiment for a punitive mission against Arabs who had attacked a Jewish colony near Haifa. By 17 July the Repulse established a Company Headquarters where seamen and Royal Marines manned a 3.7-inch howitzer. Sailors, Royal Marines, and men of the Suffolk Regiment, who had embarked on the Repulse, accompanied foot patrols of the Palestine Police Force.The Repulse, Hood(en) and HMS Warspite provided howitzer crews which were sent ashore to combat gun running near the border with Lebanon. Detained Arabs were used to build emplacements and the howitzers were moved quickly between these positions by day and night to confuse bandits as to the likely direction of fire. Periodically, the guns were used to fire warning rounds close to the vicinity of villages believed to have rebel sympathies. Britain had completed the modern deep-sea port in Haifa in 1933 and finished laying a pipeline from the Iraqi oilfields to Haifa in 1935, shortly before the outbreak of the revolt. A refinery for processing oil from the pipeline was completed by Consolidated Refineries Ltd, a company jointly owned by British Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell, in December 1939.These facilities enhanced the strategic importance of Palestine and of Haifa in particular in Britain's control of the eastern Mediterranean. The threat to British control of the region posed by the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935 and the deteriorating situation in Europe toward the end of the 1930s probably made British policy makers more willing to make concessions to Arab governments on the Palestine issue following the furore over the recommendations of the Peel Commission. The Arab Revolt was the last major test of Britain's security services in the Middle East before World War II. The development and deployment of intelligence-led counterinsurgency strategies was integral to the restoration of British imperial control in Palestine as the revolt had demonstrated to the British authorities how a popular rebellion could undermine intelligence gathering operations and thereby impair their ability to predict and respond to inter-communal disorder. The rebellion had brought together urban nationalism and peasant economic grievances arising from rural poverty and landlessness, which was blamed on British misrule. Accordingly, the Palestinian revolt targeted the political and economic apparatus of the British colonial state, including the communications network, pipelines, police stations, army outposts and British personnel. It was this aspect of the revolt, rather than attacks on Jews or violence between rivals for leadership of the national movement, that most concerned the high commissioner. The mandate authorities were further disturbed by the unity of purpose displayed during the six-month general strike and by the resurgence of pan-Arab nationalism as evidenced by the rise of the Istiqlal Party.In response to these challenges the British army command ("I" Branch) and battalion headquarters across Palestine issued a daily intelligence bulletin every afternoon detailing political developments. Special Service Officers (SSOs) assigned to intelligence gathering reported directly to their local command headquarters and their cars were equipped with wireless transmitters so that high grade intelligence could be reported directly to "I" Branch immediately. These sources of intelligence gradually became more important than those of the C.I.D. in Palestine, which had been dependent on Arab informers, and which were no longer reliable.In September 1937, the Jewish Agency appointed Reuven Zaslany liaison officer for intelligence and security affairs between the Political Department of the Jewish Agency and the intelligence arms of the Royal Air Force and the C.I.D. Zaslany sifted through intelligence collected by Jewish-controlled field operatives and forwarded it to the British military. He was a frequent visitor at the headquarters of British intelligence and the army, the police and C.I.D. and he also travelled to Damascus to liaise with the Arab opposition's peace bands and with the British Consul in Iraq. Colonel Frederick Kisch, a British army officer and Zionist leader, was appointed chief liaison officer between the British army and the Jewish Agency Executive with Zaslany as his deputy. Zaslany also worked as interpreter for Patrick Domville, head of RAF Intelligence in Palestine (who was described by Haganah leader Dov Hos as the "best Zionist informer on the English"), until the latter was posted to Iraq in 1938, and through him became acquainted with many of the British intelligence officers.In 1937 the Jewish Agency's intelligence groups were responsible for bugging the Peel Commission hearings in Palestine. Eventually, the Arab Revolt convinced the Agency that a central intelligence service was required and this led to the formation of a counter-intelligence agency known as the Ran (headed by Yehuda Arazi, who also helped to smuggle rifles, machine guns and ammunition from Poland to Palestine) and thereafter in 1940 to the creation of SHAI, the forerunner of Mossad. The Haganah (Hebrew for "defence"), a Jewish paramilitary organisation, actively supported British efforts to suppress the uprising, which reached 10,000 Arab fighters at their peak during the summer and fall of 1938. Although the British administration did not officially recognise the Haganah, the British security forces cooperated with it by forming the Jewish Settlement Police, Jewish Supernumerary Police, and Special Night Squads. The Special Night Squads engaged in activities described by colonial administrator Sir Hugh Foot, as 'extreme and cruel' involving torture, whipping, abuse and execution of Arabs.The British authorities maintained, financed and armed the Jewish police from this point onward until the end of the Mandate, and by the end of September 1939 around 20,000 Jewish policeman, supernumeraries and settlement guards had been authorised to carry arms by the government, which also distributed weapons to outlying Jewish settlements, and allowed the Haganah to acquire arms. Independently of the British, Ta'as, the Haganah's clandestine munitions industry, developed an 81-mm mortar and manufactured mines and grenades, 17,500 of the latter being produced for use during the revolt.In June 1937, the British imposed the death penalty for unauthorised possession of weapons, ammunition, and explosives, but since many Jews had permission to carry weapons and store ammunition for defence this order was directed primarily against Palestinian Arabs and most of the 112 executed in Acre Prison were hanged for illegal possession of arms.In principle all of the joint units functioned as part of the British administration, but in practice they were under the command of the Jewish Agency and "intended to form the backbone of a Jewish military force set up under British sponsorship in preparation for the inevitable clash with the Arabs." The Agency and the Mandate authorities shared the costs of the new units equally. The administration also provided security services to Jewish commercial concerns at cost.Jewish and British officials worked together to co-ordinate manhunts and collective actions against villages and also discussed the imposition of penalties and sentences. Overall, the Jewish Agency was successful in making "the point that the Zionist movement and the British Empire were standing shoulder to shoulder against a common enemy, in a war in which they had common goals."The rebellion also inspired the Jewish Agency to expand the intelligence-gathering of its Political Department and especially of its Arab Division, with the focus changing from political to military intelligence. The Arab Division set up a network of Jewish controllers and Arab agents around the country. Some of the intelligence gathered was shared with the British administration, the exchange of information sometimes being conducted by Moshe Shertok, then head of the Jewish Agency, directly with the high commissioner himself. Shertok also advised the administration on political affairs, on one occasion convincing the high commissioner not to arrest Professor Joseph Klausner, a Revisionist Maximalist activist who had played a key role in the riots of 1929, because of the likely negative consequences. † Ta'as and Rekhesh were developed and expanded during the Arab Revolt but already existed before 1936 and of course the Haganah had been in operation from the earliest days of the Mandate. There was no single body within the Jewish settlement capable of co-ordinating intelligence gathering before 1939. Until then there were four separate organisations without any regular or formal liaison. These were an underground militia, forerunner of the first official information service, Sherut Yediot (Shai); the Arab Platoon of the Palmach, which was staffed by Jews who were Arab-speaking and Arab-looking; Rekhesh, the arms procurement service, which had its own intelligence gathering capabilities, and likewise the Mossad LeAliyah Bet, the illegal immigration service. In mid-1939 the effort to co-ordinate the activities of these groups was led by Shaul Avigur and Moshe Shertok. In 1931, a Revisionist underground splinter group broke off from Haganah, calling itself the Irgun organisation (or Etzel). The organisation took its orders from Revisionist leader Ze'ev Jabotinsky who was at bitter loggerheads with the dominant Labour Zionist movement led by David Ben-Gurion. The rift between the two Zionist movements further deteriorated in 1933 when two Revisionists were blamed for the murder of Haim Arlosoroff, who had negotiated the Haavara Agreement between the Jewish Agency and Nazi Germany. The agreement brought 52,000 German Jews to Palestine between 1933 and 1939, and generated $30,000,000 for the then almost bankrupt Jewish Agency, but in addition to the difficulties with the Revisionists, who advocated a boycott of Germany, it caused the Yishuv to be isolated from the rest of world Jewry.Ultimately, however, the events of the Arab Revolt blurred the differences between the gradualist approach of Ben-Gurion and the Maximalist Iron Wall approach of Jabotinsky and turned militarist patriotism into a bipartisan philosophy. Indeed, Ben-Gurion's own Special Operations Squads conducted a punitive operation in the Arab village of Lubya firing weapons into a room through a window killing two men and one woman and injuring three people, including two children.From October 1937 the Irgun instituted a wave of bombings against Arab crowds and buses. For the first time in the conflict massive bombs were placed in crowded Arab public places, killing and maiming dozens. These attacks substantially increased Arab casualties and sowed terror among the population. The first attack was on 11 November 1937, killing two Arabs at the bus depot near Jaffa Street in Jerusalem and then on 14 November, a day later commemorated as the "Day of the Breaking of the Havlagah (restraint)," Arabs were killed in simultaneous attacks around Palestine. More deadly attacks followed: on 6 July 1938 21 Arabs were killed and 52 wounded by a bomb in a Haifa market; on 25 July a second market bomb in Haifa killed at least 39 Arabs and injured 70; a bomb in Jaffa's vegetable market on 26 August killed 24 Arabs and wounded 39. The attacks were condemned by the Jewish Agency.Ironically, the Arab leader Mohammad Amin al-Husayni and his associates also received funding from Fascist Italy during the revolt as the Italians were in dispute with the United Kingdom over Abyssinia and wished not only to disrupt the British rear but also to extend Italian influence in the region. The "peace bands" (fasa'il al-salam) or "Nashashibi units" were made up of disaffected Arab peasants recruited by the British administration and the Nashashibis in late 1938 to battle against Arab rebels during the revolt. Despite their peasant origins the bands were representative mainly of the interests of landlords and rural notables. Some peace bands also sprang up in the Nablus area, on Mount Carmel (a stronghold of the Druze who largely opposed the rebellion after 1937), and around Nazareth without connection to the Nashashibi-Husayni power struggle.From December 1937 the main opposition figures among the Arabs approached the Jewish Agency for funding and assistance, motivated by the assassination campaign pursued by the rebels at the behest of the Husseini leadership. In October 1937, shortly after Mohammad Amin al-Husayni, the leader of the Arab Higher Committee, had fled from Palestine to escape British retribution, Raghib al-Nashashibi had written to Moshe Shertok stating his full willingness to co-operate with the Jewish Agency and to agree with whatever policy it proposed. From early in 1938 the Nashashibis received funding specifically to conduct anti-rebel operations, with Raghib al-Nashashibi himself receiving £5,000. The British also supplied funding to the peace bands and sometimes directed their operations.Fakhri Nashashibi was particularly successful in recruiting peace bands in the Hebron hills, on one occasion in December 1938 gathering 3,000 villagers for a rally in Yata, also attended by the British military commander of the Jerusalem District General Richard O'Connor.Just two months earlier, on 15 October 1938, rebels had seized the Old City and barricaded the gates. O'Connor had planned the operation by which men of the Coldstream Guards, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers and Black Watch recaptured the Old City, killing 19 rebels. He was later to win fame as the field commander for Operation Compass in World War II, in which his forces completely destroyed a much larger Italian army—a victory which nearly drove the Axis from Africa, and in turn, led Adolf Hitler to send the German Africa Corps under Erwin Rommel to try to reverse the situation.Towards the end of the revolt in May 1939 the authorities dissolved the peace bands and confiscated their arms. However, because members of the bands had become tainted in the eyes of the Palestinian Arabs, and some were under sentence of death, they had little choice but to continue the battle against the national movement's leadership, which they did with the continuing help of the Zionist movement. At least 282 rebel leaders took part in the Arab Revolt and of these only four were Christians. Some of the principal leaders among them, often known as "brigands" in the Jewish press and as "bandits", "terrorists", "rebels" or "insurgents", but never as "nationalists," to the British are described below. The Arabs themselves used the term Ursabi meaning gang and the leader of an armed band was a Qaid al Ursabi. The plural form Ursabat spawned the British soldiers' nickname for all rebels, which was Oozlebart. Abdul Khallik was an effective peasant leader appointed by Fawzi al-Qawukji who caused great damage and loss of life in the Nazareth District and was thus a significant adversary of the Mandate and Jewish settlement authorities. He was trapped by British troops in a major engagement on 2 October 1938 and was killed whilst trying to lead his men to safety. Abdul Rahim al Hajj Mohammed from the Tulkarm area was a deeply religious, intellectual man and as a fervent anti-Zionist was deeply committed to the revolt. He was regarded second to Qawukji in terms of leadership ability and maintained his independence from the exiled rebel leadership in Damascus. He personally led small groups of fighters called fasa'il and carried out nighttime attacks against British targets in the revolt's early stage in 1936. When the revolt was renewed in April 1937, he established a more organised command hierarchy consisting of four main brigades who operated in the north-central highlands (Tulkarm-Nablus-Jenin). He competed for the position of General Commander of the Revolt with Aref Abdul Razzik, and the two served the post in rotation from September 1938 to February 1939, when al-Hajj Muhammad was confirmed as the sole General Commander. Notably, he refused to carry out political assassinations at the behest of political factions, including al-Husayni, once stating "I dont work for Husayniya ('Husanyni-ism'), but for wataniya ('nationalism')." He is still related by Palestinian Arabs as a hero and martyr and is regarded as a metonym "for a national movement that was popular, honourable, religious, and lofty in its aims and actions." He was shot dead in a firefight with British forces outside the village of Sanur on 27 March 1939, after Farid Irsheid's peace band informed the authorities of his location.Yusuf Said Abu Durra, a Qassamite leader in the Jenin area, was born in Silat al-Harithiya and before becoming a rebel worked as a Gazoz vendor. He was said to be a narrow-minded man who thrived on extortion and cruelty and thus became greatly feared. Yusuf Hamdan was Durra's more respected lieutenant and later a leader of his own unit; he was killed by an army patrol in 1939 and buried in Lajjun. Durra himself was apprehended by the Arab Legion in Transjordan on 25 July 1939 and subsequently hanged.Fakhri Abdul Hadi (Fakhri 'Abd al-Hadi) of the village of Arrabah worked closely with Fawzi al-Qawukji during 1936 but later defected to the British authorities. He bargained for a pardon by offering to collaborate with the British on countering rebel propaganda. Once on the payroll of the British consul in Damascus (Gilbert Mackereth) he carried out many attacks against the rebels in 1938–1939 as leader of his own "peace band". Aref Abdul Razzik (Arif 'Abd al-Raziq) of Tayibe village, who was responsible for the area south of Tulkarm, was known for seemingly being able to vanish into thin air whilst being pursued by the security forces. He signed his bulletins 'The Ghost of Sheikh Qassam'. Razzik assumed a place in British army folklore and the troops sang a song about him. Razzik was capable and daring and gained a reputation as one of the army's problem heroes.Mohammad Mahmoud Rana'an of Jaba' village was noted for his courage but lacked in intellect. Issa Battat was a peasant leader in the southern hills below Jerusalem who caused enormous damage to security patrols in his area. He was killed by a patrol of armed police in a battle near Hebron in 1937. Despite the intervention of up to 50,000 British troops and 15,000 Haganah men, the uprising continued for over three years. By the time it concluded in September 1939, more than 5,000 Arabs, over 300 Jews, and 262 Britons had been killed and at least 15,000 Arabs were wounded. In the overall context of the Jewish settlement's development in the 1930s the physical losses endured during the revolt were relatively insignificant. Although hundreds were killed and property was damaged no Jewish settlement was captured or destroyed and several dozen new ones were established. Over 50,000 new Jewish immigrants arrived in Palestine. In 1936 Jews made up about one-third of the population.The hostilities contributed to further disengagement of the Jewish and Arab economies in Palestine, which were intertwined to some extent until that time. Development of the economy and infrastructure accelerated. For example, whereas the Jewish city of Tel Aviv relied on the nearby Arab seaport of Jaffa, hostilities dictated the construction of a separate Jewish-run seaport for Tel Aviv, inspiring the delighted Ben-Gurion to note in his diary "we ought to reward the Arabs for giving us the impetus for this great creation." Metal works were established to produce armoured sheeting for vehicles and a rudimentary arms industry was founded. The settlement's transportation capabilities were enhanced and Jewish unemployment was relieved owing to the employment of police officers, and replacement of striking Arab labourers, employees, craftsman and farmers by Jewish workers. Most of the important industries in Palestine were owned by Jews and in trade and the banking sector they were much better placed than the Arabs.As a result of collaboration with the British colonial authorities and security forces many thousands of young men had their first experience of military training, which Moshe Shertok and Haganah leader Eliyahu Golomb cited as one of the fruits of the Haganah's policy of havlagah (restraint).Although the Jewish settlement in Palestine was dismayed by the publication of the 1939 White Paper restricting Jewish immigration, David Ben-Gurion remained undeterred, believing that the policy would not be implemented, and in fact Neville Chamberlain had told him that the policy would last at the very most only for the duration of the war. In the event the White Paper quotas were exhausted only in December 1944, over five and a half years later, and in the same period the United Kingdom absorbed 50,000 Jewish refugees and the British Commonwealth (Australia, Canada and South Africa) took many thousands more. During the War over 30,000 Jews joined the British forces and even the Irgun ceased operations against the British. The revolt weakened the military strength of Palestinian Arabs in advance of their ultimate confrontation with the Jewish settlement in the 1947–1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine and was thus counterproductive. During the uprising, British authorities attempted to confiscate all weapons from the Arab population. This, and the destruction of the main Arab political leadership in the revolt, greatly hindered their military efforts in the 1948 Palestine war, where imbalances between the Jewish and Arab economic performance, social cohesion, political organisation and military capability became apparent.The Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husseini and his supporters directed a Jihad against any person who did not obey the Mufti. Their national struggle was a religious holy war, and the incarnation of both the Palestinian Arab nation and Islam was Hajj Amin al-Husseini. Anyone who rejected his leadership was a heretic and his life was forfeit. After the Peel report publication, the murders of Arabs leaders who opposed the Mufti were accelerated. Pressed by the assassination campaign pursued by the rebels at the behest of the Husseini leadership, the opposition had a security cooperation with the Jews. The flight of wealthy Arabs, which occurred during the revolt, was also replicated in 1947–49. Thousands of Palestinian houses were destroyed, and massive financial costs were incurred because of the general strike and the devastation of fields, crops and orchards. The economic boycott further damaged the fragile Palestinian Arab economy through loss of sales and goods and increased unemployment.Clearly, the revolt did not achieve its goals, although it is "credited with signifying the birth of the Arab Palestinian identity." It is generally credited with forcing the issuance of the White Paper of 1939 in which Britain retreated from the partition arrangements proposed by the Peel Commission in favour of the creation of a binational state within ten years, although The League of Nations commission held that the White Paper was in conflict with the terms of the Mandate as put forth in the past. The White Paper of 1939 was regarded by many as incompatible with the commitment to a Jewish National Home in Palestine, as proclaimed in the 1917 Balfour Declaration. Al-Husseini rejected the new policy, although it seems that the ordinary Palestinian Arab accepted the White Paper of 1939. His biographer, Philip Mattar wrote that in that case, the Mufti preferred his personal interests and the ideology rather than the practical considerations. As the inevitable war with Germany approached, British policy makers concluded that although they could rely on the support of the Jewish population in Palestine, who had no alternative but to support Britain, the support of Arab governments and populations in an area of great strategic importance for the British Empire was not assured. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain concluded "if we must offend one side, let us offend the Jews rather than the Arabs."In February 1939 Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs Malcolm MacDonald called together a conference of Arab and Zionist leaders on the future of Palestine at St. James's Palace in London but the discussions ended without agreement on 27 March. The government's new policy as published in White Paper of 17 May had been determined already and despite Jewish protests and Irgun attacks the British remained resolute.There was a growing feeling among British officials that there was nothing left for them to do in Palestine. Perhaps the ultimate achievement of the Arab Revolt was to make the British sick of Palestine. Major-General Bernard "Monty" Montgomery concluded, "the Jew murders the Arab and the Arab murders the Jew. This is what is going on in Palestine now. And it will go on for the next 50 years in all probability." The 1936–1939 Arab Revolt has been and still is marginalized in both Western and Israeli historiography on Palestine, and even progressive Western scholars have little to say about the anti-colonial struggle of the Palestinian Arab rebels against the British Empire. According to Swedenberg's analysis, for instance, the Zionist version of Israeli history acknowledges only one authentic national movement: the struggle for Jewish self-determination that resulted in the Israeli Declaration of Independence in May 1948. Swedenberg writes that the Zionist narrative has no room for an anticolonial and anti-British Palestinian national revolt. Zionists often describe the revolt as a series of "events" (Hebrew מאורעות תרצ"ו-תרצ"ט) "riots", or "happenings".The appropriate description was debated by Jewish Agency officials, who were keen not to give a negative impression of Palestine to prospective immigrants. In private, however, David Ben-Gurion was unequivocal: the Arabs, he said, were "fighting dispossession ... The fear is not of losing land, but of losing the homeland of the Arab people, which others want to turn into the homeland of the Jewish people." ティベリアスの虐殺(1938年) 嘆きの壁事件 イラク・クーデター(1941年) パレスチナ民族主義 シオン主義とパレスチナの共同影軍(1917年～48年) チャールズ・テガート イギリス委任統治領パレスチナ 木頭委員会 イギリスとシオン主義者の紛争 中東近代紛争表 中東紛争表 ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o Hughes, M. (2009) The banality of brutality: British armed forces and the repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39, English Historical Review Vol. CXXIV No. 507, 314–354. ^ Black, 2006, p. 128. ^ Swedenberg, 2003, p. 220. ^ Kimmerling & Migdal, 2003, p. 103. ^ a b Millman, 1998, p. 22. ^ Bowyer Bell, 1996, p. 44. ^ Morris, 1999, p. 145. ^ a b c d e f Levenberg, 1993, pp. 74–76. ^ a b Morris, 1999, pp.159–160. ^ a b Morris, 1999, p. 136. ^ a b c d e Norris, 2008, pp. 25.45. ^ Khalidi, 2002, p. 21; p. 35. ^ Patai, 1971, p. 59. ^ a b c d e f g h i Morris, 1999, p. 160. ^ a b Morris, 1999, p. 159. ^ a b Segev, Tom (1999). One Palestine, Complete. Metropolitan Books. pp. 360–362. ISBN 978-0-8050-4848-3  ^ Matthews, 2006, p. 237. ^ Krämer, 2008, p. 263. ^ Krämer, 2008, pp. 262–263. ^ Krämer, 2008, pp. 239–240. ^ 'Nablus Bandits Seen as Izz ed Din's followers', Palestine Post, Friday, 17 April 1936. ^ 'Yesterday in Palestine', Palestine Post, Thursday, 30 April 1936. ^ Highwaymen's Second Victim Dead', Palestine Post, Tuesday, 21 April 1936. ^ 'Turk Killed by Hold-up Men', Palestine Post, Thursday, 16 April 1936 ^ Gilbert, 1998, p. 80. ^ Bar-On, 2004, p. 23. ^ 'Little Change in Situation', Palestine Post, Thursday, 23 April 1936. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Yazbak, M. (2000). From Poverty to Revolt: Economic Factors in the Outbreak of the 1936 Rebellion in Palestine. Middle Eastern Studies, 36(3), pp. 93–113. ^ Krämer, 2008, p. 273. ^ a b c Krämer, 2008, p. 239. ^ a b c Krämer, 2008, p. 254. ^ EllenFleischmann (March1995). “Jerusalem Women's Organizations During the British Mandate, 1920s–1930s”. PASSIA. 2010年5月29日閲覧。 ^ Khalidi, 2001, p. 25. ^ a b c Krämer, 2008, pp. 256–259. ^ Krämer, 2008, pp. 2656–266. ^ Krämer, 2008, p. 264. ^ Commins, 2004, p. 113. ^ Thomas, 2007, p. 295. ^ “Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936” (PDF). Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 29 May 2010閲覧。 ^ Morewood, 2004, pp. 86–96. ^ Tripp, 2002, pp. 71–75. ^ Morris, 1999, p. 129. ^ Horne, 2003, p. 208. ^ a b c d Peel Commission Report Cmd. 5479, 1937, p. 96. ^ Krämer, 2008, p. 272. ^ Peel Commission Report Cmd. 5479, 1937, p. 97. ^ 'The Funeral, Palestine Post, Tuesday, 21 April 1936. ^ 'Funeral of Nine Jewish Dead', Palestine Post, Tuesday, 21 April 1936. ^ Kayyālī, 1978, p. 193. ^ Peel Commission Report Cmd. 5479, 1937, p. 100. ^ C. Townshend, The defence of Palestine: insurrection and public security, 1936–1939. The English Historical Review, Vol. 103 (1988) 917–949. ^ a b c d Peel Commission Report Cmd. 5479, 1937, pp. 100–102. ^ Krämer, 2008, p. 274. ^ a b c Krämer, 2008, p. 291. ^ a b c d Kayyālī, 1978, p. 196. ^ Segev, 2000, p. 423. ^ a b Horne, 2003, p. 213. ^ Kayyālī, 1978, p. 197. ^ a b Krämer, 2008, p. 278. ^ Horne, 2003, p. 210; 218. ^ Peel Commission Report Cmd. 5479, 1937, p. 99;pp. 104–105. ^ Segev, 2000, p. 401. ^ a b c d e f g Wasserstein, 2004, pp. 106–114 ^ a b c Morris, 1999, pp. 138–144. ^ William Roger Louis (2006). Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization. I.B.Tauris. p. 391. ISBN 978-1-84511-347-6. https://books.google.co.jp/books?id=NQnpQNKeKKAC&redir_esc=y&hl=ja 25 July 2013閲覧。  ^ Benny Morris (2004). The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. Cambridge University Press. pp. 11, 48, 49,. ISBN 978-0-521-00967-6. https://books.google.co.jp/books?id=uM_kFX6edX8C&pg=PA11&redir_esc=y&hl=ja 25 July 2013閲覧. ""p. 11 "while the Zionist movement, after much agonising, accepted the principle of partition and the proposals as a basis for negotiation"; p. 49 "In the end, after bitter debate, the Congress equivocally approved –by a vote of 299 to 160 – the Peel recommendations as a basis for further negotiation.""  ^ Mark A. Raider; Jonathan D. Sarna; Ronald W. Zweig (12 October 2012). Abba Hillel Silver and American Zionism. Routledge. pp. 100–. ISBN 978-1-136-31495-7. https://books.google.co.jp/books?id=p9kEdaR8ekcC&pg=PA100&redir_esc=y&hl=ja. ""to negotiate a modified (Peel) proposal with the British."  ^ Bernard Wasserstein (1 May 2012). On the Eve: The Jews of Europe Before the Second World War. Simon and Schuster. p. 339. ISBN 978-1-4165-9427-7. https://books.google.co.jp/books?id=HJSQZJKHX_8C&redir_esc=y&hl=ja. ""The British government initially accepted the report in principle...With war clouds looming over Europe, they began to have second thoughts about the practicality of partition, fearing that to attempt to implement it against the will of the Palestinian Arab majority would rouse up the entire Arab world against Britain.""  ^ a b “Woodhead commission report”. 2014年10月24日閲覧。 “(p. 236) FINANCE...we found that it was impossible, whatever boundaries we might recommend, to set up an Arab State which should be self-supporting.... deficits of £P.610,000 per annum for the Arab State (including Trans- Jordan) and of £P.460,000 per annum for the Mandated Territories, but a surplus of £P.600,Q00 per annum for the (p. 237 ) Jewish State. We have found that it is not possible to call upon the Jewish State for a direct subvention to the Arab State, and neither practicable nor equitable to set up an Arab State with a budget so very far from being balanced. We conclude that, if partition is to be carried out, there is no alternative but that Parliament should be asked to provide, in some form, sufficient assistance to enable the Arab State to balance its budget. (p. 246)...CONCLUSION ... The question whether partition is practicable involves considerations of two kinds : practical and political. The former concern chiefly finance and economics ;.... But the financial and economic difficulties, ..., are of such a nature that we can find no possible way to overcome them within our terms of reference. ... we have proposed, ... a modification of partition which, ... seems to us, subject to certain reservations, to form a satisfactory basis of settlement, if His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the very considerable financial liability involved. There remain the political difficulties. .... But there is still the possibility that both sides may be willing to accept a reasonable compromise.” ^ Segev, 2000, p. 413. ^ Jeffrey K. Sosland (1 February 2012). Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin. SUNY Press. pp. 27–. ISBN 978-0-7914-7957-5. https://books.google.co.jp/books?id=3Ci0q-p0m0EC&pg=PA27&redir_esc=y&hl=ja. ""Shortly after Woodhead issued his general report, the British government rejected any partition of Palestine as impractical.""  ^ a b Horne, 2003, pp. 235–236. ^ Thomas, 2008, p. 254. ^ “File And Item Level Description of the Sir Charles Tegart Collection” (PDF). 31 May 2010閲覧。 ^ a b c d e Segev, 2000, p. 428. ^ a b Morris, 1999, p. 150. ^ Segev, 2000, p. 416. ^ a b c d e f Omissi, 1990, pp. 74–76. ^ Rotter, 2008, p. 51. ^ Gilmour, Ian and Andrew. "Terrorism Review." Journal of Palestine Studies, Volume 17, Issue 2, 1988, p. 131. ^ Omissi, 1990, p. 158. ^ Ben-Ami, 2005, p. 11. ^ Harris, 1998, p. 30. ^ a b Thomas, 2008, p. 246. ^ Black and Morris, 1991, p. 16. ^ Harouvi, 1999, p. 33. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p Stewart, 2002, pp. 7–10. ^ a b c d Krämer, 2008, p. 293. ^ Ferrier and Bamberg, 1994, p. 165. ^ a b c d e f g h i Thomas, 2008, pp. 244–246. ^ a b c d Harouvi, 1999, pp. 32–34. ^ Frilling, 2005, p. 279. ^ Adelman, 2008, p. 154. ^ Frilling, 2005, p. 28. ^ Kaniuk, 2001, p. 101. ^ Laffin, 1979, p. 80. ^ Kimmerling, 1989, p. 38. ^ Swedenburg, 2003, p. 220. ^ Morris, 1999, p. 132. ^ Cleveland, 2000, p. 255. ^ Sacharov, 2004, p. 23. ^ Adelman, 2008, p. 156. ^ Krämer, 2008, p. 292. ^ a b c d Segev, 2000, p. 427. ^ Segev, 2000, p. 426. ^ a b Morris, 1999, p. 149. ^ a b c d Johnson, 2010, p. 807. ^ Etzel – The Establishment of Irgun ^ a b Krämer, 2008, p. 242. ^ Bajohr, 2002, p. 122. ^ Segev, 1991, p. 22; p. 29. ^ Nicosia, 2008, p. 99. ^ Ben-Ami, 2005, p. 14. ^ Segev, 2000, pp. 386–387. ^ a b c d e f Morris, 1999, p. 147. ^ Morris, 1999, p. 133. ^ Arielli, 2010, pp. 109–132. ^ a b Gettleman and Schaar, 2003, p. 181. ^ Morris, 1999, p. 153. ^ a b c d e f Morris, 1999, pp. 153–154. ^ a b Hillel Cohen (2008). Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917-1948. University of California Press. pp. 146–. ISBN 978-0-520-25221-9. https://books.google.co.jp/books?id=9-NKm7nTm_IC&pg=PA146&redir_esc=y&hl=ja. ""it was the first manifestation of the Nashashibi group's armed defense against those who had violated the honor of their family and the honor of ... But when the general strike ended, he once again began coordinating his moves with the Zionists.3 The opposition's principal motivation for security cooperation was the assassination campaign pursued by the rebels at the behest of the Husseini leadership.""  ^ Cohen, 2009, p. 125. ^ Horne, 2003, pp. 237–238. ^ Cohen, 2009, p. 198. ^ Cohen, 2009, p. 167. ^ a b c Horne, 2003 p. 228. ^ Oozlebart and Cantor', Time Magazine, Monday, 15 August 1938. [リンク切れ] ^ a b Horne, 2003 p. 224; 238. ^ 'Situation in Brief: Official Reports', Palestine Post, Monday, 3 October 1938. ^ a b c Horne 2003, p. 224–226; 239. ^ Swedenburg, 2003, p. 88. ^ LeVine, 2012, p. 149. ^ LeVine, 2012, p. 153. ^ Swedenburg, 2003, p. 87. ^ Swedenburg, 2003, p. 30. ^ Frisch, 2008, p. 23. ^ Cohen, 2009, p. 152. ^ LeVine, 2012, p. 154. ^ a b c d Horne 2003, p. 224; 226; 228; 239–240. ^ a b Horne 2003, p. 224; 238. ^ Swedenburg, 2003, p. 121. ^ Fry, MacKereth & Rabinovich, 1985, p. 172. ^ a b c d Horne 2003, p. 225; 228–230. ^ Horne 2003, p. 225. ^ a b Horne 2003, p. 225; 235; 238. ^ Jewish Spectator, 1937, Volume 3, p. 8. ^ a b c d Krämer, 2008, p. 295. ^ Segev, 2000, p. 388. ^ Shapira, 1999, p. 250. ^ Segev, 2000, p. 449. ^ Segev, 2000, p. 439; 459. ^ Segev, 2000, pp. 450–451. ^ Morris, 1999, p. 121. ^ Hillel Cohen (2008). Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917-1948. University of California Press. pp. 128–. ISBN 978-0-520-25221-9. https://books.google.co.jp/books?id=9-NKm7nTm_IC&pg=PA128&redir_esc=y&hl=ja. ""the silencing of the opposition and humiliation of its leaders continued in the months that followed. In July 1938 an armed squad appeared at the home of a family of Nashashibi supporters in the village of Beit Rima, ...Before they left, the gang offered an explanation for their behavior: The jihad, they said, was directed against any person who did not obey the mufti. In the passion of the moment, they revealed the militants' fundamental tenet: Their national struggle was a religious holy war, and the incarnation of both the Palestinian Arab nation and Islam was Hajj Amin al-Husseini. Anyone who rejected his leadership was a heretic and his life was forfeit.""  ^ Hillel Cohen (3 January 2008). Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917-1948. University of California Press. pp. 122–125. ISBN 978-0-520-93398-9. https://books.google.co.jp/books?id=LMIk4adlKr0C&pg=PA122&redir_esc=y&hl=ja  ^ Nashif, 2008, p. 24. ^ Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry - Appendix IV Palestine: Historical Background ^ a b Benny Morris (25 May 2011). “chp. 4”. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1998. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. p. 159. ISBN 978-0-307-78805-4. https://books.google.co.jp/books?id=jGtVsBne7PgC&redir_esc=y&hl=ja. ""Capping it all, the Permanent Mandates Commission of the Council of the League of Nations rejected the White Paper as inconsistent with the terms of the Mandate.""  ^ a b c d Segev, 2000, pp. 436–441. ^ Segev, 2000, p. 443. ^ Segev, 2000, p. 442. ^ a b c d Swedenberg, 2003, pp. xxii; 13–15. ^ Segev, 2000, p. 433. Antonius, George (1938) The Arab Awakening. The Story of the Arab National Movement. Hamish Hamilton. (1945 edition) Adelman, Jonathan R. (2008). The Rise of Israel: A History of a Revolutionary State. Routledge. 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His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1939. Yazbak, Mahmoud (2000). From Poverty to Revolt: Economic Factors in the Outbreak of the 1936 Rebellion in Palestine. Middle Eastern Studies, 36(3), pp. 93–113. ウィキメディア・コモンズには、パレスチナ独立戦争に関連するカテゴリがあります。 The Arab Revolt in Palestine—A Zionist point of view The 1936–1939 Revolt in Palestine—A Palestinian point of view by Ghassan Kanafani. The First Intifada: Rebellion in Palestine 1936 – 1939—A view from British historian Charles Townshend.