太空發射系統

太空發射系統（英語：Space Launch System，簡稱「SLS」）是NASA自2011年以来开发的一种基於太空梭技術的重型運載火箭。SLS火箭目前的主要用途是搭載獵戶座太空船進行阿提米絲計畫，火箭将从位于佛罗里达州的肯尼迪航天中心的LC-39B发射台發射升空。在前四次阿耳忒弥斯任务之后，美国宇航局计划将太空发射系统的生产和发射移交给深空运输公司（Deep Space Transport LLC），这是波音和诺斯洛普·格鲁门的合资企业。不過，预计至少在2030年之前，阿耳忒弥斯计划每年最多使用一次SLS。 SLS旨在成為退役太空梭的繼任者以及NASA深空探索計劃的主運載火箭。SLS因利用了貨架上的現有的成熟技術，故取代了新開發戰神一號與戰神五號運載火箭的昂貴計畫，當時这些运载火箭与「星座计划」的其他部分一起被歐巴馬政府取消，而「星座计划」曾是美国旨在重返月球的计划。载人月球飞行计划，改編入阿耳忒弥斯计划的一部分，也为可能的载人火星任务作准备。SLS正在分三个主要阶段开发：Block 1、Block 1B和Block 2，其业载量不断增加。截至2019年8月 (2019-08)[update]，SLS Block 1运载火箭将发射前三次阿提米絲任務，随后的五次SLS飞行计划使用Block 1B，之后的所有飞行将使用Block 2。 美国国会在2016年12月授權进行首次發射，但SLS的发射至少被推遲了16次，最終2022年才首飛，比原来的6年计划增加了5年多。 太空發射系統是一種太空梭衍生運載火箭（英语：Shuttle-derived vehicle）。起飞阶段由一個核心級和兩個改進的航天飞机固体助推器提供動力，上面级负责将有效载荷送入特定的轨道。所有的太空發射系統型號使用同一種核心級，它們之間的差別在於助推器和上面級。 核心級和助推器負責將上面級和有效載荷送出大氣層並加速到接近軌道速度。核心級包括4台RS-25引擎、液氫燃料箱和液氧氧化劑箱、固體助推器連接點、航空電子設備和主推進系統（MPS）。主推進系統為四台RS-25引擎供应燃料和氧化劑，并使用液壓驅動引擎的萬向節，以及對推進劑罐加壓。核心級的四台RS-25引擎在起飛時提供了大約25%的推力。 核心級長65米，直徑8.4米，在結構和外觀上類似于航天飞机外储箱。 核心級的前四次發射使用16台太空梭任務剩下的RS-25D引擎。 洛克达因公司對這些引擎進行了現代化改造以適應太空發射系統。 之後的發射將使用優化的RS-25E引擎，每臺的成本降低30%以上，推力較RS-25D的2,281千牛增加到了2,321千牛。 太空發射系統Blocks 1和Blocks 1B型使用兩個五段式固体火箭助推器，这些助推器基于四段式航天飞机固体助推器额外添加一段而成，除此之外还使用了新的航空电子设备和更轻的绝缘材料，并去掉了降落伞回收系统。 五段式固体火箭助推器比四段式航天飞机固体助推器多提供了25%的冲量，但在使用后不能回收。 太空發射系統Blocks 1和Blocks 1B型使用的五段式固体火箭助推器由于库存限制只能支持八次发射。 于是在2019年3月2日提出了助推器报废和延长寿命计划（BOLE）。该计划是由诺斯洛普·格鲁门开发制造新型的固体火箭助推器，用以支持之后的Blocks 2型太空發射系統。这些助推器源自已经取消的OmegA运载火箭的复合外壳固体火箭助推器，助推器性能的提升可使Blocks 2型的近地轨道有效载荷增加到130 t（130 long ton；140 short ton）地月转移轨道有效载荷增加到46 t（45 long ton；51 short ton）。 截至2021年7月 (2021-07)[update], BOLE正在大力发展, 预计将于2024年首次点火测试。 临时低温推进上级（ICPS）将在太空發射系統Block 1型的前三次阿耳忒弥斯登月计划发射中使用。 ICPS源自拉长的德尔塔-4运载火箭上面级，由一台RL10火箭发动机提供动力。用于发射的第一个ICPS将使用RL10 B-2型变体, 第二和第三个ICPS将使用 RL10 C-2型变体。 Block 1型能够拥有95 t（93 long ton；105 short ton）的近地轨道运载能力，包括作为有效载荷一部分的ICPS重量。 在阿耳忒弥斯1号任务中，当火箭的核心级分离后，有效载荷将处在1,806乘30 km（1,122乘19 mi） 的亚轨道上，这便于核心级的安全处置。 然后ICPS将执行轨道注入和随后的地月转移，把猎户座飞船送往月球。 ICPS将为阿耳忒弥斯2、3号的载人飞行提供乘员认证。 探索上面级（EUS）计划在阿耳忒弥斯4号及之后的任务中使用，EUS将完成上升阶段然后进行深空轨道注入。 EUS将在太空發射系統的Block 1B和Block 2型上使用，其直径与核心级相同为8.4米，由四台RL-10 C3引擎提供动力，最终将升级为使用四个改进的RL10 C-X引擎。 截至2022年3月 (2022-03)[update], 波音正在为 EUS 开发一种新的基于复合材料的燃料箱，这将使Block 1B型的地月轨道有效载荷能力增加 30%。 探索上面级（EUS）原先的名称是双用途上面级（DUUS），相对于ICPS是专门为太空發射系統开发的上面级。 Block 1 配置 Block 1B 配置 Block 2 配置 太空發射系統是一種從太空梭演變而來的重型運載火箭。第一階段以载重量70噸的星座計劃載人任務為主，发射時將產生3810吨的推力；再發展出载重量130噸的貨艙型酬載任務，發射推力约合4173噸，高度和總重量将分别為117公尺和2948噸。 初步設計顯示，太空梭主發動機和太空梭固態助推器都會被作為本計畫的一部分。不像戰神五號運載火箭需要另外開發新的燃料槽。 2011年5月，美國國家航空暨太空總署宣布將已取消的星座計畫中的獵戶座飞船繼續開發，並命名為多功能人員酬載艙。在2011年9月所公布的資料顯示，第一階段載人任務會使用一對太空梭固態助推器以及三顆太空梭主發動機的改進版本(RS-25D/E)，第二節則選用J-2X發動機。第二階段貨艙任務會使用一對太空梭固態助推器的加強版以及五顆太空梭主發動機的改進版本(RS-25D/E)。 2011年9月14日，美國國家航空暨太空總署確定新一代太空發射系統的設計，並說明美國可以將太空人運送到更遠的地方，並且做為人類太空探測的基石。 太空發射系統預計花費180億美元開發，2012年至2017年間，每年將編列30億美元的預算；其中100億美元用於太空發射系統本身：20億美元改建發射台及甘迺迪太空中心：60億美元用於獵戶座載人艙組的研究、製作。根据美國太空總署的預算，从2014年到2017年首次試射前，建造測試版本的SLS火箭需要投入约70億美元。到2019年，經費投入将達到180亿美元左右，而这筆資金還只是用於研發和設計，並不涵蓋火箭的製造成本。新型火箭研製計畫的總估计投入將達到360億美元。 在 2011 年 9 月的參議院與美國國家航空航天局聯合介紹中，據稱到 2017 年 SLS 計劃的預計開發成本為 美元180 億美元，其中 100 億美元用於 SLS 火箭，60 億美元用於獵戶座飛船，以及 20 億美元用於升級 肯尼迪航天中心 的發射台和其他設施。 Booz Allen Hamilton 為 NASA 撰寫的 2011 年獨立成本評估報告中，這些成本和時間表被認為是樂觀的。 2011 年 NASA 的一份內部文件估計，到 2025 年，四次 95 t（93 long ton；105 short ton） 發射（1 次無人駕駛，3 次載人）的計劃總成本至少為 410 億美元， 130 t（130 long ton；140 short ton） 版本準備不早於 2030 年。 人類探索團隊估計 2010 年 Block 0 的單位成本為 16 億美元，Block 1 的單位成本為 18.6 億美元。 然而，自從做出了這些估計，Block 0 SLS 車輛在 2011 年底被放棄，設計沒有完成。 2012 年 9 月，SLS 項目副經理表示，5 億美元是 SLS 計劃每次飛行的合理目標平均成本。 2013 年，《太空評論》估計每次發射的成本為 50 億美元，具體取決於發射費用。 NASA 於 2013 年宣布 歐洲太空總署 將建造 獵戶座服務艙。 2014 年 8 月，隨著 SLS 計劃通過關鍵決策點 C 審查並進入全面開發階段，從 2014 年 2 月到計劃於 2018 年 9 月啟動的成本估計為 70.21 億美元。 同時，地面系統的修改和建設將需要額外的 18 億美元。 2018 年 10 月，NASA 監察長 報告稱，截至 2018 年 8 月，波音 核心階段合同已佔 SLS 支出 119 億美元的 40%。到 2021 年，核心預計各階段耗資 89 億美元，是最初計劃金額的兩倍。 2018 年 12 月，NASA 估計 SLS 的年度預算在 2019 年至 2023 年之間將在 21 至 23 億美元之間。 2019 年 3 月，特朗普政府 向 NASA 發布了 2020 財年預算申請。該預算不包括用於 SLS Block 1B 和 Block 2 的任何資金。因此不確定是否會開發這些 SLS 的未來變體，但國會的行動在通過的預算中恢復了這筆資金。 之前為 SLS Block 1B 計劃的幾次發射預計將在商業運載火箭上飛行，例如 獵鷹重型火箭、新葛倫火箭 和 火神火箭。 然而，要求為 SLS、獵戶座飛船和載人著陸器增加 16 億美元的預算以及發射清單似乎表明支持 Block 1B 的開發，即 Artemis 3 的首次亮相。Block 1B 將主要用於共同載人的機組人員轉移和後勤需求，而不是建造門戶。無人駕駛的 Block 1B 計劃於 2028 年發射月球表面資產，這是 Artemis 計劃的第一個月球前哨基地。2022年3月17日傍晚6時許，組裝完成的太空發射系統，由太空梭運輸車(Crawling Transporter)緩慢運出飛行器裝配大樓；並將花費11個小時的時間運往6.4公里外的甘迺迪太空中心 39B 發射台上，進行火箭濕式演練（Wet Dress Rehearsal，WDR）。 2011至2021財年，SLS計劃名義資金總額為212.09億美元。這相當於2021年通脹後的230.11億美元。 SLS 的生產和運營成本為 22 億美元，探索地面系統(英語:Exploration Ground Systems) 的生產和運營成本為 5.68 億美元。此外，由於前四次任務屬於 Artemis 計劃，獵戶座飛船的有效載荷將花費 10 億美元，歐洲服務艙將花費 3 億美元。:23 早期計劃 2018年SLS的計劃演化 2015 年 3 月在猶他州奧格登西北部的 Orbital ATK 沙漠設施進行的 SLS 助推器測試 探索地面系統 和 Jacobs 準備提升和放置 SLS 火箭的核心級，2021 年 6 月 SLS 是根據 2010 年國會法案（公法 111-267）創建的，其中指示 NASA 創建一個系統，用於將有效載荷和機組人員發射到太空，以取代因航天飛機退役而喪失的能力。該法案設定了某些目標，例如能夠將 130 噸或更多的有效載荷提升到近地軌道，目標日期為 2016 年 12 月 31 日系統全面運行，以及“在可行範圍內”使用的指令” 航天飛機和戰神 1 號的現有組件、硬件和勞動力, 12 2011 年 9 月 14 日，NASA 宣布了滿足這些要求的計劃：SLS 的設計，獵戶座飛船作為有效載荷。 SLS 已經考慮了幾種潛在發射配置的未來發展路線，火箭模塊的計劃演進已被多次修改。考慮了許多選項，所有這些選項都只需要滿足國會規定的最低有效載荷，包括具有三個主引擎的 Block 0 變體，具有五個主引擎的變體，具有升級助推器而不是改進的第二階段的 Block 1A 變體， Block 2 有五個主引擎加上地球出發階段，最多有三個 J-2X 引擎。 在 SLS 設計的最初公告中，NASA 還宣布了“高級助推器競賽”，以選擇將在 SLS 的 Block 2 上使用哪些助推器。幾家公司為這次比賽提出了助推器，所有這些都被證明是可行的，洛克達因和 泰萊迪布朗工程 提出了三個助推發動機，每個發動機都帶有雙燃燒室，ATK 提出了一種改進的固體火箭助推器，它具有更輕的外殼、更高能的推進劑和四個部分五，普惠洛克達因提出了一種名為 Pyrios 的液體燃料助推器。然而，本次競賽是為一項開發計劃而設計的，在該計劃中，Block 1A 之後是 Block 2A，並帶有升級的助推器。美國國家航空航天局在 2014 年 4 月取消了 Block 1A 和計劃中的競賽，支持簡單地保留戰神 I 的五段固體火箭助推器，它們本身是從航天飛機的固體火箭助推器改裝而來的，至少到 2020 年代後期。過於強大的先進助推器會導致不合適的高加速度，並且需要對 LC-39B、它的火焰溝槽和移動發射器進行修改。 2013 年 7 月 31 日，SLS 通過了初步設計審查。審查不僅包括火箭和助推器，還包括地面支持和後勤安排。 2014 年 8 月 7 日，SLS Block 1 通過了一個稱為關鍵決策點 C 的里程碑並進入全面開發，預計發射日期為 2018 年 11 月。 EUS期權 2013 年，NASA 和波音公司分析了幾種 EUS 發動機選項的性能。該分析基於 105 公噸的第二級可用推進劑負載，並將各級與四台 RL10 發動機、兩台 MARC-60 發動機或一台 J-2X 發動機進行比較。 2014 年，NASA 還考慮使用歐洲 Vinci 代替 RL10，後者提供相同的比衝但推力增加 64%，這將以更低的成本實現相同的性能。 2018 年，藍色起源提交了一份提案，用公司設計和製造的更便宜的替代品取代探索上層，但該提案於 2019 年 11 月被 NASA 以多種理由拒絕；其中包括與現有 EUS 設計相比性能較低，該提案與車輛裝配大樓門的高度僅為 390 英尺不兼容，以及 獵戶座飛船 組件（如太陽能電池板）的加速度不可接受。：7-8 SRB測試 2009年至2011年，星座計劃對五段式固體火箭助推器進行了3次全時程靜態點火試驗，包括低核心溫度和高核心溫度測試，以驗證極端溫度下的性能。 5 段固體火箭助推器將轉移到 SLS。 Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems 已經完成了五段固體火箭助推器的全持續時間靜態點火測試。合格電機 1 於 2015 年 3 月 10 日進行了測試。合格電機 2 於 2016 年 6 月 28 日成功進行了測試。 上表包含的項目包括SLS的臨時上部階段，即臨時低溫推進階段 (ICPS)，其中包括 4.12 億美元的合同。 表中還包括開發Exploration Upper Stage（英语：Exploration Upper Stage）的成本： 對 SLS 每次發射成本的估計差異很大，部分原因是不確定該計劃在運營發射開始前的開發和測試期間將花費多少，部分原因是各機構使用不同的成本衡量標準；但也基於成本估算的不同目的。例如，每增加一次發射的邊際成本忽略開發和年度經常性固定成本，而每次發射的總成本包括經常性成本但不包括開發。 對於 SLS 每次發射的成本，以及 SLS 項目投入運營後每年的經常性成本，NASA 都沒有官方的估計。每次發射的成本不是一個直接估計的數字，因為它在很大程度上取決於每年發射的次數。 例如，類似地，航天飛機 的估計值是 2012 年的美元，如果每年能夠實現 7 次發射，則每次發射的成本為 5.76 億美元，而在給定年份增加一次額外發射的邊際成本估計不到其一半，邊際成本僅為 2.52 億美元。然而，按照它的飛行速度，包括開發在內的每次航天飛機發射的最終成本為 16.4 億美元。 NASA 副局長 William H. Gerstenmaier 在 2017 年表示，不會對 NASA 為 SLS 提供的任何品種的每次飛行成本進行官方估算。 其他機構，例如 政府問責辦公室 (GAO)、NASA 監察長辦公室、參議院撥款委員會，以及 美國國家航空航天局監察長辦公室然而，管理和預算|白宮管理和預算辦公室]]已經公佈了每次發射的成本數據。 NASA 的幾個內部計劃和項目概念研究報告已經發布了包括未來 SLS 發射在內的擬議預算。例如，一份太空望遠鏡的概念研究報告稱，NASA 總部在 2019 年建議為 2035 年的 SLS 發射預算 5 億美元。 2019 年的另一項研究也提出了太空望遠鏡的設想，他們的發射預算以當前美元計算為 6.5 億美元，或者發射時間為 9.25 億美元，也就是“2030 年代中期”。 Europa Clipper 是 NASA 的一項科學任務，最初是國會要求在 SLS 上發射的。 NASA 內部和外部的監督機構都不同意這一要求。首先，美國宇航局監察長辦公室於2019年5月發布了一份報告 這表明 Europa Clipper 需要為 SLS 發射的“邊際成本”放棄 8.76 億美元。然後，2019 年 8 月發布的這封信的附錄增加了估計，並表示改用商用火箭將節省超過 10 億美元。但是，這些節省可能包括與發射計劃延遲相關的部分費用；商業替代品可能會比 SLS 更早推出。 該信中引用的 JCL（聯合成本和進度置信水平）分析表明，每次發射節省的成本為 7 億美元，其中 SLS 每次發射 10.5 億美元，商業替代方案為 3.5 億美元。 最後，白宮管理和預算辦公室 (OMB) 於 2019 年 10 月致參議院撥款委員會的一封信顯示，SLS 在開發完成後每次發射對納稅人的總成本估計為“超過 20 億美元”；表示，按 2021 年的美元計算，開發成本為 230 億美元。 這封信建議國會取消這一要求，同意 NASA 監察長的意見，並補充說，使用 Europa Clipper 的商業運載火箭而不是 SLS 將總共節省 15 億美元。 NASA 沒有否認這 20 億美元的發射成本，該機構發言人表示，「隨著該機構繼續與波音公司就長期生產合同和努力進行談判，它正在努力降低給定年份單次 SLS 發射的成本確定火箭其他部件的合同和成本」。 OMB 的這個數字取決於建造速度，因此更快地建造更多 SLS 火箭可以降低單位成本。 例如，探索地面系統其唯一作用是支持、組裝、集成和發射 SLS——已單獨預算每年 6 億美元的設施固定成本，無論當年發射多少火箭。 然後，在 2019 年 12 月，NASA 局長 Jim Bridenstine 非正式地表示，他不同意 20 億美元的數字，因為 SLS 發射的邊際成本應該會在前幾次發射後下降，預計最終將達到 8 億至 900 美元左右萬，儘管合同談判才剛剛開始。 然後，在 2021 年 7 月，NASA 宣布將使用 SpaceX 獵鷹重型火箭 代替 SLS 來發射 Europa Clipper。 這樣做是出於與成本無關的技術原因，總成本節省估計為 20 億美元。 2021 年 11 月，發布了一項新的 NASA 監察長辦公室 審計，估計至少對於 SLS 的前四次發射，SLS 每次發射的生產和運營成本為 22 億美元，外加 568 美元百萬用於 探索地面系統。此外，由於前四次任務是在 Artemis 計劃下進行的，獵戶座飛船 的有效載荷將花費 10 億美元，ESA 服務模塊將花費 3 億美元。 SLS 是由國會在 2010 年通過的一項公法 111-267 創建的，其中指示 NASA 創建一個系統，用於將有效載荷和機組人員發射到太空，以取代因 航天飛機退役而失去的能力. 該法案設定了某些目標，例如能夠將 130 噸或更多的有效載荷提升到近地軌道，目標日期為 2016 年 12 月 31 日系統全面運行，以及“在可行範圍內”使用的指令“來自航天飛機和 戰神1號 的現有組件、硬件和勞動力。 2011 年 9 月 14 日，NASA 宣布了滿足這些要求的計劃：SLS 的設計，以 獵戶座飛船 作為載荷。 SLS 已經考慮了幾種潛在發射配置的未來發展路線，火箭模塊的計劃演進已被多次修改。 考慮了很多選項，所有這些都只需要滿足國會規定的最低有效載荷， 包括具有三個主要引擎的 Block 0 變體， 具有五個主引擎的變體， 具有升級助推器而不是改進的第二節的 Block 1A 變體， Block 2 有五個主引擎加上 地球出發階段(英語:Earth Departure Stage)，最多有三個 J-2X 引擎。 在 SLS 設計的最初公告中，NASA 還宣布了“高級助推器競賽”，以選擇將在 SLS 的 Block 2 上使用哪些助推器。 幾家公司為本次比賽提出了助推器，所有這些都被證明是可行的， 洛克達恩 和 Teledyne Brown 提出了三個增壓發動機，每個發動機都有雙燃燒室， Alliant Techsystems 提出了一種改進的固體火箭助推器，具有更輕的外殼、更高能的推進劑和四段反而不是五段， Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne 和 Dynetics 提出了一種名為 Pyrios 的液體燃料助推器。 然而，本次競賽是為一項開發計劃而設計的，在該計劃中，Block 1A 之後是 Block 2A，並帶有升級的助推器。 NASA 在 2014 年 4 月取消了 Block 1A 和計劃中的競賽，支持簡單地保留 戰神1號 的五段固體火箭助推器，它們本身是從 航天飛機 的固體火箭助推器改裝而來的，至少到 2020 年代後期。 過於強大的先進助推器會導致對人體不合適的加速度，並且需要修改 LC-39B、它的火焰溝槽和 移動發射器. 2013 年 7 月 31 日，SLS 通過了初步設計審查。審查不僅包括火箭和助推器，還包括地面支持和後勤安排。 2014 年 8 月 7 日，SLS Block 1 通過了一個稱為關鍵決策點 C 的里程碑並進入全面開發，預計發射日期為 2018 年 11 月。 2013 年，NASA 和波音公司分析了幾種 EUS 發動機選項的性能。該分析基於 105 公噸的第二級可用推進劑負載，並比較了四台 RL10 發動機、兩台 MARC-60 發動機或一台 J-2X 發動機的階段。 2014 年，NASA 還考慮使用歐洲的 Vinci 代替 RL10，它提供相同的比衝但推力大 64%，這將以更低的成本換取相同的性能。 2018 年，Blue Origin 提交了一份提案，用公司設計和製造的更便宜的替代品取代SLS第二級(探索上層級)，但該提案於 2019 年 11 月被 NASA 以多種理由拒絕；其中包括與現有 EUS 設計相比性能較低，提案與 車輛裝配大樓 門的高度僅為 390 英尺不兼容，以及太陽能電池板等獵戶座飛船組件的加速度不能接受。 從 2009 年到 2011 年，在 星座計劃 下，對五節固體火箭助推器進行了 3 次全持續時間靜態點火試驗，包括低核心溫度和高核心溫度測試，以驗證極端溫度下的性能。 5 段式固體火箭助推器將由 SLS 使用。 Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems 已經完成了五段固體火箭助推器的全持續靜態點火測試。Qualification Motor 1 於 2015 年 3 月 10 日進行了測試。 Qualification Motor 2 於 2016 年 6 月 28 日成功通過測試。 已隱藏部分未翻譯内容，歡迎參與翻譯。 截至2020年 (2020-Missing required parameter 1=month!)[update], 已計畫了三個太空發射系統的版本: Block 1、Block 1B和Block 2. 它們都採用相同的核心級與4個主引擎, 但Block 1B將使用探索上層級（EUS）, 而Block 2將會採用探索上層級與升級的助推器, 也就是推進器報廢和延長壽命計劃（BOLE）. 在2017年七月聯合發射聯盟已交付給NASA臨時低溫推進上級（ICPS）, 且2018年11月起已安置在甘迺迪太空中心.. In mid-November 2014, construction of the first Core Stage hardware began using a new welding system in the South Vertical Assembly Building at NASA's Michoud Assembly Facility. Between 2015 and 2017, NASA test fired RS-25 engines in preparation for use on SLS. The core stage for the first SLS, built at Michoud Assembly Facility by Boeing, had all four engines attached in November 2019, and it was declared finished by NASA in December 2019. The first core stage left Michoud Assembly Facility for comprehensive testing at Stennis Space Center in January 2020. The static firing test program at Stennis Space Center, known as the Green Run, operated all the core stage systems simultaneously for the first time. Test 7 (of 8), the wet dress rehearsal, was carried out in December 2020 and the fire (test 8) took place on 16 January 2021, but shut down earlier than expected, about 67 seconds in total rather than the desired eight minutes. The reason for the early shutdown was later reported to be because of conservative test commit criteria on the thrust vector control system, specific only for ground testing and not for flight. If this scenario occurred during a flight, the rocket would have continued to fly normally. There was no sign of damage to the core stage or the engines, contrary to initial concerns. The second fire test was completed on 18 March 2021, with all 4 engines igniting, throttling down as expected to simulate in-flight conditions, and gimballing profiles. The core stage was shipped to Kennedy Space Center to be mated with the rest of the rocket for Artemis 1. It left Stennis on April 24 and arrived at Kennedy on April 27. It was refurbished there in preparation for stacking. On 12 June 2021, NASA announced the assembly of the first SLS rocket was completed at the Kennedy Space Center. The assembled SLS is planned to be used for the uncrewed Artemis 1 mission in 2022. While the first SLS for Artemis 1 is being prepared for launch, NASA and Boeing are constructing the next three, for Artemis 2, Artemis 3, and Artemis 4. Boeing stated in July 2021 that while the COVID-19 pandemic has affected their suppliers and schedules, such as delaying parts needed for hydraulics, they still will be able to provide the Artemis 2 SLS Core stage per NASA's schedule, with months to spare. The spray-on foam insulation process for Artemis 2 has been automated since Artemis 1 for most sections of the core stage, saving 12 days in the schedule. The Artemis 2 forward skirt, which is the foremost component of the Core stage, was affixed on the liquid oxygen tank in late May 2021. 截至2022年7月 (2022-07)[update], is set to ship to NASA in March 2023. Artemis 3, assembly elements of the thrust structure began at Michoud Assembly Facility in early 2021. The liquid hydrogen tank that is to be used on Artemis 3 was originally planned to be the Artemis 1 tank, but it was set aside as the welds were found to be faulty. Repair techniques were developed, and the tank has reentered production and will be proof tested for strength, for use on Artemis 3. As of July 2021, Boeing is also preparing to begin construction of the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS), which is planned to debut on Artemis 4. Originally planned for late 2016, the uncrewed first flight of SLS has slipped more than sixteen times and more than five years. As of July 2022, NASA projects the SLS will launch no earlier than 29 August 2022. NASA limits the amount of time the solid rocket boosters can remain stacked to "about a year" from the time two segments are joined. The first and second segments of the Artemis 1 boosters were joined on 7 January 2021. NASA can choose to extend the time limit based on an engineering review. On 29 September 2021, Northrop Grumman indicated that the limit can be extended to eighteen months for Artemis 1, based on an analysis of the data collected when the boosters were being stacked. In late 2015, the SLS program was stated to have a 70% confidence level for the first Orion flight that carries crew, the second SLS flight overall, by 2023; 截至November 2021年 (November 2021-Missing required parameter 1=month!)[update], NASA delayed Artemis 2 from 2023 to May 2024. Template:SLS launches/future While the SLS is only confirmed for use on the first few Artemis missions, many NASA mission concept studies for robotic missions planned to launch on the SLS, such as: Neptune Odyssey, Europa Lander, Enceladus Orbilander, Persephone, HabEx, Origins Space Telescope, LUVOIR, Lynx, and Interstellar probe. These concept studies were prepared for possible recommendation by the National Academy's Decadal surveys. The Astronomy and Astrophysics Decadal Survey in 2021 recommended a smaller, merged version of HabEx and LUVOIR preceded by a technology maturation program to reduce cost and schedule risk, although the eventual mission may or may not use SLS. In 2022 the Planetary Science Decadal Survey recommended Enceladus Orbilander as the third highest priority for flagship planetary missions in the 2020s. The Heliophysics Decadal Survey, due to be completed in 2024, is considering the Interstellar Probe mission concept. 2021年1月16日，美國太空總署在斯坦尼斯航天中心測試太空發射系統的引擎，不過引擎啟動僅1分鐘後就因技術問題提前熄滅，而搜集所需數據至少需要啟動4分鐘。 2021年3月19日，美國太空總署在斯坦尼斯航天中心測試太空發射系統的引擎，並完成8分鐘靜態點火測試。 2022年3月18日，太空發射系統轉移至甘迺迪太空中心39B發射台，預備進行燃料加注測試。 2022年8月3日，美國太空總署發佈Artemis-1任務詳情，並暫定8月29日 8:33ET發射。 2022年8月29日上午，已加注完推進劑的太空發射系統，核心級(Core Stage)的1具RS-25發動機冷卻管線出現液氫洩漏。由於無法即時解決問題，NASA在倒數暫停於40分鐘許久之後宣布取消發射，並延後至9月2日的第2個發射窗口(Launch Window)。 2022年9月3日早上，已加注完液態氧的太空發射系統，由於地面設施中的快速斷開連接臂(Quick Disconnect Arm)泄漏液態氫，空氣中氫氣濃度過高而終止加注燃料，發射倒數暫停於T-2:28:53。最後，NASA官方宣布取消此次發射任務，並延後至之後的發射窗口(Launch Window)，以便修復設施。 2022年9月26日，為避免火箭受颶風伊恩(Ian)吹襲而損毀，美國太空總署決定將太空發射系統送返垂直組裝大樓，亦代表下次發射窗口將不早於2022年11月。 2022年11月8日，美國太空總署因應颶風妮可(Nicole)吹襲佛羅里達州，將發射時間由11月14日推遲至11月16日。 2022年11月16日，太空發射系統於甘迺迪太空中心39B發射台順利升空，獵戶座號並進入預定軌道。 一個非官方與非正式的單位在預算的最壞狀態列出一些太空發射系統的早期發射排程： SLS因計劃成本、进展缓慢、缺乏商業參與、立法使用航天飛機組件飛行器的非競爭性而受到批評。 已隱藏部分未翻譯内容，歡迎參與翻譯。 In 2011, Rep. Tom McClintock and other groups called on the Government Accountability Office to investigate possible violations of the Competition in Contracting Act, arguing that Congressional mandates forcing NASA to use Space Shuttle components for the SLS are de facto non-competitive, single-source requirements assuring contracts to existing Shuttle suppliers. The Competitive Space Task Force, in September 2011, said that the new government launcher directly violates NASA's charter, the Space Act, and the 1998 Commercial Space Act requirements for NASA to pursue the "fullest possible engagement of commercial providers" and to "seek and encourage, to the maximum extent possible, the fullest commercial use of space". Opponents of the heavy launch vehicle have critically used the name "Senate launch system",a name that was still being used by opponents to criticize the program in 2021, as "the NASA Inspector General said the total cost of the rocket would reach $27 billion through 2025". Lori Garver, a former NASA Deputy Administrator, called for canceling the launch vehicle alongside the Mars 2020 rover. Phil Plait shared his criticism of the SLS in light of ongoing budget tradeoffs between the Commercial Crew Development and SLS budgets, also referring to earlier critiques by Garver. In 2019, the Government Accountability Office found that NASA had awarded Boeing over $200 million for service with ratings of good to excellent despite cost overruns and delays. 截至2019年 (2019-Missing required parameter 1=month!)[update], the maiden launch of the SLS was expected in 2021. NASA continued to expect that the first orbital launch would be in 2021 as late as May 2021. NASA moved out $889 million of costs relating to SLS boosters, but did not update the SLS budget to match, a March 2020 Inspector General report found. This kept the budget overrun to 15% by FY 2019. At 30%, NASA would have to notify Congress and stop funding unless Congress reapproves and provides additional funding. The Inspector General report found that were it not for this "masking" of cost, the overrun would have been 33% by FY 2019. The GAO separately stated "NASA's current approach for reporting cost growth misrepresents the cost performance of the program". On 1 May 2020, NASA awarded a contract extension to Aerojet Rocketdyne to manufacture 18 additional RS-25 engines with associated services for $1.79 billion, bringing the total RS-25 contract value to almost $3.5 billion. Ars Technica commented that the average cost of each RS-25 therefore rose to $146 million, so each SLS launch uses $580 million for its four engines. Ars noted that for the cost of just one engine, six more powerful RD-180 engines could be purchased, or nearly an entire Falcon Heavy launch with two-thirds of the SLS lift capacity. Former NASA Administrator Charlie Bolden, who oversaw the initial design and development of the SLS, also criticized of the program in an interview with Politico in September 2020. Bolden said that the "SLS will go away ... because at some point commercial entities are going to catch up." Bolden further stated, "They are really going to build a heavy-lift launch vehicle sort of like SLS that they will be able to fly for a much cheaper price than NASA can do SLS. That's just the way it works." In 2009, the Augustine commission proposed a commercial 75 t（83 short ton） launcher with lower operating costs and noted that a 40—60 t（44—66 short ton） launcher was the minimum required to support lunar exploration. In 2011–2012, the Space Access Society, Space Frontier Foundation, and The Planetary Society called for the cancellation of the project, arguing that the SLS will consume the funds for other projects from the NASA budget. U.S. Representative Dana Rohrabacher and others proposed that an orbital propellant depot should be developed and the Commercial Crew Development program accelerated instead. A NASA study that was not publicly released and another from the Georgia Institute of Technology showed this option to be possibly cheaper. In 2012, the United Launch Alliance also suggested using existing rockets with on-orbit assembly and propellant depots as needed. The lack of competition in the SLS design was highlighted. In the summer of 2019, a former ULA employee claimed that Boeing, NASA's prime contractor for SLS, viewed orbital refueling technology as a threat to the SLS and blocked further investment in it. In 2011, Robert Zubrin, founder of Mars Society and Mars Direct, suggested that a heavy lift vehicle could be developed for $5 billion on fixed-price requests for proposal. In 2010, SpaceX's CEO Elon Musk claimed that his company could build a launch vehicle in the 140—150 t（310,000—330,000磅） payload range for $2.5 billion, or $300 million (in 2010 dollars) per launch, not including a potential upper-stage upgrade. 200-km (124-mi) altitude, 28.5° inclination, circular The FY2021 spending plan indicates that this is for "Block 1B (non-add) (including EUS)" 引用错误：没有为名为totalcost的参考文献提供内容 Berger, Eric. NASA does not deny the "over US$2 billion" cost of a single SLS launch. Ars Technica. 2019-11-08 [2019-11-13]. （原始内容存档于2019-11-11）. The White House number appears to include both the "marginal" cost of building a single SLS rocket as well as the "fixed" costs of maintaining a standing army of thousands of employees and hundreds of suppliers across the country. Building a second SLS rocket each year would make the per-unit cost "significantly less"  White House warns Congress about Artemis funding. SpaceNews. 2019-11-07 [2019-11-13]. （原始内容存档于2021-09-30）.  2018 draft factsheet of SLS capabilities (PDF). NASA. 2018-08-20 [2022-08-24]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2020-08-07）.  Harbaugh, Jennifer. The Great Escape: SLS Provides Power for Missions to the Moon. NASA. 2018-07-09 [2018-09-04]. （原始内容存档于2019-12-11）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Space Launch System (PDF). NASA Facts. NASA. 2017-10-11 [2018-09-04]. FS-2017-09-92-MSFC. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2018-12-24）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 NASA's Space Launch System: Exploration, Science, Security (PDF). The Boeing Company. [2021-10-04]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-08-09）.  Creech, Stephen. NASA's Space Launch System: A Capability for Deep Space Exploration (PDF). NASA: 2. April 2014 [2018-09-04]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2016-03-07）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Mohon, Lee. Space Launch System (SLS) Overview. NASA. 2015-03-16 [2019-07-06]. （原始内容存档于2019-07-25）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 SLS Lift Capabilities and Configurations (PDF). NASA. 2020-04-29 [2021-01-20]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2020-09-21）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Space Launch System Solid Rocket Booster. NASA. February 2021 [2022-08-16]. （原始内容存档于2022-07-03）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Redden, Jeremy J. SLS Booster Development. NASA Technical Reports Server. 2015-07-27 [2020-10-01]. （原始内容存档于2021-08-23）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 SLS Core Stage Fact Sheet (PDF). NASA. [2021-10-04]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-02-20）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 RS-25 Engine. [2021-06-12]. （原始内容存档于2021-08-12）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 What is ICPS?. United Launch Alliance. 2021-06-23 [2021-10-04]. （原始内容存档于2021-06-23）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Space Launch System. 2018-09-09 [2021-10-04]. （原始内容存档于2021-10-05）.  RL10 Engine. [2021-07-05]. （原始内容存档于2021-07-09）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Potter, Sean Sean. NASA Prepares for Space Launch System Rocket Services Contract. NASA. 2022-07-27 [2022-08-10]. （原始内容存档于2022-08-10）.  Weitering, Hanneke. NASA has a plan for yearly Artemis moon flights through 2030. The first one could fly in 2021.. Space.com. 2020-02-12 [2020-02-20]. （原始内容存档于2020-02-28）.  Siceloff, Steven. SLS Carries Deep Space Potential. nasa.gov. NASA. 2015-04-12 [2018-01-02]. （原始内容存档于2018-12-24）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 World's Most Powerful Deep Space Rocket Set To Launch In 2018. iflscience.com. 2014-08-29 [2021-09-19]. （原始内容存档于2019-07-07）.  Chiles, James R. Bigger Than Saturn, Bound for Deep Space. airspacemag.com. October 2014 [2018-01-02]. （原始内容存档于2019-12-12）.  S.3729 – National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010. United States Congress. 2010-10-11 [2020-09-14]. （原始内容存档于2021-04-28）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Stephen Clark. NASA to set exploration architecture this summer. Spaceflight Now. 2011-03-31 [2011-05-26]. （原始内容存档于2011-05-15）.  Day, Dwayne. Burning thunder. The Space Review. 2013-11-25 [2014-08-17]. （原始内容存档于2014-08-19）.  Finally, some details about how NASA actually plans to get to Mars. arstechnica.com. 2017-03-28 [2018-01-02]. （原始内容存档于2019-07-13）.  Gebhardt, Chris. NASA finally sets goals, missions for SLS – eyes multi-step plan to Mars. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2017-04-06 [2017-08-21]. （原始内容存档于2017-08-21）.  Gebhardt, Chris. Eastern Range updates "Drive to 48" launches per year status. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2019-08-15 [2020-01-06]. （原始内容存档于2019-11-30）. NASA, on the other hand, will have to add this capability to their SLS rocket, and Mr. Rosati said NASA is tracking that debut for the Artemis 3 mission in 2023.  Space Launch System. aerospaceguide.net. [2014-04-09]. （原始内容存档于2019-07-26）.  Harbaugh, Jennifer. NASA Continues Testing, Manufacturing World's Most Powerful Rocket. nasa.gov. NASA. 2017-05-12 [2021-08-12]. （原始内容存档于2017-05-24）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Public Law 111–267 111th Congress, 42 USC 18322. SEC. 302 (c) (2) 42 USC 18323. SEC. 303 (a) (2) (PDF): 11–12. 2010-10-11 [2020-09-14]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2020-11-12）. 42 USC 18322. SEC. 302 SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM AS FOLLOW-ON LAUNCH VEHICLE TO THE SPACE SHUTTLE [...] (c) MINIMUM CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS (1) IN GENERAL — The Space Launch System developed pursuant to subsection (b) shall be designed to have, at a minimum, the following: (A) The initial capability of the core elements, without an upper stage, of lifting payloads weighing between 70 tons and 100 tons into low-Earth orbit in preparation for transit for missions beyond low Earth orbit [...] (2) FLEXIBILITY [...] (Deadline) Developmental work and testing of the core elements and the upper stage should proceed in parallel subject to appro-priations. Priority should be placed on the core elements with the goal for operational capability for the core elements not later than December 31, 2016 [...] 42 USC 18323. SEC. 303 MULTI-PURPOSE CREW VEHICLE (a) INITIATION OF DEVELOPMENT (1) IN GENERAL — The Administrator shall continue the development of a multi-purpose crew vehicle to be available as soon as practicable, and no later than for use with the Space Launch System [...] (2) GOAL FOR OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. It shall be the goal to achieve full operational capability for the transportation vehicle developed pursuant to this subsection by not later than December 31, 2016. For purposes of meeting such goal, the Administrator may undertake a test of the transportation vehicle at the ISS before that date.  NASA Adjusts Dates for Artemis I Cryogenic Demonstration Test and Launch. [2022-09-19]. （原始内容存档于2022-09-12）.  Bergin, Chris. SLS trades lean towards opening with four RS-25s on the core stage. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2011-10-04 [2013-09-16]. （原始内容存档于2019-07-16）.  Chris Bergin. SLS planning focuses on dual phase approach opening with SD HLV. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2011-04-25 [2012-01-26]. （原始内容存档于2019-06-29）.  Bergin, Chris. Managers SLS announcement after SD HLV victory. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2011-06-16 [2012-01-26]. （原始内容存档于2012-01-29）.  Bergin, Chris. Acronyms to Ascent – SLS managers create development milestone roadmap. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2012-02-23 [2012-04-09]. （原始内容存档于2012-04-30）.  Harbaugh, Jennifer. NASA, Public Marks Assembly of SLS Stage with Artemis Day. nasa.gov. NASA. 2019-12-09 [2019-12-10]. （原始内容存档于2020-02-06）. NASA and the Michoud team will shortly send the first fully assembled, 212-foot-tall core stage [...] 27.6-feet-in-diameter tanks and barrels.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 space launch system (PDF). nasa.gov. 2012. （原始内容 (PDF)存档于2012-08-13）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Chris Bergin. SLS finally announced by NASA – Forward path taking shape. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2011-09-14 [2012-01-26]. （原始内容存档于2019-09-02）.  Evans, Ben. NASA Orders 18 More RS-25 Engines for SLS Moon Rocket, at $1.79 Billion. AmericaSpace. 2020-05-02 [2021-10-13]. （原始内容存档于2021-08-31）.  Sloss, Philip. NASA ready to power up the RS-25 engines for SLS. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2015-01-02 [2015-03-10]. （原始内容存档于2019-05-15）.  Boen, Brooke. RS-25: The Clark Kent of Engines for the Space Launch System. NASA. 2015-03-02 [2021-03-29]. （原始内容存档于2020-12-24）.  Harbaugh, Jennifer. Space Launch System RS-25 Core Stage Engines. NASA. 2020-01-29 [2021-08-29]. （原始内容存档于2021-03-18）.  Campbell, Lloyd. NASA conducts 13th test of Space Launch System RS-25 engine. SpaceflightInsider.com. 2017-03-25 [2017-04-29]. （原始内容存档于2019-04-26）.  NASA Awards Aerojet Rocketdyne $1.79 Billion Contract Modification to Build Additional RS-25 Rocket Engines to Support Artemis Program | Aerojet Rocketdyne. www.rocket.com. [2021-03-29]. （原始内容存档于2021-03-23）.  Sloss, Philip. NASA, Aerojet Rocketdyne plan busy RS-25 test schedule for 2021. NASASpaceFlight. 2020-12-31 [2021-10-13]. （原始内容存档于2021-04-09）.  Ballard, Richard. Next-Generation RS-25 Engines for the NASA Space Launch System (PDF). NASA Marshall Space Flight Center: 3. 2017 [2021-10-13]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-10-13）.  Four to Five: Engineer Details Changes Made to SLS Booster. 2016-01-10 [2020-06-09]. （原始内容存档于2020-07-25）.  Priskos, Alex. Five-segment Solid Rocket Motor Development Status (PDF). ntrs.nasa.gov (NASA). 2012-05-07 [2015-03-11]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2018-12-24）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Space Launch System: How to launch NASA's new monster rocket. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2012-02-20 [2012-04-09]. （原始内容存档于2019-11-16）.  Bergin, Chris. SLS requires Advanced Boosters by flight nine due to lack of Shuttle heritage components. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2018-05-08 [2019-11-15]. （原始内容存档于2019-06-01）.  Sloss, Philip. NASA, Northrop Grumman designing new BOLE SRB for SLS Block 2 vehicle. NASASpaceFlight. 2021-07-12 [2021-08-13]. （原始内容存档于2021-08-13）.  Tobias, Mark E.; Griffin, David R.; McMillin, Joshua E.; Haws, Terry D.; Fuller, Micheal E. Booster Obsolescence and Life Extension (BOLE) for Space Launch System (SLS) (PDF). NASA Technical Reports Server (NASA). 2019-03-02 [2019-11-15]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2019-11-15）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Tobias, Mark E.; Griffin, David R.; McMillin, Joshua E.; Haws, Terry D.; Fuller, Micheal E. Booster Obsolescence and Life Extension (BOLE) for Space Launch System (SLS) (PDF). NASA Technical Reports Server. NASA. 2020-04-27 [2021-08-12]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-01-27）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Upper Stage RL10s arrive at Stennis for upcoming SLS launches February 2020. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2020-02-03 [2020-02-15]. （原始内容存档于2020-02-15）.  NASA'S SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM BEGINS MOVING TO THE LAUNCH SITE (PDF). NASA. 2020-04-15 [2021-10-12]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-10-12）.  Rosenberg, Zach. Delta second stage chosen as SLS interim. Flight International. 2012-05-08 [2021-10-07]. （原始内容存档于2012-07-27）.  Henry, Kim. Getting to Know You, Rocket Edition: Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage. nasa.gov. 2014-10-30 [2020-07-25]. （原始内容存档于2020-08-06）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Batcha, Amelia L.; Williams, Jacob; Dawn, Timothy F.; Gutkowski, Jeffrey P.; Widner, Maxon V.; Smallwood, Sarah L.; Killeen, Brian J.; Williams, Elizabeth C.; Harpold, Robert E. Artemis I Trajectory Design and Optimization (PDF). NASA Technical Reports Server. NASA. 2020-07-27 [2021-09-08]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-09-09）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Space Launch System Data Sheet. SpaceLaunchReport.com. 2014-05-27 [2014-07-25]. （原始内容存档于2014-10-21）.  SLS prepares for PDR – Evolution eyes Dual-Use Upper Stage. NASASpaceFlight.com. June 2013 [2015-03-12]. （原始内容存档于2013-09-14）.  NASA confirms EUS for SLS Block 1B design and EM-2 flight. NASASpaceFlight.com. [2014-07-24]. （原始内容存档于2014-07-16）.  Sloss, Philip. NASA, Boeing looking to begin SLS Exploration Upper Stage manufacturing in 2021. Nasaspaceflight. 2021-03-04 [2021-06-23]. （原始内容存档于2021-06-24）.  Gebhardt, Chris. With all-composite cryogenic tank, Boeing eyes mass-reducing space, aviation applications. 2022-03-05 [2022-03-18]. （原始内容存档于2022-03-07）.  Bergin, Chris. SLS positioning for ARRM and Europa missions. NASASpaceflight.com. 2014-03-28 [2014-11-08]. （原始内容存档于2021-12-03）.  Space Launch System Lift Capabilities and Configurations (PDF). 2018-08-20 [2020-03-07]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2020-08-07）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Featured Legislation: The NASA Authorization Act of 2010. United States Senate. 2010-07-15 [2011-05-26]. （原始内容存档于2011-04-10）.  Clark, Stephen. NASA to set exploration architecture this summer. spaceflightnow.com. 2011-03-31 [2011-05-26]. （原始内容存档于2011-05-15）.  [1] （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆）. NASA [2] （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆）. nasaspaceflight.com Keith Cowing. NASA’s New Space Launch System Announced – Destination TBD. SpaceRef. 2011-09-14 [2012-01-26]. （原始内容存档于2012-06-04）.  Release:11-301, NASA. NASA Announces Design For New Deep Space Exploration System. NASA. 2011-09-14 [2011-09-14]. （原始内容存档于2011-09-21）.  VideoLibrary, C-Span. Press Conference on the Future of NASA Space Program. c-span.org. 2011-09-14 [2011-09-14]. （原始内容存档于2012-02-08）.  NewYorkTimes, The. NASA Unveils New Rocket Design. nytimes.com. 2011-09-14 [2011-09-14]. （原始内容存档于2013-03-08）.  Marcia Smith. New NASA Crew Transportation System to Cost $18 Billion Through 2017. spacepolicyonline. 2011-09-14 [2011-09-15]. [永久失效連結] Smith, Marcia. New NASA Crew Transportation System to Cost US$18 Billion Through 2017. Space Policy Online. 2011-09-14 [2011-09-15]. （原始内容存档于2015-04-02）.  Bill Nelson, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Charles F. Bolden. Future of NASA Space Program. Washington, D.C.: Cspan.org. 2011-09-14 [2022-08-18]. （原始内容存档于2022-08-18）.  Booz Allen Hamilton. Independent Cost Assessment of the Space Launch System, Multi-purpose Crew Vehicle and 21st Century Ground Systems Programs: Executive Summary of Final Report (PDF). nasa.gov. 2011-08-19 [2012-03-03]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2012-03-02）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Paszior, Andy. White House Experiences Sticker Shock Over NASA's Plans. The Wall Street Journal. 2011-09-07 [2015-02-22]. （原始内容存档于2017-12-09）.  参数|newspaper=与模板{{cite web}}不匹配（建议改用{{cite news}}或|website=） (帮助) ESD Integration, Budget Availability Scenarios (PDF). Space Policy Online. 2011-08-19 [2011-09-15]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2011-12-09）.  Smith, Marcia. The NASA Numbers Behind That WSJ Article. Space Policy Online. 2011-09-09 [2011-09-15]. （原始内容存档于2013-01-04）.  HEFT Phase I Closeout (PDF). nasawatch.com: 69. September 2010 [2012-03-25]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-09-30）.  NASA's huge new rocket may cost US$500 million per launch. NBC News. 2012-09-12 [2019-11-13]. （原始内容存档于2020-08-12）.  Lee Roop. NASA defends Space Launch System against charge it 'is draining the lifeblood' of space program. al.com. 2013-07-29 [2015-02-18]. （原始内容存档于2015-02-18）.  Strickland, John. Revisiting SLS/Orion launch costs. The Space Review. 2013-07-15 [2015-02-18]. （原始内容存档于2015-02-18）.  NASA Signs Agreement for a European-Provided Orion Service Module. NASA. 2015-04-12 [2013]. （原始内容存档于2013-01-18）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Foust, Jeff. SLS Debut Likely To Slip to 2018. SpaceNews. 2014-08-27 [2015-03-12]. （原始内容存档于2021-09-30）.  Davis, Jason. NASA Budget Lists Timelines, Costs and Risks for First SLS Flight. The Planetary Society. [2015-03-11]. （原始内容存档于2015-03-12）.  NASA's Management of the Space Launch System Stages Contract (PDF). oig.nasa.gov. NASA Office of Inspector General Office of Audits. 2018-10-10 [2018-10-14]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2018-10-10）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 NASA FY 2019 Budget Estimates (PDF). nasa.gov: BUD-2. [2018-12-16]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2018-12-24）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Smith, Rich. Is NASA Preparing to Cancel Its Space Launch System?. The Motley Fool. 2019-03-26 [2019-05-15]. （原始内容存档于2019-06-23）.  NASA FY 2019 Budget Overview (PDF). [2019-06-24]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2019-12-04）.  Quote: "Supports launch of the Power and Propulsion Element on a commercial launch vehicle as the first component of the LOP–Gateway, (page 14) 本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 SLS Rollout, NASA's Most Powerful Rocket Ever. NASASpaceflight. 2022-03-17 [2022-03-18]. （原始内容存档于2022-03-18）.  NASA FY20 Inflation Tables – to be utilized in FY21. NASA: Inflation Table. [2021-10-11]. （原始内容存档于2022-08-03）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 FY 2013 Complete Budget Estimates (PDF). NASA. [2021-10-03]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-09-06）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 NASA, Assessments of Major Projects (PDF). General Accounting Office: 63. March 2016 [2016-06-23]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2016-04-13）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 FY 2014 Complete Budget Estimates (PDF). NASA. [2021-10-03]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-09-06）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 FY 2013 Operating Plan (PDF). NASA. [2021-10-03]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-01-19）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 FY 2014 Operating Plan (PDF). NASA. [2021-10-03]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2017-06-11）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 FY 2015 Operating Plan Update (Aug. 2015) (PDF). NASA. [2021-10-03]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2017-02-17）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 FY 2016 Operating Plan (Sept. 4 update) (PDF). NASA. [2021-10-03]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-10-04）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 FY 2017 Operating Plan (PDF). NASA. [2021-10-03]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-10-04）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 FY 2018 Operating Plan (PDF). NASA. [2021-10-03]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-07-12）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 FY 2019 Spend Plan (PDF). NASA. [2021-10-03]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2020-11-11）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Updated FY 2020 Spending Plan (PDF). NASA. [2021-10-03]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2020-11-01）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Updated FY 2021 Spending Plan (PDF). NASA. [2021-10-03]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-09-23）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Definitive Contract NNM12AA82C. govtribe.com. [2018-12-16]. （原始内容存档于2021-09-30）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 NASA outlines plan for 2024 lunar landing. SpaceNews. 2019-05-01 [2019-05-15]. （原始内容存档于2021-09-30）.  Berger, Eric. NASA's full Artemis plan revealed: 37 launches and a lunar outpost. Ars Technica. 2019-05-20 [2019-05-20]. （原始内容存档于2019-05-23）.  Sloss, Philip. Amid competing priorities, Boeing redesigns NASA SLS Exploration Upper Stage. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2019-12-18 [2020-07-25]. （原始内容存档于2020-08-07）.  Jenkins, Dennis R. Space Shuttle: Developing an Icon – 1972 –2013. Specialty Press. 2016. ISBN 978-1-58007-249-6.  Berger, Eric. NASA chooses not to tell Congress how much deep space missions cost. arstechnica.com. 2017-10-20 [2018-12-16]. （原始内容存档于2018-12-17）.  Origins Space Telescope Mission Concept Study Report (PDF): ES-11. 2019-10-11 [2020-05-14]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2020-07-12）. The launch cost (US$500 million for the SLS launch vehicle, as advised by NASA Headquarters) is also included.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Habitable Exoplanet Observatory Final Report (PDF). Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 2019-08-25 [2020-05-11]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2019-12-11）.  Section 9-11 9.4.1 Basis of estimate, page 281 MANAGEMENT OF NASA'S EUROPA MISSION (PDF). oig.nasa.gov. 2019-05-29 [2019-11-08]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2019-06-26）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Foust, Jeff. Inspector general report warns of cost and schedule problems for Europa Clipper. SpaceNews. 2019-05-29 [2021-01-20]. （原始内容存档于2021-09-30）.  Follow-up to May 2019 Audit of Europa Mission – Congressional Launch Vehicle Mandate (PDF). oig.nasa.gov. 2019-08-27 [2021-01-20]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2020-11-08）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Foust, Jeff. NASA inspector general asks Congress for Europa Clipper launch flexibility. SpaceNews. 2019-08-28 [2021-01-20]. （原始内容存档于2021-09-30）.  Vought, Russell T. Letter to the Chair and Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee with respect to 10 of the FY 2020 annual appropriations bills (PDF). whitehouse.gov: 7. [2019-11-13]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2019-11-13）. estimated cost of over US$2 billion per launch for the SLS once development is complete  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 NASA FY2021 budget estimates (PDF). NASA. [2020-09-14]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2020-07-27）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Town Hall with Administrator Bridenstine and NASA's New HEO Associate Administrator Douglas Loverro (YouTube). NASA. 事件发生在 24:58. 2019-12-03 [2021-01-20]. （原始内容存档于2021-10-31）. "I do not agree with the US$2 billion number, it is far less than that. I would also say that the number comes way down when you buy more than one or two. And so I think at the end we're going to be, you know, in the US$800 million to US$900 million range – I don't know, honestly. We've recently just begun negotiations on what number three through whatever – we don't have to buy any quite frankly, but we intend to. But we're looking at what we could negotiate to get the best price for the American taxpayper, which is my obligation as the head of NASA".  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Potter, Sean. NASA Awards Launch Services Contract for the Europa Clipper Mission (新闻稿). NASA. 2021-07-23 [2021-07-23]. （原始内容存档于2021-07-24）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 SpaceX to launch the Europa Clipper mission for a bargain price. Ars Technica. 2021-07-23 [2021-08-12]. （原始内容存档于2021-08-13）.  Falcon Heavy to launch Europa Clipper. SpaceNews. 2021-07-24 [2021-10-13].  Supply chain, Artemis program limit SLS use for science missions. SpaceNews. 2021-07-08 [2021-10-13].  NASA'S MANAGEMENT OF THE ARTEMIS MISSIONS (PDF). Office of Inspector General (United States). NASA: numbered page 23, PDF page 29. 2021-11-15 [2021-11-15]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-11-15）. SLS/Orion Production and Operating Costs Will Average Over $4 Billion Per Launch [...] We project the cost to fly a single SLS/Orion system through at least Artemis IV to be $4.1 billion per launch at a cadence of approximately one mission per year. Building and launching one Orion capsule costs approximately $1 billion, with an additional $300 million for the Service Module supplied by the ESA [...] In addition, we estimate the single-use SLS will cost $2.2 billion to produce, including two rocket stages, two solid rocket boosters, four RS-25 engines, and two stage adapters. Ground systems located at Kennedy where the launches will take place—the Vehicle Assembly Building, Crawler-Transporter, Mobile Launcher 1, Launch Pad, and Launch Control Center—are estimated to cost $568 million per year due to the large support structure that must be maintained. The $4.1 billion total cost represents production of the rocket and the operations needed to launch the SLS/Orion system including materials, labor, facilities, and overhead, but does not include any money spent either on prior development of the system or for next-generation technologies such as the SLS’s Exploration Upper Stage, Orion’s docking system, or Mobile Launcher 2. [...] The cost per launch was calculated as follows: $1 billion for the Orion based on information provided by ESD officials and NASA OIG analysis; $300 million for the ESA’s Service Module based on the value of a barter agreement between ESA and the United States in which ESA provides the service modules in exchange for offsetting its ISS responsibilities; $2.2 billion for the SLS based on program budget submissions and analysis of contracts; and $568 million for EGS costs related to the SLS/Orion launch as provided by ESD officials.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 NASA Announces Design For New Deep Space Exploration System. NASA. 2011-09-14 [2011-09-14]. （原始内容存档于2011-09-21）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 NASA Announces Key Decision For Next Deep Space Transportation System. NASA. 2011-05-24 [2012-01-26]. （原始内容存档于2016-09-15）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Press Conference on the Future of NASA Space Program. C-Span. 2011-09-14 [2011-09-14]. （原始内容存档于2012-02-08）.  Kenneth Chang. NASA Unveils New Rocket Design. The New York Times. 2011-09-14 [2011-09-14]. （原始内容存档于2017-02-21）.  Bergin, Chris. Advanced Boosters progress towards a solid future for SLS. NasaSpaceFlight.com. 2015-02-20 [2015-02-25]. （原始内容存档于2015-02-23）.  Frank Morring. NASA Will Compete Space Launch System Boosters. Aviation Week. 2011-06-17 [2011-06-20]. （原始内容存档于2011-10-11）.  SLS Block II drives hydrocarbon engine research. thespacereview.com. 2013-01-14 [2013-09-13]. （原始内容存档于2013-09-02）.  NASA's Space Launch System: Partnering For Tomorrow (PDF). NASA. [2013-03-12]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2015-04-02）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 The Dark Knights – ATK's Advanced Boosters for SLS revealed. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2013-01-14 [2013-09-10]. （原始内容存档于2013-09-12）.  Lee Hutchinson. New F-1B rocket engine upgrades Apollo-era design with 1.8M lbs of thrust. Ars Technica. 2013-04-15 [2013-04-15]. （原始内容存档于2017-12-02）.  Second SLS Mission Might Not Carry Crew. SpaceNews. 2014-05-21 [2014-07-25]. （原始内容存档于2014-07-27）.  Wind Tunnel testing conducted on SLS configurations, including Block 1B. NASASpaceFlight.com. July 2012 [2012-11-13]. （原始内容存档于2012-10-24）.  NASA's Space Launch System Program PDR: Answers to the Acronym. NASA. 2013-08-01 [2013-08-03]. （原始内容存档于2013-08-04）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 NASA Completes Key Review of World's Most Powerful Rocket in Support. NASA. 2015-04-15 [2015-10-26]. （原始内容存档于2016-05-27）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Gebhardt, Chris. SLS upper stage proposals reveal increasing payload-to-destination options. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2013-11-13 [2013-11-18]. （原始内容存档于2013-11-18）.  Todd, David. SLS design may ditch J-2X upper stage engine for four RL-10 engines. Seradata. 2013-06-03. （原始内容存档于2016-03-04）.  Todd, David. Next Steps for SLS: Europe's Vinci is a contender for Exploration Upper-Stage Engine. Seradata. 2014-11-07. （原始内容存档于2016-03-04）.  Berger, Eric. NASA rejects Blue Origin's offer of a cheaper upper stage for the SLS rocket. Ars Technica. 2019-11-05 [2019-12-19]. （原始内容存档于2019-12-19）.  Redacted_EUS.pdf. sam.gov. 2019-10-31 [2021-10-06]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-10-05）.  NASA and ATK Successfully Test Ares First Stage Motor. NASA. 2009-09-10 [2012-01-30]. （原始内容存档于2018-12-24）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 NASA and ATK Successfully Test Five-Segment Solid Rocket Motor. NASA. 2010-08-31 [2012-01-30]. （原始内容存档于2011-12-19）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 NASA Successfully Tests Five-Segment Solid Rocket Motor. NASA. 2010-08-31 [2011-09-08]. （原始内容存档于2011-09-24）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Bergin, Chris. QM-1 shakes Utah with two minutes of thunder. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2015-03-10 [2015-03-10]. （原始内容存档于2015-03-13）.  Orbital ATK Successfully Tests the World's Largest Solid Rocket Motor. Northrop Grumman. 2016-06-28 [2021-10-11]. （原始内容存档于2021-06-15）.  The NASA Authorization Act of 2010. Featured Legislation. U.S. Senate. 2010-07-15 [2011-05-26]. （原始内容存档于2011-04-10）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Tate, Karl. Space Launch System: NASA's Giant Rocket Explained. Space.com. 2011-09-16 [2012-01-26]. （原始内容存档于2012-01-27）.  SLS Upper Stage set to take up residence in the former home of ISS modules July 2017. 2017-07-11 [2020-02-15]. （原始内容存档于2020-08-07）.  Harbaugh, Jennifer. Meet the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage for SLS. NASA. 2018-11-08. （原始内容存档于2020-08-07）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 SLS Engine Section Barrel Hot off the Vertical Weld Center at Michoud. NASA. [2014-11-16]. （原始内容存档于2014-11-19）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 NASA's Space Launch System Core Stage Passes Major Milestone, Ready to Start Construction. Space Travel. 2012-12-27 [2012-12-27]. （原始内容存档于2019-12-21）.  All Four Engines Are Attached to the SLS Core Stage for Artemis I Mission. NASA. 2019-11-08 [2019-11-12]. （原始内容存档于2019-11-12）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Clark, Stephen. NASA declares first SLS core stage complete. Spaceflight Now. 2019-12-15 [2021-10-07]. （原始内容存档于2022-05-11）.  Rincon, Paul. Nasa Moon rocket core leaves for testing. BBC News. 2020-01-09 [2020-01-09]. （原始内容存档于2020-01-09）.  Boeing, NASA getting ready for SLS Core Stage Green Run campaign ahead of Stennis arrival. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2019-12-14 [2020-01-09]. （原始内容存档于2021-09-30）.  NASA Will Have 8 Minute Hold Down Test in 2020. Next Big Future. [2019-08-02]. （原始内容存档于2019-08-02）.  Foust, Jeff. Green Run hotfire test ends early. SpaceNews. 2021-01-16 [2021-01-17]. （原始内容存档于2021-10-03）.  Rincon, Paul. SLS: NASA finds cause of 'megarocket' test shutdown. BBC News. 2021-01-20 [2021-01-20]. （原始内容存档于2021-01-20）.  Dunbar, Brian. Space Launch System Core Stage Arrives at the Kennedy Space Center. NASA. 2021-04-29 [2021-06-01]. （原始内容存档于2021-05-07）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Sloss, Philip. SLS Core Stage thermal protection system refurbishment in work at Kennedy for Artemis 1. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2021-05-20 [2021-05-26]. （原始内容存档于2021-05-26）.  Sloss, Philip. EGS, Jacobs completing first round of Artemis 1 pre-launch integrated tests prior to Orion stacking. NASASpaceFlight. 2021-09-29 [2021-09-29]. （原始内容存档于2021-09-29）.  Sloss, Philip. Boeing working on multiple Cores, first EUS hardware for Artemis missions 2–4. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2021-07-19 [2021-10-11]. （原始内容存档于2021-08-12）.  Shields up! Spray foam evolving to protect NASA SLS. Boeing. 2021-07-14 [2021-10-11]. （原始内容存档于2021-08-15）.  Sloss, Philip. Boeing aiming to deliver second SLS Core Stage to NASA in March. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2022-07-25 [2022-07-30]. （原始内容存档于2022-08-31） （美国英语）.  SLS Monthly Highlights February 2020 (PDF). NASA. February 2020 [2021-10-11]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-10-11）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Davis, Jason. To Mars, with a monster rocket: How politicians and engineers created NASA's Space Launch System. The Planetary Society. 2016-10-03 [2020-09-14]. （原始内容存档于2020-09-25）.  Davis, Jason. The anatomy of a delay: Here's a timeline of twists and turns for NASA's SLS and Orion programs. The Planetary Society. 2017-05-17 [2022-03-18]. （原始内容存档于2020-08-07）.  Harwood, William. NASA unveils new super rocket for manned flights beyond Earth orbit. CBS News. 2011-09-14 [2020-09-14]. （原始内容存档于2020-08-10）.  NASA's Giant Rocket for Deep-Space Travel Passes Key Review. Space.com. 2012-07-26 [2022-03-18]. （原始内容存档于2021-05-13）.  Foust, Jeff. NASA Says SLS and Orion Will Slip to 2018 Despite Extra Funding. SpaceNews. 2014-12-10.  Foust, Jeff. NASA inspector general foresees additional SLS/Orion delays. SpaceNews. 2017-04-13 [2020-09-14]. （原始内容存档于2021-10-03）.  Clark, Stephen. NASA confirms first flight of Space Launch System will slip to 2019. Spaceflight Now. 2017-04-28 [2017-04-29]. （原始内容存档于2017-12-26）.  Clark, Stephen. NASA expects first Space Launch System flight to slip into 2020. Spaceflight Now. 2017-11-20 [2018-05-24]. （原始内容存档于2018-08-09）.  Patel, Neel. The seven most exciting space missions of 2020. MIT Technology Review. 2019-12-31 [2022-03-18]. （原始内容存档于2020-08-08）.  Gebhardt, Chris. SLS debut slips to April 2021, KSC teams working through launch sims. NASASpaceFlight.com. 2020-02-21 [2020-02-21]. （原始内容存档于2020-08-06）.  Foust, Jeff. First SLS launch now expected in second half of 2021. SpaceNews. 2020-03-02 [2022-08-18]. （原始内容存档于2023-09-09）.  Clark, Stephen. Hopeful for launch next year, NASA aims to resume SLS operations within weeks. 2020-05-01 [2020-05-03]. （原始内容存档于2020-09-13）.  SMSR Integrated Master Schedule (PDF). Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. NASA. 2021-06-07 [2021-06-09]. （原始内容 (PDF)存档于2021-06-14）.  Clark, Stephen. NASA's hopes waning for SLS test flight this year. Spaceflight Now. 2021-08-31 [2021-09-01]. （原始内容存档于2021-09-01）.  Berger, Eric. NASA's big rocket misses another deadline, now won't fly until 2022. Ars Technica. 2021-08-31 [2021-09-01]. （原始内容存档于2021-09-01）.  Clark, Steven. NASA targets February launch for Artemis 1 moon mission. Spaceflight Now. 2021-10-22 [2022-03-18]. （原始内容存档于2022-01-13）.  Sloss, Philip. Artemis 1 Orion joins SLS to complete vehicle stack. NASASpaceFlight. 2021-10-21 [2021-10-22]. （原始内容存档于2021-12-30）.  Artemis I Integrated Testing Update. NASA. 2021-12-17 [2021-12-18]. （原始内容存档于2022-12-11）.  Wall, Mike. NASA's Artemis 1 moon mission, 1st flight of new megarocket, won't launch until May. Space.com. 2022-02-24 [2022-02-25]. （原始内容存档于2022-03-18）.  Barker, Nathan; Gebhardt, Chris. NASA moon rocket SLS rolls out to "rebuilt" LC-39B ahead of Artemis 1 rehearsal. NASASpaceFlight. 2022-03-17 [2022-03-18]. （原始内容存档于2022-03-17）.  Clark, Stephen. NASA's moon rocket rolls back to Vehicle Assembly Building for repairs. Spaceflight Now. 2022-04-26 [2022-04-26]. （原始内容存档于2022-04-26）.  Clark, Stephen. NASA not planning another Artemis 1 countdown dress rehearsal. Spaceflightnow. 2022-06-22 [2022-06-24]. （原始内容存档于2022-06-23）.  The SLS rocket finally has a believable launch date, and it's soon. Ars Technica. 2022-07-20 [2022-07-20]. （原始内容存档于2022-07-20）.  Sloss, Philip. New Artemis 1 schedule uncertainty as NASA EGS ready to continue SLS Booster stacking. nasaspaceflight. 2020-12-04 [2021-09-28]. （原始内容存档于2021-09-28）.  Clark, Stephen. Stacking complete for SLS boosters. spaceflightnow.com. 2021-03-09 [2021-09-28]. （原始内容存档于2021-06-03）.  Stephen, Clark. NASA proceeds with SLS booster stacking in Florida before core stage arrives. Spaceflight Now. 2021-01-15 [2021-09-28]. （原始内容存档于2021-03-07）.  Foust, Jeff. First Crewed Orion Mission May Slip to 2023. SpaceNews. 2015-09-16 [2016-06-23]. （原始内容存档于2021-09-30）.  Clark, Stephen. Orion spacecraft may not fly with astronauts until 2023. Spaceflight Now. 2015-09-16 [2016-06-23]. （原始内容存档于2016-07-01）.  Clark, Smith. Mikulski "Deeply Troubled" by NASA's Budget Request; SLS Won't Use 70 Percent JCL. spacepolicyonline.com. 2014-05-01 [2016-06-23]. （原始内容存档于2016-08-05）.  Report No. IG-20-018: NASA's Management of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Program (PDF). Office of Inspector General (United States). NASA. 2020-07-16 [2020-07-17]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2020-07-19）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Foust, Jeff. NASA delays human lunar landing to at least 2025. SpaceNews. 2021-11-09 [2021-11-09]. （原始内容存档于2022-09-01）.  Carter, Jamie. The $3.4 Billion Plan For NASA To Explore 'Pluto's Twin' And The Rings Of Neptune Then Execute A 'Death Dive'. Forbes. 2021-09-27 [2021-10-13]. （原始内容存档于2021-10-05）.  Rymer, Abigail M.; et al. Neptune Odyssey: A Flagship Concept for the Exploration of the Neptune–Triton System. The Planetary Science Journal. 2021-09-08, 2 (5): 184 [2021-10-13]. Bibcode:2021PSJ.....2..184R. S2CID 237449259. doi:10.3847/PSJ/abf654. （原始内容存档于2021-10-08）.  Foust, Jeff. Europa lander work continues despite budget uncertainty. SpaceNews. 2017-03-31 [2017-03-31].  Foust, Jeff. Final fiscal year 2019 budget bill secures US$21.5 billion for NASA. SpaceNews. 2019-02-17.  Europa Lander Mission Concept Overview （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） Grace Tan-Wang, Steve Sell, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, NASA, AbSciCon2019, Bellevue, Washington. 26 June 2019 本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Clark, Stephen. Five years after New Horizons flyby, scientists assess next mission to Pluto. Spaceflightnow. 2020-07-14 [2021-10-13]. （原始内容存档于2021-10-06）.  Siegel, Ethan. New Space Telescope, 40 Times The Power Of Hubble, To Unlock Astronomy's Future. Forbes. 2017-09-19 [2021-10-13]. （原始内容存档于2021-07-05）.  Lynx X-Ray Observatory (PDF). NASA. [2021-10-13]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-04-16）.  Billings, Lee. Proposed Interstellar Mission Reaches for the Stars, One Generation at a Time. Scientific American. 2019-11-12 [2021-10-13]. （原始内容存档于2021-07-25）.  NASA測試新太空發射系統引擎現故障　或延美太空人重返月球計劃 (17:55). [2021-01-17]. （原始内容存档于2021-02-09）.  https://twitter.com/NASA/status/1590116388403785729 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） SLS Launch delayed to 16th Nov https://twitter.com/NASA_SLS/status/1592773054312038400 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） SLS-1 Launch https://twitter.com/NASA_Orion/status/1592803012245917697 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） Orion seperated from ICPS Bergin, Chris. Preliminary NASA Plan Shows Evolved SLS Vehicle 21 Years Away. nasaspaceflight.com. 2011-07-27 [2011-07-28]. （原始内容存档于2011-08-12）.  Ferris Valyn. Monster Rocket Will Eat America's Space Program. Space Frontier Foundation. 2011-09-15 [2011-09-16]. （原始内容存档于2011-10-06）.  Congressman, Space Frontier Foundation, And Tea Party In Space Call For NASA SLS Investigation. moonandback.com. 2011-10-04 [2011-10-20]. （原始内容存档于2011-10-03）.  The Senate Launch System. Competitive Space Task Force. 2011-10-04 [2011-10-20]. （原始内容存档于2011-10-27）.  Henry Vanderbilt. Impossibly High NASA Development Costs Are Heart of the Matter. moonandback.com. 2011-09-15 [2012-01-26]. （原始内容存档于2012-03-31）.  Rick Tumlinson. The Senate Launch System – Destiny, Decision, and Disaster. Huffington Post. 2011-09-15 [2014-09-09]. （原始内容存档于2014-09-10）.  参数|newspaper=与模板{{cite web}}不匹配（建议改用{{cite news}}或|website=） (帮助) Davenport, Christian. As private companies erode government's hold on space travel, NASA looks to open a new frontier. Washington Post. 2021-02-25 [2021-02-26]. （原始内容存档于2021-10-03）.  Garver: NASA Should Cancel SLS and Mars 2020 Rover. Space News. January 2014 [2015-08-25]. （原始内容存档于2021-10-03）.  Why NASA Still Can't Put Humans in Space: Congress Is Starving It of Needed Funds. 2015 [2015-08-25]. （原始内容存档于2015-08-24）.  New Report Finds Nasa Awarded Boeing Large Fees Despite SLS Launch Slips. ArsTechnica. 2019-06-19 [2019-08-01]. （原始内容存档于2019-08-14）.  Space News: Contractors continue to win award fees despite SLS and Orion delays. Space News. 2019-06-19 [2019-08-01]. （原始内容存档于2021-10-03）.  NASA'S MANAGEMENT OF SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM PROGRAM COSTS AND CONTRACTS (PDF). NASA – Office of Inspector General – Office of Audits. 2020-03-10 [2020-09-14]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2020-08-28）. Based on our review of SLS Program cost reporting, we found that the Program exceeded its Agency Baseline Commitment (ABC) by at least 33 percent at the end of FY 2019, a figure that could reach 43 percent or higher if additional delays push the launch date for Artemis I beyond November 2020. This is due to cost increases tied to Artemis I and a December 2017 replan that removed almost $1 billion of costs from the ABC without lowering the baseline, thereby masking the impact of Artemis I’s projected 19-month schedule delay from November 2018 to a June 2020 launch date. Since the replan, the SLS Program now projects the Artemis I launch will be delayed to at least spring 2021 or later. Further, we found NASA’s ABC cost reporting only tracks Artemis I-related activities and not additional expenditures of almost $6 billion through FY 2020 that are not being reported or tracked through the official congressional cost commitment or the ABC. [...] as a result of delaying Artemis I up to 19 months to June 2020, NASA conducted a replan of the SLS Program in 2017 and removed $889 million in Booster and RS-25 Engine-related development costs because SLS Program officials determined those activities were not directly tied to Artemis I. [...] In our judgement, the removal of these costs should have reduced the SLS Program’s ABC development costs from $7.02 billion to $6.13 billion. [...] SLS Program and HEOMD officials disagreed with our assessment and stated the SLS Program’s change in cost estimates for the Booster and Engines element offices were not a removal of costs but rather a reallocation of those activities to appropriately account for them as non-Artemis I costs. [...] Federal law requires that any time Agency program managers have reasonable knowledge that development costs are likely to exceed the ABC by more than 30 percent, they must notify the NASA Administrator. Once the Administrator determines the SLS Program will exceed the development cost baseline by 30 percent or more, NASA is required to notify Congress and rebaseline program costs and schedule commitments. If the Administrator notifies Congress of the need to rebaseline, NASA is required to stop funding program activities within 18 months unless Congress provides approval and additional appropriations. In our judgement, using NASA’s cost estimates from October 2019 and accounting for the removed costs from the replan, the SLS Program was required to rebaseline when the program exceeded its ABC by 33 percent at the end of FY 2019, an increase that could reach 43 percent or higher by the Artemis I launch date.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 NASA HUMAN SPACE EXPLORATION: Persistent Delays and Cost Growth Reinforce Concerns over Management of Programs (PDF). GAO. [2020-09-15]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-10-03）. NASA’s current approach for reporting cost growth misrepresents the cost performance of the program and thus undermines the usefulness of a baseline as an oversight tool. NASA’s space flight program and project management requirements state that the agency baseline commitment for a program is the basis for the agency’s commitment to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congress based on program requirements, cost, schedule, technical content, and an agreed-to joint cost and schedule confidence level. Removing effort that amounts to more than a tenth of a program’s development cost baseline is a change in the commitment to OMB and the Congress and results in a baseline that does not reflect actual effort. [...] Further, the baseline is a key tool against which to measure the cost and schedule performance of a program. A program must be rebaselined and reauthorized by the Congress if the Administrator determines that development costs will increase by more than 30 percent. Accounting for shifted costs, our analysis indicates that NASA has reached 29.0 percent development cost growth for the SLS program. [...] In addition, as we previously reported in May 2014, NASA does not have a cost and schedule baseline for SLS beyond the first flight. As a result, NASA cannot monitor or track costs shifted beyond EM-1 against a baseline. We recommended that NASA establish cost and schedule baselines that address the life cycle of each SLS increment, as well as for any evolved Orion or ground systems capability. NASA partially concurred with the recommendation, but has not taken any action to date. [...] By not adjusting the SLS baseline to account for the reduced scope, NASA will continue to report costs against an inflated baseline, hence underreporting the extent of cost growth. NASA’s Associate Administrator and Chief Financial Officer stated that they understood our rationale for removing these costs from the EM-1 baseline and agreed that not doing so could result in underreporting of cost growth. Further, the Associate Administrator told us that the agency will be relooking at the SLS program’s schedule, baseline, and calculation of cost growth.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 NASA Commits to Future Artemis Missions with More SLS Rocket Engines (新闻稿). NASA. 2020-05-01 [2020-05-04]. （原始内容存档于2020-05-01）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Berger, Eric. NASA will pay a staggering 146 million for each SLS rocket engine. Ars Technica. 2020-05-01 [2020-05-04]. （原始内容存档于2020-05-04）.  Bolden talks expectations for Biden's space policy. Politico. 2020 [2020-09-11]. （原始内容存档于2020-09-11）.  Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee; Augustine, Austin; Chyba, Kennel; Bejmuk, Crawley; Lyles, Chiao; Greason, Ride. Seeking A Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of A Great Nation (PDF). NASA. October 2009 [2010-04-15]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2019-02-16）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Statement before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology US House of Representatives Hearing: A Review of the NASA's Space Launch System (PDF). The Planetary Society. 2011-07-12 [2012-01-26]. （原始内容 (PDF)存档于2012-03-29）.  Rohrabacher, Dana. Nothing New or Innovative, Including It's（原文如此） Astronomical Price Tag. 2011-09-14 [2011-09-14]. （原始内容存档于2011-09-24）.  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。 Rohrabacher calls for "emergency" funding for CCDev. parabolicarc.com. 2011-08-24 [2011-09-15]. （原始内容存档于2014-11-26）.  Jeff Foust. A monster rocket, or just a monster?. The Space Review. 2011-09-15 [2011-10-20]. （原始内容存档于2011-10-17）.  Jeff Foust. Can NASA develop a heavy-lift rocket?. The Space Review. 2011-11-01 [2011-10-20]. （原始内容存档于2011-10-15）.  Mohney, Doug. Did NASA Hide In-space Fuel Depots To Get a Heavy Lift Rocket?. Satellite Spotlight. 2011-10-21 [2011-11-10]. （原始内容存档于2016-03-03）.  Propellant Depot Requirements Study (PDF). HAT Technical Interchange Meeting. 2011-07-21 [2012-05-25]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-10-01）.  Cowing, Keith. Internal NASA Studies Show Cheaper and Faster Alternatives to the Space Launch System. SpaceRef. 2011-10-12 [2011-11-10]. （原始内容存档于2021-10-03）.  Near Term Space Exploration with Commercial Launch Vehicles Plus Propellant Depot (PDF). Georgia Institute of Technology / National Institute of Aerospace. 2010-09-02 [2012-03-07]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2016-02-04）.  Affordable Exploration Architecture (PDF). United Launch Alliance. 2009. （原始内容 (PDF)存档于2012-10-21）.  Grant Bonin. Human spaceflight for less: the case for smaller launch vehicles, revisited. The Space Review. 2011-06-06 [2011-09-20]. （原始内容存档于2012-11-23）.  Robert Zubrin. How We Can Fly to Mars in This Decade — And on the Cheap. Mars Society. 2011-05-14. （原始内容存档于2012-03-19）.  Andrew Gasser. Propellant depots: the fiscally responsible and feasible alternative to SLS. The Space Review. 2011-10-24 [2011-10-31]. （原始内容存档于2011-10-27）.  Berger, Eric. The SLS rocket may have curbed development of on-orbit refueling for a decade. 2019-08-01 [2019-08-05]. （原始内容存档于2019-08-05）.  Boyle, Alan. Is the case for Mars facing a crisis?. MSNBC. 2011-12-07. （原始内容存档于2012-01-07）.  Strickland, John K. Jr. The SpaceX Falcon Heavy Booster: Why Is It Important?. National Space Society. [2012-01-04]. （原始内容存档于2015-07-08）.  NASA Studies Scaled-Up Falcon, Merlin. Aviation Week. 2010-12-02. （原始内容存档于2012-07-27）.  引用错误：在<references>标签中name属性为“gsd-pdr-2016”的参考文献没有在文中使用 维基共享资源上的相关多媒体资源：太空發射系統 Space Launch System & Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle page on NASA.gov（页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） Preliminary Report on Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle and Space Launch System（页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） (PDF). NASA SLS Future Frontiers video （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） Video animations of mission to asteroid, the Moon, and Mars, beyondearth.com （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） "NASA Continues Journey to Mars Planning", spacepolicyonline.com （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） Video Animation of the SLS（页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆）