libxl: rework domain userdata file lock

The lock introduced in d2cd9d4f ("libxl: functions to lock / unlock
libxl userdata store") has a bug that can leak the lock file when domain
destruction races with other functions that try to get hold of the lock.

There are several issues:
1. The lock is released too early with libxl__userdata_destroyall
   deletes everything in userdata store, including the lock file.
2. The check of domain existence is only done at the beginning of lock
   function, by the time the lock is acquired, the domain might have
   been gone already.

The effect of this two issues is we can run into such situation:

     Process 1                        Process 2 domain destruction
   # LOCK FUNCTION                 # LOCK FUNCTION
    check domain existence          check domain existence
                                    acquire lock (file created)
                                   # LOCK FUNCTION
                                    destroy all files (lock file deleted,
                                                       lock released)
    acquire lock (file created)
   # LOCK FUNCTION                  destroy domain
                                   # UNLOCK (close fd only)
   [ lock file leaked ]

Fix this problem by deploying following changes:

1. Unlink lock file in unlock function.
2. Modify libxl__userdata_destroyall to not delete domain-userdata-lock,
   so that the lock remains held until unlock function is called.
3. Check domain still exists when the lock is acquired, unlock if
   domain is already gone.

Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
libxl: synchronise configuration when we hotplug a device

We update JSON version first, then write to xenstore, so that we
maintain the following invariant: any device which is present in
xenstore has a corresponding entry in JSON.

The workflow is as followed:
   lock json config
       read json config
       update in-memory json config with new entry, replacing
         any stale entry
       for loop
           open xs transaction
           check device existence, abort if it exists
           write in-memory json config to disk
           commit xs transaction
       end for loop
   unlock json config

Please see comment in libxl_internal.h for correctness proof.

As those routines are called both during domain creation and device
hotplug, we add a flag to indicate whether we need to update JSON
config. This flag is only set to true when we hotplug a device. We
cannot update JSON config during domain creation as JSON config is
committed to disk only when domain creation finishes.

Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
libxl: make libxl_cd_insert "eject" + "insert"

We introduce an intermediate empty state when inserting media into
CDROM. The scheme works like this:

  lock json config
  write empty state to xenstore
  for (;;) {
      write user supplied disk to JSON
      write disk information to xenstore
  }
  unlock json config

Bear in mind that all steps can fail. With the proposed scheme, we now
know, if xenstore is empty, then CDROM should be considered empty;
otherwise we should use JSON version of CDROM configuration.

Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
libxl: refactor libxl_get_memory_target

Introduce a helper function which can return both "target" node and
"static-max" node of a domain. Reimplement libxl_get_memory_target using
this helper. libxl__fill_dom0_memory_info is adjusted as well.

This helper will be used in later patch.

Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
libxl: introduce libxl_retrieve_domain_configuration

Introduce a new public API to return domain configuration. This returned
configuration can be used to rebuild a domain.

Note that this configuration only describes the configuration necessary
to reproduce the guest visible state and does not necessarily include
specific decisions made by the toolstack regarding its current
incarnation (e.g. disk backend) unless they were specified by the
application when the domain was created.

With this approach we can preserve what user has provided in the
original configuration as well as valuable information from xenstore.

Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
libxl: introduce libxl_userdata_unlink

This will be used in later patch for xl to remove its "xl" userdata
file.

Both CTX lock and userdata lock are taken in this API. CTX lock is taken
to maintain locking hierarchy, but it also has a side effect to protect
against R-M-W by other threads. Userdata lock is used to protect against
domain destruction.

In general application should not rely on these internal locks to
protect its own userdata files. It should deploys its own lock if it
cares.

Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xl: use libxl_retrieve_domain_configuration and JSON format

Before this change, xl stores domain configuration in "xl" format, which
is in fact a verbatim copy of user supplied domain config.

Now libxl provides a new API to retrieve domain configuration, switch to
that new API, store configuration in JSON format.

Tests done so far (xl.{new,old} denotes xl with{,out} "libxl-json"
support):

1. xl.new create then xl.new save, hexdump saved file: domain config
   saved in JSON format
2. xl.new create, xl.new save then xl.old restore: failed on
   mandatory flag check
3. xl.new create, xl.new save then xl.new restore: succeeded
4. xl.old create, xl.old save then xl.new restore: succeeded
5. xl.new create then local migrate, receiving end xl.new: succeeded
6. xl.old create then local migrate, receiving end xl.new: succeeded

Note that "xl" config is still supported and handled when restarting a
domain. "xl" config file takes precedence over "libxl-json" in that
case, so that user who uses "config-update" to store new config file
won't have regression. All other scenarios (migration, domain listing
etc.) now use the new API.

Lastly, print out warning when users invoke "config-update" to
discourage them from using this command.

Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xl: long output of "list" command now contains Dom0 information

As we've already generated a JSON config for Dom0, print that out when
requested.

Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Merge branch 'staging' of ssh://xenbits.xen.org/home/xen/git/xen into staging
x86/p2m: fix conversion macro of p2m_access to XENMEM_access

Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86/hvm: always set pending event injection when loading VMC[BS] state

In colo mode, secondary vm is running, so VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO may
valid before restoring vmcs. If there is no pending event after
restoring vm, we should clear it.

Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>

Also clear pending software exceptions.
Copy the fix to SVM as well.

Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@amd.com>
x86: suppress event check IPI to MWAITing CPUs

Mass wakeups (via vlapic_ipi()) can take enormous amounts of time,
especially when many of the remote pCPU-s are in deep C-states. For
64-vCPU Windows Server 2012 R2 guests on Ivybridge hardware,
accumulated times of over 2ms were observed (average 1.1ms).
Considering that Windows broadcasts IPIs from its timer interrupt,
which at least at certain times can run at 1kHz, it is clear that this
can't result in good guest behavior. In fact, on said hardware guests
with significantly beyond 40 vCPU-s simply hung when e.g. ServerManager
gets started.

Recognizing that writes to softirq_pending() already have the effect of
waking remote CPUs from MWAITing (due to being co-located on the same
cache line with mwait_wakeup()), we can avoid sending IPIs to CPUs we
know are in a (deep) C-state entered via MWAIT.

With this, average broadcast times for a 64-vCPU guest went down to a
measured maximum of 255us (which is still quite a lot).

One aspect worth noting is that cpumask_raise_softirq() gets brought in
sync here with cpu_raise_softirq() in that now both don't attempt to
raise a self-IPI on the processing CPU.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
x86/HVM: batch vCPU wakeups

Mass wakeups (via vlapic_ipi()) can take enormous amounts of time,
especially when many of the remote pCPU-s are in deep C-states. For
64-vCPU Windows Server 2012 R2 guests on Ivybridge hardware,
accumulated times of over 2ms were observed (average 1.1ms).
Considering that Windows broadcasts IPIs from its timer interrupt,
which at least at certain times can run at 1kHz, it is clear that this
can't result in good guest behavior. In fact, on said hardware guests
with significantly beyond 40 vCPU-s simply hung when e.g. ServerManager
gets started.

This isn't just helping to reduce the number of ICR writes when the
host APICs run in clustered mode, it also reduces them by suppressing
the sends altogether when - by the time
cpu_raise_softirq_batch_finish() is reached - the remote CPU already
managed to handle the softirq. Plus - when using MONITOR/MWAIT - the
update of softirq_pending(cpu), being on the monitored cache line -
should make the remote CPU wake up ahead of the ICR being sent,
allowing the wait-for-ICR-idle latencies to be reduced (perhaps to a
large part due to overlapping the wakeups of multiple CPUs).

With this alone (i.e. without the IPI avoidance patch in place),
average broadcast times for a 64-vCPU guest went down to a measured
maximum of 310us. With that other patch in place, improvements aren't
as clear anymore (short term averages only went down from 255us to
250us, which clearly is within the error range of the measurements),
but longer term an improvement of the averages is still visible.
Depending on hardware, long term maxima were observed to go down quite
a bit (on aforementioned hardware), while they were seen to go up
again on a (single core) Nehalem (where instead the improvement on the
average values was more visible).

Of course this necessarily increases the latencies for the remote
CPU wakeup at least slightly. To weigh between the effects, the
condition to enable batching in vlapic_ipi() may need further tuning.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
x86/HVM: emulate with no writes

Added support for emulating an instruction with no memory writes.
Additionally, introduced hvm_emulate_one_full(), which inspects
possible return values from the hvm_emulate_one() functions
(EXCEPTION, UNHANDLEABLE) and acts on them.

Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86: optimize introspection access to guest state

Speed optimization for introspection purposes: a handful of registers
are sent along with each mem_event. This requires enlargement of the
mem_event_request / mem_event_response stuctures, and additional code
to fill in relevant values. Since the EPT event processing code needs
more data than CR3 or MSR event processors, hvm_mem_event_fill_regs()
fills in less data than p2m_mem_event_fill_regs(), in order to avoid
overhead. Struct hvm_hw_cpu has been considered instead of the custom
struct mem_event_regs_st, but its size would cause quick filling up
of the mem_event ring buffer.

Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
x86, libxc: force-enable relevant MSR events

Vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr() will now refuse to disable interception of
MSRs needed for memory introspection. It is not possible to gate this on
mem_access being active for the domain, since by the time mem_access does
become active the interception for the interesting MSRs has already been
disabled (vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr() runs very early on).

Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
x86: handle resumed instruction based on previous mem_event reply

In a scenario where a page fault that triggered a mem_event occured,
p2m_mem_access_check() will now be able to either 1) emulate the
current instruction, or 2) emulate it, but don't allow it to perform
any writes.

Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
VT-d: suppress UR signaling for further desktop chipsets

This extends commit d6cb14b34f ("VT-d: suppress UR signaling for
desktop chipsets") as per the finally obtained list of affected
chipsets from Intel.

Also pad the IDs we had listed there before to full 4 hex digits.

This is CVE-2013-3495 / XSA-59.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
xen: Relocate mem_access and mem_event into common.

In preparation to add support for ARM LPAE mem_event, relocate mem_access,
mem_event and auxiliary functions into common Xen code.
This patch makes no functional changes to the X86 side, for ARM mem_event
and mem_access functions are just defined as placeholder stubs, and are
actually enabled later in the series.

Edits that are only header path adjustments:
   xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
   xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/nested_ept.c
   xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/nested_hap.c
   xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_paging.c
   xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c
   xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
   xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c
   xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
   xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
   xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c

Makefile adjustments for new/removed code:
   xen/common/Makefile
   xen/arch/x86/mm/Makefile

Relocated prepare_ring_for_helper and destroy_ring_for_helper functions:
   xen/include/xen/mm.h
   xen/common/memory.c
   xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
   xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c

Code movement of mem_event and mem_access:
    xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c -> xen/common/mem_access.c
    xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_event.c -> xen/common/mem_event.c
    xen/include/asm-x86/mem_access.h -> xen/include/xen/mem_access.h
    xen/include/asm-x86/mem_event.h -> xen/include/xen/mem_event.h

Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
---
v5: Make <xen/mem-event.h> include <xen/sched.h> by default.
    Style fix with grouping of #includes.

v4: Make <xen/mem_access.h> include <public/memory.h> by default.

v3: Replace asm/domain.h with xen/sched.h in mem_event.c to better
    accomodate for the new code location.
    Replace #ifdef CONFIG_X86 wrappers with HAS_MEM_ACCESS flags.

v2: Update MAINTAINERS.
    More descriptive commit message to aid in the review process.
xen: Relocate struct npfec definition into common

Nested page fault exception code definitions can be reused on ARM as well.

Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>