SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()

While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit
this bug:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
  IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT
  CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20
  Hardware name:                  /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006
  task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000
  RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>]  [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48  EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000
  RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54
  R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M
  CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
  Call Trace:
    security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30
    __inode_permission+0x41/0xa0
    inode_permission+0x18/0x50
    link_path_walk+0x66/0x920
    path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0
    do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0
    do_sys_open+0x146/0x240
    SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
    system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
  Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff
  RIP  selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  CR2: 0000000000000020

Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the
dereference of it caused the oops.

in selinux_inode_permission():

	isec = inode->i_security;

	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);

Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs
files.  I was not able to recreate this via normal files.  But I'm not
sure they are safe.  It may just be that the race window is much harder
to hit.

What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is
being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted.
As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is
the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these
structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock().

The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does
not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct.  Now if the freeing of
the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of
the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then
there will be no issue here.  (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the
field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the
permission check).

Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand.  A real fix is
to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers
from the RCU callback.  But that is a major job to do, and requires a
lot of work.  For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it
works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: MassStash <MassStash@gmail.com>
SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.

Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.

Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy.  In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.

[On Android, this can only be set by root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes,
and if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if mac_admin permission
is granted in policy.  In Android 4.4, this would only be allowed for
root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes that are also in unconfined domains. In current
AOSP master, mac_admin is not allowed for any domains except the recovery
console which has a legitimate need for it.  The other potential vector
is mounting a maliciously crafted filesystem for which SELinux fetches
xattrs (e.g. an ext4 filesystem on a SDcard).  However, the end result is
only a local denial-of-service (DOS) due to kernel BUG.  This fix is
queued for 3.14.]

Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo

Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled.  Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.

BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[  473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[  473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[  474.027196] Modules linked in:
[  474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G      D   I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[  474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[  474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[  474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>]  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[  474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[  474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[  474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[  474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[  474.453816] FS:  00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  474.489254] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[  474.556058] Stack:
[  474.584325]  ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[  474.618913]  ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[  474.653955]  ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[  474.690461] Call Trace:
[  474.723779]  [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[  474.778049]  [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[  474.811398]  [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[  474.843813]  [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[  474.875694]  [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[  474.907370]  [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[  474.938726]  [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[  474.970036]  [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[  475.000618]  [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[  475.030402]  [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[  475.061097]  [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[  475.094595]  [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[  475.148405]  [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[  475.255884] RIP  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  475.296120]  RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[  475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---

[sds:  commit message edited to note Android implications and
to generate a unique Change-Id for gerrit]

Change-Id: I4d5389f0cfa72b5f59dada45081fa47e03805413
Reported-by:  Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Conflicts:
	security/selinux/ss/services.c
mutex: Make more scalable by doing less atomic operations

Date	Mon, 15 Apr 2013 10:37:57 -0400

In the __mutex_lock_common() function, an initial entry into
the lock slow path will cause two atomic_xchg instructions to be
issued. Together with the atomic decrement in the fast path, a total
of three atomic read-modify-write instructions will be issued in
rapid succession. This can cause a lot of cache bouncing when many
tasks are trying to acquire the mutex at the same time.

This patch will reduce the number of atomic_xchg instructions used by
checking the counter value first before issuing the instruction. The
atomic_read() function is just a simple memory read. The atomic_xchg()
function, on the other hand, can be up to 2 order of magnitude or even
more in cost when compared with atomic_read(). By using atomic_read()
to check the value first before calling atomic_xchg(), we can avoid a
lot of unnecessary cache coherency traffic. The only downside with this
change is that a task on the slow path will have a tiny bit
less chance of getting the mutex when competing with another task
in the fast path.

The same is true for the atomic_cmpxchg() function in the
mutex-spin-on-owner loop. So an atomic_read() is also performed before
calling atomic_cmpxchg().

The mutex locking and unlocking code for the x86 architecture can allow
any negative number to be used in the mutex count to indicate that some
tasks are waiting for the mutex. I am not so sure if that is the case
for the other architectures. So the default is to avoid atomic_xchg()
if the count has already been set to -1. For x86, the check is modified
to include all negative numbers to cover a larger case.

The following table shows the jobs per minutes (JPM) scalability data
on an 8-node 80-core Westmere box with a 3.7.10 kernel. The numactl
command is used to restrict the running of the high_systime workloads
to 1/2/4/8 nodes with hyperthreading on and off.

+-----------------+-----------+------------+----------+
|  Configuration  | Mean JPM  |  Mean JPM  | % Change |
|		  | w/o patch | with patch |	      |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
|		  |      User Range 1100 - 2000	      |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
| 8 nodes, HT on  |    36980   |   148590  | +301.8%  |
| 8 nodes, HT off |    42799   |   145011  | +238.8%  |
| 4 nodes, HT on  |    61318   |   118445  |  +51.1%  |
| 4 nodes, HT off |   158481   |   158592  |   +0.1%  |
| 2 nodes, HT on  |   180602   |   173967  |   -3.7%  |
| 2 nodes, HT off |   198409   |   198073  |   -0.2%  |
| 1 node , HT on  |   149042   |   147671  |   -0.9%  |
| 1 node , HT off |   126036   |   126533  |   +0.4%  |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
|		  |       User Range 200 - 1000	      |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
| 8 nodes, HT on  |   41525    |   122349  | +194.6%  |
| 8 nodes, HT off |   49866    |   124032  | +148.7%  |
| 4 nodes, HT on  |   66409    |   106984  |  +61.1%  |
| 4 nodes, HT off |  119880    |   130508  |   +8.9%  |
| 2 nodes, HT on  |  138003    |   133948  |   -2.9%  |
| 2 nodes, HT off |  132792    |   131997  |   -0.6%  |
| 1 node , HT on  |  116593    |   115859  |   -0.6%  |
| 1 node , HT off |  104499    |   104597  |   +0.1%  |
+-----------------+------------+-----------+----------+
At low user range 10-100, the JPM differences were within +/-1%. So
they are not that interesting.

AIM7 benchmark run has a pretty large run-to-run variance due to random
nature of the subtests executed. So a difference of less than +-5%
may not be really significant.

This patch improves high_systime workload performance at 4 nodes
and up by maintaining transaction rates without significant drop-off
at high node count.  The patch has practically no impact on 1 and 2
nodes system.

The table below shows the percentage time (as reported by perf
record -a -s -g) spent on the __mutex_lock_slowpath() function by
the high_systime workload at 1500 users for 2/4/8-node configurations
with hyperthreading off.

+---------------+-----------------+------------------+---------+
| Configuration | %Time w/o patch | %Time with patch | %Change |
+---------------+-----------------+------------------+---------+
|    8 nodes    |      65.34%     |      0.69%       |  -99%   |
|    4 nodes    |       8.70%	  |      1.02%	     |  -88%   |
|    2 nodes    |       0.41%     |      0.32%       |  -22%   |
+---------------+-----------------+------------------+---------+
It is obvious that the dramatic performance improvement at 8
nodes was due to the drastic cut in the time spent within the
__mutex_lock_slowpath() function.

The table below show the improvements in other AIM7 workloads (at 8
nodes, hyperthreading off).

+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+
|   Workload   | mean % change | mean % change  | mean % change   |
|              | 10-100 users  | 200-1000 users | 1100-2000 users |
+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+
| alltests     |     +0.6%     |   +104.2%      |   +185.9%       |
| five_sec     |     +1.9%     |     +0.9%      |     +0.9%       |
| fserver      |     +1.4%     |     -7.7%      |     +5.1%       |
| new_fserver  |     -0.5%     |     +3.2%      |     +3.1%       |
| shared       |    +13.1%     |   +146.1%      |   +181.5%       |
| short        |     +7.4%     |     +5.0%      |     +4.2%       |
+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
mutex: Queue mutex spinners with MCS lock to reduce cacheline contention

Date	Mon, 15 Apr 2013 10:37:58 -0400

The current mutex spinning code (with MUTEX_SPIN_ON_OWNER option turned
on) allow multiple tasks to spin on a single mutex concurrently. A
potential problem with the current approach is that when the mutex
becomes available, all the spinning tasks will try to acquire the
mutex more or less simultaneously. As a result, there will be a lot of
cacheline bouncing especially on systems with a large number of CPUs.

This patch tries to reduce this kind of contention by putting the
mutex spinners into a queue so that only the first one in the queue
will try to acquire the mutex. This will reduce contention and allow
all the tasks to move forward faster.

The queuing of mutex spinners is done using an MCS lock based
implementation which will further reduce contention on the mutex
cacheline than a similar ticket spinlock based implementation. This
patch will add a new field into the mutex data structure for holding
the MCS lock. This expands the mutex size by 8 bytes for 64-bit system
and 4 bytes for 32-bit system. This overhead will be avoid if the
MUTEX_SPIN_ON_OWNER option is turned off.

The following table shows the jobs per minute (JPM) scalability data
on an 8-node 80-core Westmere box with a 3.7.10 kernel. The numactl
command is used to restrict the running of the fserver workloads to
1/2/4/8 nodes with hyperthreading off.

+-----------------+-----------+-----------+-------------+----------+
|  Configuration  | Mean JPM  | Mean JPM  |  Mean JPM   | % Change |
|		  | w/o patch | patch 1   | patches 1&2 |  1->1&2  |
+-----------------+------------------------------------------------+
|		  |              User Range 1100 - 2000		   |
+-----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| 8 nodes, HT off |  227972   |  227237   |   305043    |  +34.2%  |
| 4 nodes, HT off |  393503   |  381558   |   394650    |   +3.4%  |
| 2 nodes, HT off |  334957   |  325240   |   338853    |   +4.2%  |
| 1 node , HT off |  198141   |  197972   |   198075    |   +0.1%  |
+-----------------+------------------------------------------------+
|		  |              User Range 200 - 1000		   |
+-----------------+------------------------------------------------+
| 8 nodes, HT off |  282325   |  312870   |   332185    |   +6.2%  |
| 4 nodes, HT off |  390698   |  378279   |   393419    |   +4.0%  |
| 2 nodes, HT off |  336986   |  326543   |   340260    |   +4.2%  |
| 1 node , HT off |  197588   |  197622   |   197582    |    0.0%  |
+-----------------+-----------+-----------+-------------+----------+
At low user range 10-100, the JPM differences were within +/-1%. So
they are not that interesting.

The fserver workload uses mutex spinning extensively. With just
the mutex change in the first patch, there is no noticeable change
in performance.  Rather, there is a slight drop in performance. This
mutex spinning patch more than recovers the lost performance and show
a significant increase of +30% at high user load with the full 8 nodes.
Similar improvements were also seen in a 3.8 kernel.

The table below shows the %time spent by different kernel functions
as reported by perf when running the fserver workload at 1500 users
with all 8 nodes.

+-----------------------+-----------+---------+-------------+
|        Function       |  % time   | % time  |   % time    |
|                       | w/o patch | patch 1 | patches 1&2 |
+-----------------------+-----------+---------+-------------+
| __read_lock_failed    |  34.96%   | 34.91%  |   29.14%    |
| __write_lock_failed   |  10.14%   | 10.68%  |    7.51%    |
| mutex_spin_on_owner   |   3.62%   |  3.42%  |    2.33%    |
| mspin_lock            |    N/A    |   N/A   |    9.90%    |
| __mutex_lock_slowpath |   1.46%   |  0.81%  |    0.14%    |
| _raw_spin_lock        |   2.25%   |  2.50%  |    1.10%    |
+-----------------------+-----------+---------+-------------+
The fserver workload for an 8-node system is dominated by the
contention in the read/write lock. Mutex contention also plays a
role. With the first patch only, mutex contention is down (as shown by
the __mutex_lock_slowpath figure) which help a little bit. We saw only
a few percents improvement with that.

By applying patch 2 as well, the single mutex_spin_on_owner figure is
now split out into an additional mspin_lock figure. The time increases
from 3.42% to 11.23%. It shows a great reduction in contention among
the spinners leading to a 30% improvement. The time ratio 9.9/2.33=4.3
indicates that there are on average 4+ spinners waiting in the spin_lock
loop for each spinner in the mutex_spin_on_owner loop. Contention in
other locking functions also go down by quite a lot.

The table below shows the performance change of both patches 1 & 2 over
patch 1 alone in other AIM7 workloads (at 8 nodes, hyperthreading off).

+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+
|   Workload   | mean % change | mean % change  | mean % change   |
|              | 10-100 users  | 200-1000 users | 1100-2000 users |
+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+
| alltests     |      0.0%     |     -0.8%      |     +0.6%       |
| five_sec     |     -0.3%     |     +0.8%      |     +0.8%       |
| high_systime |     +0.4%     |     +2.4%      |     +2.1%       |
| new_fserver  |     +0.1%     |    +14.1%      |    +34.2%       |
| shared       |     -0.5%     |     -0.3%      |     -0.4%       |
| short        |     -1.7%     |     -9.8%      |     -8.3%       |
+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+
The short workload is the only one that shows a decline in performance
probably due to the spinner locking and queuing overhead.

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
mutex: back out architecture specific check for negative mutex count

Date	Mon, 15 Apr 2013 10:37:59 -0400

If it is confirmed that all the supported architectures can allow a
negative mutex count without incorrect behavior, we can then back
out the architecture specific change and allow the mutex count to
go to any negative number. That should further reduce contention for
non-x86 architecture.

If this is not the case, this patch should be dropped.

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
sched: Reduce overestimating rq->avg_idle

Date	Thu, 29 Aug 2013 13:05:34 -0700

When updating avg_idle, if the delta exceeds some max value, then avg_idle
gets set to the max, regardless of what the previous avg was. This can cause
avg_idle to often be overestimated.

This patch modifies the way we update avg_idle by always updating it with the
function call to update_avg() first. Then, if avg_idle exceeds the max, we set
it to the max.

Signed-off-by: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
sched/rt: Remove redundant nr_cpus_allowed test

Date	Fri, 4 Oct 2013 14:24:53 -0500

From: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com>

In 76854c7e8f3f4172fef091e78d88b3b751463ac6 "sched: Use
rt.nr_cpus_allowed to recover select_task_rq() cycles" an optimization
was added to select_task_rq_rt() that immediately returns when
p->nr_cpus_allowed == 1 at the beginning of the function.  This makes
the latter p->nr_cpus_allowed > 1 check redundant and can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com>

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
sched,rt: disable rt_runtime borrowing by default

Make the default RT_RUNTIME_SHARE setting reflect the most common
throttle role, that of safety mechanism to protect the box.

Bug 1269903

Change-Id: Id4ccf0095ea254f2e15fddc7ab02069f7f60a7c0
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <bitbucket@online.de>
Reviewed-on: http://git-master/r/234274
(cherry picked from commit be74a12c8d8b987f569cdd0eec2aead3dcbdfa31)
Reviewed-on: http://git-master/r/237266
Tested-by: Peter Boonstoppel <pboonstoppel@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Boonstoppel <pboonstoppel@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Automatic_Commit_Validation_User
Reviewed-by: Diwakar Tundlam <dtundlam@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Walmsley <pwalmsley@nvidia.com>
GVS: Gerrit_Virtual_Submit
nohz: stat: Fix CPU idle time accounting

Since cpustat[CPUTIME_IDLE] is never connected to ts->idle_sleeptime,
never read from cpustat[CPUTIME_IDLE] when reporting stats in
/proc/stat.

Note this was rejected by Michal Hocko when it was initially proposed
by Martin Schwidefsky in LKML, so if you want to upstream it, better
find an alternative (either completely disable cpustat[CPUTIME_IDLE]
for CONFIG_NO_HZ or somehow connect them to keep them in sync.)

bug 1190321

Change-Id: Idc92488910b826aff850a010016d8326c7ab9e6c
Signed-off-by: Bo Yan <byan@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-on: http://git-master/r/214638
Reviewed-by: Automatic_Commit_Validation_User
GVS: Gerrit_Virtual_Submit
Reviewed-by: Liang Cheng (SW) <licheng@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Liang Cheng (SW) <licheng@nvidia.com>
sched: reinitialize rq->next_balance when a CPU is hot-added

Reinitialize rq->next_balance when a CPU is hot-added.  Otherwise,
scheduler domain rebalancing may be skipped if rq->next_balance was
set to a future time when the CPU was last active, and the
newly-re-added CPU is in idle_balance().  As a result, the
newly-re-added CPU will remain idle with no tasks scheduled until the
softlockup watchdog runs - potentially 4 seconds later.  This can
waste energy and reduce performance.

This behavior can be observed in some SoC kernels, which use CPU
hotplug to dynamically remove and add CPUs in response to load.  In
one case that triggered this behavior,

0. the system started with all cores enabled, running multi-threaded
   CPU-bound code;

1. the system entered some single-threaded code;

2. a CPU went idle and was hot-removed;

3. the system started executing a multi-threaded CPU-bound task;

4. the CPU from event 2 was re-added, to respond to the load.

The time interval between events 2 and 4 was approximately 300
milliseconds.

Of course, ideally CPU hotplug would not be used in this manner,
but this patch does appear to fix a real bug.

Nvidia folks: this patch is submitted as at least a partial fix for
bug 1243368 ("[sched] Load-balancing not happening correctly after
cores brought online")

Change-Id: Iabac21e110402bb581b7db40c42babc951d378d0
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pwalmsley@nvidia.com>
Cc: Peter Boonstoppel <pboonstoppel@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-on: http://git-master/r/208927
Reviewed-by: Automatic_Commit_Validation_User
Reviewed-by: Peter Zu <pzu@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Boonstoppel <pboonstoppel@nvidia.com>
GVS: Gerrit_Virtual_Submit
Tested-by: Peter Zu <pzu@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Yu-Huan Hsu <yhsu@nvidia.com>
random: make 'add_interrupt_randomness()' do something sane

commit 775f4b297b780601e61787b766f306ed3e1d23eb upstream.

We've been moving away from add_interrupt_randomness() for various
reasons: it's too expensive to do on every interrupt, and flooding the
CPU with interrupts could theoretically cause bogus floods of entropy
from a somewhat externally controllable source.

This solves both problems by limiting the actual randomness addition
to just once a second or after 64 interrupts, whicever comes first.
During that time, the interrupt cycle data is buffered up in a per-cpu
pool.  Also, we make sure the the nonblocking pool used by urandom is
initialized before we start feeding the normal input pool.  This
assures that /dev/urandom is returning unpredictable data as soon as
possible.

(Based on an original patch by Linus, but significantly modified by
tytso.)

Tested-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Nadia Heninger <nadiah@cs.ucsd.edu>
Reported-by: Zakir Durumeric <zakir@umich.edu>
Reported-by: J. Alex Halderman <jhalderm@umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin.google.com>

random: use lockless techniques in the interrupt path

commit 902c098a3663de3fa18639efbb71b6080f0bcd3c upstream.

The real-time Linux folks don't like add_interrupt_randomness() taking
a spinlock since it is called in the low-level interrupt routine.
This also allows us to reduce the overhead in the fast path, for the
random driver, which is the interrupt collection path.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin@google.com>

random: create add_device_randomness() interface

commit a2080a67abe9e314f9e9c2cc3a4a176e8a8f8793 upstream.

Add a new interface, add_device_randomness() for adding data to the
random pool that is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly
even per boot).  This would be things like MAC addresses or serial
numbers, or the read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual
entropy to the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values
for devices that might otherwise be identical and have very little
entropy available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).

[ Modified by tytso to mix in a timestamp, since there may be some
  variability caused by the time needed to detect/configure the hardware
  in question. ]

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin@google.com>

usb: feed USB device information to the /dev/random driver

commit b04b3156a20d395a7faa8eed98698d1e17a36000 upstream.

Send the USB device's serial, product, and manufacturer strings to the
/dev/random driver to help seed its pools.

Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Conflicts:
	drivers/usb/core/hub.c

Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin@google.com>

net: feed /dev/random with the MAC address when registering a device

commit 7bf2357524408b97fec58344caf7397f8140c3fd upstream.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin@google.com>

random: use the arch-specific rng in xfer_secondary_pool

commit e6d4947b12e8ad947add1032dd754803c6004824 upstream.

If the CPU supports a hardware random number generator, use it in
xfer_secondary_pool(), where it will significantly improve things and
where we can afford it.

Also, remove the use of the arch-specific rng in
add_timer_randomness(), since the call is significantly slower than
get_cycles(), and we're much better off using it in
xfer_secondary_pool() anyway.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin@google.com>

random: add new get_random_bytes_arch() function

commit c2557a303ab6712bb6e09447df828c557c710ac9 upstream.

Create a new function, get_random_bytes_arch() which will use the
architecture-specific hardware random number generator if it is
present.  Change get_random_bytes() to not use the HW RNG, even if it
is avaiable.

The reason for this is that the hw random number generator is fast (if
it is present), but it requires that we trust the hardware
manufacturer to have not put in a back door.  (For example, an
increasing counter encrypted by an AES key known to the NSA.)

It's unlikely that Intel (for example) was paid off by the US
Government to do this, but it's impossible for them to prove otherwise
  --- especially since Bull Mountain is documented to use AES as a
whitener.  Hence, the output of an evil, trojan-horse version of
RDRAND is statistically indistinguishable from an RDRAND implemented
to the specifications claimed by Intel.  Short of using a tunnelling
electronic microscope to reverse engineer an Ivy Bridge chip and
disassembling and analyzing the CPU microcode, there's no way for us
to tell for sure.

Since users of get_random_bytes() in the Linux kernel need to be able
to support hardware systems where the HW RNG is not present, most
time-sensitive users of this interface have already created their own
cryptographic RNG interface which uses get_random_bytes() as a seed.
So it's much better to use the HW RNG to improve the existing random
number generator, by mixing in any entropy returned by the HW RNG into
/dev/random's entropy pool, but to always _use_ /dev/random's entropy
pool.

This way we get almost of the benefits of the HW RNG without any
potential liabilities.  The only benefits we forgo is the
speed/performance enhancements --- and generic kernel code can't
depend on depend on get_random_bytes() having the speed of a HW RNG
anyway.

For those places that really want access to the arch-specific HW RNG,
if it is available, we provide get_random_bytes_arch().

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin@google.com>

random: remove rand_initialize_irq()

commit c5857ccf293968348e5eb4ebedc68074de3dcda6 upstream.

With the new interrupt sampling system, we are no longer using the
timer_rand_state structure in the irq descriptor, so we can stop
initializing it now.

[ Merged in fixes from Sedat to find some last missing references to
  rand_initialize_irq() ]

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin@google.com>
Signed-off-by: MassStash <MassStash@gmail.com>
softirq: Use hotplug thread infrastructure

[ paulmck: Call rcu_note_context_switch() with interrupts enabled. ]

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120716103948.456416747@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: MassStash <MassStash@gmail.com>
msm: rq_stats: Calculate load based on current freq limit

Prior to this patch, load has been calculated based on an
initial value of policy.cpuinfo.max_freq. This value may
change for several reasons: userspace settings or thermal
throttling (hello hammerhead!). This results in unreliable
calculations that confuse mpdecision which accesses
/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/rq-stats/* for stats info.
Consider current policy.max to fix this behaviour.

Change-Id: Iae1f2fc7f4aa470f7e80371c1ebcf7be423f51ca

Signed-off-by: MassStash <MassStash@gmail.com>
cpufreq: interactive: restructure CPUFREQ_GOV_LIMITS

The cpufreq_interactive_timer gets cancelled and rescheduled
whenever the cpufreq_policy is changed. When the cpufreq policy is
changed at a rate faster than the sampling_rate of the interactive
governor, then the governor misses to change the target frequency
for long duration. The patch removes the need of cancelling the
timers when policy->min is changed.

Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
Change-Id: I7862f1c8022a3b98a890e7537f93d02010e86764
Signed-off-by: MassStash <MassStash@gmail.com>
cpufreq: interactive: turn boost_pulse off on boost off

Change-Id: I36fe217fa047d68ea90e78b12c7db4537ea8010b
Signed-off-by: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: MassStash <MassStash@gmail.com>
ARM: add cpufreq transiton notifier to adjust loops_per_jiffy for smp

If CONFIG_SMP, cpufreq skips loops_per_jiffy update, because different
arch has different per-cpu loops_per_jiffy definition.

Change-Id: I3bfdf800784c9c494f873de096e3a1972f14f358
Signed-off-by: Richard Zhao <richard.zhao@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Signed-off-by: MassStash <MassStash@gmail.com>
ARM: 7653/2: do not scale loops_per_jiffy when using a constant delay clock

When udelay() is implemented using an architected timer, it is wrong
to scale loops_per_jiffy when changing the CPU clock frequency since
the timer clock remains constant.

The lpj should probably become an implementation detail relevant to
the CPU loop based delay routine only and more confined to it. In the
mean time this is the minimal fix needed to have expected delays with
the timer based implementation when cpufreq is also in use.

Change-Id: I75f66afe0cd4851031c71c1ebd522b402bb0a788
Reported-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Liviu Dudau <Liviu.Dudau@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: MassStash <MassStash@gmail.com>
ARM: 7685/1: delay: use private ticks_per_jiffy field for timer-based delay ops

Commit 70264367a243 ("ARM: 7653/2: do not scale loops_per_jiffy when
using a constant delay clock") fixed a problem with our timer-based
delay loop, where loops_per_jiffy is scaled by cpufreq yet used directly
by the timer delay ops.

This patch fixes the problem in a more elegant way by keeping a private
ticks_per_jiffy field in the delay ops, independent of loops_per_jiffy
and therefore not subject to scaling. The loop-based delay continues to
use loops_per_jiffy directly, as it should.

Change-Id: I675a5089c2156c01e7c2e151c7be2795cf965091
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: MassStash <MassStash@gmail.com>
msm: kgsl: Fix nice level for higher priority GPU start thread

Before, we were actually setting the lowest possible priority.

Change-Id: I3a52de949eee0faea8061dd91ed303fa8231f0d4

Signed-off-by: MassStash <MassStash@gmail.com>
nohz: Make tick_nohz_irq_exit() irq safe

commit e5ab012c3271990e8457055c25cafddc1ae8aa6b upstream.

As it stands, irq_exit() may or may not be called with
irqs disabled, depending on __ARCH_IRQ_EXIT_IRQS_DISABLED
that the arch can define.

It makes tick_nohz_irq_exit() unsafe. For example two
interrupts can race in tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick(): the inner
most one computes the expiring time on top of the timer list,
then it's interrupted right before reprogramming the
clock. The new interrupt enqueues a new timer list timer,
it reprogram the clock to take it into account and it exits.
The CPUs resumes the inner most interrupt and performs the clock
reprogramming without considering the new timer list timer.

This regression has been introduced by:
     280f06774afedf849f0b34248ed6aff57d0f6908
     ("nohz: Separate out irq exit and idle loop dyntick logic")

Let's fix it right now with the appropriate protections.

A saner long term solution will be to remove
__ARCH_IRQ_EXIT_IRQS_DISABLED and mandate that irq_exit() is called
with interrupts disabled.

Change-Id: I2ae7d82cbc920c0f0449f299b8b643fb0b244702
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1361373336-11337-1-git-send-email-fweisbec@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Lingzhu Xiang <lxiang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: MassStash <MassStash@gmail.com>