fix commit xen/arm: Add support for GICv3 for domU

The build of xen-4.5.0-rc2 fails if XSM_ENABLE=y due to an inconsistency
in commit fda1614 "xen/arm: Add support for GICv3 for domU" which uses
XEN_DOMCTL_configure_domain in xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c and
xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors but XEN_DOMCTL_arm_configure_domain
elsewhere.

 	Michael Young
In fda1614 ("xen/arm: Add support for GICv3 for domU")
XEN_DOMCTL_configure_domain is used in xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c and
xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors but XEN_DOMCTL_arm_configure_domain
is used elsewhere.

Signed-off-by: Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
sched_rt: sanity check input and serialization

Sanity check input params in rt_dom_cntl();
Serialize rt_dom_cntl() against the global lock.

Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Meng Xu <mengxu@cis.upenn.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
sched_rt: serialize vcpu data access

Fix the following two issues in rtds scheduler:
1) The runq queue lock is not grabbed when rt_update_deadline is
called in rt_alloc_vdata function, which may cause race condition;
Solution: Move call to rt_update_deadline from _alloc to _insert;
Note: rt_alloc_vdata does not need grab the runq lock, because only one
cpu will allocate the rt_vcpu; before the rt_vcpu is inserted into the
runq, no more than one cpu operates on the rt_vcpu.

2) rt_vcpu_remove should grab the runq lock before remove the vcpu
from runq; otherwise, race condition may happen.
Solution: Add lock in rt_vcpu_remove().

Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Meng Xu <mengxu@cis.upenn.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
dpci: move from an hvm_irq_dpci (and struct domain) to an hvm_dirq_dpci model

When an interrupt for an PCI (or PCIe) passthrough device is to be sent
to a guest, we find the appropiate 'hvm_dirq_dpci' structure for the
interrupt (PIRQ), set a bit (masked), and schedule an tasklet.

Then the 'hvm_dirq_assist' tasklet gets called with the 'struct domain'
from where it iterates over the the radix-tree of 'hvm_dirq_dpci' (from
zero to the number of PIRQs allocated) which are masked to the guest
and calls each 'hvm_pirq_assist'. If the PIRQ has a bit set (masked) it
figures out how to inject the PIRQ to the guest.

This is inefficient and not fair as:
 - We iterate starting at PIRQ 0 and up every time. That means the PCIe
   devices that have lower PIRQs get to be called first.
 - If we have many PCIe devices passed in with many PIRQs and if most
   of the time only the highest numbered PIRQ get an interrupt (as the
   initial ones are for control) we end up iterating over many PIRQs.

But we could do beter - the 'hvm_dirq_dpci' has the field for
'struct domain', which we can use instead of having to pass in the
'struct domain'.

As such this patch moves the tasklet to the 'struct hvm_dirq_dpci' and
sets the 'dom' field to the domain. We also double-check that the
'->dom' is not reset before using it.

We have to be careful with this as that means we MUST have 'dom' set
before pirq_guest_bind() is called. As such we add the
'pirq_dpci->dom = d;' to cover for such cases.

The mechanism to tear it down is more complex as there are two ways it
can be executed:

 a) pci_clean_dpci_irq. This gets called when the guest is being
    destroyed. We end up calling 'tasklet_kill'.

    The scenarios in which the 'struct pirq' (and subsequently the
    'hvm_pirq_dpci') gets destroyed is when:

    - guest did not use the pirq at all after setup.
    - guest did use pirq, but decided to mask and left it in that
      state.
    - guest did use pirq, but crashed.

    In all of those scenarios we end up calling 'tasklet_kill' which
    will spin on the tasklet if it is running.

 b) pt_irq_destroy_bind (guest disables the MSI). We double-check that
    the softirq has run by piggy-backing on the existing
    'pirq_cleanup_check' mechanism which calls 'pt_pirq_cleanup_check'.
    We add the extra call to 'pt_pirq_softirq_active' in
    'pt_pirq_cleanup_check'.

    NOTE: Guests that use event channels unbind first the event channel
    from PIRQs, so the 'pt_pirq_cleanup_check' won't be called as event
    is set to zero. In that case we either clean it up via the a)
    mechanism. It is OK to re-use the tasklet when 'pt_irq_create_bind'
    is called afterwards.

    There is an extra scenario regardless of event being set or not:
    the guest did 'pt_irq_destroy_bind' while an interrupt was
    triggered and tasklet was scheduled (but had not been run). It is
    OK to still run the tasklet as hvm_dirq_assist won't do anything
    (as the flags are set to zero). As such we can exit out of
    hvm_dirq_assist without doing anything.

Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
dpci: replace tasklet with softirq

The existing tasklet mechanism has a single global spinlock that is
taken every-time the global list is touched. And we use this lock quite
a lot - when we call do_tasklet_work which is called via an softirq and
from the idle loop. We take the lock on any operation on the
tasklet_list.

The problem we are facing is that there are quite a lot of tasklets
scheduled. The most common one that is invoked is the one injecting the
VIRQ_TIMER in the guest. Guests are not insane and don't set the
one-shot or periodic clocks to be in sub 1ms intervals (causing said
tasklet to be scheduled for such small intervalls).

The problem appears when PCI passthrough devices are used over many
sockets and we have an mix of heavy-interrupt guests and idle guests.
The idle guests end up seeing 1/10 of its RUNNING timeslice eaten by
the hypervisor (and 40% steal time).

The mechanism by which we inject PCI interrupts is by hvm_do_IRQ_dpci
which schedules the hvm_dirq_assist tasklet every time an interrupt is
received. The callchain is:

_asm_vmexit_handler
 -> vmx_vmexit_handler
    ->vmx_do_extint
        -> do_IRQ
            -> __do_IRQ_guest
                -> hvm_do_IRQ_dpci
                   tasklet_schedule(&dpci->dirq_tasklet);
                   [takes lock to put the tasklet on]

[later on the schedule_tail is invoked which is 'vmx_do_resume']

vmx_do_resume
 -> vmx_asm_do_vmentry
        -> call vmx_intr_assist
          -> vmx_process_softirqs
            -> do_softirq
              [executes the tasklet function, takes the
               lock again]

While on other CPUs they might be sitting in a idle loop and invoked to
deliver an VIRQ_TIMER, which also ends up taking the lock twice: first
to schedule the v->arch.hvm_vcpu.assert_evtchn_irq_tasklet (accounted
to the guests' BLOCKED_state); then to execute it - which is accounted
for in the guest's RUNTIME_state.

The end result is that on a 8 socket machine with PCI passthrough,
where four sockets are busy with interrupts, and the other sockets have
idle guests - we end up with the idle guests having around 40% steal
time and 1/10 of its timeslice (3ms out of 30 ms) being tied up taking
the lock. The latency of the PCI interrupts delieved to guest is also
hindered.

With this patch the problem disappears completly. That is removing the
lock for the PCI passthrough use-case (the 'hvm_dirq_assist' case) by
not using tasklets at all.

The patch is simple - instead of scheduling an tasklet we schedule our
own softirq - HVM_DPCI_SOFTIRQ, which will take care of running
'hvm_dirq_assist'. The information we need on each CPU is which
'struct hvm_pirq_dpci' structure the 'hvm_dirq_assist' needs to run on.
That is simple solved by threading the 'struct hvm_pirq_dpci' through a
linked list. The rule of only running one 'hvm_dirq_assist' for only
one 'hvm_pirq_dpci' is also preserved by having 'schedule_dpci_for'
ignore any subsequent calls for an domain which has already been
scheduled.

== Code details ==

Most of the code complexity comes from the '->dom' field in the
'hvm_pirq_dpci' structure. We use it for ref-counting and as such it
MUST be valid as long as STATE_SCHED bit is set. Whoever clears the
STATE_SCHED bit does the ref-counting and can also reset the '->dom'
field.

To compound the complexity, there are multiple points where the
'hvm_pirq_dpci' structure is reset or re-used. Initially (first time
the domain uses the pirq), the 'hvm_pirq_dpci->dom' field is set to
NULL as it is allocated. On subsequent calls in to 'pt_irq_create_bind'
the ->dom is whatever it had last time.

As this is the initial call (which QEMU ends up calling when the guest
writes an vector value in the MSI field) we MUST set the '->dom' to a
the proper structure (otherwise we cannot do proper ref-counting).

The mechanism to tear it down is more complex as there are three ways
it can be executed. To make it simpler everything revolves around
'pt_pirq_softirq_active'. If it returns -EAGAIN that means there is an
outstanding softirq that needs to finish running before we can continue
tearing down. With that in mind:

a) pci_clean_dpci_irq. This gets called when the guest is being
   destroyed. We end up calling 'pt_pirq_softirq_active' to see if it
   is OK to continue the destruction.

   The scenarios in which the 'struct pirq' (and subsequently the
   'hvm_pirq_dpci') gets destroyed is when:

   - guest did not use the pirq at all after setup.
   - guest did use pirq, but decided to mask and left it in that state.
   - guest did use pirq, but crashed.

   In all of those scenarios we end up calling 'pt_pirq_softirq_active'
   to check if the softirq is still active. Read below on the
   'pt_pirq_softirq_active' loop.

b) pt_irq_destroy_bind (guest disables the MSI). We double-check that
   the softirq has run by piggy-backing on the existing
   'pirq_cleanup_check' mechanism which calls 'pt_pirq_cleanup_check'.
   We add the extra call to 'pt_pirq_softirq_active' in
   'pt_pirq_cleanup_check'.

   NOTE: Guests that use event channels unbind first the event channel
   from PIRQs, so the 'pt_pirq_cleanup_check' won't be called as 'event'
   is set to zero. In that case we either clean it up via the a) or c)
   mechanism.

   There is an extra scenario regardless of 'event' being set or not:
   the guest did 'pt_irq_destroy_bind' while an interrupt was triggered
   and softirq was scheduled (but had not been run). It is OK to still
   run the softirq as hvm_dirq_assist won't do anything (as the flags
   are set to zero). However we will try to deschedule the softirq if
   we can (by clearing the STATE_SCHED bit and us doing the
   ref-counting).

c) pt_irq_create_bind (not a typo). The scenarios are:

   - guest disables the MSI and then enables it (rmmod and modprobe in
     a loop). We call 'pt_pirq_reset' which checks to see if the
     softirq has been scheduled. Imagine the 'b)' with interrupts in
     flight and c) getting called in a loop.

We will spin up on 'pt_pirq_is_active' (at the start of the
'pt_irq_create_bind') with the event_lock spinlock dropped and waiting
(cpu_relax). We cannot call 'process_pending_softirqs' as it might
result in a dead-lock. hvm_dirq_assist will be executed and then the
softirq will clear 'state' which signals that that we can re-use the
'hvm_pirq_dpci' structure. In case this softirq is scheduled on a
remote CPU the softirq will run on it as the semantics behind an
softirq is that it will execute within the guest interruption.

   - we hit once the error paths in 'pt_irq_create_bind' while an
     interrupt was triggered and softirq was scheduled.

If the softirq is in STATE_RUN that means it is executing and we should
let it continue on. We can clear the '->dom' field as the softirq has
stashed it beforehand. If the softirq is STATE_SCHED and we are
successful in clearing it, we do the ref-counting and clear the '->dom'
field. Otherwise we let the softirq continue on and the '->dom' field
is left intact. The clearing of the '->dom' is left to a), b) or again
c) case.

Note that in both cases the 'flags' variable is cleared so
hvm_dirq_assist won't actually do anything.

Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
adjust number of domains in cpupools when destroying domain

Commit bac6334b51d9bcfe57ecf4a4cb5288348fcf044a (move domain to
cpupool0 before destroying it) introduced an error in the accounting
of cpupools regarding the number of domains. The number of domains
is nor adjusted when a domain is moved to cpupool0 in kill_domain().

Correct this by introducing a cpupool function doing the move
instead of open coding it by calling sched_move_domain().

Reported-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Tested-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
tools/hotplug: use configure --sysconfdir result

... instead of hardcoding values and guess where they config files may
be. Also use the result of --with-sysconfig-leaf-dir.

Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xl: correct test condition on libxl_domain_info

The `if' statement considered return value 0 from libxl_domain_info an
error, while 0 actually means success.

Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
vTPM: Fix Atmel timeout bug.

Some versions of Atmel TPMs provide invalid values for TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT query.
Because timeouts are invalid, every other command after tpm_get_timeouts will fail.
It is a known issue and it was fixed recently in linux kernel tpm_tis.c on 2014-07-29.
This patch does not allow timeouts to be less than standard values.
I tested it on a Dell Latitude E5520 and after making the changes I was able to start vtpmmgr-stubdom.

Signed-off-by: Emil Condrea <emilcondrea@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
libxl: add missing action in DEFINE_DEVICE_ADD

... otherwise when device add operation fails, the error message looks
like "libxl: error: libxl.c:1897:device_addrm_aocomplete: unable to (null)
device", which is not very helpful.

Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
x86: (allow to) override LIST_POISON*

Having these point into space not controlled by the hypervisor provides
an unnecessary attack surface. Allow architectures to override them and
utilize that override to make them non-canonical addresses (thus
causing #GP rather than #PF when dereferenced).

Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
EFI: allow retry of ExitBootServices() call

The specification is kind of vague under what conditions
ExitBootServices() may legitimately fail, requiring the OS loader to
retry:

"If MapKey value is incorrect, ExitBootServices() returns
 EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER and GetMemoryMap() with ExitBootServices() must
 be called again. Firmware implementation may choose to do a partial
 shutdown of the boot services during the first call to
 ExitBootServices(). EFI OS loader should not make calls to any boot
 service function other then GetMemoryMap() after the first call to
 ExitBootServices()."

While our code guarantees the map key to be valid, there are systems
where a firmware internal notification sent while processing
ExitBootServices() reportedly results in changes to the memory map.
In that case, make a best effort second try: Avoid any boot service
calls other than the two named above, with the possible exception of
error paths. Those aren't a problem, since if we end up needing to
retry, we're hosed when something goes wrong as much as if we didn't
make the retry attempt.

For x86, a minimal adjustment to efi_arch_process_memory_map() is
needed for it to cope with potentially being called a second time.

For arm64, while efi_process_memory_map_bootinfo() is easy to verify
that it can safely be called more than once without violating spec
constraints, it's not so obvious for fdt_add_uefi_nodes(), hence a
step by step approach:
- deletion of memory nodes and memory reserve map entries: the 2nd pass
  shouldn't find any as the 1st one deleted them all,
- a "chosen" node should be found as it got added in the 1st pass,
- the various "linux,uefi-*" nodes all got added during the 1st pass
  and hence only their contents may get updated.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org>
Release-acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
x86: don't allow page table updates on non-PV page tables in do_mmu_update()

paging_write_guest_entry() and paging_cmpxchg_guest_entry() aren't
consistently supported for non-PV guests (they'd deref NULL for PVH or
non-HAP HVM ones). Don't allow respective MMU_* operations on the
page tables of such domains.

This is CVE-2014-8594 / XSA-109.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
x86emul: enforce privilege level restrictions when loading CS

Privilege level checks were basically missing for the CS case, the
only check that was done (RPL == DPL for nonconforming segments)
was solely covering a single special case (return to non-conforming
segment).

Additionally in long mode the L bit set requires the D bit to be clear,
as was recently pointed out for KVM by Nadav Amit
<namit@cs.technion.ac.il>.

Finally we also need to force the loaded selector's RPL to CPL (at
least as long as lret/retf emulation doesn't support privilege level
changes).

This is CVE-2014-8595 / XSA-110.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
libxl: CODING_STYLE: Much new material

Discuss:

    Memory allocation
    Conventional variable names
    Convenience macros
    Error handling
    Idempotent data structure construction/destruction
    Asynchronous/long-running operations

Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
libxl: CODING_STYLE: Deprecate `error' for out blocks

We should have only one name for this and `out' is more prevalent.

Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
libxl: CODING_STYLE: Mention function out parameters

We seem to use both `_r' and `_out'.  Document both.

Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
libxl: CODING_STYLE: Discuss existing style problems

Document that:
 - the existing code is not all confirming yet
 - code should conform
 - we will sometimes accept patches with nonconforming elements if
   they don't make matters worse.

Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
libxl: remove existence check for PCI device hotplug

The existence check is to make sure a device is not added to a guest
multiple times.

PCI device backend path has different rules from vif, disk etc. For
example:
/local/domain/0/backend/pci/9/0/dev-1/0000:03:10.1
/local/domain/0/backend/pci/9/0/key-1/0000:03:10.1
/local/domain/0/backend/pci/9/0/dev-2/0000:03:10.2
/local/domain/0/backend/pci/9/0/key-2/0000:03:10.2

The devid for PCI devices is hardcoded 0. libxl__device_exists only
checks up to /local/.../9/0 so it always returns true even the device is
assignable.

Remove invocation of libxl__device_exists. We're sure at this point that
the PCI device is assignable (hence no xenstore entry or JSON entry).
The check is done before hand. For HVM guest it's done by calling
xc_test_assign_device and for PV guest it's done by calling
pciback_dev_is_assigned.

Reported-by: Li, Liang Z <liang.z.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
libxl: Document device parameter of libxl_device_<type>_add functions

The device parameter of libxl_device_<type>_add is an in/out parameter.
Unspecified fields are filled in with appropriate values for the created
device when the function returns.  Document this behaviour.

Signed-off-by: Euan Harris <euan.harris@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>