UBUNTU: Ubuntu-2.6.32-56.118

Signed-off-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>
UBUNTU: Start new release

Ignore: yes
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)

CVE-2013-4587

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1261564

In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield.  Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory.  This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel.  This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.

Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 338c7dbadd2671189cec7faf64c84d01071b3f96)
Acked-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
KVM: x86: Fix potential divide by 0 in lapic (CVE-2013-6367)

CVE-2013-6367

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1261566

Under guest controllable circumstances apic_get_tmcct will execute a
divide by zero and cause a crash.  If the guest cpuid support
tsc deadline timers and performs the following sequence of requests
the host will crash.
- Set the mode to periodic
- Set the TMICT to 0
- Set the mode bits to 11 (neither periodic, nor one shot, nor tsc deadline)
- Set the TMICT to non-zero.
Then the lapic_timer.period will be 0, but the TMICT will not be.  If the
guest then reads from the TMCCT then the host will perform a divide by 0.

This patch ensures that if the lapic_timer.period is 0, then the division
does not occur.

Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(back ported from commit b963a22e6d1a266a67e9eecc88134713fd54775c)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
xfs: underflow bug in xfs_attrlist_by_handle()

CVE-2013-6382

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1256091

If we allocate less than sizeof(struct attrlist) then we end up
corrupting memory or doing a ZERO_PTR_SIZE dereference.

This can only be triggered with CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
(back ported from commit 31978b5cc66b8ba8a7e8eef60b12395d41b7b890)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
aacraid: prevent invalid pointer dereference

CVE-2013-6380

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1256083

It appears that driver runs into a problem here if fibsize is too small
because we allocate user_srbcmd with fibsize size only but later we
access it until user_srbcmd->sg.count to copy it over to srbcmd.

It is not correct to test (fibsize < sizeof(*user_srbcmd)) because this
structure already includes one sg element and this is not needed for
commands without data.  So, we would recommend to add the following
(instead of test for fibsize == 0).

Signed-off-by: Mahesh Rajashekhara <Mahesh.Rajashekhara@pmcs.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit b4789b8e6be3151a955ade74872822f30e8cd914)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
wireless: radiotap: fix parsing buffer overrun

CVE-2013-7027
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1260622

When parsing an invalid radiotap header, the parser can overrun
the buffer that is passed in because it doesn't correctly check
 1) the minimum radiotap header size
 2) the space for extended bitmaps

The first issue doesn't affect any in-kernel user as they all
check the minimum size before calling the radiotap function.
The second issue could potentially affect the kernel if an skb
is passed in that consists only of the radiotap header with a
lot of extended bitmaps that extend past the SKB. In that case
a read-only buffer overrun by at most 4 bytes is possible.

Fix this by adding the appropriate checks to the parser.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
(back ported from commit f5563318ff1bde15b10e736e97ffce13be08bc1a)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic

CVE-2013-7266

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1267081

This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.

This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.

Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.

Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.

Changes since RFC:

Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.

With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
	msg->msg_name = NULL
".

This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.

Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.

Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(back ported from commit f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
net: rose: restore old recvmsg behavior

CVE-2013-7266

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1267081

recvmsg handler in net/rose/af_rose.c performs size-check ->msg_namelen.

After commit f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
(net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic), we now
always take the else branch due to namelen being initialized to 0.

Digging in netdev-vger-cvs git repo shows that msg_namelen was
initialized with a fixed-size since at least 1995, so the else branch
was never taken.

Compile tested only.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit f81152e35001e91997ec74a7b4e040e6ab0acccf)
Acked-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
fsnotify: pass a file instead of an inode to open, read, and write

CVE-2013-0160

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1097680

fanotify, the upcoming notification system actually needs a struct path so it can
do opens in the context of listeners, and it needs a file so it can get f_flags
from the original process.  Close was the only operation that already was passing
a struct file to the notification hook.  This patch passes a file for access,
modify, and open as well as they are easily available to these hooks.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2a12a9d7814631e918dec93abad856e692d5286d)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
UBUNTU: ubuntu: AUFS: fsnotify_open() now receives a file

CVE-2013-0160

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1097680

After upstream commit 2a12a9d7814631e918dec93abad856e692d5286d ("fsnotify:
pass a file instead of an inode to open, read, and write"), function
fsnotify_open() expects to receive a 'struct file *' and not a 'struct
dentry *'.

This patch fixes the AUFS call to this function.

Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
vfs: introduce FMODE_NONOTIFY

CVE-2013-0160

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1097680

This is a new f_mode which can only be set by the kernel.  It indicates
that the fd was opened by fanotify and should not cause future fanotify
events.  This is needed to prevent fanotify livelock.  An example of
obvious livelock is from fanotify close events.

Process A closes file1
This creates a close event for file1.
fanotify opens file1 for Listener X
Listener X deals with the event and closes its fd for file1.
This creates a close event for file1.
fanotify opens file1 for Listener X
Listener X deals with the event and closes its fd for file1.
This creates a close event for file1.
fanotify opens file1 for Listener X
Listener X deals with the event and closes its fd for file1.
notice a pattern?

The fix is to add the FMODE_NONOTIFY bit to the open filp done by the kernel
for fanotify.  Thus when that file is used it will not generate future
events.

This patch simply defines the bit.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
(back ported from commit ecf081d1a73b077916f514f2ec744ded32b88ca1)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
fanotify: FMODE_NONOTIFY and __O_SYNC in sparc conflict

CVE-2013-0160

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1097680

sparc used the same value as FMODE_NONOTIFY so change FMODE_NONOTIFY to be
something unique.

Signed-off-by: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 12ed2e36c98aec6c41559222e311f4aa15d254b6)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
TTY: do not update atime/mtime on read/write

CVE-2013-0160

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1097680

On http://vladz.devzero.fr/013_ptmx-timing.php, we can see how to find
out length of a password using timestamps of /dev/ptmx. It is
documented in "Timing Analysis of Keystrokes and Timing Attacks on
SSH". To avoid that problem, do not update time when reading
from/writing to a TTY.

I am afraid of regressions as this is a behavior we have since 0.97
and apps may expect the time to be current, e.g. for monitoring
whether there was a change on the TTY. Now, there is no change. So
this would better have a lot of testing before it goes upstream.

References: CVE-2013-0160

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # after 3.9 is out
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(back ported from commit b0de59b5733d18b0d1974a060860a8b5c1b36a2e)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
TTY: fix atime/mtime regression

CVE-2013-0160

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1097680

In commit b0de59b5733d ("TTY: do not update atime/mtime on read/write")
we removed timestamps from tty inodes to fix a security issue and waited
if something breaks.  Well, 'w', the utility to find out logged users
and their inactivity time broke.  It shows that users are inactive since
the time they logged in.

To revert to the old behaviour while still preventing attackers to
guess the password length, we update the timestamps in one-minute
intervals by this patch.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(back ported from commit 37b7f3c76595e23257f61bd80b223de8658617ee)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
tty: fix up atime/mtime mess, take three

CVE-2013-0160

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1097680

We first tried to avoid updating atime/mtime entirely (commit
b0de59b5733d: "TTY: do not update atime/mtime on read/write"), and then
limited it to only update it occasionally (commit 37b7f3c76595: "TTY:
fix atime/mtime regression"), but it turns out that this was both
insufficient and overkill.

It was insufficient because we let people attach to the shared ptmx node
to see activity without even reading atime/mtime, and it was overkill
because the "only once a minute" means that you can't really tell an
idle person from an active one with 'w'.

So this tries to fix the problem properly.  It marks the shared ptmx
node as un-notifiable, and it lowers the "only once a minute" to a few
seconds instead - still long enough that you can't time individual
keystrokes, but short enough that you can tell whether somebody is
active or not.

Reported-by: Simon Kirby <sim@hostway.ca>
Acked-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(back ported from commit b0b885657b6c8ef63a46bc9299b2a7715d19acde)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
farsync: fix info leak in ioctl

CVE-2014-1444

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1271442

The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit 96b340406724d87e4621284ebac5e059d67b2194)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>
wanxl: fix info leak in ioctl

CVE-2014-1445

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1271444

The wanxl_ioctl() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.

Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit 2b13d06c9584b4eb773f1e80bbaedab9a1c344e1)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>
hamradio/yam: fix info leak in ioctl

CVE-2014-1446

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1271445

The yam_ioctl() code fails to initialise the cmd field
of the struct yamdrv_ioctl_cfg. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the 4-byte info leak.

Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit 8e3fbf870481eb53b2d3a322d1fc395ad8b367ed)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>
SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.

CVE-2014-1874

Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.

Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy.  In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.

Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo

Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled.  Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.

BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[  473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[  473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[  474.027196] Modules linked in:
[  474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G      D   I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[  474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[  474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[  474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>]  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[  474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[  474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[  474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[  474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[  474.453816] FS:  00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  474.489254] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[  474.556058] Stack:
[  474.584325]  ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[  474.618913]  ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[  474.653955]  ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[  474.690461] Call Trace:
[  474.723779]  [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[  474.778049]  [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[  474.811398]  [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[  474.843813]  [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[  474.875694]  [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[  474.907370]  [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[  474.938726]  [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[  474.970036]  [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[  475.000618]  [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[  475.030402]  [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[  475.061097]  [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[  475.094595]  [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[  475.148405]  [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[  475.255884] RIP  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  475.296120]  RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[  475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---

Reported-by:  Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98)
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>