sysfs_devices_system_cpu should be a sysfs_type

Otherwise the following denials occur on mako:

<5>[    2.494246] type=1400 audit(1382544550.200:4): avc:  denied  { associate } for  pid=1 comm="init" name="time_in_state" dev="sysfs" ino=17444 scontext=u:object_r:sy
sfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=filesystem
<5>[    2.494735] type=1400 audit(1382544550.200:5): avc:  denied  { associate } for  pid=1 comm="init" name="total_trans" dev="sysfs" ino=17443 scontext=u:object_r:sysf
s_devices_system_cpu:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=filesystem
<5>[    2.495162] type=1400 audit(1382544550.200:6): avc:  denied  { associate } for  pid=1 comm="init" name="stats" dev="sysfs" ino=17442 scontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devi
ces_system_cpu:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=filesystem
<5>[    2.495620] type=1400 audit(1382544550.200:7): avc:  denied  { associate } for  pid=1 comm="init" name="scaling_governor" dev="sysfs" ino=17435 scontext=u:object_r
:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=filesystem
<5>[    2.496047] type=1400 audit(1382544550.200:8): avc:  denied  { associate } for  pid=1 comm="init" name="cpuinfo_transition_latency" dev="sysfs" ino=17429 scontext=
u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=filesystem
<5>[    2.496505] type=1400 audit(1382544550.200:9): avc:  denied  { associate } for  pid=1 comm="init" name="scaling_available_frequencies" dev="sysfs" ino=17439 sconte
xt=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=filesystem
<5>[    2.496963] type=1400 audit(1382544550.200:10): avc:  denied  { associate } for  pid=1 comm="init" name="scaling_driver" dev="sysfs" ino=17436 scontext=u:object_r:
sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=filesystem

Change-Id: I584a1cf61cb871a38be4d3b308cef03e64cfda8e

Move sysfs_devices_system_cpu to the central policy.

Every device has a CPU. This is not device specific.

Allow every domain to read these files/directories.
For unknown reasons, these files are accessed by A LOT
of processes.

Allow ueventd to write to these files. This addresses
the following denials seen on mako:

<5>[    4.935602] type=1400 audit(1383167737.512:4): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=140 comm="ueventd" name="cpu0" dev="sysfs" ino=3163 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[    4.935785] type=1400 audit(1383167737.512:5): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=140 comm="ueventd" name="cpu0" dev="sysfs" ino=3163 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[    4.935937] type=1400 audit(1383167737.512:6): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=140 comm="ueventd" name="cpu0" dev="sysfs" ino=3163 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[    4.936120] type=1400 audit(1383167737.512:7): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=140 comm="ueventd" name="uevent" dev="sysfs" ino=3164 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tclass=file
<5>[    4.936303] type=1400 audit(1383167737.512:8): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=140 comm="ueventd" name="uevent" dev="sysfs" ino=3164 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I4766dc571762d8fae06aa8c26828c070b80f5936
Start confining ueventd

* Keep ueventd in permissive
* Drop unconfined macro to collect logs
* Restore allow rules to current NSA maintained policy

Change-Id: Ic4ee8e24ccd8887fed151ae1e4f197512849f57b
Make sure exec_type is assigned to all entrypoint types.

Some file types used as domain entrypoints were missing the
exec_type attribute.  Add it and add a neverallow rule to
keep it that way.

Change-Id: I7563f3e03940a27ae40ed4d6bb74181c26148849
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Isolate untrusted app ptys from other domains.

Add a create_pty() macro that allows a domain to
create and use its own ptys, isolated from the ptys
of any other domain, and use that macro for untrusted_app.
This permits the use of a pty by apps without opening up access
to ptys created by any other domain on the system.

Change-Id: I5d96ce4d1b26073d828e13eb71c48d1e14ce7d6b
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Allow apps to execute app_data_files

Fixes the following denial:

<5>[28362.335293] type=1400 audit(1378991198.292:24): avc:  denied  { execute } for  pid=1640 comm="facebook.katana" path="/data/data/com.facebook.katana/app_libs/libfb_jpegturbo.so" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=652556 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I4a515610149f06f0c49194feb6bc96e9b3080c12
Fix denials encountered while getting bugreports.

Bug: 10498304
Change-Id: I312665a2cd09fa16ae3f3978aebdb0da99cf1f74
Move audio_firmware_file and /data/misc/audio entry to core sepolicy.

Change-Id:  Ib8c96ab9e19d34e8e34a4c859528345763be4906
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Rename camera_calibration_file and audio_firmware_file.

Use more general type names for the contents of /data/misc/camera and
/data/misc/audio.  These were the names used in our policy until 4.3
was released, at which point we switched to be consistent with AOSP.
However, the Galaxy S4 4.2.2 image, Galaxy S4 4.3 image, and
Galaxy Note 3 4.3 image all shipped with policies using _data_file names
because they were based on our older policy.  So we may as well switch
AOSP to these names.

Not sure if in fact these could be all coalesced to the new media_data_file
type for /data/misc/media introduced by
Ic374488f8b62bd4f8b3c90f30da0e8d1ed1a7343.

Options to fix already existing devices, which would only apply
to Nexus devices with 4.3 or 4.4 at this point:
1) Add restorecon_recursive /data/misc/audio /data/misc/camera to either
the system/core init.rc or to the device-specific init.*.rc files.
-or-
2) Add a typealias declaration in the policy to remap the old type names.
to the new ones.  Then existing types on persistent storage will be
remapped internally to the new ones.
-or-
3) Some sort of relabeld.

Option #2 is implemented by this change.

Change-Id: Id36203f5bb66b5200efc1205630b5b260ef97496
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Introduce controls on wake lock interface

Change-Id: Ie0ee266e9e6facb2ab2abd652f68765239a41af1
Allow untrusted apps to execute binaries from their sandbox directories.

Various third party apps come with their own binaries that they write out to
their sandbox directories and then execute, e.g.:
audit(1386527439.462:190): avc:  denied  { execute_no_trans } for  pid=1550 comm="Thread-79" path="/data/data/com.cisco.anyconnect.vpn.android.avf/app_bin/busybox" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=602891 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c39,c256 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c39,c256 tclass=file

While this is not ideal from a security POV, it seems necessary to support for
compatibility with Android today.

Split out the execute-related permissions to a separate allow rule as it
only makes sense for regular files (class file) not other kinds of files
(e.g. fifos, sockets, symlinks), and use the rx_file_perms macro.

Move the rule to untrusted_app only so that we do not permit system apps
to execute files written by untrusted apps.

Change-Id: Ic9bfe80e9b14f2c0be14295c70f23f09691ae66c
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Add rules to permit CTS security-related tests to run.

Change-Id: I184458af1f40de6f1ab99452e76ba586dad1319e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Merge remote-tracking branch 'cm/cm-11.0' into kk-4.4