compiler-gcc.h: Add gcc-recommended GCC_VERSION macro

commit 3f3f8d2f48acfd8ed3b8e6b7377935da57b27b16 upstream.

Throughout compiler*.h, many version checks are made.  These can be
simplified by using the macro that gcc's documentation recommends.
However, my primary reason for adding this is that I need bug-check
macros that are enabled at certain gcc versions and it's cleaner to use
this macro than the tradition method:

  #if __GNUC__ > 4 || (__GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ => 2)

If you add patch level, it gets this ugly:

  #if __GNUC__ > 4 || (__GNUC__ == 4 && (__GNUC_MINOR__ > 2 || \
      __GNUC_MINOR__ == 2 __GNUC_PATCHLEVEL__ >= 1))

As opposed to:

  #if GCC_VERSION >= 40201

While having separate headers for gcc 3 & 4 eliminates some of this
verbosity, they can still be cleaned up by this.

See also:

  http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/cpp/Common-Predefined-Macros.html

Signed-off-by: Daniel Santos <daniel.santos@pobox.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Qiang Huang <h.huangqiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
zram: introduce compressing backend abstraction

ZRAM performs direct LZO compression algorithm calls, making it the one
and only option.  While LZO is generally performs well, LZ4 algorithm
tends to have a faster decompression (see http://code.google.com/p/lz4/
for full report)

	Name            Ratio  C.speed D.speed
	                        MB/s    MB/s
	LZ4 (r101)      2.084    422    1820
	LZO 2.06        2.106    414     600

Thus, users who have mostly read (decompress) usage scenarious or mixed
workflow (writes with relatively high read ops number) will benefit from
using LZ4 compression backend.

Introduce compressing backend abstraction zcomp in order to support
multiple compression algorithms with the following set of operations:

        .create
        .destroy
        .compress
        .decompress

Schematically zram write() usually contains the following steps:
0) preparation (decompression of partioal IO, etc.)
1) lock buffer_lock mutex (protects meta compress buffers)
2) compress (using meta compress buffers)
3) alloc and map zs_pool object
4) copy compressed data (from meta compress buffers) to object allocated by 3)
5) free previous pool page, assign a new one
6) unlock buffer_lock mutex

As we can see, compressing buffers must remain untouched from 1) to 4),
because, otherwise, concurrent write() can overwrite data.  At the same
time, zram_meta must be aware of a) specific compression algorithm memory
requirements and b) necessary locking to protect compression buffers.  To
remove requirement a) new struct zcomp_strm introduced, which contains a
compress/decompress `buffer' and compression algorithm `private' part.
While struct zcomp implements zcomp_strm stream handling and locking and
removes requirement b) from zram meta.  zcomp ->create() and ->destroy(),
respectively, allocate and deallocate algorithm specific zcomp_strm
`private' part.

Every zcomp has zcomp stream and mutex to protect its compression stream.
Stream usage semantics remains the same -- only one write can hold stream
lock and use its buffers.  zcomp_strm_find() turns caller into exclusive
user of a stream (holding stream mutex until zram release stream), and
zcomp_strm_release() makes zcomp stream available (unlock the stream
mutex).  Hence no concurrent write (compression) operations possible at
the moment.

iozone -t 3 -R -r 16K -s 60M -I +Z

       test            base           patched
--------------------------------------------------
  Initial write      597992.91       591660.58
        Rewrite      609674.34       616054.97
           Read     2404771.75      2452909.12
        Re-read     2459216.81      2470074.44
   Reverse Read     1652769.66      1589128.66
    Stride read     2202441.81      2202173.31
    Random read     2236311.47      2276565.31
 Mixed workload     1423760.41      1709760.06
   Random write      579584.08       615933.86
         Pwrite      597550.02       594933.70
          Pread     1703672.53      1718126.72
         Fwrite     1330497.06      1461054.00
          Fread     3922851.00      3957242.62

Usage examples:

	comp = zcomp_create(NAME) /* NAME e.g. "lzo" */

which initialises compressing backend if requested algorithm is supported.

Compress:
	zstrm = zcomp_strm_find(comp)
	zcomp_compress(comp, zstrm, src, &dst_len)
	[..] /* copy compressed data */
	zcomp_strm_release(comp, zstrm)

Decompress:
	zcomp_decompress(comp, src, src_len, dst);

Free compessing backend and its zcomp stream:
	zcomp_destroy(comp)

Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
enable swap for zram, and load 4 devices
Revert "ext4: fix memory leak in xattr"

This reverts commit f0e432af4e903d8e519124cf8307102546ef17fa.
Revert "input: touch: use MSC activity (nvidia)"

This reverts commit e32be2e70bf81b66a9f69333919d56d86dee481f.
Revert "Input: add MSC_ACTIVITY event for reporting early input activity"

This reverts commit 9129f6844f65d61139c667adc33d7dd5c8db5e37.
SELinux:  Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.

Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.

Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy.  In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.

Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo

Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled.  Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.

BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[  473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[  473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[  474.027196] Modules linked in:
[  474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G      D   I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[  474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[  474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[  474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>]  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[  474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[  474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[  474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[  474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[  474.453816] FS:  00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  474.489254] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[  474.556058] Stack:
[  474.584325]  ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[  474.618913]  ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[  474.653955]  ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[  474.690461] Call Trace:
[  474.723779]  [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[  474.778049]  [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[  474.811398]  [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[  474.843813]  [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[  474.875694]  [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[  474.907370]  [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[  474.938726]  [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[  474.970036]  [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[  475.000618]  [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[  475.030402]  [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[  475.061097]  [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[  475.094595]  [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[  475.148405]  [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[  475.255884] RIP  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  475.296120]  RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[  475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---

Reported-by:  Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: Amperific <amperific@gmail.com>
FS: Initial F2FS import

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
f2fs: add code to handle the lack of s_max_links superblock field in 3.2

further modified for Nexus Grouper Kernel

Signed-off-by: Alejandro Martinez Ruiz <alex@nowcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
Merge commit '5a2f3a02aea164f4f59c0c3497772090a411b462' into kk_mr1
f2fs: change the prototype for show_options

Signed-off-by: Alejandro Martinez Ruiz <alex@nowcomputing.com>
fs/f2fs/namei.c: fix merge derp + linux 3.2 compatibility fixups

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
evm: building without EVM enabled fixes

- Missing 'inline' on evm_inode_setattr() definition.
Introduced by commit 817b54aa45db ("evm: add evm_inode_setattr to prevent
updating an invalid security.evm").

- Missing security_old_inode_init_security() stub function definition.
Caused by commit 9d8f13ba3f48 ("security: new security_inode_init_security
API adds function callback").

Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
evm: fix build problems

- Make the previously missing security_old_inode_init_security() stub
  function definition static inline.

- The stub security_inode_init_security() function previously returned
  -EOPNOTSUPP and relied on the callers to change it to 0.  The stub
  security/security_old_inode_init_security() functions now return 0.

Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
security: Fix a typo

Fix a typo.

Signed-off-by: Roy.Li <rongqing.li@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
security: sparse fix: Move security_fixup_op to security.h

Fix sparse warning by moving declaraion to global header.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
security.h: fix misc typos/grammar errors in comments

Fix various typos/grammar errors in include/linux/security.h comments (no code changes).

Signed-off-by: Vsevolod Alekseev <vsevolod.alekseev@gmx.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
include/linux/security.h: fix security_inode_init_security() arg

Make the security_inode_init_security() initxattrs arg const, to match the
non-stubbed version of that function.

Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
security: update security_file_mmap() docs

This documents the fields added to security_file_mmap() that were
introduced in ed0321895182ffb6ecf210e066d87911b270d587.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
security: Fix security_old_inode_init_security() when CONFIG_SECURITY is not set

Commit 1e39f384bb01 ("evm: fix build problems") makes the stub version
of security_old_inode_init_security() return 0 when CONFIG_SECURITY is
not set.

But that makes callers such as reiserfs_security_init() assume that
security_old_inode_init_security() has set name, value, and len
arguments properly - but security_old_inode_init_security() left them
uninitialized which then results in interesting failures.

Revert security_old_inode_init_security() to the old behavior of
returning EOPNOTSUPP since both callers (reiserfs and ocfs2) handle this
just fine.

[ Also fixed the S_PRIVATE(inode) case of the actual non-stub
  security_old_inode_init_security() function to return EOPNOTSUPP
  for the same reason, as pointed out by Mimi Zohar.

  It got incorrectly changed to match the new function in commit
  fb88c2b6cbb1: "evm: fix security/security_old_init_security return
  code".   - Linus ]

Reported-by: Jorge Bastos <mysql.jorge@decimal.pt>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>