block: cgroups, kconfig, build bits for BFQ-v7r2-3.4

Update Kconfig.iosched and do the related Makefile changes to include
kernel configuration options for BFQ. Also add the bfqio controller
to the cgroups subsystem.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Valente <paolo.valente@unimore.it>
Signed-off-by: Arianna Avanzini <avanzini.arianna@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: poondog <markj338@gmail.com>
block: introduce the BFQ-v7r5 I/O sched for 3.4

Add the BFQ-v7r5 I/O scheduler to 3.4.
The general structure is borrowed from CFQ, as much of the code for
handling I/O contexts. Over time, several useful features have been
ported from CFQ as well (details in the changelog in README.BFQ). A
(bfq_)queue is associated to each task doing I/O on a device, and each
time a scheduling decision has to be made a queue is selected and served
until it expires.

    - Slices are given in the service domain: tasks are assigned
      budgets, measured in number of sectors. Once got the disk, a task
      must however consume its assigned budget within a configurable
      maximum time (by default, the maximum possible value of the
      budgets is automatically computed to comply with this timeout).
      This allows the desired latency vs "throughput boosting" tradeoff
      to be set.

    - Budgets are scheduled according to a variant of WF2Q+, implemented
      using an augmented rb-tree to take eligibility into account while
      preserving an O(log N) overall complexity.

    - A low-latency tunable is provided; if enabled, both interactive
      and soft real-time applications are guaranteed a very low latency.

    - Latency guarantees are preserved also in the presence of NCQ.

    - Also with flash-based devices, a high throughput is achieved
      while still preserving latency guarantees.

    - BFQ features Early Queue Merge (EQM), a sort of fusion of the
      cooperating-queue-merging and the preemption mechanisms present
      in CFQ. EQM is in fact a unified mechanism that tries to get a
      sequential read pattern, and hence a high throughput, with any
      set of processes performing interleaved I/O over a contiguous
      sequence of sectors.

    - BFQ supports full hierarchical scheduling, exporting a cgroups
      interface.  Since each node has a full scheduler, each group can
      be assigned its own weight.

    - If the cgroups interface is not used, only I/O priorities can be
      assigned to processes, with ioprio values mapped to weights
      with the relation weight = IOPRIO_BE_NR - ioprio.

    - ioprio classes are served in strict priority order, i.e., lower
      priority queues are not served as long as there are higher
      priority queues.  Among queues in the same class the bandwidth is
      distributed in proportion to the weight of each queue. A very
      thin extra bandwidth is however guaranteed to the Idle class, to
      prevent it from starving.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Valente <paolo.valente@unimore.it>
Signed-off-by: Arianna Avanzini <avanzini.arianna@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: poondog <markj338@gmail.com>
block, bfq: add Early Queue Merge (EQM) to BFQ-v7r5 for 3.4.0

A set of processes may happen  to  perform interleaved reads, i.e., requests
whose union would give rise to a  sequential read  pattern.  There are two
typical  cases: in the first  case,   processes  read  fixed-size chunks of
data at a fixed distance from each other, while in the second case processes
may read variable-size chunks at  variable distances. The latter case occurs
for  example with QEMU, which  splits the  I/O generated  by the  guest into
multiple chunks,  and lets these chunks  be served by a  pool of cooperating
processes,  iteratively  assigning  the  next  chunk of  I/O  to  the first
available  process. CFQ  uses actual  queue merging  for the  first type of
rocesses, whereas it  uses preemption to get a sequential  read pattern out
of the read requests  performed by the second type of  processes. In the end
it uses  two different  mechanisms to  achieve the  same goal: boosting the
throughput with interleaved I/O.

This patch introduces  Early Queue Merge (EQM), a unified mechanism to get a
sequential  read pattern  with both  types of  processes. The  main idea is
checking newly arrived requests against the next request of the active queue
both in case of actual request insert and in case of request merge. By doing
so, both the types of processes can be handled by just merging their queues.
EQM is  then simpler and  more compact than the  pair of mechanisms used in
CFQ.

Finally, EQM  also preserves the  typical low-latency properties of BFQ, by
properly restoring the weight-raising state of  a queue when it gets back to
a non-merged state.

Signed-off-by: Mauro Andreolini <mauro.andreolini@unimore.it>
Signed-off-by: Arianna Avanzini <avanzini.arianna@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Valente <paolo.valente@unimore.it>
Signed-off-by: poondog <markj338@gmail.com>
softirq: reduce latencies

In various network workloads, __do_softirq() latencies can be up
to 20 ms if HZ=1000, and 200 ms if HZ=100.

This is because we iterate 10 times in the softirq dispatcher,
and some actions can consume a lot of cycles.

This patch changes the fallback to ksoftirqd condition to :

- A time limit of 2 ms.
- need_resched() being set on current task

When one of this condition is met, we wakeup ksoftirqd for further
softirq processing if we still have pending softirqs.

Using need_resched() as the only condition can trigger RCU stalls,
as we can keep BH disabled for too long.

I ran several benchmarks and got no significant difference in
throughput, but a very significant reduction of latencies (one order
of magnitude) :

In following bench, 200 antagonist "netperf -t TCP_RR" are started in
background, using all available cpus.

Then we start one "netperf -t TCP_RR", bound to the cpu handling the NIC
IRQ (hard+soft)

Before patch :

# netperf -H 7.7.7.84 -t TCP_RR -T2,2 -- -k
RT_LATENCY,MIN_LATENCY,MAX_LATENCY,P50_LATENCY,P90_LATENCY,P99_LATENCY,MEAN_LATENCY,STDDEV_LATENCY
MIGRATED TCP REQUEST/RESPONSE TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET
to 7.7.7.84 () port 0 AF_INET : first burst 0 : cpu bind
RT_LATENCY=550110.424
MIN_LATENCY=146858
MAX_LATENCY=997109
P50_LATENCY=305000
P90_LATENCY=550000
P99_LATENCY=710000
MEAN_LATENCY=376989.12
STDDEV_LATENCY=184046.92

After patch :

# netperf -H 7.7.7.84 -t TCP_RR -T2,2 -- -k
RT_LATENCY,MIN_LATENCY,MAX_LATENCY,P50_LATENCY,P90_LATENCY,P99_LATENCY,MEAN_LATENCY,STDDEV_LATENCY
MIGRATED TCP REQUEST/RESPONSE TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET
to 7.7.7.84 () port 0 AF_INET : first burst 0 : cpu bind
RT_LATENCY=40545.492
MIN_LATENCY=9834
MAX_LATENCY=78366
P50_LATENCY=33583
P90_LATENCY=59000
P99_LATENCY=69000
MEAN_LATENCY=38364.67
STDDEV_LATENCY=12865.26

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Francisco Franco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: poondog <markj338@gmail.com>
squashed: glibc versions:

the kernel's memcpy and memmove is very inefficient. But the glibc version is
quite fast, in some cases it is 10 times faster than the kernel version. So I
introduce some memory copy macros and functions of the glibc to improve the
kernel version's performance.

The strategy of the memory functions is:
1. Copy bytes until the destination pointer is aligned.
2. Copy words in unrolled loops.  If the source and destination are not
   aligned in the same way, use word memory operations, but shift and merge
   two read words before writing.
3. Copy the few remaining bytes.

Signed-off-by: Miao Xie <miaox*******>

and

the performance of memcpy and memmove of the general version is very
inefficient, this patch improved them.

Signed-off-by: Miao Xie <miaox*******>
SELinux: include definition of new capabilities

The kernel has added CAP_WAKE_ALARM and CAP_EPOLLWAKEUP.  We need to
define these in SELinux so they can be mediated by policy.

Change-Id: I8a3e0db15ec5f4eb05d455a57e8446a8c2b484c2
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
[sds: rename epollwakeup to block_suspend to match upstream merge]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
writeback: fix occasional slow sync(1)

In case when system contains no dirty pages, wakeup_flusher_threads() will
submit WB_SYNC_NONE writeback for 0 pages so wb_writeback() exits
immediately without doing anything, even though there are dirty inodes in
the system.  Thus sync(1) will write all the dirty inodes from a
WB_SYNC_ALL writeback pass which is slow.

Fix the problem by using get_nr_dirty_pages() in wakeup_flusher_threads()
instead of calculating number of dirty pages manually.  That function also
takes number of dirty inodes into account.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Paul Taysom <taysom@chromium.org>
Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Frandom a fast pseudo-random number generator
futex: Prevent attaching to kernel threads

We happily allow userspace to declare a random kernel thread to be the
owner of a user space PI futex.

Found while analysing the fallout of Dave Jones syscall fuzzer.

We also should validate the thread group for private futexes and find
some fast way to validate whether the "alleged" owner has RW access on
the file which backs the SHM, but that's a separate issue.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <darren@...art.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@...com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@...hat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...fujitsu.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@...k.frob.com>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <carlos@...hat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@...hat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140512201701.194824402@...utronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

Change-Id: I7444c58d00cbded35b078331a8740e8431cb13a5
Signed-off-by: flar2 <asegaert@gmail.com>
futex: Add another early deadlock detection check

Dave Jones trinity syscall fuzzer exposed an issue in the deadlock
detection code of rtmutex:
  http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140429151655.GA14277@...hat.com

That underlying issue has been fixed with a patch to the rtmutex code,
but the futex code must not call into rtmutex in that case because
    - it can detect that issue early
    - it avoids a different and more complex fixup for backing out

If the user space variable got manipulated to 0x80000000 which means
no lock holder, but the waiters bit set and an active pi_state in the
kernel is found we can figure out the recursive locking issue by
looking at the pi_state owner. If that is the current task, then we
can safely return -EDEADLK.

The check should have been added in commit 59fa62451 (futex: Handle
futex_pi OWNER_DIED take over correctly) already, but I did not see
the above issue caused by user space manipulation back then.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <darren@...art.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@...com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@...hat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...fujitsu.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@...k.frob.com>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <carlos@...hat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@...hat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140512201701.097349971@...utronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

Change-Id: I245f77622443435cf36bbd157b98798c235acdb0
Signed-off-by: flar2 <asegaert@gmail.com>
futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing
from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this,
then dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an
exploitable condition.

This change brings futex_requeue() into line with
futex_wait_requeue_pi() which performs the same check as per commit
6f7b0a2a5 (futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi())

[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
  	different depending on the mapping ]

Fixes CVE-2014-3153.

Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Change-Id: Iea1dfe1d877d63a374db2623dca6cea4e7a544b9
Signed-off-by: flar2 <asegaert@gmail.com>
futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()

We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.

Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state. If
it has, return -EINVAL. The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up. Subsequent calls will fail as well. Not our problem.

[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
  	restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Change-Id: I6c19ae4a5e85fbc9c560723e672d5136c4786ab6
Signed-off-by: flar2 <asegaert@gmail.com>
futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi

If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
cleanup the user space futex. So the owner TID of the current owner
(the unlocker) persists. That's observable inconsistant state,
especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.

Clean it up unconditionally.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Change-Id: Ic84473a62bdf3e5702f46e04b266afa38e9ec40e
Signed-off-by: flar2 <asegaert@gmail.com>
futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust

The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
the TID value 0 in the user space futex. We can get into the kernel
even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters
bit or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi
path or from user space just for fun.

The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
address. This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
circumstances.

Handle the cases explicit:

     Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID      | uODIED | ?

[1]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | 0         | 0/1    | Valid
[2]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | >0        | 0/1    | Valid

[3]  Found  | NULL     | --        | Any       | 0/1    | Invalid

[4]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | 0         | 1      | Valid
[5]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | >0        | 1      | Invalid

[6]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 1      | Valid

[7]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | Any       | 0      | Invalid

[8]  Found  | Found    | task      | ==taskTID | 0/1    | Valid
[9]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 0      | Invalid
[10] Found  | Found    | task      | !=taskTID | 0/1    | Invalid

[1]  Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
     came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.

[2]  Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
     thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.

[3]  Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex

[4]  Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
     value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.

[5]  The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
     and exit_pi_state_list()

[6]  Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
     the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.

[7]  pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.

[8]  Owner and user space value match

[9]  There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
     except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
     FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]

[10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
     TID out of sync.

Backport to 3.13
  conflicts: kernel/futex.c

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Change-Id: I967e3bb07b239941ea51af6b09d61d7b08138f40
Signed-off-by: flar2 <asegaert@gmail.com>