fix memory leak
Merge branch 'master' of http://www.github.com/effectstocause/vericoin
Treat non-final transactions as non-standard

At least one service that accepted zero-confirmation transactions
was vulnerable because an attacker could send a transaction
with a lock time far in the future, and then have plenty of time in
which to get a double-spend mined (perhaps from a miner who wasn't
on the network when the first transaction was broadcast).

That is a variation on the "Finney attack". We still don't
recommend anybody accept 0-confirmation transactions as final
payment for anything. This change keeps non-final transactions
from appearing in the wallet, and, assuming most of the network
accepts this change, will prevent them from being relayed until
they are final.
protocol patch for potential subsidy manipulation
correction
Merge pull request #2 from effectsToCause/master

Protocol patches
versioning
Merge pull request #3 from effectsToCause/master

versioning
staking only unlock
added more digits to int
full unlock
Merge pull request #4 from effectsToCause/master

add int length for accuracy
Added checkpoint for block 296915
calc interest from previous blocks stakeweight
identify stakeweight previous block by hash instead of height
switch from explicit hash to index
restrict versioning and reschedule buffer removal
Merge pull request #5 from effectsToCause/master

interest calculated on previous block fix
allow old clients initially
remove questionable checkpoint