Merge pull request #1 from cyril279/kk4.4

slim_i777_defconfig: Updates for SlimSaber
ARM: 7668/1: fix memset-related crashes caused by recent GCC (4.7.2) optimizations

Recent GCC versions (e.g. GCC-4.7.2) perform optimizations based on
assumptions about the implementation of memset and similar functions.
The current ARM optimized memset code does not return the value of
its first argument, as is usually expected from standard implementations.

For instance in the following function:

void debug_mutex_lock_common(struct mutex *lock, struct mutex_waiter *waiter)
{
	memset(waiter, MUTEX_DEBUG_INIT, sizeof(*waiter));
	waiter->magic = waiter;
	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&waiter->list);
}

compiled as:

800554d0 <debug_mutex_lock_common>:
800554d0:       e92d4008        push    {r3, lr}
800554d4:       e1a00001        mov     r0, r1
800554d8:       e3a02010        mov     r2, #16 ; 0x10
800554dc:       e3a01011        mov     r1, #17 ; 0x11
800554e0:       eb04426e        bl      80165ea0 <memset>
800554e4:       e1a03000        mov     r3, r0
800554e8:       e583000c        str     r0, [r3, #12]
800554ec:       e5830000        str     r0, [r3]
800554f0:       e5830004        str     r0, [r3, #4]
800554f4:       e8bd8008        pop     {r3, pc}

GCC assumes memset returns the value of pointer 'waiter' in register r0; causing
register/memory corruptions.

This patch fixes the return value of the assembly version of memset.
It adds a 'mov' instruction and merges an additional load+store into
existing load/store instructions.
For ease of review, here is a breakdown of the patch into 4 simple steps:

Step 1
======
Perform the following substitutions:
ip -> r8, then
r0 -> ip,
and insert 'mov ip, r0' as the first statement of the function.
At this point, we have a memset() implementation returning the proper result,
but corrupting r8 on some paths (the ones that were using ip).

Step 2
======
Make sure r8 is saved and restored when (! CALGN(1)+0) == 1:

save r8:
-       str     lr, [sp, #-4]!
+       stmfd   sp!, {r8, lr}

and restore r8 on both exit paths:
-       ldmeqfd sp!, {pc}               @ Now <64 bytes to go.
+       ldmeqfd sp!, {r8, pc}           @ Now <64 bytes to go.
(...)
        tst     r2, #16
        stmneia ip!, {r1, r3, r8, lr}
-       ldr     lr, [sp], #4
+       ldmfd   sp!, {r8, lr}

Step 3
======
Make sure r8 is saved and restored when (! CALGN(1)+0) == 0:

save r8:
-       stmfd   sp!, {r4-r7, lr}
+       stmfd   sp!, {r4-r8, lr}

and restore r8 on both exit paths:
        bgt     3b
-       ldmeqfd sp!, {r4-r7, pc}
+       ldmeqfd sp!, {r4-r8, pc}
(...)
        tst     r2, #16
        stmneia ip!, {r4-r7}
-       ldmfd   sp!, {r4-r7, lr}
+       ldmfd   sp!, {r4-r8, lr}

Step 4
======
Rewrite register list "r4-r7, r8" as "r4-r8".

Signed-off-by: Ivan Djelic <ivan.djelic@parrot.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Dirk Behme <dirk.behme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
ARM: 7670/1: fix the memset fix

Commit 455bd4c430b0 ("ARM: 7668/1: fix memset-related crashes caused by
recent GCC (4.7.2) optimizations") attempted to fix a compliance issue
with the memset return value.  However the memset itself became broken
by that patch for misaligned pointers.

This fixes the above by branching over the entry code from the
misaligned fixup code to avoid reloading the original pointer.

Also, because the function entry alignment is wrong in the Thumb mode
compilation, that fixup code is moved to the end.

While at it, the entry instructions are slightly reworked to help dual
issue pipelines.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Alexander Holler <holler@ahsoftware.de>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
n7000: Enable zzmoove governor

Change-Id: I40d9b99c8155099874ed2fefa778a7ef0b4beafd
makefile: kernel faults with -fschedule-insns2 in GCC 4.8.2

Conflicts:
	Makefile

Change-Id: I21744c5eb6a109fb55b0829139ea4111c850dcf7
Add arm flags

Change-Id: I173b8fad79bd27170d32182df69ca8d85780a1b9
Update flags

Change-Id: Id3d511de655b4229617a711f4a28c018ba551284
mali: 3-step dvfs with adjusted thresholds

Conflicts:
	drivers/gpu/mali400/r3p2/mali/platform/pegasus-m400/exynos4_pmm.c
Revert "mali: bump step1 to 200MHz"

This reverts commit 6db0665e3858c05bf1cf7bf7a5fe312ef4af459c.
futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing
from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this,
then dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an
exploitable condition.

This change brings futex_requeue() into line with
futex_wait_requeue_pi() which performs the same check as per commit
6f7b0a2a5 (futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi())

[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
  	different depending on the mapping ]

Fixes CVE-2014-3153.

Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()

We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.

Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state. If
it has, return -EINVAL. The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up. Subsequent calls will fail as well. Not our problem.

[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
  	restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi

If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
cleanup the user space futex. So the owner TID of the current owner
(the unlocker) persists. That's observable inconsistant state,
especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.

Clean it up unconditionally.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Change-Id: I155eafa98f365408450527e34998893dcdd64803

Conflicts:
	kernel/futex.c
futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust

The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
the TID value 0 in the user space futex. We can get into the kernel
even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters
bit or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi
path or from user space just for fun.

The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
address. This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
circumstances.

Handle the cases explicit:

     Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID      | uODIED | ?

[1]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | 0         | 0/1    | Valid
[2]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | >0        | 0/1    | Valid

[3]  Found  | NULL     | --        | Any       | 0/1    | Invalid

[4]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | 0         | 1      | Valid
[5]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | >0        | 1      | Invalid

[6]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 1      | Valid

[7]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | Any       | 0      | Invalid

[8]  Found  | Found    | task      | ==taskTID | 0/1    | Valid
[9]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 0      | Invalid
[10] Found  | Found    | task      | !=taskTID | 0/1    | Invalid

[1]  Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
     came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.

[2]  Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
     thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.

[3]  Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex

[4]  Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
     value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.

[5]  The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
     and exit_pi_state_list()

[6]  Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
     the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.

[7]  pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.

[8]  Owner and user space value match

[9]  There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
     except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
     FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]

[10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
     TID out of sync.

Backport to 3.13
  conflicts: kernel/futex.c

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Change-Id: I155eafa98f365408450527e34998893dcdd64804
filter: prevent nla extensions to peek beyond the end of the message

The BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR and BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extensions fail to check
for a minimal message length before testing the supplied offset to be
within the bounds of the message. This allows the subtraction of the nla
header to underflow and therefore -- as the data type is unsigned --
allowing far to big offset and length values for the search of the
netlink attribute.

The remainder calculation for the BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extension is
also wrong. It has the minuend and subtrahend mixed up, therefore
calculates a huge length value, allowing to overrun the end of the
message while looking for the netlink attribute.

The following three BPF snippets will trigger the bugs when attached to
a UNIX datagram socket and parsing a message with length 1, 2 or 3.

 ,-[ PoC for missing size check in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR ]--
 | ld	#0x87654321
 | ldx	#42
 | ld	#nla
 | ret	a
 `---

 ,-[ PoC for the same bug in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
 | ld	#0x87654321
 | ldx	#42
 | ld	#nlan
 | ret	a
 `---

 ,-[ PoC for wrong remainder calculation in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
 | ; (needs a fake netlink header at offset 0)
 | ld	#0
 | ldx	#42
 | ld	#nlan
 | ret	a
 `---

Fix the first issue by ensuring the message length fulfills the minimal
size constrains of a nla header. Fix the second bug by getting the math
for the remainder calculation right.

Fixes: 4738c1db15 ("[SKFILTER]: Add SKF_ADF_NLATTR instruction")
Fixes: d214c7537b ("filter: add SKF_AD_NLATTR_NEST to look for nested..")
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

[geissert: backport to 2.6.32]
smdk4412: update mali driver

from GT-N7100_SEA_KK_Opensource

Change-Id: I1ddaa2c88660427348f359a6477aced196c4d7dc

smdk4412: fix build

Change-Id: I3b9e6cee7343c9dd3a7ae68694e60991047db50d
Signed-off-by: Jorge Ruesga <jorge@ruesga.com>
Disable DEBUG_KERNEL

Change-Id: Iaa6bf0087e3d77d9d19c6535e1ee7f5f72f938a0
bcmdhd wireless: Fix off by one in initialization.

An sprintf in dhd_write_macaddr wrote a rogue null byte after the buffer.
Found with CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y (idea of Lanchon at XDA Developers [1]).

[1]: http://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?p=55306602

Panic, on a Samsung Galaxy S2 i9100, was:

<0>[   26.412257] c1 Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: bf013a2c
<0>[   26.412315] c1
<4>[   26.412334] c1 Backtrace:
<4>[   26.412382] c1 [<c064e5b8>] (dump_backtrace+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0b91e6c>] (dump_stack+0x18/0x1c)
<4>[   26.412439] c1  r6:e211e820 r5:c0ed4760 r4:c0f5c940 r3:271aed5c
<4>[   26.412496] c1 [<c0b91e54>] (dump_stack+0x0/0x1c) from [<c0b92204>] (panic+0x80/0x1ac)
<4>[   26.412561] c1 [<c0b92184>] (panic+0x0/0x1ac) from [<c0684be0>] (init_oops_id+0x0/0x58)
<4>[   26.412613] c1  r3:271aed5c r2:271aed00 r1:bf013a2c r0:c0cb8880
<4>[   26.412663] c1  r7:e273bc32
<4>[   26.412742] c1 [<c0684bc4>] (__stack_chk_fail+0x0/0x1c) from [<bf013a2c>] (dhd_write_macaddr+0x2e4/0x310 [dhd])
<4>[   26.412864] c1 [<bf013748>] (dhd_write_macaddr+0x0/0x310 [dhd]) from [<bf01a554>] (dhd_bus_start+0x1a4/0x2e0 [dhd])
<4>[   26.412985] c1 [<bf01a3b0>] (dhd_bus_start+0x0/0x2e0 [dhd]) from [<bf020558>] (dhdsdio_probe+0x4a4/0x72c [dhd])
<4>[   26.413097] c1 [<bf0200b4>] (dhdsdio_probe+0x0/0x72c [dhd]) from [<bf00c0ec>] (bcmsdh_probe+0xf8/0x150 [dhd])
<4>[   26.413206] c1 [<bf00bff4>] (bcmsdh_probe+0x0/0x150 [dhd]) from [<bf00e038>] (bcmsdh_sdmmc_probe+0x54/0xbc [dhd])
<4>[   26.413304] c1 [<bf00dfe4>] (bcmsdh_sdmmc_probe+0x0/0xbc [dhd]) from [<c09a7fe8>] (sdio_bus_probe+0xfc/0x108)
<4>[   26.413368] c1  r5:e2d97000 r4:e2d97008
<4>[   26.413414] c1 [<c09a7eec>] (sdio_bus_probe+0x0/0x108) from [<c0896764>] (driver_probe_device+0x94/0x1a8)
<4>[   26.413474] c1  r8:00000000 r7:bf067414 r6:e2d9703c r5:c0f6ddb8 r4:e2d97008
<4>[   26.413531] c1 r3:c09a7eec
<4>[   26.413563] c1 [<c08966d0>] (driver_probe_device+0x0/0x1a8) from [<c089690c>] (__driver_attach+0x94/0x98)
<4>[   26.413624] c1  r7:e2e631e0 r6:e2d9703c r5:bf067414 r4:e2d97008
<4>[   26.413683] c1 [<c0896878>] (__driver_attach+0x0/0x98) from [<c0895678>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x4c/0x94)
<4>[   26.413742] c1  r6:c0896878 r5:bf067414 r4:00000000 r3:c0896878
<4>[   26.413799] c1 [<c089562c>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x0/0x94) from [<c0896428>] (driver_attach+0x24/0x28)
<4>[   26.413857] c1  r6:c0f02af0 r5:bf067414 r4:bf067414
<4>[   26.413904] c1 [<c0896404>] (driver_attach+0x0/0x28) from [<c08960c8>] (bus_add_driver+0x180/0x250)
<4>[   26.413970] c1 [<c0895f48>] (bus_add_driver+0x0/0x250) from [<c0896e14>] (driver_register+0x80/0x150)
<4>[   26.414037] c1 [<c0896d94>] (driver_register+0x0/0x150) from [<c09a8128>] (sdio_register_driver+0x2c/0x30)
<4>[   26.414131] c1 [<c09a80fc>] (sdio_register_driver+0x0/0x30) from [<bf00e250>] (sdio_function_init+0x3c/0x8c [dhd])
<4>[   26.414244] c1 [<bf00e214>] (sdio_function_init+0x0/0x8c [dhd]) from [<bf00c19c>] (bcmsdh_register+0x1c/0x24 [dhd])
<4>[   26.414311] c1  r5:00000004 r4:bf06a3c4
<4>[   26.414398] c1 [<bf00c180>] (bcmsdh_register+0x0/0x24 [dhd]) from [<bf027990>] (dhd_bus_register+0x24/0x48 [dhd])
<4>[   26.414515] c1 [<bf02796c>] (dhd_bus_register+0x0/0x48 [dhd]) from [<bf07618c>] (init_module+0x18c/0x284 [dhd])
<4>[   26.414610] c1 [<bf076000>] (init_module+0x0/0x284 [dhd]) from [<c06448f8>] (do_one_initcall+0x128/0x1a8)
<4>[   26.414683] c1 [<c06447d0>] (do_one_initcall+0x0/0x1a8) from [<c06b9710>] (sys_init_module+0xdf8/0x1b1c)
<4>[   26.414756] c1 [<c06b8918>] (sys_init_module+0x0/0x1b1c) from [<c064a8c0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30)
<2>[   26.414861] c0 CPU0: stopping
<4>[   26.414886] c0 Backtrace:
<4>[   26.414920] c0 [<c064e5b8>] (dump_backtrace+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0b91e6c>] (dump_stack+0x18/0x1c)
<4>[   26.414977] c0  r6:c0d54000 r5:c0eb5d08 r4:00000006 r3:271aed5c
<4>[   26.415039] c0 [<c0b91e54>] (dump_stack+0x0/0x1c) from [<c06444bc>] (do_IPI+0x258/0x29c)
<4>[   26.415102] c0 [<c0644264>] (do_IPI+0x0/0x29c) from [<c064a340>] (__irq_svc+0x80/0x130)
<4>[   26.415156] c0 Exception stack(0xc0d55ef0 to 0xc0d55f38)
<4>[   26.415197] c0 5ee0:                                     3b9ac9ff 540deacd 01c99e53 00072679
<4>[   26.415258] c0 5f00: c0f5a468 00000000 c0d54000 00000000 c1b540a8 412fc091 00000000 c0d55f64
<4>[   26.415317] c0 5f20: 540deacd c0d55f38 c06aa768 c065bd78 20000013 ffffffff
<4>[   26.415380] c0 [<c065bd3c>] (exynos4_enter_idle+0x0/0x174) from [<c099a890>] (cpuidle_idle_call+0xa4/0x120)
<4>[   26.415442] c0  r7:00000000 r6:00000001 r5:c0f815ac r4:c1b540b8
<4>[   26.415498] c0 [<c099a7ec>] (cpuidle_idle_call+0x0/0x120) from [<c064bd40>] (cpu_idle+0xc4/0x100)
<4>[   26.415554] c0  r8:4000406a r7:c0ba09a8 r6:c0f59ec4 r5:c0ebd8c4 r4:c0d54000
<4>[   26.415610] c0 r3:c099a7ec
<4>[   26.415641] c0 [<c064bc7c>] (cpu_idle+0x0/0x100) from [<c0b83238>] (rest_init+0x8c/0xa4)
<4>[   26.415694] c0  r7:c1b51180 r6:c0f59e00 r5:00000002 r4:c0d54000
<4>[   26.415752] c0 [<c0b831ac>] (rest_init+0x0/0xa4) from [<c00089c4>] (start_kernel+0x2dc/0x330)
<4>[   26.415807] c0  r5:c063d944 r4:c0eb5d34
<4>[   26.415845] c0 [<c00086e8>] (start_kernel+0x0/0x330) from [<40008044>] (0x40008044)

Change-Id: Iaa907383e196fdf787ae4660977b58de79212de1
bcmdhd wireless: Fix more off by one errors.

These were not detected by the stack protector, either because the functions
where not called or because the corruption hits a local variable.

Change-Id: I385c81b133ee09c28df56597df3fb25d9c063f43
bcmdhd wireless: Fix sprintf/sscanf format strings.

%X is int. This is too wide for the chars used there, so use %hhx instead. Avoid
undefined pointer casts from char* to unsigned int* in sscanf calls.

Also use the already defined MACF and update it with %hhx instead of typing this
long format string all over again.
Add MACF_U which is the same as MACF but with uppercase hex (%hhX instead of %hhx).

Change-Id: Idd2465e0d05bca9b05566abeec05a5ad59a577ad
Bluetooth: Cancel power_on and power_off work

* This is not exact upstream patch but replica
  functions that will do similar function.
* Thanks to Dorimanx.

Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>