fat: limit the number of error prints

Use fat_fs_error_ratelimit instead of fat_fs_error so as to
avoid large number of prints.

Change-Id: I458df6c2c7a53c0902f2b388b5992007b719cb86
Signed-off-by: Asutosh Das <asutoshd@codeaurora.org>
SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.

Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.

Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy.  In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.

[On Android, this can only be set by root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes,
and if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if mac_admin permission
is granted in policy.  In Android 4.4, this would only be allowed for
root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes that are also in unconfined domains. In current
AOSP master, mac_admin is not allowed for any domains except the recovery
console which has a legitimate need for it.  The other potential vector
is mounting a maliciously crafted filesystem for which SELinux fetches
xattrs (e.g. an ext4 filesystem on a SDcard).  However, the end result is
only a local denial-of-service (DOS) due to kernel BUG.  This fix is
queued for 3.14.]

Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo

Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled.  Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.

BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[  473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[  473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[  474.027196] Modules linked in:
[  474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G      D   I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[  474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[  474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[  474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>]  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[  474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[  474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[  474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[  474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[  474.453816] FS:  00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  474.489254] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[  474.556058] Stack:
[  474.584325]  ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[  474.618913]  ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[  474.653955]  ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[  474.690461] Call Trace:
[  474.723779]  [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[  474.778049]  [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[  474.811398]  [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[  474.843813]  [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[  474.875694]  [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[  474.907370]  [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[  474.938726]  [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[  474.970036]  [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[  475.000618]  [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[  475.030402]  [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[  475.061097]  [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[  475.094595]  [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[  475.148405]  [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[  475.255884] RIP  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  475.296120]  RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[  475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---

[sds:  commit message edited to note Android implications and
to generate a unique Change-Id for gerrit]

Change-Id: I4d5389f0cfa72b5f59dada45081fa47e03805413
Reported-by:  Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sivasri Kumar Vanka <sivasri@codeaurora.org>
msm: ocmem: Call restore_sec_config() after every power collapse

As the QRIB is enabled, after every power collapse of ocmem, the
QRIB is reset to the maximum security state. Due to this the apps
processor cannot access the ocmem register space.

The restore_sec_config() scm call needs to be called before any
register is accessed after a power collapse to ensure that the
security configuration is restored. The clocks need to be turned
on before every call that is made into TZ to ensure that there
is no power collapse.

CRs-Fixed: 651324, 660089
Change-Id: Ieb6b635142057e219de29e811c93749f6500cec5
Signed-off-by: Neeti Desai <neetid@codeaurora.org>
Merge "msm: ocmem: Call restore_sec_config() after every power collapse"
Merge "Merge "msm: ocmem: Call restore_sec_config() after every power collapse""
msm: kgsl: Enable protected mode for A3XX

Enable protected register mode for A3XX with these commits from
msm-3.10:

msm: kgsl: Enable protected register mode for A3XX
msm: kgsl: Print the register that causes a protected mode error
msm: kgsl: Unprotect the VBIF performance counters

Change-Id: Ic0dedbad950ffbd063fd861d9440bb5dce8d5fb1
Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org>
msm: kgsl: Protect SMMU registers from being written by the GPU

Put the SMMU register range in protected mode to shield them from
IB1/IB2 writes from userspace.

CRs-Fixed: 599971
Change-Id: Ic0dedbad8c03fc1c54ff73221231e2440d3c34dd
Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org>
msm: kgsl: Protect CP_STATE_DEBUG_INDEX

Put CP_STATE_DEBUG_INDEX and CP_STATE_DEBUG_DATA under protection
to keep it from being written from an IB1. Doing so however opens
up a subtle "feature" in the microcode: memory read opcodes turn off
protected mode in the microcode to do the read and then turns it
back on regardless of the initial state. This is a problem if the
memory read happens while protected mode is turned off and then we
try to access a protected register which then complains and goes boom.

To account for this irregularity explicitly turn back off protected
mode in all the places where we know this will be a problem.

Change-Id: Ic0dedbad1397ca9b80132241ac006560a615e042
Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org>
arm: mach-msm: Remove the unused rmt_storage code

The rmt_storage module is no longer used.
Remove the unused module and cleanup the makefile and kconfig.

CRs-Fixed: 549951
Change-Id: Ie9ebaa2209ea9fa0df05dc892504fcb882f00f29
Signed-off-by: Nikhilesh Reddy <reddyn@codeaurora.org>
Merge "arm: mach-msm: Remove the unused rmt_storage code"
Merge "Merge "arm: mach-msm: Remove the unused rmt_storage code""
Merge "SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts."
Merge "Merge "SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.""
Merge "msm: kgsl: Enable protected mode for A3XX"
Merge "msm: kgsl: Protect SMMU registers from being written by the GPU"
Merge "msm: kgsl: Protect CP_STATE_DEBUG_INDEX"
Merge "Merge "msm: kgsl: Protect CP_STATE_DEBUG_INDEX""
Merge "fat: limit the number of error prints"
Merge "Merge "fat: limit the number of error prints""
Merge b3dd82e03030677cefd138baa76877585fa05073 on remote branch

Change-Id: Ib77eb8695286fa48e531e8f9372e136e4eaf757c