X3: Enable wake irq on vol+

Change-Id: I3987f62c459b15ed0247a5939af8f3a8ff53041e
Clean up X3 panel mess

Change-Id: If9d3ef4e35129333123b2576e904dcf21010db32
video: tegra: avoid null deref on nvdps read

When reading nvdps sysfs file, check mode to avoid a null dereference.

Bug 1032235
Bug 1283024

Change-Id: I19b3b5b3de6743cdcc9e3a846a4ba102de681ad3
Signed-off-by: Haley Teng <hteng@nvidia.com>
net: ipv6: add missing lock in ping_v6_sendmsg

[net-next commit a1bdc45580fc19e968b32ad27cd7e476a4aa58f6]

Bug: 9469865
Change-Id: I7ae28d29c645c535e570eb8d12f45e8eafd9c70b
net: ipv6: fix wrong ping_v6_sendmsg return value

[net-next commit fbfe80c890a1dc521d0b629b870e32fcffff0da5]

ping_v6_sendmsg currently returns 0 on success. It should return
the number of bytes written instead.

Bug: 9469865
Change-Id: I86eb936e06bf8582975d59597e48e2bcc53b958d
ARM: 7301/1: Rename the T() macro to TUSER() to avoid namespace conflicts

This macro is used to generate unprivileged accesses (LDRT/STRT) to user
space.

Change-Id: I437b29aa989fce232e428859af7d28222d943353
ARM: 7527/1: uaccess: explicitly check __user pointer when !CPU_USE_DOMAINS

The {get,put}_user macros don't perform range checking on the provided
__user address when !CPU_HAS_DOMAINS.

This patch reworks the out-of-line assembly accessors to check the user
address against a specified limit, returning -EFAULT if is is out of
range.

[will: changed get_user register allocation to match put_user]
[rmk: fixed building on older ARM architectures]

Change-Id: I11f883c7d0c6f2464395104f99b66200ca62dbe2
ptrace: introduce signal_wake_up_state() and ptrace_signal_wake_up()

Cleanup and preparation for the next change.

signal_wake_up(resume => true) is overused. None of ptrace/jctl callers
actually want to wakeup a TASK_WAKEKILL task, but they can't specify the
necessary mask.

Turn signal_wake_up() into signal_wake_up_state(state), reintroduce
signal_wake_up() as a trivial helper, and add ptrace_signal_wake_up()
which adds __TASK_TRACED.

This way ptrace_signal_wake_up() can work "inside" ptrace_request()
even if the tracee doesn't have the TASK_WAKEKILL bit set.

Change-Id: I4d9d918696d42332db34228478d59b7cd8a3c5dc
ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL

putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack.  However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.

set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.

As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it.  Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.

Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().

While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().

Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ed Tam <etam@google.com>
Change-Id: Ice05797d8f4a98d1e7bac26304e106050962fdee
wake_up_process() should be never used to wakeup a TASK_STOPPED/TRACED task

wake_up_process() should never wakeup a TASK_STOPPED/TRACED task.
Change it to use TASK_NORMAL and add the WARN_ON().

TASK_ALL has no other users, probably can be killed.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ed Tam <etam@google.com>
Change-Id: I58ab37ae11a983673e26deaff5193f381974f336
Add permission checking for binder IPC.

Signed-off-by: Ed Tam <etam@google.com>
Change-Id: Ibb29fb641b8119db61e84c1d8ad7e0f61b357c6b
Fix security_binder_transfer_binder hook.

Drop the owning task argument to security_binder_transfer_binder
since ref->node->proc can be NULL (dead owner?).
Revise the SELinux checking to apply a single transfer check between
the source and destination tasks.  Owning task is no longer relevant.
Drop the receive permission definition as it is no longer used.

This makes the transfer permission similar to the call permission; it is only
useful if you want to allow a binder IPC between two tasks (call permission)
but deny passing of binder references between them (transfer permission).

Signed-off-by: Ed Tam <etam@google.com>
Change-Id: Ic3800dd3aed3629ff54ff95ed0dc97b7b38a613b
netfilter: xt_qtaguid: fix error exit that would keep a spinlock.

qtudev_open() could return with a uid_tag_data_tree_lock held
when an kzalloc(..., GFP_ATOMIC) would fail.
Very unlikely to get triggered AND survive the mayhem of running out of mem.

Signed-off-by: JP Abgrall <jpa@google.com>
Change-Id: Id39ae3452a203346a68906bf9c40869d7331fd95
netfilter: qtaguid: Don't BUG_ON if create_if_tag_stat fails

If create_if_tag_stat fails to allocate memory (GFP_ATOMIC) the
following will happen:

qtaguid: iface_stat: tag stat alloc failed
...
kernel BUG at xt_qtaguid.c:1482!

Signed-off-by: Pontus Fuchs <pontus.fuchs@gmail.com>
Change-Id: Ia156bc63b99089cbccab18c9ad69f40d423b623a