attempt to find TMU sweet-spot 2
Linux 3.4.42 - 92

Linux 3.4.43

Linux 3.4.44

Linux 3.4.45

Linux 3.4.46

Linux 3.4.47

Linux 3.4.48

Linux 3.4.49

Linux 3.4.50

Linux 3.4.51

Linux 3.4.52

Linux 3.4.53

Linux 3.4.54

Linux 3.4.55

Linux 3.4.56

Linux 3.4.57

Linux 3.4.58

Linux 3.4.59

Conflicts:
	kernel/futex.c

Linux 3.4.60

Linux 3.4.61

Linux 3.4.62

Linux 3.4.63

Linux 3.4.64

Linux 3.4.65

Linux 3.4.66

Linux 3.4.67

Linux 3.4.68

Linux 3.4.69

Linux 3.4.70

Linux 3.4.71

fix:
	warning: 'kmap_atomic_deprecated' is deprecated
	warning: '__kunmap_atomic_deprecated' is deprecated

Linux 3.4.72

Linux 3.4.73

Linux 3.4.74

Linux 3.4.75

Linux 3.4.76

Linux 3.4.77

Linux 3.4.78

Linux 3.4.79

Linux 3.4.80

Linux 3.4.81

Linux 3.4.82

Linux 3.4.83

Linux 3.4.84

Linux 3.4.85

Linux 3.4.86

Linux 3.4.87

Linux 3.4.88

Linux 3.4.89

Linux 3.4.90

Linux 3.4.91

Linux 3.4.92

Conflicts:
	kernel/futex.c
Clean up some build warnings and such:

/drivers/gpu/arm/t6xx/kbase/src/platform/5420/mali_kbase_dvfs.c: In function 'hlpr_set_min_max_G3D':
/drivers/gpu/arm/t6xx/kbase/src/platform/5420/mali_kbase_dvfs.c:250:44: warning: array subscript is below array bounds [-Warray-bounds]
    dvfs_step_max_minus1 = mali_dvfs_infotbl[i-1].clock;

/fs/binfmt_misc.c: In function 'parse_command.part.1':
/fs/binfmt_misc.c:421:7: warning: array subscript is above array bounds [-Warray-bounds]
  if (s[count-1] == '\n')
       ^

/fs/exec.c: In function '__register_binfmt':
/fs/exec.c:93:2: warning: 'return' with a value, in function returning void
  return 0;
  ^

/arch/arm/mach-exynos/cpuidle.c: In function 'exynos_check_enter_mode':
/arch/arm/mach-exynos/cpuidle.c:289:2: warning: implicit declaration of function 'check_dram_status' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
  if (check_dram_status())
  ^

/net/ipv6/ping.c: In function 'pingv6_init':
/net/ipv6/ping.c:85:29: warning: assignment from incompatible pointer type
  pingv6_ops.ipv6_recv_error = ipv6_recv_error;
                             ^
*** No rule to make target `drivers/md/dm-builtin.o', needed by `drivers/md/built-in.o'.  Stop.
Fixup last build warning

/include/linux/rbtree.h:125:27: warning: '*((void *)&waiter+12).rb_parent_color' is used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized]
  rb->rb_parent_color = (rb->rb_parent_color & 3) | (unsigned long)p;
                           ^
/kernel/rtmutex.c:724:25: note: 'waiter' was declared here
  struct rt_mutex_waiter waiter;
futex: move user address verification up to common code

When debugging the read-only hugepage case, I was confused by the fact
that get_futex_key() did an access_ok() only for the non-shared futex
case, since the user address checking really isn't in any way specific
to the private key handling.

Now, it turns out that the shared key handling does effectively do the
equivalent checks inside get_user_pages_fast() (it doesn't actually
check the address range on x86, but does check the page protections for
being a user page).  So it wasn't actually a bug, but the fact that we
treat the address differently for private and shared futexes threw me
for a loop.

Just move the check up, so that it gets done for both cases.  Also, use
the 'rw' parameter for the type, even if it doesn't actually matter any
more (it's a historical artifact of the old racy i386 "page faults from
kernel space don't check write protections").

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
futexes: Clean up various details

- Remove unnecessary head variables.
- Delete unused parameter in queue_unlock().

Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Scott Norton <scott.norton@hp.com>
Cc: Tom Vaden <tom.vaden@hp.com>
Cc: Aswin Chandramouleeswaran <aswin@hp.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1389569486-25487-2-git-send-email-davidlohr@hp.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
futexes: Increase hash table size for better performance

Currently, the futex global hash table suffers from its fixed,
smallish (for today's standards) size of 256 entries, as well as
its lack of NUMA awareness. Large systems, using many futexes,
can be prone to high amounts of collisions; where these futexes
hash to the same bucket and lead to extra contention on the same
hb->lock. Furthermore, cacheline bouncing is a reality when we
have multiple hb->locks residing on the same cacheline and
different futexes hash to adjacent buckets.

This patch keeps the current static size of 16 entries for small
systems, or otherwise, 256 * ncpus (or larger as we need to
round the number to a power of 2). Note that this number of CPUs
accounts for all CPUs that can ever be available in the system,
taking into consideration things like hotpluging. While we do
impose extra overhead at bootup by making the hash table larger,
this is a one time thing, and does not shadow the benefits of
this patch.

Furthermore, as suggested by tglx, by cache aligning the hash
buckets we can avoid access across cacheline boundaries and also
avoid massive cache line bouncing if multiple cpus are hammering
away at different hash buckets which happen to reside in the
same cache line.

Also, similar to other core kernel components (pid, dcache,
tcp), by using alloc_large_system_hash() we benefit from its
NUMA awareness and thus the table is distributed among the nodes
instead of in a single one.

For a custom microbenchmark that pounds on the uaddr hashing --
making the wait path fail at futex_wait_setup() returning
-EWOULDBLOCK for large amounts of futexes, we can see the
following benefits on a 80-core, 8-socket 1Tb server:

 +---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
 | threads | baseline (ops/sec) | aligned-only (ops/sec) | large table (ops/sec) | large table+aligned (ops/sec) |
 +---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
 |     512 |              32426 | 50531  (+55.8%)        | 255274  (+687.2%)     | 292553  (+802.2%)             |
 |     256 |              65360 | 99588  (+52.3%)        | 443563  (+578.6%)     | 508088  (+677.3%)             |
 |     128 |             125635 | 200075 (+59.2%)        | 742613  (+491.1%)     | 835452  (+564.9%)             |
 |      80 |             193559 | 323425 (+67.1%)        | 1028147 (+431.1%)     | 1130304 (+483.9%)             |
 |      64 |             247667 | 443740 (+79.1%)        | 997300  (+302.6%)     | 1145494 (+362.5%)             |
 |      32 |             628412 | 721401 (+14.7%)        | 965996  (+53.7%)      | 1122115 (+78.5%)              |
 +---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+

Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Scott Norton <scott.norton@hp.com>
Cc: Tom Vaden <tom.vaden@hp.com>
Cc: Aswin Chandramouleeswaran <aswin@hp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1389569486-25487-3-git-send-email-davidlohr@hp.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>

Conflicts:
	kernel/futex.c

Conflicts:
	kernel/futex.c
futexes: Document multiprocessor ordering guarantees

That's essential, if you want to hack on futexes.

Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Scott Norton <scott.norton@hp.com>
Cc: Tom Vaden <tom.vaden@hp.com>
Cc: Aswin Chandramouleeswaran <aswin@hp.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1389569486-25487-4-git-send-email-davidlohr@hp.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
futexes: Avoid taking the hb->lock if there's nothing to wake up

In futex_wake() there is clearly no point in taking the hb->lock
if we know beforehand that there are no tasks to be woken. While
the hash bucket's plist head is a cheap way of knowing this, we
cannot rely 100% on it as there is a racy window between the
futex_wait call and when the task is actually added to the
plist. To this end, we couple it with the spinlock check as
tasks trying to enter the critical region are most likely
potential waiters that will be added to the plist, thus
preventing tasks sleeping forever if wakers don't acknowledge
all possible waiters.

Furthermore, the futex ordering guarantees are preserved,
ensuring that waiters either observe the changed user space
value before blocking or is woken by a concurrent waker. For
wakers, this is done by relying on the barriers in
get_futex_key_refs() -- for archs that do not have implicit mb
in atomic_inc(), we explicitly add them through a new
futex_get_mm function. For waiters we rely on the fact that
spin_lock calls already update the head counter, so spinners
are visible even if the lock hasn't been acquired yet.

For more details please refer to the updated comments in the
code and related discussion:

  https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/11/26/556

Special thanks to tglx for careful review and feedback.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Scott Norton <scott.norton@hp.com>
Cc: Tom Vaden <tom.vaden@hp.com>
Cc: Aswin Chandramouleeswaran <aswin@hp.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1389569486-25487-5-git-send-email-davidlohr@hp.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
futexes: Fix futex_hashsize initialization

"futexes: Increase hash table size for better performance"
introduces a new alloc_large_system_hash() call.

alloc_large_system_hash() however may allocate less memory than
requested, e.g. limited by MAX_ORDER.

Hence pass a pointer to alloc_large_system_hash() which will
contain the hash shift when the function returns. Afterwards
correctly set futex_hashsize.

Fixes a crash on s390 where the requested allocation size was
4MB but only 1MB was allocated.

Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140116135450.GA4345@osiris
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Conflicts:
	kernel/futex.c

Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
futex: Allow architectures to skip futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() test

If an architecture has futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() implemented and there
is no runtime check necessary, allow to skip the test within futex_init().

This allows to get rid of some code which would always give the same result,
and also allows the compiler to optimize a couple of if statements away.

Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140302120947.GA3641@osiris
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
futex: revert back to the explicit waiter counting code

Srikar Dronamraju reports that commit b0c29f79ecea ("futexes: Avoid
taking the hb->lock if there's nothing to wake up") causes java threads
getting stuck on futexes when runing specjbb on a power7 numa box.

The cause appears to be that the powerpc spinlocks aren't using the same
ticket lock model that we use on x86 (and other) architectures, which in
turn result in the "spin_is_locked()" test in hb_waiters_pending()
occasionally reporting an unlocked spinlock even when there are pending
waiters.

So this reinstates Davidlohr Bueso's original explicit waiter counting
code, which I had convinced Davidlohr to drop in favor of figuring out
the pending waiters by just using the existing state of the spinlock and
the wait queue.

Reported-and-tested-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Original-code-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
futex: avoid race between requeue and wake

Jan Stancek reported:
 "pthread_cond_broadcast/4-1.c testcase from openposix testsuite (LTP)
  occasionally fails, because some threads fail to wake up.

  Testcase creates 5 threads, which are all waiting on same condition.
  Main thread then calls pthread_cond_broadcast() without holding mutex,
  which calls:

      futex(uaddr1, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PRIVATE, 1, 2147483647, uaddr2, ..)

  This immediately wakes up single thread A, which unlocks mutex and
  tries to wake up another thread:

      futex(uaddr2, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1)

  If thread A manages to call futex_wake() before any waiters are
  requeued for uaddr2, no other thread is woken up"

The ordering constraints for the hash bucket waiter counting are that
the waiter counts have to be incremented _before_ getting the spinlock
(because the spinlock acts as part of the memory barrier), but the
"requeue" operation didn't honor those rules, and nobody had even
thought about that case.

This fairly simple patch just increments the waiter count for the target
hash bucket (hb2) when requeing a futex before taking the locks.  It
then decrements them again after releasing the lock - the code that
actually moves the futex(es) between hash buckets will do the additional
required waiter count housekeeping.

Reported-and-tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.14
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
futex: update documentation for ordering guarantees

Commits 11d4616bd07f ("futex: revert back to the explicit waiter
counting code") and 69cd9eba3886 ("futex: avoid race between requeue and
wake") changed some of the finer details of how we think about futexes.
One was a late fix and the other a consequence of overlooking the whole
requeuing logic.

The first change caused our documentation to be incorrect, and the
second made us aware that we need to explicitly add more details to it.

Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
futex: Add another early deadlock detection check

Dave Jones trinity syscall fuzzer exposed an issue in the deadlock
detection code of rtmutex:
  http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140429151655.GA14277@redhat.com

That underlying issue has been fixed with a patch to the rtmutex code,
but the futex code must not call into rtmutex in that case because
    - it can detect that issue early
    - it avoids a different and more complex fixup for backing out

If the user space variable got manipulated to 0x80000000 which means
no lock holder, but the waiters bit set and an active pi_state in the
kernel is found we can figure out the recursive locking issue by
looking at the pi_state owner. If that is the current task, then we
can safely return -EDEADLK.

The check should have been added in commit 59fa62451 (futex: Handle
futex_pi OWNER_DIED take over correctly) already, but I did not see
the above issue caused by user space manipulation back then.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <darren@dvhart.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140512201701.097349971@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
futex: Prevent attaching to kernel threads

We happily allow userspace to declare a random kernel thread to be the
owner of a user space PI futex.

Found while analysing the fallout of Dave Jones syscall fuzzer.

We also should validate the thread group for private futexes and find
some fast way to validate whether the "alleged" owner has RW access on
the file which backs the SHM, but that's a separate issue.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <darren@dvhart.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140512201701.194824402@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing
from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this,
then dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an
exploitable condition.

This change brings futex_requeue() into line with
futex_wait_requeue_pi() which performs the same check as per commit
6f7b0a2a5 (futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi())

[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
  	different depending on the mapping ]

Fixes CVE-2014-3153.

Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()

We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.

Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state. If
it has, return -EINVAL. The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up. Subsequent calls will fail as well. Not our problem.

[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
  	restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi

If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
cleanup the user space futex. So the owner TID of the current owner
(the unlocker) persists. That's observable inconsistant state,
especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.

Clean it up unconditionally.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust

The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
the TID value 0 in the user space futex. We can get into the kernel
even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters
bit or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi
path or from user space just for fun.

The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
address. This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
circumstances.

Handle the cases explicit:

     Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID      | uODIED | ?

[1]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | 0         | 0/1    | Valid
[2]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | >0        | 0/1    | Valid

[3]  Found  | NULL     | --        | Any       | 0/1    | Invalid

[4]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | 0         | 1      | Valid
[5]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | >0        | 1      | Invalid

[6]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 1      | Valid

[7]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | Any       | 0      | Invalid

[8]  Found  | Found    | task      | ==taskTID | 0/1    | Valid
[9]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 0      | Invalid
[10] Found  | Found    | task      | !=taskTID | 0/1    | Invalid

[1]  Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
     came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.

[2]  Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
     thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.

[3]  Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex

[4]  Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
     value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.

[5]  The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
     and exit_pi_state_list()

[6]  Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
     the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.

[7]  pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.

[8]  Owner and user space value match

[9]  There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
     except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
     FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]

[10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
     TID out of sync.

Backport to 3.13
  conflicts: kernel/futex.c

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>