lockdep, rwsem: provide down_write_nest_lock()

down_write_nest_lock() provides a means to annotate locking scenario
where an outer lock is guaranteed to serialize the order nested locks
are being acquired.

This is analogoue to already existing mutex_lock_nest_lock() and
spin_lock_nest_lock().

Change-Id: Ib6124fd59cfc01c225cdb6fa46eec2b6d57f8c18
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
lockdep, rwsem: fix down_write_nest_lock() if !CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC

Commit 1b963c81b145 ("lockdep, rwsem: provide down_write_nest_lock()")
contains a bug in a codepath when CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC is disabled,
which causes down_read() to be called instead of down_write() by mistake
on such configurations.  Fix that.

Change-Id: I1b463f6df91cf12e6c23f3fa751cdbd315d07f88
Reported-and-tested-by: Andrew Clayton <andrew@digital-domain.net>
Reported-and-tested-by: Zlatko Calusic <zlatko.calusic@iskon.hr>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Asynchronous Fsync: initial extraction of Async Fsync from HTC

adapted for SGS4

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
net: sctp: fix skb leakage in COOKIE ECHO path of chunk->auth_chunk

[ Upstream commit c485658bae87faccd7aed540fd2ca3ab37992310 ]

While working on ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to
verify if we/peer is AUTH capable"), we noticed that there's a skb
memory leakage in the error path.

Running the same reproducer as in ec0223ec48a9 and by unconditionally
jumping to the error label (to simulate an error condition) in
sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() receive path lets kmemleak detector bark about
the unfreed chunk->auth_chunk skb clone:

Unreferenced object 0xffff8800b8f3a000 (size 256):
  comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294769856 (age 110.757s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    89 ab 75 5e d4 01 58 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ..u^..X.........
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff816660be>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
    [<ffffffff8119f328>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x210
    [<ffffffff81566929>] skb_clone+0x49/0xb0
    [<ffffffffa0467459>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1d9/0x230 [sctp]
    [<ffffffffa046fdbc>] sctp_inq_push+0x4c/0x70 [sctp]
    [<ffffffffa047e8de>] sctp_rcv+0x82e/0x9a0 [sctp]
    [<ffffffff815abd38>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xa8/0x210
    [<ffffffff815a64af>] nf_reinject+0xbf/0x180
    [<ffffffffa04b4762>] nfqnl_recv_verdict+0x1d2/0x2b0 [nfnetlink_queue]
    [<ffffffffa04aa40b>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x250 [nfnetlink]
    [<ffffffff815a3269>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xc0
    [<ffffffffa04aa7cf>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x23f/0x408 [nfnetlink]
    [<ffffffff815a2bd8>] netlink_unicast+0x168/0x250
    [<ffffffff815a2fa1>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2e1/0x3f0
    [<ffffffff8155cc6b>] sock_sendmsg+0x8b/0xc0
    [<ffffffff8155d449>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x369/0x380

What happens is that commit bbd0d59809f9 clones the skb containing
the AUTH chunk in sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() when having the edge case
that an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be authenticated:

  ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
  <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
  ------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ---------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------

When we enter sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and before we actually get to
the point where we process (and subsequently free) a non-NULL
chunk->auth_chunk, we could hit the "goto nomem_init" path from
an error condition and thus leave the cloned skb around w/o
freeing it.

The fix is to centrally free such clones in sctp_chunk_destroy()
handler that is invoked from sctp_chunk_free() after all refs have
dropped; and also move both kfree_skb(chunk->auth_chunk) there,
so that chunk->auth_chunk is either NULL (since sctp_chunkify()
allocs new chunks through kmem_cache_zalloc()) or non-NULL with
a valid skb pointer. chunk->skb and chunk->auth_chunk are the
only skbs in the sctp_chunk structure that need to be handeled.

While at it, we should use consume_skb() for both. It is the same
as dev_kfree_skb() but more appropriately named as we are not
a device but a protocol. Also, this effectively replaces the
kfree_skb() from both invocations into consume_skb(). Functions
are the same only that kfree_skb() assumes that the frame was
being dropped after a failure (e.g. for tools like drop monitor),
usage of consume_skb() seems more appropriate in function
sctp_chunk_destroy() though.

Fixes: bbd0d59809f9 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
bridge: multicast: add sanity check for query source addresses

[ Upstream commit 6565b9eeef194afbb3beec80d6dd2447f4091f8c ]

MLD queries are supposed to have an IPv6 link-local source address
according to RFC2710, section 4 and RFC3810, section 5.1.14. This patch
adds a sanity check to ignore such broken MLD queries.

Without this check, such malformed MLD queries can result in a
denial of service: The queries are ignored by any MLD listener
therefore they will not respond with an MLD report. However,
without this patch these malformed MLD queries would enable the
snooping part in the bridge code, potentially shutting down the
according ports towards these hosts for multicast traffic as the
bridge did not learn about these listeners.

Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@web.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: unix: non blocking recvmsg() should not return -EINTR

[ Upstream commit de1443916791d75fdd26becb116898277bb0273f ]

Some applications didn't expect recvmsg() on a non blocking socket
could return -EINTR. This possibility was added as a side effect
of commit b3ca9b02b00704 ("net: fix multithreaded signal handling in
unix recv routines").

To hit this bug, you need to be a bit unlucky, as the u->readlock
mutex is usually held for very small periods.

Fixes: b3ca9b02b00704 ("net: fix multithreaded signal handling in unix recv routines")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ipv6: don't set DST_NOCOUNT for remotely added routes

[ Upstream commit c88507fbad8055297c1d1e21e599f46960cbee39 ]

DST_NOCOUNT should only be used if an authorized user adds routes
locally. In case of routes which are added on behalf of router
advertisments this flag must not get used as it allows an unlimited
number of routes getting added remotely.

Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
vlan: Set correct source MAC address with TX VLAN offload enabled

[ Upstream commit dd38743b4cc2f86be250eaf156cf113ba3dd531a ]

With TX VLAN offload enabled the source MAC address for frames sent using the
VLAN interface is currently set to the address of the real interface. This is
wrong since the VLAN interface may be configured with a different address.

The bug was introduced in commit 2205369a314e12fcec4781cc73ac9c08fc2b47de
("vlan: Fix header ops passthru when doing TX VLAN offload.").

This patch sets the source address before calling the create function of the
real interface.

Signed-off-by: Peter Boström <peter.bostrom@netrounds.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: socket: error on a negative msg_namelen

[ Upstream commit dbb490b96584d4e958533fb637f08b557f505657 ]

When copying in a struct msghdr from the user, if the user has set the
msg_namelen parameter to a negative value it gets clamped to a valid
size due to a comparison between signed and unsigned values.

Ensure the syscall errors when the user passes in a negative value.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Leach <matthew.leach@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ipv6: Avoid unnecessary temporary addresses being generated

[ Upstream commit ecab67015ef6e3f3635551dcc9971cf363cc1cd5 ]

tmp_prefered_lft is an offset to ifp->tstamp, not now. Therefore
age needs to be added to the condition.

Age calculation in ipv6_create_tempaddr is different from the one
in addrconf_verify and doesn't consider ADDRCONF_TIMER_FUZZ_MINUS.
This can cause age in ipv6_create_tempaddr to be less than the one
in addrconf_verify and therefore unnecessary temporary address to
be generated.
Use age calculation as in addrconf_modify to avoid this.

Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <heiner.kallweit@web.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ipv6: ip6_append_data_mtu do not handle the mtu of the second fragment properly

[ Upstream commit e367c2d03dba4c9bcafad24688fadb79dd95b218 ]

In ip6_append_data_mtu(), when the xfrm mode is not tunnel(such as
transport),the ipsec header need to be added in the first fragment, so the mtu
will decrease to reserve space for it, then the second fragment come, the mtu
should be turn back, as the commit 0c1833797a5a6ec23ea9261d979aa18078720b74
said.  however, in the commit a493e60ac4bbe2e977e7129d6d8cbb0dd236be, it use
*mtu = min(*mtu, ...) to change the mtu, which lead to the new mtu is alway
equal with the first fragment's. and cannot turn back.

when I test through  ping6 -c1 -s5000 $ip (mtu=1280):
...frag (0|1232) ESP(spi=0x00002000,seq=0xb), length 1232
...frag (1232|1216)
...frag (2448|1216)
...frag (3664|1216)
...frag (4880|164)

which should be:
...frag (0|1232) ESP(spi=0x00001000,seq=0x1), length 1232
...frag (1232|1232)
...frag (2464|1232)
...frag (3696|1232)
...frag (4928|116)

so delete the min() when change back the mtu.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Fixes: 75a493e60ac4bb ("ipv6: ip6_append_data_mtu did not care about pmtudisc and frag_size")
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
vhost: fix total length when packets are too short

[ Upstream commit d8316f3991d207fe32881a9ac20241be8fa2bad0 ]

When mergeable buffers are disabled, and the
incoming packet is too large for the rx buffer,
get_rx_bufs returns success.

This was intentional in order for make recvmsg
truncate the packet and then handle_rx would
detect err != sock_len and drop it.

Unfortunately we pass the original sock_len to
recvmsg - which means we use parts of iov not fully
validated.

Fix this up by detecting this overrun and doing packet drop
immediately.

CVE-2014-0077

Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
vhost: validate vhost_get_vq_desc return value

[ Upstream commit a39ee449f96a2cd44ce056d8a0a112211a9b1a1f ]

vhost fails to validate negative error code
from vhost_get_vq_desc causing
a crash: we are using -EFAULT which is 0xfffffff2
as vector size, which exceeds the allocated size.

The code in question was introduced in commit
8dd014adfea6f173c1ef6378f7e5e7924866c923
    vhost-net: mergeable buffers support

CVE-2014-0055

Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
xen-netback: remove pointless clause from if statement

[ Upstream commit 0576eddf24df716d8570ef8ca11452a9f98eaab2 ]

This patch removes a test in start_new_rx_buffer() that checks whether
a copy operation is less than MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET in length, since
MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET is defined to be PAGE_SIZE and the only caller of
start_new_rx_buffer() already limits copy operations to PAGE_SIZE or less.

Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Reported-By: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Tested-By: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ipv6: some ipv6 statistic counters failed to disable bh

[ Upstream commit 43a43b6040165f7b40b5b489fe61a4cb7f8c4980 ]

After commit c15b1ccadb323ea ("ipv6: move DAD and addrconf_verify
processing to workqueue") some counters are now updated in process context
and thus need to disable bh before doing so, otherwise deadlocks can
happen on 32-bit archs. Fabio Estevam noticed this while while mounting
a NFS volume on an ARM board.

As a compensation for missing this I looked after the other *_STATS_BH
and found three other calls which need updating:

1) icmp6_send: ip6_fragment -> icmpv6_send -> icmp6_send (error handling)
2) ip6_push_pending_frames: rawv6_sendmsg -> rawv6_push_pending_frames -> ...
   (only in case of icmp protocol with raw sockets in error handling)
3) ping6_v6_sendmsg (error handling)

Fixes: c15b1ccadb323ea ("ipv6: move DAD and addrconf_verify processing to workqueue")
Reported-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
netlink: don't compare the nul-termination in nla_strcmp

[ Upstream commit 8b7b932434f5eee495b91a2804f5b64ebb2bc835 ]

nla_strcmp compares the string length plus one, so it's implicitly
including the nul-termination in the comparison.

 int nla_strcmp(const struct nlattr *nla, const char *str)
 {
        int len = strlen(str) + 1;
        ...
                d = memcmp(nla_data(nla), str, len);

However, if NLA_STRING is used, userspace can send us a string without
the nul-termination. This is a problem since the string
comparison will not match as the last byte may be not the
nul-termination.

Fix this by skipping the comparison of the nul-termination if the
attribute data is nul-terminated. Suggested by Thomas Graf.

Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
isdnloop: Validate NUL-terminated strings from user.

[ Upstream commit 77bc6bed7121936bb2e019a8c336075f4c8eef62 ]

Return -EINVAL unless all of user-given strings are correctly
NUL-terminated.

Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
isdnloop: several buffer overflows

[ Upstream commit 7563487cbf865284dcd35e9ef5a95380da046737 ]

There are three buffer overflows addressed in this patch.

1) In isdnloop_fake_err() we add an 'E' to a 60 character string and
then copy it into a 60 character buffer.  I have made the destination
buffer 64 characters and I'm changed the sprintf() to a snprintf().

2) In isdnloop_parse_cmd(), p points to a 6 characters into a 60
character buffer so we have 54 characters.  The ->eazlist[] is 11
characters long.  I have modified the code to return if the source
buffer is too long.

3) In isdnloop_command() the cbuf[] array was 60 characters long but the
max length of the string then can be up to 79 characters.  I made the
cbuf array 80 characters long and changed the sprintf() to snprintf().
I also removed the temporary "dial" buffer and changed it to use "p"
directly.

Unfortunately, we pass the "cbuf" string from isdnloop_command() to
isdnloop_writecmd() which truncates anything over 60 characters to make
it fit in card->omsg[].  (It can accept values up to 255 characters so
long as there is a '\n' character every 60 characters).  For now I have
just fixed the memory corruption bug and left the other problems in this
driver alone.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
rds: prevent dereference of a NULL device in rds_iw_laddr_check

[ Upstream commit bf39b4247b8799935ea91d90db250ab608a58e50 ]

Binding might result in a NULL device which is later dereferenced
without checking.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
sparc: PCI: Fix incorrect address calculation of PCI Bridge windows on Simba-bridges

[ Upstream commit 557fc5873ef178c4b3e1e36a42db547ecdc43f9b ]

The SIMBA APB Bridges lacks the 'ranges' of-property describing the
PCI I/O and memory areas located beneath the bridge. Faking this
information has been performed by reading range registers in the
APB bridge, and calculating the corresponding areas.

In commit 01f94c4a6ced476ce69b895426fc29bfc48c69bd
("Fix sabre pci controllers with new probing scheme.") a bug was
introduced into this calculation, causing the PCI memory areas
to be calculated incorrectly: The shift size was set to be
identical for I/O and MEM ranges, which is incorrect.

This patch set the shift size of the MEM range back to the
value used before 01f94c4a6ced476ce69b895426fc29bfc48c69bd.

Signed-off-by: Kjetil Oftedal <oftedal@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>