fastcharge: initial adaptation for Vega Iron

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>

Conflicts:
	drivers/power/pm8921-charger.c

Conflicts:
	arch/arm/mach-msm/Kconfig
Optimized ARM RWSEM algorithm

RWSEM implementation for ARM using atomic functions.
Heavily based on arch/sh/include/asm/rwsem.h

Signed-off-by: Ashwin Chaugule <ashwinc@codeaurora.org>
cpufreq: limit initial speed to stock speeds

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
ARM: 7670/1: fix the memset fix

commit 418df63adac56841ef6b0f1fcf435bc64d4ed177 upstream.

Commit 455bd4c430b0 ("ARM: 7668/1: fix memset-related crashes caused by
recent GCC (4.7.2) optimizations") attempted to fix a compliance issue
with the memset return value.  However the memset itself became broken
by that patch for misaligned pointers.

This fixes the above by branching over the entry code from the
misaligned fixup code to avoid reloading the original pointer.

Also, because the function entry alignment is wrong in the Thumb mode
compilation, that fixup code is moved to the end.

While at it, the entry instructions are slightly reworked to help dual
issue pipelines.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Alexander Holler <holler@ahsoftware.de>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Bénard <eric@eukrea.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Conflicts:
	arch/arm/lib/memset.S
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c: gcc 4.8.x fixup

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
drivers/usb/gadget/f_qdss.c: gcc 4.8 fixup

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c: GCC 4.8.x fix up again

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
ext4: fix potential deadlock in ext4_nonda_switch()

In ext4_nonda_switch(), if the file system is getting full we used to
call writeback_inodes_sb_if_idle().  The problem is that we can be
holding i_mutex already, and this causes a potential deadlock when
writeback_inodes_sb_if_idle() when it tries to take s_umount.  (See
lockdep output below).

As it turns out we don't need need to hold s_umount; the fact that we
are in the middle of the write(2) system call will keep the superblock
pinned.  Unfortunately writeback_inodes_sb() checks to make sure
s_umount is taken, and the VFS uses a different mechanism for making
sure the file system doesn't get unmounted out from under us.  The
simplest way of dealing with this is to just simply grab s_umount
using a trylock, and skip kicking the writeback flusher thread in the
very unlikely case that we can't take a read lock on s_umount without
blocking.

Also, we now check the cirteria for kicking the writeback thread
before we decide to whether to fall back to non-delayed writeback, so
if there are any outstanding delayed allocation writes, we try to get
them resolved as soon as possible.

   [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
   3.6.0-rc1-00042-gce894ca #367 Not tainted
   -------------------------------------------------------
   dd/8298 is trying to acquire lock:
    (&type->s_umount_key#18){++++..}, at: [<c02277d4>] writeback_inodes_sb_if_idle+0x28/0x46

   but task is already holding lock:
    (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){+.+...}, at: [<c01ddcce>] generic_file_aio_write+0x5f/0xd3

   which lock already depends on the new lock.

   2 locks held by dd/8298:
    #0:  (sb_writers#2){.+.+.+}, at: [<c01ddcc5>] generic_file_aio_write+0x56/0xd3
    #1:  (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){+.+...}, at: [<c01ddcce>] generic_file_aio_write+0x5f/0xd3

   stack backtrace:
   Pid: 8298, comm: dd Not tainted 3.6.0-rc1-00042-gce894ca #367
   Call Trace:
    [<c015b79c>] ? console_unlock+0x345/0x372
    [<c06d62a1>] print_circular_bug+0x190/0x19d
    [<c019906c>] __lock_acquire+0x86d/0xb6c
    [<c01999db>] ? mark_held_locks+0x5c/0x7b
    [<c0199724>] lock_acquire+0x66/0xb9
    [<c02277d4>] ? writeback_inodes_sb_if_idle+0x28/0x46
    [<c06db935>] down_read+0x28/0x58
    [<c02277d4>] ? writeback_inodes_sb_if_idle+0x28/0x46
    [<c02277d4>] writeback_inodes_sb_if_idle+0x28/0x46
    [<c026f3b2>] ext4_nonda_switch+0xe1/0xf4
    [<c0271ece>] ext4_da_write_begin+0x27/0x193
    [<c01dcdb0>] generic_file_buffered_write+0xc8/0x1bb
    [<c01ddc47>] __generic_file_aio_write+0x1dd/0x205
    [<c01ddce7>] generic_file_aio_write+0x78/0xd3
    [<c026d336>] ext4_file_write+0x480/0x4a6
    [<c0198c1d>] ? __lock_acquire+0x41e/0xb6c
    [<c0180944>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x11a/0x13e
    [<c01967e9>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
    [<c018099f>] ? local_clock+0x37/0x4e
    [<c0209f2c>] do_sync_write+0x67/0x9d
    [<c0209ec5>] ? wait_on_retry_sync_kiocb+0x44/0x44
    [<c020a7b9>] vfs_write+0x7b/0xe6
    [<c020a9a6>] sys_write+0x3b/0x64
    [<c06dd4bd>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
ext4: prevent kernel panic in case of uninitialized jinode

ext4: prevent kernel panic in case of uninitialized jinode

In some cases the kernel crash occurs during system suspend/resume:

[ 4095.041351] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000
[ 4095.050689] pgd = c0004000
[ 4095.053985] [00000000] *pgd=00000000
[ 4095.058807] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 4095.064483] Modules linked in: wl12xx mac80211 pvrsrvkm_sgx540_120 cfg80211 compat [last unloaded: wl12xx_sdio]
[ 4095.064575] CPU: 1    Tainted: G    B        (3.0.31-01807-gfac16a0 #1)
[ 4095.064605] PC is at jbd2_journal_file_inode+0x38/0x118
[ 4095.064666] LR is at mpage_da_map_and_submit+0x48c/0x618
[ 4095.064697] pc : [<c01da5a8>]    lr : [<c01aeac0>]    psr: 60000013
[ 4095.064697] sp : c6e07c80  ip : c6e07ca0  fp : c6e07c9c
[ 4095.064727] r10: 00000001  r9 : c6e06000  r8 : 00000179
[ 4095.064758] r7 : c6e07ca0  r6 : c73b8400  r5 : 00000000  r4 : c59a7d80
[ 4095.064758] r3 : 00000038  r2 : 00000800  r1 : 00000000  r0 : c7754fc0
[ 4095.064788] Flags: nZCv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment kernel
[ 4095.064819] Control: 10c5387d  Table: 86cc804a  DAC: 00000015
[ 4095.064849]
[ 4095.064849] PC: 0xc01da528:
[ 4095.064880] a528  0a000003 e3a05000 e1a00005 e24bd020 e89da9f0 e5951010 e3e06000 e14b22dc
.....
[ 4095.070373] 7fe0: c00a48ac 00000013 00000000 c6e07ff8 c00a48ac c00c0a94 84752f09 60772177
[ 4095.070404] Backtrace:
[ 4095.070465] [<c01da570>] (jbd2_journal_file_inode+0x0/0x118) from [<c01aeac0>] (mpage_da_map_and_submit+0x48c/0x618)
[ 4095.070495]  r7:c6e07ca0 r6:c6e07d00 r5:c6e07d90 r4:c7754fc0
[ 4095.070556] [<c01ae634>] (mpage_da_map_and_submit+0x0/0x618) from [<c01af40c>] (ext4_da_writepages+0x2a4/0x5c8)
[ 4095.070617] [<c01af168>] (ext4_da_writepages+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c0112af4>] (do_writepages+0x34/0x40)
[ 4095.070678] [<c0112ac0>] (do_writepages+0x0/0x40) from [<c01645a4>] (writeback_single_inode+0xd4/0x288)
[ 4095.070709] [<c01644d0>] (writeback_single_inode+0x0/0x288) from [<c0164ed4>] (writeback_sb_inodes+0xb4/0x184)
[ 4095.070770] [<c0164e20>] (writeback_sb_inodes+0x0/0x184) from [<c01655a0>] (writeback_inodes_wb+0xc4/0x13c)
[ 4095.070831] [<c01654dc>] (writeback_inodes_wb+0x0/0x13c) from [<c01658f0>] (wb_writeback+0x2d8/0x464)
[ 4095.070861] [<c0165618>] (wb_writeback+0x0/0x464) from [<c0165cb8>] (wb_do_writeback+0x23c/0x2c4)
[ 4095.070922] [<c0165a7c>] (wb_do_writeback+0x0/0x2c4) from [<c0165df4>] (bdi_writeback_thread+0xb4/0x2dc)
[ 4095.070953] [<c0165d40>] (bdi_writeback_thread+0x0/0x2dc) from [<c00c0b18>] (kthread+0x90/0x98)
[ 4095.071014] [<c00c0a88>] (kthread+0x0/0x98) from [<c00a48ac>] (do_exit+0x0/0x72c)
[ 4095.071044]  r7:00000013 r6:c00a48ac r5:c00c0a88 r4:c78c7ec4
[ 4095.071105] Code: e89da8f0 e5963000 e3130002 1afffffa (e5913000)
[ 4095.071166] ---[ end trace 7fe9f9b727e5cf78 ]---
[ 4095.071197] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

The probably reason of such behaviour is an inode opened in READ mode
has been marked as 'dirty' somehow and written back by ext4_da_writepages.
Cause jinode == NULL it could lead to the kernel panic.

The patch prevents kernel panic and helps to investigate the problem
providing an inode number.

Change-Id: I1d77a011b580db682b8e2d122ef3d5e44e0ce5c7
Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Mieshkov <volodymyr.mieshkov@ti.com>
ext4: add support for read_iter and write_iter

use the generic_file_read_iter(), create ext4_file_write_iter() based on
ext4_file_write(), and make ext4_file_write() a wrapper around
ext4_file_write_iter().

Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Cc: Zach Brown <zab@zabbo.net>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
modified for Mako from LKML reference

Signed-off-by: faux123 <reioux@gmail.com>
old bug in htree_dirblock_to_tree()

Both ext3 and ext4 htree_dirblock_to_tree() is just filling
the in-core rbtree for use by call_filldir().  All updates of
->f_pos are done by the latter; bumping it here (on error) is obviously
wrong - we might very well have it nowhere near the block we'd found
an error in.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
ext4: make sure the journal sb is written in ext4_clear_journal_err()

After we transfer set the EXT4_ERROR_FS bit in the file system
superblock, it's not enough to call jbd2_journal_clear_err() to clear
the error indication from journal superblock --- we need to call
jbd2_journal_update_sb_errno() as well.  Otherwise, when the root file
system is mounted read-only, the journal is replayed, and the error
indicator is transferred to the superblock --- but the s_errno field
in the jbd2 superblock is left set (since although we cleared it in
memory, we never flushed it out to disk).

This can end up confusing e2fsck.  We should make e2fsck more robust
in this case, but the kernel shouldn't be leaving things in this
confused state, either.

Change-Id: I7a7cd58880209fbd54f4ded5f2b62de492cae9e0
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Git-commit: d796c52ef0b71a988364f6109aeb63d79c5b116b
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
Signed-off-by: Osvaldo Banuelos <osvaldob@codeaurora.org>
jbd2: Fix use after free after error in jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata()

When jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() returns error,
__ext4_handle_dirty_metadata() stops the handle. However callers of this
function do not count with that fact and still happily used now freed
handle. This use after free can result in various issues but very likely
we oops soon.

The motivation of adding __ext4_journal_stop() into
__ext4_handle_dirty_metadata() in commit 9ea7a0df seems to be only to
improve error reporting. So replace __ext4_journal_stop() with
ext4_journal_abort_handle() which was there before that commit and add
WARN_ON_ONCE() to dump stack to provide useful information.

Change-Id: Ibfd59e399f4a11abc378a237e10b3741bef2a15e
Reported-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org	# 3.2+
Git-commit: 91aa11fae1cf8c2fd67be0609692ea9741cdcc43
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
Signed-off-by: Osvaldo Banuelos <osvaldob@codeaurora.org>
ext4: fix memory leak in xattr

If we take the 2nd retry path in ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea, we
potentionally return from the function without having freed these
allocations.  If we don't do the return, we over-write the previous
allocation pointers, so we leak either way.

Spotted with Coverity.

[ Fixed by tytso to set is and bs to NULL after freeing these
  pointers, in case in the retry loop we later end up triggering an
  error causing a jump to cleanup, at which point we could have a double
  free bug. -- Ted ]

Change-Id: I49b8ca41a6c6d44b563eb23306870258a3affd3b
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Git-commit: 6e4ea8e33b2057b85d75175dd89b93f5e26de3bc
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
Signed-off-by: Osvaldo Banuelos <osvaldob@codeaurora.org>
dynamic fsync: don't disable fdatasync()

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>

Conflicts:
	fs/sync.c
dynamic fsync: favor true case since most will be using this feature

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>

Conflicts:
	fs/sync.c
ARM: 7668/1: fix memset-related crashes caused by recent GCC (4.7.2) optimizations

commit 455bd4c430b0c0a361f38e8658a0d6cb469942b5 upstream.

Recent GCC versions (e.g. GCC-4.7.2) perform optimizations based on
assumptions about the implementation of memset and similar functions.
The current ARM optimized memset code does not return the value of
its first argument, as is usually expected from standard implementations.

For instance in the following function:

void debug_mutex_lock_common(struct mutex *lock, struct mutex_waiter *waiter)
{
	memset(waiter, MUTEX_DEBUG_INIT, sizeof(*waiter));
	waiter->magic = waiter;
	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&waiter->list);
}

compiled as:

800554d0 <debug_mutex_lock_common>:
800554d0:       e92d4008        push    {r3, lr}
800554d4:       e1a00001        mov     r0, r1
800554d8:       e3a02010        mov     r2, #16 ; 0x10
800554dc:       e3a01011        mov     r1, #17 ; 0x11
800554e0:       eb04426e        bl      80165ea0 <memset>
800554e4:       e1a03000        mov     r3, r0
800554e8:       e583000c        str     r0, [r3, #12]
800554ec:       e5830000        str     r0, [r3]
800554f0:       e5830004        str     r0, [r3, #4]
800554f4:       e8bd8008        pop     {r3, pc}

GCC assumes memset returns the value of pointer 'waiter' in register r0; causing
register/memory corruptions.

This patch fixes the return value of the assembly version of memset.
It adds a 'mov' instruction and merges an additional load+store into
existing load/store instructions.
For ease of review, here is a breakdown of the patch into 4 simple steps:

Step 1
======
Perform the following substitutions:
ip -> r8, then
r0 -> ip,
and insert 'mov ip, r0' as the first statement of the function.
At this point, we have a memset() implementation returning the proper result,
but corrupting r8 on some paths (the ones that were using ip).

Step 2
======
Make sure r8 is saved and restored when (! CALGN(1)+0) == 1:

save r8:
-       str     lr, [sp, #-4]!
+       stmfd   sp!, {r8, lr}

and restore r8 on both exit paths:
-       ldmeqfd sp!, {pc}               @ Now <64 bytes to go.
+       ldmeqfd sp!, {r8, pc}           @ Now <64 bytes to go.
(...)
        tst     r2, #16
        stmneia ip!, {r1, r3, r8, lr}
-       ldr     lr, [sp], #4
+       ldmfd   sp!, {r8, lr}

Step 3
======
Make sure r8 is saved and restored when (! CALGN(1)+0) == 0:

save r8:
-       stmfd   sp!, {r4-r7, lr}
+       stmfd   sp!, {r4-r8, lr}

and restore r8 on both exit paths:
        bgt     3b
-       ldmeqfd sp!, {r4-r7, pc}
+       ldmeqfd sp!, {r4-r8, pc}
(...)
        tst     r2, #16
        stmneia ip!, {r4-r7}
-       ldmfd   sp!, {r4-r7, lr}
+       ldmfd   sp!, {r4-r8, lr}

Step 4
======
Rewrite register list "r4-r7, r8" as "r4-r8".

Signed-off-by: Ivan Djelic <ivan.djelic@parrot.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Dirk Behme <dirk.behme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Bénard <eric@eukrea.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Conflicts:
	arch/arm/lib/memset.S