development version
CVE-2014-3477: deliver activation errors correctly, fixing Denial of Service

How it should work:

When a D-Bus message activates a service, LSMs (SELinux or AppArmor) check
whether the message can be delivered after the service has been activated. The
service is considered activated when its well-known name is requested with
org.freedesktop.DBus.RequestName. When the message delivery is denied, the
service stays activated but should not receive the activating message (the
message which triggered the activation). dbus-daemon is supposed to drop the
activating message and reply to the sender with a D-Bus error message.

However, it does not work as expected:

1. The error message is delivered to the service instead of being delivered to
   the sender. As an example, the error message could be something like:

     An SELinux policy prevents this sender from sending this
     message to this recipient, [...] member="MaliciousMethod"

   If the sender and the service are malicious confederates and agree on a
   protocol to insert information in the member name, the sender can leak
   information to the service, even though the LSM attempted to block the
   communication between the sender and the service.

2. The error message is delivered as a reply to the RequestName call from
   service. It means the activated service will believe it cannot request the
   name and might exit. The sender could activate the service frequently and
   systemd will give up activating it. Thus the denial of service.

The following changes fix the bug:
- bus_activation_send_pending_auto_activation_messages() only returns an error
  in case of OOM. The prototype is changed to return TRUE, or FALSE on OOM
  (and its only caller sets the OOM error).
- When a client is not allowed to talk to the service, a D-Bus error message
  is pre-allocated to be delivered to the client as part of the transaction.
  The error is not propagated to the caller so RequestName will not fail
  (except on OOM).

[fixed a misleading comment -smcv]

Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=78979
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
Prepare embargoed security release
reset version
dbus-launch: kill bus if we can't attach to a session when requested

Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=74698
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
NEWS
If loader contains two messages with fds, don't corrupt the second

There were two bugs here: we would previously overwrite the unused
fds with the already-used fds instead of the other way round, and
we would copy n bytes where we should have copied n ints.

Additionally, sending crafted messages in a chosen sequence to a victim
system service could cause an invalid file descriptor to be present
when dbus-daemon tries to forward one of those crafted messages to the
victim, causing sendmsg() to fail with EBADF, which resulted in
disconnecting the victim service, which would likely respond to that
by exiting. This is a denial of service (fd.o #80469, CVE-2014-3533).

Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=79694
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80469
Reviewed-by: Alban Crequy <alban.crequy@collabora.co.uk>
Handle ETOOMANYREFS when sending recursive fds (SCM_RIGHTS)

Since Linux commit 25888e (from 2.6.37-rc4, Nov 2010), sendmsg() on Unix
sockets returns -1 errno=ETOOMANYREFS ("Too many references: cannot splice")
when the passfd mechanism (SCM_RIGHTS) is "abusively" used recursively by
applications. A malicious client could use this to force a victim system
service to be disconnected from the system bus; the victim would likely
respond by exiting. This is a denial of service (fd.o #80163,
CVE-2014-3532).

This patch silently drops the D-Bus message on ETOOMANYREFS and does not close
the connection.

Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80163
Reviewed-by: Thiago Macieira <thiago@kde.org>
[altered commit message to explain DoS significance -smcv]
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
Prepare 1.8.6 in advance
start 1.8.7