Fix apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Dan Trifan <jimsth@gmail.com>
Allow unprivileged CLONE_NEWUTS and CLONE_NEWIPC with no_new_privs

They are normally disallowed because they could be used to subvert
setuid programs.  But if setuid is disabled, then they are safe.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Dan Trifan <jimsth@gmail.com>
Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs

With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc)
become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of
subverting privileged binaries.

This patch completely breaks apparmor.  Someone who understands (and
uses) apparmor should fix it or at least give me a hint.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Dan Trifan <jimsth@gmail.com>
Allow unprivileged chroot when safe

Chroot can easily be used to subvert setuid programs.  If no_new_privs,
then setuid programs don't gain any privilege, so allow chroot.

Because chroot is an easy way to break out of chroot jail, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
is still required if the caller is already chrooted.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Dan Trifan <jimsth@gmail.com>