lz4: ensure length does not wrap

Given some pathologically compressed data, lz4 could possibly decide to
wrap a few internal variables, causing unknown things to happen.  Catch
this before the wrapping happens and abort the decompression.

Change-Id: I055b70a212d4c0f3f2ad8e57eebec6ce8aa8b4a6
Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" <donb@securitymouse.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
lz4: fix another possible overrun

There is one other possible overrun in the lz4 code as implemented by
Linux at this point in time (which differs from the upstream lz4
codebase, but will get synced at in a future kernel release.)  As
pointed out by Don, we also need to check the overflow in the data
itself.

While we are at it, replace the odd error return value with just a
"simple" -1 value as the return value is never used for anything other
than a basic "did this work or not" check.

Change-Id: I839144f135e2a4eb3c1fdcf1fa418ea34d481ea3
Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" <donb@securitymouse.com>
Reported-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
lz4: add overrun checks to lz4_uncompress_unknownoutputsize()

Jan points out that I forgot to make the needed fixes to the
lz4_uncompress_unknownoutputsize() function to mirror the changes done
in lz4_decompress() with regards to potential pointer overflows.

The only in-kernel user of this function is the zram code, which only
takes data from a valid compressed buffer that it made itself, so it's
not a big issue.  But due to external kernel modules using this
function, it's better to be safe here.

Change-Id: If7e9e5778ef7f8b6b28d34e8a1143e7f929a51e6
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: "Don A. Bailey" <donb@securitymouse.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
ext4: Add support for FIDTRIM, a best-effort ioctl for deep discard trim

* What
This provides an interface for issuing an FITRIM which uses the
secure discard instead of just a discard.
Only the eMMC command is "secure", and not how the FS uses it:
due to the fact that the FS might reassign a region somewhere else,
the original deleted data will not be affected by the "trim" which only
handles un-used regions.
So we'll just call it "deep discard", and note that this is a
"best effort" cleanup.

* Why
Once in a while, We want to be able to cleanup most of the unused blocks
after erasing a bunch of files.
We don't want to constantly secure-discard via a mount option.

From an eMMC spec perspective, it tells the device to really get rid of
all the data for the specified blocks and not just put them back into the
pool of free ones (unlike the normal TRIM). The eMMC spec says the
secure trim handling must make sure the data (and metadata) is not available
anymore. A simple TRIM doesn't clear the data, it just puts blocks in the
free pool.
JEDEC Standard No. 84-A441
  7.6.9 Secure Erase
  7.6.10 Secure Trim

From an FS perspective, it is acceptable to leave some data behind.
 - directory entries related to deleted files
 - databases entries related to deleted files
 - small-file data stored in inode extents
 - blocks held by the FS waiting to be re-used (mitigated by sync).
 - blocks reassigned by the FS prior to FIDTRIM.

Change-Id: I676a1404a80130d93930c84898360f2e6fb2f81e
Signed-off-by: Geremy Condra <gcondra@google.com>
Signed-off-by: JP Abgrall <jpa@google.com>

Conflicts:
	fs/ext4/mballoc.c