UBUNTU: Start new release

Ignore: yes
UBUNTU: SAUCE: Revert "EISA: Log device resources in dmesg"

cherry-picked from linux-next

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1251816

This reverts commit a2080d0c561c546d73cb8b296d4b7ca414e6860b.

Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
UBUNTU: SAUCE: Revert "EISA: Initialize device before its resources"

cherry picked from linux-next

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1251816

This reverts commit 26abfeed4341872364386c6a52b9acef8c81a81a.

In the eisa_probe() force_probe path, if we were unable to request slot
resources (e.g., [io 0x800-0x8ff]), we skipped the slot with "Cannot
allocate resource for EISA slot %d" before reading the EISA signature in
eisa_init_device().

Commit 26abfeed4341 moved eisa_init_device() earlier, so we tried to read
the EISA signature before requesting the slot resources, and this caused
hangs during boot.

Link: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1251816
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org	# v3.10+ a2080d0c561c: Revert "EISA: Log device resources in dmesg"
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
mmc: sdhci-pci: break out definitions to header file

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1239938

Break out definitions in sdhci-pci.c to sdhci-pci.h, for introducing
module files like sdhci-pci-xxx.c

Signed-off-by: Adam Lee <adam.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Ball <chris@printf.net>
(back ported from commit 522624f97ee22684cf1b169b5a490cc3ad87b22c)

Conflicts:
	drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci.c
Acked-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
mmc: sdhci-pci: add support of O2Micro/BayHubTech SD hosts

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1239938

Add O2Micro/BayHubTech SD Host DeviceId 8520 support.
Add O2Micro/BayHubTech SD Host DeviceId 8420 & 8421 support.
Add O2Micro/BayHubTech SD Host DeviceId 8620 & 8621 support.

These card readers are used in laptops like Lenovo ThinkPad W540,
Dell Latitude E5440, Dell Latitude E6540.

Signed-off-by: Peter Guo <peter.guo@bayhubtech.com>
Signed-off-by: Adam Lee <adam.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Ball <chris@printf.net>
(cherry picked from commit 01acf6917aed934388609177605d54ad1463b252)
Acked-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
kexec: add sysctl to disable kexec_load

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1259570

For general-purpose (i.e.  distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build
with CONFIG_KEXEC to allow end users to choose what kind of things they
want to do with kexec.  However, in the face of trying to lock down a
system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec_load
(much like module loading can be disabled).  Without this, it is too easy
for the root user to modify kernel memory even when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM
and modules_disabled are set.  With this change, it is still possible to
load an image for use later, then disable kexec_load so the image (or lack
of image) can't be altered.

The intention is for using this in environments where "perfect"
enforcement is hard.  Without a verified boot, along with verified
modules, and along with verified kexec, this is trying to give a system a
better chance to defend itself (or at least grow the window of
discoverability) against attack in the face of a privilege escalation.

In my mind, I consider several boot scenarios:

1) Verified boot of read-only verified root fs loading fd-based
   verification of kexec images.
2) Secure boot of writable root fs loading signed kexec images.
3) Regular boot loading kexec (e.g. kcrash) image early and locking it.
4) Regular boot with no control of kexec image at all.

1 and 2 don't exist yet, but will soon once the verified kexec series has
landed.  4 is the state of things now.  The gap between 2 and 4 is too
large, so this change creates scenario 3, a middle-ground above 4 when 2
and 1 are not possible for a system.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7984754b99b6c89054edc405e9d9d35810a91d36)
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.

CVE-2014-1874

Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.

Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy.  In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.

Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo

Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled.  Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.

BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[  473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[  473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[  474.027196] Modules linked in:
[  474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G      D   I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[  474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[  474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[  474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>]  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[  474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[  474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[  474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[  474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[  474.453816] FS:  00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  474.489254] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[  474.556058] Stack:
[  474.584325]  ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[  474.618913]  ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[  474.653955]  ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[  474.690461] Call Trace:
[  474.723779]  [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[  474.778049]  [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[  474.811398]  [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[  474.843813]  [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[  474.875694]  [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[  474.907370]  [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[  474.938726]  [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[  474.970036]  [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[  475.000618]  [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[  475.030402]  [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[  475.061097]  [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[  475.094595]  [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[  475.148405]  [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[  475.255884] RIP  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  475.296120]  RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[  475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---

Reported-by:  Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98)
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
br: fix use of ->rx_handler_data in code executed on non-rx_handler path

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1279399

commit 859828c0ea476b42f3a93d69d117aaba90994b6f upstream.

br_stp_rcv() is reached by non-rx_handler path. That means there is no
guarantee that dev is bridge port and therefore simple NULL check of
->rx_handler_data is not enough. There is need to check if dev is really
bridge port and since only rcu read lock is held here, do it by checking
->rx_handler pointer.

Note that synchronize_net() in netdev_rx_handler_unregister() ensures
this approach as valid.

Introduced originally by:
commit f350a0a87374418635689471606454abc7beaa3a
  "bridge: use rx_handler_data pointer to store net_bridge_port pointer"

Fixed but not in the best way by:
commit b5ed54e94d324f17c97852296d61a143f01b227a
  "bridge: fix RCU races with bridge port"

Reintroduced by:
commit 716ec052d2280d511e10e90ad54a86f5b5d4dcc2
  "bridge: fix NULL pointer deref of br_port_get_rcu"

Please apply to stable trees as well. Thanks.

RH bugzilla reference: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1025770

Reported-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
Debugged-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com>
arc_emac: fix potential use after free

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1279399

commit 37ec274e9713eafc2ba6c4471420f06cb8f68ecf upstream.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

skb_tx_timestamp(skb) should be called _before_ TX completion
has a chance to trigger, otherwise it is too late and we access
freed memory.

Fixes: e4f2379db6c6 ("ethernet/arc/arc_emac - Add new driver")
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexey Brodkin <Alexey.Brodkin@synopsys.com>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com>
ipv4: fix tunneled VM traffic over hw VXLAN/GRE GSO NIC

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1279399

commit 7a7ffbabf99445704be01bff5d7e360da908cf8e upstream.

VM to VM GSO traffic is broken if it goes through VXLAN or GRE
tunnel and the physical NIC on the host supports hardware VXLAN/GRE
GSO offload (e.g. bnx2x and next-gen mlx4).

Two issues -
(VXLAN) VM traffic has SKB_GSO_DODGY and SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL with
SKB_GSO_TCP/UDP set depending on the inner protocol. GSO header
integrity check fails in udp4_ufo_fragment if inner protocol is
TCP. Also gso_segs is calculated incorrectly using skb->len that
includes tunnel header. Fix: robust check should only be applied
to the inner packet.

(VXLAN & GRE) Once GSO header integrity check passes, NULL segs
is returned and the original skb is sent to hardware. However the
tunnel header is already pulled. Fix: tunnel header needs to be
restored so that hardware can perform GSO properly on the original
packet.

Signed-off-by: Wei-Chun Chao <weichunc@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[ luis: backported to 3.11: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com>
sfc: Add length checks to efx_xmit_with_hwtstamp() and efx_ptp_is_ptp_tx()

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1279399

commit e5a498e943fbc497f236ab8cf31366c75f337ce6 upstream.

efx_ptp_is_ptp_tx() must be robust against skbs from raw sockets that
have invalid IPv4 and UDP headers.

Add checks that:
- the transport header has been found
- there is enough space between network and transport header offset
  for an IPv4 header
- there is enough space after the transport header offset for a
  UDP header

Fixes: 7c236c43b838 ('sfc: Add support for IEEE-1588 PTP')
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com>
sfc: PTP: Moderate log message on event queue overflow

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1279399

commit f32116003c39f3a6815215a7512e1ea8d1e4bbc7 upstream.

Limit syslog flood if a PTP packet storm occurs.

Fixes: 7c236c43b838 ('sfc: Add support for IEEE-1588 PTP')
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com>
sfc: Rate-limit log message for PTP packets without a matching timestamp event

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1279399

commit 35f9a7a380728a94d417e5824a866f969423ac83 upstream.

In case of a flood of PTP packets, the timestamp peripheral and MC
firmware on the SFN[56]322F boards may not be able to provide
timestamp events for all packets.  Don't complain too much about this.

Fixes: 7c236c43b838 ('sfc: Add support for IEEE-1588 PTP')
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com>
sfc: Stop/re-start PTP when stopping/starting the datapath.

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1279399

commit 2ea4dc28a5bcec408e01a8772763871638a5ec79 upstream.

This disables PTP when we bring the interface down to avoid getting
unmatched RX timestamp events, and tries to re-enable it when bringing
the interface up.

[bwh: Make efx_ptp_stop() safe on Falcon. Introduce
 efx_ptp_{start,stop}_datapath() functions; we'll expand them later.]

Fixes: 7c236c43b838 ('sfc: Add support for IEEE-1588 PTP')
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
[ luis: backported to 3.11:
  - adjusted context
  - added 'extern' to declarations in nic.h ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com>
sfc: Maintain current frequency adjustment when applying a time offset

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1279399

commit cd6fe65e923175e4f2e9fb585b1d78c6bf580fc6 upstream.

There is a single MCDI PTP operation for setting the frequency
adjustment and applying a time offset to the hardware clock.  When
applying a time offset we should not change the frequency adjustment.

These two operations can now be requested separately but this requires
a flash firmware update.  Keep using the single operation, but
remember and repeat the previous frequency adjustment.

Fixes: 7c236c43b838 ('sfc: Add support for IEEE-1588 PTP')
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
[ luis: backported to 3.11:
  - replaced MCDI_SET_QWORD() by 2x MCDI_SET_DWORD() ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com>
dm thin: switch to read-only mode if metadata space is exhausted

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1279399

commit 4a02b34e0cf1d0d0dd3737702841da4bf615a50a upstream.

Switch the thin pool to read-only mode in alloc_data_block() if
dm_pool_alloc_data_block() fails because the pool's metadata space is
exhausted.

Differentiate between data and metadata space in messages about no
free space available.

This issue was noticed with the device-mapper-test-suite using:
dmtest run --suite thin-provisioning -n /exhausting_metadata_space_causes_fail_mode/

The quantity of errors logged in this case must be reduced.

before patch:

device-mapper: thin: 253:4: reached low water mark for metadata device: sending event.
device-mapper: space map metadata: unable to allocate new metadata block
device-mapper: space map common: dm_tm_shadow_block() failed
device-mapper: space map metadata: unable to allocate new metadata block
device-mapper: space map common: dm_tm_shadow_block() failed
device-mapper: space map metadata: unable to allocate new metadata block
device-mapper: space map common: dm_tm_shadow_block() failed
device-mapper: space map metadata: unable to allocate new metadata block
device-mapper: space map common: dm_tm_shadow_block() failed
device-mapper: space map metadata: unable to allocate new metadata block
device-mapper: space map common: dm_tm_shadow_block() failed
<snip ... these repeat for a _very_ long while ... >
device-mapper: space map metadata: unable to allocate new metadata block
device-mapper: thin: 253:4: commit failed: error = -28
device-mapper: thin: 253:4: switching pool to read-only mode

after patch:

device-mapper: thin: 253:4: reached low water mark for metadata device: sending event.
device-mapper: space map metadata: unable to allocate new metadata block
device-mapper: thin: 253:4: no free metadata space available.
device-mapper: thin: 253:4: switching pool to read-only mode

Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
[ luis: backported to 3.11: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com>
dm thin: always fallback the pool mode if commit fails

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1279399

commit 020cc3b5e28c2e24f59f53a9154faf08564f308e upstream.

Rename commit_or_fallback() to commit().  Now all previous calls to
commit() will trigger the pool mode to fallback if the commit fails.

Also, check the error returned from commit() in alloc_data_block().

Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
[ luis: backported to 3.11: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com>
mm: memcg: fix race condition between memcg teardown and swapin

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1279399

commit 96f1c58d853497a757463e0b57fed140d6858f3a upstream.

There is a race condition between a memcg being torn down and a swapin
triggered from a different memcg of a page that was recorded to belong
to the exiting memcg on swapout (with CONFIG_MEMCG_SWAP extension).  The
result is unreclaimable pages pointing to dead memcgs, which can lead to
anything from endless loops in later memcg teardown (the page is charged
to all hierarchical parents but is not on any LRU list) or crashes from
following the dangling memcg pointer.

Memcgs with tasks in them can not be torn down and usually charges don't
show up in memcgs without tasks.  Swapin with the CONFIG_MEMCG_SWAP
extension is the notable exception because it charges the cgroup that
was recorded as owner during swapout, which may be empty and in the
process of being torn down when a task in another memcg triggers the
swapin:

  teardown:                 swapin:

                            lookup_swap_cgroup_id()
                            rcu_read_lock()
                            mem_cgroup_lookup()
                            css_tryget()
                            rcu_read_unlock()
  disable css_tryget()
  call_rcu()
    offline_css()
      reparent_charges()
                            res_counter_charge() (hierarchical!)
                            css_put()
                              css_free()
                            pc->mem_cgroup = dead memcg
                            add page to dead lru

Add a final reparenting step into css_free() to make sure any such raced
charges are moved out of the memcg before it's finally freed.

In the longer term it would be cleaner to have the css_tryget() and the
res_counter charge under the same RCU lock section so that the charge
reparenting is deferred until the last charge whose tryget succeeded is
visible.  But this will require more invasive changes that will be
harder to evaluate and backport into stable, so better defer them to a
separate change set.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[ luis: backported to 3.11: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com>
ARM: dts: exynos5250: Fix MDMA0 clock number

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1279399

commit 8777539479abd7b3efeb691685415dc2b057d0e0 upstream.

Due to incorrect clock specified in MDMA0 node, using MDMA0 controller
could cause system failures, due to wrong clock being controlled. This
patch fixes this by specifying correct clock.

Signed-off-by: Abhilash Kesavan <a.kesavan@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Mike Turquette <mturquette@linaro.org>
[t.figa: Corrected commit message and description.]
Signed-off-by: Tomasz Figa <t.figa@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com>
ARM: shmobile: kzm9g: Fix coherent DMA mask

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1279399

commit 4f387323853c495ac589210832fad4503f75a0e7 upstream.

Commit 4dcfa60071b3d23f0181f27d8519f12e37cefbb9 ("ARM: DMA-API: better
handing of DMA masks for coherent allocations") added an additional
check to the coherent DMA mask that results in an error when the mask is
larger than what dma_addr_t can address.

Set the LCDC coherent DMA mask to DMA_BIT_MASK(32) instead of ~0 to fix
the problem.

Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms+renesas@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com>