ARM: 7301/1: Rename the T() macro to TUSER() to avoid namespace conflicts

This macro is used to generate unprivileged accesses (LDRT/STRT) to user
space.

Change-Id: Ied1f7d4fc83b3dad8ced8c0930f2738680867d93
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Git-commit: 4e7682d077d693e34a993ae7a2831b522930ebcb
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <lauraa@codeaurora.org>
ARM: 7527/1: uaccess: explicitly check __user pointer when !CPU_USE_DOMAINS

The {get,put}_user macros don't perform range checking on the provided
__user address when !CPU_HAS_DOMAINS.

This patch reworks the out-of-line assembly accessors to check the user
address against a specified limit, returning -EFAULT if is is out of
range.

[will: changed get_user register allocation to match put_user]
[rmk: fixed building on older ARM architectures]

CRs-Fixed: 504011
Change-Id: I3818045a136fcdf72deb1371b132e090fd7ed643
Reported-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Git-commit: 8404663f81d212918ff85f493649a7991209fa04
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <lauraa@codeaurora.org>
ARM: Use -mcpu=cortex-a15 when targeting MSM Krait CPUs

Enable compiler optimizations specific to the Cortex-A15
processor when targeting MSM Krait CPUs. This is necessary
take advantage of the UDIV/SDIV instructions supported by
these processors. To accomplish this, we need to remove the
-march=armv7-a ISA restriction from the compiler options
because 'cortex-a15' is a superset of 'armv7-a'.

Change-Id: I6215aecc11fb4f77c971de7b84f68649ef234357
Signed-off-by: Stepan Moskovchenko <stepanm@codeaurora.org>
kernel: gtod: vsyscall

Introduce kernel user helper vsyscall to allow a higher performance
gettimeofday implementation in user-space.

Change-Id: I9b9971d217382129170ecd6a35461539dac9eebb
Signed-off-by: Brent DeGraaf <bdegraaf@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Joonwoo Park <joonwoop@codeaurora.org>

Conflicts:

	arch/arm/Kconfig
ARM: 7294/1: vectors: use gate_vma for vectors user mapping

The current user mapping for the vectors page is inserted as a `horrible
hack vma' into each task via arch_setup_additional_pages. This causes
problems with the MM subsystem and vm_normal_page, as described here:

https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/14/55

Following the suggestion from Hugh in the above thread, this patch uses
the gate_vma for the vectors user mapping, therefore consolidating
the horrible hack VMAs into one.

Acked-and-Tested-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>

Change-Id: I30eb4688e34dae4b2f39ce941eb631f46596cd36
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
kernel: ARM-specific implementation of user-accessible timers

Expose a read-only timer page to user-space to allow for a more
efficient implementation of gettimeofday in user-space.

Change-Id: Ibd6ce41f5f4ff9435e4bf4582ef5de721283d56b
Signed-off-by: Brent DeGraaf <bdegraaf@codeaurora.org>
kernel: Add hooks for user-accessible timers in the kernel.

Hooks for user-accessible timers allow implementation of a
more efficient gettimeofday in user-space.

Change-Id: If2f63d010c1cf142eb84f3745617e756913e46f7
Signed-off-by: Brent DeGraaf <bdegraaf@codeaurora.org>
kernel: gtod: Add MSM-specific user-accessible timers

Enable MSM-specific timers to be readable from user-space.
This allows implementation of a higher-performance
gettimeofday in user-space.

Change-Id: I1f322b5396ee335b10aeb81c681593621d151176
Signed-off-by: Brent DeGraaf <bdegraaf@codeaurora.org>
ARM: Fix negative idle stats for offline cpu

We see negative idle stats because of cpu dying without
cleaning up idle entry statistics. When a cpu is offline,
the most immediate thing you'd want to do is just call
into cpu_die() and not waste time calling notifier(IDLE_START).

CRs-Fixed: 414554
Change-Id: Iadc6a3ca39997e0ccf65d2a29b004e24b1b211a1
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa Vaddagiri <vatsa@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Taniya Das <tdas@codeaurora.org>
arm: free all .init memory when CONFIG_STRICT_MEMORY_RWX is set

When CONFIG_STRICT_MEMORY_RWX is set, the .init section is
padded to the next megabyte boundary. The part of the .init
section past __init_end (i.e. the pad) was not being freed
since the kernel uses the address of __init_end to determine
how much memory to free.

The fix is to set __init_end to the end of the pad.

Change-Id: I5b6520100d233093c1ad0a0904a3c223b4fc28c4
CRs-Fixed: 367748
Signed-off-by: Larry Bassel <lbassel@codeaurora.org>
futex: Add another early deadlock detection check

Dave Jones trinity syscall fuzzer exposed an issue in the deadlock
detection code of rtmutex:
  http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140429151655.GA14277@redhat.com

That underlying issue has been fixed with a patch to the rtmutex code,
but the futex code must not call into rtmutex in that case because
    - it can detect that issue early
    - it avoids a different and more complex fixup for backing out

If the user space variable got manipulated to 0x80000000 which means
no lock holder, but the waiters bit set and an active pi_state in the
kernel is found we can figure out the recursive locking issue by
looking at the pi_state owner. If that is the current task, then we
can safely return -EDEADLK.

The check should have been added in commit 59fa62451 (futex: Handle
futex_pi OWNER_DIED take over correctly) already, but I did not see
the above issue caused by user space manipulation back then.

Change-Id: I3c2ee2898c5b7e78c9078404378342b8b1c8e139
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <darren@dvhart.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140512201701.097349971@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
futex: uninitialized warning corrections

The variables here are really not used uninitialized.

kernel/futex.c: In function 'fixup_pi_state_owner.clone.17':
kernel/futex.c:1582:6: warning: 'curval' may be used uninitialized in this function
kernel/futex.c: In function 'handle_futex_death':
kernel/futex.c:2486:6: warning: 'nval' may be used uninitialized in this function
kernel/futex.c: In function 'do_futex':
kernel/futex.c:863:11: warning: 'curval' may be used uninitialized in this function
kernel/futex.c:828:6: note: 'curval' was declared here
kernel/futex.c:898:5: warning: 'oldval' may be used uninitialized in this function
kernel/futex.c:890:6: note: 'oldval' was declared here

Change-Id: I3307f3f010c1578e0dbaf256f599d78ef43fb23a
Signed-off-by: Vitaliy Ivanov <vitalivanov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
futex: Prevent attaching to kernel threads

We happily allow userspace to declare a random kernel thread to be the
owner of a user space PI futex.

Found while analysing the fallout of Dave Jones syscall fuzzer.

We also should validate the thread group for private futexes and find
some fast way to validate whether the "alleged" owner has RW access on
the file which backs the SHM, but that's a separate issue.

Change-Id: Ifde6183426d5e655465b874c8fbab70af8375a17
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <darren@dvhart.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140512201701.194824402@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
futex: prevent requeue pi on same futex

CVE-2014-3153: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-3153

futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call.  If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.

This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")

[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
  	different depending on the mapping ]

Fixes CVE-2014-3153.

Change-Id: I7fd48817799970e9e0854953b2afe61a583b5ca2
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()

We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.

Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state.  If
it has, return -EINVAL.  The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up.  Subsequent calls will fail as well.  Not our problem.

[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
  	restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]

Change-Id: Ic6bec19017c0d0ca9c7ace3f80adad8ebb243a15
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi

If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
cleanup the user space futex.  So the owner TID of the current owner
(the unlocker) persists.  That's observable inconsistant state,
especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.

Clean it up unconditionally.

Change-Id: I33393ea445855620a71a7512872738dbec19c1af
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust

The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
the TID value 0 in the user space futex.  We can get into the kernel
even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters bit
or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi path
or from user space just for fun.

The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
address.  This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
circumstances.

Handle the cases explicit:

       Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID      | uODIED | ?

  [1]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | 0         | 0/1    | Valid
  [2]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | >0        | 0/1    | Valid

  [3]  Found  | NULL     | --        | Any       | 0/1    | Invalid

  [4]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | 0         | 1      | Valid
  [5]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | >0        | 1      | Invalid

  [6]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 1      | Valid

  [7]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | Any       | 0      | Invalid

  [8]  Found  | Found    | task      | ==taskTID | 0/1    | Valid
  [9]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 0      | Invalid
  [10] Found  | Found    | task      | !=taskTID | 0/1    | Invalid

 [1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
     came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.

 [2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
     thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.

 [3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex

 [4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
     value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.

 [5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
     and exit_pi_state_list()

 [6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
     the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.

 [7] pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.

 [8] Owner and user space value match

 [9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
     except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
     FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]

[10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
     TID out of sync.

Change-Id: I18334b3cc2221dffe25445dfe9b1ac377378da90
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>