Power: add an API to log wakeup reasons

Add API log_wakeup_reason() and expose it to userspace via sysfs path
/sys/kernel/wakeup_reasons/last_resume_reason

Change-Id: I81addaf420f1338255c5d0638b0d244a99d777d1
Signed-off-by: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
POWER: fix compile warnings in log_wakeup_reason

Change I81addaf420f1338255c5d0638b0d244a99d777d1 introduced compile
warnings, fix these.

Change-Id: I05482a5335599ab96c0a088a7d175c8d4cf1cf69
Signed-off-by: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
Power: Add an API call to log wakeup reasons

Change-Id: I18bb8180efdb20fe784c193f9003bb0929f0c9a8
Signed-off-by: Ruchi Kandoi<kandoiruchi@google.com>
Power: Changes the permission to read only for sysfs file /sys/kernel/wakeup_reasons/last_resume_reason

Change-Id: If25e8e416ee9726996518b58b6551a61dc1591e3
Signed-off-by: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
prctl: adds PR_SET_TIMERSLACK_PID for setting timer slack of an arbitrary thread.

Second argument is similar to PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, if non-zero then the
slack is set to that value otherwise sets it to the default for the thread.

Takes PID of the thread as the third argument.

This allows power/performance management software to set timer slack for
other threads according to its policy for the thread (such as when the
thread is designated foreground vs. background activity)

Change-Id: I744d451ff4e60dae69f38f53948ff36c51c14a3f
Signed-off-by: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>

Conflicts:
	include/linux/prctl.h
	kernel/sys.c
nf: IDLETIMER: time-stamp and suspend/resume handling.

Message notifications contains an additional timestamp field in nano seconds.
The expiry time for the timers are modified during suspend/resume.
If timer was supposed to expire while the system is suspended then a
notification is sent when it resumes with the timestamp of the scheduled expiry.

Removes the race condition for multiple work scheduled.

Bug: 13247811

Change-Id: I752c5b00225fe7085482819f975cc0eb5af89bff
Signed-off-by: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
nf: Remove compilation error caused by e254d2c28c880da28626af6d53b7add5f7d6afee

Signed-off-by: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
net: ipv4: current group_info should be put after using.

Plug a group_info refcount leak in ping_init.
group_info is only needed during initialization and
the code failed to release the reference on exit.
While here move grabbing the reference to a place
where it is actually needed.

Signed-off-by: Chuansheng Liu <chuansheng.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Dongxing <dongxing.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: xiaoming wang <xiaoming.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Conflicts:
	net/ipv4/ping.c

Change-Id: I51931e439cce7f19b4179f5828d7355bb3b1dcfa
netlink: fix possible spoofing from non-root processes

Non-root user-space processes can send Netlink messages to other
processes that are well-known for being subscribed to Netlink
asynchronous notifications. This allows ilegitimate non-root
process to send forged messages to Netlink subscribers.

The userspace process usually verifies the legitimate origin in
two ways:

a) Socket credentials. If UID != 0, then the message comes from
   some ilegitimate process and the message needs to be dropped.

b) Netlink portID. In general, portID == 0 means that the origin
   of the messages comes from the kernel. Thus, discarding any
   message not coming from the kernel.

However, ctnetlink sets the portID in event messages that has
been triggered by some user-space process, eg. conntrack utility.
So other processes subscribed to ctnetlink events, eg. conntrackd,
know that the event was triggered by some user-space action.

Neither of the two ways to discard ilegitimate messages coming
from non-root processes can help for ctnetlink.

This patch adds capability validation in case that dst_pid is set
in netlink_sendmsg(). This approach is aggressive since existing
applications using any Netlink bus to deliver messages between
two user-space processes will break. Note that the exception is
NETLINK_USERSOCK, since it is reserved for netlink-to-netlink
userspace communication.

Still, if anyone wants that his Netlink bus allows netlink-to-netlink
userspace, then they can set NL_NONROOT_SEND. However, by default,
I don't think it makes sense to allow to use NETLINK_ROUTE to
communicate two processes that are sending no matter what information
that is not related to link/neighbouring/routing. They should be using
NETLINK_USERSOCK instead for that.

Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
net: Fix "ip rule delete table 256"

[ Upstream commit 13eb2ab2d33c57ebddc57437a7d341995fc9138c ]

When trying to delete a table >= 256 using iproute2 the local table
will be deleted.
The table id is specified as a netlink attribute when it needs more then
8 bits and iproute2 then sets the table field to RT_TABLE_UNSPEC (0).
Preconditions to matching the table id in the rule delete code
doesn't seem to take the "table id in netlink attribute" into condition
so the frh_get_table helper function never gets to do its job when
matching against current rule.
Use the helper function twice instead of peaking at the table value directly.

Originally reported at: http://bugs.debian.org/724783

Reported-by: Nicolas HICHER <nhicher@avencall.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Henriksson <andreas@fatal.se>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ARM: nakasi: turn off android logger

Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com>
Bug: 15384806
Change-Id: I623e15d1d7317b4aef58918536b9014fe2527470
futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing
from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this,
then dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an
exploitable condition.

This change brings futex_requeue() into line with
futex_wait_requeue_pi() which performs the same check as per commit
6f7b0a2a5 (futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi())

[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
  	different depending on the mapping ]

Fixes CVE-2014-3153.

Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()

We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.

Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state. If
it has, return -EINVAL. The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up. Subsequent calls will fail as well. Not our problem.

[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
  	restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi

If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
cleanup the user space futex. So the owner TID of the current owner
(the unlocker) persists. That's observable inconsistant state,
especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.

Clean it up unconditionally.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Conflicts:
	kernel/futex.c
futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust

The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
the TID value 0 in the user space futex. We can get into the kernel
even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters
bit or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi
path or from user space just for fun.

The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
address. This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
circumstances.

Handle the cases explicit:

     Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID      | uODIED | ?

[1]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | 0         | 0/1    | Valid
[2]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | >0        | 0/1    | Valid

[3]  Found  | NULL     | --        | Any       | 0/1    | Invalid

[4]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | 0         | 1      | Valid
[5]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | >0        | 1      | Invalid

[6]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 1      | Valid

[7]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | Any       | 0      | Invalid

[8]  Found  | Found    | task      | ==taskTID | 0/1    | Valid
[9]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 0      | Invalid
[10] Found  | Found    | task      | !=taskTID | 0/1    | Invalid

[1]  Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
     came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.

[2]  Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
     thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.

[3]  Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex

[4]  Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
     value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.

[5]  The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
     and exit_pi_state_list()

[6]  Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
     the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.

[7]  pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.

[8]  Owner and user space value match

[9]  There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
     except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
     FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]

[10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
     TID out of sync.

Backport to 3.13
  conflicts: kernel/futex.c

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
prctl: adds the capable(CAP_SYS_NICE) check to PR_SET_TIMERSLACK_PID.

Adds a capable() check to make sure that arbitary apps do not change the
timer slack for other apps.

Bug: 15000427
Change-Id: I558a2551a0e3579c7f7e7aae54b28aa9d982b209
Signed-off-by: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
net: wireless: bcmdhd: Add WIPHY_WOWLAN_ANY support

Change-Id: I4a9de9ab40f6de2e5ef5830529cfb066d6c75b57
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
tcp_v4_send_reset: binding oif to iif in no sock case

Binding RST packet outgoing interface to incoming interface
for tcp v4 when there is no socket associate with it.
when sk is not NULL, using sk->sk_bound_dev_if instead.
(suggested by Eric Dumazet).

This has few benefits:
1. tcp_v6_send_reset already did that.
2. This helps tcp connect with SO_BINDTODEVICE set. When
connection is lost, we still able to sending out RST using
same interface.
3. we are sending reply, it is most likely to be succeed
if iif is used

[android-3.4 commit e2446eaab5585555a38ea0df4e01ff313dbb4ac9]

Change-Id: I44eed2e7168eb3586d1ea724a23ecc3492edb9d6
Signed-off-by: Shawn Lu <shawn.lu@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
tcp: resets are misrouted

[ Upstream commit 4c67525849e0b7f4bd4fab2487ec9e43ea52ef29 ]

After commit e2446eaa ("tcp_v4_send_reset: binding oif to iif in no
sock case").. tcp resets are always lost, when routing is asymmetric.
Yes, backing out that patch will result in misrouting of resets for
dead connections which used interface binding when were alive, but we
actually cannot do anything here.  What's died that's died and correct
handling normal unbound connections is obviously a priority.

Comment to comment:
> This has few benefits:
>   1. tcp_v6_send_reset already did that.

It was done to route resets for IPv6 link local addresses. It was a
mistake to do so for global addresses. The patch fixes this as well.

Actually, the problem appears to be even more serious than guaranteed
loss of resets.  As reported by Sergey Soloviev <sol@eqv.ru>, those
misrouted resets create a lot of arp traffic and huge amount of
unresolved arp entires putting down to knees NAT firewalls which use
asymmetric routing.

Change-Id: I49311654de05ca97ae370931e4a6e83f6ca3ced7
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ipv6: tcp: fix tcp_v6_conn_request()

Since linux 2.6.26 (commit c6aefafb7ec6 : Add IPv6 support to TCP SYN
cookies), we can drop a SYN packet reusing a TIME_WAIT socket.

(As a matter of fact we fail to send the SYNACK answer)

As the client resends its SYN packet after a one second timeout, we
accept it, because first packet removed the TIME_WAIT socket before
being dropped.

This probably explains why nobody ever noticed or complained.

[net-next commit 4d0fe50c75a547088e4304e5eb5f521514dfae46]

Change-Id: I1575a5c76dd3a21bb9cdb08aa8f0580d20700c3d
Reported-by: Jesse Young <jlyo@jlyo.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>